



# Peace & Security Council Report

The trend towards subsidiarity: a retrospective of the outgoing PSC

South Africa and Nigeria are crucial for continental initiatives

PSC Interview: Towards a collective ownership of the PSC

Decisions of the PSC from January – March 2018

## The trend towards subsidiarity: a retrospective of the outgoing PSC

In a retrospective of the meetings, statements and decisions of the outgoing Peace and Security Council (PSC) during its two-year term from April 2016 to March 2018, it is evident that the decrease in bold decisions on crises on the continent was influenced by the January 2016 decision not to send a protection force to Burundi. In this period the PSC did focus on a number of other conflicts, including South Sudan, Somalia, Darfur, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The outgoing PSC was elected in January 2016 in the midst of an historical moment in the African Union (AU). The 15-member PSC consisted of Egypt and Algeria (North Africa); Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo and Niger (Western Africa); Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda (Eastern Africa); Zambia, Botswana and South Africa (Southern Africa); and Chad, Burundi and the Republic of Congo (Central Africa).

A month before the new PSC was to take office, the PSC at its 565<sup>th</sup> meeting for the first time evoked article 4H of the AU Constitutive Act to decide on the deployment of a preventive mission in Burundi to halt the cycle of violence in the country. At the AU summit of January 2016, however, the PSC at the level of heads of state (including Burundi, then a member of the PSC) rejected the decision.

The PSC members started their term in a context where the authority of the ambassadors on the PSC was tarnished

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### Current PSC Chairperson

**Bankole A Adeoye**, the Nigerian ambassador to Ethiopia and permanent representative to the African Union (AU).

### PSC members

Angola, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe

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
This reversal has led to many questions regarding the degree of authority devolved to the permanent representatives of the PSC in Addis Ababa. The newly elected PSC members thus started their term in April 2016 in a context where the authority of the ambassadors on the PSC was tarnished by the events that had taken place two months earlier. The most visible consequence was the progressive disappearance of Burundi from the agenda of the PSC as the East African Community took over the mediation.

Did this context affect the PSC in the next 24 months, from April 2016 to March 2018? This retrospective looks at how the outgoing PSC exerted its mandate to identify major trends and draw lessons for the members elected at the 30<sup>th</sup> AU summit in January 2018. In this regard, the period from April 2016 to March 2017 will be referred to as 'Year One' (Y1), and the one from April 2017 to March 2018, 'Year 2' (Y2).

## Focus on crisis situations

From April 2016 to March 2018, 36% of the meetings held by the PSC were about ongoing crisis and conflict situations in Africa.

**Figure 1: PSC decisions in Y1 and Y2**




The other major categories (above 10%) were partnerships, mostly with the European Union and the United Nations (UN), and matters related to the architecture for peace and security in Africa (African Standby Force, Panel of the Wise, Early Warning). These categories account for 15% and 12% of PSC meetings, respectively. During this period 11% of meetings also were devoted to discussing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

## Conflicts in Eastern Africa dominate

Conflicts in South Sudan (13%), Somalia (13%), Darfur (13%), the CAR (11%) and the DRC (11%) dominated the proceedings of the PSC in this period. From Y1 to Y2, the dynamics in this regard remain quite similar, with the top five topics consisting of the aforementioned conflicts.

Eastern African crises attracted most of the PSC's attention. From April 2016 to March 2018, these conflicts constituted an average 41% of the PSC's meetings on crises. This was followed by crises in Central Africa (28%), where the drop in meetings on Burundi was compensated for by the increase in meetings on the

**Figure 2: PSC meetings on crises in Y1 and Y2**



political crisis in the DRC and the continuation of the crisis in the CAR.

Crises in West Africa constituted 22% of the PSC's meetings on situations. (It should be noted that the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel and Guinea-Bissau have the same number of entries.) In North Africa, Libya and Western Sahara were the crises considered by the PSC (12%). The two meetings on the protracted crisis in Western Sahara both happened under the chair of South Africa, which is a prominent supporter of the Polisario Front. (Chairs of the PSC rotate monthly, usually in alphabetical order.)


## A stable number of decisions

There are two kinds of decisions by the PSC: communiqués, which are binding, and press releases, which could be considered summaries of meetings. Globally the number of decisions by the PSC remained stable in Y1 (64) and Y2 (62), with a total of 126 decisions for 253 meetings. This means that half of the meetings of the PSC ended up with a decision as an outcome. Approximately one-third of meetings (28%) had a binding decision as an outcome, while 20% were summed up by a press release.

Only 34 communiqués out of 126 statements by the PSC in the two-year period contained the word 'decides', indicating a course of action in either political or policy terms.


In the first year of the new PSC, besides decisions on crises, there were few binding decisions on partnerships between AU organs and UN bodies (the UN Security Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission), elections and humanitarian actors. During both years, crises still constituted the bulk of PSC ‘decisions’, with two-thirds addressing conflict situations.

**Figure 3: ‘Decisions’ by the PSC Y1–Y2**



As discussed earlier, crises in Eastern Africa (Darfur, South Sudan, Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army [LRA]) dominated the decisions of the PSC with 53% of statements made.

**Figure 4: Decisions on crises in Y1–Y2**



This could be explained, firstly, by the fact that Africa-led peace support operations are deployed in these areas, with the exception of South Sudan. Secondly, it could be said that its proximity to Addis Ababa and the presence within the PSC of several relevant stakeholders help to keep this situation high on the council’s agenda. The PSC also adopted ‘decisions’ on the crises in The Gambia, which is in the midst of a post-electoral crisis; Guinea-Bissau, where the peace process has been stalling; Western Sahara; the Sahel; and the Lake Chad Basin.

### **Subsidiarity as the governing principle of APSA**

The main trend in the current PSC has been its failure, in most cases, to appear in the front line of crisis management on the continent.

This could be as a consequence of the events of December 2015 to January 2016 regarding Burundi, as the PSC in this period adopted few bold decisions in response to crises. The boldest decision was taken in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2017 when the PSC threatened to institute sanctions against South Sudan.

In most cases, the PSC only provided political support to regional initiatives. These regional initiatives were not all based on the AU configuration of the eight recognised regional economic communities. An illustration of this is the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The PSC also supported the Southern African Development Community’s mission to Lesotho, which was deployed in December 2017. Besides these situations involving peace support operations, the imprint of the PSC in political crises has been limited. Apart from the DRC, the PSC barely addressed burgeoning crises. The crisis in Zimbabwe, which built up to the ousting of former president Robert Mugabe in November 2017, is one example.

The impact of the PSC is still to be reflected – or defined – in a regionally driven architecture of peace and security in Africa. As the successes of regional responses have so far been uneven, the PSC will have to sort out the structural dilemma in APSA in order to achieve political effectiveness in achieving the AU’s aim of ‘silencing the guns’ by 2020.

*Note: This article is an excerpt of an upcoming policy brief on the outgoing PSC.*

## South Africa and Nigeria are crucial for continental initiatives

The impressive turnout at the African Union's Extraordinary Summit on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 21 March showed the continent's united fervour to boost its economic opportunities.

Delegations from 50 countries, including 27 heads of state, attended the summit on the AfCFTA in Kigali. The fact that there were almost as many leaders present as attend the bi-annual AU summits contrasts with the major divisions within the AU on much-needed reforms of the institution. Countries seem to agree on boosting intra-African trade, but disagree on strengthening the AU itself.

At the January AU summit, 23 countries signed up to the Single African Air Transport Market and 30 have signed the AU's Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment.

Countries seem to agree on boosting intra-African trade, but disagree on strengthening the AU itself

Even though many hurdles lie ahead in establishing the free trade area and even more in allowing free movement of Africans across the continent, these agreements are important first steps. The AfCFTA initiative in particular has been hailed as a major achievement, paving the way for greater intra-African trade and more economic opportunities for all African states.

### Nigeria and South Africa still out in the cold

However while 44 countries signed the agreement, two of Africa's biggest economies, South Africa and Nigeria, didn't. Due to their economic, military and diplomatic strength and their history of driving change in Africa, these two countries are crucial for such initiatives. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa did attend the Kigali summit, and made upbeat statements about the benefits of the AfCFTA.

South Africa did sign the Kigali Declaration – showing its intent to sign the free trade deal in future, pending finalisation of outstanding aspects of the agreement. South Africa in fact proposed the drawing up of such a declaration, says the country's Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies. Ratification of the AfCFTA would also need the nod from South Africa's Parliament.

Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari decided at the last moment not to attend the summit, citing the need for further consultation. According to local reports, concerns were raised by private-sector organisations such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria. This came as a blow to Rwanda, the event's host, and its President Paul Kagame, current AU chairperson.

Nigeria has a major role to play in Africa's free trade deal. In fact, Buhari leads a country that has historically been at the forefront of getting the AfCFTA off the ground. The creation of such a free trade area was first mooted in the Lagos Plan of Action that followed a summit in Nigeria's commercial capital in 1980. The 1991 Abuja Treaty on establishing the African Economic Community was the forerunner of the AfCFTA and trade experts often still refer to the process as the Abuja road map.

Buhari leads a country that has historically been at the forefront of getting the AfCFTA off the ground

Nigeria initially proposed to host the secretariat of the AfCFTA. The country is also the undisputed leader of the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – one of Africa's most pro-active regional economic communities. Within the AU, Buhari has also been appointed the lead head of state on the AU theme for 2018 – winning the fight against corruption: a sustainable path to Africa's transformation.

So why did Nigeria stay away?



## Nigerian concerns

While the only official explanation has so far been that the decision was put on hold ‘for further consultation with local stakeholders’, it is also clear that some Nigerians might not see intra-African trade in the same way as, say, South Africans do. Nigerians have in the past been on the receiving end of South Africa’s strong economic drive on the continent – the cellphone giant MTN being one obvious example.

This was also one of the reasons given for strong opposition in Nigeria to Morocco’s application to join ECOWAS at the end of 2017. Morocco is one of the biggest investors on the continent, especially in West Africa – and there have been fears that greater access via ECOWAS agreements on free movement of people and goods could threaten local businesses in Nigeria.

However Nigeria is also a major exporter and investor on the continent in financial services, manufactured goods, agricultural products and the like. Trade experts concur that in the long run, the AfCFTA can be a win-win for all, especially the bigger economies. Former United Nations Economic Commission for Africa head Carlos Lopes commented during the summit that Nigeria would come around on the trade agreement – although he later tweeted that it had missed a symbol of historic significance by not signing.

## A lot to gain from intra-African trade

Clearly the two giants of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and South Africa, both have a lot to gain from greater intra-African trade. In the past, strong cooperation between South Africa and Nigeria has led to major advances, such as the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the AU.

In the past, strong cooperation between South Africa and Nigeria has led to major advances

In his new book on Nigerian and South African foreign policy, *The Eagle and the Springbok*, University of Johannesburg Professor Adekeye Adebajo calls South Africa and Nigeria the two ‘Gullivers’ in their respective regions. After a ‘lost decade’ where ‘Africa’s indispensable bilateral relationship’ between South Africa and Nigeria was marked by competition and diplomatic squabbles, there is a need for greater cooperation between these African powers, together with others such as Algeria, Ethiopia or Angola, he says.

‘The combined political clout of these two states represents a potentially formidable force in shaping Africa’s integration and representing the continent’s interests on the world stage,’ he says.

The AfCFTA and other AU initiatives need both South Africa and Nigeria. Ramaphosa has so far indicated that he is committed to regional integration and intra-African trade. Now is a good time to strengthen diplomatic links with Nigeria to keep the Abuja road map on track.

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44

COUNTRIES HAVE SIGNED  
THE AFCFTA

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## PSC Interview: Towards a collective ownership of the PSC

This month, 10 new members will join the PSC. Morocco, which returned to the AU in January 2017, will start its first two-year tenure on the council. The *PSC Report* asked Morocco's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Nasser Bourita about Morocco's plans for its PSC membership.

### What are the major crisis issues on the continent that Morocco will focus on as it joins the PSC in April 2018?

Morocco's election to the Peace and Security Council is a recognition of the constructive role and the productive action carried out by Morocco in favour of peace and stability of Africa, under the leadership of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI.

Morocco doesn't come to the PSC with a 'menu à la carte' of the crises that it considers to be a priority. This would amount to a cherry-picking exercise that could be detrimental. Instead, Morocco comes with a vision through which its engagement in the PSC will be total. No issue will be left aside.

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In this regard, Morocco's goal during its mandate on the PSC is to contribute in an effective and a direct manner to the activities of the important body. Morocco has considerable expertise, having contributed to maintaining peace and security in Africa for the past 60 years.

Morocco's vision is based on the interdependence between security, regional integration and development. The emergence of our continent depends on development, which can't be achieved without peace and regional integration. These three components are vital for the rise of a New Africa and are critical for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Morocco's election to the PSC is therefore guided by the aim of strengthening African unity and solidarity. Achieving peace and stability across the continent could seem a daunting task, but we believe that if realism, compromise and unity of action prevail, the PSC can successfully meet the challenge. Avoidance of division, fragmentation and polarisation of the PSC's work will be critical in this regard.

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January 2017

MOROCCO'S RETURN  
TO THE AU

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## How can Morocco help to improve the working methods of the PSC?

The improvement of the PSC's working methods has been on the table of discussion for years now, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of this important organ of the AU. The PSC has started to implement some of these changes to its working methods, but more needs to be done.

It should be recalled that the report presented by President Paul Kagame, in January 2017, stresses that 'a thorough reform of the PSC should be initiated. This reform could include: a) reviewing the PSC's membership, in line with Article 5 (4) of the PSC Protocol, b) strengthening the PSC's working methods, and c) strengthening the PSC's role in prevention and crisis management.'

Currently, there is a growing consensus about the urgent need for improving the PSC's working methods, so as to consolidate the collective ownership of the council by the member states, and the role of the PSC in preserving peace and security in Africa.

There is a growing consensus about the need for improving the PSC's working methods to consolidate the collective ownership of the council

Morocco considers that the improvement of the PSC's working methods is a component of the AU reform process that needs to be tackled in a comprehensive and holistic manner. The Kingdom will work jointly with other member states of the PSC for increased efficiency in order to give the work of the council a real intergovernmental dimension.

As a PSC member, Morocco will contribute in a constructive and productive manner to this important process, so as to enhance further consensus through an inclusive and transparent approach.

## What needs to be done to improve the efficiency of the PSC in crisis situations as the AU works to silence the guns by 2020?

As the AU set the ambitious goal of 'silencing the guns by 2020', we need to underline that a comprehensive and holistic reform of the PSC is key to improve its efficiency in terms of preventing and managing crises in Africa.

Morocco considers that the main step to this end starts with the real ownership of this body by the member states, which have to be the driving force of the PSC. There is an urgent need to make the council intergovernmental. One can't stress enough that the appropriation by member states is key for the proper functioning of the PSC.

In order to cope with the growing peace and security agenda in Africa, adequate human and financial resources need to be devoted for the

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2020

THE AU'S DEADLINE FOR  
SILENCING THE GUNS

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proper functioning of the PSC. Moreover, an emphasis needs to be put on prevention through strengthening the mechanism of early warning and conflict prevention.

As a newly elected member of the PSC, Morocco will put its well-known and wide experience in peacekeeping operations, mediation, peacebuilding and in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism at the disposal of this AU organ and for African states.

### **What is Morocco's view about the AU reform process?**

The Royal Vision of His Majesty the King for the emergence of Africa is very clear. The AU reform process is a priority for the Kingdom of Morocco because a reformed AU will be a catalyst for intra-African cooperation, which Morocco has chosen as a flagship policy in its relations on the continent. Morocco is eager to share its expertise and its know-how in the fields of peace and security, sustainable development, migration, climate change and other domains.

The Kingdom has submitted its contribution to the crucial debate on AU reform to President Kagame, in his capacity as leader of the AU reform process. Morocco also participated actively in the Kigali retreat in May 2017.

We would like to underscore the leadership of Rwanda's president on this important issue and pay tribute to the work that he is accomplishing. The report 'The imperative to strengthen our Union' is an important and pragmatic document. It contains important proposals that AU members need to discuss in depth.

The AU reform process is a priority for Morocco because a reformed AU will be a catalyst for intra-African cooperation

Morocco's view is that the AU is at a crossroads; we believe now is the time for an effective and efficient AU. The Kingdom has important multilateral diplomacy experience, and we think that AU reform needs to be bold and holistic in scope in view of the many challenges and threats that the continent faces in peace, security and sustainable development.

The AU reform process needs to be a consensual one. We don't believe that it must be a piecemeal approach through which African states decide which changes they favour and which ones they reject. We think we need to invest in the process to get it right. Ownership of this process by African states is vital. We had a very healthy debate on the issue during the 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> AU summits. I am sure that the coming weeks and months will witness important consultations and discussions.



MOROCCO IS EAGER  
TO SHARE ITS EXPERTISE  
WITH OTHER AU  
MEMBER STATES

### **How can Morocco assist the AU to implement its vision and roadmap on migration?**

The choice of His Majesty King Mohammed VI as leader on the issue of migration during the 28<sup>th</sup> AU Summit is far from being random. It is a recognition of His pioneer role in the adoption and implementation of a humanistic national policy on migration.

Under the leadership of His Majesty the King, a large and inclusive process of consultation was conducted during one year with African states, the AU Commission, the regional economic communities as well as relevant stakeholders, culminating in the presentation of the African Agenda on Migration during the 30<sup>th</sup> AU Summit held in Addis Ababa in January 2018.

The agenda is comprehensive in scope and offers an Afro-centred vision on migration. It aims to make migration in Africa a choice rather than a necessity, and advocates for coherent national policies, effective subregional coordination and a continental perspective.

The African Agenda on Migration aims to assist African states to tackle the challenges associated with migration

In this regard, the agenda calls for the creation of an African Observatory for Migration, under the AU umbrella, to develop the observation and the exchange of information between African countries and in order to promote better management of migratory flows. It also stresses the necessity to create a post of AU Special Envoy for Migration, who will be primarily responsible for coordinating the AU's policies on migration.

The African Agenda on Migration, through its holistic approach, aims to assist African states and the AU Commission to tackle in an integrated manner the multidimensional challenges associated with migration. The agenda can inform the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration elaboration process.

The Kingdom of Morocco, in its capacity as host country of the Intergovernmental Conference for the adoption of the Global Compact in December 2018, is committed to making this multilateral conference a platform for Africa.

Morocco stands ready to share with other African states its successful national experience after six years of implementation of the policy on migration and asylum. The Kingdom is a strong proponent of inter-African cooperation, and working together on the issue of migration can be a starting point to implement long-term development strategies for the benefit of the continent, within the framework of relevant processes, in particular the Rabat Process.

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December 2018

MOROCCO HOSTS A  
CONFERENCE OF  
THE GLOBAL COMPACT  
ON MIGRATION

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## Decisions of the PSC from January – March 2018

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
744 <sup>th</sup> meeting 15 January 2018	Dialogue between the PSC and the League of Arab States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Holding annual joint consultative meetings</li> <li>• Exchanging agendas</li> <li>• Ensuring regular interaction between the chairpersons of the two organs on issues of common concern</li> <li>• Undertaking joint field missions</li> <li>• Holding joint retreats/brainstorming sessions to reflect on existing and emerging threats to peace and security in Africa and the Arab world</li> <li>• Organising joint consultative meetings and seminars in the areas of peacekeeping, conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• League of Arab States</li> <li>• PSC</li> </ul>	Pending the reactivation of the League of Arab States' PSC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timing of the reactivation of the League of Arab States' PSC</li> <li>• Capacity of non-Arab member states to weigh in on the exchange due to the donor–recipient relationship between Gulf states and African states</li> </ul>
746 <sup>th</sup> meeting 17 January 2018	5 <sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All PSC member states should participate in all future high-level seminars</li> <li>• The agendas of future high-level seminars should start with a review of the status of implementation of previous decisions</li> <li>• The list of invitees should be developed by the AU Commission (PSC Secretariat) and submitted to the PSC for approval</li> <li>• The commission should take all necessary steps to implement the outcomes of the 5<sup>th</sup> High-Level Seminar (listed above)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PSC member states</li> <li>• AU Commission</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The influence of member states on the list of invitees: this could lead to the exclusion of some participants due to state considerations rather than the relevance of their contribution to the discussion</li> </ul>
748 <sup>th</sup> meeting 24 January 2018	Deployment of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) contingent mission to Lesotho	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The chairperson of the AU Commission, in consultation with the SADC Secretariat, is requested to make proposals on possible technical and financial support to the mission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AUC Chairperson</li> <li>• AU Commission</li> </ul>	As soon as possible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability and political will of the AU to ensure that the SADC mission is compliant with the principles of the African Peace and Security Architecture</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
748 <sup>th</sup> meeting 24 January 2018 <i>Continued</i>	Deployment of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) contingent mission to Lesotho <i>Continued</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The chairperson of the AU Commission is requested to transmit the communiqué to the UN secretary general and to request that it be circulated as an official UN Security Council document</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AUC Chairperson</li> </ul>		
749 <sup>th</sup> meeting 27 January 2018	Development of a comprehensive approach to combating the trans-national threat of terrorism in Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Member states are called upon to make contributions to the AU Special Fund on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism</li> <li>The AU Commission is requested to continue to assist member states in dealing with the return of terrorist fighters from abroad</li> <li>The Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism should be operationalised immediately</li> <li>The subcommittee is encouraged to develop an African watch list composed of a database of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts</li> <li>Member states are urged to sign and ratify AU instruments on counter-terrorism and to implement the communiqué adopted at the 455<sup>th</sup> meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AU member states</li> <li>PSC member states</li> <li>AU Commission</li> <li>Partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Immediately for the PSC Subcommittee on Terrorism</li> <li>No explicit deadline for other measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of binding incentives for member states to speed up the implementation of past decisions on terrorism adopted by the AU</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
750 <sup>th</sup> meeting 6 February 2018	AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The governments of Sudan and South Sudan should continue their collaboration to sustain the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement of 2012</li> <li>These governments are called upon to implement decisions taken at the Extraordinary Joint Political Security Mechanism meeting on 4 February 2018</li> <li>The AUHIP is requested to intensify its engagement with parties to encourage timely implementation of those decisions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sudan and South Sudan</li> <li>AUHIP</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resolution of the Abyei crisis not high on the agenda for either the Sudanese or the South Sudanese government, as they currently face other challenges</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The two states are urged to mandate their representatives in the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to discuss and take decisions on the establishment of the Abyei Area interim institutions</li> <li>Traditional leaders of Abyei are encouraged to sustain their commitment to improve relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sudan and South Sudan</li> <li>Traditional leaders of Abyei</li> </ul>		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The government of Sudan and Sudanese opposition parties should renew their commitment to an inclusive national political process</li> <li>The panel is requested to continue its consultations with the Sudanese interlocutors</li> <li>An appeal is made to the Sudanese parties, particularly the government, to create and preserve conditions conducive to the participation of Sudanese political actors in the envisaged national political process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government of Sudan</li> <li>Sudanese opposition</li> <li>AUHIP</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leverage and incentives at the disposal of the AUHIP and the AU</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
750 <sup>th</sup> meeting 6 February 2018 <i>Continued</i>	AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan and South Sudan <i>Continued</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An appeal is made to national authorities to exercise restraint in their response to public dissatisfaction with the economic situation</li> </ul>			
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The government and the armed movements in Sudan should sustain and renew the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities that they have unilaterally declared</li> <li>The government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) should continue their preparations to resume the adjourned cessation of hostilities by 6 March 2018, when the SPC expects the parties to reach a formal cessation of hostilities agreement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government of Sudan</li> <li>Armed movements</li> <li>SPLM-North</li> </ul>	6 March 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Uncertainty resulting from unilateral ceasefires</li> <li>Lack of incentives for the parties to reach a ceasefire</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AUHIP is encouraged to renew its engagement to complement the efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in support of the democratic transformation of South Sudan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AUHIP</li> <li>IGAD</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cohesion among IGAD member states</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decision to dedicate a PSC session to deliberate on issues in the Horn of Africa</li> <li>The AUHIP is requested to urgently implement the recommendations of the Khartoum consultation and the panel's plans to facilitate and conduct further research and consultation to inform proposals for actions</li> <li>Decision to renew the mandate of the AUHIP for a period of 12 months</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PSC</li> <li>AUHIP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Urgently</li> <li>Immediately</li> </ul>	



Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
752 <sup>nd</sup> meeting 13 February 2018	Guinea-Bissau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The AU Commission, in consultations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is to mobilise financial resources to support the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau's (ECOMIB) operations</li> <li>• Decision to endorse the measures taken by ECOWAS in its 4 February 2018 decision, including sanctions against 'political obstructionists'</li> <li>• The AU Commission to coordinate with the ECOWAS Commission in order to ensure effective implementation of these measures</li> <li>• The UN Security Council is requested to endorse the PSC communiqué in order to ensure its effective implementation</li> <li>• The AUC chairperson should transmit the communiqué to the UN secretary general, through to the UN Security Council, and request that it be circulated as an official UN Security Council document</li> <li>• The AU Commission should be asked to continue to provide regular updates to the council on the evaluation of the situation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AU Commission</li> <li>• AUC Chairperson</li> <li>• UN Security Council</li> <li>• PSC</li> </ul>	Immediately	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of financial resources from the AU, as the operationalisation of the Peace Fund is not finalised yet</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
753 <sup>rd</sup> meeting 15 February 2018	Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The AU Commission is requested to expedite the development of a new AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) concept of operations, which is essential for effective operations, and to identify the required support, including from the UN Support Office in Somalia</li> <li>• Decision to establish a mechanism of naming and shaming suppliers, financiers, facilitators, transit points and recipients of illicit weapons, with a view to stemming the illicit proliferation of these weapons</li> <li>• The AU Commission, in close cooperation with the regional economic communities/ regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa, to develop a draft mechanism to be submitted to the council for consideration</li> <li>• The AU Commission, working in close collaboration with the government of Somalia, is requested to operationalise the Joint Task Force on Somalia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AU Commission</li> <li>• PSC</li> <li>• Federal Government of Somalia</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of cooperation by regional stakeholders regarding the naming and shaming of those involved in aiding terrorist organisations in Somalia</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
753 <sup>rd</sup> meeting 15 February 2018 <i>Continued</i>	Somalia <i>Continued</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AU Commission should establish a platform for political dialogue with AMISOM troop- or police-contributing countries (T/PCCs), IGAD and concerned AU member states to ensure a coherent and unified political approach to the situation in Somalia</li> <li>Decision to review the situation in Somalia and AMISOM activities on a quarterly basis, and the Somali government is urged to report to the council on progress made on key milestones in the transition process</li> </ul>			
754 <sup>th</sup> meeting 20 February 2018	Darfur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AUHIP and the AU–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) should continue with their engagement with the parties to the conflict, and provide an update on the progress made with these efforts within the next three months in order for the council to take appropriate measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AUHIP</li> <li>UNAMID</li> </ul>	By the end of May 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The limited leverage at the disposal of the AUHIP to push the various parties to comply with its decisions</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AU Commission should immediately take the necessary steps to mobilise financial resources and humanitarian assistance in support of peace processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AU Commission</li> </ul>	Immediately	

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
754 <sup>th</sup> meeting 20 February 2018 <i>Continued</i>	Darfur <i>Continued</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNAMID's priorities must be realigned to support post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in Darfur</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNAMID</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial resources at the disposal of the AU to make an impact on post-reconstruction and development activities in the long term</li> </ul>
747 <sup>th</sup> meeting 18 February 2018	Upcoming elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AU Commission to review the AU election observation methodology</li> <li>The AU Commission should always ensure that a core team of AU election experts and analysts remain in the country organising elections right up to the end of the electoral process, in order to provide technical support as required</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial cost of long-term election observation missions (EOMs)</li> <li>Uneven political commitment from the AU leadership to assist EOMs in launching a political dialogue on the organisation of elections</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All member states planning to organise elections in the first quarter of 2018 are urged to ensure the credibility and legitimacy of their election outcomes, through, among others, effective and transparent voter registration exercises, and civic education on inclusivity, diversity management, tolerance and culture of peace, as well as on the importance of using legal channels to address cases of election-related grievances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Member states</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Uneven political will among member states</li> </ul>
758 <sup>th</sup> meeting 14 March 2018	Democratic Republic of Congo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AU Commission chairperson to take the necessary steps to enable the AU and its member states to participate actively in the Round Table of Donors on the humanitarian situation in the DRC, scheduled in Geneva on 13 April 2019</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AU Commission</li> </ul>	Immediately	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Willingness of AU member states to work through the AU Commission to support a fellow member state</li> </ul>

Meeting	Issue	Measures	Stakeholders	Deadline	Risks
758 <sup>th</sup> meeting 14 March 2018 <i>Continued</i>	Democratic Republic of Congo <i>Continued</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AU Commission to take the necessary steps to coordinate the multifarious support from AU member states to provide for the organisation of elections in the DRC</li> </ul>			
760 <sup>th</sup> meeting 29 March 2018	Guinea-Bissau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requests the AU Commission to dispatch, as soon as possible, an electoral technical assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau, to evaluate the conditions and preparations for the holding of the upcoming legislative elections, and to brief the council accordingly</li> <li>The ECOWAS Commission to provide further details on the sanction measures that it has taken, in particular the personal details of the individuals who have been sanctioned, and to regularly coordinate its efforts with the AU Commission to facilitate the implementation of sanctions by all member states</li> <li>Further requests ECOWAS to develop a mechanism to ensure that the imposed sanctions work effectively and the Conakry Agreement is fully implemented</li> <li>Requests the AU Commission to provide regular updates to the council on the evolution of the situation in Guinea-Bissau</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AU Commission</li> <li>ECOWAS Commission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As soon as possible</li> <li>Medium term</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stance of PSC members on sanctions</li> <li>Lack of operationalisation of the Subcommittee on Sanctions to ensure implementation is monitored</li> </ul>

### About the PSC Report

The Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). The monthly publication is the only one of its kind dedicated to providing current analysis of the PSC's work. It is written by a team of ISS analysts in Addis Ababa.

### About the ISS

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa's future. Our goal is to enhance human security as a means to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity. Using its networks and influence, the ISS provides timely and credible analysis, practical training and technical assistance to governments and civil society.

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