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## On the Agenda

### The PSC agrees on a cautious exit strategy for AMISOM

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has renewed the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for another year – with a number of critical changes. The new mandate of the largest Africa-led peace-support operation is less about fighting al-Shabaab and more about supporting the Federal Government of Somalia to establish a functioning and effective security sector architecture. This comes as the African Union (AU) is considering a gradual exit from Somalia. The rationale behind this shift seems to be that the threat posed by al-Shabaab has diminished to such an extent that local authorities should be able to handle it on their own.

AMISOM has a new mandate, as set out by the PSC on 12 July and confirmed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 30 August 2017. Its tasks going forward are to:

- Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on the abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia
- Reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups
- Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels, as well as stabilisation, reconciliation and peacebuilding

Many questions, however, remain about AMISOM's new mandate. Given that the European Union has reduced its funding to AMISOM, is this new strategic shift owing to budgetary considerations rather than the evolution of the security situation on the ground? Clearly, while al-Shabaab has lost most of the territory it used to control, it seems to have retained its capability to launch asymmetric attacks on civilians, AMISOM or the Somali national forces.

The report of the UN secretary-general on Somalia in early September painted a complex picture of the security situation. It noted a reduction of incidents during Ramadan in Mogadishu this year due to the actions of the federal government, yet the number of casualties caused by the terrorist group has increased owing to its use of improvised explosive devices.

#### PSC Chairperson

##### H.E. Dieudonné Ndabarushima

Ambassador of Burundi to Ethiopia and the African Union

#### Current members of the PSC:

Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Zambia

According to Institute for Security Studies researcher Omar Mahmood, al-Shabaab continues to present a serious security threat to Somalia, regardless of the specific ebb and flow of violence over the past few years.

‘Recent dynamics, such as continued car bombs in Mogadishu or the targeting of army bases like in Beled Hawo, demonstrate these capabilities. In this sense, while there are areas of progress, al-Shabaab’s core ability to challenge security actors and inflict violence in Somalia persists,’ he says.

In such a context, the ability of the Somali national forces to take over the fight against al-Shabaab remains uncertain – in both the short and the medium term.

The ability of the Somali national forces to take over the fight against al-Shabaab remains uncertain

### A flexible exit timeline

The new direction for AMISOM follows on the AU Commission’s Ten-Year Lessons Learned report and an AU–UN Joint Review. Both exercises came to the conclusion that AMISOM needs to adopt a conditions-based exit strategy from Somalia.

At this stage the exit timeline sets October 2018 for the reduction of AMISOM troops by at least 1 500, while 500 additional policemen would be deployed in the country. Meanwhile, the AU, the UN and the Federal Government of Somalia will launch a verification exercise of the Somali national security forces to determine the exact number of staff, their equipment and their training needs.

A subsequent transition plan will be defined after a review in 2018 and until the 2021 election, based on the security conditions at the time. It should be noted that the exit strategy remains cautious, as the PSC states that AMISOM ‘remains an indispensable partner for peace in Somalia, but needs to be properly reconfigured to support the next phase of state building in Somalia during the course of the implementation of the transitional plan’. This timeline provides a degree of flexibility, to be adjusted depending on security conditions.

### The establishment of an effective security sector as the main condition of exit

As troop- and police-contributing countries are looking forward to an exit, AMISOM is now oriented towards both an end-state – the establishment of the national security architecture agreed to in April to take over the fight against al-Shabaab – and a short-term end date of 2020/2021, when the first one person/one vote election is supposed to take place.

The emphasis on the establishment of an effective security sector as a vector for the stabilisation of Somalia is ambitious. Firstly, it assumes that

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1 500  
FEWER AMISOM TROOPS BY  
THE END OF NEXT YEAR

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state building in Somalia lies mainly in the security sector rather than in the social contract between the authorities and the inhabitants. Secondly, it is not certain that the national security architecture will respond effectively to the challenge posed by al-Shabaab.

The security pact adopted in May 2017 in London proposes an unprecedented division of labour in the management of security between the national and the regional levels. For example, the national security council would be in charge of drafting policies and strategies while the regional security council would be in charge of their implementation. It is difficult to see how this system will not replicate the clan divisions of Somali politics, resulting in a fragmented security sector. Moreover, the coordination costs associated with such an architecture in a post-conflict setting could hamper the effectiveness of the response to the challenge posed by al-Shabaab.

Clearly, beyond defeating al-Shabaab, the key for the sustainable stabilisation of Somalia lies in the ability of the various regional, clan-based factions to agree on the governance of security in the country. Without such a development, AMISOM would likely have to extend its deployment.

## Which role for AMISOM beyond military tasks?

Participants in the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference in March 2017 acknowledged that the mission was 'too military heavy'. The main consideration guiding the AMISOM exit strategy seems to be the takeover by the Somali security forces, rather than the political stabilisation of the country.

Despite calling for an enhanced role for AMISOM in a new configuration, the PSC does not set any guidelines about AMISOM's role in civilian stabilisation. The Ten-Year Lessons Learnt report includes such a questioning

of the future role of AMISOM: should AMISOM focus on a reduced military presence to support the fight against al-Shabaab and let other actors handle civilian stabilisation? Or should AMISOM withdraw a significant part of its military component in order to beef up its civilian component? If this is the case, priorities need to be defined in order to guarantee an impact on the ground. The drafting of a new concept of operations should provide clarification on this issue.


## The new mandate of AMISOM, as proposed by the PSC

- Continue to support political dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia
- Protect main population centres and the presence of international actors, securing and enabling political processes, reconciliation, maintenance of law and order, early recovery and public safety, while prudently mentoring Somali security entities in implementing a transfer of responsibilities to the Somali national security forces
- Contribute to securing the main supply routes, beginning with those linking the main population centres, through joint operations with Somali forces
- Conduct targeted operations against al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups jointly with Somali forces, continue mentoring during combat operations and provide operational support to Somali forces
- Support capacity building at various levels of the Somali national security forces, in line with the National Security Architecture and in full coordination with the UN and other relevant partners
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and support early recovery and extension of state authority, within available resources

## The priority tasks of AMISOM adopted by the UN Security Council

- Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritising the main population centres
- Assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions, their efforts towards reconciliation and peacebuilding and security for key infrastructure
- Protect, as appropriate, its personnel facilities, installations, equipment and missions, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of UN personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council
- Secure supply routes, including to areas recovered from al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the UN and the AU
- Conduct targeted offensive operations against al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali security forces
- Mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and in line with the National Security Architecture
- Reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel with an authorised AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the secretary-general
- Receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the UN and the Federal Government of Somalia

## Deadly violence continues in Somalia



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Conflict Trends Report no. 60 (July 2017)

Notes: Figures show that the number of conflict events and reported fatalities in Somalia remains very high. According to ACLED over 2500 people died in Somalia in the first half of 2017 due to terror attacks. This graph also shows an increase in the number of violent incidents in the Central African Republic (article on page 6). In comparison, there have been fewer fatalities in this period caused by terrorist attacks in countries like Chad and Mali and due to protests in Ethiopia. In Kenya, according to ACLED, the violence in this period was due to attacks by al-Shabaab, as well as ethnic and communal disputes, often over land, aggravated by political tension in the run-up to August elections.



## On the Agenda

### Challenges ahead for the AU roadmap on the CAR

The AU is making a renewed effort to help the Central African Republic (CAR) to its feet after having withdrawn from the country in 2014 and handed operations over to the United Nations (UN). The PSC met on 16 October 2017 to discuss the implementation of the new AU Roadmap for the CAR. Ongoing violence, however, is hindering the various attempts at achieving a ceasefire and protecting CAR civilians.

The international community's post-conflict reconstruction efforts after the relatively peaceful election in 2016 have been dealt a serious blow by the resurgence of violence and organised criminal activity in the CAR. It was hoped that the election, which brought Faustin Archange Touadéra to power, would unite the country and foster stability. The resurgence of violence now raises fears of a potential genocide.

### The resurgence of violence now raises fears of a potential genocide.

Like several other agreements, the peace deal facilitated by the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio Community on 19 June 2017 was flouted only days after being signed. The AU is yet to implement its Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR and it is hoped that the PSC meeting on the country on 16 October will help the AU's mediation effort to gather momentum. Recent developments require urgent efforts to bridge the divisions that sustain violence, build intercommunity confidence, and secure a lasting agreement that will end the five-year conflict.

### Conflict setting in the CAR

Last year, on 17 November 2016, international donors pledged US\$2.2 billion to support post-conflict reconstruction in the country. While there is no information on whether donors have honoured their pledges, peacebuilding efforts in the country have stalled owing to the continued violence.

About 70% of the country is under the control of armed groups, while the government and the UN Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) are unable to expand state authority beyond Bangui.

The conflict is fuelled by continued mistrust and the quest for revenge, not only among rival armed groups but also among rival communities affiliated

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70%

OF THE CAR IS CONTROLLED  
BY ARMED GROUPS

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with the ex-Séléka and anti-balaka armed groups. The ongoing clashes hamper efforts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate fighters.

The 14 identified armed groups in the CAR often participate in the government-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration consultative committee, but they are unwilling to lay down their weapons. Armed groups and communities are worried that giving away their weapons could make them vulnerable to attacks by members of rival groups that are unwilling to cease hostilities.

## The conflict has been worsened by the withdrawal of US Special Forces and Ugandan troops

The conflict has also been complicated by the fragmentation and proliferation of militias that are motivated not only by antagonism towards rival groups but also by criminality and lawlessness. The illegal exploitation of natural resources is a major source of income for armed factions and they fight each other for control of mining sites, especially in the eastern and western parts of the country.

### **Security vacuum after exit of US, Ugandan and French troops**

The conflict has been worsened by the withdrawal of US Special Forces and Ugandan troops that were fighting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa, particularly in the south-eastern CAR.

Last year, on 30 October 2016, France also ended its Operation Sangaris, which had been deployed to the region during the worst of the crisis in 2013.

The government's weak security institutions – assisted by more than 12 000 UN peacekeepers – have been unable to fill the void left by these withdrawals. Armed groups, including the LRA, now operate freely in those regions and pose a threat to the civilian population in the south-eastern CAR. In a report released on 8 September 2017, Amnesty International accused the UN of being ineffective in the face of numerous attacks against civilians. On 8 May 2017, for instance, UN peacekeepers arrived too late to prevent the massacre of about 130 people in the town of Alindao. Yet the protection of civilians is the immediate, priority task of MINUSCA officers, who have also suffered deadly attacks by armed groups.

The increased unrest in the CAR, coupled with the withdrawal of the Ugandan and US forces, has led the UN to request an additional 750 troops to strengthen MINUSCA's presence on the ground. Rwanda recently sent 140 troops to reinforce the mission. As the mandate of MINUSCA awaits renewal in November 2017, the UN Security Council should strengthen the mission. It has to adequately protect civilians and ensure a safe environment for the

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12 000

UN PEACEKEEPERS IN THE CAR

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provision of humanitarian assistance to about 52% of the CAR's population (2.4 million out of a total of 4.6 million people).

## The challenge of securing a lasting deal

Apart from the recent peace deal mediated by the Sant'Egidio community, there have been several other mediation efforts to resolve the crises in the CAR, including by the AU, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Chad and Angola.

In an effort to harmonise mediation efforts, the AU and its partners adopted its new Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR in July 2017 in order to promote dialogue and secure a deal that could disarm combatants. The roadmap is a common initiative by the AU, ECCAS and ICGLR, as well as Angola, the Republic of Congo and Chad. This is to ensure the coordination of peace efforts by neighbouring states and that they play an active role in getting the agreement to stick. Indeed, most of the warring leaders in the CAR have support, interests and properties in neighbouring countries. However, the new roadmap has yet to make an impact on the ground.

In an effort to harmonise mediation efforts, the AU and its partners adopted its new Roadmap

## Peace versus justice debate

In light of the failing effort to get armed groups to cooperate, some argue that removing the element of justice may incentivise these groups to lay down their weapons in exchange for amnesty.

Others maintain that, rather than ending grievances, amnesty will only encourage the growing culture of impunity in the country.

Possible amnesty provisions are also not in line with the conclusions of the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation of May 2015, where participants resolved that ensuring justice is central to the peace effort. This led former interim president Catherine Samba-Panza's government to promulgate the establishment of the Special Criminal Court for the CAR on 3 June 2015. The court is to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity that have occurred since 2003, when former president Francois Bozize led a coup d'état against his predecessor, Ange-Felix Patasse.

In a recent speech to the UN Human Rights Council, the president of the CAR also insisted that the road to peace lay in combating impunity and holding people accountable for their crimes.

The government and international mediators have to find ways to address underlying fears and assure citizens that the perpetrators of violence will

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2,4 million

PEOPLE NEED HUMANITARIAN  
AID IN THE CAR

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face justice. This includes supporting the country's weak justice system to also prioritise the prosecution of those leaders who had ordered and financed criminal acts in the country.

### **Making international sanctions effective**

Overall, the travel bans, asset freezes and arms embargoes imposed by the UN against the CAR have been violated. Pertinent to the arms embargoes, the report of the UN Panel of Experts shows that the 'ongoing hostilities are fuelled by a regular flow of weapons through ... Chad, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. This illicit flow of arms contradicts the UNSC decision that all member states shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons to the CAR.

Neighbouring countries have to cooperate to enforce the existing arms embargoes on the CAR. This includes providing support to the government to track and stop those facilitating illegal trade and funding rebel groups.



## On the Agenda

### Sustaining the fight against illegal weapons in Africa

The AU has declared that every September until 2020 will be 'Africa Amnesty Month' for the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons. This is part of the AU's effort to implement the roadmap on practical steps to silence the guns in Africa by 2020 – a roadmap adopted in January. Questions remain, however, about the role of individual member states in this initiative.

The AU's new initiative to combat illegal weapons in Africa, discussed during an open session of the PSC on 4 September 2017, stipulates that persons who surrender their illegally owned weapons or arms during the month of September 'shall not be subjected to disclosure, humiliation, arrest or prosecution'.

It also says that persons who fail to surrender their illegally owned weapons/arms during this period shall automatically be considered to be in violation of national laws and the amnesty and shall therefore be prosecuted according to the national laws of member states.

### Africa is the continent most affected by the proliferation, circulation and use of illegal weapons

This will be carried out in line with African and international best practices, which identify states as the recipients of the surrendered arms. The 2000 Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, for instance, obliges member states to develop and implement national programmes for the voluntary surrender of illegal small arms and light weapons.

One of the questions yet to be discussed by the PSC, however, is whether member states have the capacity and political will to implement the decision.

### Reality of the illegal proliferation of arms in Africa

Africa is the continent most affected by the proliferation, circulation and use of illegal weapons due to weak institutions, porous borders and corruption. These weapons provide the opportunity for non-state actors to further their interests through violent means.

Many African states have not established adequate regulatory measures to control and manage weapons. This makes it easy for traffickers to circulate

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# September

AFRICA AMNESTY MONTH

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weapons, not only within those weak countries but also in states with well-established regulatory frameworks.

For instance, research suggests that Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire – both fairly organised states – are points of entry of illegal weapons into weaker states in West Africa, while Sudan is a point of entry into East Africa. Mali serves as a point of entry into North African countries with stronger regulatory systems.

The AU and its regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) have a vital role to play in identifying states with weak regulatory frameworks and helping them to detect and intercept illegal weapons. This includes supporting member states with clear guidelines to implement the amnesty decision.

### **The diversion of legally obtained weapons**

Several reports show that even legally obtained weapons become illegal owing to diversions, corruption and organised raids by criminal and terrorist networks.

Nelson Alusala, a research consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, stresses that 'the diversion of state-owned arms into illicit markets is an increasingly worrying trend in Africa today. These are arms that governments import legitimately, but which, due to poor physical security and stockpile management systems, get diverted into illicit markets.'

Such situations require a renewed commitment from member states to document, mark and protect state stockpiles of weapons, as provided for by international frameworks. This includes enhancing cooperation among states on import and export controls and information sharing on arms seizures, arms traffickers and armed crimes.

Information about existing weapons flows, trafficking routes and techniques used to circumvent control systems must also be shared across all states.

### **Adherence to international frameworks**

There are already important landmarks in international regulatory frameworks for the weapons trade.

For instance, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2013 binds various stakeholders to regulatory frameworks

that could end the proliferation and circulation of illegal weapons. But many AU member states are yet to sign and ratify the ATT. The ATT has been ratified by only 22 African countries, while 17 others have signed but not ratified it.

Even AU decisions, including the Bamako Declaration and the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, have not been effectively implemented.

Alusala says that 'one of the most comprehensive approaches would be for the AU and its RECs/RMs to lobby member states to adopt and domesticate international instruments such as the ATT, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) as well as sub-regional instruments'. Member states should also adhere to relevant decisions on cross-border management and maritime security, among others.

Legally obtained weapons become illegal owing to diversions, corruption and organised raids by criminal networks

### **Enhancing state willingness to enforce arms embargoes**

The AU and subregional organisations should be more willing to impose and enforce arms embargoes on selected crisis areas and member states.

Indeed, the illegal flow of arms in Africa follows the demand from armed conflicts. There have been a number of UN arms embargoes on conflict-affected areas such as Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Eritrea, Libya, Darfur (in Sudan) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

However, AU member states have been weak in enforcing and supporting the implementation of arms embargoes.

In the CAR, for instance, the UN Panel of Experts reported that the 'ongoing hostilities are fuelled by a regular flow of weapons through routes that have been identified in previous reports of the Panel of Experts, in particular from Chad, Sudan and the DRC'.

The AU and its international partners should find ways to support states to implement arms embargoes, given that some neighbouring states do not necessarily always have the capacity to enforce such embargoes, often due to their own internal crises.

There should also be improved intelligence on the manufacturers, middlemen and recipients of weapons in Africa. The AU does at times convene meetings of experts in order to map illegal arms, but it needs to develop the internal capacity to engage in sustained data gathering and information sharing.

It should also be able to establish commissions of inquiry for targeted investigations as the need arises. In the interim, more attention must be given to the flow of ammunition into conflict zones.

There should be improved intelligence on the manufacturers, middlemen and recipients of weapons in Africa

### **What about the causes of conflicts?**

However, the effort to curb illegal weapons will be unsuccessful if there are no concrete efforts to address the main causes of conflict, such as poor governance, marginalisation, state oppression, flawed political movements, injustice and inequality.

Indeed, the roadmap on silencing the guns identified these areas of concern, but efforts to implement the roadmap have thus far focused mainly on issues such as illegal weapons, which are merely enablers of violent conflicts.

While the proliferation of guns in Africa remains a worrying phenomenon, it is not the foundational cause of conflict on the continent.

Going forward, the AU should also be firm about combatting poor governance, corruption and inequality as part of the effort to implement the roadmap on silencing the guns. This will shift the discussion from merely managing the current crisis to a preventative initiative.

# Situation Analysis

## Nigeria's military approach against separatists stokes more tension



The Nigerian military has reacted with heavy-handedness to the nascent rebellion in the south-east of the country by groups that claim to be the successors to the failed Biafra secessionist movement of the late 1960s. So far there has been little international reaction to the violence in the south-east. The AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN should urge the government to pursue a peaceful solution to the unrest in the country.

Last month the Nigerian military embarked on 'Operation Python Dance', a show of force to try to quell the pro-Biafra agitation in the south-east of the country. The military exercise targeted the supporters of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its leader Nnamdi Kanu, who has been the focal point of the Biafra agitation since 2015.

## Opinions in Nigeria differ on the appropriate response to the pro-Biafra movement

Several pro-Biafrans were arrested and the military has been accused of brutality, arbitrary killings and torture. The human rights group Amnesty international has criticised the government for the extra-judicial killings and the deadly repression of the Biafra agitation. In 2016 the organisation had reported the killing of over 150 IPOB supporters during the Biafran Remembrance Day.

The Nigerian military, meanwhile, has labelled IPOB a terrorist organisation. Opinions in Nigeria differ on the appropriate response to the pro-Biafra movement. While some insist on the need to put an end to the separatist activism, many analysts agree that the government's traditional resort to a strong military response – as in the case of Boko Haram – could further popularise the separatist movement, lessen the opportunities for dialogue and foster militancy in the region.

### Not a new call for secession

The latest clamour for the independence of Biafra builds on the original attempt by Dim Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, a former colonel in the Nigerian Army, to establish the state of Biafra. Ojukwu's declaration of secession in 1967 led to the bloody Nigerian civil war that lasted until 1970.

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PRO-BIAFRANS KILLED IN 2016

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After Biafra again became part of Nigeria in 1970, the Biafra agitation lingered on to various degrees. In 1999, when a democratic Nigeria emerged from a long history of military dictatorships, Ralph Uwazuruike established the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). MASSOB, however, also failed to realise the pro-Biafra dream.

In 2015, when Kanu, a relatively unknown pro-Biafra activist, was arrested for treason, the Biafran agitation became popular again. Kanu was detained in Kuje Prison in Abuja for over a year without trial. He was eventually tried in early 2017 and released on bail on 28 April 2017, but he has flouted his bail conditions by heightening his campaigning.

Some say that the recent call for Biafra is an attempt to undermine President Muhammadu Buhari

### **Fragility of the Nigerian state**

Some observers hold that the recent call for Biafra is an attempt to undermine the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner. The Biafra agitators were silent when Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, was in power.

Others argue that the fall in the oil price, the weakened naira, Nigeria's heavy debt burden and the high cost of living under Buhari's regime have raised grievances across the country and have generally weakened the state.

Activism for secession has in fact increased across Nigeria. This includes the call for the Oduduwa Republic in the south-west, led by the Yoruba Liberation Command, and the call for a Niger Delta Republic in the south. Even in the north of the country there is a growing quest to liberate Hausas from perceived Fulani hegemony. The Boko Haram insurgency, which has exhibited extreme violence in its fight for an independent Islamic state, also counts among Nigeria's secession challenges. Nevertheless, the Biafra agitation remains the most popular secessionist call at present.

### **Peculiar grievances of the Igbos**

Fifty years on, the grievances that led to the Biafra declaration of independence and the civil war remain. IPOB regularly cites perceptions that Igbos are marginalised by the federal government in terms of infrastructure and appointments in government institutions.

However, not everyone supports the group's clamour for Biafra – IPOB's radical views often estrange would-be supporters.

Kanu has, for example, been criticised for his hate speech and offensive remarks about the Nigerian government. IPOB's statements regarding the existence of a Biafra Secret Service and a Biafra National Guard also raise alarm, despite IPOB's claim that the groups are unarmed self-defence units.

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1967

THE START OF THE WAR OVER BIAFRA

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IPOB has also threatened to prevent the elections in Biafra region, beginning with the impending elections in Anambra State in November.

### **Military response generates mixed reactions**

The disregard for the grievances of people from the south-east and the military response to the Biafran issue come in the context of Nigeria's infamous history of stoking conflicts through its heavy-handed approach to crises. The Boko Haram insurgency has partly been blamed on the government's 2009 killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's leader when the group mainly exhibited radical views without violence.

The recent killings of members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite group in the north, also raise fears of unrest in the region. The leader of the Shiite group, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, has been held in detention since December 2015 after government forces raided his residence and killed many of his followers.

The labelling as a terrorist organisation could now force the group to go underground

### **The politics of using the terrorism label**

Opinions also differ regarding the government's characterisation of the pro-Biafra groups as 'terrorists'. While calling for calm and restraint, Senate president Bukola Saraki said it was unconstitutional and against the law to proscribe IPOB or categorise it as a terrorist organisation.

This labelling as a terrorist organisation could now force the group to go underground to pursue its objectives violently.

### **What to do going forward?**

The AU, the UN and ECOWAS should urge the government to pursue a peaceful solution to the unrest in the country. The government has to shift away from its default military response to dissent, because such responses have only increased the publicity for and support base of dissenters.

Instead, the government has to pursue systematic dialogue and persuade Nigerians of the need for unity through ideas rather than force.

It should also make genuine efforts to ensure equity, fairness and positive change in the lives of ordinary Nigerians, and address the serious claims of marginalisation by inhabitants of the south-east.



## Addis Insight

Funding issues still a bone of contention with the UN Security Council

The 11<sup>th</sup> joint consultative meeting between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the PSC took place on 7 and 8 September 2017 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. While there was agreement on several issues pertaining to peace and security in Africa, the two councils still do not see eye to eye when it comes to funding AU-led peace operations on the continent.

As was the case in 2016, the consultative meeting between the PSC and the UNSC last month was divided into an informal session, with the expected outcome of favouring frank debates on issues of common interest, and a formal meeting. There were three items on the agenda of the informal session: AU–UN partnerships; the funding of AU-led peace support operations; and peacebuilding/post-conflict reconstruction and development. The formal meeting covered only the conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin.

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Like the previous edition that took place in New York last year, the consultative meeting seemed to move towards creating a framework that allows for an exchange on a wide range of issues – including those issues that are contentious.

### Consensual assessments of crisis situations

On the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin, both bodies, but especially UNSC members, stressed the need to include the principle of respect for human rights in counter-terrorism policies. They also emphasised that governments' primary responsibility was to protect civilians – echoing the argument in the recent UNSC resolution that denied the G5 Sahel Joint Force a Chapter VII authorisation. The PSC and the UNSC suggested a joint visit by the heads of the AU Commission, the World Bank and the UN to the region to enhance the mobilisation of resources. They also encouraged the Economic Commission of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to draft a common strategy for the region.

The discussions on the future of Somalia were again marked by the recurring disagreement between the UNSC and the PSC on the funding of the AU

7–8 September  
2017

THE UNSC-PSC JOINT  
CONSULTATIVE MEETING



Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While the initial draft of the outcome of the consultative meeting by the PSC contained a reference to enhancing the predictability and durability of AMISOM funding, the final draft makes only a general call for enhanced funding of AU-led peace support operations authorised by the UNSC. In anticipation of the report by the UN secretary-general on AMISOM funding, to be presented in November 2017, relevant stakeholders are called upon to come up with alternative solutions to fund the mission besides UN assessed contributions.

The PSC underlined the progress that has been made by the AU in complying with UN criteria

### Different views on funding

Funding remains a major bone of contention between the two bodies. The PSC presented a coordinated view on funding during the informal meeting. PSC members expressed their frustration with the lack of progress regarding the use of assessed UN contributions in order to pay the salaries of troops deployed in AU-led peace support operations authorised by the UNSC. The PSC underlined the progress that has been made by the AU in complying with UN criteria to release funding from assessed contributions. These include the establishment of the AU Peace Fund and the AU's adoption of a human rights compliance policy.

Members of the UNSC have a different view of the funding issue. One permanent UNSC member, for example, emphasised that it excluded any use of assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations unless progress was made in ensuring financial accountability and protecting human rights, among others. It was also stressed that no further AMISOM funding through assessed contributions was to be expected soon. Other UNSC members argued that the issue of funding was not within the purview of the PSC and should rather be addressed at the level of the UN General Assembly, which has competence over budgetary matters. One member specifically stressed the need to explore solutions in bilateral support.

The debate around funding and AMISOM reflects the divergent views of PSC member states and some UNSC members on the achievements of AMISOM. The former considers the mission to be a success while the latter feels that, despite the achievements of the largest AU peace mission, it is not necessarily a partnership model for the two organisations.

This lack of progress regarding funding could hamper the operationalisation of the Peace Fund. Indeed, the fund was established on the assumption that if the AU provided 25% of the peace operations budget the UN would cover the remainder. In the absence of any firm decision from UNSC member states in this regard, it is debatable whether certain AU member states will maintain their commitment to contribute to the fund.

The Peace Fund is based on the newly adopted self-financing model of the AU, whereby a 0.2% levy on eligible imports would go to the AU and the Peace Fund. One UNSC member raised the issue of the 0.2% import levy's compliance with World Trade Organization regulations. While this issue has been downplayed by the architects of the new self-financing model, this is not the case from the perspective of several of Africa's trading partners, including the United States.

### A positive evolution of the format

While PSC member states expressed their frustration with the lack of progress regarding funding, the joint consultative meeting has become an important forum for dialogue between the two bodies.

There is some reluctance to formalise the meetings to such an extent that it puts the two organisations on an equal footing

It has to be noted that the PSC and the UNSC have very different perceptions of the importance of the meeting. The PSC views this meeting as critical and is calling for both enhanced formalisation and more joint action, while the UNSC sees it mainly as an informal discussion with no binding impact. This is illustrated by the systematic reference to 'members of the UN Security Council' rather than the 'UNSC' in past joint communiqués. Legally,


UNSC *members* can engage the members of a regional body, but that does not constitute a binding commitment for the UNSC as an institution. There is also some reluctance to formalise the meetings to such an extent that it puts the two organisations on an equal footing. Most members of the UNSC believe it is important to keep the upper hand and stress its primacy in the relationship.

However, there is consensus among participants that the joint consultative meeting is a useful mechanism for maintaining dialogue and building closer cooperation between the UN and the AU in the area of peace and security. As the joint consultative meeting takes place on annual basis, there has been some progress in finding a format that allows frank discussions on issues of agreement and disagreement between the UNSC and the PSC. It helps primarily to diffuse tensions and clear up misunderstandings between the two bodies.

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