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POLICY BRIEF

Lake Chad Basin's perfect storm

Climate change, violent extremism and displacement

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The Lake Chad Basin region is home to one of the world's biggest compounding crises. Climate change, disasters, violent extremism, intercommunal conflicts and displacement form a 'perfect storm' of interlinked issues. Communities suffer layered losses, exacerbating all nature of vulnerabilities. These issues cannot be treated distinctly. Coordinated interventions are needed that are informed by the interlinkages, include all relevant actors and focus on long-term resilience planning.

Key findings

- The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) has experienced increased rainfall and extreme weather. In 2022 and 2024, floods killed hundreds, displaced millions and damaged cropland, homes and livestock.
- The LCB is among the regions worst affected by climate change worldwide, and is the least prepared to adapt. It is warming 1.5 times faster than the global average, which will result in a 30% increase in precipitation by 2050. More sudden weather events and more frequent droughts are expected. Rising heat will damage soil quality and reduce water supplies by up to 10%.
- Climate change and violent extremism are mutually reinforcing. Climate change affects livelihoods and drives displacement, poverty and food insecurity, creating fertile ground for recruitment and extortion by terrorist groups. Boko Haram factions weaponise food, healthcare and cattle rustling, and extract taxes on trade, farming and fishing.
- More displacement in LCB is caused by climate disasters than by conflict; however, the two are increasingly compounding.
- Weak governance limits riparian states' ability to maintain infrastructure, control natural resources, protect ecosystems, resolve tensions and implement long-term planning.

Recommendations

Lake Chad Basin Commission:

- Establish a climate security taskforce whose mandate includes hotspot mapping, water management and flood response coordination, pooled rapid finance, and operational liaison with national emergency and water agencies. Framing the taskforce as a humanitarian-climate response could enhance support from member states and development partners.
- The task force, supported by the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and satellite partners, should produce a priority hotspots map and operational dashboard. It should use satellite flood maps, displacement flows and security incident data to facilitate strategic preparedness, resilience and humanitarian investments.
- Convene national governments and sub-national authorities to create or reopen transboundary pastoral corridors with negotiated access agreements, supported by veterinary, market and education hubs to reduce farmer-herder clashes.
- Revamp customary mediation structures.
- Create and administer a pooled donor fund through the LCB regional civil society platform as a contingency micro-grant window for livelihood support. The fund can rapidly disburse cash for work, seeds, toolkits and boat repairs in hotspots.

National and sub-national authorities:

- With UN Refugee Agency and IOM technical support, adopt temporary tenure instruments for displaced flood-affected households to mitigate vulnerability and enhance resilience.
- Invest in resilient urban planning in secondary cities and social inclusion programmes, including job skills, to absorb climate migrants without destabilising existing services.

Introduction

The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region is home to one of the world's biggest compounding crises: a complex mix of violent extremist insurgencies, banditry, intercommunal conflicts, poverty, food insecurity, and climate change, resulting in environmental degradation and natural disasters. Together, they are unleashing an extremely complex security, displacement and humanitarian landscape.

The region has become a global symbol of these complex intersections. In 2017, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued Resolution 2349 against terrorism and human rights violations. It recognised the role of climate change in exacerbating insecurity, through its impacts on food security and livelihoods.[1]

This policy brief analyses the interlinkages between climate change, security and displacement in the LCB. It examines the impacts of climate change and how insurgent groups exploit it, and the ways forced displacement compounds associated risks.

Building on an analysis of the intersecting drivers of climate change, conflict and displacement, the policy brief provides recommendations across regions, national and sub-national levels, with support from international development partners.

The recommendations emphasise immediate institutional coordination, targeted livelihood recovery and long-term resilience planning. They have been structured to align with the LCB Commission's mandate, reinforce cooperation among member states – particularly the culturally linked sub-national territories surrounding the lake – and attract support from development and humanitarian partners.

Together, these measures aim to strengthen adaptive capacity, mitigate shocks and advance a coherent, regionally owned climate security framework for the region.

Background

The LCB is the geographic region surrounding Lake Chad, on the southern edge of the Sahel and the Sahara Deserts. It spans approximately 2.4 million km^2 and covers approximately 8% of Africa.[2] The lake borders Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.[3]

Chart 1: Lake Chad Basin



Source: University of Maiduguri[4]

These four countries are among the poorest in the world, with a combined 2024 population of 309.4 million – Nigeria (233 million), Cameroon (29.1 million), Niger (27 million), and Chad (20.3 million).[5] Population growth is rapid and birth rates (per 1 000 people) are high – Niger 42, Nigeria 33, Cameroon 34, and Chad 42 – compared to a world average of 16.

Around three million people live on the shorelines, and 49 million in the wider LCB.[6] The lake is central to their livelihoods, primarily as fishermen, farmers, herders, and small traders.[7] Agriculture is dependent on rainfall quantities and cycles. Around the lake and on its islands, the almost-permanent availability of water has enabled people to develop significant off-season agriculture practices that adapt to high and low rain and water levels. Fluctuations in lake size, rainfall, and extreme floods in recent years have significantly impacted agricultural production.

Climate change is best described as a 'threat multiplier' or 'fragility amplifier'. It compounds existing economic, political, environmental and social risk factors, undermines development and exacerbates vulnerabilities that lead to conflict and displacement.

Climate change erodes development and aggravates existing vulnerabilities, causing conflict and displacement

The African Development Bank defines fragility as a condition where the exposure to internal or external pressures exceeds existing capacities to prevent, respond to and recover from them, creating risks of instability.[8] The 2024 Fragile States Index ranks all four countries in the LCB among the top 20 most fragile

Chart 2: Heatmap of climate vulnerability



Source: Notre Dame GAIN Index

states in the world,[9] and which are the least prepared to adapt.[10] The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative ranks vulnerability and readiness to improve resilience. LCB countries rank among the most vulnerable and least ready for the negative effects of climate change.[11]

The LCB suffers from weak governance and rule of law, violent insurgencies, and has an undiversified agriculture- and fishing-based economy. Weak governance limits states' ability to build and maintain infrastructure, control the use of natural resources, protect ecosystems, resolve tensions, and implement long-term planning.[12]

Cross-border cooperation and planning in LCB is difficult with extremist groups in the area and poor governance

Climate change, in turn, seriously affects health, food and water systems, ecosystems and biodiversity, economics, human settlements and infrastructure, education and migration patterns, and reinforces fragility. The borderland between Niger and Nigeria is forecast to become a climate mobility hotspot, with populations expected to increase on the Nigerian side as people try to escape deteriorating socioeconomic and climate conditions in Niger.[13]

Stretched across four countries, the LCB is a multi-country borderland. Borderlands are particularly complex and need targeted interventions. They tend to be on the margins of state authority, receive limited services, and are hotspots for illicit activities such as corruption, smuggling, cattle rustling, trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings, as well as violent extremism, and host large numbers of displaced people. They require transboundary cooperation and development planning, which is difficult with extremist groups in the area and poor governance.[14]

Restrictive border policies aimed at containing conflict and illicit trade create barriers for pastoralists, local traders, and community members who rely on cross-border activities for livelihoods, family and communication connections, or safety.

Since the early 2000s, Nigeria's North East has been the epicentre of Boko Haram activity. From 2014, this violence spread across the borders to Niger, Chad and Cameroon. After pledging allegiance to Islamic State in 2015, the group fractured into Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Military responses by governments and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which comprises Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, have achieved some successes.[15] However, despite years of security interventions, conflicts, inter-communal violence and extremist insurgencies persist.

State legitimacy is low in the region. Several countries have endured military-driven unconstitutional changes of regime, including Chad (2021) and Niger (2023). While Chad has now organised an election, Niger is still ruled by a military junta. Niger has withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, slowed its contribution to the MNJTF, and withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), together with Burkina Faso and Mali. The AES countries asked UN and French forces to withdraw and are increasingly deepening security and political ties with Russia.[16]

Climate change: disrupting livelihoods, increasing insecurity

Lake Chad has a closed drainage system – rivers and groundwater flow inward but not outward. Its main source (90%) is the Chari-Logone River system originating in the Central African Republic and Cameroon, the Komadugu Yobe River from Nigeria, other smaller rivers and groundwater.[17] The lake is therefore a reflection of the amount of rain in the catchment area. Because it is wide and shallow – on average 3 m deep – it is sensitive to rainfall and varies significantly in size and depth between rainy and dry seasons.

For years, Lake Chad has been upheld globally as an example of how climate change and environmental degradation impact vulnerable people. Specifically, its drastic shrinking between the 1960s and 1990s was used to raise alarms about the effects of permanent climate change and over-extraction of water.[18]

Chart 3: Evolution of surface water of Lake Chad Basin Area in km², 1950–2020



Notes: Total surface water area was obtained from the following sources: Olivry et al. 1996, Sédick n.d., FAO 2009, Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad 2015, Okpara, Stringer, and Dougill 2016 and Ighobor 2019

Source: R Jedwab et al.,[19]

In the 1960s, the lake covered 25 000 km². By 1990, it had shrunk to 2 000 km² and separated into two pools with a strip of land in between. Aerial photographs showing the drastic reduction between 1960 and 1990 have been widely circulated and attributed to climate variability leading to reduced rainfall and increased temperatures, increased demand for water, and unsustainable land and water management practices.[20]

However, Lake Chad has been stable or growing for two decades. The region is characterised by 'multidecadal' alternating wet and dry periods, meaning decades-long cycles of drought and heavier rains. The 1950s to 1960s were significantly wet, followed by prolonged drought in the 1970s and 1980s.

In recent decades, the region has experienced increased overall rainfall, high rainfall variability and extreme rain events. Flooding and extreme events have caused significant damage, and are predicted to worsen, but have often been sidelined by the prevailing narrative of a shrinking lake.[21]

A 2020 study found that the lake's surface water remained stable, recovered seasonally, and increased between 2010 and 2018, particularly in the southern pool.[22] The groundwater, accounting for 70% of water storage, has been increasing. The study predicted that river flows draining the Lake Chad Basin could reach or exceed 1950s levels.[23] In 2022, the surface water reached 18 800km², almost 75% of the 1960 level.[24]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts an increase in temperatures of between 3°C and 6°C in the LCB by 2100 – 1.5 times faster

LCB IS WARMING

1.5

TIMES FASTER THAN THE GLOBAL AVERAGE

than the global average.[25] The panel predicts increasing droughts and extreme events, such as flooding. The region will experience increased precipitation by 30% by 2050. The rising heat will intensify evaporation, damage soil quality and reduce water supplies by up to 10%. Some of the rivers feeding into Lake Chad flow through highly populated areas and risk flooding.

For example, in 2022, the Lake Chad Basin experienced an earlier, longer and more intense rainy season than usual and was severely impacted by the worst fluvial and pluvial flooding on record since the 1960s. This caused hundreds of deaths, displaced over 1.5 million people and damaged hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. Scientists estimate that climate change exacerbated rainfall by approximately 80 times and increased its intensity by 20% during the flooding.[26] One study called it 'the most important event from the last 60 years.'[27]

However, by 2024, another catastrophic flood surpassed it. Extreme rain in August and September 2024 caused catastrophic flooding, killing at least 1 527 people. It affected 7.5 million and displaced over 1.7 million in 13 countries.[28] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) said the countries most affected were Chad, with 1.9 million people impacted, followed by Nigeria, with over 1.3 million.[29]

Catastrophic flooding in 2024 killed at least 1 527 people and displaced over 1.7 million in 13 countries

Nigeria's Borno State was particularly hard hit after the Alau Dam breached about 20 km away from Maiduguri. Half the city was submerged, displacing 70% of its 870 000 residents.[30] In Cameroon's Far North, 236 025 people in 33 392 households were affected, and tens of thousands of homes and hectares of cropland were destroyed.[31]

The cascading effects on local economies, livelihoods and food security were severe. Farmers and pastoralists were forced to move to new locations or abandon their livelihoods altogether. Markets were flooded, and roads and bridges were damaged or devastated. Schools, health centres and homes were ruined, and displacement camps were full and lacked adequate facilities. The floods diminished the availability of workable land, creating or exacerbating competition.[32] Climate change will reduce the return period of the 2024 floods to only two to five years.

In such situations, women and vulnerable groups often suffer most. Women are disproportionately impacted by climate change and disasters due mainly to existing gender inequalities and gender roles.[33] They are more likely to have low or unpaid work, less education, fewer decision-making freedoms, and more health risks.

Resilience measures such as land tenure, ownership of productive assets or social protections are less available to them due to traditions and ambient poverty.[34] Across West Africa, women comprise 43% of the agricultural workforce but own only 8% of the land.[35] These conditions are further worsened by conflict and the presence of violent extremist groups.

Insurgents and climate change

The direct causal links between climate change and conflict are not easily defined. Climate change, in isolation, does not cause conflict, but consensus is growing that it compounds existing risks, vulnerabilities and conflicts.[36]

Evidence shows that climate change and diminishing natural resources have exacerbated conflicts, affected coping mechanisms and social cohesion, and enhanced recruitment for violent extremist groups.[37] Conflict, in turn, limits climate coping strategies.

Many conflicts in the LCB are rooted in competition over control of land, water, natural resources and poor governance. Many areas have been largely abandoned by the state without basic infrastructure and services, increasing communities' vulnerability and encouraging survival strategies that are sometimes maladaptive or violent. These already-fragile governments have even more diminished capacity to plan for and adapt to climate change while engaged in conflict.

Violent extremism and climate change constitute the two biggest threats, and are mutually reinforcing. Climate change is driving extreme weather and resource shortages that are eroding livelihoods and causing displacement, poverty and food insecurity. Extremists

find fertile recruitment grounds in communities without economic alternatives or the governance structures to mediate resolutions over scarce resources. By controlling access to land and water made scarce by environmental degradation, militants exploit scarcity and gain territory.[38]

Also, the legitimacy of traditional authorities that helped govern routes or resolve conflicts has eroded or been trumped.[39] Some extremist groups have successfully positioned themselves as arbitrators of land and resource disputes where government authorities are either corrupt or ineffective.

Boko Haram controls part of the fish trade, using violence to extort taxes at each phase from lake to market

When floods or droughts destroy pastures and farms, farmers and herders are often pushed into extremist territories looking for fertile lands. Similarly, deteriorating catch has driven fishermen into remote waters, particularly near Lake Chad's islands, increasing exposure to threats, violence, kidnapping, forced recruitment and death by Boko Haram factions.[40] All communities living in Boko Haram-controlled areas are systematically subject to extortion.

Boko Haram has deliberately withheld food from certain areas to undermine opposition, destroyed crops and infrastructure to instil fear and maintain control, and looted food stores and aid organisations. It has 'rewarded' loyal communities with social and charity activities, including healthcare and food.[41]

The group has adopted parallel government structures to extract taxes on trade, farming and fishing. Across many fishing communities, it controls part of the fish trade, extorting taxes at each phase from lake to market, enforced by violence and the threat of confiscating boats, catch and people for ransom.[42] A *New Humanitarian* report estimates that ISWAP gains US$191 million annually from taxes – roughly 10 times more than the Borno State government – with at least 10 000 large-scale fishermen accessing ISWAP territory each year.[43]

Cattle rustling has grown in both scale and violence. According to an Institute for Security Studies assessment, cattle rustling by Boko Haram in Cameroon and Chad's border regions rose from two incidents in 2015 to 158 in 2024.[44]

Cattle rustling by Boko Haram and other criminal gangs has grown and is used to fund the purchase of weapons and recruit fighters, as well as enforce governance and exert dominance over locals. Boko Haram conducts violent raids, kidnaps livestock and people for ransom, extorts 'protection' taxes, and exploits the lack of law enforcement at borders and crossings to sell at foreign markets.

Forced displacement

According to UNOCHA, as of June 2025, there were 3.2 million forcibly displaced people in the Lake Chad Basin – 2.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 330 000 refugees. As of 31 August 2025, over 10 million people needed humanitarian assistance, and 6.2 million faced food insecurity.[45]

More internal displacement in the LCB is now caused by natural disasters than by conflict or violence; however, the two are increasingly compounding and difficult to distinguish.[46] Nigeria is the worst-affected country, with 2.1 million IDPs, followed by Cameroon with almost 480 000.

Chart 4: Fragility ratings and internal displacements in LCB countries

Country	Fragility rating (world rank)	Internal displacements by conflict and violence (2008–2024)	Internal displacements by disaster (2008–2024)	Disaster events reported (2008–2024)
Cameroon	94.3 (20)	1.5 million	530 000	34
Chad	102.7 (10)	520 000	2.3 million	42
Niger	95.2 (19)	988 000	3.4 million	23
Nigeria	96.6 (15)	5.2 million	9.9 million	168

Source: Fragile States Index 2024 and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2024

The climate change-mobility nexus is complex.[47] People decide to move for various and interrelated reasons. It is difficult to isolate climate change as a primary driver, unless in response to a sudden disaster. Even where climate impacts contribute to the decision, the underlying economic and socio-political factors determine if and where people move.

For example, if droughts affect crop yields and families send members to seek work in a city, they typically report work as the motivator, not drought. Climate mobility models have improved significantly and can project how demographics will change across Africa depending on how we respond.[48]

Transhumance

Pastoralism is one of the backbones of the LCB economies. Transhumance has provided a viable livelihood for people for years, including in response to climate variations. Historically, many pastoralists and farmers cooperated, exchanging manure and milk for grazing lands, welcoming animals onto farms to fertilise the soil.

Agricultural farming has expanded significantly to accommodate population growth and increasing food demands. Climate change, population growth, changing border regimes and conflict have restricted available grazing lands and disordered pastoral migratory patterns.

In 2023, 75% of displacements in Nigeria were triggered by communal and farmer–pastoralist clashes

Pastoralists must move differently or further than before to find suitable water or grazing, including across borders.[49] Lake Chad and its tributaries are prime targets for cattle rustling during weather variations, as pastoralists often move their herds towards them in search of water and grazing.

Some have encroached on each other's and farmers' lands, and farmers have built on historic grazing lands, exacerbating tensions. ISWAP has also reportedly killed fishermen and farmers who refuse to pay extortion taxes to fund its expansion aspirations.[50]

A decade ago, most displacements in Nigeria were triggered by armed conflict. In 2023, 75% were triggered by communal violence and clashes between pastoralists and farmers.[51]

Urbanisation

By 2050, 5% of Africa's two billion people could be on the move due to climate impacts, up from 1.5% in 2022.[52] Most will move internally. By 2050, West Africa could experience up to 54.5 million internal climate migrants – the biggest increase worldwide.[53] Climate change will also change migratory patterns and disrupt population trends and distribution. Circular migration patterns will likely become more permanent or semi-permanent. 'Hotspots', areas of high in-and-out mobility, will emerge as people move towards better conditions.

BY 2050, WEST AFRICA COULD EXPERIENCE UP TO

54.5 million

INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRANTS

Chart 5: Drivers of migration



Source, AN Mbiyozo, 2023[54]

Mobility is an important adaptation strategy. Often framed as a failure to adapt, it offers options to diversify income and spread risk. When faced with diminishing returns on income sources, families rarely want to abandon their homes and are more likely to send members to seek supplementary income through circular migration.

This strategy allows households to remain in place. Financial and social remittances can help enable adaptive measures, such as drought-resistant seeds or irrigation systems.

People facing environmental hardship in the LCB have used this strategy for years. During droughts, floods or poor crop periods, people have historically moved seasonally searching for fish, water, pasture, fuelwood and arable land on the lake's shores and thousands of islands. In recent decades, there has been an increase in people searching for farming lands in response to growing populations, insecurity and the shrinking lake.[55] Boko Haram has occupied most islands, pushing people to migrate further or enter risky coping strategies, including aligning with them.

Some abandon farming and fishing and move to cities to seek employment. Most have done so within countries, while some cross borders. The World Bank predicts that two-thirds of the world's population will live in cities by 2050.[56] Urban areas such as Maiduguri, Bol, Bagassola, Maroua and Diffa are relatively safe and stable compared to some agricultural LCB hinterlands where militants are active.

When well planned, urbanisation has significant development potential.[57] It can increase structural transformation, generate economies of scale, increase labour markets and drive better economic outcomes.[58] However, urban poverty has risen because of migration. Up to 70% of Africa's urban populace resides in slums or informal settlements. Most LCB cities have poor governance, and are under-resourced and unprepared for growth.

Many urban migrants live in precarious conditions, either in temporary camps or urban slums, where they face high poverty and unemployment rates, social marginalisation, poor sanitation, and high exposure to crime.

Tensions between locals and displaced people are common, linked to competition over limited resources such as jobs, land, food and water, cultural and linguistic differences and suspicion and mistrust linked to the presence of extremists.[59] Governments are usually overwhelmed and have diminished capacities to defuse these tensions or provide necessary services.

Violent extremism further hinders people's ability to choose mobility as a climate adaptation strategy. Extremist groups restrict people's movements through methods such as blockades that prevent people, goods, media and humanitarian aid.[60] Other groups have uprooted people from their homes and forcibly displaced them.

Many LCB citizens are at risk of involuntary immobility. The most vulnerable have the fewest options to adapt or move. Poverty and diminishing returns from climate change and conflict erode the human, financial and social capital required to migrate.[61] Some of the most vulnerable get left behind in the 'poverty trap', including widows, elderly, low-skilled, women, children and people with disabilities.

Conclusion

Insecurity, climate change and forced displacement increasingly converge to exacerbate state and civilian fragility in the LCB. Climate change increasingly manifests in extreme flooding events and combines with violent extremism to damage livelihoods, worsen food insecurity, and reduce safety and people's options to build resilience to rapidly evolving threats.

Governance roles and responsibilities in the LCB stretch across multiple countries and borderlands and are not always clearly defined, further complicating climate and security action and resource management. National climate, security and resource management policies are often incomplete or poorly implemented.

The LCB Commission, comprising Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Niger and Libya, was established in 1964 to coordinate access and sustainable use of Lake Chad and its resources.[62] It plays a pivotal role in promoting and facilitating cooperation, sustainable development and management practices, climate change adaptation and transboundary water management. The commission has legitimacy among riparian states to resolve disputes but needs further capacity building and support.

Interventions must avoid isolating security from socioeconomic, political and environmental factors

The prevailing narrative of the shrinking lake may be important in sounding the alarm on global climate action, but actual solutions that address a far more complex reality are needed. All stakeholders, including the riparian countries, the LCB Commission, and their international partners should shift discussions about the shrinking lake towards in-depth plans to manage increasingly frequent extreme weather, including flooding and drought in the short, medium and long terms.

The regional stabilisation strategy should anchor its actions in an approach that prioritises the climate-security-displacement linkages and cascading effects. All initiatives must contribute to the adaptability of communities to these fluctuations.

Security interventions must avoid historical approaches that isolate security from socioeconomic, political and environmental factors. Interventions that prioritise adaptation measures that help communities build resilience to climate impacts and focus on minimising the damage and destruction of climate impacts and stabilising livelihoods are key.

To be effective, they must address the vulnerabilities that expose individuals, regions, and countries to fragility and support adaptation and community resilience strategies.

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Implementing the stabilisation strategy in the Lake Chad Basin

Key lessons

Philip K Attuquayefio, Emmaculate A Liaga, Dawit Yohannes, Remadji Hoinathy and Alvin G Odinukwe

The implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience for the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin shows the importance of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. Combining security interventions with governance, recovery and resilience efforts has proven essential for addressing the region's deep-rooted instability. This report distils key lessons from implementation, highlighting how integrated, regionally owned approaches can strengthen coordination, promote recovery and sustain long-term stability across the Lake Chad Basin.

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

POLICY BRIEF

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Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

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Socio-economic resilience in the shadow of Boko Haram

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This report presents evidence-based analysis to support ongoing processes to build resilience in the Lake Chad Basin through human mobility and commerce. It shows how economic actors in the region have been affected by the Boko Haram conflict and how some government measures have exacerbated their vulnerability. It also highlights actions taken by these actors to sustain livelihoods and adapt to the crisis.

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