

# Electoral reform in Tanzania

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As Tanzanians go to the polls in October 2020, citizens are faced with a choice between the incumbent President John Magufuli and aspirants from opposition parties. In the last five years, Magufuli has been given credit for growing the economy and rooting out corruption. However, his administration has promulgated a large number of laws that have curtailed media freedom and other civil liberties. To preserve Tanzania's democracy going forward, it will be crucial to level the playing field and ensure the implementation of electoral reforms.

## Key findings

- ▶ The elections are taking place in the context of heightened tensions between those in the ruling party that support President John Magufuli and see the new legislation passed by government as necessary reforms and the opposition that sees these new laws as an attack on basic civil and political rights.
- ▶ Given the popularity of some of the government's economic reforms and the fight against corruption, Magufuli and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) are in a good position to win the elections.
- ▶ The CCM is further buoyed by its landslide victory in the November 2019 local government elections. The ruling party garnered 99% of the seats after a massive boycott by opposition parties.
- ▶ Opposition parties have meanwhile strongly criticised the ban against political rallies after the 2015 elections, preventing them from engaging with the citizenry. They see this as unfairly favouring the CCM.
- ▶ Less than three months ahead of the elections, opposition forces appeared to be in disarray, lacking a clear election strategy and offering no viable alternative to the CCM.
- ▶ A quota system has helped to increase women's participation in politics, yet the qualitative participation of women is still limited.

## Recommendations

- ▶ Civil society, notably religious leaders, should urge members of the governing and opposition parties to communicate with each other and agree to reforms to pave the way for reconciliation to ensure a more credible vote.
- ▶ Reforms should include a move towards an absolute majority system (50+1) from a simple majority, as has been stipulated in the proposed new constitution.
- ▶ Repressive legislation introduced in the past five years that curbs media freedom and curtails the participation of citizens in opposition activity should be scrapped.
- ▶ Provision should be made for recourse to the courts in cases where the outcome of presidential elections is disputed.
- ▶ The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) should be guaranteed. The appointment of commissioners should be done through a transparent, inclusive and rigorous process that engenders confidence in the commission.
- ▶ The tenure of members of the NEC has to be guaranteed and timed to allow them to exercise their functions impartially, without fear of their security of tenure. The commission meanwhile insists on its impartiality.
- ▶ Regional efforts that include the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community should support political discussions between government and the opposition. They should engage with Tanzania towards instituting political reforms that are vital to create an even political playing field.

## Introduction

In October 2020, Tanzanians head to the polls to elect the president, members of Parliament and councillors. This research aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the politics of Tanzania ahead of the elections. It looks at recent political developments since President John Pombe Magufuli ascended to power, the legal framework as well as the status of political contestation in Tanzania as the country prepares for the polls.

The general elections will be the country's sixth since multiparty democracy was re-introduced in 1992. The ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), is fielding the incumbent Magufuli as its presidential candidate for a second five-year term. On 11 July 2020 the CCM Congress confirmed his candidacy with 100% of the votes.

The elections are taking place in the context of new laws passed by Parliament that have, according to the opposition and many astute observers of politics in Tanzania, stifled active citizenship and limited access to information and basic civil and political rights.

The elections are also going ahead in spite of the global Covid-19 pandemic that has seen countries like Uganda postpone elections.

The government has launched a number of economic mega-projects that have received buy-in from the general population. Magufuli's direct, non-compromising approach to issues like corruption and government spending, his new infrastructure development and rural electrification along with his review of the country's mining acts have been praised in many quarters. Efforts have also been made to ensure free education.

Tanzania's economic growth figures are among the highest in Africa; the World Bank has recently declared it a 'lower middle income' country. The incumbent president has garnered support for his efforts to reform the economy and especially his efforts to root out corruption.

The CCM is not facing any real electoral threat. The party goes into the elections buoyed by its landslide win in the November 2019 local government elections. The ruling party garnered 99% of the votes after a massive boycott by opposition parties, including the Party for Democracy and Progress

(Chadema), its main opposition. The opposition parties argued that the ruling party had used its influence over state apparatus to manipulate the electoral process to the extent that there were no prospects of a free and fair poll. While the opposition parties might have legitimate grievances, the local election results put CCM ahead of the pack. Local elections are important in Tanzania as they have a direct impact on day-to-day lives and give any party with presence at the local level significant mobilisation advantage.

Historically, Tanzania has been celebrated for its political stability and support for liberation struggles across Africa. CCM is also the oldest ruling party on the continent. The country has seen political skirmishes over the years, both in mainland Tanzania and the Isles of Zanzibar. Still, these have not offset its reputation as a peaceful and stable country.

## Tanzania's elections are going ahead in spite of the global Covid-19 pandemic

Tanzanians have also over the past few decades seen politics being centred on party loyalty, rather than on the issues. As a result, the fundamental question of civic freedoms is likely to play second fiddle in the 2020 elections. Ruling party loyalists are unlikely to be disturbed by recent developments that have seen the government clamp down on civic space. Instead, they will point to the country's economic stability and growth as indicators of an able leader.

The Tanzanian general election 2020 takes on a different dimension in Zanzibar as it marks the end of the two constitutional terms of incumbent President HE Dr Ali Mohammed Shein, who also comes from the ruling CCM. The fact that this election is a change of regime is contentious within the ruling party. Historically, the process of nominating the candidate for CCM presidential candidate for Zanzibar begins in Zanzibar but is ultimately determined by the mainland during meetings of the Central Committee, National Executive Council (NEC) and finally, the National Congress.

In addition, the political arrangements of Tanzania create an uneven playing field, with opposition politicians finding

themselves with many restrictions that impede their ability to organise mass mobilisation as well as enjoy access to public media and other civil liberties that would enable an opposition political party to thrive.

## Research methodology

The research involved a multi-method approach. Different methods were used at different intervals to ensure relevance and consistency in the collection of data. The methods used were:

- Literature review of laws, policies, plans, reports and assessments informing the current electoral context. It also includes an assessment of previous electoral cycles
- Key informant interviews: this involved political parties, individuals with significant experience in electoral programming and management in Tanzania, civil society, media, electoral management bodies, donor agencies and observers
- Analysis of election-related content in both online and mainstream media

## The political context

The United Republic of Tanzania is a union of two initially sovereign countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, formed on 26 April 1964 through an Act of Union signed by the first presidents of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, respectively. Tanganyika gained independence from Great Britain in 1961. Zanzibar, an Indian Ocean archipelago comprising Unguja, the main island, Pemba, Mafia and other small islands, gained independence in 1963.

Prior to independence both Tanganyika and Zanzibar had multiparty systems introduced by the colonial administrators. Upon forming one sovereign state, the two parts of Tanzania retained characteristics that distinguish them from each other politically. Political dynamics in Zanzibar are characterised by a high level of civic activism, a vibrant opposition, a compromised ruling party and a citizenry that is generally more politically conscious than their mainland counterparts.

## A one-party system

Immediately after the union, in 1965, the Tanganyika African National Union (Tanu) government amended

the constitution to provide for a one-party system, making Tanu and the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) the sole governing parties on the mainland and islands respectively. The one-party system was promoted under the pretext of protecting national unity. Due to their ideological similarities, Tanu and ASP merged on 5 February 1977 to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM – Swahili for Party of the Revolution) that continued to rule the country unchallenged until 1992 when a multiparty system was re-introduced.

The ruling CCM is the longest serving liberation party on the African continent

Although Tanzania is today constitutionally a multiparty state,<sup>1</sup> the legal and constitutional framework remains largely that of a one-party state characterised by a strong presidency and the intertwined relations of the ruling party and the state. The president, who also serves as the chair of the ruling party, retains excessive powers of appointment while a weak constitutional order allows for limited room for independent checks and balances among the organs of the state.<sup>2</sup> The ruling party dominates both the executive and the legislature and the president has the sole prerogative of appointing members of the judiciary.

The ruling CCM is the longest serving liberation party on the African continent and had, until the reforms of 1992, been a single ruling party. It has not lost an election since the first multiparty election in 1995 and retains significant control of Parliament and local level government, particularly on the mainland.

## The move to multiparty politics

With the advent of multiparty politics, numerous political parties emerged in Tanzania. At one point the country had over 20 registered political parties. A number of political parties have survived Tanzania's CCM-dominated political landscape. In 2015, a total of 19 political parties took part in the general elections.

The country's political playing field has since seen numerous political somersaults as politicians crossed the floor, defecting to and from the ruling party. This

has weakened the opposition going into the 2020 general elections.

According to the office of the registrar of political parties (see annex) there are currently 19 fully registered political parties in Tanzania. The top parties are the CCM, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema, Swahili for Democracy and Development Party), the Civic United Front (CUF) and the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT- Wazalendo, Swahili for Patriots).

### Political party preparedness

By the end of August 2020, all political parties concluded their internal processes for nominations for both presidential, parliamentary and councillor candidates. CCM, as expected, confirmed the incumbent President John Pombe Magufuli as its flag bearer. Unlike in the 2015 elections when a few opposition parties came together with one agenda and fronted one candidate to challenge the ruling party at the presidential and parliamentary level, the 2020 elections have a different configuration.

Chadema has picked prominent Tundu Lissu, who returned to Tanzania to a rousing welcome by Chadema members, three years after narrowly surviving an assassination attempt. ACT-Wazalendo is fielding Bernard Membe, a former foreign minister for nine years, as their presidential candidate. The National Electoral Commission has confirmed the presidential candidates picked by parties. This is in spite of pronouncements made during respective party conventions in August 2020 for a united opposition<sup>3</sup> to challenge CCM and Magufuli. The opposition parties have fielded their candidates individually, giving room for the CCM to win easily.

Despite Lissu's and Membe's nominations as the main opposition presidential candidates, expected to give Tanzania's democracy renewed impetus this year, the opposition is less organised and relatively weakened by the performance of Magufuli's administration. Before the heroic return<sup>4</sup> of opposition figure Lissu, in late July 2020, Tanzania's political landscape lacked the exuberance and ebullience that comes with an election season. Lissu's return reignited the hopes of a despondent opposition that had been subdued.

The CCM's manifesto in the previous election was centred on poverty eradication, anti-corruption and employment. With Magufuli, CCM goes into the election with a good development track record. However, many argued during the research that while the economic numbers look good, the government has not invested in the nation's human resources. It was indicated that the government's repressive legislation and the curtailing of media and individual freedoms have cast the Magufuli administration in the worst possible light.<sup>5</sup> The respondents accused the administration of human rights abuses<sup>6</sup> including the arbitrary disappearance and jailing of dissidents as well as curtailing civil society space, incidents which none can legally say that the government was involved in, since the truth has not been established.

Lissu's return reignited the hopes of a despondent opposition that had been subdued

The opposition is bound to capitalise on these issues during the campaigns. It has also called for the electoral commission to be reformed, stating that it is not independent but structured in a way that favours the ruling party.

The CCM has expansive stronghold regions in both the mainland and Zanzibar. The two main opposition parties, Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo, are angling to remove the CCM from power. Chadema, which came second in previous elections, has its manifesto focused on free education, media freedom and the strengthening of the governance system, amongst others. ACT focused on participatory economy, social security, health and education. Following the defection of some of Chadema MPs to CCM and other opposition parties, and the divisions that engulfed the CUF, ACT could now become the second most influential party after elections in both the mainland and Zanzibar. This is due to the defection of former Zanzibar vice president Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad to ACT-Wazalendo. After the Union Parliament was dissolved, all members of CUF from Zanzibar and Pemba defected to ACT-Wazalendo, making the party stronger and popular.

## Elections in Zanzibar – A test for the sovereign union

The Tanzanian general election 2020 takes on a different dimension in Zanzibar. While on the mainland Magufuli is seeking re-election for a second term, in Zanzibar the election marks the end of the two constitutional terms of incumbent President Dr Ali Mohammed Shein, who comes from the ruling CCM. The fact that this election is a change of the hand at the helm creates a two-fold political battle; first, within CCM and secondly between CCM and opposition parties at the polls.

The process of nominating the candidate for the CCM presidential candidate for Zanzibar begins in Zanzibar, but it is ultimately determined by the meetings of the Central Committee, National Executive Council (NEC) and finally, the National Congress. Zanzibar has been the scene of bitter political contestations with the opposition parties rejecting all election results since multiparty elections began. What is more, Zanzibar has seen more electoral violence than mainland Tanzania.

The power-sharing agreement was a landmark achievement in the history of Zanzibari politics

In Zanzibar, the CCM's dominance has always been seriously challenged and the opposition led by the CUF has been able to create a significant support base with adequate credibility to challenge the party's control. The CCM has been able to keep its grip on power through a disciplined decentralised party machinery that has facilitated networks at grassroots and national level capable of providing the necessary resources to win elections. The party has also leveraged its undue influence over all levels of the state, including the security forces, to curb any emerging competition by the opposition.

In Zanzibar, political tolerance and peaceful electoral competition reached its climax during a political process called *Maridhiano* (a Swahili acronym for agreement) following contested 2010 elections. The process aimed to reach a power-sharing agreement between the CUF and the CCM. The power-sharing agreement was a landmark achievement in the history of Zanzibari politics,

which led to the formation of a Government of National Unity following the 2010 elections. However, this significant achievement was followed by an immediate anti-climax following the October 2015 elections, which were annulled by the chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC).

## The 2015 elections – crossroads for democratic maturity

The 2015 general elections were described as the most closely contested since the advent of multiparty democracy in Tanzania. The elections saw the poorest showing of the CCM since the dawn of independence in Tanzania.<sup>7</sup> Magufuli won by 58%, the lowest since 1995. The CCM had averaged 68% in the preceding four elections. While this was a low showing for the ruling party, it was a comfortable margin ahead of contenders from a coalition of four opposition parties.

The leading opposition party Chadema had formed a coalition, called Ukawa, with three other parties – CUF, NCCR-Mageuzi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) – for the first time in Tanzania's history. They were joined by a string of high-profile defectors from the ruling CCM and the most prominent of these defectors, Edward Lowassa, the former Tanzanian prime minister, as the opposition presidential candidate. Lowassa was a few percentage points shy of 40%. This was the strongest showing an opposition candidate has ever achieved in Tanzania. This left CCM candidate Magufuli with 58% of the vote – a seemingly strong performance, but the worst CCM has ever had.<sup>8</sup> The opposition also took control of all major cities with the exception of Mwanza and now controls 23% of local government and 29% of Parliament.

Analysts suggest that the CCM's poor showing in the last elections has created a sense of insecurity in the party which has led it to suppress any dissent in order to regain strength and legitimacy.

The 2015 elections also happened to be the most disputed elections, marred in controversy both in the mainland and in Zanzibar. The opposition cried foul and Lowassa's camp refused to accept the election results, accusing the CCM of manipulating the electoral process, rigging the vote and using violence to intimidate voters.

While discontent in the mainland was well articulated, it was in the Isles of Zanzibar that the credibility of the whole electoral process was found wanting. The electoral management body found the process to have been so marred with irregularities that there was no prospect of delivering election results reflecting the will of the people as expressed through voting. This formed the basis for annulling the results of the entire general election. Notably, the chairman of the ZEC annulled the elections even after independent observers had declared the same to be free and fair.<sup>9</sup>

Critics judged this move as a violation of the Zanzibar constitution and the electoral laws. By the time of the annulment, the CUF had garnered up to nine seats in Unguja (a typical CCM stronghold), which would have guaranteed their majority in Parliament. The decision was followed by a protest by the CUF, which stayed out of a rerun election conducted in March 2016 and have since refused to endorse the current Zanzibar government.

The CCM's hold in Zanzibar was severely weakened and the many internal frictions with regards to Zanzibar discussed elsewhere in this paper points to a fractured ruling party which is imposing candidates for Zanzibar from its base in the mainland.

In February 2016, Magufuli declared at a public rally to commemorate the founding of the CCM that he would get rid of opposition parties in the country by 2020. Since then there have been events and actions that have made a political space more challenging for all actors. There have been crackdowns on the opposition, perceived harassment, prosecution<sup>10</sup> and violations of opposition politicians' human rights, including an unsolved attempted assassination of one MP,<sup>11</sup> and the murders of local government councillors from both ruling and opposition parties.

### **2019 local elections – consolidating repressive policies**

The grievances raised by the opposition parties in 2015 have still not been addressed as Tanzania heads to its sixth general elections. In November 2019 the country held local government elections which were boycotted by opposition parties, with the CCM standing unopposed in 90% of the seats. The opposition parties cited government's excessive interference with electoral laws in

a manner that pre-tilted the scales in favour of the CCM as the main reason for the boycott.

The structure and composition of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has been discredited, as its independence is not guaranteed. In the current setup, the NEC commissioners serve at the pleasure of the president and have no guarantee of tenure. This threatens the impartiality of the NEC and the integrity of the electoral process.

Another key grievance is the lack of legal recourse for presidential election disputes. Without legal recourse and with repressive law enforcement in place, opposition parties and other civic organisations find themselves bound by a legal space that does not allow them to express legitimate concerns.

### **Grievances raised by opposition parties in 2015 have still not been addressed**

Before the 1995 elections, the posts of regional election co-ordinator or liaison officers, returning officers, principal assistant returning offices and assistant returning officers were advertised in the mass media and the successful applicants were appointed as NEC personnel for the purpose of elections.

However, this has been amended and returning officers are now appointed from city, municipal, town and district executive directors (Elections Act, 1985). Of late, the lack of independent staff has raised particular concern in view of the appointments of new district, city and town executive directors, many of whom are alleged to be ruling party cadres<sup>12</sup> who also double as returning officers in their respective administrative areas. The appointment of such candidates with clear party affiliation poses an important challenge to the independence and credibility of the conduct of elections at sub-national level. Within the current framework, the NEC is under the Office of the Prime Minister under which its budget is approved.

In 2019, three High Court judges found the provision of the Elections Act of 1985 unconstitutional, saying it infringed the independence of the NEC, the body intended to oversee elections in an impartial manner.

The case was based on a provision that allowed officials appointed by the president to become returning officers, acting on behalf of the electoral agency, during elections. Later on, the Court of Appeal overturned the original decision, saying there are enough safety measures in place to make sure that the officers act with independence.

Clearly, a CCM-dominated Parliament has served to rubber stamp the wishes of the executive and through the powerful party caucus. The passing of the Judiciary Administration Act in 2011 also effectively curtailed the judiciary's independence as presidential district and regional commissioner appointees were put in charge of the judicial ethics committee. Ethics committees are established for the purposes of resolving electoral disputes that are deemed minor and do not require a legal court challenge.

### Issues of the 2020 election

The October 2020 general election promises to be a plebiscite in which Tanzanians will be called to approve or disapprove of Magufuli's direct non-compromising approach to issues like corruption, government spending and economic stability. Approval for Magufuli's moral high ground stand on corruption and integrity will mean continued economic progress and continued zero tolerance for corruption. Disapproval will mean listening to Magufuli's many adversaries and critics of his disregard for civil and political liberties and press freedom, his insensitivity to gender issues as well as his disdain for dissent and a plurality of opinion, leading to increased repression.

### Positive economic growth

Tanzania's economy remains on an upward trajectory with key economic indicators pointing to a bright future. Before the Magufuli administration came to power, the ruling party had come to be associated with corruption, patronage and increased poverty levels among Tanzanians. It is these social ills that are considered to be the reason for the all-time poor performance of the CCM in the 2015 general election. Magufuli rose to prominence on integrity and anti-corruption, a position he has maintained. The president earned himself the nickname 'bulldozer' as he brazenly attacked corrupt officials, took aim at government profligacy and unbridled spending and

reined in errant local and international business with such determination that it seemed like a new dawn to most Tanzanians weary of corruption.

Magufuli earned the nickname 'bulldozer' as he brazenly attacked corrupt officials

In the last five years Tanzania's economy has performed well ahead of most of its peers in both the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Magufuli administration's five-year development master plan anchored the country's growth on human development, implementation effectiveness and industrialisation. The government maintained the upward economic trajectory it inherited from former president Jakaya Kikwete's years in power. During Kikwete's last five-year term in office the country enjoyed an annual average growth of 6.8%, becoming one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s initial projections for the country for the year 2020 were consistent with previous years at 6%.<sup>13</sup> However, with the advent of Covid-19, the IMF is predicting a significant drop as the economy slows down.

Magufuli's drive has been to rationalise and rein in government spending, fight corruption and increase employment opportunities for Tanzanians through industrialisation. He has also pushed for what many Tanzanians see as win-win contracts between Tanzania and multinational corporations. A case in point is the historic mining deal between the Tanzanian government and Barrick Gold Corporation signed on 24 January 2020. The agreement redefines how the leading global gold mining company will operate in Tanzania after more than 20 years. It gives the country a 16% holding in the three operating gold mines whose combined output is the country's biggest export earner.

The signing of the Framework Agreement at the Dar es Salaam State House, televised on the national broadcasting corporation as well as local media stations, ended over three years of standoff between the mining company and the government. This is seen as one of Magufuli's signature economic reform achievements.



He has also pushed for what some see as win-win contracts between Tanzania and multinational corporations.<sup>14</sup>

The business environment is much changed as the government has created an enabling environment for local economic actors to flourish. Unemployment in Tanzania currently stands at 9.7%, which is an outlier in the SADC bloc.<sup>15</sup> Inflation rates have been kept in check by hard economic decisions that successive governments have taken. However even with a GDP per capita of US\$1 133.05, the majority of Tanzanians live fairly basic lives.

Magufuli has continued his economic reform agenda with a focus on ensuring Tanzania becomes an industrialised country (Tanzania ya Viwanda), in the belief that his strategy can make Tanzania a middle-income country by 2025. Several projects are being implemented and have been strategically kicked off to support key sectors that will facilitate the realisation of his industrialisation agenda. They include bridge and road construction, a power generation dam, the revival of the national carrier Air Tanzania and the construction of a new international airport in the capital city Dodoma.

Tanzania's democracy is founded on a weak constitutional order which inhibits the full participation of citizens

While not everyone in Tanzania enjoys the benefits of economic growth, there is a sense that the country is on the right economic trajectory and while poverty and unemployment remain a cause for concern, the current administration has proved up to the task.

The CCM government has managed to reduce poverty by nearly 10% from 2007 to 2018. However, contradictions emerge when one looks at the performance of the country on such indicators as the Ease of Doing Business index, the Competitive index, governance and transparency. The country scores low on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business index, sitting at number 141 out of 177.<sup>16</sup> The country comes at 48.9 on the Global Competitiveness index out of 177, which leaves a lot of room for improvement. Key index indicators like institutions, infrastructure and ICT adoption continue

to pull the country down in terms of competitiveness. Having said that, investment inflows and new business opportunities in the country have been on the rise during the last decade.

While the statistics coming out of the country's economic performance are impressive, one needs to view these in the context of the government gag on statistics. The government, through the Statistics Act of 2017, criminalises any independent publishing of statistics on economy, poverty and other related indicators, making these the sole prerogative of government. As a result, it is difficult to establish the reality on the ground on key indicators such as unemployment and poverty levels.

### Restrictive new laws

Tanzania's democracy is founded on a weak constitutional order which inhibits the full participation of citizens and a level playing field for political parties to compete. While the overall spirit of the country's constitution and the Political Parties Act of 1992 provide an enabling framework for political participation, these freedoms have been curtailed by legislation that has been enacted in subsequent years. Since 2015, the executive has systematically controlled and muzzled other arms of government, undermining the principle of the separation of powers, a key tenet of democracy. A raft of new laws passed recently by a partisan Parliament has further stifled active citizenship, access to information and basic civil and political rights.

Electoral laws, particularly the Elections Act (1985), provide for the provision of civic and voter education, which is to be conducted under the coordination of the NEC.<sup>17</sup> The Election Expenses Act makes provision for monitoring and controlling corruption in elections. Part V of the National Elections (Presidential and Parliamentary Elections) Regulations, 2015, and Part VI of the Local Authorities (Councillors' Elections) Regulations, 2015 provide for and set out how election observation should be done. Civil society in Tanzania is recognised under various legislation, most notably the NGO Act (2002), as a key player in providing civic and voter education. The law however provides for strict limitations for engaging in political and/or partisan activity, which may lead to the suspension of an NGO. This provision has often been used to censor the activities of civil society by leveraging the 'vague' definition of 'political activity'.

In some cases, the selective application of laws related to elections has been deployed to inhibit the opportunity for parties to participate in elections. The political opposition has complained about the abuse of power by returning officers, the police force as well as district commissioners in banning campaign rallies, barring opposition candidates or harassing opposition leaders during campaigns.<sup>18</sup>

Observers have pointed out some of the key gaps in the Tanzanian legislative framework such as the lack of provision for an independent candidate, the absence of a legislative provision to challenge presidential results and decisions made by the NEC and ZEC in the undertaking of its mandate.<sup>19</sup> Elections in Tanzania involve a wide range of stakeholders including state actors and non-state actors. There is no framework in place, however, that brings all these stakeholders together for a dialogue on the critical subject of elections.

A number of laws have created a context that stifles political plurality, multiple voices and the guarantee of basic civil liberties. These draconian pieces of legislature include the Police and Auxiliary Services Act, the Cyber Crime Act (2015), the Statistics Act (2015), Electronics and Postal Communication (2010), the Prevention of Terrorism (2002) and the Media Services Act (2016). All these have been deployed to curtail the activities of political parties including propagation, dissemination and mobilisation.

As a result, Magufuli's administration could go down in history as the one administration that sustained attacks on the media and access to information by instituting laws that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the country's constitution.

## Managing the election

The NEC was established in 1993 under Article 74 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) to manage elections and specifically to supervise and coordinate voter registration, conduct general elections, review boundaries of constituencies, provide voter education and declare elected candidates. The NEC comprises seven commissioners appointed by the president and is headed by the chairman who is a retired judge of the Court of Appeal. The tenure of office for each member is five years renewable but the law

allows the president to remove any commissioner from office for inability to discharge his duties, misconduct or for losing qualification. The NEC's director of elections, who is appointed by the president from among senior civil servants and recommended by the commission, serves as the chief executive officer and secretary of the commission.

The NEC has powers to issue regulations, directives and notices on various aspects of the electoral process. The independence of the commission is a point of contention mainly because the commissioners are appointed by the president – who also happens to be the chairperson of the ruling party. Article 74 (11) and (12) of the country's constitution provides that the commission is not obliged to comply with orders or directives from any person or government department or the views of any political party.<sup>20</sup>

The international community has again urged the country to observe a peaceful, free and fair election in 2020

Election management challenges in Tanzania are as follows.

- **Perceived lack of independence of the NEC**  
The structure and composition of the NEC does not engender confidence in the body's ability to run free, fair and credible elections. The president has the sole appointing powers. These are perceived as appointments not on merit but based on political party interest. In addition, the tenure of the NEC commissioners is not secured and as such leaves them at the mercy of the president.
- **Exclusion of courts from hearing presidential results disputes**  
The current electoral law does not allow for legal recourse on presidential election results. In this case there is no opportunity to test the rigour of the electoral process in a court of law.
- **No provisions for independent candidates**  
The unfair practice of limiting participation and representation has to come via political party structures, excluding independents from

exercising their right to participate and stand for election as individuals.

- ***Use of simple majority as opposed to 50%+ in the presidential contest.***

The use of a simple majority in principle makes it possible for a president to be elected with less than half of the electoral votes cast. This hits directly at the legitimacy and the mandate of the elected person.

### **International legal framework**

Besides the national legislative framework, Tanzania is party to a series of international and regional instruments regulating the conduct of democratic elections, which include:

- UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1998
- SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections 2015 (Revised)
- UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 1979
- UN International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1969
- Commonwealth Harare Declaration 1991

Tanzania, however, has avoided signing or ratifying the African Union's African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance despite participating in the establishment of the instrument. At the East African level, the process to establish the Protocol on Good Governance has stalled since 2011.

Also, as a case in point, related to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, at the time of the research neither SADC nor EAC election observer missions had been deployed. In terms of the principles enshrined in the document, Tanzania has made fair progress, but there are issues that remain unresolved, not just for this election but more so for previous elections as well.

### **Role of the international community**

Since the first multiparty general election in 1995, Tanzania has been allowing both local and international observers to monitor the elections. There are guidelines

set by the NEC to guide both local and international observers in their activities. Monitors and observers have been making recommendations over the years and some have been implemented, though with adjustments.

The international community has again urged the country to observe a peaceful, free and fair election in 2020. In January 2020, during the Sherry Party – a diplomatic gathering to welcome the New Year, hosted by the president at the State House – Magufuli assured members of the diplomatic corps that his government would invite election observers to observe the 2020 elections and emphasised that the elections would be free and fair.<sup>21</sup> At the time of this research, members of the international community interviewed, however, indicated that contrary to past elections, the government had not yet invited them to discuss the upcoming elections. According to some sources within the international community interviewed for the study, interest in the 2020 elections is not as high as in previous elections. This is partly because they have not been closely involved.

Tanzania has avoided signing or ratifying the AU's African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

From past elections, various bodies such as the EAC, SADC, the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU) sent electoral observation missions and a majority of the reports reflected the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2015).

The following was, for example, noted in the 2015 SADC Observation Mission Report:

- The lack of independence and impartiality of the NEC and the ZEC
- Biased media perceived to give more airtime to the state and the ruling party
- Alleged utilisation of government resources by the ruling party
- Absence of legal recourse once presidential results have been announced, Section 41(7) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania

SADC has a chequered history when it comes to electoral observation and active citizen participation in politics and democratic processes such as elections. Some countries within SADC have made significant strides in meaningful citizens' participation in the decision-making processes and strengthening of democratic practice and institutions. Tanzania attempted further, even though the process was incomplete, to develop a more robust new constitution. The governing constitution enshrines the principles of

equal opportunities and full participation of citizens in the political process.

Pursuant to Article 4.1 of the revised SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2015), member states are enjoined to invite SADC electoral observation missions to observe their elections, based on the provisions of the SADC Treaty, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Member states have committed to uphold several principles for conducting democratic elections. Here is the context in Tanzania.

**Table 1: SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections – Tanzania context**

<b>SADC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES GOVERNING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS</b>	<b>TANZANIA CONTEXT</b>
Full participation of citizens in the political process	All citizens of voting age are able to participate
Freedom of association, assembly and expression	The opposition has faced difficulties organising public rallies and internal party meetings
Measures to prevent corruption, bribery, political violence, intimidation and intolerance	Both states and political parties have in place laws and regulations aimed to prevent corruption and bribery
Equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media and access to and integrity of the voter's roll	The government-cum-ruling party seems to dominate the media, and timely access to the voters' roll, as of recent experience, was a challenge for the opposition
Respect for values of electoral justice	Largely, most provisions on electoral process are adhered to
No undue restraints against the opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for	The exercise is non-discriminatory, for voters and candidates
Independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions	Responsibilities are clearly stipulated in the constitution and the judiciary can be said to be quite independent
Civic and voter education	This is provided for by the NEC and non-state actors including media and NGOs
Acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent national electoral authorities in accordance with the law of the land	The independence of the NEC is questioned. Often, the opposition has refuted results especially for presidential polls but that is as far as it goes since the result cannot be challenged in court
Provision of electoral justice through expeditious settlement of electoral disputes as provided for in the law	Other results can be challenged in court, but presidential results cannot

Four major election observer missions witnessed the Tanzanian 2015 general election. The four were from the EU, the AU, SADC and the Commonwealth. The EU mission (EUEOM 2010) has previously argued that the legal framework for both the Union and Zanzibar elections provided 'a reasonable basis for the conduct of elections in line with international and regional principles'. However, as noted above, since the reintroduction of a multiparty system, the existing electoral systems and the electoral management bodies have been highly challenged by stakeholders, especially opposition parties.

The EU observer mission<sup>22</sup> to the 2015 elections noted that while in general terms the elections were held in a free and fair environment there are a number of problematic issues that need to be attended to. The report notes that the Tanzanian government has put in place laws such as the Cyber Crime Act that can be used to arbitrarily limit freedom of expression and access to alternative information. The latter is important given the bias of the state media during and after elections as noted by the report. The mission report also noted that the involvement of government structures in electoral processes dilutes the integrity and credibility of the process as government structures are perceived to be sympathetic to the CCM.

The Commonwealth Observer Group<sup>23</sup> concurred with the other three major missions on the general credibility of the electoral processes. However, the Commonwealth expressed concern over the appointment of the NEC as currently the prerogative of the president. It noted that this remains a blight on the independence of the electoral management body as well as the overall integrity of the electoral process. The AU mission made a similar observation and recommended that the electoral management structure be removed from the civil service and placed under independent electoral commissions.<sup>24</sup>

## Pre-election challenges in 2020

As the country heads to elections once again, many of those interviewed for this study observed abnormalities when it came to voter registration and election preparedness. From the field research it emerged that the major electoral issues this year for Tanzanians have not much changed from the past. Jobs and social welfare are still on the table but there has been an outcry for an

independent NEC. The desire to institute such a new independent electoral commission has attracted much attention. The prime minister recently spoke out against the claim that the NEC favours the ruling party since its officials are presidential appointees.<sup>25</sup> 'NEC is formed according to the constitution, and hence it is free to perform without interference from neither the president nor any political party,' he said.

Social welfare has always been on the table. Free education finally has been implemented by the current government. The health budget has been increased, leading to the construction of health infrastructure and the hiring of medical staff. In addition, there has been an overhaul and upgrading of health services in many referral hospitals in Tanzania. There is, however, a lot to be done.

The desire to institute a new independent electoral commission has attracted much attention

The question of the Union has always been pertinent during elections but might be debated more this year, since the incumbent Zanzibari president's tenure is coming to an end and people are always wary of the incoming president's ability to foster or challenge the Union.

Many voters could be left unregistered. The interviewees also felt there has been no level political playing field allowing the opposition to exercise political rights, e.g. conducting political rallies, especially for opposition legislators addressing their voters. This point was raised by the leaders of opposition parties (politicians), researchers, academics and many of the interviewed university students.

Clearly, there is a lack of intra-party democracy and the nature of the regime has contributed to the change of politics that many Tanzanians were used to. Meanwhile, however, the research noted praise for the fact that there were fewer corruption scandals in the current government. This is thanks to the government's tough measures in reinforcing its institutions, e.g. the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), in dealing with corruption in the country. However, such efforts are still lacking within the parties, especially the ruling CCM.

Many demonstrated their desire to see the PCCB working effectively in political parties. This point was raised by politicians in the ruling party. Others, however, said that the Fifth Republic under Magufuli was highly commended for a job well done in fighting corruption, not only within government machinery, but also even within his own ruling party. Some of those interviewed claimed that they had only seen such efforts under the presidency of Tanzania's first president and father of the nation, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.

Despite the fact that corruption has tremendously declined during the past five years, many Tanzanians still want to see more action against corruption in election processes. There are likely to be questions around justice, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, which were not common in the past.

### **An election amidst the Covid-19 pandemic?**

Tanzania has been criticised for its lacklustre response to the coronavirus outbreak. A seeming lack of transparency has resulted in uncertainty around the severity of the outbreak in Tanzania. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the government maintains that the elections will take place in October 2020 as scheduled. This was buttressed by Magufuli in March after several cases of Covid-19 were reported. Since then electoral preparations, including updating the voters' roll, have been going on under the watch of the NEC and the ZEC.

In Zanzibar, the incumbent president and chairman of the Revolutionary Council was quoted<sup>26</sup> on 13 May during a speech in Pemba as saying that the election will not be postponed. He reiterated that the ZEC chair has already said that the elections will be in October, and that the chair's mandate includes announcing the date of the election.

Magufuli also said<sup>27</sup> on 26 March that the election would not be postponed, since 'no one wants to stay in these offices for a long time'. It must be noted, however, that there are serious doubts over voter participation, despite the assurances coming from high-ranking government officials.

### **Voter education**

The Elections Act of 1985, Article 4 (c) gives the NEC power as the sole government institution charged with

the provision as well as the coordination of voter education in the country. According to the Act, no person or institution should provide voter education without the NEC's permission. The commission has so far issued a notice to the public inviting institutions that wish to conduct voter education to seek permission from its offices. Civil society organisations (CSOs) have been active in this regard, even in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Tanzania has been criticised for its lacklustre response to the coronavirus outbreak

Several organisations have continued with online voter education ahead of the 2020 polls. In a country where fewer than 45% of citizens have access to the internet and where online content is increasingly criminalised, with misuse of the information/manipulation of data and facts an offence under the Cybercrime Act, online voter education can hardly be effectual and leaves over half of the population without access to such critical information.

### **Voter turnout**

Since the beginning of multiparty elections in 1995 up to 2005, the turnout for general elections has been 78% on average. However in the 2010 general election only 42% of eligible voters turned out to vote. The table below clearly depicts a declining trend of voter turnout, particularly after the 2000 general elections. The 42% voter turnout was the lowest in the country's electoral history. This was likely linked to the fact that former president Kikwete was standing for a second term – an important factor in voter turnout as noted in Table 2.

Data<sup>28</sup> shows that voter turnout for presidential elections for the second term of an incumbent is usually lower than for the first term. If that assumption persists, it is likely that many voters, especially women and young people (including first time voters), will not show up at the polls. The likelihood already manifested during the 2019 local government elections. The roles of young people and women cannot be stressed enough; they have always been a determining factor on who wins the election. On the other hand, they are also vulnerable

**Table 2: Voters' turnout and the results of the last four multiparty elections**

ELECTION YEAR	VOTER TURNOUT	PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS	RULING PARTY VICTORY
1995	8 928 826	77%	61%
2000	10 088 484	84.4%	71%
2005	9 123 952	72.4%	80%
2010	8 398 394	42.84%	62%
2015	15 242 500	67%	58%

groups easily swayed and manipulated by politicians from both sides. During the research, however, youth showed a lack of enthusiasm concerning elections and political participation. They expressed a feeling of total disappointment with their political leaders.

### Election funding

Funding of election activities is regulated by the National Elections Act (Cap 343 R.E. 2010) that stipulates that funding for elections will be paid out of the Consolidated Fund.

The funding of politics (such as the funding of political parties) and political processes (such as funding elections) has always been a contentious issue as the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Temco) observed in 2015: Money and politics has been a subject of considerable discussion in Tanzania since the first multiparty elections in 1995. Although both the chairman and director of the NEC admit that the government does fulfil its obligation to disburse budgeted funds to the commission, two issues appear to affect the institution's operations. The first one relates to a general limitation of the country's budget, which leads to the slashing of the budgeted funds and, secondly, an occasional delay of disbursement tends to affect the commission's implementation of activities as planned.

Another crucial aspect of election funding relates to how political parties get funding to cover electoral expenses such as advertising, rallies, travel, accommodation, and other general expenses relating to campaigning. According to one NGO based in Dar es Salaam,<sup>29</sup> apart from the subsidy extended to political parties with MPs in Parliament, the government does not provide any funding for campaign expenses.

Many respondents interviewed during the field research believed that a crucial aspect of election funding relates to how political parties get funds to cover electoral expenses such as advertising, rallies, travel, accommodation, and other general expenses relating to campaigning. One NGO based in Dar es Salaam<sup>30</sup> observed that bigger political parties normally get extra funding from friendly parties in developed countries, which they must declare to authorities. A researcher at the University of Dar es Salaam<sup>31</sup> laments the glaring inequalities among parties when it comes to financial resources for campaigns: the CCM and bigger opposition parties have a lion's share of funding because of the unfair political arrangement where political party funds allocation is based on the number of seats it holds in Parliament.

The funding of politics and political processes has always been a contentious issue

Yet the issue of corruption in election campaigns has been critical in all the elections. In a move to control the use of money in elections, the government passed the Election Expenses Act in 2010, which some commentators think has been ineffective. One elections expert argued that the Act has not worked as many had expected: political parties have continued to spend a lot of money and it is not clear where it comes from. In addition, as Temco has observed: there has been a flurry of activities by incumbent MPs issuing loans, contributions, ambulances and other kinds of donations sometimes in the name of fulfilling the promises they

made earlier. It is very difficult in some cases to draw a fine line between corrupting voters and fulfilling election manifestos. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau has already warned against corrupting tendencies during elections.

### **The role of civil society**

CSOs in Tanzania have played an important role in the democratisation process.

The Tanzania Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) is leading the Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (Taceo) to monitor the electoral process from the registration of voters to the actual voting and after the poll events. CSOs have also participated in civic education. UN Women has also supported NGOs such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programmes (TGNP) and others to support efforts by women to play a significant role in the coming election.

The civil society sector in Tanzania remains nascent with many organisations established following the introduction of governance reforms in the 1990s. While many organisations work in advocacy, legislative and policy reforms, there are not many examples of organisations working exclusively on elections in Tanzania. The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Temco) based at the University of Dar es Salaam and hosted by the Research for Democracy Education in Tanzania (Redet) spearheaded these efforts. Temco has observed every election since the first multiparty elections in 1995 and provided a critical platform for civil society to offer expert input on the fairness, transparency and credibility of elections in Tanzania.

Recognising the diversity of views and approaches, Taceo was established in 2010 to broaden the opportunity for civic oversight of electoral processes in the country. Taceo is hosted by the Legal and Human Rights Centre, one of the leading human rights organisations in Tanzania. Both Temco and Taceo identify as network/umbrellas of civil society networks bringing together diverse groups to work together on election observation. In the 2015 elections, the two networks attempted to work together through the Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania (Cemot) with the view of maximising on their comparative experience and approaches and the

strategic use of data and technology in the oversight of electoral processes in the country.

### **Women's participation in politics**

Tanzania introduced the quota system for women in politics over two decades ago, ahead of most of its regional counterparts. This move increased the number of female members of the National Assembly to 37.2%. However, contention has been around the actual qualitative participation of women in decision making within their own political parties and at national government level. Women have been restricted to special seats as beneficiaries of affirmative action, but some say this has the unintended negative effect of having them viewed not as competent in their own right, but as recipients of undue preferential treatment who could otherwise not make it on merit. Ability, character and performance should come first before considering gender. Women can lead and they must lead not because they are women but because they have the ability and skill set that make them leaders.

Tanzania introduced the quota system for women in politics over two decades ago

Religious attributes and culture still hold back many women from being candidates for higher political posts. But two strong women made it to the final round for presidential nomination races in Zanzibar and the mainland.

This issue has also been noted by various past election observer missions.

### **Involving the youth in politics**

The question of youth participation in politics in Africa is often contentious. This is made worse by the fact that African societies, including Tanzania, have a culture of gerontocracy. Though Tanzania has seen fairly young leaders compared to others in the SADC region this has not translated to active youth participation in the national political process. The youth remain by and large political foot soldiers who are integrated for their numerical advantage, enthusiasm and ability to mobilise. Over 60% of Tanzania's population is below 30 years of age, which puts the country in an advantageous position to derive



benefits from a demographic dividend. However, with the current economic and political structure the participation of young people is restricted.

In relation to the forthcoming elections, it doesn't seem as if there is space for the youth to actively participate, beyond voting. Political parties in Zanzibar are not recruiting new members per se besides children of existing party members.

On the youth, many showed a lack of enthusiasm with regards to elections and political participation. They expressed a feeling of total disappointment with their political leaders. Some of those interviewed went further to reveal their disenchantment with the current regime and see themselves as forlorn figures left with empty promises – and no salary.

## Recommendations

### Recommendations for political parties

- Civil society, particularly religious leaders, should urge members of the governing and opposition parties to communicate with each other and agree to reforms, which might build the foundation for a more credible vote.
- A new round of talks should be brokered between the governing CCM leaders and opposition leaders. The emphasis would be on levelling the field of play ahead of the election. Opposition members, in effect, should pledge to avoid language that would spark tensions ahead of the ballot.
- International partners like SADC and the EAC should support such talks. Western governments that provide important funding for the Tanzanian government should do likewise.
- Ruling party former leaders, including Tanzania's former presidents, should warn that excessive repression would further destabilise the atmosphere.

### Recommendations on the electoral framework

- Broad reforms should be made to align the electoral system with liberal democratic norms. Constitutional changes pertaining to the electoral system needed to establish the long-term legitimacy and stability of the political system, notably to place safeguards against the possibilities of sectarian governments and those based on sub-national identities.

- The presidential election should follow an absolute majority system (50% +) rather than a simple majority.
- Members of the electoral commission should have a fixed one-term tenure of six to seven years and must be cushioned from removal unless for serious violation of the constitution or other laws.
- To guarantee impartiality and professionalism the electoral commission should have offices, with permanent staff, throughout the country rather than rely on local government for temporary staffing.
- The electoral commission should have a dedicated vote from Parliament and not be subjected to the whims of the finance minister, who might use it as a tool to punish or reward the NEC, depending on ruling party sentiments.
- A constitutional review is necessary that clearly stipulates that the NEC and office holders are (a) subject only to the constitution and the law; and (b) independent and not subject to control by any person or authority.
- A court of law should be the final authority in determining justice pertaining to electoral disputes, including presidential results.
- Independent candidates should be allowed to run at all levels and be barred from crossing over to political parties.

These recommendations have been expressed in various post-electoral observation reports and electoral reviews, yet none of them has been effected. As it stands, the October elections will take place in more or less the same legal environment that stakeholders have contested.

## Conclusion

The Tanzanian general election comes hot on the heels of local government elections held in 2019, which turned out to be one-party contests after all opposition parties boycotted en masse. The general election is taking place in the context of both significant progress in one aspect and debilitating regression in another. For the last five years under Magufuli's administration the country has witnessed momentum with regards to economic growth, industrialisation and concomitant employment creation. The overall economic performance of the country has remained buoyant with positive projections for 2020, albeit revised in the face of the Covid-19 global pandemic.

While the economy is on the rise and key indicators such as poverty and inflation are pointing in a positive direction there has been a sustained attack on civil and political liberties. The Magufuli administration has put in place a raft of laws that have limited citizens' active participation in politics, including the suppression of such rights as the right to protest. The government has systematically limited access to information and alternative voices. A number of laws have been crafted targeting journalists and the media, including online social media. Further, the government has gagged everyone with regards to the publication of statistics, be they on the country's economic performance or its health and social service delivery status. This muzzling of the population goes against the letter and spirit of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections as well as the ethos of a modern democratic state.

In addition, Tanzania has had longstanding electoral management policy issues that have not been resolved.

While some progress has been made since the advent of multiparty elections in 1995, the country is significantly lagging in necessary electoral reforms. To this day Tanzania maintains a clause that the presidential results once declared by the NEC cannot be challenged in the courts. This is unfortunate, given that the right to legal recourse is an important provision for testing the integrity of the electoral process. The composition of the NEC has been a longstanding bone of contention and remains a stumbling block in ensuring that elections are not only said to be free and fair but that all stakeholders have confidence in the integrity, impartiality and professionalism of the electoral management body.

Tanzanians find themselves in a dilemma as they go to the polls where issues of civil liberties and freedom could be considered subservient to issues of national importance such as economic growth and national stability.

## Notes

- 1 Article 3 of the 1977 constitution stipulates that 'The United Republic is a democratic, secular and socialist state which adheres to multi-party democracy'.
- 2 The president appoints the chief justice, judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal while indirectly through his party he also influences the appointment of the speaker of Parliament through the party central committee.
- 3 <https://apnews.com/cde163cbeec864973f851411db48cc4d>
- 4 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/tanzania-opposition-figure-tundu-lissu-returns-exile-200727134418474.html>
- 5 <https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-tightens-noose-on-press-freedom-media-activists-stunned/a-54530614>
- 6 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/tanzania-and-zanzibar>
- 7 [www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-election/ruling-party-wins-tanzania-presidency-opposition-rejects-result-idUSKCNOSN1E320151029](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-election/ruling-party-wins-tanzania-presidency-opposition-rejects-result-idUSKCNOSN1E320151029).
- 8 [www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34669468](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34669468).
- 9 [www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/zanzibar-annuls-election-vote-expected-151112080707064.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/zanzibar-annuls-election-vote-expected-151112080707064.html).
- 10 Two Chadema MPs (Peter Lijuakali and Joseph Mbilinyi) have faced jail time while the entire top leadership of the party is currently facing criminal charges following protests during a by-election in December 2017. [www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Chadema-top-brass-released-on-bail/1840340-4371156-da6x2bz/index.html](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Chadema-top-brass-released-on-bail/1840340-4371156-da6x2bz/index.html).
- 11 The opposition chief whip was shot at in September 2017 while attending Parliament and has since been hospitalised in Brussels. The Chadema councillor for Namwalala in Morogoro was murdered in February 2018 while Kinondoni party official Daniel John was tortured and murdered in the same month.
- 12 <https://allafrica.com/stories/201611110056.html>
- 13 [www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/03/05/pr2081-tanzania-imf-staff-completes-2020-article-iv-mission#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20pace%20of%20economic%20activity,the%20construction%20and%20mining%20sectors](http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/03/05/pr2081-tanzania-imf-staff-completes-2020-article-iv-mission#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20pace%20of%20economic%20activity,the%20construction%20and%20mining%20sectors).
- 14 <https://politicaleconomy.org.za/2017/10/impact-of-political-uncertainty-on-tanzanian-growth/>.
- 15 A comparative analysis can be found at [www.afdb.org/en/countries-east-africa-tanzania/tanzania-economic-outlook](http://www.afdb.org/en/countries-east-africa-tanzania/tanzania-economic-outlook).
- 16 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ?end=2019&locations=TZ&start=2019&view=bar>.
- 17 Section 4C of the National Elections Act, Cap 343, vests NEC with the responsibility of providing and coordinating voters' education.
- 18 [www.ippmedia.com/en/news/opposition-mp-matiko-held-'unlawful-assembly'-tarime](http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/opposition-mp-matiko-held-'unlawful-assembly'-tarime).
- 19 Article 74(12) of the 1977 United Republic of Tanzania Constitution.
- 20 <https://web.archive.org/web/20180726171110/http://www.judiciary.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/constitution.pdf>
- 21 [https://parstoday.com/sw/news/africa-i58666-rais\\_magufuli\\_uchaguzi\\_ujao\\_wa\\_tanzania\\_utakuwa\\_huru\\_na\\_wa\\_haki](https://parstoday.com/sw/news/africa-i58666-rais_magufuli_uchaguzi_ujao_wa_tanzania_utakuwa_huru_na_wa_haki).
- 22 European Union Elections Observer Mission to United Republic of Tanzania Final Report General Elections 2015.
- 23 Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Tanzania General Elections, 25 October 2015.
- 24 African Union Election Observation Mission, Tanzania, 2015.
- 25 [www.rfi.fr/sw/eac/20200206-tanzania-yakataa-shinikizo-za-kuifanyia-marekebicho-tume-ya-uchaguzi](http://www.rfi.fr/sw/eac/20200206-tanzania-yakataa-shinikizo-za-kuifanyia-marekebicho-tume-ya-uchaguzi).
- 26 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Fb3syJp\\_PE](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Fb3syJp_PE).
- 27 [www.dw.com/sw/uhakiki-na-uandikishaji-wapiga-kura-wakamilika-tanzania/av-53349622](http://www.dw.com/sw/uhakiki-na-uandikishaji-wapiga-kura-wakamilika-tanzania/av-53349622).
- 28 NEC Election Reports.
- 29 In an interview with CIP.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 *Ibid.*

## Annex 1

POLITICAL PARTY (REGISTERED ON 31 JULY 2020)	CHAIRPERSON
Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	Dr John Pombe Magufuli
The Civic United Front (CUF-Chama cha Wananchi)	Professor Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)	Hon Freeman Aikael Mbowe
Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)	Mr Kamana Masoud Mlenda
National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi)	Hon James Francis Mbatia
National League for Democracy (NLD)	Mr Oscar Emmanuel Makaidi
United Peoples' Democratic Party (UPDP)	Mr Hamadi Mohamed Ibrahim (Secretary General)
National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	Mr Simai Abdalah Abdullah
African Democratic Alliance Party (ADA-Tadea)	Mr John Paul Shibuda (Secretary General)
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	Mr Augustino Lyatonga Mrema
United Democratic Party (UDP)	Mr John Momose Cheyo
Chama cha Demokrasia Makini (Makini)	Mr Mohamed Ally Abdulah
Democratic Party (DP)	Mr Philipo John Fumbo
Sauti ya Umma (SAU)	Ms Bertha Nkango Mpata
Alliance for African Farmers Party (AAFP)	Hon Said Soud Said
Chama cha Kijamii (CCK)	Mr David Daudi Mwaijjojele
Alliance for Democratic Change (ADC)	Hon Hamad Rashid Mohamed
Chama cha Ukombozi wa Umma (Chaumba)	Mr Hashim Rungwe Spunda
Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo)	Mr Shaaban Mambo Shaaban

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