Time for Africa to respond to terrorism and coups
Staying on target to silence the guns by 2030
Somalia leadership switch could sweeten soured relationship with the AU
Aligned and enforced election norms and guidelines badly needed
PSC Interview with Birgitte Markussen, European Union ambassador to the AU
The African Union (AU) 16th extraordinary summit on 28 May 2022 sought solutions to the threats of terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) in Africa. These, according to AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, ‘are hindering Africa from achieving its goals of becoming a peaceful and prosperous continent’.

The summit, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, was organised at a time when Africa is witnessing an increase in terrorist attacks and UCGs. It resulted in a draft declaration and draft decision yet to be made public.

According to these documents, African heads of states endorsed previous recommendations by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and other organs able to enhance AU responses to terrorism and UCGs. The outcomes are a continental commitment to addressing the two threats and their consequences, without signalling a significant policy shift in AU responses to them.

It remains to be seen whether and how these decisions will be implemented. This is particularly so considering the major financial and human resource restrictions confronting the AU, particularly the AU Commission, which is expected to be central to implementation of these decisions.

**Summit outcomes**

The summit declaration adopted the theme ‘robust response, deepening democracy and collective security’. It is, for the most part, a political statement that reiterates AU member states’ commitment to previous AU decisions, frameworks and mechanisms on terrorism and UCGs.

It acknowledges the extent to which the two issues have threatened African peace and security and calls on member states to ratify and implement AU decisions and instruments on both. It also reaffirms AU decisions, including the establishment of a counter-terrorism unit under the African Standby Force (ASF) and the implementation of a fund to fight terrorism and violent extremism.

The declaration endorsed the AU Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security’s May 2022 recommendation for an AU and regional economic communities (RECs) memorandum of understanding on the ASF. It further recommended establishing a counter-terrorism coordination task force at ministerial level to enhance synergy and harmonise counter-terrorism responses at different levels.

The much-more succinct draft decision includes seven major action-oriented resolutions that provide more guidance on AU responses to UCGs beyond...
the declaration, which offers only general aspirations for their prevention. The draft decision seeks immediate reactivation of the sanctions sub-committee and establishment of a PSC sub-committee on UCGs to monitor other potential UCGs, including amendment of national constitutions. The AU Commission has been tasked with developing by the February 2023 summit guidelines for the amendment of national constitutions.

The draft calls for prompt activation of the PSC sub-committee on counter-terrorism established in 2010 but that has never been functional. It also tasks the AU Commission with consolidating a comprehensive continental strategic plan of action for countering terrorism and violent extremism. This is expected to synthesise AU’s policy frameworks on countering terrorism, mercenarism, small arms and light weapons, transnational organised crime and criminalisation of ransom payments.

Reactivation is sought of the sanctions sub-committee and there’s a call for a UCGs sub-committee

At their upcoming executive council meeting in July, foreign ministers are expected to determine how much funding to allocate to the AU’s rapid response capability for emerging conflicts, including terrorism. The funds will come from the Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF).

The other two decisions focus on the implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and African Peace and Security Architecture implementation, and for the next African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) governance report to focus on UCGs.

Achievements

Establishing a sub-committee on UCGs, independent of the sanctions sub-committee, and renewed commitment to developing guidelines for national constitution amendments, signal AU readiness to go beyond sanctions to manage UCGs. If fully implemented, the sub-committee will focus increasingly on prevention of and early response to UCGs, including monitoring incumbents’ attempts to amend constitutions to expand their powers and/or extend their terms.

This is a move in the right direction as contestations over constitutional amendments have contributed to political instability and triggered public protests leading to military interventions in some African countries. The decision to consolidate a continental strategic action plan to counter terrorism and violent extremism also indicates realisation of the need for a more holistic and coordinated response to the threat.

Governance off the table

While the outcomes of the summit widened the AU’s response to UCGs and terrorism, governance deficits that drive both phenomenon were off the table for the AU once more. Addressing governance continentally is challenging as the implementation of decisions on governance issues is difficult due to considerations of sovereignty.

The AU’s response to terrorism and violent extremism continues to be focused on security and militaristic response to the threat rather than interventions such as socio-political measures. While the AU can only encourage states to make changes, it can ensure continental policy frameworks provide a holistic response to the threats.

Decisions past and present

The summit outcomes also seem to have overlooked complementarity between new provisions and previous summit decisions. For example, the February 2022 summit stipulated that a high-level hybrid committee of sitting and former heads of state and government would be established. It would engage incumbents who try to amend national constitutions ‘without national consensus’.

The last summit had also decided that a monitoring and oversight committee be established including the AU Commission, RECs, the APRM and member states. It would monitor and evaluate the implementation of country structural vulnerability and resilience assessments to help member states deal with the structural causes of UCGs. It is not clear whether the sub-committee on UCGs will now take over these responsibilities or if these will work in tandem in a structure yet to be established.

Resources stretched

Implementing the summit decisions will have serious cost implications. The declaration promises that there would be a budget for national and regional response
to terrorism and violent extremism. However, given the AU’s track record of allocating funding to initiatives, including the Peace Fund, member states will have difficulty deciding on a budget and meeting their commitments.

It is also not clear whether this finance will come from the AU’s regular budget, the Peace Fund CRF or the newly established special counter-terrorism fund. While the establishment of the counter-terror unit under the ASF was endorsed by the summit, its realisation will face similar financial challenges.

The decision to develop guidelines for the amendment of national constitutions is also not new. Since 2010, member states, through AU Assembly and PSC decisions, have asked the AU Commission to develop such a guideline that will be universally applicable to its members. The Commission, however, is unable to do so because of constrained human and financial resources. This affects its ability to consult with 55 member states, which would mean deploying dedicated experts for an extended time.

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Importantly, the sub-committees on counter-terrorism and sanctions have never operated, attributable to inadequate human resources in delegations of member states and the AU Commission. The AU currently does not have human resources nor financial capacity to monitor and enforce sanction regimes.

Moreover, while various AU agencies working on terrorism and violent extremism might actively support that sub-committee, there are no active units focusing on governance issues to support the UCGs sub-committee. The AGA is a coordination platform rather than a governance advisory body, while APRM operates by the invitation of member states. The PSC is the only member of the AGA platform with a mandate to scrutinise the governance performance of member states. However, it has shied away from this responsibility since establishment and particularly after 2015.

The crux of the matter

While the summit may have made important strides in responding to terrorism and UCGs, its success can be measured only to the extent these decisions are implemented. Member states’ response to decisions correlates directly with political commitment and the extent of their willingness to dedicate resources to decisions and monitor their implementation.

This will entail ensuring the various entities being proposed become operational in a reasonably short time. Furthermore, funds and human resources should be made available to the Commission, whose responsibility it is to implement a number of the decisions.
Staying on target to silence the guns by 2030

The AU seems to be in the habit of assigning deadlines for overly ambitious goals and then struggling to meet them. This has been the case with initiatives such as the adoption of an African passport by 2018 and the self-financing of the AU through an import levy by 2017.

Another one of these is ‘Silencing the Guns by 2020’ – a flagship project of the AU’s Agenda 2063. Clearly, 2020 has come and gone without Africa having reached the goal of being conflict-free. Therefore the deadline was extended to 2030.

Cynics are already predicting that this won’t be met, given the trend of insecurity the continent faces. This includes the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, a resurgence in coup d’états, resource-linked instability and conflicts in areas like the Great Lakes Region, and intra-state conflicts such as in South Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia and Cameroon.

Tackling the multiple root causes of Africa’s many conflicts by 2030 in the midst of COVID-19 and its consequent global economic slow-down will be difficult, if not impossible. The AU also remains limited by the sovereignty of its member states. It can do only so much to nudge its members in the right direction – but ultimately its hands are tied. This won’t change by 2030.

To avoid disappointment, the AU Commission is working towards a better definition of what ‘silencing the guns’ means in the context of the Agenda 2063 goals and specific milestones that should be achieved between now and 2030.

A new framework to monitor progress

The Master Roadmap to Silencing the Guns, adopted in Lusaka in 2016, lacked clarity and a workable implementation matrix with clear indicators of what success would mean. As part of efforts towards enhanced achievements, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework was adopted by the AU Assembly in February, and the development of an implementation plan to guide the contribution of key actors is under way.

Predictably, the current process of fine-tuning the M&E framework and working towards its implementation is challenging. Two years have lapsed since the goalposts were shifted to 2030.

The aims of Silencing the Guns are also extremely broad. They encompass almost everything the AU does or is supposed to. The new M&E framework divides the issues to be addressed by the Silencing the Guns roadmap under the broad frameworks of political, economic, legal and social issues.

Certain objectives such as strengthening financing for African peace support operations, setting up military interventions under the African Standby Force (ASF) or preventing the circulation of illicit arms flows in Africa can be fairly easily attached to a list of indicators of success. Success can be measured by e.g. looking at the amount of funds in the Peace Fund, the number of ASF deployments, cooperation between security agencies and the ratification and enforcement of treaties dedicated to rooting out illicit arms trafficking.

It’s important to popularise the Silencing the Guns agenda afresh and ensure buy-in from member states

Some goals, such as the success of African mediation strategies and peacekeeping, however, are harder to measure. How do you prove that conflicts would have escalated had peacemakers not stepped in? Success in making peace is always more difficult to measure than failure.

Other issues also demand much greater political will and are linked to issues of sovereignty that a framework from the AU will do little to change. For example, the AU plans to keep member states to their commitments made under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This is aimed at ensuring free and fair elections and preventing heads of state from unilaterally rewriting their own constitutions to stay in power. This is difficult to do for an inter-governmental organisation that has no legal hold over its member states.
Yet, without putting the bar too low, for member states to merely ratify their own decisions over the years will be an important first step; and this can be measured by the M&E framework. Enforcing sanctions against those who don’t comply with AU instruments would be another necessary step – and is also noted in the M&E framework.

The economic and social progress to be made on the continent in order to Silence the Guns by 2030 are broader and more difficult to measure. However, tracking and recovering illicit financial flows from Africa, harmonising legislation and building the capacity of states’ financial intelligence services, enhancing compliance with labour laws, and enforcing compliance with regulations regarding the extractive industry should be possible.

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Promoting industrialisation on the continent and creating decent jobs are, meanwhile, harder to measure and achieve. The same goes for social aspects of the roadmap.

Still, amid the enormity of the task, instead of passing the buck, the AU Commission is trying to forge ahead. It should be congratulated for this.

**Popularising the roadmap**

The danger of relying too much on frameworks, documents and committees is that ordinary citizens will expect to see concrete results. Africans want to see a more peaceful and prosperous continent by the end of the decade, short of any explanations. This is clearly beyond the scope of what the AU and its organs and institutions can deliver, if a new way of going about managing peace and security isn’t adopted.

Thanks to the roadmap and the M&E framework, the organisation could tease out some of the more workable goals it has set for itself and show progress. For this to happen and for citizens to keep track, it’s important to popularise the Silencing the Guns agenda afresh and ensure buy-in from member states. This can be done by involving the African Peer Review Mechanism that has focal points in most countries, the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the private sector, civil society organisations and the media.

The overall aim of Agenda 2063 is a ‘conflict-free, integrated and prosperous Africa.’ Strides are being made with all three of these, albeit not fast enough. The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement was adopted with much fanfare in 2018 and a secretariat has been set up in Accra, but final negotiations around key issues are ongoing and trading hasn’t begun.

Its fast adoption by states benefited from heavyweight states’ strong leadership, and financial support from partners, to take it forward. Silencing the Guns should benefit from this same momentum, institutional framework and urgency.
Since 2007, the AU has played a central role in Somalia through its African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Among other things, AMISOM has led efforts to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab, capacitated the Somali national force and spearheaded key political engagements to restore the country to normality. These contributions have come at massive political, human and financial costs to the organisation.

Somalia leadership switch could sweeten soured relationship with the AU

In many ways, therefore, the story of Somalia’s gradual steps towards state consolidation cannot be told without including the efforts of the AU. However, the contribution has been challenged by successive Somali leaders, which has soured relations between the continental body and the country’s leaders. The relationship became more strained in the lead-up to Somalia’s 2022 elections. However, with the election of former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, expectations are high that the relationship with the AU will improve.

Farmajo-AU tensions

During the presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmajo, the relationship between the AU and Somalia’s political leaders reached an all-time low. This was triggered by Farmajo’s complaints about the influence of troop-contributing countries on AMISOM and Somalia’s federal member states.

His claims were based on allegations about troop operations from Somalia’s neighbours and the implications on Somalia’s internal politics, particularly relations between its member states and the central government. His administration took the view that the states’ relationship with the centre was unbalanced due to the support of troop-contributing countries, particularly Kenya. The ensuing tensions affected AMISOM’s operations and shaped perceptions of it among sections of the Somali population.

Many argue that while Farmajo courted several external allies, particularly the United States and the European Union, his administration failed to manage and use his relationship with the AU well. Farmajo’s desire for international alliances, it is said, was particularly evident in his first three and half years in office until tensions heightened with his former prime minister Hassen Ali Khaire, who was mostly responsible for international relations. His administration’s approach to handling disagreements on elections including his unilateral presidential term extension resulted in a 15-months delay.

Relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea – countries traditionally considered adversaries – improved, while relations with Kenya and Djibouti – contributors of troops to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia – thawed considerably. His regional alliances won him security support, with which he distracted opposition and influenced domestic politics. The trilateral alliance with Eritrea and Ethiopia was, however, also viewed as competition to existing regional blocs, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Towards the end of his term, therefore, relations with the AU and IGAD had deteriorated considerably, affecting AMISOM’s operations. In December 2020, Somalia accused Kenya of interfering in its internal affairs and complained to IGAD, which established a fact-finding mission to investigate the complaint. The mission found insufficient evidence to support Somalia’s claims. Somalia rejected the findings and threatened to leave IGAD if it wasn’t reversed.

In May 2021, Somalia rejected the AU’s special envoy for Somalia appointed to resolve the political impasse that followed Farmajo’s unilateral presidential term extension. The Peace and Security Council condemned the term extension despite Farmajo’s attempts to persuade the then-AU Chairperson – President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo – to support the parliamentary resolution. Further worsening relations were political differences particularly between Farmajo and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble.
In April 2022, Roble expelled the special representative of the chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. He accused Madeira of activities incompatible with AMISOM’s mandate and Somalia’s security strategy, days after AMISOM became the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The representative remained after Farmajo immediately rejected the expulsion, calling it unauthorised. In November 2021, as crucial discussions were underway on the fate of AMISOM, the Somalia foreign affairs ministry had expelled the deputy special representative.

Hope for improved relations
The long-awaited Somalia election was completed in May 2022, installing a returning president and new bicameral parliaments. The re-election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (who served between 2012 and 2017) brings some optimism and hope for a fresh start amid the country’s domestic and international challenges. Reassuring to many is the president’s motto of ‘Somalia at peace with itself and with the world’.

Achieving the desired peace to pave the way for improved external relations will be daunting. The trust deficit between federal and regional political leaders remains an enduring tension that will not dissipate with President Hassan’s return, save conscious efforts, beyond business as usual, to resolve it.

Some experts argue that the presidential election was more a matter of anyone-but-Farmajo and that political elites saw an opportunity to remove him from office. Prominent presidential candidates endorsed President Hassan just to rally against Farmajo without having a common interest. Their differences are likely to surface, challenging the journey to political stability. This will require careful management of the situation and expectations. It will certainly also affect Somalia’s regional and continental relations.

Bumpy road ahead
The al-Shabaab threat remains the primary insecurity in Somalia and the region. In recent months, the group committed many attacks, including in Mogadishu and Beledweyne, claiming more than 53 lives. Al-Shabaab also still controls large territories in south and central Somalia. The extremist group’s financial and warfare capacity is also growing. Some reports indicate that it collected about US$180 million in revenue and spent US$24 million on weapons in 2021.

The newly reconfigured mission, ATMIS, is expected to support Somalia’s security forces in degrading al-Shabaab and in building the capacity of Somalia’s security institutions. The mission is planned to end in December 2024, with its forces downsized in phases. This is unlikely to give ATMIS time to counter the persistent threat from al-Shabaab.

As with its predecessor, the new administration is expected to grapple with the multiplicity of regional interests in Somalia, including from the Gulf countries. Clear faultlines exist among these countries: While the United Arab Emirates supports the federal member states, Qatar is believed to be allied with the federal government following the split within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Despite the signing of an agreement to resolve the GCC crisis in 2021, the rifts need time to heal. These divides present major terrain within which the new administration will need to define and project Somalia’s national interest and consolidate external support in a coordinated way. The AU should remain an indispensable partner, protecting Somalia from unhelpful external influences, given its longstanding role in bringing stability to the country.

Reactivising political and security support
The new administration and the AU should learn from previous experiences and use the change in government to reactivate relations. Fostering good relations and greater coordination between the AU and the other international actors (notably the United Nations) could be a start in supporting outstanding political and security issues.

This includes helping the new administration to manage its political crisis through genuine and inclusive dialogue, and supporting initiatives to build trust among the country’s political elites. A dialogue should be considered to finalise the constitutional review.

Coordination between the AU and the new administration is even more imperative as the operations of ATMIS depend on a smooth relationship between the two. The Somalia national forces should be equipped and capacitated to ensure they can take responsibility for the country’s security when ATMIS exits.
Electoral crises and ensuing political instability have been the bane of most post-colonial African states. The African Union (AU) and regional blocs such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have tried to craft norms and guidelines to entrench democratic values and stability on the continent. However, even with norms, the subregion has had its share of disputed elections that have caused instability and suffering among its population.

Over the next 18 months Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Zimbabwe are heading for elections. These countries have a history of disputed elections. With each successive election, they make minimal progress in the right direction. However, with each dispute, AU and SADC limitations in handling the electoral process and conflicts become more apparent.

At the core is the understanding that the regional bloc’s role is to encourage rather than force member states to reform electoral processes in line with regional and continental norms. As a result, the two bodies don’t have an iron-clad mechanism to set member states on the right path to consolidating democracy. Analysts believe that regional and continental bodies are complicit in the democratic deficit in many countries as they will not outrightly criticise the clear flaunting of established norms.

Alignment of norms

In 2015, SADC revised its principles and guidelines governing democratic elections in alignment with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007, which was adopted in 2012. While in theory, the SADC guidelines attempt to localise the charter, the efforts do not go far enough. Substantive alignment and a clear link between AU and SADC guidelines are lacking.

As it stands, member states can ‘cherry-pick’ which norms to adopt and which to defer. When member states are given this latitude to choose, the message is that the norms are not hard and fast. Secondly, it makes it impossible for the AU to intervene through technical support or criticism of a member state not party to the charter.

Of the four countries heading for elections, only Lesotho signed, ratified and deposited the instruments of the charter. The other three have only signed, with Zimbabwe being the last to do so in 2018. However, all four countries are parties to the SADC protocol that gives effect to the guidelines.
Such a situation exposes the limits of continental endeavour to consolidate democracy. SADC and the AU cannot speak from the same premise when monitoring and supporting these countries in their electoral processes. The former can decide which electoral issues to bring to the AU, which cannot use its charter to intervene. It is an indictment on the AU and SADC that countries are not given definite timelines to ascend to key continental protocols.

In this situation, creating a joint mechanism of operations would require a shared position on the ratification of both regional and continental norms. Such a mechanism to monitor implementation and provide support is important for the continent to speak with one voice on the democratic trajectory. Given that some instability in member states arises from disputed elections, the AU must be actively involved with states to attain key continental goals such as stability and silencing guns.

Clear mechanisms are needed on AU technical or advisory support and on sanctions

This would also send a clear message that member states cannot play one body off against the other. When there is a crisis in Lesotho, for instance, it has an immediate effect on the region but also affects the AU’s ability to attain peace and developmental goals.

Lastly, as member states acquire multiple regional memberships, the AU’s role will be crucial in anchoring continental norms shared by all regional blocs. The DRC, which is now also a member of the East Africa Community, can hypothetically choose which regional bloc norms are more aligned to its wishes and easy to fulfil. Thus, it would avoid regional accountability. A joint mechanism with regional bodies would enable the AU to step in despite which norms member states align with.

Analysts bemoan the AU and SADC ‘soft’ approach of encouragement rather than persuasion. No joint processes exist to audit member state electoral processes against established norms. Worse is that SADC has no mechanism to persuade member states to ratify the charter. Thus, coordination and a joint approach to elections remain theoretical. Zimbabwe, DRC and Angola, which have not ratified the charter, consistently fail short in one or other area of electoral norms.

Coordination and alignment of norms between the continental body and the regional bloc would enable uniformity and predictability of action. They would build confidence in the citizens that the bodies act as one and follow set norms rather than whims. What’s more, the bodies have not sufficiently established enforcement, implementation and monitoring mechanisms for the norms. Both the SADC guidelines and the AU charter are more normative than prescriptive. In other words, the guidelines speak to the desired state rather than a defined end goal with a strong sanctioning component.

While the guidelines were drawn up as a framework for electoral processes, they remain an unattainable utopia in the absence of clear implementation instruments and sanctions against defaulters. In electoral disputes in countries such as DRC and Zimbabwe, for example, the SADC regional bloc has failed to take decisive action to defend its own guidelines. The AU has remained in the distant background save for the DRC case in 2018.

In this case, it took a firm stand that elections did not conform to the country’s electoral laws and there had to be high-level intervention. Unfortunately, the position was not shared by SADC and the regional bloc prevailed.

Subsidiarity not to be applied blindly

Subsidiarity between the AU and the regional blocs is akin to member state sovereignty. The principle makes sure that institutions and structures close to the people are tasked with providing solutions and support locally. However, the principle cannot be applied blindly. It should be founded on capacity of the regional bloc to respond and willingness to act based on its track record. Countries in a regional bloc may falter on the same matter, in this case holding credible free and fair elections, which may jeopardise the founding values of the AU. Clear mechanisms are needed on how the AU can lend technical or advisory support and institute sanctions to mitigate the situation.

While the current situation leaves much to be desired, there is scope for implementation synergies to entrench democratic values in SADC regions. There are certain immediate entry points for building structured implementation and coordination. As a start, the AU should approach the regional bloc to draft timelines for member state ratification of its charter.
Outcomes soon to be outputs as AU-EU summit decisions advance

European Union Ambassador to the African Union, Birgitte Markussen, confirms that the intercontinental partnership remains strong and well-funded. The PSC Report spoke to her.

How are the outcomes of the February 2022 AU-EU Summit being taken forward?

As we have just been marking Europe Day in early May, I’d like to share a brief flashback. On 9 May 1950, after decades of tensions and war, French foreign affairs minister Robert Schuman suggested pooling resources previously used for war under a common authority. This was the European Coal and Steel Community.

At that time, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands laid the basis for what we now know as the EU. War among the 27 member states remains unthinkable. In Schuman’s words, conflict between historic rivals France and Germany would be ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’.

A joint EU-AU vision would underline a partnership of solidarity, security and peace and sustainable and sustained economic development

Firstly, the outcomes of the summit are being advanced through follow-up on the strong commitments of more than 80 European and African leaders at the event. After 18 months of COVID-19-triggered delay, it was very important for our leaders to finally meet.

Secondly, it was agreed to define a joint vision. This vision underlines a partnership of solidarity, security, peace, and sustainable and sustained economic development and prosperity for citizens of the two unions, uniting people, regions and organisations. Today, this vision of solidarity, security and sustained economic development is more relevant than ever.

Finally, we are working 24/7 with our African partners and EU member states to deliver several concrete outcomes:

• Supplying 450 million vaccines by July, but, more importantly, contributing to a permanent solution by expanding vaccine production in Africa, already having started in four African countries to support ‘vaccine sovereignty’. With EU member states, we have backed manufacturing capacity with €1 billion and supported COVID Vaccines Global Access with more than €3 billion.
• The Global Gateway Investment Package of €150 billion. Across Africa and with the African Union (AU) we are exploring investments that will create better living conditions. Simultaneously, we are tackling the global challenges of climate change, global health security and stronger supply chains – focusing on concrete deliverables.

• This year, we pay special tribute to young people, 2022 being the European Year of Youth. It is time to recognise the huge sacrifices of young people throughout the pandemic and during war. Youth are at the heart of the EU-AU partnership – if we don’t listen to young voices, we miss out on the future and they won’t listen to us. Central to this is fostering people-to-people cooperation and putting youth at the forefront. The new AU-EU programme to support youth, entitled the “Youth Lab 3.0” will take this to the next level.

• Our leaders committed to continuing cooperation on African-led peace support operations (PSOs), only two weeks ago pledging €600 million to the cause. We have ongoing, and plan future, joint efforts in Somalia, the Sahel, the Central African Republic and Mozambique. The list is long.

• Finally, our leaders committed to promoting effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core.

To ensure the success of these outcomes, we are developing a tracking mechanism and governance structure to monitor implementation. Extensive technical work is continuing.

What is the EU’s view of the African Peace Facility’s termination and the implications of the European Peace Facility for Africa?

This is a crucial issue on which I’m regularly asked for clarity. The European Peace Facility (EPF) was established in March 2021 to finance all Common Foreign and Security Policy actions in military and defence areas. Predictable and reliable EU support to AU-led peace and security activities has endured. Politically and symbolically important, the first assistance measure adopted under the EPF in 2021 benefitted the AU.

EU member states have clearly reiterated their strong commitment to peace and security in Africa. The EPF is a key instrument to strengthen multilateralism, notably the role of the AU and African states in peace and security on the continent. In less than a year, the EU built a new, improved tool able to deliver different types of military and defence equipment and infrastructure continentally, regionally and nationally. This included lethal equipment, which was not possible under the African Peace Facility (APF).

As mentioned, the EU Council recently announced a three-year assistance measure for €600 million to support the AU from 2022 to 2024. The duration of the measure aims to reduce the incidence, length and intensity of violent conflicts in Africa and reinforce the AU role in continental peace and security. To this end, it will finance military aspects of African-led PSOs, notably those mandated or authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council.

We are tackling the global challenges of climate change, global health security and stronger supply chains.

The transition from the former APF is ongoing, with a normal termination of all programmes progressing to initially scheduled deadlines. All activities previously supported through the APF will be reconsidered for funding in collaboration with our African partners.

How will the €1.5 billion EPF funding for military equipment to Ukrainian armed forces affect finance for African-led peace efforts, especially against terrorist groups?

The €1.5 billion is helping Ukraine to defend its territory and population against the Russian aggression. Military equipment (lethal and non-lethal), medical supplies and engineering logistical assets were delivered swiftly, demonstrating the utility and efficiency of this new EU supportive tool.

The allocation is in line with the EPF and underpins Europe’s solidarity with a close neighbour. What Russia is doing to Ukraine is an existential threat to Europe, with wide-ranging consequences for Africa and the world. The EPF is a global instrument whose support to Africa will not diminish, as reflected in the €600 million allocated until 2024.

The EU will continue its significant support for military components of African-led PSOs previously funded
under the APF. Assistance measures already validated for AU support are the aforementioned €600 million and €30 million in 2021, which include contributions to:

- The African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) military component, including troop allowances, to enable the gradual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces.
- The military training facility and non-lethal equipment for battalions and soldiers trained by EU training missions to enhance Somali National Army capacity to effect the country’s transition.
- Increase the capabilities of the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in the Lake Chad area.
- Strengthen the resilience of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and increase its capacity for equipment maintenance to ensure its sustainability.

**How has the position of African countries on the Russian-Ukraine conflict affected relations between Europe and Africa?**

Immediately after Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and current AU Chair Macky Sall responded. Their statement expressed extreme concern and called for respect for international law. Although they did not expressly condemn Russia, the statement was welcome.

Nevertheless, AU member states are divided on Ukraine, which makes it difficult to generalise. The UN General Assembly vote on the Ukraine resolution on 2 March saw a slight majority of member states voting in favour. During the 7 April vote on Russia’s suspension from the Human Rights Council, only 20% of states voted in favour, with the rest either abstaining or voting against.

**The AU-EU partnership is and will remain a priority for Europe; the conflict in Ukraine has not weakened the EU’s engagement in Africa**

Despite the inevitable spotlight on Ukraine, Africa is still an EU priority. And as Europe remains outward-looking in these existential times, we all, including Africa, have to step in, not step away from this question. Russia’s actions are affecting the whole world, including Africa. They are in clear violation of basic principles adhered to by African countries and enacted in the UN Charter. Given this threat, it is essential in our view that African countries align with others in condemning without hesitation Russia’s aggression. Indeed, Europe as close partner of Africa expects support. Africa is an international player with expectations and ambitions in the United Nations, including integration in the Security Council. It is essential to show real action now.

At the EU-AU Summit only a week before the invasion, European and African heads of state reaffirmed their cross-continental partnership and recommitted
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

The EU strongly condemns Russia’s blatant breach of territorial integrity and Ukrainian sovereignty.

In parallel, the EU also wants to continue dialogue with African countries to understand their positions better. This will facilitate joint upholding of the principles of international law and of the threatened multilateral system. It will also enable exploration of ways to mitigate the severe economic impacts of the war on Africa.

**How will relations between the AU and the EU be affected by the war in Ukraine?**

To reiterate, the AU-EU partnership is and will remain a priority for Europe. The conflict in Ukraine has not weakened the EU’s engagement in Africa. We remain dedicated to honouring the commitments made by our leaders at the summit. Building on our longstanding partnership, and as the biggest economic partner to the region, we stand together with Africa, through our deeds as well as our words.

The commitments that we made at the summit will all remain valid for years to come. Some fear a disengagement of Europe in Africa because of what is happening in Ukraine, but this will not happen. In certain situations, we’ve adjusted our support, but this has been misleadingly attributed to the war. For instance, the downscaling of funding for ATMIS under the EPF has been discussed consistently since 2021.

Russia’s action in Ukraine is dramatically pushing up oil, fertiliser and food prices worldwide, and particularly in Africa. The most vulnerable are the hardest hit. The EU is dedicated to mitigating the effects of this crisis by supporting UN efforts, but also by tailoring its response and mobilising additional support for Africa. The EU and its member states have pledged up to €4 billion to address food insecurity in the Sahel, Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and North Africa.

EU sanctions are solely targeted at Russia’s ability to finance the aggression against Ukraine and its people. None of the EU’s sanctions target the agricultural sector of Russia. But even so, the increase in global prices is happening through actions including Russia’s blocking of Ukrainian exports and preventing its agricultural production. Russia, Belarus and China have also introduced export restrictions or bans on fertilizers and their components. This affects everyone, especially here in Africa. The solution is for Russia to stop the war. Rising global food insecurity is not due to EU sanctions, but to Russia’s actions.

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The war in Ukraine encourages us to step up our joint efforts to develop transformative approaches, resilient and sustainable local production, and food systems in Africa. During crises, sometimes opportunities arise. Russia’s behaviour may even strengthen EU-Africa ties, as Europe seeks to diversify energy supply sources and consolidate partnerships to uphold multilateralism with the UN at its core. The EU remains committed to collaborating with its African partners, including the AU, in the spirit of mutual interests and shared values.
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The Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). The monthly publication is the only one of its kind dedicated to providing current analysis of the PSC’s work. It is written by a team of ISS analysts in Addis Ababa.

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The publication of the PSC Report is made possible through support from the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Denmark and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. The ISS is also grateful for the support of the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the European Union and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.