Insurgents have attacked towns and villages in Cabo Delgado, the poorest province in Mozambique. The government has responded by sending in the military to stamp out the assailants, using ‘whatever it takes’, amid suspicions that foreign fighters from Tanzania have radicalised local youth who are behind the violence. Other measures to counter the violence include an extra-judicial state of emergency and the suppression of information.
Key findings

- Extremists are laying waste to villages in Cabo Delgado, the poorest province in Mozambique.
- They appear to consist of local youth who have devised a deviant form of Islam, to the distress of local imams, who have denounced it and ejected the youth from local mosques.
- The government, which had ignored signs of the growing radicalisation of Muslim youth in the villages, has responded with force, sending in the military to put down the uprising.
- The government has suspended human rights in the area and has taken steps to ensure that information does not leak out.
- Both insurgents and villagers, fighting back, have escalated the level of violence, with beheadings and torture not uncommon.
- The province shares a border with Tanzania, and villagers claim that Tanzanian members of the terror group al-Shabaab have crossed the border to radicalise Mozambican youth.
- The region is fertile ground for radicalisation, with high unemployment, low literacy rates and few if any services in this forgotten province. Youth claim that the few jobs in the growing oil and natural gas extraction industry are going to people from other provinces and, especially, to men from Maputo.

Recommendations

- The government should invest in infrastructure – roads, bridges, telecommunications and transportation – in Cabo Delgado, so that its people can become integrated with the rest of the country.
- The government should make extensive investment in education in the province and diversify its economy, to lessen the economic, social and political exclusion of large numbers of young people.
- The government should consider the economic, social and cultural rights of local communities when transferring land tenure to mining companies.
- The president must declare an official state of emergency and the government must investigate allegations of human rights violations.
- The government should lift its illegal ban on movements of journalists, researchers and civil society representatives.
- The Southern African Development Community, East African Community and African Union, working together, should develop and implement a policy for the prevention of extremist violence in the region.
Introduction

On 5 October 2017, assailants armed with machetes and machine guns began a two-day attack on police stations and other government buildings in the town of Mocímboa da Praia, in the north of Cabo Delgado province. The ordeal claimed the lives of 17 people, of whom two were police officers, 14 were members of the attacking group, and one was a civilian.

The Mozambican authorities, who had ignored warning signs from locals, scrambled to regain control of the town, described the attack as an isolated incident and claimed to have everything under control. There followed a series of battles between government security forces and the insurgent groups. The government ordered the closure of three mosques it suspected of being radicalisation centres in Pemba, the provincial capital, and by the end of November, the security forces had arrested more than 150 suspected extremists.

Although five days after the initial attack, police spokesperson Inacio Dina told the public that the attackers had been isolated and neutralised, he went public weeks later with a different version. Dina told the nation that, on the 29 November, the violent group had vandalised houses, establishments, and a Christian church in the villages of Mitumbate and Makulo in Mocímboa da Praia. He claimed, however, that there was no link between the attacks.

From the beginning of the attacks till January 2019, over 150 people were killed and over 500 houses were burned. Estimates suggest that there were at least 18 reported terror attacks between October 2017 and December 2018 in the districts of Macomia, Momcimboa da Praia, Nangade, Quissanga and Palma. Other estimates indicate that from the beginning of the attacks till January 2019, more than 150 people were killed, and more than 500 houses were burned. The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) cautions that these numbers are underestimates, as the media is banned from the region and authorities also have little or no access to remote locations where more killings might be happening. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that, by December 2018, about 300 suspected extremists had been arrested by the defence and security forces; more than 400 houses had been burned; and about 10 000 people had been displaced and were receiving food aid from the World Food Programme (WFP).

What are the economic, social and political conditions within which this unknown group of violent insurgents took control of a major town for two days, taking the government by surprise? How did it come to pass that, in a territory where the central authority enjoys a monopoly over the means of violence and taxation, such a group can pull off surprise attacks? What is the significance of these attacks in relation to the Mozambican state’s ability to protect its territory and people from violent groups?

The target is Cabo Delgado

Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province of Mozambique, bordering Tanzania in the north, Niassa province in the west, Nampula province in the south, and the Indian Ocean in the east. The province has 17 districts, namely: Ancuabe, Balama, Chiüre, Ibo, Macomia, Mecúfi, Meluco, Metuge, Mocímboa da Praia, Montepuez, Mueda, Muidumbe, Namuno, Nangade, Palma, Pemba and Quissanga (see Map 1).

Emakhuwa is the most widely spoken language with 67% of speakers, followed by Shimakonde with 22%, both spoken on the plateau, and Mwani, with 6% of speakers mostly on the coast. About 5% are Kiswahili speakers along the border with Tanzania and Ajawa speakers along the border with Niassa province. About 22% of Cabo Delgado’s population also speaks Portuguese.

The attacks have targeted mainly five isolated districts – Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Nangade, Palma and Quissanga. These districts, except Nangade, are coastal areas overlooking the Mozambican Channel, and Macomia has a large plateau area that stretches into the interior. Although Mocímboa da Praia is the birthplace of this violent group, it was in Macomia that the group launched most of its attacks. It is noteworthy that in these districts, most of the population are Mwani and Makwe speakers who practice Islam.

Research methodology

Our analysis draws on our monitoring and documentation of the political situation in northern Mozambique since the beginning of the attacks in August 2017. We documented the attacks as they occurred throughout
the period up to the final iteration of the current report. Our fieldwork itinerary included four districts: Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Palma and Pemba. However, our itinerary was interrupted after we visited Pemba and Mocímboa da Praia.

The extremists attacked Chitolo village, in Mocímboa da Praia, twice – in the first attack, on 12 March 2018, they killed one person, burned 50 houses and looted food and goods; in the second attack, on 29 July 2018, they killed one soldier and stole unspecified military equipment. Chitolo residents confirmed this information during our interviews on 17 December 2018.

There was a military roadblock at the entrance to the road to Chitolo and initially, the soldiers refused to let us through. However, after negotiation, they agreed to let us proceed but their superiors assigned us a military escort. So we were forced to conduct interviews with the villagers under the escort of heavily armed members of the Mozambican Defense Force (FADM) who also took notes on our activities and photographed and recorded our movements and interactions with the villagers. For security reasons, in this report, we do not use the names of the people we interviewed.

When asked how safe and secure they felt, the villagers praised the soldiers for protecting them. At the same time, they said they could not venture out of the village because it was not safe. In terms of what the residents could and could not say to us, this was a limitation. However, it was also clear evidence of the heavy military presence in the village.

After our visit to Chitolo village we continued north towards Palma district. About 25km before the town of Palma, we were ambushed, captured and escorted back to Mocímboa da Praia in the company of heavily armed men and an armoured vehicle. We were taken to a military base in Quelimane village where we were held incommunicado for two days, heavily guarded by armed members of the FADM.

Our captivity proved to be a methodological blessing in disguise, for it exposed us to the social and political life of the conflict in that part of the country which we would have otherwise missed. The time we spent in captivity gave us additional insight into the crisis and how the military is dealing with it.

We made extensive use of secondary data analysis, drawing information from local media reports, partly to compensate for our interrupted itinerary. Credit is due to the local media for continuing to report as much as they have done despite the government’s repressive stance against those who dare to cover the conflict.

Chronology of carnage

Contrary to popular opinion, which dates the first extremist attack to 5 October 2017 in Mocímboa, the first attack actually occurred in August in Mogovolas district, Nampula province. At the time, the state daily Jornal Notícias and the Portuguese version of the German Deutsche Welle reported that armed men wearing long robes made a surprise attack on the
Mogovolas district police station in the town of Nametil, killing one police officer and critically injuring another. The attackers stole an unspecified number of guns and ammunition. While no one, to our knowledge, has publicly made the link between this attack and the attacks in Cabo Delgado, there is no reason to believe there are no links. The attackers in Mogovolas were identified as men dressed in Arab garments, alluding to an Islamic connection.

According to a local Islamic cleric in Mocímboa da Praia, in October 2017, the alleged ‘al-Shabaab’ extremists launched their second attack in the district (the first in Cabo Delgado) targeting government positions and institutions, including the police station and central administration building. Members of the Muslim community in Mocímboa da Praia, including religious leaders of this community, told O Pais that they believed that the attackers sought to gain control of the town to install their version of law and order. Many of the attackers were residents who spoke Portuguese and local languages.

Government security forces clashed with the extremists regularly until the end of 2017. From October to December 2017, in total, there were three reported major attacks in northern Cabo Delgado, although it appears there may have been many unreported attacks. These attacks do not include those launched by government defence and security forces on suspected extremist positions. In one of these attacks, government forces shelled the village of Mitumbate, a supposed base of the extremists, by air and by sea, killing 50 people, including women and children, and injuring an unspecified number of people.

On 16 December 2017, the extremists launched a surprise attack on a military convoy, killing an unnamed high-ranking official who was first shot and then chopped with machetes. Officials in Pemba were not willing to speak about the case. This attack occurred just a few days after the general chief of police announced an amnesty for those extremists willing to surrender themselves. O Pais reported that according to local residents, the attack lasted for at least one hour, critically injuring five police officers.

Between 5 October and 20 December 2017, at least 200 people suspected of taking part in the attacks had been arrested in Mocímboa da Praia. After the first attack, the military presence has increased with the Rapid Intervention Unit leading the process and later the FADM, accompanied by other special forces. The imposed secrecy which denies journalists and non-governmental organisations access to northern Cabo Delgado makes it impossible to know for certain how many attacks occurred and how many people were killed or injured. The state has created a tight military cordon and fomented a culture of fear in the area. In our estimate, over two-thirds of the traffic on the south-north highway which connects Pemba and the northern districts is made up of military vehicles. Even civilian vehicles have armed men in them. The intelligence community has infiltrated all the social tiers of village life and speaking is risky. Consequently, there are allegations of mass graves which cannot be investigated.

The state has created a tight military cordon and fomented a culture of fear in the area.

Some human rights organisations, including HRW and the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), accused government defence and security forces of human rights violations, including torture and the extrajudicial killing of suspected extremists. HRW writes, ‘Since August 2018, the security forces have allegedly arbitrarily detained, ill-treated, and summarily executed dozens of people they suspected of belonging to an armed Islamist group.’ HRW made the statement after interviewing witnesses from villagers, members of the armed forces, and former detainees, all of whom confirmed the allegations.

An ex-detainee quoted by HRW said: ‘We were all told to remove our shirts and sit on the floor. The soldiers would come and take us one by one to the forest, and then we would hear gunshots followed by screaming. Some of them did not come back.’ Another ex-detainee confirmed that ‘several of the detainees were taken outside, gunshots and screams followed, and the men never returned’. In a statement made 20 days before HRW’s report, the HRC quotes the residents of the villages that had been attacked by the extremists as saying they had seen unidentified dead bodies scattered in the forests.
A new development in this conflict emerged in December 2018, when villagers took matters into their own hands and fought back against the extremist attackers. The first attempt occurred on 1 December, when the Quinto Congresso village militia fought against the attackers – who killed two of the armed village militia and burned 17 houses.\(^{25}\) The second, four days later, was more successful. After the extremists carried out an attack in Lilongo, residents of five villages ‘gathered into a posse’ (as in a Western movie)\(^{26}\) to hunt down the attackers. The ‘posse’, armed with machetes and knives, captured and beheaded two suspected attackers.

‘The soldiers would come and take us one by one to the forest, and then we would hear gunshots followed by screaming. Some of them did not come back’

Author and academic Joseph Hanlon writes: ‘One of those decapitated, Fazil Chungu, came from Litingina village and was suspected of being the guide to murderous incursions. His arm was cut off and carried into the village and displayed in front of Chungu’s family’s house. The posse also destroyed 17 houses of alleged relatives of extremists and those suspected of belonging to rebel groups.’\(^{27}\) A third example took place on 7 December, when young men from Chikulwa village in Mocímboa da Praia district aided the military patrol and killed seven suspected extremists.\(^{28}\)

**Extremists change their strategy**

The behaviour of the extremists has changed since the beginning of the attacks in August 2017. In the first attacks, in Mogovolas (Nampula province) and Mocímboa da Praia (Cabo Delgado province), the attackers seem to have targeted mostly security installations and stole arms. This was the case in point in Mogovolas, where, in August 2017, they attacked the police station and took rifles and ammunition.

In Mocímboa da Praia, they took over control of the town by targeting three police stations, and they ambushed a police convoy and killed the head of reconnaissance of the Rapid Intervention Force.\(^{29}\)

However following the counter-insurgency by government military and security forces, the extremists introduced gruesome killing methods – beheading their victims – and began going after – at this point, male – civilians, targeting community leaders and other men. They also began to attack villages, burning houses, looting, plundering and pillaging and sowing fear and panic in the region. According to local opinion, the extremists targeted community leaders because they believed they were acting as informants working in collaboration with military and security forces, revealing the identities and positions of the extremists.

In May 2018, new reports emerged of the extremists now killing women and children. *A Verdade* reported, ‘Ten citizens were beheaded, among them two children, by armed men who are terrorising northern Mozambique, known by
the locals as al-Shabaab, between Saturday (26 May) and Sunday (27 May) at Monjane village, Palma district, Cabo Delgado province. In November 2018, SIC Noticias reported, ‘There was an attack in a town of Nangade district, in an area not patrolled by security forces … The attackers killed 12 people, including women and children.’ Hundreds of villagers fled to Tanzania.

The extremists proceeded to burn the vehicle and behead the driver and six passengers, most of whom were women

They also began to target passenger vehicles. O Pais reported that, for the first time, on 6 January 2019, the attackers intercepted a civilian vehicle transporting people in Nangade district. The attackers shot at the truck, which was travelling on the main road linking the towns of Palma and Pandanhar, forcing it to stop. Then the extremists proceeded to burn the vehicle and behead the driver and six passengers, most of whom were women.

The sociogenesis of extremism

The political identity, ideology and demands of the extremists remain unknown. However, there are indications that the extremists have some known demographic characteristics. The former minister of health, Ivo Garido, referred to the extremists as ‘our children, recruited from our neighborhoods’, suggesting the extremists come from communities and families in villages in northern Cabo Delgado.

According to three Islamic leaders, locally known as Sheiks, who were interviewed for this study, the first signs of extremism came to light in 2014 and 2015 in Mocímboa da Praia when young people from the local mosques began to rebel against the established mosques and started mosques of their own with what were described as strange beliefs and practices. Some members of the group were recruited locally with promises of jobs and scholarships for education. There are also indications that some of them came from other countries including Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Congo (DRC). The insurgents speak local languages as well as Kiswahili and Arabic. They profess a brand of Islam which is both rejected and denounced by Islamic authorities in the region.

Although the attacks in Cabo Delgado are said to have begun in October 2017, from the interviews we conducted with the local Islamic leadership, the existence of this group in Mocímboa da Praia predates 2017. The local Islamic leadership assured us that since 2014, the last year of Armando Guebuza’s 10-year rule, the group has been developing under the unconcerned eye of local and central government authorities. There were at least two years of social and psychological work to recruit, indoctrinate, brainwash and transform the youth. According to the local Islamic leadership, the authorities were warned about the phenomenon, but they chose inaction and turned a blind eye, until they were rudely awakened and shaken in October 2017.
One cleric commented: ‘It is a group that covers itself with the cloak of Islam. In the past few years, members of this group which title themselves al-Shabab have been spreading their vision of Islam in this region. They refuse to recognise the government.’ According to this cleric, the group originated in Mocímboa da Praia, ‘in Magule village, created by native youngsters with ideologies contrary to the Islamic commandments’. Some of these young people were their students, they said. Others, they added, were their nephews who became attracted to the new ideology, contrary to the one professed in the community. The clerics claimed the new faith was imported by Tanzanian nationals who found fertile ground.

How did the new phenomenon manifest itself, we asked? Another cleric explained:

‘The youngsters in Mocímboa da Praia began to disapprove of our faith, saying we were not professing it correctly; they rejected celebrating marriages and other ceremonies. They began to say if someone dies, we should not cover the head of the deceased, but should instead take her and bury her. They said we cannot do funeral prayers. Sometimes, when someone dies, they would say we should mourn for three days, that people should gather together, eat something and say goodbye. These youths don’t want and don’t accept these ceremonies.’

He explained that the youngsters contradicted the established Islamic *modus vivendi* in the community:

‘As Muslims we have our rules and traditions that are part of our religion; they are also part of the Islamic commandments. The youngsters rejected our mosques and refused to do the five prescribed prayers. Instead, they did their own prayers. For us, if someone doesn’t wear pants below the knees, he is not accepted; without a beard, they can’t do *Sualate* [or *Salat* – the Islamic ritual prayer performed five times a day]. Those people weren’t part of our prayers, the *Jamaat* [congregation of Muslims in worship]. Later, they started doing their own *Jamaat* and then the disturbances started.’

Local Islamic leaders believe ‘strange ideas arrived’ from Tanzania and Somalia, given the proximity between these countries and Mocimboa da Praia. This new religious ideology divided the community, with ‘our sons, nephews and all these youngsters’ on one side and the rest of the community on the other side, which eventually led them ‘to take up arms in town in October of 2017’. There is a perception among local populations that, despite the phenomenon propagating in full view of the local Mozambican authorities, nothing was done as the ‘sons, nephews and youngsters’ intensified their attacks.

The clerics told a tale of rising tensions, conflict, disputes and family breakdown, involving fathers, sons, nephews and uncles, throwing the community into unprecedented chaos. Community leaders held several meetings to discourage the ‘native youngsters’ from adhering to ideologies that contradict the Islamic commandments long upheld in the community. The youngsters refused to attend the meetings and continued to defy the established Islamic orthodoxy in town, which culminated with their expulsion from their communities.

‘They didn’t accept our invitations to the meetings. We were forced to expel them from our mosques because they were a bad influence, strange to our religion. We expelled the kids. What we saw was not the same religion of the Prophet anymore, which we follow until today. Something had come in amongst us,’ one cleric told us.

When asked whether the youngsters read different scriptures in their newly found faith, the same cleric responded: ‘The writings are the same. We read the same book, *Al Quran*. There is no difference.’ However, he noted that the youngsters interpreted the holy book differently, producing syncretic ideas about how to live.

From 2014 onwards, said the cleric, a Tanzanian ideologist known as Adbul Chacur taught the youngsters how to read the *Al Quran*. These teachings led to conflicts as they required the youngsters to ‘refute our teachings, our Islam, our weddings, our brothers, our leaders, and our imams’.

The syncretic doctrine governed the youngsters’ new lives in deviant communities which they called ‘liberated zones’, where:

‘The wives were attributed new fathers and godfathers, saying that their fathers and godfathers were nothing but *cafres* [unbelievers]. The marriages celebrated in
our community were rejected. The youngsters were required to marry their wives for the second time under the new beliefs. Imagine, they renounced their marriage as soon as they arrived in their zone and celebrated them again, the same marriages, for the second time, based on their new ideology. They renounced our Sualate and Jamaat. This was a serious red flag for the Islamic leaders in Mocimboa town. After expulsion from the traditional mosques, they began to build their own places of worship and adopted a strange code of conduct:

‘They started building their mosques, where they would walk in with shoes, something that is forbidden by Islam. As well as covering their wives’ bodies completely, they would even cover the faces, staying distant from the teachings of Islam. In the Al Quran there is a passage that says “faintanaza mufuchak farudu Hill alai”. As Muslims, if there is contradiction among us, we sit and talk, we take our divine book, we look for reasons and consensus. The Al Quran says to us follow this, this is how it is done. But there was no more understanding between us and them.’

One of the clerics referred to a specific location as the cradle of the new faith:

‘It was there in Maculo; that’s where it all started. After expulsion, they all gathered there, in Maculo, a coastal area here in Mocimboa. Then they retired to the bush and soon after they started stabbing the people of Maculo. They started killing in Maculo, their own brothers. One person killed his own brother. They went to kill in Lalane, they went to kill in Sande, kill halal. They did all that along the coast. Then they went up a little, in the interior. They went to kill in Chikuluia; they also went to a place called Unidade.’

Is there a Tanzanian connection?

The clerics with whom we spoke at length referred to the extremists’ Tanzanian connection. According to local media, among the 189 suspected extremists tried in court, there were 29 Tanzanians and three Somalis. However, apart from those extremists and Tanzanian media stories about violent groups terrorising the country’s south and setting up bases in Cabo Delgado, we are not aware of additional evidence alluding to a possible Tanzania connection.

On 21 October 2018, Reuters in Dar es Salaam reported: ‘Tanzania arrests 104 people for setting up “radical camps” in Mozambique.’ The report suggested there were more than 104 suspects plotting to cross the border into Mozambique, because some managed to flee while others were killed. The publication cited Tanzania’s Inspector General of Police, Simon Sirro, saying:
‘During that operation, some criminals were arrested and some ... died, and a few escaped. Those who escaped are the ones trying to cross the border to Mozambique to establish a base.’ Some were captured while trying to escape. ‘After questioning them, they said they were going there to join radical camps.’

On 16 January 2018, the Mozambican and Tanzanian police signed an agreement on collaboration in fighting cross-border crime. Sirro revealed that the Tanzanian Police Force had undertaken operations to put an end to a killing spree by Tanzanian extremists along the coastal areas of Ikwiriri and Kibiti. The Tanzanian Police Force operation drove some Tanzanian extremist suspects to flee across the border to Mozambique where they joined their Mozambican counterparts, he said.

The Citizen, a local Tanzanian paper, reported that unknown assailants had been involved in ‘killings that have devastated the districts [of Rufiji, Mkuranga and Kilwa along the Indian Ocean] and disrupted socio-economic conditions’. The killings started in January 2015 and claimed 33 lives of government officials and police officers. The assassins issued ‘verbal warnings’ and placed ‘notices at crime scenes, stating why they will continue with the killings’. Like the situation in Mozambique, Tanzanian authorities were caught off guard and the police lacked any information about the killers or ideas on how to end the killings. This led President John Joseph Magufuli to replace Ernest Mangu with Sirro as police Inspector-General.

Political impact: a culture of fear

There is a generalised culture of secrecy in Cabo Delgado, which sets the province apart from the rest of the country. In other provinces, the authorities are more open to speak about government decisions, and the media is more inclined to ask difficult questions. But in Cabo Delgado the media is less likely to ask questions of any authorities. In press conferences, the politicians often say whatever is on their minds and leave the press conference without taking questions from the media. In any case, the media does not often ask questions. The decisions of Cabo Delgado government officials are not vetted, either by civil society or by the media. The province is notorious for having a weak civil society, and there are strong beliefs, suspicions and allegations that the secret intelligence service has infiltrated and destroyed civil society there.

This culture of fear is historically contingent upon the status of the liberation movement in the province. Frelimo, the ruling party, has enjoyed popularity – indeed, sacrosanctity – in the province. Since Frelimo was born in Cabo Delgado, the people of Cabo Delgado view themselves as Frelimo’s loving (and overindulgent) custodians, which has until recently enabled the party to get away with misconduct in the province.

The fact that some of the oldest and most powerful leaders of the ruling party are affiliated with the mythologized Makonde tribe has further cemented this status of the ruling party in Cabo Delgado’s collective psyche. In the past four decades, it has been considered taboo to question or criticise Frelimo in the province. Here, with no effort, Frelimo has enjoyed enviable landslide electoral victories. Consequently (and ironically) however, Cabo Delgado has become one of the poorest and most marginalised provinces.

The central government in Maputo has made a concerted effort to cover the extremist attacks with a repressive cloud of secrecy. Senior government officials, including, notably, the president, have buried their heads in the sand. The government of Mozambique does not want the national and international public to be informed about violent extremism in the province. On 23 February 2019, the Governor of Cabo Delgado, Julio Parruque, a day after the arrest of Germano Adriano, a local community radio station journalist, called a meeting with journalists to warn them to refrain from reporting on extremist attacks. Carta de Mocambique reports:

‘An intimidation meeting to show the regime’s intolerance against press freedom is the only way of interpreting the objective of that press conference… speaking to the journalists who attended the conference, Julio Parruque said daily life in Cabo Delgado was not only made up of attacks, corruption, illicit enrichment, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and other social and political problems. With an obvious threatening tone, he added that, from that day on, he, the provincial governor, would no longer tolerate Cabo Delgado journalists interested in reporting on the above-mentioned topics.’

Pemba, the capital city of Cabo Delgado, is also in the grip of fear. The elite in Pemba, who, by definition, are the most learned, the most informed, and therefore should speak out against injustice, hold the government...
accountable and demand transparency, are themselves afraid and mute. In such a deeply ingrained patronage political system – whereby ‘if you speak, you get sidelined and marginalised’ – the Pemba elite remain conveniently silent to maintain their benefits. It was telling that during a provincial development conference in Pemba from 12 to 14 December 2018, all the business people who were asked to comment on the impact of the extremist attacks on their businesses refused to do so, saying only competent institutions (meaning the government) could comment.

A growing humanitarian crisis

There is a looming humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado as the attacks force people to abandon their villages in search of safer places to take refuge. Earlier in this report, we cited the HRW’s estimate that over 10 000 internally displaced people had received food aid from WFP by the end of 2018. As the attacks continue, we can expect to see more and more people fleeing their villages and in need of humanitarian assistance.

People are afraid to venture out of their villages to plant or harvest their crops

People are afraid to venture out of their villages to plant or harvest their crops. They are afraid to enter forests to collect wild fruit, medicinal plants and firewood as they had traditionally done. When we visited Chitolo on 17 December 2018, the villagers reported changes in their behaviour, practices and modus vivendi generally after the attacks began. They no longer went to their fields to produce and collect food as they had done before the onslaught of the attacks. When asked about food security, they informed us they had in fact depleted the reserves of food without being able to replenish them.

In Naunde village, for instance, *O Pais* found that hunger affected more than 5 000 people, and the situation was more critical for those families who had lost almost everything during the invasion that had been carried out by the extremist group. One villager told *O Pais*: ‘We are suffering because of hunger here in Naunde. And now we don’t know if there is any food left in our fields because since we were attacked, no one dares to enter the forests.’ *O Pais* found that many fields in the area still had crops from the last production season, but the villagers could not harvest them because they were afraid of the attackers hidden in the forests.

In Chitolo, we asked the residents whether their children still attended school. They said the school had closed after the attacks began, and the teachers and the school principal had abandoned the village because of fear. There were many children in the village and the adults assured us that there was no longer any education taking place.

Exclusion in the forgotten province

The scant literature hitherto produced about this phenomenon – notably a study by Saide Abibe, Salvador Forquilha and Joao Fereira – rightly identifies economic and social exclusion as stimuli for extremist views and behaviour. However, the literature has still to identify and describe the forms and manifestations of economic and social exclusion.

In colloquial discourse, Cabo Delgado is dubbed *Cabo Esquecido*, that is, *Forgotten Cape*, an ironic and emotionally painful categorisation because the province occupies a central place in the national mythology, as Cabo Delgado is the birthplace of Frelimo, the party-state or party-nation; it is the cradle of the nation because it was in Cabo Delgado where the liberation struggle began and where the first liberated zones were declared; from Cabo Delgado came the legendary generals and heroes of the liberation struggle, though they are now part of the rotten political elite.

This national mythology is still alive and well in the imagination of Cabo Delgado residents. For instance, when we visited Chitolo village in Mocímboa da Praia on 17 December 2018, the residents prided themselves on being the inhabitants of the first liberated zones, the first Mozambicans and instrumental in the liberation of the rest of the country.

What does it mean to be the *Forgotten Cape*? From the standpoint of economic and social development it means economic and social exclusion. Most of Cabo Delgado has poor economic and social conditions – the poorest health facilities; the poorest schools; the poorest sanitation; high unemployment, notably youth unemployment. The province fares very poorly, and often ranks at the bottom, in most social and economic indicators. This is the case even though the province is one of the richest (if not the richest) in natural resources.
Yet it has nothing to show but illiteracy, ignorance, misery, poverty and strife.

Cabo Delgado exclusion profile

As the result of political decisions made in Maputo, only 0.3% of Cabo Delgado’s population has post-secondary education, the lowest percentage in the country, followed by Niassa with 0.6%. Cabo Delgado is the province with the highest rate of families headed by men and women whose occupation is peasantry (79%), followed by Tete with 78.2%. Nampula and Niassa sit at 68.3% and 72.5% respectively. The province (together with Inhambane) has the lowest rate of family heads in higher/senior leadership (0.1%).

Cabo Delgado Illiteracy Rates Relative to National Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total % of illiteracy</th>
<th>% of illiterate Men</th>
<th>% of illiterate Women</th>
<th>Total % of illiteracy</th>
<th>% of illiterate Men</th>
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<td>National Average</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado Average</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cabo Delgado had the highest rate of children and young people between the ages of five and 25 who did not attend school (35.1%), followed by Tete (32.9%), Niassa (31.6) and Nampula (30.6%). The government’s National Statistics Agency cites ‘lack of interest’ as the strongest reason for children failing to attend school – and with 55.9%, Cabo Delgado leads the country in this category, says the Statistics Agency. While the government through its Statistics Agency blames the population, it is clear to anyone who pays attention that living conditions in the province result from the government’s long-term neglect – hence the term Cabo Esquecido.

When it comes to energy sources, Cabo Delgado remains in the same precarious position. Only 12.1% of households had access to electricity for lighting in 2015. About 67.4% and 11.7% of households used batteries and firewood for light.

The population of Cabo Delgado is predominantly Muslim and rural with traditional cultural practices, particularly early marriages and polygamy. The result of this social and cultural interweaving is large families with a lack of, or limited, access to education and other socio-economic services. The province has few roads, making it difficult for people to move themselves and their goods from one place to another. The interlocking of these factors results in social, economic and political exclusion.

The population of the province derives little to no benefit from the growing extractives industry. Communication systems are defective at best. Mobile networks do not cover the entire province. In Mozambique, child marriages are unmistakable indicators of poverty and exclusion, because “giving girls away in marriage not only brings an immediate material windfall, in the form of lobolo, but also removes a mouth to feed – an important consideration for families living below or only slightly above the poverty line”. Child marriages are particularly widespread in Cabo Delgado, most notably in the northern districts where they are part of everyday life – and where the extremists have been operating.

Jobless youngsters – a time bomb

On 23 May 2018, a group of a little over 100 young people gathered in Palma to protest against unemployment and what they saw as discrimination in the distribution of job opportunities. The protestors complained that the jobs in Palma’s oil- and gas-driven economy – including logistics, exploration, drilling, construction, machine operation, equipment maintenance, security, not to mention jobs in the growing service industry comprising of hotels, lodges, restaurants, service stations – which should naturally be given to them as Palma natives, were being given to people from other regions, particularly southerners from Maputo.

"Unemployment is a time bomb whereby every year about 800 000 young people are seeking employment"

In December 2018, we asked former minister of health Ivo Garido how he made sense of the attacks in Cabo Delgado. He said social exclusion appears to be the root causes of the attacks. In his view, “unemployment is a time bomb whereby every year about 800 000 young people are seeking employment where the government..."
at best creates 100 000 jobs. Every passing year the
time bomb is becoming increasingly dangerous.62 With
continued emphasis on poverty and unemployment he went on to say:

‘The evidence indicates that many of these young people are our children, recruited from our
neighbourhoods, which calls for a sociological study to answer the question why our own children are being recruited, who is convincing them, what arguments do they use to recruit our children to commit barbarous acts such as beheading people. We must pay attention very carefully because this is linked to poverty, to unemployment. If that young person had an occupation, a job, it would be more difficult to recruit him; I am not an absolutist to believe it would be impossible but I do believe it would be difficult to recruit him. Unemployment is a problem that we need to analyse with care because, as I have said, it is a time bomb, and each passing year the number of unemployed young people increases. We need to examine our history with humility since we proclaimed independence, so that we can understand where we made mistakes, why we continue to make the same mistakes, what we can do to avoid making the same mistakes. For me, unemployment is the number one political problem.’63

The Palma gas project involves a consortium of several national and multinational companies – including National Hydrocarbon Company (ENH), BRPL Ventures Mozambique, Anadarko from the United States, ENI from Italy, Mitsui from Japan, BTTEP from Thailand, as well as ONG Videsh and Beas Rovuma Energy, both from India. With this consortium, Mozambique is expected to become a major exporter of natural gas by 2023. Anadarko has plans to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant in Palma district, having created a co-development consortium that includes McDermott from the United States, Saipem from Italy, and Chiyoda from Japan, to build the Afungi LNG Park valued at US$25-30 billion.

ENI has plans to inject US$8 billion for the construction of six subsea wells connected to a floating LNG production facility to be completed in 2022. The American oil and gas multinational corporation ExxonMobil is said to have acquired 25% of ENI’s stakes in Area 4, a deal in which ENI will lead all upstream operations while ExxonMobil leads the construction and operation of liquefaction facilities onshore at Afungi LNG Park.

Popular wisdom suggests that all these developments in the natural gas sector in the region, including many other natural gas development projects not mentioned here, will unleash unprecedented job creation and economic growth that will surely lift the country out of poverty. This belief is held as an article of faith among members of political and business classes who often proclaim it publicly. Asked whether these developments would defuse the unemployment time bomb, the former health minister responded:

‘When people speak to me about the gas in Cabo Delgado I often say, look, that gas we want to exploit has been there for millions of years. If we postponed exploiting that gas, if we let it remain untouched for 20 more years, we would be just as fine as a country. And now they come and tell me the gas project will solve the problem of poverty in Cabo Delgado! It won’t! What will solve the poverty problem in Cabo Delgado and the rest of the country is economic diversification.’64

The Constitution is suspended unofficially

The government’s response has been to conduct itself as if in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado the rule of law does not apply, nor do domestic, regional and international human rights standards. The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique has been suspended extrajudicially.

On 4 March 2018, the national HRC called on the government to declare a state of emergency, as it is required by the Constitution.65 However, the government continues to ignore the call, preferring instead the political option of implementing an undeclared, quiet and illegal state of emergency. An undeclared state of emergency is problematic, not only because it is unconstitutional, but also because it gives license to act in the margins and outside of the law without accountability. Declaring an official state of emergency, as the Constitution requires, binds the president to give a detailed public explanation of the problem that gives rise to the emergency.

Politically, declaring a state of emergency would seem to imply an admission that the government has no control over the events in Cabo Delgado. Therefore, an undeclared state of emergency is politically preferable so that security forces can arrest and detain people – including journalists, researchers and suspected extremists – and deny them rights that are constitutionally guaranteed within a declared state of emergency.
Amade Abubacar and Germano Adriano, both journalists, were arrested on 5 January and 6 February 2019 respectively for reporting on the conflict in Macomia. Abubacar was arrested while interviewing villagers who had fled to the Macomia district centre after their homes had been overrun by the extremists. The police abducted him and later handed him over to the military who, in turn, detained him for 13 days without charges. While in military custody, he was allegedly tortured.

The military arrested and detained us for two days without charge. We were held at gunpoint; accused of spying and aiding and abetting the extremists; intimidated, harassed and threatened with death. Our work equipment was confiscated – including two cameras with their chargers, two portable computers with their chargers, six mobile phones with their respective chargers. When we were released we asked for our work equipment. The soldiers refused to return it, alleging it had been sent elsewhere for further investigation. When we insisted on having our equipment back, the soldiers threatened to hold us hostage even longer. Fearing the worst, we left the military base without our equipment, which remains with the military.

Declaring a state of emergency would seem to imply an admission that the government has no control over the events in Cabo Delgado

In June 2018, the police arrested and detained a Zimbabwean journalist, accusing him of spying. He was released three days later without any charges. In August 2018, the military arrested and detained a group of journalists for five hours in Mocimboa da Praia without charge.

There is a heavy military presence in northern Cabo Delgado. The districts of Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Nangade and Palma are extremely militarised. In this area there are men in uniform and men in plain clothes infiltrating civilian life. The military have imposed curfews, limiting people’s rights to movement during certain hours. In Palma, the military have banned walking at night. The mayor of Mocimboa da Praia imposed a curfew on municipal residents but withdrew it after the Mozambican Bar Association president, Flávio Menete, issued sharp criticism, noting the fact that the Constitution confers this competency only to the president.

There are reports suggesting that the defence and security forces exploit the current situation of insecurity to take advantage of residents. There are allegations of extortion and confiscation of goods from residents for personal benefit. In Palma, those who are caught walking at night are obliged to pay the soldiers MZN50 (US$0.81).

Asked how they identified the extremists, a soldier stationed in Mocimboa da Praia explained: ‘When we see strangers we consider them as suspects; we arrest them and hand them over to our superiors.’ When asked what happens next, he explained that the suspects are interrogated, some are jailed, others are ‘sent to collect firewood in the jungle’, and those who have...
money are released. ‘We have superior orders to arrest any strangers, extract as much information as possible from them, using whatever means possible, and then send them to collect firewood in the jungle if necessary.’ When asked to explain the expression ‘whatever means necessary’, he said: ‘That’s the use of force to make you talk’. Asked to explain the expression ‘send them to collect firewood’, he replied: ‘When we send you to the jungle to collect firewood you are gone forever. No one will see you ever again.’

Four decades of half-mast sovereignty

Since independence in 1975, the central authority has lacked a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory and held to a fragile and precarious control over the borders. It maintains a half-mast sovereignty. Mozambique’s 2 000km long coastline has made the country vulnerable. This weakness is manifest in a number of ways.

Extremism could only emerge and thrive where government officials pursued self-interest

One, after independence the central authority and Renamo clashed in a 16-year civil war which claimed over a million lives. Two, since the end of the civil war in 1992, Renamo has been able to have its cake and eat it – strong parliamentary representation, on the one hand, and a large contingency of armed men, on the other hand, whilst enjoying popular support in central and northern provinces. The central authority has always had to tread carefully to maintain a delicate balance between war and peace, because Renamo has remained armed and dangerous, able to order its army to march as to war. Renamo still controls large areas of the country, notably in Sofala province where Serra de Gorongoza, its political shrine, is located. When Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama felt persecuted and unsafe in the cities, he retreated there with his troops, and the state army failed to capture or kill him. In the end, he died of natural causes rather than as a casualty of the state army’s shelling.

Three, a deeply engrained and normalised culture of corruption at all levels of government undercuts the state’s ability to exert control over its territory. This internal rot in the central authority has dealt a fatal and fateful blow to the development of the state’s duty to protect and care for its citizens.

Extremism could only emerge and thrive where government officials pursued self-interest, diverting their attention from public interest, away from the construction and care of the commons. For instance, in the course of this research, disgruntled soldiers told us that their superiors often released suspected extremists from custody in exchange for large amounts of money. This has led many soldiers to avoid handing suspected extremists over to their superiors, preferring to collect the cash payments themselves from suspected extremists. This is part of the weltanschauung for the emergence of extremism.

The central authority never offered the nascent state a chance to take root following independence. The extremist masterminds exploited the
ineptitude of the central authority, occupied this sociopolitical vacuum in the national space and mobilised the reserve army of uneducated, unemployed and unemployable youths which the central authority had unwittingly built through exclusion. With their indoctrination and brainwashing techniques, the masterminds turned this army of the wretched against the central authority. The central authority is now scrambling to control this tide, making damaging mistakes, and Mozambique is running the risk of becoming a failed state.

**Conclusion**

The ongoing attacks in the northern districts of Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province had their origins in Mocímboa da Praia districts. The Muslim residents, including Islamic religious leaders, in Mocímboa da Praia maintain that signs of the radicalisation of young people appeared in their communities in 2014. According to them, government authorities were informed of the growing assimilation and practice of strange doctrines in certain places of worship; however, nothing was done until the rude awakening in the early hours of 5 October 2017.

The public’s attention has hitherto been focused on the attacks in northern Cabo Delgado. However, the first known attack in Cabo Delgado occurred two months after a similar attack in Mogovolas district in Nampula province. While to our knowledge the government has not publicly claimed there is a link between the Cabo Delgado and Nampula attacks, we cannot dismiss the possibility of such a link.

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If the history of Mozambique’s governance and leadership mean anything, the province is poised to grow in poverty, misery and strife

The government has responded with a heavy military presence, including an intelligence service that has penetrated communities, creating an atmosphere of fear. Hundreds of people, including women and their children, have been arrested and can be found in jails in Pemba. Researchers and journalists are not allowed into the conflict zone, and when found in these areas they are arrested and detained. Human rights organisations have pointed to human rights violations by security forces. Soldiers alluded to the violent treatment meted out to suspects.

The economic and social conditions of the province of Cabo Delgado are among reasons for the emergence of malcontents and deviants. After decades of exclusion and neglect by the government, the province ranks at the bottom in most social indicators – e.g., illiteracy, unemployment, unemployability, poor housing conditions, high rates of child marriages, large families, limited access to safe drinking water, poor sanitation, lack of infrastructure, lack of or poor social services, among others.

If the history of Mozambique’s governance and leadership mean anything, the province is poised to grow in poverty, misery and strife, never mind the...
large deposits of mineral resources. If anything, these material conditions are bound to stimulate, rather than attenuate, discontent, bitterness, wretchedness, and extremism.

In the four decades of the country’s independence, the central authority has not enjoyed a monopoly over taxation and the use of the means of violence. For all the claims of complete and total independence, the central authority has always maintained half-mast sovereignty, with weak control over its borders and ocean. Such weakness and vulnerability offer competitive advantages for internal and external insurgents with nefarious intentions.

**Recommendations**

1. A lasting solution to the extremist violence in Cabo Delgado cannot be brought about by hard power and military might. There is a need for soft power whereby the government addresses regional asymmetries which could be part of the complex of motivations for extremism. The government of Mozambique should consider the following recommendations:

   - Cabo Delgado needs extensive and intensive investment in infrastructure – roads, bridges, telecommunications, transportation – so that people can freely move and trade their goods and become integrated with the rest of the county;

   - Cabo Delgado has one of the highest rates of illiteracy in the country which reproduces and sustains economic, social and political exclusion, and as a result, large numbers of young people are not only unemployed but also unemployable. The province needs extensive and intensive investment in education to ensure that young people have the skills required in the booming extractives industry;

   - Cabo Delgado runs the risk of becoming dependent on resource extraction, which may result in economic growth without employment and expose the province to the volatility of commodity prices in the international market. The territory must diversify its economy as early as possible before the dependence on extraction and export of natural resources kicks in. A diversified provincial economy – for example, one which develops its agricultural potential – has a higher capacity to employ and feed more people.

   - In Cabo Delgado, the emergence of the extractives industry appears to have brought discontent due to the government’s methods of land tenure transfer from local communities to mining companies. Often, the government transfers the rights to land use from local communities without any human rights considerations, without the free, prior and informed consent of local communities – the economic, social and cultural rights of local communities are rarely considered. The government must adopt a human rights-centred and driven development of the extractives industry in the province.

2. The government appears to have introduced an extrajudicial state of emergence which permits lawlessness in which security forces violate...
human rights – arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and extrajudicial killings, harassment and intimidation of local residents – with impunity. Army officials have become their own lords. Therefore:

• The president must declare a state of emergency so that security forces can act within the parameters of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and the rule of law.

• The government must investigate all the allegations of human rights violations and bring to justice any members of the security forces found guilty, and pay fair reparations to all those who suffered damages.

• The growing humanitarian crisis in the northern districts must inform the declaration of the state of emergency, calling upon the international community to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance.

3. While the right to information and a free press is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, the government has deliberately kept Mozambicans in the dark about the regressive situation in Cabo Delgado. Information about the violent conflict between the security forces and the extremist groups could benefit the populations directly affected. Research shows that, in conflict situations, information enables people to make informed decisions that may save their lives. Therefore:

• The government should immediately lift the illegal ban on movements of journalists, researchers and civil society representatives in the region and should allow unfettered media coverage of the conflict.

4. There are indications that the emergence of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado was mediated through transnational networks of extreme deviance. It makes no sense for fragile states to cling to outdated notions of national sovereignty and non-interference. The growth of global criminal and terrorist networks means that a threat to national security in any country is a threat to national security in all countries in the region. Therefore:

• Southern African member states should approach threats to national security as threats to regional security. The Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the African Union should develop and implement, in a coordinated way, policy for the prevention of extremist violence in the region.
Notes

1. We do not claim this to be the first attack – more on this later in the report.

2. Agência Lusa, Norte de Moçambique: alvo de insurgentes com visão radical do Islão, diz líder muçulmano, Deutsche Welle, 11 October 2017, www.dw.com/pt-002/norte-de-mo%C3%A7ambique-alvo-de-insurgentes-com-vis%C3%A3o-radical-do-isl%C3%A3o-diz-%C3%ADder-mu%C3%A7ulmano/a-40010044

3. Nâdia Issuto, Encerramento de mesquitas em Moçambique: Reação ajustada ou exagerada, Deutsche Welle, 22 November 2017, www.dw.com/pt-002/encerramento-de-mesquitas-em-mo%C3%A7ambique-re%C3%A7a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-ajustada-ou-exagerada/a-41489354


5. AFP, Agência Lusa, Moçambique: Mocimboa da Praia foi palco de novo ataque, Deutsche Welle, 6 December 2017, www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-foi-palco-de-novo-ataque/a-41670697


7. Ibid.


11. While we started this report with the attack in October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia, we did not claim this to be the first attack. Our decision was to start narrating the story with that attack simply because it has been highly publicised. Here, as we are presenting the chronology of the attacks, we are saying the October attack in Mocimboa da Praia was not the first. In our view, the August attack in Mogovolas marks the beginning of the attacks.


13. The extremist group is locally known as al-Shabaab. During our detention, the armed men accused our driver of being part of al-Shabaab. The Mozambican media also uses the term al-Shabaab to describe the group. Local sources, including Islamic clerics, claim that the attackers shouted al-Shabaab during their first attack in Mocimboa da Praia. Mozambican authorities and media also use the term ‘insurgents’ to describe the group. In this report we use the term ‘extremist’ because of the unusual inhuman cruelty with which they kill their victims – beheading and disembowlement.


17. ‘Three reported major attacks’ in this paragraph bears no relation to ‘clashed regularly’. ‘Three major attacks’ refers to the extremists’ major assault on government establishments and villages. ‘Clashed regularly’ refers to battles between government forces and the extremists as the two sides pursued each other after 5 October. We elaborate on this in the following paragraph. In any case, an attack is one too many in this context, and three major attacks from October to December can be construed as regular events, given their unusual nature.


20. Our mission was not to conduct an investigation into human rights violations, although the report would have provided an added service to humanity had we been presented with the mass grave evidence. Our mission was to seek to understand the political, economic and social state of affairs of the area in relation to the attacks.


23. Ibid.

24. Por medo, há quem deixe de dormir em casa. Relatos da insegurança a
medo-ha-querem-deixar-de-dormir-em-casa-relatos-de-violencia-a-norte-de-mocambique-10186642.html


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.


33 Ivo Garido, Interviews in Pemba, December 2018.

34 Sheik 3, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018. Other town residents interviewed a few days after the attack confirmed these declarations – see Francisco Mandlate, Jovens radicais sonham com califado em Mocimboa da Praia, O Pais, 9 October 2017, http://opais.sapo.mz/jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-Mocimboa-da-praia-

35 Sheik 1, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018.

36 Ibid.

37 Sheik 2, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018

38 Sheik 3, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018.

39 Ibid.

40 Sheik 2, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018.

41 Sheik 3, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, December 2018.

42 Sheik 1, Interviews in Mocimboa da Praia, 2018.

43 André Baptista, Tribunal duplica audiências no julgamento de suspeitos atacantes em Cabo Delgado, Voice of America, 15 October 2018, www.voaportugueses.com/a/tribunal-duplica-audi%C3%A7%C3%B3es-no-julgamento-de-suspeitos-atacantes-em-cabo-delgado/4614403.html


48 We do not claiming that poverty always means marginalization. It is our view that poverty in Cabo Delgado is a symptom of marginalization. One must bear in mind that the Makonde, who only make up 22% of the province’s population, are not the only ethnic group in Cabo Delgado. There are other tribes in the province who constitute the majority. The Makonde military generals within Frelimo have not been able to translate their establishment position in the party in political, economic and social inclusion of their province. Leveraging this advantage to benefit the province was never a priority. The priority seems to have always been using their established position in the ruling party for personal enrichment.

49 Local civil society representative who preferred to remain anonymous, December 2018.


51 Interview with local civil society representative in Pemba who did not want to be named, December 2018.


54 Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), Relatório final do inquérito ao orçamento familiar, December 2015.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.


60 Ibid.


62 Interview with former minister in the government of Armando Guebuza, December 2018, Cabo Delgado.

64 Ibid.

65 Agência Lusa, Comissão de Direitos Humanos pede estado de emergência em Cabo Delgado, Deutsche Welle, 4 March 2018, www.dw.com/pt-002/comiss%C3%A3o-de-direitos-humanos-pede-estado-de-emerg%C3%A3ncia-em-cabo-delgado/a-47760688


One particularly bitter soldier in Mocímboa da Praia resented the fact that lower-ranking officers like himself suffered, sacrificed themselves and their families, fought unknown enemies and were paid peanuts, whereas their superiors collected large sums of many from suspected extremists. He showed us his payslip with a monthly salary of MZN 7,500 (about US$120). “What can a man do with 7,500 meticais?” he asked rhetorically, adding: “We risk our lives, sacrifice our families, and we have misery to show for it.”
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