

In this issue

■ On the Agenda

Humanitarian agencies have called upon the AU to use its unique position to protect **the rights of migrants**.

■ Situation Analysis

Those who are charged with setting up **the hybrid court for South Sudan** are not keen on keeping leaders accountable.

■ Addis Insight

Three new candidates have entered **the race for AU Commission chairperson** to be elected in January 2017.

Despite several decisions in this regard, **the subcommittees of the PSC** are still not functioning.

■ PSC Interview

The African Union urgently needs highly trained experts to help with its peacekeeping operations, says **Dr Jide Okeke**, Head of Policy Development and Civilian Coordinator at the AU's Peace Support Operations Division.



Peace & Security Council Report

“Large-scale migration will remain a contemporary phenomenon

Page 3

“The double candidacy of Central Africa will have a negative impact

Page 10

“The African Standby Force is not an end in itself

Page 17



On the Agenda

The AU should do more for forced migrants

On 17 October 2016 the Peace and Security Council (PSC) held its second meeting this year on forcefully displaced persons and the implications for peace and security. The PSC was briefed by humanitarian agencies that called upon the African Union (AU) to use its unique position to protect the rights of migrants.

The ordeals described recently by 11 Eritrean women who had been captured by the Islamic State in Libya while trying to flee their country once again highlighted the vulnerability of African refugees, especially in Libya, one of the main transit countries to Europe. The women were freed from captivity on 24 October.

Meanwhile, the Mediterranean Sea is claiming tens of thousands of migrants' lives, many of them from Africa.

Arbitrary refugee determination processes in host countries have led to limited protection of the rights of genuine asylum seekers from Africa

Forced migrants from Africa are clearly in grave danger. Once they get to Europe, many Africans are also often not considered to be forced migrants and are deported back home. The movement of large numbers of forced migrants has blurred the lines between refugees and economic migrants. Arbitrary refugee determination processes in host countries have led to limited protection of the rights of genuine asylum seekers from Africa.

This is particularly concerning for the AU, which, together with the United Nations (UN), should advance the robust protection of migrants.

PSC Chairperson

H.E. Adam Maïga Zakariaou

Ambassador of Niger to Ethiopia
and Permanent Representative to
the African Union

Current members of the PSC

Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Chad,
Egypt, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of Congo, Rwanda,
South Africa, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia

AU policies and initiatives on migration

The AU has made some effort to address the challenges of displacement and irregular migration through policies and a number of initiatives. The African Common Position on Migration and Development of 2006, for example, underscored the positive implications of all forms of migration on development, as well as the challenges in terms of human resources (the 'brain drain'), security and human rights.

The Migration Policy Framework for Africa goes further to provide non-binding guidelines to enable governments and subregional organisations to develop concrete plans of action on migration. But, as with all policies, the challenge is in the implementation.

In 2009 the AU Commission launched the Initiative Against Trafficking to create momentum around member states' responsibility to combat human trafficking. The AU also launched the Horn of Africa Initiative in October 2014 to tackle human trafficking and smuggling, especially within the Horn of Africa. However, the success of these initiatives remains questionable in light of the continued large-scale irregular migration from and within the continent.

The tightening of border controls in a number of countries further encourages the use of illegal and dangerous routes for migration, thereby enhancing the role of human traffickers and smugglers. It is clear that large-scale irregular migration will remain a contemporary phenomenon until constructive solutions to insecurity, bad governance and poverty are found.

The tightening of border controls in a number of countries further encourages the use of illegal and dangerous routes for migration

As interveners in conflict settings, the AU, the UN and international partners need to advance the robust protection of civilians in conflict regions to raise the confidence of vulnerable populations who will otherwise flee for fear of attack. This involves facilitating humanitarian access to civilians.

For those seeking refuge elsewhere, the AU plays a critical role in defending their rights in light of the recent migration crisis.

Need for coordination between the AU and Europe

Speaking to the PSC on 17 October, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Peter Maurer insisted that 'the African Union, as a continental organisation and as the beholder of legal and humanitarian affairs on the continent, is in a unique position to shape policies in response to the migration dynamics we are witnessing today'.

In recent years the European Union (EU) has launched a number of efforts to stop more migrants from entering EU countries. The latest EU initiative is conceptualised within the EU Migration Partnership Framework of July 2016. The deal intends to commit €8 billion to a five-year development plan in Africa and some countries in the Middle East, including Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan and Lebanon.

Running parallel to the EU–Turkey deal, which has seen thousands of migrants from Syria sent back to Turkey, the aim of this framework is to get origin and transit countries in developing regions to collaborate with the EU on returning migrants and engaging in effective border controls. Recently, the World Bank, Britain and the EU also announced plans to assist Ethiopia to create 100 000 jobs. Of these, 30 000 will be reserved for refugees in the country.

€8 billion

THE EU'S NEW DEAL TO
DISCOURAGE MIGRATION

Regardless of the need for development in countries of origin, developed regions remain focused on relieving European countries of their responsibility to host forcefully displaced persons, who should be of shared concern among member states of the international community. Despite limited resources, African states already host 26% of the world's refugee population – more than any other region in the world.

Moreover, the principle of *non-refoulement* – enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture – requires that 'no contracting state shall expel or return (*refouler*) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened'. This raises concern about the determination process and the grounds for the possible return of African refugees, who make up a significant part of the forced migrants attempting to enter Europe.

The AU needs to develop coordinated responses to the EU plans for African refugees and migrants in Europe who face uncertain fates

The AU needs to develop coordinated responses to the EU plans for African refugees and migrants in Europe who face uncertain fates. This is key to ensuring a genuine determination process for asylum seekers and that their rights are well protected.

Europe desperate to impose deals on returnees

The new EU deal, announced in July this year, also stipulates that countries that do not cooperate with the EU on tackling migration into Europe could face a reduction in EU funding. This puts pressure on a number of developing states that need this EU funding. These extreme measures highlight the fact that the EU is struggling to address the concerns of its people, as noted in the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) report 'How the world views migration'. It observed that public opinion is more favourable towards migrants than commonly perceived, except in Europe.

Within the return deals between developed and developing states, the AU has a role to play in ensuring respect for the human rights and security of those asylum seekers and migrants who could be repatriated.

The AU has a role to play in ensuring respect for the human rights and security of asylum seekers

Building on the outcomes of the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants as well as the US-led Leaders' Summit on Refugees in September, the AU

26%

OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES
ARE IN AFRICA

should sustain the pressure to ensure collective burden sharing in terms of forcefully displaced persons, along with highlighting the need for the longer-term structural prevention of situations causing forced migration.

Curbing the brain drain

In Africa and beyond, the AU should also advance the need to safeguard and actualise the skills and potential of Africa's displaced persons to avoid a brain drain in the continent. Research has shown that many economic migrants and refugees possess significant skills and qualifications but are forcefully displaced by economic, political and social insecurities. Many African migrants are held in refugee camps in remote areas on the continent and in Europe with restricted access to meaningful work, as well as limited hopes of either returning home or being assimilated into host countries.

Commendably, the AU established the African Institute for Remittances in 2014 to help reduce the transaction costs of remittances from migrants. The project is supported by the World Bank and the European Commission, and operates in cooperation with the African Development Bank and the IOM. But for refugees in remote areas, the question of remittances remains a non-issue.

In January 2015 the AU also adopted the Joint Labour Migration Programme, which was developed jointly by the AU Commission, the IOM, the International Labour Organization and the UN Economic Commission for Africa to facilitate development through the free movement of labour and skills within Africa. This requires a great deal of political will on the part of states and a shift from a nationalist stance to a position of shared humanity.

Research has shown that many economic migrants and refugees possess significant skills and qualifications

The question of forcefully displaced children

Children constitute half of the world refugee population. The PSC held two meetings this year on the right of refugee and internally displaced children to education. It was emphasised that the limited education opportunities in refugee camps produce young people who are often uneducated, unskilled and vulnerable to radicalisation and conscription by armed groups.

More practical efforts are needed to foster the education and training of forcefully displaced children, for the security and development of the continent.

January 2015

THE AU ADOPTS THE JOINT LABOUR
MIGRATION PROGRAMME



Situation Analysis

Will the hybrid court for South Sudan ever try the current leadership?

The planned hybrid court for South Sudan – a war crimes court based on a mix of South Sudanese and international law – has still not seen the light of day. This is because those who are charged with setting it up, the current government and the AU heads of state, are not keen on keeping leaders accountable. Many others feel, however, that this court is crucial in bringing an end to the violent conflict in Africa's youngest state.

On 13 October 2016 the African Union Commission (AUC) launched a campaign to 'restore the dignity of women and to ensure accountability in South Sudan'. The campaign was launched to lobby for accountability and an end to the atrocities that have disproportionately affected women in South Sudan. 'This campaign is organised in solidarity with the women of South Sudan, who sometimes cannot speak because they are the ones that are facing the atrocities,' AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security Bineta Diop said at the launch in Addis Ababa. The outcomes of the campaign will be presented to high-ranking South Sudanese officials.

Reports on the South Sudanese conflict consistently point out that the country's leaders bear responsibility for war crimes

While accountability has been touted as a key element for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, the elephant in the room remains whether the envisaged hybrid court for South Sudan will try sitting leaders and senior government officials who planned and commanded the atrocities in the country.

Reports on the South Sudanese conflict consistently point out that the country's leaders bear responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country, and have in fact benefited from these. The reports include key reports by the AU Commission of Inquiry (2014) as well as Human Rights Watch, the United Nations Human Rights Council and Amnesty International. Thus any real effort to ensure accountability and end the violence in South Sudan has to engage the role of the South Sudanese leaders.

Deadline for setting up the court is creeping closer

Efforts are underway at the legal affairs department of the AUC to mobilise funds and finalise the memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the

August 2015

SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT
ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE
CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

establishment of the hybrid court. This is in line with the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed by former vice-president Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir.

According to the peace agreement, the MoU, the mandate and the jurisdiction of the hybrid court should have been finalised within six months of the formation of the government of national unity, which took place in April 2016. That means the deadline expired last month. The hybrid court should then be operational within 12 months of that date, meaning April 2017.

However, the ongoing violence and the replacement of Machar with Taban Deng Gai as vice president of the government of national unity are now stalling the process and creating divisions among international actors, especially since the AU is expected to establish and operationalise the hybrid court.

The ongoing violence and the replacement of Machar with Taban Deng Gai as vice president of the government of national unity are now stalling the process

Internal hindrances aside, the crucial question is: will the AU Assembly of heads of state and government – its highest decision-making body – draw up legislation for the hybrid court that enables it to try leaders and senior government officials? It is worth noting that Chapter 5 of the peace agreement stipulates that the hybrid court ‘shall not be impeded or constrained by any statutes of limitations or the granting of pardons, immunities or amnesties. No one shall be exempt from criminal responsibility on account of their official capacity as a government official, an elected official or claiming the defence of superior orders.’

AU in favour of immunity for heads of state

The AU has over the years developed an immunity principle for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. This came after the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued an arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan in 2009. The immunity stance of the AU led to the inclusion of an immunity clause in Article 46A bis of the 2014 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. This is to replace the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which had no immunity clause. Although the protocol is yet to enter into force, Article 46A bis of the amended protocol stipulates that ‘no charges shall be commenced or continued before the court against any serving AU head of state or government or anybody acting or any entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office’.

April 2017

DEADLINE FOR THE
OPERATIONALISATION OF
THE HYBRID COURT

The AU contends that the prosecution of sitting leaders and government officials is detrimental to state stability and has fought desperately in the case of Kenya and Sudan for the lifting of the ICC charges against these leaders. The AU also recently called for an inquiry into a collective withdrawal from the ICC based on the differences over immunity and concerns that the ICC targets Africa. Burundi, South Africa and The Gambia recently announced their withdrawal from the ICC.

The leaders of the warring factions in South Sudan are also not unaware of the immunity principle of the AU.

The AU contends that the prosecution of sitting leaders and government officials is detrimental to state stability

Warring parties in South Sudan remain in power

Within this context, many questions are being asked about how far the AU will go to hold the warring South Sudanese leaders accountable. According to the peace deal, the same leaders who would have to be tried by the hybrid court are meant to occupy leadership positions in the transitional government of national unity.

This is unlike the case of Madagascar, where the international community supported an election in 2013 without the candidacy of former presidents Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, who were the key divisive figures in the country. This followed the 2009 political crisis when Rajoelina staged a coup against Ravalomanana with the support of the military and opposition parties. Instead the South Sudanese deal puts the South Sudanese leaders back in the positions they occupied before the war started.

IGAD leaders not in favour of accountability

The dynamics among the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that are mediating in the South Sudan conflict show that the question of leadership accountability is not a favoured topic there either. Hence, there is not enough regional support for the issue to deter the South Sudanese leaders from orchestrating further violent atrocities.

The hybrid court for South Sudan could thus end up prosecuting lesser officials and soldiers – the scapegoats for the Kiir and Machar factions. This already happened when the government of South Sudan, through the military court, recently convicted 60 soldiers for murdering civilians and looting in Juba in July 2016.

Can the international community intervene?

Due to these concerns a number of reports on accountability in South Sudan have recommended that an alternative international body should provide the necessary checks and balances. Others recommended that the South Sudanese leaders should be bound through the peace agreement to ratify the Rome Statute, thereby enabling the ICC to intervene if they attempt to undermine the efforts of the hybrid court. Although the peace agreement is vague about the role of the transitional government in the hybrid court, Chapter 5(1.1) of the agreement states that the transitional government ‘shall initiate legislation for the establishment of the transitional justice institutions’, and Chapter 5(1.5) expects the hybrid court to cooperate with the AU and the international community in the operationalisation of the court. This gives the transitional government some leverage in influencing the establishment and mandate of the hybrid court from the outset. The amount of support the transitional government will give the hybrid court is also questionable in view of a recent call, published in international newspapers by South Sudanese leaders, for the court to be scrapped. They argue that it will destabilise the country and scupper any peace deal.

In order for the AU campaign to fight for the rights of women in South Sudan to succeed it is crucial to underline the liability of South Sudanese leaders for the heinous atrocities and human rights abuses in the country.

Addis Insight

New faces in the contest for AU Commission chairperson



The election of the new African Union Commission (AUC) is to take place at the next summit of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa on 30–31 January 2017. It is a tense race and the number of contenders for all the positions has increased since the elections were postponed in July 2016. Divisive issues such as membership of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are also now likely to play a major role in these elections.

At the 27th AU summit in July in Kigali, Rwanda, the AU heads of state and government failed to agree on the choice of the chairperson of the AUC. The leading candidate, Pemoni Venson-Moitai from Botswana, failed to reach the required two-thirds majority of votes to be elected chairperson. Significantly, 30 member states abstained in the ultimate and seventh round of voting. This was seen as a boycott by those unhappy with the list of candidates on the table. The assembly then decided to extend the mandate of the AUC for six months and reopen the process to allow for new candidates.

Old faces and new contenders for the position of chairperson

While there were only three candidates for the position of AUC chairperson in July 2016, there are now five. Venson-Moitai and Agapito Mba Mokuy, the foreign ministers of Botswana and Equatorial Guinea, will run again for the same position. Meanwhile, three new candidates have entered the race. They are:

- Abdoulaye Bathily, the former United Nations (UN) special envoy for Central Africa and a former minister of environmental affairs and of energy in Senegal
- Moussa Faki Mahamat, the foreign minister and former prime minister of Chad
- Amina Mohamed, the foreign minister of Kenya and a former deputy executive director of the UN Environment Programme

In an unprecedented show of interest from across Africa in these elections, four of Africa's five regions presented a candidate for the position of chairperson, the exception being Northern Africa. The Central region has distinguished itself by fielding two candidates, from Chad and Equatorial Guinea respectively, exposing the regional divide.

5

CANDIDATES FOR AUC CHAIRPERSON

Multiple factors influence the choice made by the heads of state, who elect the winner through a secret ballot. These include the support that candidates get from their respective heads of state; the personal connections and networks of the heads of state; regional solidarity; alliances among regions; linguistic and historical links between countries; and the personal stature of the candidates.

For the first time major ideological issues, such as the possible withdrawal by African states from the ICC and the request by Morocco to reintegrate into the AU, are also expected to play an important role.

Multiple factors influence the choice made by the heads of state, who elect the winner through a secret ballot

Regional backing a crucial consideration

The challenge faced by most candidates is ensuring strong regional backing while expanding their support through other regions. From this perspective, the double candidacy of Central Africa will have a negative impact on the prospects of its candidates.

The success of Bathily's candidature, on the other hand, will depend a lot on Senegal's ability to convince Ghana and Nigeria to respect regional solidarity within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS officially designated Bathily as its candidate earlier this year. Bathily's election could, however, scupper Ghana and Nigeria's bids to win the positions of deputy chair and commissioner of peace and security.

Indeed, there is an unwritten rule requiring a regional balance in the top positions at the commission (chairperson, deputy chairperson, peace and security and political affairs). It is unusual to have nationals from the same region filling two of these four portfolios.

Meanwhile, Mohamed is also likely to face some opposition due to the fact that a Kenyan national, Erastus Mwencha, has held the position of deputy chairperson for the last eight years. Some may believe Kenya has had its turn at the top of the AUC.

South Africa and Botswana already at odds over the ICC

South Africa's decision on 21 October 2016 to withdraw from the ICC drew strong reaction from Botswana, a supporter of the court. Venson-Moitai said in a media interview that African states should not withdraw from the ICC but rather 'work towards fixing it'. Officially, South Africa still supports Venson-Moitai, the candidate of the Southern African Development Community.

In the wake of South Africa's withdrawal, The Gambia also announced that it would walk away from the ICC. This is in contrast to the stance taken by its neighbour, Senegal. At the July 2016 summit Senegal argued against a call for a collective African withdrawal from the ICC. This sensitive and highly divisive issue could therefore also play a role in the choices made by the heads of state.

Morocco's bid also a bone of contention?

The request by Morocco to become a member of the AU could also be a strong driver of discord within the continent. While support for the Democratic Sahrawi Republic (RASD) is decreasing among AU member states, it still counts many regional powers among its supporters (Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia). Therefore the position adopted by the states presenting candidates could influence the ultimate outcome of the vote.

The request by Morocco to become a member of the AU could be a strong driver of discord within the continent

More regionally diverse list of candidates

Between July and October 2016 the number of candidates for the AUC rose from 39 to 50. This is largely due to the fact that Southern and Northern Africa presented more candidates than previously; the Northern region now has nine candidates, compared to only six previously, and Southern Africa now has ten candidates, compared to only two in the last round. These were Venson-Moitai for the position of AUC chairperson and Anthony Maruping Motae for economic affairs.

This time there is thus a greater diversity of candidates

from a regional perspective: East (16%), North (18%), West (20%), Central (22%) and South (24%).

In theory, regions are supposed to consult before putting forward candidates for the AUC. However, in most cases there are more than one candidate from a region contesting positions on the commission. This shows that the selection of candidates still remains a decision by individual countries, with minimal or only informal consultation within regions.

On the issue of gender representation there has been little movement, however. Compared to the July list, the number of women candidates has risen to 38% from 33%. Another interesting statistic is the gap between the continental median age (19.5) and the average age of the candidates (56.3).

Civil servants still dominate among the candidates

Civil servants, whether diplomats, government officials or international civil servants, constitute almost half of the candidates (48%). Academics (27%) represent the second biggest category. As before, executives from the private sector constitute a marginal proportion of candidates (4%).

The aggregation of these various issues provides an interesting picture of the governance of most African states: a young continent ruled by male civil servants in their late fifties.

Algeria and Nigeria vie for commissioner of peace and security position

The incumbent Commissioner of Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui, who is from Algeria, will face competition not only from within his own region but also from one of Africa's other heavyweight countries, Nigeria. In the Northern region Diye Ba from Mauritania is running for this position. Meanwhile, Fatima Kyari Mohammed from Nigeria, ECOWAS' Special Advisor for Peace and Security, is also in the running for commissioner of peace and security.

Earlier this year Nigeria initially presented Salamatou Hussaini Suleiman, the ECOWAS Commissioner of

Political Affairs, Peace and Security, for this position before withdrawing his candidature after informal consultations with Algiers. The fact that it is once again fielding a candidate for this position shows that its interests in the AU have shifted to peace and security from political affairs, where Commissioner Aisha Abdullahi is ending her term. The other surprise is the presence of two candidates from Malawi for this position. This is despite the fact that Southern Africa has been an historical ally of Algeria within the AU and the Peace and Security Council.

Civil servants, whether diplomats, government officials or international civil servants, constitute almost half of the candidates

High-profile candidates for political affairs

The other competitive race will be for the portfolio of political affairs. The mandate of the Department of Political Affairs covers issues such as governance, elections, the reform of the UN Security Council and the ICC.

The candidates for this critical position include high-profile individuals known in Addis Ababa and diplomatic circles. They are Tete Antonio from Angola, currently AU representative to the UN; Minata Samaté Cessouma, Burkina Faso's former representative to the AU and previously head of the joint mechanism of the UN-Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID); Hawa Ahmed Youssouf from Djibouti, currently the AUC chairperson's special representative to Madagascar; Rahamtalla Mohamed Osman, Sudan's former permanent representative to the UN; Hesphina Rukato from Zimbabwe, executive director of the Centre for African Development Solutions; and Churchill Ewumbue Monono from Cameroon, who is a presidential advisor.

CANDIDATURES TO AU COMMISSION 2017–2021					
Position	Candidate	Country	Region	Gender	Professional background
Chairperson	Abdoulaye Bathily	Senegal	West	M	UN special envoy in Central Africa; former minister of environment; former minister of energy
	Moussa Faki Mahamat	Chad	Central	M	Current Minister of Foreign Affairs; former prime minister
	Agapito Mba Mokuy	Equatorial Guinea	Central	M	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Amina Mohamed	Kenya	East	F	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Pelononi Venson-Moitai	Botswana	South	F	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Deputy Chairperson	Yacin Elmi Bouh	Djibouti	East	M	Former minister of interior and decentralisation; former minister of finance
	Abdul Hakim Elwaer	Libya	North	M	Director of Cooperation and Economic Integration at Islamic Development Bank; former AU director of human resources, science and technology; former director of administration and human resources
	Thomas Kwesi Quartey	Ghana	West	M	Current Executive Secretary to the President; former deputy minister of foreign affairs and cooperation; former ambassador to AU, UNECA and Ethiopia
	Claude Joachim Tiker Tiker	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Central	M	Former ECCAS deputy secretary general
Peace and Security	Diyé Ba	Mauritania	North	M	Former minister of health and social affairs
	Smail Chergui*	Algeria	North	M	Incumbent; elected in 2013 in replacement of Ramtane Lamamra
	Rose Tujilane Chizumila	Malawi	South	F	Former ombudsman
	Epiphanie Ntamwana Kabushemeye	Burundi	Central	F	Chief of Staff of AUSRC in Somalia; former ambassador to AU, UNECA, Ethiopia and Canada
	Fatima Kyari Mohammed	Nigeria	West	F	ECOWAS Special Advisor for Peace and Security
	Geoffrey Lufu James Mvula	Malawi	South	M	Ambassador to Egypt
Political Affairs	Tete Antonio	Angola	South	F	AU Permanent Representative to the UN
	Minata Samaté Cessouma	Burkina Faso	West	F	Charge de Mission, MFA; former representative to the AU, UNECA and Ethiopia; former head of UNAMID Joint Mechanism
	Churchill Ewumbue Monono	Cameroon	Central	M	Presidential Advisor; former minister, Council to the Embassy in Russia
	Rahamtalla Mohamed Osman	Sudan	East	M	Former representative to the UN; former undersecretary of foreign affairs
	Hesphina Rukato	Zimbabwe	South	F	Executive Director of Center for African Development Solutions
	Hawa Ahmed Youssouf	Djibouti	East	F	AUC Special Representative in Madagascar; AUC Special Representative in Central African Republic
Infrastructure and Energy	Amani Aboud-Zeid	Egypt	North	F	AfDB Representative in Morocco
	Kadiatou Balde Bah	Guinea	West	F	Former senior advisor to the minister of energy
	Mahboub M. Maalim	Kenya	East	M	IGAD Executive Secretary
	Amel Makhoulouf	Tunisia	North	F	Coordinator Tunisia (R20, Regions of Climate Action)
	Kouassi Rene N'guettia	Côte d'Ivoire	West	M	Current AU Director of Economic Affairs

CANDIDATURES TO AU COMMISSION 2017–2021					
Position	Candidate	Country	Region	Gender	Professional background
Social Affairs	Pride Chigwedere	Zimbabwe	South	M	UNAIDS Senior Advisor to the AU
	Amira Elfadil Mohammed Elfadil	Sudan	East	F	Minister of Social Welfare and Social Security
	Mustapha Sidiki Kaloko*	Sierra Leone	West	M	Incumbent Commissioner
	Warren Naamara	Uganda	East	M	UNAIDS Country Director in Ethiopia
	Seodi Venekai-Rudo White	Malawi	South	M	Consultant, former commissioner, Public Service Reform Commission
	Sabine Ntakarutimana	Burundi	Central	F	Former minister of health and the fight against AIDS
Human Resources, Science and Technology	Chahida Fraj Bouraoui	Tunisia	North	F	Former state secretary for housing
	Mamoudou Djibo	Niger	West	M	Chair of the National Commission of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
	Saidi Kibeya	Burundi	Central	M	Head of the Bureau of Strategic Policies for Development at the Presidency; former minister of higher education and scientific research, public works and transport
	Philippe Kuhutama Mawoko	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Central	M	Director of the African Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation (AOSTI)
	Toufik Milat	Algeria	North	M	Former ambassador to Cameroon
	Fatimetou Mohamed Saleck	Mauritania	North	F	CEO of Servotics; former secretary of state for new technologies
	Maurice Tchuenté	Cameroon	Central	M	Chancellor of University of Buea; former minister of scientific research
Trade and Industry	Fatima Haram Acyl*	Chad	Central	F	Incumbent Commissioner
	Mona Toema El-Garf	Egypt	North	F	Chairperson of Egyptian Competition Authority; Economics professor at Cairo University
	Balness Ngina Mdezo	Malawi	South	F	
	Albert M. Muchanga	Zambia	South	M	Permanent Secretary for Parliamentary Business in the Office of the Vice President; director of tourism; former representative to the AU, UNECA and Ethiopia
Rural Economy and Agriculture	Josue Dione	Mali	West	M	Special Advisor to the AU Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture; former director, Food Security and Sustainable Development Division at UNECA
	Francois Ekanga Ekoko	Cameroon	Central	M	United Nations University; South–South Cooperation Advisor, UNDP
	Austin Charles Job Sichinga	Zambia	South	M	Former State House chief of staff; former permanent secretary in the office of the vice president; former permanent secretary in the ministry of water and energy
	Antoine Marie Moustache	Seychelles	East	M	Chief Executive Officer Seychelles Agricultural Agency, Special Advisor to the Minister for Natural Resources and Industry
	Josefa Correa Sacko	Angola	South	F	Former secretary-general of the Inter-Africa Coffee Organisation (IACO)
Economic Affairs	Anthony Mothae Maruping*	Lesotho	South	M	Incumbent Commissioner
	Kako Kossivi Nubukpo	Togo	West	M	Current Director of the Francophonie numerique et economique in OIF; former minister of long-term strategy and public policy evaluation

* Incumbent

Figure 1: Gender breakdown of candidates for the AU Commission





Figure 2: Regional breakdown of candidates for the AU Commission




Gender	Number of candidates
Male	30
Female	20

Regions	Number of candidates
North	9
West	10
Central	11
East	8
South	12

Profession	Number of candidates
Civil servant	9
International civil servant	5
Academic	14
Engineer	4
Diplomat	10
Executive	2
Journalist	1
Lawyer	2
Physician	4

Figure 3: Breakdown by profession



Addis Insight

Why are the PSC subcommittees still not up and running?



Last month the Egyptian chairperson of the PSC, Ambassador Abou Bakr Hefny, expressed concern over the fact that the PSC subcommittees – set up in 2011 – are still not functioning. These committees are designed to assist the PSC with taking decisions and speed up their implementation. A lack of capacity and disagreement among member states are some of the reasons for this situation.

The PSC, as the highest decision-making body of the AU on peace and security, is often accused of not taking strong action and not following through on decisions made about crises in Africa. Behind the scenes, however, there is frustration over the lack of capacity of the PSC. Essentially, it relies on the AU Commission to draft reports and come up with decisions, but the commission is already overloaded with many other issues, in addition to those concerning peace and security.

The PSC is often accused of not taking strong action and not following through on decisions made about crises in Africa

The protocol creating the PSC allows for member states to establish subsidiary bodies as they deem necessary for the performance of the PSC. These bodies include ad hoc committees for 'mediation, conciliation or enquiry'.

The AU has thus far agreed to the creation of five subsidiary bodies: a committee of experts; a military staff committee; a committee on counter-terrorism; a committee on sanctions; and a committee on post-conflict, reconstruction and development.

The committees are composed of experts from member states plus two officers from the Peace and Security Department. The committee of experts is designed to assist the PSC in drafting its decisions and should meet prior to its sessions. This could reduce the workload of the country representatives and would ultimately speed up the proceedings of the PSC.

The military staff committee is composed of military attachés of PSC member states. Its tasks consist of giving military advice to the PSC, which it has done on occasion. The other committees are composed of five members chosen by each region, and each one has its own mandate. None of these committees, however, has yet been fully operational, for various reasons.

Only the subcommittee on terrorism has met once and has drafted a work plan.

Past decisions on the subsidiary bodies

Over the last five years the PSC has adopted two decisions regarding the establishment of its subsidiary bodies, but with uneven implementation. At its 264th meeting on 13 March 2012, the PSC vowed to take all the necessary steps to ensure the speedy operationalisation of the committees in terms of the designation of their members and their mandate. It also decided that the military staff committee should hold monthly meetings. This decision was not implemented, however, because all PSC members do not have a military attaché in their delegations, among other reasons.

The PSC held another meeting in 2014 on the subsidiary bodies. It decided that their functioning should be guided by the rules of procedure of the PSC. It also requested a single framework for the functioning of these bodies according to the protocol, while taking into account their specific mandate. The PSC asked the committee of experts to draft the terms of reference for the various organs, for submission by February 2015. However, this decision was not implemented either.

Meanwhile, the committee on counter-terrorism was operationalised by the PSC in November 2012. The members of the committee were only elected in July 2014 (Algeria, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia and South Africa) and a work plan was drafted. However, this process was stopped because most PSC member states insist on the simultaneous operationalisation of all the subsidiary bodies. Since the election of a new PSC in January 2016, the new members of this subcommittee have not yet been nominated.

A priority for Egypt and Algeria

Pull quote: Algeria and Egypt made the reactivation of the subsidiary bodies a priority of their presidencies.

Algeria and Egypt – which chaired the PSC in April and September 2016 respectively – made the reactivation of the subsidiary bodies a priority of their presidencies. Yet the meeting that was held in early September on this issue did not result in any decision either. The matter

was referred to the committee of experts for further consultation. The main trend within the PSC is that most member states want the simultaneous operationalisation of all the subsidiary bodies in a framework close to the PSC's rules of procedure, to avoid a divergence between their activities and the decision-making processes of the PSC. An agreement is yet to be reached on this issue. Despite the decision taken in 2014, the divide remains between those member states that prefer generic terms of reference and those that favour terms of reference curtailed by the mandate of the committee.

The challenges ahead of operationalisation

There are many challenges in the effective operationalisation of the subsidiary bodies. The first is the sustainability of the PSC's commitment. As said earlier, this issue has been an uneven priority among member states. It has been on and off the PSC agenda, with significant time lapses in-between. Effective operationalisation depends on the political will of the chairperson of the PSC. For example, the committee of experts and the military staff committee can convene meetings only at the initiative of the monthly chairperson. In order to operationalise these committees, the successive chairs should convene them.

The second challenge is the issue of capabilities, in terms of both staff and funding. Ensuring that a committee produces qualitative outputs requires that member states deploy the adequate technical experts in their delegations. Moreover, it also supposed that the PSC comes up with a sustainable funding mechanism for the activities of these committees. The operationalisation of these committees would mean more work for the PSC Secretariat, which already has a limited staff.

Beyond the technicalities, the challenge of operationalisation illustrates the different approaches of member states. There are member states that would like to balance the dominating role the AU Commission plays in the policymaking process of the PSC. They believe the sub-committees would provide the adequate technical background to inform decisions countries' representatives in the PSC. This approach is not shared by other member states, which do not see the setting-up of these committees as being urgent.

PSC Interview

'The African Standby Force needs political buy-in from member states'



Since 2006 the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and partners have developed policy frameworks that pave the way for the operationalisation of the civilian component of the African Standby Force (ASF). These are staff working at the political, humanitarian, gender, civil affairs, public information, administration and security and safety units of peace operations. In Somalia, the civilian component of the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) already works closely with the government and civil society to assist with state building.

Last month the AU also launched the Civilian Strategic Support Group (CSSG) to enhance the role of civilians in peace operations. The *PSC Report* spoke about this to Dr Jide Martyns Okeke, Head of Policy Development and Civilian Coordinator at the PSOD.

What progress has been made with the ASF, especially its civilian component?

The ASF should not be understood as an end in itself. Rather, it should be seen as part of a political process that provides options for AU policy organs, especially the PSC, to prevent, manage and resolve crises. At present, we have moved to a post-full operational capacity of the ASF.

The African Standby Force should be seen as part of a political process that provides options for AU policy organs, especially the PSC, to prevent, manage and resolve crises

The milestones reached in setting up the civilian component can be understood in relation to the progress made in the development of the ASF as a whole.

The AU and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms [RECs and RMs] have held a series of command exercises, as well as the first ever AMANI-Africa II field training exercise in December 2015. This confirmed the operational capacity of the ASF, although there are outstanding activities required to boost the rapid deployment capability of the force.

October 2016

THE LAUNCH OF THE CIVILIAN
STRATEGIC SUPPORT GROUP

What timelines are you working towards?

On the basis of the confirmation of the operational readiness of the ASF, member states directed the AU Commission to develop a five-year strategic work plan of the ASF. The recent validation workshop of the draft Maputo strategic five-year work plan on 19–20 October 2016 was aimed at ensuring a comprehensive approach in the development of the work plan that will define the post-full operational capability phase of the ASF. The work plan includes indicators, deliverables and timelines for the ASF civilian, police and military components, including recommendations on partnership, harmonious work plans and the mobilisation of resources by the AU, member states and RECs and RMs.

The report of the independent panel of experts' assessment of the ASF in 2013 had indicated that the civilian component is the least developed component of the ASF. This is in part because the component is generated from a broad spectrum of specialities, unlike other components. Over the years, however, we have made remarkable progress in developing the civilian component. Relevant policy documents have also been developed to enhance the operational capacity of the civilian component of the ASF, including the African Standby Capacity selection guideline manual and the civilian standby roster, among others. These documents provide required guidelines for the continued training, rostering and staffing of civilians for ASF missions.

The AU deploys civilians as part of high-intensity operations, as in the case of Mali in 2013

Given the AU's peacekeeping experiences in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali, what has been the major contribution of the civilian component in peace operations?

The AU deploys civilians as part of high-intensity operations, as in the case of Mali in 2013, the Central African Republic in 2013 and 2014, and Somalia, which is ongoing. This is unlike the United Nations, whose peace operations are conducted in regions where ceasefires and peace agreements have been secured.

In the volatile security context of Somalia, the AU has been mandated to deploy 70 civilian officers in AMISOM, including substantive mission support staff, with enormous impact on the peace operation.

We have staff working at the various civilian units of AMISOM. They have been working closely with the government and civil society to support efforts to consolidate and extend the state's services across Somalia. There is, however, more work needed in the recruitment and training of civilian officers going into mission to ensure more enhanced productivity.

70

CIVILIAN OFFICERS IN AMISOM

What is the role of the recently launched Civilian Strategic Support Group (CSSG)?

The CSSG was established in May 2015 and launched in October 2016 to enable the articulation and enhancement of the role of the civilian component. The CSSG is to provide technical and advisory support on matters relating to civilian tasks in AU peace operations. The CSSG will also help to enhance the visibility and coordination of the component at the AU and RECs and RMs.

The CSSG is multi-dimensional in that it comprises patrons such as the former special representative to the chairperson of the AU Commission and heads of state, as well as senior management of the AU Commission, focal officers of the civilian component in the five regions of the continent, civil society partners, training institutions – especially the African Peace Support Trainers' Association – and relevant experts. Through the CSSG, we can then assess and measure progress and areas for further development.

The political buy-in of the member states is key for the enhancement of the capacities of the civilian component

What are the main challenges faced by the civilian component of the ASF?

The after-action review of Amani Africa-II revealed that the ASF is operational but, without the cooperation of member states and the RECs and RMs, it will be difficult to deploy. The political buy-in and commitment of the member states and the RECs and RMs is particularly key for the enhancement of the capacities of the civilian component in the area of rostering, staffing and eventual deployment.

What do you require from AU member states?

Notably, more highly qualified staff are needed, both at the AU Commission and in field missions. This is necessary because of some specialised tasks that civilians are required to undertake in peace support operations. Member states should therefore be consistently encouraged to second suitable and highly competent experts to support the AU Commission in peace support operations and elsewhere. Training centres have a role to play in completing the training of civilians who meet the minimum eligibility criteria for various civilian functions.

Unfortunately, there is limited knowledge in academic and policy circles about the functions of civilians in peace operations. This highlights the need to popularise the role of the civilians in peace operations to enable open recruitment of qualified and competent civilian officers from across the continent. In this regard, member states and RECs and RMs could play a useful role in investing in opportunities for the capacity building of civilians.

December 2015

AMANI-AFRICA II FIELD
TRAINING EXERCISE



About the ISS

The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance.

Contributors to this issue

Yann Bedzigui, ISS Addis Ababa researcher

Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Consultant to the *PSC Report*

Ndubuisi Christian Ani, ISS Addis Ababa researcher

Contact

Liesl Louw-Vaudran

Consultant to the *PSC Report*

ISS Pretoria

Email: llouw@issafrica.org

ISS Pretoria

Block C, Brooklyn Court
361 Veale Street
New Muckleneuk
Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 346 9500
Fax: +27 12 460 0998

ISS Addis Ababa

5th Floor, Get House
Building, Africa Avenue
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251 11 515 6320
Fax: +251 11 515 6449

ISS Dakar

4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum
Route de Ouakam
Dakar, Senegal
Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42
Fax: +221 33 860 3343

ISS Nairobi

Braeside Gardens
off Muthangari Road
Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 72 860 7642
Fax: +254 73 565 0300

Acknowledgements



Government of the Netherlands

The publication of the *PSC Report* is made possible through support from the Hanns Seidel Stiftung and the Government of The Netherlands. The ISS is also grateful for the support of the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.