



POLICY BRIEF

Coordination: key to the success of African solutions for Mozambique

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The Cabo Delgado crisis is testing the African Union (AU) peace and security architecture. Troop deployments from the Southern African Development Community and Rwanda show that Africa can deal with security challenges in various ways. So far, however, the AU and its Peace and Security Council have taken a back seat. Coordination and a joint vision for tackling the root causes of violent extremism are crucial going forward.

Key findings

- ▶ The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) six months after it was deployed. The AU regards SAMIM as a deployment under the framework of the African Standby Force.
- ▶ Up to January 2022, the AU's role was minimal in coordinating multilateral and bilateral deployments in Cabo Delgado.
- ▶ SADC has been reluctant to involve the AU in its security challenges due to an historic mistrust of the continental body and an insistence on the principle of subsidiarity.
- ▶ There have been no high-level meetings of Mozambique, SADC and Rwanda to discuss a joint strategy against violent extremism.
- ▶ Rwanda sees its Mozambique intervention as effort to combat terrorism in the region spanning Rwanda, Tanzania and northern Mozambique.
- ▶ Rwanda is protecting Cabo Delgado's coastal areas around liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. SAMIM is deployed in other parts of the province, together with the Mozambican armed forces.
- ▶ International partners face difficult choices in financing the various foreign interventions.

Recommendations

The AU should:

- ▶ Support coordination between all its member states involved in Mozambique.
- ▶ Emphasise the need to address causes of the crisis.
- ▶ Advise and assist on the inclusion of civilian and police components in SAMIM and support SADC in financing the intervention.
- ▶ Hold regular PSC meetings about Mozambique to inform AU member states and the international community.
- ▶ Ensure that AU decisions on combating terrorism are shared and implemented in Mozambique.

SADC should:

- ▶ Invite all parties with a military presence in Mozambique to discussions on the crisis.
- ▶ Assist Mozambique to develop a long-term strategy for peace in Cabo Delgado and

implement SADC summit decisions on socio-economic and development challenges and humanitarian assistance.

- ▶ Communicate regularly to the media in Mozambique and the region about progress.
- ▶ Ensure the new counter-terrorism centre in Tanzania is operating as soon as possible.

Mozambique should:

- ▶ Consult with civil society and political parties about foreign intervention on its soil.
- ▶ Ensure that all agreements on this deployment are made public, including SAMIM's concept of operations and the Rwandan force's mandate.
- ▶ Address the causes of the crisis, including underdevelopment in the north.
- ▶ Help internally displaced people to return to their homes when it is safe to do so.

Introduction

When violent extremist attacks started in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique in 2017, there were calls across the region for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to intervene. It was urged to stop Islamic State-linked insurgents from launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians and from halting economic activities in the resource-rich area.¹ SADC, however, was largely silent until its first extraordinary summit devoted to the crisis in Cabo Delgado, in May 2020.

At the same time, Mozambique indicated it didn't need the region's help. It invoked the principle of national sovereignty and initially presented the problem as 'criminal activity'. Then, in 2019, it contracted mercenaries from Russia and later South Africa, but these interventions were unable to stem the flow of violent extremist attacks by the Ahlu Sunnah wal Jammah, or al Shabaab as the group is known locally.² The much-publicised March 2021 attack on Palma, near liquified natural gas (LNG) projects, prompted greater SADC action. On 23 June 2021, it decided to send a 3 000-strong SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) intervention force to Mozambique.³

The African Union's (AU) first mention of the conflict came at the February 2020 plenary of the AU Assembly during discussions on the state of peace and security in Africa report. The document was compiled by the then-AU Peace and Security Department (now the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department – PAPS).⁴

There was, however, no formal Peace and Security Council (PSC) discussion on Mozambique until its 1 062nd meeting on 31 January 2022,⁵ when the council endorsed SAMIM's deployment as part of the ASF. In September 2021, PAPS Commissioner Bankole Adeoye visited Cabo Delgado and pledged US\$100 000 from the AU to halt the conflict.⁶

Since July 2021, around 2 000 Rwandan forces have been in Cabo Delgado on the invitation of the Mozambican government under a bilateral security agreement and with implicit AU backing.⁷ This intervention was deemed necessary given the slow reaction by SADC and little AU attention. SADC officials and South Africa's minister of defence, however

questioned the timing of the Rwandan deployment, indicating a lack of coordination.⁸

To date, more than 3 800 people⁹ have died and 800 000 have been driven from their homes. Important gains by SADC and Rwanda aside, the insurgency is far from over.

The question may be asked whether the intervention in Mozambique – with both a regional force and a bilateral intervention – can be seen as a model of effective 'African solutions for African problems'. And if so, does the continent's peace and security architecture need to be reviewed? What are the risks involved in such an intervention if there is no political coordination? Could a better framework regulating the implementation of subsidiarity and the AU-regional economic community (RECs) relationship ensure a greater AU role in intervening in crises such as that in Cabo Delgado?

South Africa's minister of defence questioned the timing of the Rwandan deployment to Cabo Delgado

This policy brief explores responses to these questions to help shape policy understanding and thinking on processes that should inform regional and continental interventions. It draws on qualitative interviews with officials, diplomats and experts in Addis Ababa, Maputo and Pretoria, as well as telephonically and via virtual platforms. Key documents and publications were also consulted online.

SADC and AU differences

According to the PSC Protocol,¹⁰ the council is the main continental organ to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The AU recognises eight RECs and regional mechanisms (RMs), among them SADC, comprising 16 Southern African member states. Subsidiarity is recognised, which holds that the immediate region is the first responder in crises. However, it has been noted that 'the inconsistent and complex implementation of the concept of subsidiarity' has, at times, been an obstacle in continental efforts to make peace in Africa.¹¹

The AU-RECs relationship is highly political and often causes conflict. Southern Africa has long maintained an insistence on subsidiarity.¹² A perceived lack of SADC and AU coordination and consultation have also led to friction between the regional bloc and the AU in Addis Ababa.¹³

SADC didn't inform the PSC of its intention to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado in early-April 2021, when the decision was first discussed. Some Southern African officials noted it was 'a mere formality' and that the delayed discussion was not a significant obstacle to SAMIM's deployment. Yet, an official at the AU said the delay should be seen against the historical background of SADC's insistence on sovereignty on peace and security matters. At times, this approach was motivated by 'a suspicion that the AU will come and meddle in affairs in Southern Africa.'¹⁴

The AU-RECs relationship is also not only because of the regions' insistence on subsidiarity, but is influenced by AU weaknesses, notably in the implementation of its peace and security architecture. In a fast-moving security landscape, where new and evolving threats are continually confronting member states, there have been calls for reform of the peace and security architecture, particularly the African Standby Force (ASF).

A force divided

The ASF, a pillar of the architecture, was initially intended to be one continental peacekeeping force.¹⁵ The AU Commission would provide guidance and standardised approaches, notably on the need to focus on governance and causes of crises. In practice, this has not happened and each of the five regional standby forces has developed largely independently with its own instruments and standards.¹⁶ While progress has been made in East, Southern and West Africa, North and Central Africa have no meaningful capacity.

This is partly due to the AU's lack of capacity to provide much-needed coordination and guidance,¹⁷ and resistance by RECs such as SADC, as noted above. The original ASF frameworks have also not kept pace with the reality of peace and security on the ground. Experts question whether the ASF is indeed the best way to combat threats of terrorism and violent extremism.¹⁸

SADC's regional standby force, meanwhile, has held several joint exercises, including Amani I and II in 2013 and 2015 in South Africa. It launched military deployments in Lesotho and in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – the latter deployment both in the late-1990s and currently as part of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade.

Invoking SADC's mutual defence pact,¹⁹ the region decided in June 2021 to deploy an initial 3 000 troops.²⁰ The first six months after its deployment on 15 July 2021, involved mostly troops from South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania and Lesotho.²¹ SAMIM, for now, is focused on peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping, given that no peace agreement or dialogue is in place.

Rwanda and Mozambique

The decision to deploy the Rwandan Defence Force to Mozambique in July 2021 followed a request from Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi. It was seen as a solution to a problem that had to be resolved urgently. Insurgents had occupied the strategic harbour town of Mocimboa da Praia since August 2020, and it was feared that they would return to Palma and the Afungi Peninsula where LNG projects were progressing.

Experts question whether the African Standby Force is the best way to combat violent extremism

Oil multinational TotalEnergies pressured the government to secure the area to restore economic activity. At stake were not only the lives and livelihoods of the inhabitants of Cabo Delgado, but vast investments and potential financial gains from gas extraction.

Rwanda had initial successes, driving insurgents from Mocimboa da Praia and surrounding villages such as Awase, Mbau and Diaca and securing key roads to bring stability to crucial towns such as Palma. This provided the government of Mozambique with a clear argument for Rwandan deployment.

Rwanda argues that its deployment stems from, firstly, its painful past marked by genocide and the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians in conflict. Its

military intervention should be seen as protecting civilians and saving lives, which it did in its first months in Mozambique. Secondly, it is concerned with the spread of violent extremism throughout the southern and eastern African regions.²²

The country sees itself as geographically and linguistically part of the region from the Great Lakes to Uganda, Tanzania and northern Mozambique. It, in fact, applied to join SADC in 2005, but, as did neighbouring Burundi, failed. It opted then to throw its weight behind the Tripartite Agreement of SADC, the East African Community, of which it is part, and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa. The established links between the Islamic State in Central African Province, comprising both the Uganda-based ADF and Ahlu Sunnah in northern Mozambique, is telling.

While SADC sees northern Mozambique as part of Southern Africa, Rwanda sees it as part of the eastern region, along with the Great Lakes and Tanzania

The lack of transparency around financing of the deployment has, however, often been raised by opposition parties and civil society in Mozambique.²³ Such a costly intervention could hardly be financed solely by the domestic resources of a small country such as Rwanda, which is already engaged in military operations in other parts of the continent. Claims have been made that France is financing the deployment, but Rwanda and France have both denied these claims.²⁴

That the deployment was not brought before parliament was criticised by the Mozambican opposition Renamo.²⁵ Rwanda's internal political situation, and the lack of freedom of speech and adherence to democratic values underpin much of the negative sentiment and mistrust.²⁶ Civil society activists also point to the strong links between the Rwandan and Mozambican presidents, Paul Kagame and Filipe Nyusi.²⁷ This, they say, potentially increases Rwanda's bid for a bigger role in the Southern African region, undermining values of democracy, rule of law and freedom of speech.

The SADC and Rwandan deployments in Cabo Delgado differ in two ways. First, while SADC regards northern Mozambique as part of Southern Africa, Rwanda sees it as part of the Swahili-speaking eastern region, linking it with the Great Lakes and Tanzania. Second, the governance model envisaged by Rwanda is one of efficacy and tight control over decision-making, while SADC countries, in the main, claim to adhere to values of democracy and free speech.

SADC's challenge in sustaining peace

SADC's institutional weaknesses are linked to capacity challenges and the inadequate size of its secretariat in Gaborone,²⁸ lack of sufficient buy-in from



member states and a complicated structure to manage governance, peace and security issues. It also has minimal experience in dealing with a violent extremist threat such as that in northern Mozambique.²⁹ Its slow reaction to the Mozambique crisis is indicative not only of institutional weaknesses, but reveals a lack of trust and solidarity among the region's leadership.

In the past, solidarity among former liberation movement parties in the region created a united front to ensure stability – sometimes at the expense of democratic and sustainable solutions.³⁰ Why then did President Filipe Nyusi wait so long to authorise a SADC deployment?

It would be more difficult for SADC's troops to achieve results than for any bilateral deployment

The fear of South African domination in the region has been regarded as a factor in relations within SADC that influenced decision making.³¹ Any SADC military intervention would be led by South Africa or, at the very least, the force would have a significant South African component, which is currently

the case. That country is the biggest investor in Mozambique and its brands dominate,³² as they do in most of Southern Africa, which does at times lead to suspicion and resentment.

In addition, solidarity among the political elite has been affected by changes in the region's leadership.³³ Above all, Mozambique's sense of sovereignty and its insistence, especially at the outset, that its own security forces could deal with the threat, were significant factors in its slow acceptance of SADC's intervention. The ruling party Frelimo has also been divided over whether SADC intervention should have been accepted.³⁴

For SAMIM to achieve rapid results would be more difficult than for any bilateral deployment given the complicated nature of multilateral missions. While there have been successful joint exercises by the SADC Standby Brigade, as noted above, working in one deployment with forces from different countries, with varying skills levels and military cultures, is exceptionally challenging. In that sense, the Rwandan deployment is salutary since it contributes to the success of security efforts in Cabo Delgado.

By the end of 2021, coordination between SAMIM and Rwanda had been established on an operation level.³⁵

Chart 1: Territorial division of labour between SAMIM and Rwandan forces (March 2022)



Source: Author

Rwanda was deployed largely in the coastal region around Palma, the Afungi Peninsula and Mocimboa da Praia, with SAMIM covering Nangade, Mueda and Macomia.

Despite SAMIM's many challenges, SADC and Mozambique should take the lead in seeking a political strategy and end goal for the deployment. It is there for the long haul and is likely to be transformed from a peace enforcement or counterinsurgency mission to a peacekeeping effort, depending on how the situation evolves.

The PSC Protocol tasks the AU Commission Chairperson to harmonise peace and stability activities to ensure they align with AU principles

At its extraordinary summit in Lilongwe, Malawi, on 23 January 2022,³⁶ the SADC Framework for Support to the Republic of Mozambique was approved to 'consolidate peace, security and socio-economic recovery of the Cabo Delgado province.' SADC also welcomed Mozambique's reconstruction plan for the province and intention to organise an international fundraising conference to finance it.

These are important initiatives that recognise the need to tackle the causes of the conflict and focus attention on the non-military responses needed to achieve lasting peace. Coordination among all the actors is required to realise this.

What can the AU do?

The AU has over many years adopted several measures and protocols to deal with terrorism and violent extremism.³⁷ It must ensure this experience doesn't go to waste. The continent benefits from knowledge in dealing with extremism, post-conflict reconstruction, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. It also has the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers.

Experience has shown, for example, that a greater police and civilian component in peace missions helps to secure buy-in from local communities and increases the focus on non-military responses and rule of law. The AU Commission has many instruments that could be used in Mozambique. These include the AU Peace Fund – revitalised in 2018 and currently holding more than US\$230 million – which could support SAMIM had modalities for its use been finalised.³⁸

The PSC Protocol tasks the AU Commission Chairperson to harmonise all peace, security and stability activities of RECs/RMs to ensure that they are consistent with the objectives and principles of the AU. These requirements are set out in articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU (2000).³⁹

> US\$230
million

AMOUNT IN AU PEACE
FUND THAT COULD
SUPPORT SAMIM

The PSC is member states' main decision-making body on peace and security between AU Assembly summits. Discussing conflicts at this level is essential for a number of reasons,⁴⁰ not least bringing them to the attention of the international community.⁴¹ Should the insurgency in Mozambique continue to grow, this would be crucial, as further funds would need to be sourced from the European Union (EU) and, eventually, the United Nations (UN).

In its communiqué following the PSC meeting of 31 January 2022 discussing SADC's deployment,⁴² the AU endorsed the mission and its extension to April 2022, ratified at the Lilongwe meeting in January. It also urged the AU Commission to intensify dialogue and engagement with SADC on SAMIM. It ordered it to provide SAMIM with equipment from the continental logistics base in Cameroon and asked that it supply the military aid donated to the AU by China.

The PSC appealed to all member states, the UN, EU and international community to extend their support to SAMIM and Mozambique, through materials, technical and financial resources.⁴³ SADC has, meanwhile, discussed possible funding through the AU Peace Fund and asked for help from the AU to access EU finance.⁴⁴ The AU endorsed the disbursement of €2 million for SAMIM from the EU-funded Early Response Mechanism in March 2022.⁴⁵ So far, SADC has financed SAMIM through member state contributions.

Path to more effective African solutions

The crisis in Mozambique is a test case for Africa's responses and shows the need for greater coordination and clarification of the continent's peace and security architecture. Sustainable solutions for Mozambique call on all those involved to not only coordinate their actions, but their vision for the future of the country. Long-term political solutions are needed to ensure development,

the equitable distribution of revenues from resources, job creation and other measures to eradicate poverty and marginalisation.

In that sense, the military intervention in Mozambique could show the way for solving the continent's problems. This would involve speedy and effective bilateral interventions, financed by either local funds or foreign powers, while larger multinational deployments could implement more lasting solutions.⁴⁶ This is not to be seen as a choice between multinational deployments and a bilateral intervention such as that of Rwanda in Mozambique. A flexible approach to mutual military assistance outside the ASF framework is also possible.

So far, SADC has financed its SAMIM deployment through contributions by its member states

It is fortunate that the PSC, in January 2022, endorsed SAMIM, albeit six months after its deployment. Going forward, this should mean greater visibility of the crisis, and increased financial and other support to the efforts to bring peace to Cabo Delgado and surrounding areas.

More broadly, the AU took steps to promote greater AU-RECs coordination through its mid-year coordination meetings. It established special representatives and offices of RECs and RMs at AU level and vice versa. REC summits were attended by the AU Commission Chairperson.

As is clear, much must still be done to ensure coordination. Ultimately, funding constraints drive RECs such as SADC to approach the AU for assistance, while better frameworks and division of labour could ensure smoother and more mutually beneficial cooperation.

Notes


- 1 Institute for Security Studies press release, August 2020, 'Mozambique insurgency required urgent action from SADC and the AU', <https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/mozambique-insurgency-requires-urgent-response-from-sadc-and-the-au>. Also see: M Kahi, 'Mozambique's Cabo Delgado: An African burden' – ecumenical leaders, ACI Africa, 5 March 2021, <https://www.aciafrica.org/news/2982/mozambiques-cabo-delgado-crisis-an-african-burden-southern-africas-ecumenical-leaders>.
- 2 B Namhirre, 'Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado?' *ISS Policy Brief* 5 November 2021, <https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado>.
- 3 Communiqué of the extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state, 23 June 2021, <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government/>.
- 4 Interview with AU Commission official, Addis Ababa, on 10 February 2020.
- 5 See: Communiqué of the 1062nd meeting of the PSC on 31 January on the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1062nd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-31-january-2022-on-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-mozambique-samim>.
- 6 Club of Mozambique: 10 September 2021, Mozambique: AU to provide \$100 000 for IDPs, military training, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-au-to-provide-us100000-for-idps-military-training-for-fds-o-pais-200747/>.
- 7 AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat congratulated Rwanda for its deployment in a tweet on 10 July 2021 but there was no formal statement, https://twitter.com/auc_moussafaki/status/1413869560374104069?lang=en.
- 8 P Fabricius, 'Rwandan deployment of forces into Mozambique irks SADC', *Daily Maverick*, 11 July 2021, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-11-rwandas-deployment-of-forces-into-mozambique-irks-sadc/>.
- 9 Armed Conflict and Event Data Project Cabo Ligado report of 6 March 2022, <https://www.cabologado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-28-february-6-march-2022>.
- 10 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf>.
- 11 See P Handy and F Djilo, 'Unscrambling subsidiarity in the African Union – from competition to collaboration', *ISS Africa Report*, December 2021, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/AR-37-Rev.pdf>.
- 12 While eight RECs are recognised by the AU, the continent is divided into five regions: North, East, South, Central and West Africa when it comes to voting blocs or rotational principles in AU structures. Only 11 of the 16 SADC members are part of Southern Africa, with Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, the Comoros and the Seychelles belonging to either Central or East Africa.
- 13 This was evident in many instances such as during the AU reform process, led by Rwandan President Paul Kagame since 2016, the debate around the European Union-African Union frameworks (the Cotonou agreement) and the election of President Etienne Tshisekedi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in late-2018. The last-mentioned incident opposed SADC and Kagame, who chaired the AU at the time. See S Wolters, 'Regional and continental responses to the DRC crisis', ISS Central Africa Report, 9 December 2019, <https://issafrica.org/research/central-africa-report/regional-and-continental-responses-to-the-drc-election-crisis>.
- 14 Interview with AU Commission official with long experience of the PSC, 23 March 2022.
- 15 The four other pillars are the PSC, the AU Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System. The ASF comprises five regional brigades, including the Southern African Brigade, with its training centre in Harare, Zimbabwe.
- 16 Telephonic interview with Annette Leijenaar, expert consultant and former head of the ISS Peacebuilding and Peace Operations Programme, 9 March 2022.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 These include Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Chairperson of the board of the Institute for Security Studies and Head of African Futures and Innovation. Remarks made on 19 March 2022.
- 19 https://www.sadc.int/files/2913/5333/8281/SADC_Mutual_Defence_Pact2003.pdf. The AU Non-aggression and Mutual Defence Pact, which entered into force in 2009 could also be seen as the ideal vehicle for the type of intervention needed in Mozambique. However, by 2017, only 22 countries had ratified the pact. This includes Mozambique, but excludes the main SAMIM troop contributors Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Tanzania, <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-non-aggression-and-common-defence-pact>.
- 20 Confidential report of the technical assessment mission that visited Mozambique from 15 to 21 March, seen by the author, recommends a total force of 2 916 soldiers and personnel, comprising air, maritime and infantry capability, as well as special forces.
- 21 Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi are also part of the mission in smaller numbers, <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief/>.
- 22 Interview with HE Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, 3 March 2022, Maputo.
- 23 Club of Mozambique, 'NGO criticizes president of not informing parliament of Rwandan military in Cabo Delgado', 12 July 2021, <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-ngo-criticises-president-for-not-informing-parliament-of-rwandan-military-in-cabo-delgado-196325/>.
- 24 Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), 'Is France using development aid to finance the intervention of Rwandan troops in Mozambique?' 21 November 2021, <https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Is-France-using-development-aid-to-finance-the-intervention-of-Rwandan-troops-in-Mozambique.pdf> and Deutsche Welle, 'Rwanda's military intervention in Mozambique raises eyebrows' 24 August 2021, available here <https://www.dw.com/en/rwandas-military-intervention-in-mozambique-raises-eyebrows/a-58957275> or V Prashad, 'Rwanda's military is the French proxy on African soil' *Mail & Guardian*, 12 September 2021, <https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-09-12-rwandas-military-is-the-french-proxy-on-african-soil/>.
- 25 See B Namhirre, 'Mozambicans divided over Rwandan deployment', *ISS Today*, 19 July 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambicans-divided-over-rwandan-deployment>.
- 26 See C Matseke and KM Kouakou, 'Rwandan troops for African solutions in Mozambique', *Independent Online*, 14 August 2021,

<https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/rwandan-troops-for-african-solutions-in-mozambique>.

- 27 Interview with Prof Nuvunga, 3 March 2022, Maputo.
- 28 Noted among others in A van Nieuwkerk, 'Building anticipatory governance in SADC: Post-Covid-19 conflict and defence outlook', SAIIA occasional paper, 11 May 2021, <https://saiaa.org.za/research/building-anticipatory-governance-in-sadc-post-covid-19-conflict-and-defence-outlook/>.
- 29 SADC is present in eastern DRC as part of the UN Force Intervention Brigade, where the ADF – defined as a violent extremist group – is increasingly responsible for attacks. However, the Cabo Delgado crisis is the first fairly large-scale threat in Southern Africa that is linked to international terror groups such as the Islamic State.
- 30 This was the case in Zimbabwe for over a decade following the political crisis that started in early-2000. SADC maintained a united front in refraining from any criticism against abuses by late president Robert Mugabe – except for Botswana, which at times spoke out – outside of official meetings of SADC. The democratic deficits in eSwatini were also kept off SADC's agenda for a very long time.
- 31 Interview with Prof Carlton Cadeado, security expert, Joachim Chissano University, Maputo, 3 March 2022.
- 32 Interview with Southern African officials, Maputo, 4 March 2022.
- 33 Ibid. While former South African president Jacob Zuma, for example, had very strong historical links with Mozambique, this is not the case under President Cyril Ramaphosa. Leadership changes in Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana and Tanzania are also regarded as a factor leading to new dynamics among SADC countries.
- 34 See B Namhirre, 'Mozambicans divided over Rwandan deployment', *ISS Today*, 19 July 2021, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambicans-divided-over-rwandan-deployment>.
- 35 Statement by Prof Mpho Molomo, head of SAMIM, during ISS webinar, 8 Nov 2021, 'Will foreign intervention save Cabo Delgado?', <https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado>.
- 36 Communiqué of the extraordinary summit of heads of state and government, 12 January 2022, <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-summit-heads-state-and-government-southern-african-development-community-sadc/>.
- 37 Communiqué of the 1048th PSC meeting on 15 November on countering extremist ideologies, radicalisation and financing of terrorism in Africa outlines some of the instruments adopted <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/eng-communique-of-the-1048th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-psc-held-on-15-november-2021-on-countering-extremist-ideology-radicalization-and-financing-of-terrorism-in-africa>.
- 38 *PSC Report* 1 December 2021, 'Peace fund lies dormant as member states discuss its use', <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use>.
- 39 Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf>.
- 40 Recommendations for further action by the AU in Cabo Delgado were made by the *PSC Report* in early 2021. See 'What can the AU do about the crisis in Mozambique?' *PSC Report*, 26 March 2021, <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/what-can-the-au-do-about-the-conflict-in-mozambique>.
- 41 Contribution by Martin Ewi, ENACT Southern Africa Regional Coordinator, in online discussions, 7 March 2022.
- 42 Communiqué of the PSC meeting of 31 January 2022 on the deployment of the SADC mission in Mozambique, <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1062nd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-31-january-2022-on-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-mozambique-samim>.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 The South African minister of international relations and cooperation Naledi Pandor, currently chairing the Council of Ministers of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, also discussed AU funding and support with PAPS commissioner Bankole Adeoye on the margins of the February 2022 AU summit, together with SADC secretary-general Elias Makgosi. Interview with SADC member state ambassador in Addis Ababa, 9 February 2022.
- 45 Statement by senior AU official on 25 March 2022. This financial support to SAMIM is part of a multi-faceted EU strategy for Mozambique, which includes the EU Training Mission for Mozambique. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-mozambique/104669/about-european-union-training-mission-mozambique_en. EU member states are also being consulted about further support for SAMIM and for Rwanda, according to interview with EU member state in Pretoria, 25 January 2022.
- 46 Telephonic interview with Dr Craig Moffat, head of governance delivery and impact at Good Governance Africa, on 9 March 2022.

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