


Preventing extremism in the Horn of Africa

Preliminary findings from Kenya, Somalia,
Tanzania and Uganda

Denys Reva, Cheryl Frank and Isel van Zyl



This overview presents preliminary findings from ongoing research in the Horn of Africa that aims to promote effective, evidence-based approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism. The research explores a wide range of project design and evaluation elements, as well as challenges and lessons for preventing and countering extremism in Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda.

Introduction

This overview presents preliminary findings from ongoing research in the Horn of Africa on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in order to add to the growing body of knowledge on this issue. It aims to promote effective, evidence-based approaches to addressing terrorism interventions.

The research explores a wide range of project design and evaluation elements, as well as challenges to implementation and lessons learned, in order to understand how selected P/CVE projects in Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda aim to achieve their stated results. The preliminary findings present data collected from 32 organisations on 42 projects in the four countries

The acronym P/CVE is used throughout this report to acknowledge that the interventions identified might have features relating to preventing violent extremism (PVE) as well as countering violent extremism (CVE). These terms are defined in the terminology section.

Background

Given the suffering caused by terrorism over the last two decades, it is not surprising that P/CVE, as a key strategy to address this ongoing global threat, has attracted such attention and financial investment in recent years.

The United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism¹ inspired a growing focus on prevention, advancing a ‘whole of society’ approach and encouraging states to complement counterterrorism strategies with proactive measures that deal with a range of factors associated with the growth of violent extremism.

This is not a simple task, as emphasised by the UNDP’s 2016 report, Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity, which argues that the root causes of violent extremism are ‘complex, multifaceted and intertwined’ and the product of historical, political, economic and social circumstances that include the impact of regional and global power politics.²

Researchers and most policymakers agree that structural factors relating to governance, development and justice are core to addressing the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism. There is also broad agreement that localised solutions based on local needs will bring positive results. However, there is limited practical

guidance on how to align actions in these two spheres to address specific problems. It is therefore critical that an evidence-based approach drive P/CVE efforts in both the structural and local spheres. This will require an understanding of project design, implementation and results, and the sharing of information between different groups working on similar goals.

With this in mind, the ISS began research on how the ideas behind P/CVE policy are being translated into practical projects, and how these projects are being designed. Such information will contribute to understanding P/CVE and the extent to which it can be understood as a specialised field, separate from other fields of violence prevention. It will also help build a body of evidence about P/CVE programming.

This part of the research focused on the Horn of Africa and its exposure to threats from al-Shabaab and other groups, including those with ties to the Islamic State. Somalia and Kenya were chosen for study as the countries in the region most affected by terrorism,³ and Uganda and Tanzania as countries considered at risk and thus relevant to the study’s focus on prevention.⁴ The study is ongoing and may be expanded to include more countries based on additional considerations.

Methodology

Relating to the data presented below, the study adopted the following methods:

1. Relevant projects were identified through Internet searches that included a broad range of keywords.
2. Organisations implementing these projects were contacted to verify whether their work related to violent extremism; if so, they were asked to participate.
3. Chain-referral sampling was used to identify additional relevant organisations.
4. A total of 32 organisations participated; representatives of 30 were interviewed directly (by telephone or Skype), and 2 submitted written responses.
5. A semi-structured questionnaire was used to guide the interviews. Direct interviews were audio-recorded, unless the respondent requested otherwise. Respondents were given the option of remaining anonymous; 17 out of 32 – primarily from Somalia and Tanzania – chose this option.

General findings

The findings reported below focus on broad trends rather than individual projects.

Project categorisation


Most respondents used more than one label to describe their projects. Some deliberately avoided using the terms PVE and CVE, to avoid the attention of extremist groups and government agencies. Given project activities involving current and former members of extremist groups, as well as victims, respondents also noted the need to protect beneficiaries from the scrutiny of the local community or of law enforcement agencies.

Objectives, target groups and activities

The study investigated project objectives, activities and target groups and the ways in which the projects address terrorism or violent extremism.

In terms of objectives, projects had a strong focus on 'promoting cooperation and participation' and 'promoting tolerance and multi-culturalism.' In Somalia, where inter-clan conflict and marginalisation have been identified as drivers of violent extremism, the emphasis is on building understanding between different religious and ethnic groups. In Kenya, many projects have focused on working with government agencies and on building trust and

Figure 1: Project categories



★ Other: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (2)
Conflict mitigation (2)
Cross-border conflict management (1)
Reconciliation (1)

★ Two respondents opted not to label their project.

Figure 2: Project objectives

32 Capacity building	6 Psychosocial support
24 Promoting cooperation and participation	6 Rehabilitation and reintegration
14 Promoting tolerance and multiculturalism	6 Early warning and rapid response
13 Awareness raising	4 Counter/Alternative narratives
13 Socio-economic empowerment	4 Promoting access to justice
9 Building resilience	2 Education
8 Gaining knowledge/research	

Figure 3: Project activities

42 Training	13 Radio discussions, social media and media campaigns
34 Meetings	9 Lobbying and advocacy
19 Financial and other types of logistical support	9 Cultural, sports and recreational activities
15 Workshops	7 Counselling
14 Research	6 Mentorship
13 Interfaith dialogue	1 Physical rehabilitation

Figure 4: Project target groups



*** Others:**

10 Government officials	1 Victims
5 Law enforcement	1 Judiciary
4 Government agencies	1 Justice sector
3 Prison officials	1 Immigration officials
3 Media	1 Private sector
2 Traditional leaders	1 University students
2 Prisoners	1 Social workers
2 Security agencies	1 Psychologists
1 Elders	1 Family counsellors



cooperation between communities and the government. Respondents there noted that in communities that had experienced heavy-handed actions by security actors, much effort would be required to rebuild trust.

Such actions have also been directly linked to radicalisation and recruitment into extremist groups, creating the need for far more serious remedial actions at the individual and community levels.⁵ One respondent

said, 'Having a community that has a cooperative relationship with the government based on mutual trust cultivates resilience in the community.'

Across all four countries, poverty and the lack of economic opportunities were identified as drivers of violent extremism. Addressing these issues was described as essential: 'It is hard to sustain the impact [of a P/CVE project] if you can't provide people with alternatives ... [people] need to feed themselves, and to work and to feel productive. Livelihoods and economics are an integral part of any such project.' This also raises the critical issue of how development projects can extend and sustain these efforts.

Youth and women were identified as the two main targets and beneficiaries of the projects across all four countries, with youth (often including men and women) seen as the primary at-risk group and women seen as a marginalised group that needs to be included in P/CVE and peacebuilding processes.

Theories of change

This aspect of the study sought to understand how the objectives and activities of projects were intended to achieve the stated results.

Responses provided are summarised in the table below.

Figure 5: Respondents' theories of change

Activities	Results expected to be achieved
Promoting cooperation	If cooperation and trust between communities and security agencies is increased, if the conflict between religious groups is reduced, if women and youth are empowered and given a voice, then the factors associated with violent extremism would be mitigated
	By creating platforms for dialogue, discussion and inclusion - if people feel like they are being heard and included as part of a social development and nation building - we should be able to build a secure community resilient to violent extremism
	If mutual understanding between the judiciary and the communities improve, the judiciary will become more responsive, and community will receive greater access to justice, then citizens will feel less marginalised by the justice system, and be less vulnerable to manipulation by extremists
	By fostering coordinated, inclusive, informed preventative responses to localised violent extremism, but also by using resilience that already exist in communities, building on them, will reduce the incidences of violent extremism in Tanzania
	Communities distrust each other, and don't see themselves as part of the same community, or part of the same country. If we bring together these diverse communities and preach messages of peace, tolerance and understanding, then it would - at a minimum - provide exposure, and help to provide some counter-narratives to some of the violent extremist narratives they may hear, that demonises the other side
	Having a community that has a cooperative relationship with the government based on mutual trust cultivates resilience in the community. The government then accounts for the needs of the communities, and their security concerns, while the community cooperates with the government
	By creating safe spaces for people to discuss their concerns, and by empowering the community to deal with their issues, the risks related to violent extremism will be reduced
	Increased cooperation between state and non-state actors will reduce the risks associated with violent extremism
	If you can build community resilience against violent extremism, then it will help with minimising the issue of radicalisation, and be able to strengthen community-security relationship (which will help community feel that they are part of the process)
	If CVE stakeholders, organisations and leaders work together to analyse local violent extremist dynamics and prioritise CVE activities in their context AND intentionally establish/strengthen functional coordination, then community CVE networks can emerge, therefore community networks established.
	If CVE networks are established that harness unique perspectives and skills of a diverse cross-section of community stakeholders, then the community will mobilise to develop and implement initiatives that address local drivers of violent extremism, thereby effectively reducing violent extremism, therefore community-led CVE strategies and initiatives are developed
	If women are connected to security actors - the information about the matters of security will flow more easily, and people will be able to report incidents and information easier

Activities

Results expected to be achieved

Counter-narratives

By addressing and countering some of the violent extremist narratives on the ground, the risks associated with violent extremism will be reduced

If people are exposed to positive narratives within communities - they are able to better connect among each other

If we engage youth in interfaith dialogue, and give them an awareness of other faiths and traditions, then they will be more tolerant and understanding

Religious leaders play an integral role in building sustainable foundation for peaceful coexistence and community development. Because of their sacred knowledge, influence, credibility, trust and power in mobilizing ideas, actors and institutions, their engagement in CVE process is unavoidable

Awareness raising

Better understanding of causes and drivers of conflict could increase ideas on how to address these drivers

Spreading awareness will help people detect instances of radicalisation. They can detect and understand instances of ideologically-motivated behaviour and resolve it in a manner that is proactive - you don't have to wait for the issue to grow

Build awareness and recognition, to drive home the message that this is their [community] problem, and they can find local solutions by introducing activities relevant to their context

Capacity Building

The religious leaders can speak about VE issues in the mosque and the churches. And because they are respected and have the trust of community who attends the church/mosque - if the youth [for instance] is being radicalised they are more likely to engage the religious leader and have a conversation

If we build the capacity of the local actors, then we will strengthen the responsiveness of these institutions to violent extremism

By supporting informal justice sector, and providing training to the elders and adjudicators involved in the process, Somali communities receive access to justice, and reduces the risk associated with violent extremism.

By building the capacity of the communities to absorb disengaged combatants and defectors, by raising awareness on drivers of violent extremism, and providing viable alternatives to youth, this approach is meant to contribute to the prevention of violent. In a way, it builds the absorption capacity of the community, but also allows the community to be the drivers of mitigation actions of violent extremists

By building the capacity of the youth they will have the space to understand and articulate agendas for violent extremism, then it will reduce marginalisation and empower youths' voice within communities, therefore the capacity of youth to respond to violent extremism or the issues of peacebuilding will be increased

If targeted national and local government officials CVE capacity is enhanced, then national and county governments will better understand multiple causal layers of VE and effectively collaborate with communities to develop and implement responsive CVE policies and strategies, therefore increase government capacity

By strengthening grassroots community policing systems, the risks associated with violent extremism will be reduced

For sustainable peace projects to continue there is a need to develop grassroots capacity to carry on

Vocational training

If youth have skills they can be used to improve employment and livelihood prospects

By increasing opportunities to employment, it will reduce vulnerability in the young people

If ex-combatants are given vocational training they will carry on with their lives and will not go back to the violent extremist group

If young people have skills to start-up ventures, not sitting idle, then those with ill intentions cannot lure them into violent behaviour activities by promising them socio-economic opportunities and status

Activities

Results expected to be achieved

Empowering (financially, educationally, generally)

By amplifying the voices of women in peace and security, the risks associated with violent extremism will be reduced

If people are being gainfully employed or being active in economic sense - as compared to being idle and lazy - then people are less likely to think about and engage in violence

By addressing the unemployment and by addressing the conflict between clans the risks associated with violent extremism will be reduced

If people of Somalia have a real access to justice, formal and the informal justice sector, it would reduce the level of conflict and triggers of the conflict and the discontent of the local population, then the appeal and the recruitment of al-Shabaab will be reduced

Poverty plays a big role in driving radicalisation

By amplifying the voices of youth in peace and security will reduce the risks associated with violent extremism

If women are financially empowered, they will have a voice

If an understanding about Counter-Terrorism legal environment in communities is increased, if information sharing between the communities and the government is increased, and if an environment, a platform, for grievances resolution, through which the communities can engage the justice sector is created, then the risks associated with violent extremism will be reduced

Women as role models are connected to young women to target pull and push factors of radicalisation

Discrediting Al-Shabaab by exposing their brutality, and hence weakening its following and public support

By giving youth the platform to interact and voice their grievances, and establishing trust between communities and law enforcement agencies, the risk associated with VE will be reduced

If a wide variety of local stakeholders - women and youth included - have an enhanced understanding of violent extremism and their leadership skills strengthened, then stakeholders will expand their circle of influence and be able to generate community engagement and support for CVE effort

Providing accurate and useful information to young people, which in turn helps them to understand the benefits of democratic institutions in Somalia

Trauma counselling and psycho-social support

By providing psycho-social support to women, and helping them to reintegrate into their societies, it would lead to strengthening women's resilience against violent extremism and establishing an effective rapid response towards precedents of violence and violent extremism.

Promoting tolerance and multiculturalism

By creating an environment conducive to people to understand and listen to each other, leading people to understand that conflict is normal but violence is not acceptable, and once people develop an understanding that they need to work together to resolve conflicts - then working together, through that cooperation and collaboration, begins to address these violent extremism challenges

Increased participation

Increased community involvement in the ownership in the project, an increased participation of at-risk women and youth in the project, create sustainable livelihood for youth - with a focus of around 30 000 households in Kenya. Create sustainable employment for youth at risk in Kenya and Somalia. Returnees benefit from the project in terms of their reintegration [not directly but as part of the society]. These activities will reduce the risks associated with violent extremism.

These ideas need to be tested in practice through these projects, and project activities need to be evaluated, including in longitudinal studies, with careful attention to context.

Evaluation

This aspect of the study sought to understand whether projects are evaluated and by what means, as well as how project results are measured.

Figure 6: Approaches to project evaluation

Total	Approaches	Description
26	M&E plan in place	Formal M&E officer on staff Outcome indicators included
10	Follow-up	Feedback sessions with participants Focus group discussions with participants
8	Positive outcomes	Measuring behavioural change Number of people that can support their families financially

Figure 7: How projects are evaluated




Figure 8: Sources of project funding





Figure 9: Funding amounts (US\$)



* Some respondents from the countries indicated their funding amounts in Danish Krone, Kenyan Shilling and Euro. The exchange rate of 16 July 2018 was used to convert those amounts into US dollars.

A significant proportion of the projects reviewed for this study were reported as undergoing an evaluation of some kind; more than half of respondents said that their projects had specialised monitoring and evaluation (M&E) staff and that outcome indicators were included in their approach to evaluation. This trend is important for contributing to an evidence base on P/CVE. It has not yet been possible to assess the extent to which organisations share M&E reporting, or whether M&E results are reported primarily to donors or to the general public as well.

Funding

This aspect of the study sought to understand the nature of project funding including the names of donors, amounts allocated and duration of funding.

The duration of project funding is important, especially in terms of how it is aligned with project objectives. This is because many objectives may require long time-lines before results are observed. A large proportion (75%) of the projects are funded for two or more years, and 14% for five years or more.

The region has clearly benefited from significant financial investment in P/CVE. The highest number of projects are funded by international governments; funding is also provided by local or national governments and private donors. Further research is needed on whether private donors and government agencies take different

approaches from international governments to funding and M&E of P/CVE projects. The projects in the study are funded in amounts ranging up to US\$70 million, with the largest proportion (38%) receiving at least US\$100 000 but less than US\$500 000.

Key actors

Actors involved in project implementation (aside from the initiating organisation) fall into two categories: members of the local community, and partner organisations.

In terms of engaging with communities, respondents described two broad approaches:

- Some approached the community first to ascertain their challenges and needs and the specific local drivers of violent extremism. This approach was seen as important in ensuring that communities contribute to their own solutions.
- Some designed the project first and then approached the community to ascertain whether the activities would meet the needs of the community and target groups.

Figure 10: Duration of project funding




Figure 11: How community members contribute to project implementation

Total	Contribution	Description
25	Expert capacity	<p>The community provides information on issues, concerns and challenges</p> <p>They share information about security issues</p> <p>They share ideas about the problems they are facing</p> <p>Communities provide feedback on how to engage and how to design the work</p> <p>Communities help inform the organisation about the problems and drivers of violence within their communities</p> <p>Due to lack of capacity, expert community members are reached out to</p>
23	Participation	<p>As part of the dialogue mechanism they participate in meetings, they engage with police as part of the “police cafés”</p> <p>Empowering citizens</p> <p>Communities play important roles as participants, they can benefit from non-violent conflict resolution</p>
19	Planning and execution	<p>Women also have a voice; different genders have a voice in the process</p> <p>Community provides ideas for activities</p> <p>Communities are continuously consulted with regards to activities and issues</p> <p>Communities help spread awareness campaigns to neighbouring regions</p>
3	Logistical and administrative support	<p>The community is able to provide a platform to discuss issues that exist in the communities</p> <p>Communities assist in mobilisation process</p> <p>Community members help with research and background data prior to the design of the project</p>

The former approach is aligned with the general view that P/CVE solutions need to be localised and based on local needs. One respondent noted, ‘For a project to be successful there needs to be an element of community ownership. The ideas for our implementation of the activities came from the communities.’

However, respondents also shared concerns that communities could be used by governments and donors to achieve objectives that are not directly aligned with their needs and their problem-solving styles. An example was offered of external actors working through local organisations to avoid the perception that Western governments were attempting to influence local communities.

While project implementers often engage in and value partnerships with other organisations, this seems to be driven primarily by the need for technical skills rather than any specific networking or collaborative purpose.

Challenges in implementation

This aspect of the study sought to understand the major challenges experienced by organisations in implementing their project/s.

This provides a valuable resource for understanding some of the intricacies that organisations need to manage as implementation activities are pursued. Some of the most critical challenges noted related to working in places where security was a concern, and the lack of government support in others. In one country, respondents reported as a major challenge that the government’s lack of understanding (or perhaps denial) of the threat posed by violent extremism severely impeded the implementation of P/CVE projects.

It is noteworthy that the issue of funding was noted as a concern in only eight cases. The issues relating to donors are valuable information for the donor community that recipients might not feel free to communicate directly to donors.

Figure 12: How other organisations contribute to implementation

Total	Contribution	Description
26	Partnership and participation	<p>Grants are awarded to smaller CSOs in order to help implement the projects at the grassroots level</p> <p>Facilitators are drawn from existing networks</p> <p>Collaboration between state and non-state actors</p> <p>Women's organisations and women police officers have participated in the project</p> <p>Partnership with government agencies</p> <p>Organisation helped to develop a trauma-healing approach</p> <p>Organisations engage the communities, beneficiaries, stakeholders and do the work on the ground</p> <p>Local CSOs are approached to help with the implementation</p>
9	Logistical and administrative support	<p>Other organisations help with research</p> <p>Other organisations help build the capacity and expertise of the implementing organisation</p> <p>Help identify relevant individuals and target groups</p> <p>One organisation helped organise speakers for an event</p>
4	Financial support	<p>One implementing organisation helped link youth with livelihood programmes</p> <p>Organisations support the initiatives through financial support</p>

Figure 13: Challenges

Total	Challenges	Description
23	Lack of support	<p>Government has no clear directions on how to deal with returnees</p> <p>Lack of support from government authorities</p> <p>CSOs are involved in local politics for the wrong reasons</p> <p>Difficult to engage with government</p> <p>Communities refuse to hand over perpetrators to the authorities</p> <p>Government does not recognise violent extremism and refuses to support any PVE initiatives</p> <p>Government recognises only three cultural leaders when there are more than 130 different ethnicities</p> <p>Lack of cooperation between government and CSOs</p>
12	Logistics and time	<p>Difficulty reaching some target groups</p> <p>Project was not properly designed</p> <p>Market saturated with vocational trainees</p>
12	Insecurity	<p>Porous borders</p> <p>Frequent attacks by violent extremist groups</p> <p>Risk of being targeted</p> <p>Staff have been injured while in the field</p>

Total	Challenges	Description
10	Lack of capacity	<p>Difficult to work with organisations who do not normally focus on CVE as they do not have the right capacity</p> <p>Organisation struggled to deal with an overload of information</p> <p>Organisation had difficulty finding staff with the right skills</p> <p>Organisation did not have capacity to deal with target groups who suffered from trauma</p> <p>Lack of capacity from the government's side</p>
9	Hostility	<p>Hostility between communities and law enforcement – returnees disappearing</p> <p>Hostility between CSOs and the government</p> <p>Hostility between implementing organisation and communities</p>
8	Community perceptions	<p>High expectations from communities and target groups</p> <p>CVE is viewed as negative</p> <p>Lack of interest from target groups</p> <p>Violent extremism is seen as religious problem and not marginalisation issue</p> <p>Some target groups complain that other target groups are receiving vocational training and they are not</p>
8	Funding	<p>Delayed funding</p> <p>Not enough funding</p>
6	Donor organisation	<p>Donors policies can be restrictive</p> <p>The donor organisation's logo caused problems, as the donor country had been receiving bad publicity</p> <p>Implementing organisation received pressure to conduct an external evaluation</p> <p>Competition between donor organisations</p> <p>Lack of coordination between some donor organisations</p>
5	Fear	<p>Fears whether participants and some target groups can be trusted</p> <p>No trust in police and fear of police</p> <p>No witness protection programme</p>
3	Lack of knowledge	<p>No awareness on the driving factors behind violent extremism</p> <p>Because of governments' ignorance, communities remain marginalised</p>

Lessons learned

This aspect sought to understand what lessons organisations had learned through implementing their project/s, and what they would change if they implemented the project again.

Respondents described a wide range of lessons learned; these can be helpful for current and future implementers and donors of P/CVE projects. While many relate to

project design and management, there are also important lessons on project target groups, the need to increase local participation, project duration, and partnerships for implementation. Only four respondents mentioned lessons learned about funding and project duration.

Figure 14: Lessons learned

Total	Lessons learned	Description
13	Include other target groups	<p>Prevention programmes should start with children and youth in school</p> <p>Need to engage with security agencies</p> <p>Introduce a family support programme: parents need to do more to support their children</p> <p>Involve more youth as they are actors for change</p> <p>Need to be targeting more women – especially mothers</p> <p>Marginalised communities need to be targeted</p>
12	Improved planning	<p>Need to include economic opportunities for youth and women</p> <p>Would design follow-up mechanisms to ensure progress</p> <p>Invest in appropriate digital reporting techniques</p> <p>Introducing psycho-social support regarding women and returnees</p> <p>Provide more resources and materials for reference purposes</p> <p>Planning needs to improve in relation to the complications existing in the country</p> <p>Consider risk mitigation policy to protect staff and community volunteers</p> <p>Be mindful of the changing contexts within countries and regions</p> <p>It would have been helpful to conduct baseline research</p> <p>A more systematic and structured M&E framework to track the progress</p> <p>Communities, target groups and leaders should all be briefed on what violent extremism is before the organisation pitches the idea of the project</p> <p>Increase the number of staff in implementing organisation</p> <p>Gender balance in the programme should be emphasised</p>
11	Implementation	<p>Implement CVE-relevant projects</p> <p>Extend the reach of the project</p> <p>Include more activities like panel discussions</p> <p>Make use of social media because it is the cheapest and most efficient mode of communication</p> <p>Include more mentors to speak at meetings</p> <p>Consider a holistic approach and to focus on all the drivers behind violent extremism</p> <p>Marginalisation should be addressed</p> <p>Informal justice system can be used to reintegrate low-risk disengaged combatants</p> <p>Pre-forgiveness consultations are essential for the success of and impact of the forgiveness ceremony</p>
10	Increase participation	<p>Increase engagement with security actors</p> <p>Include more community members</p> <p>Include local and regional governors as political exclusion also serves as a driver behind violent extremism</p> <p>Members of parliament should be engaged because they often undermine the work of the judiciary</p>

Total	Lessons learned	Description
3	Extend duration	<p>The project would have benefitted from more time</p> <p>Longer duration of capacity building</p>
2	Implementing partners	<p>Engage with government at a higher level</p> <p>Invest in appropriate expertise</p> <p>Maintain good relationship with government agencies</p> <p>Focus on enhancing the trust among implementing partners</p> <p>Success depends on the support by the communities</p> <p>Include actors as it adds to the success of the project</p> <p>Need to conduct the project in close cooperation with the government for it to be effective in the long term</p>
1	Funding	The project needs more funding

Country-level snapshots

The data collected is provided to profile the findings relating to each country. This is done for the interest of those working in selected countries. Note that this information is recorded as provided by respondents,

in terms of their understanding of issues such as their donor. No data is provided here on the donors relating to Tanzania and Somalia. This is due to requests from these respondents for some of this information to remain confidential.

Kenya

Figure 15: Target groups





Figure 16: Funding



* Some respondents from the countries indicated their funding amounts in Danish Krone, Kenyan Shilling and Euro. The exchange rate of 16 July 2018 was used to convert those amounts into US dollars.

Figure 17: Donors

10	USAID	1	Royal Danish Embassy
5	European Union	1	DANIDA
3	US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour	1	UN Women
2	US Mission Council	1	US Embassy
2	US State Department	1	Mombasa County
2	US State Department Bureau of Counter-Terrorism	1	National Government of Kenya
1	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa		

Somalia

Figure 18: Target groups



* Others:

4	Government agencies	1	Victims
2	Prisoners	1	Prison officials
2	Traditional leaders	1	Law enforcement





Figure 19: Funding



* Some respondents from the countries indicated their funding amounts in Danish Krone, Kenyan Shilling and Euro. The exchange rate of 16 July 2018 was used to convert those amounts into US dollars.

Tanzania

Figure 20: Target groups



* Others:

4	Government officials	1	Immigration officials
1	Judiciary	1	Prison officials
1	Justice sector	1	Media



Figure 21: Funding

- 0 - 9 999

- 10 000 - 99 999

3 100 000 - 499 999


2 500 000 - 999 999

1 1 000 000 - 70 000 000

* Some respondents from the countries indicated their funding amounts in Danish Krone, Kenyan Shilling and Euro. The exchange rate of 16 July 2018 was used to convert those amounts into US dollars.

Uganda

Figure 22: Target groups




* Others:

1 Government officials	1 Social workers
1 Media	1 Psychologists
1 Private sector	1 Family counsellors
1 University students	



Figure 23: Funding



* Some respondents from the countries indicated their funding amounts in Danish Krone, Kenyan Shilling and Euro. The exchange rate of 16 July 2018 was used to convert those amounts into US dollars.

Figure 24: Donors

2 US State Department	1 Ugandan Fund
1 Private donor in Japan	1 Finn Church Aid
1 Democratic Governance Facility	1 US Mission in Uganda
1 US private donors	

This information is recorded as provided by respondents.

Terminology

Several of the terms used in this document are contested. This study has adopted the following definitions.

Violent extremism is ‘a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature [and] may include acts of terrorism.’¹⁶

Terrorism is the ‘unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.’¹⁷

Radicalisation is ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.’¹⁸

Counter-terrorism consists of military or police activities that are undertaken ‘to neutralize terrorists [and extremists], their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.’¹⁹

Preventing violent extremism is the use of ‘systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism. This includes confronting conditions conducive to terrorism [including marginalisation, socio-economic deprivation, human rights abuses and corruption] while protecting human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism.’¹⁰

Countering violent extremism is an ‘approach to mitigating or preventing potential terrorist activity that emphasizes the strength of local communities via engagement with a broad range of partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviours, tactics, and other indicators associated with terrorist activity.’¹¹

A theory of change is ‘a set of assumptions about the relationship between project activities and goals.’¹²

Endnotes

- 1 United Nations General Assembly, *Plan of action to prevent violent extremism*, A/70/674, 24 December 2015, 1, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism>
- 2 United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing violent extremism through promoting inclusive development, tolerance and respect for diversity*, www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper---preventing-violent-extremism-through-inclusiv.html, 10.
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Acknowledgements

This report is published with support from the Government of Norway. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union and the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.