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Cooperation between African states and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Annie DuPre, Nicolas Kasprzyk and Noël Stott
Cooperation between African states and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

ISS Research report
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Executive Summary

On 9 September 2016 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) conducted its fifth nuclear test. This followed previous nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013 and January 2016, all of which violated various United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and were condemned by the majority of the international community.

Most African states have refrained from explicitly condemning the DPRK’s nuclear weapon- and delivery system-related activities as a threat to international peace and security. This may be the result of the legacy of North Korea’s military support of African liberation movements and the contemporary political and economic relations that many African states still have with North Korea.

According to a February 2016 report released by the UN Security Council Committee pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006), which oversees the sanction measures imposed by the UN Security Council, the DPRK ‘has continued to engage in the export of ballistic missile-related items to the Middle East and trade in arms and related materiel to Africa … [and] to exploit long-standing military relationships in Africa and Asia to provide training for police and paramilitary units’.1

North Korean-built arms factories have been built in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Madagascar and Uganda. Namibia has contracted the DPRK to build military sites for a period of 15 years, and ballistic-missile manufacturing lines have been sold to Egypt and Libya. In November 2009 South Africa intercepted a shipment of weapons from North Korea bound for the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

Training and leadership-protection courses provided by North Korea have also been popular over the years with African countries such as Benin, the DRC, Egypt, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Libya, Seychelles, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

North Korea has not limited itself to exploring and maintaining economic and military relations with African states. To enhance diplomatic relations, in the 1970s the DPRK also participated in educational and cultural exchanges and established numerous Juche (self-reliance) study groups and research institutes across Africa. Some of these Juche groups still exist, although not much information about them is publicly available. In addition, as part of North Korea’s ‘Third World diplomacy campaign’ in the 1980s, select African students were invited to the DPRK to study for free, given that a number of African leaders admired North Korea’s alternative brand of socialist modernity.

At the international and political level, the UN Security Council has, over the years, established progressively more stringent sanctions regimes in response to the threat to international peace and security posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles activities. The participation of African states in the implementation of these sanctions is uneven. For example, these regimes require UN member states to report on the steps they have taken to implement various sanctions. Africa is a region with an especially high number of non-reporting states. As at 1 September 2016, only seven African UN member states have submitted National Implementation Reports, representing just 13% of the African Union (AU) membership.

Recently, several African states have formally distanced themselves from North Korea – cutting diplomatic ties, ceasing military and security cooperation and disengaging from North Korean state-run companies.
Conversely, the trade data analysed in this report shows some African states actually increased trade with the DPRK after 2006.

An analysis of data released under the Harmonised System (HS), developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO), related to trade activities between African states and the DPRK shows an increase since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006. From 2007 to 2015 the value of trade activities between African states and the DPRK amounted to an average US$216.5 million per year, against an average US$90 million per year from 1998 to 2006. A peak was observed in 2010, with the total trade value between African states and the DPRK rising to US$627 million. From 1990 to 2015 the total trade value of imports, exports, re-imports and re-exports between African states and the DPRK amounted to US$2.88 billion, representing an average US$111 million per year.

Africa’s increasing trade activities with the DPRK after 2006 may be a sign that the Pyongyang regime is trying to diversify its economic partnerships to reduce its dependency on China. Those efforts seem to have been less successful in the most recent period: the trade value between African states and the DPRK was an average US$118 million from 2011 to 2015, against US$337 million from 2007 to 2010. Indications are that African states seem to be relying less and less on the DPRK as an economic partner. Given the decline in economic relations between African states and the DPRK, and with the AU on 16 September 2016 for the first time issuing a press release responding to the 9 September 2016 nuclear test, African states may feel more comfortable in further cutting back on bilateral economic relations and publically condemning North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile activities.

Many African states are also not fully aware of the nature of the North Korean state, in particular with regard to the social and economic conditions under which its citizens live. Despite international media reports on human rights violations, the lack of food security and other humanitarian challenges in the country, these issues are not highlighted in the African press. African states are also dealing with their own challenges of development, poverty, education and health, and thus the situation on the Korean Peninsula is not a significant concern. In this respect, there is a clear need for greater awareness raising among the African populace.

In addition, it is clear that many states, and in particular customs officials at ports of entry, lack the technical knowledge and capacity to identify sensitive material and items on the various lists of prohibited items. This not only prevents effective controls at the national level but could also be an avenue for North Korea to circumvent trade embargoes.

Possible means by which the implementation of sanctions by African states can be improved, and economic and military relations weakened, are:

- Including sanctions on the agenda of the annual consultations between the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC)
- Supporting the PSC in its efforts to operationalise its long-awaited subsidiary sanctions committee
- Offering specialised military teaching and training services, to undercut North Korea’s status as a favoured service provider in this area
- Training customs officials and professionals in the transportation industry in order to develop the capacity of African states to conduct cargo inspections and enforce travel bans
- Developing African initiatives to address the issues of the Korean Peninsula in a holistic manner and that support a negotiated solution to achieve the peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula
- Enhancing Africa’s socio-economic development through sustainable trade and aid programmes
- Undertaking systematic and sustained awareness-raising activities among the African elite and populace (in particular in those countries that have strong bilateral relations with the DPRK) on the socio-political and economic conditions under which North Korea’s citizens live.
Introduction

On 9 September 2016 the verification system of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s Preparatory Commission detected an unusual seismic event originating from the DPRK, pointing to a nuclear detonation. Soon afterwards, North Korea’s official news agency confirmed that the country had just conducted its fifth nuclear test. According to preliminary assessments, this test was the most powerful yet to have been conducted by the DPRK – with an estimated yield of 10 to 30 kilotons, the equivalent of 10 000 to 30 000 tonnes of a TNT-type explosive.

This follows previous nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013 and January 2016, all of which violated various UN Security Council resolutions and had been condemned by the international community.

Most African states have refrained from explicitly condemning North Korea’s nuclear weapon- and delivery system-related activities as a threat to international peace and security, with only South Africa and Egypt consistently proving to be the exception.

This research report examines whether this may be the result of the historical and contemporary political and economic relations that many African states had or still have with North Korea. Also examined is the participation of African states in the implementation of international sanctions – in particular UN Security Council mandatory sanctions – the use of which are intended to apply pressure on a state or entity to comply with the objectives set by the UN Security Council without the use of force. Sanctions by other states (such as the United States [US]) or group of states (such as the European Union [EU]) are also noted. These may not, however, influence African behaviour in the same manner as UN Security Council sanctions, particularly because of the framework within which the council may take enforcement action when determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and when making recommendations to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). A detailed description and analysis – both quantitative and qualitative – of trade data related to activities between African states and the DPRK is provided.

Methodology and limitations

The report has been compiled using publically available secondary sources, interviews with relevant government officials and other stakeholders, and primary trade data exchanged by states in the framework of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, also referred to as the Harmonised System (HS).

To assess relations between African states and the DPRK an analysis of economic relations was conducted. Many relevant approaches can be chosen to assess economic ties between two countries. For the purposes of this study, it was decided to analyse trade data on activities between African states and the DPRK. While the DPRK does not participate in the voluntary exchange of international trade data, most African states do. It is therefore possible to examine trade activities between African states and the DPRK on the basis of the information shared by the African states.

Two databases provided the data used:

- The Global Trade Atlas (GTA), which makes available the trade data of Algeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and South Africa.
• The UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE), which makes available the trade data of most African states.

In order to keep the study concise only the most significant findings are reported, with a focus on Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Sudan, while also reporting on the available trade data of Algeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and South Africa.

Only trade activities involving commodities have been analysed, as information related to services is scarce. At a methodological level, it must be underscored that trade data related to commodities does not cover economic activities, including, for example, the sharing of experience and technology, training activities or joint ventures to establish production facilities.

In conducting the trade data analysis, African states were organised into three categories:

a) States specifically assigned to the study as states of interest: Ethiopia, the DRC, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan
b) States whose trade data is available in the GTA: Algeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and South Africa
c) All African UN member states

Quantitative and qualitative examination of trade activities with the DPRK

States from categories (a) and (b) were subject to a detailed examination, making full use of the resources (through the GTA) made available to the study.

Trends in the following fields were examined:

• Trade value of imports from the DPRK. This gives an indication of the extent to which the importing country represents a source of currencies for the DPRK.

• Trade value of exports to the DPRK. This gives an indication of the extent to which the DPRK represents a market for the exporting country.

• Trade balance with the DPRK. This data gives an indication of the comparative benefits of the DPRK and the considered country in the trade relationship. A trade balance characterised by a significant difference in trade value between exports and imports is likely to be the result of either trade activities related to commodities that are essential for the economy of one of the partners or trade activities that are part of a privileged relationship between the two countries (i.e. a relationship in which one of the countries accepts to help the other country by promoting the import of its commodities).

• Total value of commodities traded with the DPRK. This gives an indication of the importance of the economic relationship between the DPRK and each state.

Figure 1: Sample of trade data: trade balance between Egypt and the DPRK, 2005–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Description</th>
<th>United States Dollar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, All Commodity Chapters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>−841,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric, Instantaneous Or Storage Water Heaters And Immersion Heaters</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Trade Atlas
In addition, a qualitative analysis was made, screening by the type of commodity most traded with the DPRK. This was done by resorting to trade data exchanged by states in the framework of the HS.

The HS, developed by the WCO, is a description system used by more than 200 countries and economies in their customs and international trade activities. It comprises more than 5,000 commodity groups, each identified by a six-digit code. As part of the classification established by the HS, over 1,200 headings are grouped in 96 chapters, the latter being themselves arranged in 21 sections. Each heading is identified by a four-digit code; the first two digits indicate the chapter wherein the heading appears, while the two following digits indicate the position of the heading in the chapter.

For instance, heading 28.44 (‘radioactive elements, isotopes, compounds and mixtures’) is the 44th heading of Chapter 28, which covers ‘inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes’. Heading 28.44 has then been sub-divided into five 1-dash subheadings. Within heading 28.44 there are therefore five six-digit commodity groups: 284410 (‘natural uranium, its compounds, mixtures’), 284420 (‘uranium [enriched U235], plutonium compounds, alloys’), 284430 (‘uranium [depleted U235], thorium compounds, products’), 284440 (‘radioactive nes, their mixtures and compounds’) and 284450 (‘spent fuel elements of nuclear reactors’).

Figure 2: Sample of trade data, displaying the trade value of exports from Côte d’Ivoire to the DPRK using HS codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Description</th>
<th>United States Dollar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Specific HS Class. Detail Description Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish, Nesoi, Excluding Fillets, Livers And Rees, Frozen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pears And Quinces, Fresh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices, Nesoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Products (Including Unroasted Chicory Roots Of The Variety Cichorium Intybus Sativum) Of A Kind Used Primarily For Human Consumption, Nesoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasta, Prepared, Nesoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee Extracts, Essences And Concentrates, And Preparations With A Basis Of These Products Or With A Basis Of Coffee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy Sauce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Preparations Nesoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potassium Carbonates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyanides And Cyanide Oxides Of Sodium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyanides And Cyanide Oxides, Nesoi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propane-1,2-Diol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acetic Acid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dioctyl Orthophthalates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccines For Human Medicine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaments, In Measured Doses, Etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Trade Atlas
While the HS was initially designed to facilitate customs revenues, it is useful for the analysis of trade activities, including those involving sensitive or strategic commodities.

It must be noted, however, that in spite of all its strengths, the HS remains an imperfect tool to accurately track trade activities related to dual-use items and other sensitive commodities. Some HS numbers unquestionably relate to sensitive/strategic commodities. For instance, HS code 284420, mentioned above, is unique to uranium enriched in U235 and plutonium, which are always considered strategic by relevant international initiatives (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Nuclear Suppliers Group). In most cases, however, HS numbers cover both strategic/sensitive commodities and non-strategic/non-sensitive commodities. For instance, HS number 810390 (described as ‘articles of tantalum’) covers crucibles, which are considered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group as strategic if they are extremely pure (99.9% or higher) and if they have a volume between 50 ml and 2 l. However, HS number 810390 also covers many other articles made of tantalum used in non-sensitive and non-strategic industrial activities.

Several alternative lists have been produced that correlate HS numbers to national control lists or to control lists elaborated in other frameworks, such as the supplier’s regimes. The EU, for instance, has produced a dual-use correlation table, which sets out the list of dual-use items subject to controls in the EU. This list merges several control lists originated from the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Chemical Weapons Convention. While each list serves a useful purpose, they have unique complexities and face specific correlation challenges. An article written by a recognised expert on export controls provides concrete examples of such challenges.

As part of the qualitative analysis, commodities traded with the DPRK were checked against HS numbers that are likely to designate strategic commodities. These numbers are part of the following chapters:

- HS Chapter 26 (ore)
- HS Chapter 28–30 (special materials)
- HS Chapter 36 (explosives, pyrotechnics, and related products)
- HS Chapter 38 (miscellaneous chemical products)
- HS Chapter 55 (synthetic filaments and fibres)
- HS Chapter 62 (articles of apparel)
- HS Chapter 68 (articles of stone or of other mineral substances)
- HS Chapter 69 (ceramic product)
- HS Chapter 70 (glass)
- HS Chapters 72–83 (metals and articles of metal)
- HS Chapter 84 (machinery)
- HS Chapter 85 (electronics)
- HS Chapter 87 (vehicles)
- HS Chapter 88 (aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof)
- HS Chapter 89 (ships)
- HS Chapter 90 (optical, photographic, measuring equipment)
- HS Chapter 93 (arms and ammunition)
States from category (c), that is, ‘All African United Nations member states’, were subject to a general examination of their trade activities, in order to assess the evolution of the volume of trade activities between African states as a whole and between each state and the DPRK.

Other limitations include the fact that in Africa the issue of sanctions tends to be sensitive given that a number of states and entities are, or have been, subjected to arms embargoes and other actions such as diplomatic, economic, military, trade and travel bans. Clearly, states that engage with North Korea – whether diplomatically or commercially – need to balance their self-interest and developmental needs with their obligations under international law. Interviews were thus restrictive, publically available official information inadequate and studies undertaken by scholars often speculative or hearsay.

The study concludes by recommending a number of possible ways in which the implementation of sanctions by African states can be improved. It also examines the potential role of African states and the AU in addressing the issues of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful and comprehensive manner and thus bringing the DPRK back into the international community.
Background

The relationship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and African states: a historical perspective

The history of the DPRK’s involvement in Africa can be traced through three time periods. Each of these periods has seen the government in Pyongyang facing greater difficulties in retaining and expanding its commercial and military endeavours.

The first period occurred from North Korea's establishment in 1948 until the end of the Cold War. During this time North Korea began targeting African countries to gain recognition and decrease South Korea's legitimacy. It also supported rebel and guerrilla groups in their fight for independence. The second period lasted from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2006, with subsequent changes in North Korea's tactics. The third period began in 2006 with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which formalised sanctions against North Korea and put greater pressure on the international community to monitor and react to Pyongyang's military actions. This section provides a brief overview of this history.

1948 to the end of Cold War

North Korea was founded in 1948 and has always sought relations with 'anti-imperialist' forces, no matter their political system. Then president Kim Il Sung was determined to grow the capacity of North Korea to be self-reliant in terms of defence and military production capability. One of his major goals was the reunification of the Koreas, on North Korea's terms, while undermining the legitimacy of South Korea abroad. To gain recognition and support for its goals, North Korea targeted newly independent African nations. The decolonisation and independence movements sweeping Africa proved opportune for Pyongyang to pursue diplomatic relations. It was also careful not to align fully with any superpower, merely taking sides on specific issues, to avoid alienation. Through the development of military equipment, North Korea was able to expand its foreign relations to developing countries in Africa while avoiding being drawn into the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

During the Cold War, Africa was seen as a battleground in the ideological war between the US and the then Soviet Union. New African states were joining the UN around the time the Korean question was being tabled, and between 1945 and 1961 African membership in the UN increased nearly sevenfold. This increase meant Africa had a controlling vote in the UN (although African countries did not always vote consistently). The increase in African participation was timely, as the Korean question was debated almost every year in the UN from 1950–1978. North Korea would work with any country, regardless of its political ideology, as long as it recognised Pyongyang as the legitimate government of Korea. Thus North Korea did not base its foreign relations entirely on the political ideology of other countries, as it was hoping to cast as wide a net as possible in order to capture loyalty before South Korea could.

Newly independent African states were targeted because of similar developmental ideologies, to gain votes in the UN, and to increase support for Pyongyang's goal of removing US military troops from South Korea. South Korea, meanwhile, often refused to develop relationships with countries that had relations with North Korea. This changed from 1961 onwards when South Korea decided to handle each situation according to its national interests, and not simply writing off anyone who communicated with North Korea. South Korea's
alliance with the US was also beneficial to North Korea’s relations in Africa, as many new African countries articulated anti-Western sentiments.

The use of anti-Western, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric proved a useful and common thread for both African states and North Korea. North Korea made many efforts to distribute propaganda directly in African countries, including Mali and Zambia. In the 1970s especially, Kim Il Sung attempted to spread his Juche, or self-reliance, ideology into Africa. While many African countries experimented with the concept, most became disillusioned as it had little practical application for ‘Third World’ development. Kim Il Sung’s attempts in this regard thus often fell flat.

A rapid increase in exporting weapons to Africa and Asia (from the late 1960s) was likely due to North Korea’s main goal of attaining greater international legitimacy. To gain favour in Africa, North Korea would promote ‘anti-Western’ propaganda and offer military assistance and training, either for free or at an extremely reduced price. While Pyongyang aimed to remain unaligned on political issues, these relations were sometimes negotiated with the assistance of China or the Soviet Union.

North Korea’s relationship with Africa has been heavily affected by the superpowers’ interest in intra-Korean politics. In 1972, after US president Richard Nixon’s visit to China and the reconciliation in Sino-American relations, North Korea and South Korea began competing for support in the UN General Assembly. Within four years 93 countries had recognised North Korea, and Pyongyang sent its first permanent observer missions to the UN. In establishing relations with other countries, Pyongyang relied on cultural diplomacy while Seoul relied mainly on trade diplomacy. From 1965 to 1973 South Korea focused on concluding trade agreements, giving aid and sending trade missions, while North Korea focused on concluding cultural agreements, establishing friendship associations and exchanging cultural missions. For example, the Central African Republic (CAR) established official relations with Pyongyang in 1969. A ‘treaty of peace and friendship’ was signed in 1978, and North Korea agreed to provide agricultural equipment in exchange for coffee, timber and diamonds.

The 1970s represent the peak of North Korea’s African diplomacy and the promotion of Juche as a model. Between 1971 and 1980 the DPRK established diplomatic relations with the following African states:

- 1972: Cameroon, Rwanda, Uganda, Senegal, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Madagascar and Zaire (now the DRC)
- 1973: Togo, Benin, Gambia, Mauritius and Angola
- 1974: Libya, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Niger and Botswana
- 1975: Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tunisia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde
- 1976: Nigeria and Seychelles
- 1980: Zimbabwe and Lesotho

Support for guerrilla and rebel groups

In the two years after Nixon’s China visit, North Korea established relations with 16 African countries. It also expanded its military relations in Africa to state and non-state actors. One African leader who was particularly captivated by North Korea was Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. North Korea supported his guerrilla forces during Zimbabwe’s liberation movement. In 2009 Mugabe reminisced about his relationship with Kim Il Sung, saying he ‘provide[d] us with training facilities for our cadres … We thank him today as we did yesterday.’

After independence Pyongyang continued to supply Mugabe with military assistance, including helping to create a national army from the two former Rhodesian guerrilla forces. Mugabe visited Pyongyang in 1980 and ‘came back almost a different man’, hoping to emulate the personality cult created in the DPRK under Kim Il Sung. He also sought military assistance from North Korea to eliminate his opposition,
the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). In 1981 the North Koreans sent US$18 million in small arms and ammunition, as well as 106 instructors to train 3,500 members of the Fifth Brigade, Mugabe’s elite military division. A few years later the Fifth Brigade massacred 20,000 ‘dissidents’ in the region of Matabeleland, home to Mugabe’s main political rival Joshua Nkomo. This incident became known as the Matabeleland Massacre.

In 1975, during the Angolan civil war, North Korea provided military support to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Pyongyang sent 107 military instructors to Zaire (now the DRC), where the North Korean instructors trained FNLA guerrillas in military camps. The following year, however, North Korea withdrew all instructors (at that time 454) from Zaire. This may have been due to differences between North Korea and Zaire on the Angolan independence issue. North Koreans appeared on both sides of the Angolan border during the civil war, which eroded trust and contributed to the dissolution of military cooperation. When the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was victorious against the FNLA in 1975, Kim Il Sung congratulated the MPLA leader, embarrassing the Zairean government, which had supported the FNLA with North Korean assistance.

The legacy of North Korea’s support of African liberation movements continues to influence economic and military relations today. In 2014 the ambassador of North Korea praised continued relations with Angola, saying they are ‘historical and are continuing to be developed according to the wishes and expectations of both peoples and governments’. This legacy also applies to Namibia. During the War of Independence in the 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) received military support from the DPRK. Until very recently the government of Namibia has pointed to North Korea’s support during the struggle for independence as justification for their continued relations. In April 2016, for example, President Hage Geingob of Namibia defended his country’s links with the DPRK, saying the relationship began before independence when Namibia was fighting for freedom.

End of Cold War to 2006

By the end of the Cold War, according to the US’ Library of Congress, North Korea had established military relations with 62 state and non-state actors from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. ‘North Korea trained approximately 2,500 Third World guerrilla fighters from 1972 to 1981.’ In some countries, however, the DPRK earned a reputation as an opportunistic ally. Pyongyang would provide military help and training to any willing participant regardless of political ideology or previous alliances. After the Cold War, military exports from North Korea narrowed to a smaller group of buyers, as a result of changes in foreign policy and other international developments. “In fact, Pyongyang’s golden age of military partnerships had started to come to an end already by the late 1980s.” With the collapse of Soviet-style communism and increased recognition of South Korea by the developing world, North Korea faced further difficulties in its quest for full legitimacy.

When the attractiveness of partnering with Pyongyang on diplomatic and political fronts began to wane, military relations started to wane as well. Although there was again reconciliation between the superpowers, the Koreas seemed to feel no positive effects from this rapprochement. Indeed, the ideological gulf between North Korea and South Korea seemed to be as big as ever. Many states, including some in Africa, saw greater benefit in working with Seoul. North Korea’s previous partnerships and coordinated packages of military assistance with socialist friends came to a halt. The Soviet Union also ceased providing aid to Pyongyang, mainly due to internal economic problems. North Korea thus attempted to retain relations in Africa while hoping to avoid international isolation.

International export controls on military equipment and materials were tightened in the early 1990s. Despite increased international restrictions, a number of African countries continued to maintain relations with North Korea. In 1991 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea appeared to be receiving military training and support from North Korea. In that year, out of 49 countries maintaining relations with one or both of the Koreas, only four of them had relations with South Korea alone (Cameroon, Djibouti, Swaziland and Morocco), while 12 countries maintained relations with North Korea alone.
Policy shifts abroad after the Cold War also meant the end of North Korea’s market reach, and resulted in its legitimacy as a provider of military goods decreasing. This pattern was solidified in October 2006 when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718. This resolution cemented into international law the condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes. All UN member states were thus forbidden from dealing with North Korea with respect to major weapons systems, missiles, and nuclear and other related activities and goods. Resolution 1718 has since been strengthened by subsequent resolutions.

Resolution 1874 was passed in 2009 in response to Pyongyang’s second nuclear test. It included sanctions against all arms, related materials and services, including small arms, and forbade countries from receiving police, paramilitary or special forces training from North Korea. Resolution 2087 was adopted in January 2013 in response to the satellite launch undertaken in December 2012. It strengthened the sanctions regimes by including measures clarifying procedures related to the seizure and disposal of material suspected of heading to or from North Korea, and by imposing travel bans. Resolution 2094 was passed in March 2013, in response to the third nuclear test conducted by North Korea. It called on states to inspect and detain suspected cargoes and shipments, and to exert vigilance over North Korea’s diplomatic personnel. It also restricted North Korea’s access to funds and sensitive technological equipment.

Resolution 2270 was adopted in March 2016, in response to the fourth nuclear test and the second satellite launch conducted by North Korea. It further strengthened the sanctions regime against North Korea by, among others, imposing asset freezes, limiting the banking activities of North Korean entities abroad, and restricting trade activities, including in particular the import of specific commodities from North Korea.

The DPRK’s paradoxical position in the global community and how it justifies its actions

North Korea’s military market has evolved over time, as has its relationship with the international community. Pyongyang’s decision to test its first nuclear weapon in 2006 earned it a reputation as a threat to international peace and security, yet North Korea is no less determined to expand its military markets and gain legitimacy abroad. The DPRK considers itself revolutionary, a leader to unite the Koreas under a common government and save the world from ‘Western imperialism’. Meanwhile, it is viewed by many as an increasingly desperate, unstable and reckless state determined to join the elite club of nuclear-armed states.

The operational capabilities of North Korea’s military forces have been steadily declining for decades. Additionally, the country faces severe economic stress as its global trading opportunities continue to shrink. Although North Korea was once a country with strong manufacturing and agricultural sectors, it now has neither. While the norm is not to equate failing states with aggressive ones, ‘in the North Korean case, paradoxically, the regime could get more dangerous as its prospects worsen and its grip weakens’. Indeed, Kim Jong Un shows no interest in slowing the progress made in terms of the country’s nuclear capabilities. While North Korea faces economic and financial collapse, the risk of aggression rises.

Despite rising sanctions and increased international condemnation, North Korea continues to expand and test its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. In the past decade alone it has conducted five nuclear weapons tests (in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016 and September 2016). Pyongyang tends to dismiss international and UN Security Council condemnation of its nuclear and ballistic programmes and, in particular, its testing projects, which are in violation of a number of UN resolutions and imposed sanctions. In 2013 the regime ‘all but said that nuclear weapons are its best hope of survival and last line of defence, stating that they are non-negotiable under any circumstances’.

When North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, the UN decided that the country’s activities were a problem for the entire international community. To curb these activities, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718, and its embargoes have been strengthened multiple times. Yet the DPRK has not stopped enhancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile abilities.
The North Korean government frequently uses antagonistic rhetoric to justify its actions. For example, a news article published on 15 September 2016 stated, with regard to the most recent nuclear test, ‘It is none other than the US which pushed the DPRK to a nuclear state with pre-emptive attack and retaliatory strike abilities.’ The Foreign Ministry of the DPRK also held a briefing with ambassadors from Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia and India, as well as representatives from Cambodia, Malaysia, Iran and Pakistan. The Director General of the Asian and Oceanic Department of the Ministry, Choe Hui Chol, is reported to have said that ‘[t]he DPRK will never lay down its nuclear weapons in the future, to but steadily bolster the state nuclear force both in quality and quantity to put a definite end to the US hostile policy towards the DPRK’. Examples of the North Korean government’s justifications for its actions can be found in the state-run media, which frequently publishes articles using language meant to delegitimise South Korea, the US and their allies. One recent article read, ‘The wicked conservative media of south Korea are resorting to political provocations against the DPRK through sordid red herring, thereby disturbing society and adding to the hideous crimes against the nation.’ In another, the government warned, ‘If the US imperialists and their vassal forces show even a slight sign of launching the “beheading operation” for what they call “collapse of social system” … an order will be immediately issued … to fire rockets fully tipped with nuclear warheads.’ Such statements are commonly found in recent and archived newsprint. Its spokespersons reiterate that North Korea will push ahead to increase the quality and quantity of its ‘nuclear force’, describing how its nuclear-attack capabilities are continually being improved. Indeed, its testing programme has demonstrated its ever-increasing nuclear weapons capabilities.

North Korean representatives have been very direct about preventing their nuclear development from being blocked. According to a statement by North Korea’s foreign ministry on the state-run KCNA news site after the 9 September 2016 test, any attempt by US President Barack Obama to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power was ‘as foolish an act as trying to eclipse the sun with a palm’. To quote Lee Chun-hee, the veteran North Korean news announcer: ‘We will not surrender our nuclear arms, even if the sky is falling – there will be no compromise on the nuclear issue.’

In response to the January 2016 test the state-run Rodong Simnun news agency read out a statement from the North Korean government justifying the test:

There took place a world startling event to be specially recorded in the national history spanning 5 000 years in the exciting period when all service personnel and people of the DPRK are making a giant stride, performing eye-catching miracles and exploits day by day after turning out as one in the all-out charge to bring earlier the final victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche, true to the militant appeal of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) … By succeeding in the H-bomb test in the most perfect manner to be specially recorded in history the DPRK proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear weapons states possessing of even H-bomb and the Korean people came to demonstrate the spirit of the dignified nation equipped with the most powerful nuclear deterrent. This test is a measure for self-defence the DPRK has taken to firmly protect the sovereignty of the country and the vital right of the nation from the ever-growing nuclear threat and blackmail by the US-led hostile forces and to reliably safeguard the peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional security.

Part of the rationale for North Korea’s actions is its desire to expand foreign relations with nonaligned countries and ‘break away from international isolation as it is under heavy UN sanctions for its nuclear and missile tests’. According to one UN expert in a recent North Korea sanctions workshop in Johannesburg, South Africa, two reasons may motivate North Korea to relentlessly pursue nuclear development. The first is international: the desire to gain a place at the table, be seen as a military power, be seen as legitimate. The second is domestic: the North Korean people may feel that, although their daily lives are very difficult, at least their country is strong.
Cooperation between African states and the DPRK: status and trends

Military relations with North Korea

While expanding its military markets has become increasingly difficult for North Korea, a number of African states continue to maintain close relations with Pyongyang. For decades, these relationships have remained largely under the radar of Western policymakers.50

Despite the imposition of UN sanctions, North Korean arms factories, for example, can be found in the DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Uganda. Namibia has concluded 15-year contracts with North Korea to build military sites, and ballistic-missile manufacturing lines have been sold to Egypt and Libya.51 In November 2009 South Africa intercepted a shipment of military weapons from North Korea bound for the Republic of the Congo (Congo–Brazzaville). This shipment was in violation of Resolution 1874, which bans weapons exports from North Korea.52

Table 1: Transfers of major conventional weapons, by supplier, for 1950–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier/recipient (R) or licensor (L)</th>
<th>No. ordered</th>
<th>Weapon designation</th>
<th>Weapon description</th>
<th>Year of order/licence</th>
<th>Year(s) of deliveries</th>
<th>No. delivered/produced</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R: DR Congo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Project-123P-4</td>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>1974 1975</td>
<td>3 10</td>
<td>Second-hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>M-46 130mm</td>
<td>Towed gun</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>YW-531/Type-63</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>BM-21 Grad 122mm</td>
<td>Self-propelled MRL</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
<td>1980 1999 (10)</td>
<td>BM-11 version</td>
<td>Probably assembled in Libya, never tested or deployed; planned production in Libya cancelled 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Hwasong-6/South Mod-C</td>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>MiG-17 Nampo</td>
<td>Fighter aircraft</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
<td>1975 1979 (4)</td>
<td>Second-hand, aid flown by North Korean pilots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landing craft</td>
<td>(1978)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nampo</td>
<td>Landing craft</td>
<td>(1979)</td>
<td>1980 (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>10 10</td>
<td>BM-21 Grad 122mm</td>
<td>Self-propelled MRL</td>
<td>(1987)</td>
<td>1987 1987 (10)</td>
<td>BM-11 version</td>
<td>Second-hand; designation uncertain (reported as ‘armoured cars’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>BTR-152</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>(1987)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapons system are listed separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database
A search of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database reveals available data on the trade in conventional weapons between DPRK and African states. No trade activity was reported in the UNROCA between 1992 and 2014.53 The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, however, shows exports from the DPRK to seven African states between 1950 and 2015. No imports from African states were reported.54

In the 10 years since the adoption of Resolution 1718, African states have remained the least likely to report on their implementation of the resolution. According to the most recent report of the Panel of experts supporting the 1718 Sanctions Committee the DPRK ‘has continued to engage in the export of ballistic missile-related items to the Middle East and trade in arms and related materiel to Africa … [and] to exploit long-standing military relationships in Africa and Asia to provide training for police and paramilitary units’.55 The report, released in February 2016, points to violations of the arms embargo by a few African countries. The Panel of Experts report a UN investigation into Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania and Uganda over possible arms-related dealings with the DPRK. The report also states that in 2013 a shipment of Scud missile spare parts from North Korea was intercepted before arriving in Egypt.

In Namibia, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID, listed by the UN) was reportedly conducting business as recently as 2015, including constructing a munitions factory near Windhoek.56 Responding to the investigation into KOMID’s activities, Namibia ‘informed the Panel that it had contracts with the [DPRK] concerning arms and related materiel before 2005 … Namibia also confirmed that it had received training and technical assistance relating to arms, but stated that, given [UN] sanctions, the relevant experts had returned to [North Korea].57

Training and leadership-protection courses have also been popular with some African countries that are maintaining relations with North Korea. The list of customers includes Benin, the DRC, Egypt, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Libya, Seychelles, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In 2014 Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni thanked the government of North Korea for providing technical support and training for recruits at the Kabalye Police Training School in Masindi.58 Nigeria has repeatedly sent military personnel to attend leadership-protection courses in North Korea.59 Some African countries that regularly receive military training from North Korea have argued that their relationship does not violate any UN resolution. The UN hoped to discourage these continued relationships by stipulating that such training services were also prohibited.60

More recently, however, several African states have formally distanced themselves from North Korea. This shift may be significant: African states that end ties with North Korea will have a larger landscape of trading partners (particularly those who comply with the current sanctions regimes). South Korea could capitalise on this shift and engage more African states in relations. Following a report by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, Botswana cut diplomatic ties with the DPRK in 2014, stating that it ‘does not wish to be associated with a Government which continues to display such total disregard for the human rights of its citizens’.61 Earlier this year Uganda officially disengaged from military and security cooperation with the DPRK, deciding not to renew several cooperation agreements.62 In a statement made by a senior Ugandan diplomat in October 2016, the Ugandan government determined that ‘the Security Council resolution has to be implemented immediately. So the government of Uganda is now preparing full implementation, covering all aspects of the [security and military] commitment and contracts [with North Korea].’63 In July 2016 Namibia also cut ties with North Korean companies (including KOMID), announcing it was complying with the UN sanctions against Pyongyang.64

There are indications that other African states are considering similar actions to sever ties with North Korea. This pattern provides an opportunity for both South Korea and western countries to improve relations with African states (either through trade, diplomacy or otherwise).

**Research and education cooperation**

North Korea did not limit itself to exploring economic and military relations with African states. To enhance diplomatic relations, the DPRK has also participated in educational and cultural exchanges.
According to interviews conducted by Benjamin Young with African students who had studied in the DPRK in the 1980s, North Korea set up numerous Juche study groups and research institutes across Africa in the 1970s. This resulted in South Korean and American officials becoming ‘worried about North Korea’s ideological appeal to young Africans eager to develop their newly independent nations’.65

In 1973 a ‘Pan-African seminar on the Juche idea of Comrade Kim Il Sung’ was held in Beirut, Lebanon in order to ‘enable the African people to appreciate the remarkable achievements accomplished by the heroic Korean people under the clear-sighted and vigilant leadership of Marshal Kim Il Sung’.66 Participants included members of the then government of Sierra Leone; representatives of Freetown University; the MPLA; the Association of Sierra Leone’s Women; delegates of different associations from Sudan; the Peace Movement of Mali; the Congolese Association of Friendship between the Peoples; the Mali Youth; Sierra Leone’s Youth and SWAPO.

In addition, as part of North Korea’s ‘Third World diplomacy campaign in the 1980s, select African students were invited to the DPRK to study for free’.67 Young describes the intention as follows: ‘In exchange for diplomatic recognition, the North Korean leadership would allow African governments to send several students to the DPRK to study medicine, agronomy, and of course Juche ideology.’68 In the 1980s, approximately 200 students from Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zambia, Lesotho, Mali and Ethiopia were selected by their respective governments to study in North Korea. The students were dispersed to different schools and universities depending on their field of study.

Ultimately, according to Young, North Korea’s efforts to establish itself as an ‘African power’ failed. Kim Il Sung’s works were never memorised by African schoolchildren nor did Juche become the dominant doctrine of African governments. After South Korea’s economy surpassed North Korea’s in the late 1970s, African nations became less interested in the North Korean model of socialist modernity.

Another writer explains that there were English-speaking contingents from Lesotho, Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia. ‘Student exchanges between the DPRK and Africa had begun in 1982 in the interests of international friendship and South–South co-operation … the experiment had not been much of a success and no new African students were arriving.’69

Juche study groups continue to exist in African countries (see Table 2 for examples).

Table 2: Examples of Juche Study Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Comité National Béninois d’Etude des Idées du Juche</td>
<td>Chairman Hessou Kohovi praised Kim Il Sung at the inaugural meeting of the Beninese national preparatory committee for the 2017 Meeting Praising Great Persons of Mt. Paektu in Cotonou on 1 March70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea</td>
<td>This group posted an article titled “Korean youth movement is history of victory and glory” on its website on 29 August 201171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopian Youth Study Group of the Juche Idea</td>
<td>A representative said, ‘Kim Jong Il developed the immortal Juche idea into the eternal guiding idea in the era of independence’72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigerian National Committee on the Study of Juche Idea</td>
<td>‘About 2 000 and 2 500 registered student members and more than 10 000 non-registered members but ardent sympathizers across Nigeria’73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>National Coordinating Committee on the Juche Idea Study Groups</td>
<td>The vice-chairman praised Kim Jong Il as an outstanding thinker and theoretician and great master of the world politics74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Ugandan National Committee for the Study of the Juche Idea</td>
<td>The Ugandan Committee commemorated the demise of Kim Il Sung from 6–8 July 201675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of major efforts undertaken by the DPRK to provide the Juche study groups with some visibility, their influence remains negligible. A report on Juche activities in Tanzania in 2009 states that ‘many Juche
branches were not active because of communication, financial, infrastructure problems. The same report indicates that the annual programme for the year 2009 (Juche 98) comprised meetings, seminars and lectures spread throughout the year that commemorated special anniversaries and events of great importance to the Juche study groups. Documents such as study materials from the DPRK were received via its embassy in Dar es Salaam. It seems that these materials are now sourced through the embassy in South Africa.

**Trade activities between African states and the DPRK**

From 1990 to 2015 the total trade value of imports, exports, re-imports and re-exports between African states and the DPRK amounted to US$2.88 billion, representing an average US$111 million per year. In 2014 trade activities between African states and the DPRK amounted to US$124.7 million, which is less than 1.8% of the trade activities conducted that year by the DPRK.

Interestingly, trade between African states and the DPRK has actually increased since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006. From 2007 to 2015 the value of trade activities between African states and the DPRK amounted to an average US$216.5 million per year, against an average US$90 million per year from 1998 to 2006. A peak was observed in 2010, with the total trade value between African states and the DPRK increasing to US$627 million. This peak is largely the result of trade activities conducted by Egypt and South Africa.

Africa’s increasing trade activities with the DPRK after 2006 may be a sign that the Pyongyang regime is trying to diversify its economic partnerships to reduce its dependency on China. Those efforts seem to have been less successful in the most recent period: the trade value between North Korea and Africa was an average US$118 million from 2011 to 2015, against US$337 million from 2007 to 2010.

**Figure 3: Trade activities of all African states with the DPRK, all commodities, import/export/re-export**

A total of 34 African states reported trade activities with North Korea in 2014. Table 3 ranks states by their declared trade volumes with North Korea in 2014.
### Table 3: Trade activities with North Korea, import/export, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total trade value in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade value less than US$1 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>4,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>13,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>110,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>181,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>209,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>210,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>244,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>509,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>564,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>621,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>670,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>751,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>795,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade value between US$1 and US$5 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,161,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1,548,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1,948,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2,044,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2,271,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,688,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,895,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>3,739,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4,853,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4,895,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade value more than US$5 million</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>5,051,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>5,414,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5,443,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5,446,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>6,338,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>6,489,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>11,806,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>14,777,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>17,502,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>26,091,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISS, on the basis of UNCOMTRADE data
UN Security Council Resolution 2270, in operative paragraphs 29 and 30, restricts coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore imports from North Korea.

Data from UNCOMTRADE has been used to track the import of such commodities by African states from North Korea from 2011 to 2015. Bearing in mind the scope and limitations of UNCOMTRADE, the objective of this analysis was to identify African states that are likely to be the most affected by the import restrictions, based on their trade activities with North Korea prior to the adoption of Resolution 2270.

A similar analysis was undertaken with regard to exports to North Korea of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore. While such exports are not – strictly speaking – restricted by paragraphs 29 and 30 of Resolution 2270, the analysis was undertaken in a forward-looking perspective to identify which African states would be most impacted by an extension of the sanctions regimes to also restrict the export of these commodities.

From this analysis, the African countries that are likely to be most affected by the restriction of imports from North Korea of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore are Ethiopia, Egypt and Seychelles (see Table 4).78

If the UN Security Council decides to further extend the sanctions regime to also restrict the import of above-mentioned commodities, the African states that are most likely to be affected are Cameroon and South Africa (see Table 5).

**Table 4: Imports from the DPRK of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7216), US$42 319</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iron and steel/ferro-alloys (HS 7202), US$32 892</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$1 631</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7209), US$45 516</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$142 007</td>
<td>Iron and steel/flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7208), US$2 583 456</td>
<td>Iron and steel/flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$99 949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7209), US$2,664,986</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$32,398</td>
<td>Iron and steel/ferro-alloys (HS 7202), US$473</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$11,334</td>
<td>Iron and steel/ferro-alloys (HS 7202), US$473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7209), US$209</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$11,334</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7209), US$209</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7210), US$11,334</td>
<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7209), US$209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Coal: briquettes, voids and similar fuels manufactured from coal (HS 2701), US$66</td>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7216), US$16,068</td>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7216), US$3,019</td>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7216), US$3,608</td>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7216), US$3,019</td>
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<td>Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (HS 7212), US$620</td>
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Source: compiled by the authors, on the basis of UN COMTRADE data

Table 5: Exports to the DPRK of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore and vanadium ore

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</table>

Source: compiled by the authors, on the basis of UN COMTRADE data

Case studies: Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan

Trade data for these countries appears to be unequally available:

- Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania are active participants in the voluntary exchange of data under UNCOMTRADE, providing concrete information for this analysis.

- Angola, the DRC and Sudan are either not reporting or are reporting limited information, making objective analysis more difficult. These states may then be vulnerable to unwarranted suspicions.

Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania have developed similar dynamics in their trade relationship with the DPRK:

- Ethiopia has traditionally been a source of currency for the DPRK. It increased its imports of North Korean goods after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006.

- Mozambique had limited trade activities with the DPRK until 2008. Since then it has significantly increased its imports of North Korean commodities and, to a lesser extent, its exports in the direction of the DPRK. Mozambique has become a source of currency for the DPRK.

- Tanzania has traditionally been a source of currency for the DPRK. After the 2006 sanctions it significantly increased its imports of North Korean goods and also, to a lesser extent, its exports in the direction of the DPRK.

Ethiopia

From 1995 to 2015 Ethiopia only once reported trade activities with the DPRK involving Chapter 93 commodities (arms and ammunition): in 2005 it reported the import of such commodities for a value of US$365 000.

From 1995 to 2015 the value of Ethiopian imports from the DPRK amounted to an average US$5.2 million a year. From 2003 to 2015 the value of Ethiopian exports to the DPRK represented an average US$500 000 a year. The trade balance between the two countries is therefore clearly at the advantage of the DPRK.
Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, trade activities between Ethiopia and the DPRK have increased significantly. From 2007 to 2015 the reported total trade value has been an average US$8.7 million, against an average US$2.5 million from 1998 to 2006. From 2007 to 2015 imports from the DPRK have risen appreciably, reaching an average US$8.1 million (against an average US$2.8 million from 1995 to 2006), further positioning Ethiopia as a source of currency for the DPRK, as exports to the DPRK remained modest.

Mozambique

Mozambique has never reported any trade activity with the DPRK relating to Chapter 93 (arms and ammunition) commodities.

From 2000 to 2015 the trade value of North Korean commodities imported by Mozambique amounted to an average US$2.7 million per year. Over the same period, the trade value of commodities exported by Mozambique to the DPRK represented an average US$315,000 per year. The trade balance between the two countries is therefore in favour of the DPRK: Mozambique is a source of currency for the DPRK.
It should be noted that trade activities between the two countries, as shared by Mozambique through UNCOMTRADE, were almost non-existent until 2008. From 2012 to 2015 Mozambique imported an average US$9.1 million per year from the DPRK. Over the same period, commodities exported by Mozambique to the DPRK represented only an average US$500 000 per year. It is therefore only recently that Mozambique has become a source of currency for the DPRK.

Figure 6: Mozambican imports from the DPRK, trade value, 1994–2015

The highest imports of North Korean commodities by Mozambique were reported in 2013, 2014 and 2015. They related in particular to commodities identified as:

- HS number 030379 (fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates)
- HS number 382200 (miscellaneous chemical products/composite diagnostic or laboratory reagent)
- HS number 391721 (plastics and articles thereof/tube, pipe or hose, rigid, of polyethylene)
- HS number 490110 (printed books, newspapers, pictures/brochures, leaflets and similar, in single sheets)
- HS number 490110 (printed books, newspapers, pictures/printed reading books)
- HS number 540419 (manmade filaments)
- HS number 730820 (structures, parts of structures of iron or steel/towers and lattice masts, iron or steel)
- HS number 847720 (machinery for rubber, plastics industry/extruders for working rubber or plastic)
- HS number 870323 (vehicles other than railway, tramway/automobiles, spark ignition engine)
- HS number 870422 (vehicles other than railway, tramway/motor vehicles for the transport of goods/diesel-powered trucks weighing 5–20 tonnes)

The diversity of commodities exported by the DPRK to Mozambique suggests that the DPRK has been opportunistic and seized any business opportunity in the country.
Exports of Mozambican commodities to the DPRK have fallen mainly into one category: HS number 240120 (tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped). Tobacco represented 100% of exports in 2008 and 2012, and was the main commodity exported in 2014.

The export peaks of 2008, 2012 and 2014 may be exceptions in the trade relationship between Mozambique and the DPRK. No clearly established trend can be observed. The most recent data suggests a return to low levels of exports of Mozambican commodities to the DPRK.

**Tanzania**

Tanzania has never reported any trade activity with the DPRK involving Chapter 93 (arms and ammunition) commodities.

From 1995 to 2015 the trade value of North Korean commodities imported by Tanzania amounted to an average US$1.4 million per year. Over the same period the trade value of commodities exported by Tanzania to the DPRK represented an average US$330 000 per year.\(^6\) The trade balance between the two countries therefore favours the DPRK.

**Figure 8: Tanzanian imports from the DPRK, trade value, 1995–2015**

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data
Furthermore, Tanzania’s imports of DPRK commodities were significantly higher after the adoption of UN Security Council sanctions in 2006. From 2007 to 2015 the trade value of imports from the DPRK reached an average US$2.85 million per year, against an average below US$400 000 per year from 1995 to 2006. After the 2006 sanctions Tanzania also increased its exports of goods to the DPRK; from 2007 to 2015 the trade value of commodities exported to the DPRK represented an average US$583 000 per year, against an average US$42 000 per year from 1998 to 2006.

The increased trade activity between the two countries after the sanctions, although modest, signals a will to maintain and increase cooperation.

The import of DPRK commodities peaked in 2010, at a total value of US$8.5 million. This peak was due to significant imports of:

- HS Chapter 25 commodities (salt, sulphur, earths and stone, plastering materials, lime and cement), including in particular cement (HS number 252310), for a total value of US$6 million
- HS Chapter 30 commodities (pharmaceutical products) including, in particular, vaccines for human medicine (HS number 300220), for a total value of US$1.3 million

In 2015 Tanzania imported mainly HS Chapter 90 commodities (optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof) from the DPRK, for a total value of US$1.9 million (out of US$2 million), thus about 95%.

In 2014 Tanzania mainly imported HS Chapter 27 commodities (mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, bituminous substances, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude) from the DPRK, for a total value of US$3.9 million (out of US$4.7 million). This was possibly related to DPRK ambitions to develop a domestic oil industry.81

In 2013 the commodities most imported by Tanzania from the DPRK were HS Chapter 90 commodities, as in 2015, while in 2012 most were HS Chapter 39 commodities (plastics and articles thereof).

Figure 9: Tanzanian exports to the DPRK, trade value, 1998–2015

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

While an increase in exports from Tanzania to the DPRK occurred after the sanctions, the commodities in question were non-strategic/non-sensitive. Specifically, the export peaks of 2010 and 2012 were mostly increased exports of HS Chapter 24 (tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes) and HS Chapter 9 (coffee, tea, mate and spices) commodities.
Highlights related to Algeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal and South Africa

Algeria

The value of Algeria’s total trade activities with the DPRK increased after the 2006 sanctions. From 2007 to 2014 it represented an average US$10.7 million per year, against an average US$7.5 million per year from 2000 to 2006. It must be noted, however, that trade activities between the two countries decreased significantly after 2011, falling to an average US$2.3 million per year from 2012 to 2014.

Figure 10: Global trade between Algeria and the DPRK, December, 2000–2014

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

Most of the data available on trade activities between the two countries relates to Algerian imports of North Korean commodities. A possible explanation is that Algeria has not extensively reported its exports. The GTA shows 10 years, between 2000 and 2014, with no reported exports from Algeria to the DPRK. UNCOMTRADE also reflects reporting gaps, including some discrepancies with the GTA.

Figure 11: Algerian imports from the DPRK, December, 2000–2014

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data
A thorough examination of commodities imported by Algeria from the DPRK shows several commodities of possible interest, including commodities identified under:

- HS number 290490 (sulfonated, nitrated etc. of hydrocarbons etc.)
- HS number 810890 (titanium and articles thereof)
- HS number 841191 (turbojet and turbopropeller parts)
- HS number 841370 (centrifugal pumps)
- HS number 841939 (freeze dryers, also known as lyophilizers)
- HS number 841989 (chemical reaction vessels)
- HS number 842119 (centrifugal separators)
- HS number 842129 (filtration equipment)
- HS number 842230 (machinery for filling, closing bottles, etc.)
- HS number 842890 (special lifting or handling machinery)
- HS number 847989 (machines and mechanical appliances)
- HS heading 8481 (valves)
- HS heading 85 (electric machinery)
- HS number 901580 (surveying instruments and appliances)
- HS number 9026.20 (equipment to measure or check pressure)
- HS number 902780 (equipment for physical or chemical analysis)
- HS number 903180 (measuring and checking instruments)

In addition to the methodological comments related to trade data analysis,\textsuperscript{82} it should be noted that, with the exception of commodities traded under HS number 847989 (machines and mechanical appliances) and under HS heading 85 (electric machinery), the reported trade values are very low, suggesting non-strategic trade.

**Botswana**

Botswana reported limited imports of North Korean commodities: less than US$800 000 in 2014 and less than US$400 000 in 2015. It has not reported any exports of commodities to the DPRK.

Botswana has mainly imported cyanides and oxides of sodium.

**Figure 12: Botswana’s total trade with the DPRK, December, 2010–2015**

![Graph showing Botswana’s total trade with the DPRK, December, 2010–2015](source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data)
Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire and the DPRK have modest trade activities. From 2005 to 2015 the total value of their trade activities was an average US$1.1 million per year.

An interesting aspect of the trade relationship between the two countries is that from 2005 to 2015 the trade balance was close to zero; the value of commodities imported from the DPRK has been close to the value of commodities exported to the DPRK.

**Figure 13: Côte d’Ivoire’s total trade with the DPRK, December, 2005–2015**

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

Egypt

From 2005 to 2015, excluding 2010, the average value of total trade activities between Egypt and the DPRK amounted to US$17.7 million. In 2015 the DPRK was Egypt’s 134th biggest trade partner.

A significant trade peak occurred in 2010, with the total year trade value reaching US$330.8 million. Of that, US$265.6 million of commodities were exported by Egypt to the DPRK, including in particular oil, and US$65.2 million of commodities were imported by Egypt from the DPRK.

**Figure 14: Egypt’s total trade with the DPRK, December, 2005–2015**

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data
From 2008 to 2015 the value of the DPRK commodities imported by Egypt represented an average US$26.7 million per year. Over that same period the value of commodities exported to the DPRK by Egypt represented an average US$35.3 million per year. The overall trade balance from 2008 to 2015 was therefore in Egypt’s favour.

Figure 15: Egypt’s trade balance with the DPRK, December, 2005–2015

It should be noted, however, that this situation is mainly due to the peak in the export of Egyptian commodities to the DPRK in 2010. With the exception of 2010, the yearly trade balance has systematically been in North Korea’s favour. Egypt is a source of currencies for the DPRK, with a trade deficit amounting to an average of US$14.8 million per year from 2011 to 2015.

Figure 16: Egypt’s import statistics from the DPRK, all commodities, December, 2005–2015

After the peak in 2010, annual imports by Egypt of North Korean commodities progressively declined to US$5.6 million in 2015. This coincided with strongly diminishing exports of Egyptian commodities to the DPRK; in 2015 the value of Egyptian commodities exported to the DPRK amounted to only US$280 000.
In 2015 the main commodities imported from the DPRK by Egypt were:

- HS number 291521 (acetic acid)
- HS number 390120 (polyethylene – specific gravity >0.94 in primary forms)
- HS number 620729 (nightshirt, pyjamas)
- HS number 860800 (signals etc. for rail, tram, water-way, port, airfield)

None of these HS numbers relates to strategic/sensitive items.

**Ghana**

In terms of trade value, in 2015 the DPRK was Ghana’s 77th biggest trade partner, at US$6.8 million.

**Figure 17: Global trade between Ghana and the DPRK, December, 2010–2015**

![Graph showing global trade between Ghana and the DPRK, December 2010–2015](image)

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

In the recent period, the Ghanaian yearly trade balance with the DPRK has usually been in deficit, including most recently in 2015. Ghana is therefore a source of currencies for the DPRK. In 2013 and 2014, however, the Ghanaian trade balance with the DPRK was positive.

**Figure 18: Ghana’s trade balance with the DPRK, December, 2010–2015**

![Graph showing Ghana’s trade balance with the DPRK, December 2010–2015](image)

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data
Ghana mainly imports cement from the DPRK. Its exports to the DPRK, of limited value, are mainly cocoa, pearls and precious stones.

**Kenya**

From 2006 to 2015 trade activities between Kenya and the DPRK amounted to an average US$750,000 per year, characterised by a sharp decline from 2010. The total trade value reached a low point of US$210,000 in 2015, against more than US$2 million in 2006.

In 2006 the DPRK was Kenya's 99th biggest trade partner. By 2015 it had dropped to 171st.

**Figure 19: Kenya's global trade with the DPRK, December, 2006–2015**

![Graph showing Kenya's global trade with the DPRK, December, 2006–2015](source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data)

Over the same period, Kenya's global trade activities doubled, rising from more than US$10 billion in 2006 to more than US$20 billion in 2015. The sharp decrease in trade activities with the DPRK therefore contrasts with the significant increase in trade activities with other countries.

**Figure 20: Kenya’s global trade, December, 2006–2015**

![Graph showing Kenya’s global trade, December, 2006–2015](source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data)
At the time when Kenya and the DPRK had still significant trade activities, Kenya was mainly exporting two groups of commodities to the DPRK: coffee, tea, mate and spice, and printed books, newspapers and manuscripts.

Since the collapse of trade activities between the two countries there have been residual exports of live trees and plants, vegetables and pharmaceutical products from Kenya to the DPRK.

**Mauritius**

Trade activities between Mauritius and the DPRK have collapsed in the past few years. In 2015 the total value of trade activities between the two countries represented only US$20 000, against US$2 million in 2007.

From 2005 to 2015 the trade balance between Mauritius and the DPRK was in North Korea’s favour. A sharp decline in trade activities between the two countries from 2009 resulted in a trade balance, which is now close to zero. By losing Mauritius as a trade partner the DPRK has lost a source of currencies.
Morocco

Limited data is available on the trade relationship between Morocco and the DPRK. Morocco has been a long-time participant in the sharing of trade data in the context of UNCOMTRADE. However, it reported trade activities with the DPRK only from 2012 to 2015 and, as mentioned in the methodological section, the DPRK has not shared any data.

According to the available information, Morocco and the DPRK have limited trade activities. The value of total trade activities in 2015 amounted to less than US$1 million.

In the considered period, Morocco strongly reduced its imports of North Korean commodities. In 2015 the value of North Korean commodities imported by Morocco was only 50% of the 2013 value. The residual imports are of a non-strategic nature, relating for instance to manmade staple fibres, articles of apparel and electrical machinery.
The export of commodities from Morocco to the DPRK significantly declined from US$4 million in 2013 (mainly articles of iron and steel) to US$200 000 in 2015. This reflects the increasing economic isolation of the DPRK.
Senegal

From 2009 to 2014 the total trade between Senegal and the DPRK amounted to an average US$900 000 per year. A peak was observed in 2015, with the value of total trade activities rising to US$8 million, as a result of substantial exports of fish from Senegal to the DPRK.

Figure 27: Senegal’s total trade with the DPRK, December, 2005–2015

From 2005 to 2014 Senegal’s trade balance with the DPRK was slightly negative: the trade relationship was in North Korea’s favour, at an average US$81 000 per year. In 2015, however, Senegal recorded a positive trade balance with the DPRK, close to US$7.6 million.

Figure 28: Senegal’s trade balance with the DPRK, December, 2005–2015

The import of North Korean commodities by Senegal is relatively modest, amounting to an average US$470 000 from 2005 to 2015. Senegal mainly imports commodities identified under HS Chapter 87 (vehicles and parts).

It should be noted that, in 2009, Senegal imported commodities identified as HS number 293090 (organosulfur compounds) for a total value of US$40 000. This category could possibly be linked to strategic/sensitive commodities.83
Figure 29: Senegal’s imports from the DPRK, December, 2005–2015

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

Senegal almost exclusively exports fish, crustaceans and aquatic invertebrates to the DPRK.

Figure 30: Senegal’s exports to the DPRK, December, 2005–2015

Source: ISS, on the basis of GTA data

South Africa

From 1996 to 2015 South Africa’s trade balance with the DPRK was positive, with an average surplus of US$35 million per year. The international sanctions imposed upon the DPRK in 2006 and 2009 coincided with South Africa’s increasing its trade with the DPRK, reaching a peak of US$180 million in 2010.

In the most recent period, the trade balance between South Africa and the DPRK returned to low levels. In 2015 South Africa’s trade balance with the DPRK was, in fact, negative, with a deficit amounting to US$2.1 million. The DPRK is no longer a market for South African commodities.
After a strong increase from 2006 to 2011, trade activities between South Africa and the DPRK have returned to a relatively low level. In 2015 the value of total trade activities between the two countries represented US$7.5 million, against US$183 million in 2010.

In 2010 the DPRK ranked as South Africa’s 63rd biggest trade partner. In 2015 it had dropped to 141st.

From 1997 to 2015 the value of North Korean commodities imported by South Africa amounted to an average US$2 million a year. This is relatively low, compared to the value of total trade activities between the two countries, which amounted to an average US$40.6 million per year over the same period.

The most recent data, however, shows a peak in the import of North Korean commodities by South Africa, amounting to US$4.8 million in 2015, comprising mainly HS Chapter 72 commodities (iron and steel).
In the recent period, exports of South African commodities to the DPRK have been at relatively low levels. These commodities are mainly identified as:

- HS Chapter 76 (aluminium and articles thereof)
- HS Chapter 27 (mineral fuel, oil, etc.)
- HS Chapter 47 (wood pulp)

The 2010 export peak was caused by significant exports of commodities identified as HS number 260112 (agglomerated iron ores).

South Africa has not reported any trade activity with the DPRK related to HS Chapter 93 commodities (arms and ammunition).
Problems and challenges posed by military and economic cooperation

Political influence and regional conflicts resulting from trade activities

During the period from 1974 to 1983, African states in general had a range of military assistance relationships with the Soviet Union, including arms transfers. Past studies have shown that the degree of correspondence between the UN General Assembly voting records of the Soviet Union and the recipients of Soviet military assistance could be used as an indicator of political influence.84 This same analysis could be true for African states that receive assistance – whether military or economic – from North Korea.

In addition, it should be noted that imports into Africa – whether from China, the US, Russia or North Korea – all have the potential to strengthen political influence, increase direct financial gain, or assist in the exporting country’s gaining access to commercial products or natural resources such as minerals and furthering its perceived regional security interest. Those states that trade and co-operate with North Korea, in particular, stand a chance of being isolated from the international community, as they will be perceived as supporting the North Korean regime and weapons programmes.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Africa received 9% of all global arms deliveries between 2010 and 2014, the least of all the regions but still a 45% increase from 2005 to 2009.85 In many cases these arms are used legitimately for self-defence or peacekeeping operations. In others they fuel regional conflict or are used for internal repression. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the tremendous human suffering generated by brutal armed conflicts is a consequence of the flow of conventional arms to warring parties that completely disregard international humanitarian law (IHL). ‘Ceasing the supply of weapons to parties to armed conflicts that violate IHL will reduce human suffering and ultimately contribute to creating the conditions for regional and global security.’86 Indeed, continued military involvement by the DPRK in Africa may contribute to regional instability and political tension, and could facilitate a regional arms race.

Illicit activity: illegal rhino horn and wildlife trade

There is often a nexus between legal trade and illicit activities – in North Korea’s case this seems to be common, and illustrative of the challenges posed by trade and other international relations.

According to an article published in International Security in 2007, North Korea ‘has developed extensive non-nuclear covert smuggling capabilities … It is therefore imperative to track and curtail illicit networks not only to reduce the intrinsic social and economic costs they impose, but also to increase the effectiveness of counter smuggling efforts for deterring and defending against the transfer of nuclear materials and components.’87 North Korean involvement in transnational crime has steadily grown since the mid-1970s.88 One highly publicised and sensitive trafficking network is that in illicit wildlife products, including rhino horn and ivory.

In May 2015 two North Korean nationals were arrested for possession of illegal rhino horn. One a senior diplomat at the embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, the other a suspected North Korean agent, they were stopped in their vehicle in Maputo, Mozambique and found in possession of US$100 000 in cash and
4.5 kg of rhino horn. Within hours of their arrest the North Korean ambassador flew to Maputo from Johannesburg and the two were released on bail. The South African government questioned neither of them and both returned to North Korea before the end of the year.89

An article from United Press International in 2015 affirmed, ‘North Koreans regularly access the land route to Mozambique, in order to acquire horns of protected wildlife.’90 South African government sources have alleged that North Korean officials are involved in the illicit rhino horn and ivory trade. Claims have also arisen in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that the North Korean embassy is a transit point for the smuggling of illicit wildlife products.91

Overall, of cases involving diplomats, North Korean embassy officials have been implicated in 16 of 29 cases of rhino horn and ivory trade.92 In these illicit activities, ‘driven by economic necessity and justified with ideological veneer’, North Korea’s embassies appear to play a key role.93

### Table 6: Challenges of Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Problem/Challenge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Trading in general      | • Could strengthen political influence of North Korea or provide it access to commercial products or natural resources to further own perceived security interests  
                         | • Could lead to isolation from international community due to apparent support for North Korea                                                                 |
| Weapons trading         | • Could contribute to regional instability and political tension  
                         | • Could facilitate an arms race                                                                                                                        |
| Illicit wildlife smuggling | • Causes significant social and economic costs  
                         | • Could decrease the effectiveness of counter smuggling efforts for deterring and defending against the transfer of nuclear materials and components |

ISS RESEARCH REPORT
Sanctions against the DPRK

The UN Security Council has established a stringent sanctions regime against the DPRK, in response to the threat to international peace and security posed by its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles activities.

As a supplement, additional sanctions have also been adopted by states or groups of states on a unilateral basis.

**UN Security Council sanctions**

Since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted five major resolutions imposing sanctions on North Korea and related resolutions of a more technical nature. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the sanctions have been tailored to respond to, disrupt and ultimately terminate the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes of the DPRK. These sanctions have been gradually strengthened and expanded, increasing the pressure against North Korea’s illicit programmes. They have been tailored to hurt and constrain the regime in its attempt to develop a nuclear weapons capacity while limiting the impact on North Korean citizens, who bear no responsibility for the decisions taken by the regime.

Resolution 1718 was adopted on 14 October 2006, shortly after the first nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 October 2006. It imposes an arms embargo, an assets freeze and travel ban on persons involved in the DPRK’s nuclear programme, and a ban on a range of imports and exports. It also establishes the 1718 Committee.

Resolution 1874 was adopted on 12 June 2009, in response to the second nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009. It expands measures related to arms exports and imports to include all arms and related material (except the import of small arms and light weapons and their related material). It also calls upon UN member states to prevent the provision of financial services or transfer of financial resources that could contribute to prohibited programmes/activities. As per the resolution, states must report on inspections, seizures and disposals, as well as the sale, supply or transfer of small arms or light weapons, among others. The resolution also establishes a panel of experts to assist the 1718 Committee.

Resolution 2087 was adopted on 22 January 2013, in response to a space launch conducted on 12 December 2012 that used ballistic missile technology. It expands measures related to UN member states’ rights to seize and destroy material suspected of being connected to the DPRK’s weapons development and research. It also expands measures imposed on persons suspected of being involved in the DPRK’s nuclear programme, and clarifies methods of material disposal. The resolution designates four individuals and six entities, and expands designation criteria to include entities/individuals involved in the evasion of sanctions or in the violation of the resolutions.

Resolution 2094 was adopted on 7 March 2013, in response to the third nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013. It expands the prohibited items list concerning nuclear, ballistic missile and other related items, and provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited luxury goods. It imposes targeted financial sanctions, designates additional individuals and entities and expands the designation criteria to include individuals and entities that have contributed to the DPRK’s prohibited programmes.

Resolution 2270 was adopted on 2 March 2016, in response to the fourth nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 6 January 2016 ‘in violation and flagrant disregard’ of the relevant resolutions. It expands the
arms embargo and non-proliferation measures to include small arms and light weapons, as well as catch-
all provisions to ban any item relating to prohibited programmes, dual-use nuclear/missile items, and
the operational capabilities of DPRK’s armed forces. It establishes new cargo inspection and maritime
procedures, and expands financial measures. It enforces sectoral sanctions (coal, minerals and fuel ban) and
prohibits their procurement and/or transfer by UN member states. It also adds new items to the luxury goods
ban. The resolution clarifies aspects of the ban on hosting DPRK trainers, advisors or other officials for
policy, paramilitary and military training. It bans specialised training or teaching for DPRK nationals in specific
fields that could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation activities. It requires UN member states to expel DPRK
diplomats and foreign nationals involved in illicit activities, and designates additional individuals and entities.
For lists of items prohibited for export to and import from the DPRK see https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/
sanctions/1718/prohibited-items.

Table 7: Examples of goods and services covered by UN-based sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td>Automatic rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MANPADs (man-portable air-defence systems)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes</td>
<td>Pyrolytic or fibrous reinforced graphites usable for rocket nozzles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceramic composite materials (dielectric constant less than 6 at any frequency from 100 MHz to 100 GHz) for use in missile radomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gyro-astro compasses and other devices that derive position or orientation by means of automatically tracking celestial bodies or satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on certain financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance</td>
<td>Facilitating a transaction between the provider of prohibited goods and an entity listed by the 1718 Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchasing prohibited goods on behalf of a listed entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on specialised teaching and training</td>
<td>Military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialised courses in advanced physics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialised courses in aerospace engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialised courses in computer simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel ban</td>
<td>Entry into or transit through the territory by a designated individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry into or transit through the territory by an individual acting at the direction of a designated individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry into or transit through the territory by an individual assisting in the evasion of sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial measures</td>
<td>Financial services to a company assisting in the evasion of sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing assets to a designated individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxury goods embargo</td>
<td>Snowmobile (&gt; US$2 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Racing car</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aquatic recreational vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxury watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal, iron, gold and minerals ban</td>
<td>Gold chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gold ingot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel ban</td>
<td>Kerosene</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the authors
As at 1 September 2016, the UN sanctions regime against the DPRK is thus based on the following components:

- An arms embargo
- An embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes
- A ban on the export of luxury goods
- A ban on the export of aviation fuel and rocket fuel to the DPRK
- A ban on the import of coal, iron, iron ore, gold and others from the DPRK
- A travel ban and/or asset freeze on designated individuals and entities
- A ban on the provision of financial services
- A ban on coal, iron, gold and minerals

Table 8: Overview of the sanctions regime established by the UN Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Arms embargo                                  | • Export to the DPRK: States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, of all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their related materiel  
  • Import by the DPRK: States shall prohibit the procurement of all arms and related materiel from the DPRK  
  • Conventional arms – repair: States shall prevent the shipment of items to or from the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering and marketing |
| Embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes | States shall prevent the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items relevant to nuclear-related programmes, ballistic missile-related programmes and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes  
  States shall prohibit the procurement of all the above from the DPRK |
| Ban on certain financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance | States shall prevent any transfer to the DPRK, or from the DPRK, of financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of: arms and related materiel; or items relating to nuclear, ballistic missile, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes  
  This applies also to brokering or other intermediary services |
| Proliferation networks                        | States shall expel DPRK nationals or officials, as well as foreign officials, who are working for a designated entity or individual, or assisting in sanctions evasions or violating these resolutions |
| Ban on specialised teaching and training       | States shall prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals that could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation activities |
| Assets freeze                                 | States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources in their territories that are owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities  
  States shall freeze all the funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled by entities of the government of the DPRK or the Worker’s Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities working on their behalf or at their direction, that the state determines are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by these resolutions |
| Travel ban                                    | States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of:  
  • Designated individuals  
  • Individuals acting on behalf or at the direction of designated individuals  
  • Individuals determined by the state as acting on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, violating the resolutions, assisting in the evasion of sanctions or travelling for the purpose of illicit activities |
### Category Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Financial measures               | States shall prevent the provision of financial services, or of any financial or other assets or resources, that could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited programmes or activities, or to the evasion of sanctions.  
States shall prohibit the opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of DPRK banks. States shall also prohibit financial institutions from partnering with DPRK banks, except if it is pre-approved by the 1718 Committee.  
States shall prohibit public and private financial support for trade with the DPRK, where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other prohibited activities.  
States shall not commit grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes addressing the needs of the civilian population or the promotion of denuclearisation. |
| Luxury goods embargo             | States shall prevent the supply of luxury goods to the DPRK.                                                                                                                                              |
| Coal, iron, gold and minerals ban | The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore or rare earth minerals.                                                                                |
| Fuel ban                         | States shall prevent the sale or supply of aviation fuel to the DPRK.                                                                                                                                     |
| Inspection and transportation    | States shall inspect cargoes within or transiting their territories that have originated in the DPRK, or that are destined for the DPRK, or that have been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals or individuals working for it.  
States shall seize and dispose of prohibited items that are identified in inspections.                                                                                                                  |
| Reporting                        | States are called upon to submit a report to the Security Council on the steps or concrete measures they have taken to implement the resolutions. They are also encouraged to provide any additional information.  
Reporting is also expected from states in relation to:  
• Inspection, seizure and disposal  
• Non-compliance issues  
• Transfers, re-naming or re-registering of DPRK aircraft, vessels or ships.                                                                                                                      |

Source: compiled by the ISS, on the basis of information produced by the UN

### Unilateral sanctions by the European Union

The EU claims a policy of critical engagement towards the DPRK. As per this policy, the EU’s goals are ‘to support a lasting reduction of tensions in the Korean Peninsula and in the region, the upholding of the international non-proliferation regime, and the improvement of the situation of human rights in the DPRK’.¹⁰¹

The EU has determined to domesticate sanctions decided by the UN Security Council through its various resolutions. In addition, the EU has systematically gone beyond UN-based sanctions by adopting its own more stringent and complete sanctions. For instance, when UN Resolution 1718 embargoed large-scale conventional weapons, including ‘any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms’, the EU included the much broader EU Common List of Military Equipment.¹⁰²

### Unilateral sanctions by the United States

On 26 June 2008 US President George W Bush issued Executive Order 13466 declaring a national emergency to address the ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’ represented by the ‘current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula’.¹⁰³ This executive order initiated a sanctions regime against the DPRK on a unilateral basis.
The US sanctions regime against the DPRK implements the provisions of relevant resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. It also goes beyond their scope through additional autonomous measures.

The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, signed by President Barack Obama on 18 February 2016 with broad support from the US Congress, broadens sanctions against the DPRK to include, for instance, individuals and entities involved in cash smuggling, serious human rights abuses, and censorship by the government of North Korea.104

**African Union sanctions mechanisms and the DPRK**

The PSC was established to be a collective security and early warning arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations.105 The mandate of the PSC derives from article 20 (bis) of the AU Constitutive Act (as inserted by article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act 2003) together with article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC.106

Under the protocol, the PSC can institute sanctions. This prerogative is defined, however, in a restrictive manner: ‘[T]he Peace and Security Council shall institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration.’107 The matter of sanctions against a non-African state could, however, be approached on a different basis, examples being:

- Article 7 paragraph k, which mandates the PSC to ‘promote and develop a strong “partnership for peace and security” between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations’

- Article 7 paragraph r, which mandates the PSC to ‘decide on any other issue having implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability of the Continent’

The PSC has so far neither condemned the situation in the DPRK nor recognised its consequences for the security of African states. On 2 September 2016 the Egyptian chair of the PSC did convene a meeting of the PSC dedicated to the ‘re-activation of the subsidiary bodies’, including of the sanctions committee. This suggests that progress might be observed in this area in the foreseeable future.
Implementation of sanctions by African states

As the Panel of Experts supporting the 1718 Committee noted in its most recent report, Africa has an especially high number of non-reporting states. As at 1 September 2016, only eight African UN member states had reported to the committee, representing just 15% of African state membership.

Table 9: Overview of reports submitted by African UN member states to the 1718 Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>S/AC.49/2010/6 4 May 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>S/AC.49/2012/7 29 June 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S/AC.49/2016/10 27 May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>S/AC.49/2014/7 24 December 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>S/AC.49/2011/1 3 February 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISS, on the basis of information available on the website of the 1718 Committee as of 1 September 2016

Furthermore, several of the reports submitted to the 1718 Committee have merely recognised the existence of the sanctions regime and indicated that relevant ministries and agencies have been informed, with little information on concrete steps taken or to be taken to enforce the sanctions. This can be observed in the reports submitted by Algeria (2007), Egypt (2012, 2016), Nigeria (2011) and South Africa (2006, 2010).

Some reports seem outdated and not reflective of the current situation. The report submitted by Burkina Faso (2010) looks like a nil report, justified by the statement, ‘there is virtually no trade between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Burkina Faso’. While this correctly reflected the situation at the time of submission of the report, changes have clearly occurred since then. According to the data extracted from UNCOMTRADE, trade activities between Burkina Faso and the DPRK have skyrocketed recently, rising from an average US$780 000 per year from 1995–2011 to US$36 million in 2015.
Figure 35: Burkina Faso’s total trade with the DPRK, export/import/re-import/re-export

Constructive role played by African states in the UN Security Council

African states sitting in the UN Security Council as non-permanent members have systematically provided their support for sanctions as a means to apply multilateral pressure on North Korea. For example: Resolution 1718 (2006) was adopted with the support of the Republic of the Congo, Ghana and Tanzania; Resolution 1874 (2009) with the support of Burkina Faso, Libya and Uganda; resolutions 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) with the support of Morocco, Rwanda and Togo; and Resolution 2270 (2016) with the support of Angola, Egypt and Senegal.

Loopholes in the sanctions regime

When it comes to reporting on sanctions, some African states seem to have taken advantage of loopholes in the system. Of the limited few who have reported, some have only submitted reports recognising the existence of the sanctions regimes, without much more detail. They may indicate that relevant ministries and agencies have been informed, but provide scarce information on concrete steps taken or to be taken to enforce the sanctions.

In addition, many states, and in particular customs officials at ports of entry, lack the technical knowledge and capacity to identify sensitive material and items on the various lists of prohibited items. This not only prevents effective controls at the national level but could also be an avenue for North Korea to circumvent trade embargoes.110

Limited reactions from African states to the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile activities of North Korea

The nuclear tests conducted by North Korea have had a limited effect on the African continent. Most countries have refrained from explicitly condemning them as grave threats to international peace and security, apart from South Africa and Egypt.

In 2006 South Africa strongly condemned the test conducted by North Korea, on the basis of a position111 reiterated after each of the subsequent nuclear tests, including most recently after the 9 September 2016 nuclear test.112 Furthermore, the South African position has been strengthened by its expression of concern over the ballistic missile launches by North Korea.113

The Egyptian government has taken a similarly strong stance against the North Korean nuclear weapons programme by firmly condemning the nuclear test of 2006.114 The Egyptian government has not, however, produced similar statements after subsequent nuclear tests.
As described above, some African states maintain strong diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea. Some officials claim that while their countries have every right to continue economic relations with North Korea they will balance this right with the need to comply with the sanctions regimes issued by the UN Security Council. From discussions with government officials it is clear that the issue of sanctions is a sensitive one, given that a number of African states themselves have been subject to such regimes. This is exacerbated by the oft-held view that sanctions do not in themselves result in the intended outcomes, and that dialogue between states should be maintained.

**Lack of capacity to implement sanctions and inhibiting factors**

From discussions with government officials it is clear that sanctions is a sensitive issue given that a number of Africa States themselves have been subject to such regimes. This is exacerbated by the oft-held view that sanctions do not in themselves result in the intended outcomes and that dialogue between states should be maintained.

There may be another inhibiting factor; namely, the perception held by some African states, as non-nuclear weapon states, that the nuclear-armed states have not lived up to their side of the bargain with respect to obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They may argue that they have committed themselves through the NPT to remain non-nuclear weapon states while nuclear-armed states continue to retain their stockpiles. This, they feel, is in contravention of article VI of the NPT in which all parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. As one diplomat from South Africa commented, ‘[A]s long as some countries have nuclear weapons, others will want them.’

This is exacerbated by the fact that not many African states are fully aware of the nature of the North Korean state, in particular the social and economic conditions under which its citizens live. Despite international media reports on human rights violations, the lack of food security and other humanitarian challenges brought on by either natural causes or the state, this is not highlighted in the African press. Africa is dealing with its own challenges of development, poverty, education and health, etc. The problems on the Korean Peninsula are a faraway reality and not necessarily prioritised by the state or indeed civil society. There is thus a clear need for greater awareness raising among the African populace.
Summary of conclusions and potential solutions

The analysis of the data related to trade activities between African states and the DPRK reflects limited movement of sensitive commodities. Despite the volume of trade activities in commodities between African states and the DPRK remaining limited overall – averaging only US$118 million per year from 2011 to 2015 – African states are likely to remain a strategic target for the DPRK going forward. This is likely due to a number of considerations, namely:

• Politically, the African continent represents one quarter of the UN membership, and an important part of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this context, securing a good relationship with African states is a priority for the DPRK.

• The high number of conflict/post-conflict situations on the continent makes it a market for security services (including specialised teaching and training), which the DPRK is willing to provide.

• The rise in maritime and air transportation activities on the continent, coupled with its geographic position, makes it an increasingly likely transit destination for prohibited goods and individuals subject to travel bans.

• Many African states have had negative experiences with sanctions regimes themselves and may be disillusioned with the idea of imposing such regimes on North Korea.

• African states will remain a target for the DPRK for hard currency and to enhance its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes in various ways (directly or through, for example, the purchase of luxury goods for Kim Jong Un’s family).

In this context, improved implementation of sanctions by African states should be sought, in particular in the following areas:

• Increasing the number of African states submitting a report to the 1718 Committee, thus confirming the political isolation of the DPRK

• Enforcing the ban on specialised teaching and training

• Enhancing the ability of African states, in particular maritime transportation hubs, to conduct cargo inspections as called for in Resolution 2270

• Enhancing the ability of African states, in particular transportation hubs, to enforce the travel ban

Specifically, it is recommended that the following measures be considered:

• Engage key delegations in the UN Security Council to recommend that the matter of sanctions be included on the agenda of the annual consultations between the UN Security Council and the AU PSC. This forum, which aims to harmonise the work between the two bodies, would be an ideal platform to foster dialogue between the two bodies on sanctions-related matters.
• Support the PSC in its efforts to operationalise the long-awaited sanctions committee. This subsidiary body of the PSC will eventually assist African states in their efforts to implement sanctions, including those on North Korea.

• Raise awareness of the sanctions against North Korea among African states, including the matter of reporting to the 1718 Committee. It is recommended that support be given to awareness-raising and capacity-building activities, such as workshops, at the subregional level.

• Ensure that states relying on North Korea for specialised teaching and training are offered similar services by other partners, to undermine North Korea’s ability to remain a service provider in this area.

• Train customs officials and professionals in the transportation industry in African states that are becoming maritime and air transportation hubs. These include, in particular, Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and South Africa. The training, which could be delivered in partnership with the WCO, would develop the capacity of African states to conduct cargo inspections and enforce travel bans.

• Promote the development of a system that correlates the Harmonised System with the various multilateral export control regimes’ lists of strategic and sensitive items, including dual-use goods and technologies.
COOPERATION BETWEEN AFRICAN STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Notes

5 UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE), http://comtrade.un.org/dbv/; the list of states participating in the system, with their respective levels of participation, is available at UNCOMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org/dbv/mr/daReportersResults.aspx
6 For a presentation of the Harmonised System, see World Customs Organization (WCO), What is the harmonized system (HS)?, http://comtrade.un.org/db/mr/rfCommoditiesList.aspx
10 For a presentation of the Harmonised System, see World Customs Organization (WCO), What is the harmonized system (HS)?, www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx. The list of participating countries and economies is available at WCO, 154 contracting parties, 12 May 2016, www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/~/medi/a/4236F2D74364330BF0ECD6FCB79A6DS.ashx
11 For a presentation of the Harmonised System, see World Customs Organization (WCO), What is the harmonized system (HS)?, www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx. The list of participating countries and economies is available at WCO, 154 contracting parties, 12 May 2016, www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/~/medi/a/4236F2D74364330BF0ECD6FCB79A6DS.ashx
12 On this topic, see WCO, Strategic Trade Control Enforcement (STCE) implementation guide, www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/security-programme/~/~/~/~/~/~/~/~media/4236F2D74364330BF0ECD6FCB79A6DS.ashx
17 Daan van Beek, Realizing the hybrid control concept, 1540 Compass, 7, Fall 2014.
19 Ibid., 104.
20 A Berger, I. North Korea in the global arms market, Whitehall Papers, 84:1, 2015, 13.
21 Ibid., 14.
24 Ibid., 104.
26 Ibid., 14.
29 Ibid., 104.
34 Ibid., 102.
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40 Ibid., 102.
44 A Berger, I. North Korea in the global arms market, Whitehall Papers, 84:1, 2015, 15.

35 A Berger, I. North Korea in the global arms market. Whitehall Papers, 84:1, 2015, 15.


37 A Berger, I. North Korea in the global arms market. Whitehall Papers, 84:1, 2015, 15–16.


41 Ibid.


45 See: www.kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201609/news13/20160912-11ee.html


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50 S Ramami, North Korea’s African allies, The Diplomat, 4 June 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/06/north-korea-african-allies/


53 UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, https://www.unroca.org


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.


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78 For the research, the following HS codes have been used: 261400 (titanium ores and concentrates); 261590 (niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates); 2601 (iron ores & concentrates, including roast pyrites); 7108 (gold); 2701 (coal, briquettes, aovids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal); 2702 (lignite); 2703 (peat, including peat litter); 2704 (coke and semi-coke of coal, of lignite or peat); 7201 (pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs); 7202 (ferro-alloys); 7203 (ferrous products); 720410 (waste and scrap of cast iron); 720430 (waste and scrap of tinned iron or steel); 720440 (other waste and scrap); 720450 (reSmelting scrap ingot); 720510 (granules); 720529 (powders); 720610 (ingots); 720690 (other); 7207 (semi-finished products
of iron or non-alloy steel); 7208, 7209, 7210, 7211, 7212 (various kinds of flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel); 7214 and 7215 (various kinds of other bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel); 7216 (angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel); and 7217 (wire of iron or non-alloy steel).

Export data is available on a yearly basis only from 2003.

Export data is not available for all years from 1995 to 2015. Only years with available export data were used for the calculation.


As indicated in the methodology section, commodity numbers that are likely to be used for strategic/sensitive items are also used for non-strategic/non-sensitive items. The presence of specific commodity numbers in trade activities between two countries is therefore no evidence that strategic/sensitive items have been traded.

However, as indicated in WCO, Strategic Trade Control Enforcement (STCE) implementation guide, ‘many chemicals are considered strategic. The vast majority of these chemicals have industrial applications. Some are widely traded in large volumes, while others are specialty or research chemicals shipped in small quantities with niche markets.’


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Cooperation between African states and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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