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SECURITY STUDIES

Gender and human security

African perspectives

Edited by Anne-Marie Hilsdon

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Foreword

We at UN Women declare that empowering women and girls is the greatest human rights goal of our time. We say that all women and girls should live their lives free from violence and we pledge to leave no woman or girl behind.

This monograph on gender and human security acknowledges the challenge of accomplishing these goals in Africa. Here, all gender issues are recognised as security issues. The monograph explores gender inequalities in health, education and politics in Africa and how these have been exacerbated by poverty, war and conflict.

We learn why Liberia, one of the few UN member countries to develop a Women, Peace and Security Agenda, has not been able to improve gender equality. In Northern Nigeria we note that while the safety of women targeted for kidnapping must be paramount, their education is in grave jeopardy. We also discover that Nigerian women, key to the success of transnational sex trafficking rings in Europe, are blurring the boundaries between victim and perpetrator.

In the past decade, men have been called to engage in ending violence against women. In South Africa the global #MeToo movement has led to a resurgence of a call for men to take responsibility for the sexual assault of women. The monograph explores the inclusion of men in violence prevention programmes and some of the pitfalls when this is attempted.

> Gender inequalities in health, education and politics in Africa have been exacerbated by poverty, war and conflict

Finally, this volume exposes men too as violence survivors. During the conflict and instability in the Central African Republic, the sexual abuse of men and boys, labelled homosexual and hidden from the purview of communities and authorities, has at last been acknowledged.

By adopting a consciously gendered approach, this monograph takes knowledge of human security in Africa in a new direction. It provides solutions and informs policy and practice in innovative ways.

This fine group of authors are researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African organisation that does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance.

The ISS is committed to gender mainstreaming, ensuring that gender and gendered relations are explored across all activities. This volume provides an important step for the ISS to enhance gender and human security on the continent.

Readers, I warmly recommend this monograph to you.

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

Executive Director, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)

Executive summary

Human security is the right of all people regardless of sex, religion, ethnicity, gender and other axes of oppression. There is growing global recognition that gender equality is a major prerequisite for achieving it.

Human security relates not only to personal and community safety during times of violence, war and conflict, but also includes access to education, health and economic life, and political representation.

Through perspectives from Africa, specifically Nigeria, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Africa and Liberia, this monograph explores security-related gender inequalities for women and current responses to them.

Globally, women and some men are systematically discriminated against relative to their male counterparts, the problem being particularly acute in developing countries – especially in Africa. African women face hurdles not only to personal safety and access to basic services such as education and healthcare, including reproductive health services, but also to economic inclusion and financial independence. Exacerbated by violence, war, conflict and issues of disarmament, women's insecurity can also become a catalyst for trafficking abroad.

This monograph analyses the ways in which gender inequality impacts on the provision of human security in several African countries and offers recommendations for how to ameliorate these impacts, especially fear and want.

After an initial discussion about human security and gender inequalities in Africa the monograph turns specifically to Liberia, Nigeria, the CAR and South Africa. Liberia, currently in a post-conflict phase, is one of the few countries in the world to have a national plan of action for the global Women, Peace and Security Agenda, with a subsequent proliferation of gender-sensitive legislation, policies and plans. While challenges have been identified through this process, implementation to bring greater equality for women has been forestalled.

Women's strong economic position during the latest civil war and any status gained from their substantial role in ending it have been eroded. In a context of extreme poverty and with the reassertion of sociocultural barriers, women continue to be denied representation in politics and are restrained in economic progress.

Gender-based violence levels remain high. Political will, allocation of government resources and accountability structures to effectively implement existing legislation and frameworks for gender equality are prerequisites to achieving more decision-making power and economic and social development for Liberian women.

The position of women as recruiting agents in transnational sex trafficking in Africa has been under-reported and under-researched. Historical precedents have facilitated the role of Nigerian 'madams', now the major African group trafficking women to Europe. Often former sex workers themselves, 'madams' are implicated in each stage of the odyssey from Nigeria to the specific destination country in Europe.

Poor families in Nigeria place children in the trusted care of the 'madams'. This is enabled through a cultural precedent where 'madams' are considered similar to 'wealthy relatives' who can provide greater opportunities.

Despite extensive national and international legislation, the movement of Nigerian women to Europe for sex work shows no signs of easing. Because of the feminisation of the control of sex trafficking, a more nuanced response is needed by legislators. Dismantling the framework of sex trafficking, especially the activities of Nigerian recruiting agents, requires efforts by sending countries, but especially by powerful destination countries.

Human security includes access to education, health and economic life, and political representation

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Since Boko Haram commenced targeting schoolgirls for abduction in north-east Nigeria in 2014, fears exist not only for the safety of all school-age girls, but also for their education, which has consequently been severely curtailed.

Pre-existing religious and sociocultural beliefs have already denied girls substantial access to education and these beliefs have been used to bolster Boko Haram's anti-western philosophy, gender ideology and practices.

While boys have also been kidnapped and similarly threatened, the education of girls has arguably been more affected because they have already been left behind with respect to education. Returned girls are not only fearful of attending school again, but are also stigmatised as former 'Boko Haram wives'.

So while the safety of girls to attend school must be ensured, dismantling Boko Haram gender ideology and changing gender norms underpinned by cultural and religious beliefs is also needed. National and international actors are called to address these issues.

The previously hidden sexual abuse of men during conflict in the CAR, and the responses to it, are underpinned by gender norms. Where heterosexual gender identity is the cultural norm, sexual abuse of men by men may be used as punishment.

This was uncovered when human rights groups recently investigated the rape and sexual abuse of women. Women told stories of their husbands being raped in their presence by military groups and also during other opportunistic crimes – the result of general instability in the CAR.

While reporting the sexual abuse of women is now common, that of men and boys remains low. Gender cultural values dictate that the rape of men is labelled a homosexual act. Homosexuality is taboo in many communities in the CAR because of its perceived radical departure from existing heterosexual gender norms.

Achieving gender equality so that women are free from want and fear is necessary for human security in Africa

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Men and boys are therefore inhibited from reporting any sexual abuse for fear of being labelled or worse. Gender and sexual awareness training for humanitarian workers to understand the phenomenon of sexual abuse, and gender training for the justice sector in reporting procedures, are urgently needed. In addition, the necessary resources for the provision of services and effective prosecution of the crimes against men and boys who have been sexually violated should be provided.

Men have become targets in the global #MeToo movement which has recently accelerated accusations and reporting of sexual abuse of women primarily in the workplace. In South Africa activists have highlighted specific gender-based violence incidents in NGO and government offices perpetrated not only by ordinary workers, but also senior politicians and directors.

Responses to such criminal acts have been critiqued as unsuccessful, and researchers and practitioners globally are calling for a stronger focus on the prevention of gender-based violence. The idea is to address and transform 'harmful' gender norms that may facilitate or support violence against women.

These gender-transformative programmes have met with considerable resistance by many men who feel 'singled out' and 'victimised' as rapists and sexual abusers. But such resistance acknowledges only the physical aspects of violence while ignoring the broader spectrum of oppressive attitudes and behaviours that reinforce the societal dominance of men. These are considered to support and facilitate physical violence. Men's resistance is nevertheless real and needs to be addressed.

Recommendations

Achieving gender equality so that women are free from want and fear is necessary for human security in Africa. Unlocking the dormant potential of women and young girls could drive meaningful changes across a number of different development systems.

Simply levelling the playing field between men and women would promote greater social equality, lead to more rapid economic growth and reduce the burden of disease on Africa's women of childbearing age. Freedom from gender-based violence goes hand in hand with these achievements.

Based on an understanding of the role that stakeholders and policymakers play in responding to human security threats, the monograph concludes with a set of recommendations for change, listed in order of the security issues raised in this monograph.

- Gender mainstreaming in Liberia will need to adopt a holistic approach. This means that the social, economic and political challenges that women face are integrated into one strategic policy. The languages of that policy and legal framework should be simplified and made accessible to the general population, especially community leaders, so that they understand the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Liberia and start adopting practices that ensure gender mainstreaming. Interventions undertaken by government should address the socio-cultural norms, especially those that perpetuate discrimination and inequality against women.

- National and international legislation must develop more nuanced responses to the sex trafficking of Nigerian women to Europe by Nigerian 'madams', and more directly address the feminisation of the trafficking process. European destination countries, in acknowledgement of their greater potential for both prevention and response relative to poor sending countries, must show political will in developing and implementing effective legislation and policy. At the same time, the Nigerian government and communities must continue to develop cultural responses to dissuade community members from supporting the sex trafficking of Nigerian women to Europe.

- Countering the negative effects on girls of Boko Haram's anti-education philosophy, which builds on sociocultural beliefs in north-east Nigeria that girls have less value than boys, requires sustained action. In their planning, international humanitarian actors and state governments in north-east Nigeria should strengthen the linkages between girls' education and countering violent extremism. This includes commissioning studies about how Boko Haram's ideology and methodology fit into the framework of existing sociocultural beliefs. In addition to keeping schoolgirls safe, educating girls in Nigeria should comprise initiatives to create and deepen awareness of the strong impact of cultural and religious beliefs about the role of women, and how these negatively affect girls'

access to education. To this end religious and traditional leaders should serve as partners with the media, the state government and elites to reach all sectors of northern Nigerian society.

• The Special Prosecutor of the Special Criminal Court for the CAR should be urged to consider investigating and prosecuting sexual violence against males. NGOs and government agencies should design and implement rehabilitation strategies, social support and medical services to help male survivors of sexual violence. The justice sector in the CAR should undergo training in receiving and documenting sexual violence against all individuals, including men. Communities in the CAR should develop support mechanisms including changing sociocultural norms and discriminatory practices of gender and sexuality that victimise male survivors.

• The South African government must allocate more funding to violence prevention with the aim of addressing gender-based violence before it occurs. The government and other implementing agencies must also commit to engage all men in violence prevention in South Africa in order to transform gender norms, a necessary part of the process to end violence against women. Researchers, NGOs and governments should creatively explore how to resolve the issue of men's resistance to engaging in violence prevention.

Authors' biographies

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Diketso Mufamadi joined the ISS in 2016 as a research assistant in the Justice and Violence Prevention programme. She has a BA Honours degree in Psychology from the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. She is a LifeLine counsellor and speaks several languages including English, Afrikaans, Sesotho and isiZulu. Mufamadi has been an intern at the Nelson Mandela Foundation where she worked with a team to organise events, manage bookings and engage with high-profile visitors to the foundation.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

Aids	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ASP	All Survivors Project
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CJS	Criminal justice system
CVE	Countering violent extremism
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FGM	Female genital mutilation
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
GII	Gender Inequality Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Ranking
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPs	Internally displaced people
IFs	International Futures forecasting system
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NAP	National Action Plan
NAPTIP	National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

PPP	Purchasing power parity
SA	South Africa
SAFFI	South African Faith and Family Institute
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDGE	African Union's Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WHO	World Health Organization
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Introduction

Anne-Marie Hilsdon

This monograph arose from discussions held in the monthly Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Gender Forum. This forum comprises researchers who meet to apply a gender lens to ISS research and develop gender mainstreaming of the institute more generally. Recently we decided to pursue a coordinated approach to researching gender and human security in Africa. We held several study groups and collective ideas started to emerge. A monograph was taking shape.

First, authors published a series of articles on their specific topics in the online publication *ISS Today*. Then we developed them into the chapters comprising this volume.

What does security have to do with women? Heads of militaries, governments and peacebuilding teams are either assumed to be gender-neutral or are designated male. Sometimes humans are completely absent from security studies which are overtaken by weaponry, violent extremism and war/peace strategies. If women have been included, often only their sexuality and reproductive capacity are stressed – as recipients of sexual violence and abuse. This leads to speculation that women do not really exist in security studies, other than as victims.

In addition, suspicion is rife about men who have been victims of sexual assault and gender-based violence; and those who pursue peace in the face of violence and conflict. Such men are rendered invisible.

Contextual knowledge about women and men such as these in Africa is vital. It is important that pervasive understandings of femininity and masculinity and their effects are situated within culture, race, socioeconomic status and locality. Knowledge generated through such contextualisation is crucial in assessing the different implications for women (and men) of security-related legislation, and policy and programming in all areas and levels of governance in Africa.

This process constitutes gender mainstreaming of human security. This is the strategy, and gender equality is the goal. Progress in creating gender equality in all areas of human security, however, requires political will and the participation of women *and* men.

This monograph takes a close look at what is necessary for gender equality in security arenas in Africa. It exposes existing fear and want among women and specific men; it analyses and critiques existing policies and legislative frameworks; and offers ways forward to achieve meaningful and optimal human security. The monograph is of particular relevance to practitioners and researchers of human security studies and related fields where finding new ways to facilitate gender equality has become an imperative.

Applying a gender lens to human security encompasses all areas of women's lives. This monograph then is of significance to all women's organisations and agencies, and other NGOs working for gender equality in Africa.

With the injunction that women need to be free from want *and* fear, Chapter One examines gender inequalities in education, health, economics and politics. These areas are implicated in the formation of security threats in Africa and their resolution. The chapter provides a framework for discussions in the following chapters and argues that compared to other developing regions, Africa generally has much work to do.

Gender mainstreaming of human security is the strategy and gender equality is the goal

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Chapter Two evaluates the innovative Women, Peace and Security Agenda instigated in Liberia after civil war through a series of legislation and policy frameworks. Despite its potential, it has not yet delivered gender equality for women primarily due to lack of political will for implementation, continuing poverty and sociocultural barriers for women.

Chapter Three argues that government control and regulation of sex trafficking from countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, to countries in Europe are hampered by the 'invisibility' of women as crime bosses. This phenomenon has feminised the process of sex trafficking which has not yet been addressed in legislation and policy. Authors outline the role of Nigerian madams in sex trafficking to Europe and argue for a more nuanced cultural response by Nigerian and especially European authorities in their legislation, policy development and programming to prevent human trafficking.

The next three chapters demonstrate how the private-public distinction has effects on human security. A sexual division of labour locates men and women respectively in public, and private or domestic, spaces. Such spaces have become associated with particular roles and strong gender norms for both men and women. Those who venture into the other's space are often punished.

Chapter Five is about girls in Northern Nigeria whose safety and schooling have been disrupted through kidnapping by Boko Haram. The author suggests that Boko Haram gender ideology and sociocultural values act in tandem to deny girls education. Public and private sectors and communities in Northern Nigeria, including elders, are called on to unite to offer a holistic and effective response ensuring the safety and education of all girls.

Chapter Six offers a gender analysis of the hidden issue of sexual violence against men in the Central African Republic where the rule of law has broken down. The author calls for adequate reporting and prosecution of the rape and assault of men; resource and service provision to survivors, including staff training in gender awareness; and prosecution of the perpetrators.

The final chapter on engaging men in gender-based violence prevention is set in South Africa. Authors argue that to end violence against women requires the following: an increased focus by governments on the prevention of and response to violence; the participation of men in programmes that transform gender norms; and the resolution of men's resistance to such involvement.

Analysis in this monograph is based primarily on field research, international data sources, government and other institutional studies, and both national and international reports.

Chapter 1

Gender equality in numbers: sub-Saharan Africa in a global context

by Zachary Donnenfeld

Any country, region or society that fundamentally excludes 50% of its population will never be able to realise its full potential.[1] Around the world women are systematically discriminated against relative to their male counterparts, but the problem is particularly acute in developing countries – especially sub-Saharan Africa.

Women in sub-Saharan Africa face hurdles not only to personal safety and access to basic services such as education and healthcare, including reproductive health services, but also to economic and financial independence.

The following chapter will use various international data sources, including the International Futures (IFs) modelling platform, to explore some key gender-related trends in sub-Saharan Africa and globally, as well as their likely future trajectory where available in IFs.[2] IFs is a globally integrated assessment model that blends more than 4 000 data series (from a variety of international sources like the World Bank, United Nations and World Health Organization). The data cover 186 countries and dates back to 1960, though for specific times and countries they may be unavailable.

The following chapter will provide a context for the rest of this volume by outlining some of the broad structural challenges that women face in sub-Saharan Africa, how those challenges have evolved over time and some ways in which those challenges are distinct from those faced by women in other regions.[3]

Gender equality is a prerequisite for meaningful human security. In 1994 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced a new definition of human security that advocates for inclusion of the following dimensions: economics, health, personal, political, food, environmental and community.[4] Fundamental to this broader definition of human security is the acknowledgement that all members of society are included, regardless of sex, religion, ethnicity or gender.

The aim of this monograph is to explore the relationship between gender equality and human security in the sub-Saharan African context. While the rest of this monograph will unpack and analyse the specific challenges women (and men) face in Africa, this chapter offers gender and human security at a glance on the continent.

In short, this is a broad exploration of gender inequality in the region (i.e. that men have consistently better access and opportunities relative to women), but will also examine how women on the continent fare relative to other parts of the world.

Goal 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is dedicated to promoting gender equality and declares that 'providing women and girls with equal access to education, healthcare, decent work and representation in political and economic decision-making processes will fuel sustainable economies and benefit societies and humanity at large'.[5]

Furthermore, the SDGs broadly focus on a transformative approach to human rights and more gender-inclusive development.[6] The World Economic Forum agrees that 'ensuring the healthy development and appropriate use of half the world's available talent pool thus has a vast bearing on how competitive a country may become'.[7] While there may be tacit agreement within the international community that gender equity is a laudable goal in principle, there is a long way to go to achieve gender equality in practice.

An important dimension of gender equality is the relative levels of access to educational opportunities for women and men. Education, particularly of women, has strong forward linkages to economic productivity, but is also a key driver of demographic change through its impact on fertility rates and life expectancy.[8]

Lower secondary education is particularly important as that is typically the age where the internalisation of the importance of family planning occurs, though education cannot completely counter patriarchal norms influencing family size.[9]

Numerous studies have shown that 'countries with better educated citizens have healthier, slower growing populations, as educated individuals make better health choices, live longer, and have healthier and fewer children'.[10]

There are many factors that force women out of school including early marriage, pregnancy and violence. Unlike boys, girls are also often kept home to help with domestic chores.[11] In some African societies a girl's education is undervalued relative to a boy's, partly because when married she will join her husband's household, thereby reducing the economic status of her parents.

There are also more basic reasons, such as a lack of gender-segregated sanitation facilities for adolescent girls at many public schools in Africa and the lack of menstrual supplies. This results in 'voluntary' withdrawal of girls from education.[12]

In 1948 the UN established that access to primary education should be free, compulsory and universal, and the Millennium Development Goals set a global

target of universal primary enrolment by the year 2000. The reality for women in sub-Saharan Africa is different however. Gender parity in education is a ratio of access to education of girls compared to boys: a measure of 1 (or 1:1) indicates girls and boys attend school in equal numbers (e.g. for every 100 boys who attend 100 girls also attend), below 1 denotes the ratio of fewer girls to boys attending school, and above 1 shows the opposite. Figure 1 shows gender parity in primary education in sub-Saharan Africa relative to other developing regions and highlights two important things.

The first is that women have consistently lower levels of access to education opportunities (relative to men) globally. Of the regions explored here, only Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia have historically had relative equality in access to primary education.[13] The second important trend is the variation in gender parity in education across the world's developing regions.

Figure 1 shows that while sub-Saharan Africa has improved gender parity in primary enrolment since 1975, progress has not been as rapid as in other regions. In 2015 (the most recent data point), for every 100 boys who attend school, 95 (.95) girls do. Therefore more girls than boys in sub-Saharan Africa cannot expect to ever see the inside of a primary school classroom.[14] Furthermore, on the current trajectory, sub-Saharan Africa is not forecast to achieve gender parity in primary enrolment by 2050. This is in contrast to other developing regions like South Asia, where gross enrolment rates have recently spiked above 1 – in order to make up for the decades of unequal access.

Figure 1: Gender parity levels in primary enrolment

Source: IFs version 7.34 initialised from Barro-Lee data.

What is also important about Figure 1 is the period of relative stagnation in sub-Saharan Africa from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. In that decade, primary enrolment remained relatively flat, at about 83 females enrolled for every 100 males. In contrast, South Asia moved from about 72 females enrolled for every 100 males to about 83.

Within IFs, education is conceptualised as a 'pipeline', where the goal is to move as many students through the system as possible. So having lower levels of females enrolled at each level acts as a significant constraint to improving the overall stock of education in the adult population.

A further breakdown, by level of education, shows that the continent is struggling to promote gender equality across all levels of education. Table 1 helps to frame the severity of constraints within sub-Saharan Africa's education system.

Table 1: Gender parity by level of education (2015)

	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary	Tertiary
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.95	0.90	0.87	0.73
East Asia and Pacific	0.99	1.02	1.03	1.15
Europe and Central Asia	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.17
Latin America and Caribbean	0.98	1.05	1.11	1.3
South Asia	1.084	0.99	0.95	0.97

Source: IFs v. 7.34 using UIS data.

Sub-Saharan Africa has made progress towards achieving gender parity in primary school – in 2015, as mentioned above, for every 100 boys, 95 girls attend school) – but there is clearly more work to be done at higher levels. It should also be noted that this gender inequality exists alongside relatively low levels of access in the total population. People in Africa are at a general disadvantage in terms of access to educational opportunities, but women face an additional burden.

In addition to the other benefits to development mentioned above, education can provide broader societal advantages by establishing a general framework for social interaction. Along with valuable scholastic pursuits, students engage in other activities that promote social norms and help pupils develop the social skills fundamental to membership in a supportive community and, ideally, a participatory democracy.[15] If women are excluded from these processes of socialisation beginning at early ages, it can negatively inform perceptions about the 'appropriate' roles for women within that community.

Another important area of human development in Africa where the negative consequences of gender inequality can be seen clearly is in health outcomes.[16] Although women have higher life expectancy across the board – due to a lower

propensity to engage in risky behaviours like smoking and interpersonal violence – women in African countries still face significant barriers to improved health outcomes compared to other regions.

As a result, women in Africa are nearly twice as likely to die from a communicable disease throughout the course of their lifetime as women from South Asia, the region with the next heaviest communicable disease burden globally.[17]

Women in sub-Saharan Africa are also much more likely than men to suffer from morbidity[18] stemming from communicable diseases. Women in Africa are about 40% more likely than those in other developing regions to have their quality of life affected by a communicable disease over the course of their lifetime. However, this risk factor increases to about 500% during childbearing years (ages 15 to 45).

Figure 2: Female life expectancy

Source: IFs v. 7.34 initialised from United Nations Population Division data.

Figure 2 also shows that progress on health outcomes has been slower to materialise for women in sub-Saharan African than elsewhere on the globe. In 1960, female life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa was roughly equal to that in South Asia.

While South Asia has made steady progress over the past 65 years, sub-Saharan Africa's trajectory has been less impressive. In 2015, women in South Asia could expect to live about seven and a half years longer, on average, than women born in sub-Saharan Africa.

What Figure 2 also shows is the dramatic impact of HIV/Aids. At the height of the crisis, in the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s, women in Africa suffered

nearly 85% of female Aids deaths worldwide, a figure that has only dropped to around 65% in 2015, despite African women accounting for only about 15% of the world's population.

Of the more than 500 000 female Aids deaths globally in 2015, more than 370 000 occurred in Africa. However, the divergence in health outcomes with South Asia begins well before that (as early as 1965) and suggests some deeper issues with healthcare in Africa.

The morbidity and mortality of women in Africa are both integrally linked with the HIV/Aids epidemic. As Hilsdon and I have argued elsewhere, gender norms are largely responsible for higher HIV/Aids morbidity levels in women relative to men.[19]

Cultural beliefs in southern and eastern Africa, for example, often mean that forced and unprotected sex is common for young women with older sexual partners against whom they are unable to assert themselves. In addition, women who contract HIV, even through rape, are often stigmatised differently to men and can be considered promiscuous. They may be shamed, blamed and cast out by their partners and families. By contrast HIV/Aids-infected men are often cared for by their partners.[20]

Women in sub-Saharan Africa are much more likely than men to suffer from morbidity stemming from communicable diseases

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Researchers such as Shatz and Gilbert suggest that the morbidity of older women in western and southern Africa is affected by the broader and more demanding social roles they are forced to assume in later life.[21]

Living in multigenerational households, older women in Mali are caring for the Aids-infected children of the middle generation, and sometimes their grandchildren, when infected parents are sick or have died. Gender norms ensure that older men do not assume such roles.[22] Mhaka-Mutepfa, Mpofu and Cumming suggest that the health of grandmothers in Zimbabwe as ageing primary caregivers can decline rapidly.[23]

Poverty also contributes to deteriorating health, when women are unable to afford the necessary food and healthcare.[24] These resources may also become out of reach when their pensions are diverted to care for their HIV/Aids-infected relatives.

Access to healthcare and education is a human right and an intrinsically worthy policy goal. However, access to these services also has wider benefits including enhanced economic productivity and a better-informed polity that can more actively participate in building the social contract.[25] Societies that provide women equal access to health and education opportunities can also expect, other things being equal, more inclusive economic and political outcomes.

As part of the recognition that human well-being cannot be fully encapsulated by any economic measure, many subsequent efforts have been made to provide a deeper quantitative understanding of what development means.

An important step in this effort to create a metric of human development that moves beyond GDP per capita occurred in 1995 when the UNDP began releasing a series of gender equality metrics as part of its broader Human Development Index (HDI).[26]

The most recent of these measures of gender equality is the Gender Inequality Index (GII), where a higher value indicates greater gender *inequality.*[27] The GII has several components, but broadly speaking it attempts to capture inequality by looking at health outcomes, levels of empowerment and labour market indicators.[28]

The GII compares the level of human and economic development enjoyed by women relative to men in any particular society. Figure 3 shows that the relative deprivation experienced by women varies significantly across developing regions.

Figure 3: GII scores

Source: UNDP 2016 Human Development Ranking (HDR) report.

Of the other developing regions explored in this chapter, sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest levels of gender equality in the world. Moreover, other regions – notably South Asia – have been widening the gap with sub-Saharan Africa in the GII over the past decade or so.

Women in sub-Saharan Africa actually had higher levels of gender equality in 1995, according to the GII, than women in South Asia. However, South Asian countries moved from nearly four points behind sub-Saharan African countries in

1995 to more than eight points ahead in 2015.[29] That said, in both those societies men have significantly more opportunities than women, even today, and there is much work to be done to improve gender inclusivity.

Since Africa scores below average on many of the component indicators (e.g. level of education and healthcare) of gender equality, it is unsurprising to find the continent lagging on the overall index. However, there are some areas where sub-Saharan Africa does fairly well in terms of gender equality.

One is in terms of the share of female representatives in parliament, as shown in Figure 4. Africa appears relatively progressive here, particularly in comparison to Asian countries, some of which are often hailed as ideal models of economic growth and development.

Figure 4: Percentage of parliamentary seats held by women

Figure 4 shows that while sub-Saharan Africa has not distinguished itself from other regions in terms of female representation in government, it has kept pace with Europe and Central Asia and Latin America, where GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2015 was US$25 000 and US$11 000 higher respectively.[30]

As indicated above, Europe and Central Asia and Latin America are also the highest-scoring regions on the measure of gender parity in education, and other indicators explored here. Thus these regions may serve as useful benchmarks for policymakers looking to improve gender equality outcomes in Africa.

Another area where sub-Saharan Africa performs relatively well is in the labour force participation rate of women. Apart from the human rights perspective,

removing the barriers that prevent women from entering the workplace and allowing women to willingly exchange their labour for capital is a net benefit to both economies and communities.

Inequalities occur when women are forced into low productivity jobs – often in the informal sector – where they are mostly paid subsistence wages. In many cases this happens because of a lack of access to healthcare and education, which prevents more women than men from obtaining the skills and training necessary to enter the formal workforce.

In any case, workers in the informal sector are much less likely to receive formal training or receive supplementary benefits and worker protections.[31] This creates extremely precarious employment situations for these individuals whose livelihoods can be significantly disrupted by a minor health problem or even an exogenous event like a transport strike. Moreover, women engage in much of this work in addition to 'traditional' household responsibilities, and thus endure a significantly disproportionate share of total labour.

Figure 5: Female labour force participation

Source: IFs v. 7.33 initialised from World Bank data.

Figure 5 demonstrates that women in Africa historically have relatively high access to labour markets compared to their counterparts in other developing regions. In 2015, women composed about 45% of the labour force in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to just over 44% in Europe and Central Asia, and 43% in East Asia and the Pacific. The South Asian region, where women make up only 25% of the labour force, trails noticeably behind.

Conclusion

Although there are limited aspects of gender equality in which sub-Saharan African countries perform relatively well, on the whole women in sub-Saharan Africa face higher barriers to social inclusion than women elsewhere. This impedes the ability of women and girls to lead full and productive lives, inhibits economic growth and prevents women from truly being free from want and fear.

One study found that closing the gap between men and women in education could result in a 5% boost to GDP.[32] If Africa hopes to close the gap between itself and other developing regions, then improving gender equality is a fundamental step.

Unlocking the dormant potential of Africa's women and young girls could drive meaningful changes

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On average, women on the continent are less likely to progress as far as their male peers in school, and also receive less education than women in other developing regions. African women are also more likely to suffer mortality or morbidity from a communicable disease during childbearing years and can expect to live roughly 80% as long as women around the world.

The lack of gender mainstreaming in health policies means that women face additional obstacles to basic service delivery within the context of the world's most underserved region.

Africa faces many challenges that are difficult to prioritise. However unlocking the dormant potential of its women and young girls could drive meaningful changes across a number of different development systems.

Simply levelling the playing field between men and women would unlock more rapid economic growth, reduce the burden of disease on Africa's women of childbearing age and promote greater social equality. These are all good reasons to act, but more importantly, promoting gender equality is the right thing to do.

Notes

1   A Young, 1995, The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110 (3) 641-680.

2   IFs is developed and housed at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. The IFs model is open-source and can be downloaded for free at pardee.du.edu/access-ifs.

3   The regions used come from the World Bank Country and Lending Groups, https://datahelpdesk. worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.

4   United Nations, 1994, Human Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/ hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.

5	United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals platform: Goal 5, www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/.

6	United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, Sustainable Development Goals: Human Rights in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2015, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MDGs/Post2015/HRAndPost2015.pdf.

7	World Economic Forum, 2015, Gender Gap Report, http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/the-case-for-gender-equality/.

8	J Dickson, B Hughes, M Irfan, 2010, Patterns of Potential Human Progress volume 2: Advancing Global Education, Paradigm Publishers, https://pardee.du.edu/pphp-2-advancing-global-education.

9	C Buchmann and E Hannum, Education and Stratification in Developing Countries: A Review of Theories and Research, Annual Review of Sociology: 27(1), 77-102, November 2003; also see Dickson et al. 2011.

10	J Dickson et al., 2010, 15; Buchmann and Hannum, 2003; B Hughes, R Kuhn, C Peterson et al., 2011. Patterns of Potential Human Progress volume 3: Improving Global Health, Oxford University Press, https://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/files/PPHP3_Full_Volume.pdf.

11	Better World, 13 Reasons why girls are not in school on the International Day of the Girl Child, October 2017, https://theirworld.org/news/13-reasons-why-girls-are-not-in-school.

12	One study found that in Malawi only 46% of girls who experienced menarche prior to age 14 completed primary school, against 70% who reached it after 16. M Sommer, 2013, Menarche: A Missing Indicator in Population Health from Low-Income Countries, *Public Health Reports* 128 :5: 399-401.

13	The regions explored in this paper are taken from the World Bank and include sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia. For more information on the particular countries that make up these groups see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.

14	Unless otherwise noted, all figures are taken from the IFs dataset. The original source of data within IFs can be found in the metadata by accessing the DataDict.mdb file. This file has the original source, definition and date of upload into IFs. A more limited set of information can be obtained by accessing the list features function in flexible display.

15	J Dickson, B Hughes, M Irfan, 2010, Patterns of Potential Human Progress volume 2: Advancing Global Education, Paradigm Publishers, https://pardee.du.edu/pphp-2-advancing-global-education.

16	Although access to healthcare is admittedly critical, in IFs we are restricted to macro indicators that are better suited to speaking about health outcomes, rather than equality of access.

17	K Narayan and Z Donnenfeld, 2016, Envisioning a healthy future: Africa's shifting burden of disease, Institute for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/research/papers/envisioning-a-healthy-future-africas-shifting-burden-of-disease.

18	Morbidity is defined by the Global Burden of Disease project as the time spent by an individual in a diseased state or disability caused by the existence of the diseased state, C Murray and A Lopez, The Global Burden of Disease, World Health Organization, World Bank, Harvard School of Public Health, 1997; most recent update Global, regional, and national age-sex specific all-cause and cause-specific mortality for 240 causes of death, 1990-2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, *The Lancet*, 17 December 2014.

19	A Hilsdon and Z Donnenfeld, 2018, Why African health policy needs gender mainstreaming, Institute for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-african-health-policy-needs-gender-mainstreaming.

20	 Ibid.

21	E Shatz and L Gilbert, My Legs Affect Me a Lot … I Can No Longer Walk to the Forest to Fetch Firewood: Challenges Related to Health and the Performance of Daily Tasks for Older Women in a High HIV Context, Healthcare for Women International, 35:7-9, 2014,771-788.

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23	M Mhaka-Mutepfa, R Cumming and E Mpofu, 2014, Grandparents fostering orphans: influences of protective factors on their health and well-being, *Healthcare for Women International*, 35:7-9, 1022-1039.

24	Ibid.

25	Janet Dickson, Barry Hughes and Mohammod Irfan, 2010, Patterns of Potential Human Progress Volume 2, Advancing Global Education: Forecasting the Next 50 years, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, https://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/files/PPHP2_Full_Volume.pdf.

26 This effort is generally credited to Amartya Sen but was in fact pioneered by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, *The Economist*, 23 July 1998, Mahbub ul Haq (obituary), www.economist.com/node/169653; the HDI has three broad components: income, health and education; United Nations Development Programme, 2016 Human Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.

27 Measuring gender inequality at the UNDP began with the Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) in 1995. These scores have been adjusted to a scale of 0-100 (from 0-1) to make them more easily comparable.

28 The Gender Inequality Index (GII) uses the following indicators: maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, female and male population with at least secondary education, female and male shares of parliamentary seats and female and male labour force participation rates, to form various sub-indices and then ultimately the GII score. United Nations Development Programme, 2016 Human Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii.

29 Many South Asian countries made significant gains over this period, particularly the Maldives (28 points), Pakistan (20 points) and Nepal (19 points), although Bhutan showed virtually no change (one point). Conversely Burkina Faso was the low for sub-Saharan African countries at two points – although there are some data gaps in the CAR and Chad.

30 Given that there is a positive relationship between gender equality and income, it is even more impressive that sub-Saharan Africa is able to compare itself favourably with these regions. In 2015 GDP per capita at PPP in sub-Saharan Africa was about US$3 500.

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Chapter 2

Liberian women's empowerment policies: as effective as paper tigers

by Liezelle Kumalo

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) global agenda recognises that gender mainstreaming is important for a gender-equal society. Because of historical disadvantage and unequal and discriminatory policies against women worldwide, specific attention must be given to women to tackle the challenges that impair their development.

As such, the adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 has been a victory for the WPS agenda. The resolution recognises that women should be part of peace processes. This ranges from participation, protection and prevention to early recovery to ensure sustained peace.

The resolution mandated all UN member states to develop national action plans for gender mainstreaming. A global study on WPS[1] noted that only 54 countries formulated action plans. Liberia is one of these countries, but its plan is very much focused on highlighting challenges, and not implementation or accountability mechanisms.[2]

Gender disparities and imbalances are still common in Liberia.[3] These imbalances tend to create social, political and economic problems for women. This is manifested through their lack of access to basic services, disempowerment in economic spheres and low participation in decision-making forums, as will be discussed below.

The WPS agenda highlights that women's security is linked to sustained peace and development. At the heart of these empowerment initiatives, women's equality in all aspects of decision making, economic independence and social development should be pursued. Providing education for empowerment and offering women the necessary infrastructure to develop socially is also key.

This chapter will discuss how effective Liberia's pursuance of the WPS agenda through national legal policies and strategies is in achieving an equitable society. It provides a historical background including the role of women in establishing peace. An analysis of the impact of WPS policies and national frameworks, such as the inheritance law and gender policy, on women's political participation, economic empowerment and challenges that exist socially, is provided. It concludes with recommendations that can be considered for improving the status of women in the country.

Background and context

Liberia's history is one of ethnic polarisation, exclusion and inequality. The settlement of freed slaves from the United States (1822) in the country created tensions with indigenous Liberians. Decades of authoritarian rule (1848-1980), rebellions (1979-1980) and civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003) caused major disruptions in the country.[4] Moreover, Liberia's economy has not recovered from the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis. About 51% of the population is classified as poor, with 16.5% living in extreme poverty, and 50.9% in absolute poverty.[5] Households are still dependent on agriculture-generating incomes.[6]

Women played a significant role in resolving civil war conflict in 2003. They ensured that warring factions signed the peace agreement. Their non-violent movement brought together Christian and Muslim women to end the conflict. Liberian women were part of a week-long public protest that forced warring factions to meet. The women also formed a 200-strong barricade to prevent men from leaving until a peace agreement was reached.[7]

> The post-conflict environment in Liberia has not been conducive for either women's empowerment or security

Although the involvement of women in peace processes has proved to ensure lasting peace,[8] the post-conflict environment in Liberia has not been conducive for either women's empowerment or security. Women and youth are particularly vulnerable in Liberia.

During the civil wars sexual violence was used as a systematic weapon of war against women. Yet 15 years after the end of the conflict, rape and sexual violence against women remain a serious problem.[9] As such the government developed, in 2012, the Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation. The roadmap seeks to address the gender-based violence (GBV) cases that occurred during the war and find some form of reconciliatory justice.[10]

Overcoming patriarchal ideologies and cultural practices incompatible with women's empowerment is not easy. These cultural practices have perpetuated

violence against women and girls. The structural prejudices against women are reflected in the systematic marginalisation of women in decision making, economic empowerment and social settings, despite progressive WPS policies reflected in the country's 1325 action plan and gender policy.

Political participation at both national and local levels

Africa's first woman president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is from Liberia. She governed Liberia from 2006-2018. However the country hasn't much to show for women's empowerment beyond this. The gender disparities that existed before the conflict persist at all levels. Entrenched beliefs regarding the role of women and girls perpetuate discrimination. These beliefs, prevalent in public and private spaces, see women as subordinate to men, and that they must not openly make their views heard.

In order to strengthen the WPS agenda in Liberia, the government developed the Liberian National Gender Policy (2009). The policy was to serve as a framework and guideline to empower women.[11] It calls for accountability within the government to eliminate all forms of gender-based discrimination within national institutions. The policy also calls for improvement of national capacities for enhanced gender mainstreaming in development processes.

However, women's political participation was less than 10% during Sirleaf's tenure. Numbers of women participating in electoral processes were also low. There was only a marginal increase of women's participation in the 2011 and 2017 elections as candidates increased from 11% to 16% respectively.

In 2005 only 13 women were elected to the national legislature, which dropped to eight in 2011 and nine in the current legislature.[12] Although legislation in Liberia, which is line with UN Resolution 1325, calls for a 30% quota for women in political parties, this has not been met.[13] The quota did not enhance the political stature of Liberian women. Currently only two out of 17 ministers are women. Patriarchal power structures are still in place.[14]

Laws that call for greater participation of women cannot alone enact change. Another reason for little political leadership among women is that candidates don't have the finances to participate in elections. Women also don't have enough of an electoral support base from which to garner votes.

Women are not yet represented in local decision making. There has not been a local government election since the end of the civil war in 2003.[15] Mayors and chiefs have been appointed by the president. When it came to these political appointments, Sirleaf appointed few women.[16]

Nevertheless, at the community level change seems to be happening. The informal platforms for rural women allows for sharing, learning and strategising. Women among themselves in the counties meet regularly to discuss their concerns and find solutions to tackle their challenges. At a community level,

women are part of decision-making structures, through policy formulation and design which is then pushed to the local level; however, they are still excluded from property rights and land tenure issues.[17]

Women's political participation is much more difficult to achieve through legislation alone. Structural hindrances that block women's formal participation in decision making should be addressed. Understanding how community women have become part of decision-making structures in a bottom-up approach would be useful to bridge the gap at a national level.

Lack of economic participation and empowerment

During the civil wars, women were the backbone of the economy. But accessing economic and productive resources became more complicated for them in the post-conflict phase. Nevertheless, the breakdown of the economy due to the conflict is being rebuilt by the prominent role of women in certain areas. Women comprise 54% of the labour force, yet they constitute the most disadvantaged and poor in Liberia. Structural challenges such as social constraints discussed below also contribute to their lack of empowerment.

To address this, the government introduced a cross-cutting pillar in development plans, that includes an Agenda for Transformation to consider gender equality. The plan focused on improving the socio-economic and political status and capacity of women in Liberia.[18] Subsequent policies and development frameworks call for women's involvement in economic recovery but progress has been very slow, and in some instances non-existent.

> Women's access to land is through their husbands' ownership, with only 10% of women owning land they can cultivate

Women are still found predominantly in the agricultural sector, in 76% of cash crop production and 93% of food crop production,[19] however, only a small number of women own land in Liberia. For the majority of women this increases their vulnerability to poverty. Most women's access to land is through their husbands' ownership, with only 10% of women owning land that they can cultivate.

The inheritance law recognises that a woman can inherit property that is exclusively hers, but to conduct business she needs her husband's consent. Although inheritance laws ensure that women can own land, community leaders (who are men) have the responsibility of settling land disputes, which often favour men.[20]

Women are also the majority of small-scale traders. Their network brings together producers from all rural areas. These networks have facilitated the functioning of the economy throughout market breakdowns and the Ebola crisis.[21] Though

women are the main processors of agricultural products for commercial use, they are noticeably absent from profit-generating sectors. This includes areas such as cash crop production and mining. Even more worrying is that in the formal economy women account for only 2% of membership, mostly in the public sector.[22]

In general, women are found in the least productive sectors of the economy, which means they have low productivity, small earnings and are open to exploitation.[23] The poor road networks, expensive transportation costs and lack of storage facilities mean that women can sell their produce only in rural areas.

Although the government has recognised that development strategies should include women, they have not properly mainstreamed women into productive sectors of the economy, which constitutes a key aspect of the WPS agenda.

Social challenges

The economic and political development of women is stymied because of patriarchal beliefs, namely socio-cultural norms that undervalue women. A lack of political representation and economic empowerment continue a vicious cycle of inequality in Liberian society. Violence against women is very high, and plans to reduce it have not yet been implemented.

Pursuing a more equitable and just society for women, the Liberian government developed a National Action Plan (NAP). This plan underscores the need for more gender-sensitive approaches for ensuring sustainable peace and social cohesion.

The plan was adopted in 2009 with a focus on six strategic issues related to women and girls, among others:[24]

• Psycho-social and trauma counselling.

• Protection of human rights and strengthening of security.

• Increasing access to quality health education with a specific focus on reproductive health and HIV/Aids.

• Combating all types of violence, including sexual and GBV.

• Empowerment through increased access to housing and natural resources and strengthening participation in the management of the environment.

• Promoting the full involvement of governmental and civil society actors, including women's groups, in the monitoring and evaluation of the NAP.

Despite the plan's positive focus, implementation has been challenging, and numerous obstacles must be overcome before it can be realised. As one of the poorest countries in the world, with half of all households running short of food in 2014, Liberia's social challenges are also linked to a lack of economic development.[25]

A considerable number of people are vulnerable. During the conflicts over the years 95% of all schools have been destroyed. In rural areas health facilities have been destroyed.[26] Services devoted to health and education protecting the most vulnerable have collapsed. Social capital has been weakened especially within family structures, where respect for women has been undermined.

Despite the National Action Plan, not much to date can be shown to demonstrate a positive change in the lives of women and girls. For example in urban areas 35% of households are female-headed. The majority, as indicated above, make an income through petty trading. The urbanisation of Liberia has significantly increased the proportion of poverty-stricken women and children.[27]

When it comes to education, illiteracy rates among women are high: 60% among women aged 15-46 and for men, 30%. More alarming is that 42% of Liberian women have never attended school compared to 18% of men. Moreover, only 8% of women have completed secondary school while 19% of men have.[28] This underscores the problem of girls not completing schooling. Despite policy interventions that seek to reduce the gender difference in literacy rates, gaps still exist. Recent data show that only 39.9% of girls attend primary school despite a 98.2% enrolment.[29]

The domestic violence law (January 2018) criminalises domestic violence against women and men. It aims to protect women against violence and was supposed to ban the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), but allows it to be conducted on girls over 18 years if they give their consent.[30]

> 42% of Liberian women have never attended school
> compared to 18% of men

As indicated above, GBV in the country is also alarmingly high. For women aged between 15 and 49, 44% have experienced physical violence. For almost a quarter of women between 25 and 39 this violence is sexual[31] and health facilities do not have the equipment, resources or expertise to deal with these cases.[32]

In terms of addressing the high prevalence of GBV the government adopted the sexual violence and rape law in 2006. The law recognises rape as a crime (but not spousal rape). The law imposes serious penalties for perpetrators especially in cases of gang rape and where the victim is under 18. Nevertheless there are challenges in terms of dealing with GBV. Law enforcement is ineffective and cases are often settled out of court. Many rape cases go unreported because of the shame surrounding sexual violence. Sexually transmitted infections are significantly higher among females compared to males.[33]

Considering the prevalence of GBV, the national police should be equipped to effectively investigate these cases, so that survivors can receive redress from the

justice system. But access to justice is hampered by the poor quality of police investigations, over-burdened and ill-functioning criminal justice systems and corruption. Laws for the protection of women from violence are not implemented adequately because of the challenges of seeking justice through the courts and security institutions.

There are anomalies regarding the implementation of social laws. Females can consent to marriage at 16, according to the inheritance law, but the rape law stipulates the age of consent at 18. The implementation of these laws will require coherence among various government ministries. These two laws, instead of complementing each other, create more confusion regarding the rights of young women in Liberia.

Current trends also show that there is an increase in pregnancies and births among women under 19, so government family planning services seem not to be reaching their goal.[34] Traditional cultural practices still dominate Liberia's political landscape.

Some traditional practices are considered to promote and facilitate GBV.[35] This was clearly demonstrated through the domestic violence law, where FGM was omitted due to pressure from local traditional leaders. But Sirleaf, before leaving office, placed a ban on the practice.[36] The challenge remains whether a law will be enacted to enforce the ban.

The government of Liberia faces myriad challenges, especially with 63.8% of the population living in poverty after the civil wars. Recovery post-conflict is further hampered by a lack of physical and social infrastructure. The lack of social welfare infrastructure places a considerable burden on the weak economic and social system. Interventions at a local level, however, include the delivery of community-based support programmes in health and social welfare. These programmes focus on building local capacity[37] which at least helps to meet some of the basic infrastructure needs of poor communities.

The achievement of gender equality in Liberia is hampered by these social (and economic) challenges. FGM and GBV deter women from fully participating in rebuilding Liberia. Greater still is their lack of access to existing health and educational provisions that make it difficult for women to participate in both economic and political spheres.

Conclusion

The full achievement of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Liberia is constrained by the lack of women's political leadership, their limited economic empowerment and underpinning social constraints. Gender equality remains elusive because the WPS agenda in Liberia is not pursued holistically.

The various legislation frameworks and policies are ineffective because they are heavily focused on highlighting issues, but not their implementation. The Gender

Policy (2009), for example, does not ensure a quota system is achieved; and the NAP, although it deals extensively with GBV, doesn't enhance the security of women.

The existing policies and plans don't translate into real change for women. Gender mainstreaming and woman empowerment in Liberia will require political will for effective implementation. Resources and accountability structures need to be put in place to effectively implement legislation. These mechanisms should tackle gender inequality in a systematic and substantive manner.

Education programmes and gender-sensitive training for government officials – both men and women – to create awareness of the importance of gender equality should be introduced, so they can effectively implement strategies.

At a community level, cultural leaders will also have to understand the importance of gender mainstreaming and empowering women. The continued prevalence of GBV in the country should be addressed in a systematic manner: this means an overhaul from the police to court systems that facilitates responsiveness.

As Liberia demonstrates, having women in the highest political office doesn't necessarily translate to gender equality for women. While the NAP and gender policy are progressive, customary law and practices continue to discriminate against women. A review process resolving the contradictions between customary law and national legal frameworks should be undertaken.

In addition, male-dominated institutions mean that women's empowerment laws are not necessarily adhered to or respected. Little budget is made available for their implementation. Gender-sensitive laws should be translated into action with enough financial support.

Recommendations

• Gender mainstreaming in Liberia will need to adopt a holistic approach. This means that social, economic and political challenges that women face are integrated into one strategic policy.

• The language of the policies and legal frameworks should be simplified and made accessible to the general population, especially community leaders, so that they understand the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the country and start adopting practices that ensure gender mainstreaming.

• Interventions undertaken by government should actually address the socio-cultural norms – especially those that perpetuate discrimination and inequality against women.

Notes

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Chapter 3

Transnational organised crime in West and Central Africa: the case of Nigerian 'madams'

by Agnes Ebo'o and Naomi Tite

Between 19 March and 16 July 2018, four high-profile cases led to the imprisonment of human traffickers in Palermo, Italy;[1] Rennes, France;[2] Birmingham, UK;[3] and Paris, France.[4] All four cases involved the sex trafficking of women, mostly young adults and teenagers, from Nigeria to Europe.

A notable feature in each of these cases was the involvement of women as prominent members of the trafficking rings. In the Palermo case, two of the three people jailed were women. They were tasked with 'welcoming the girls to Italy after they were recruited by fellow Nigerians in Nigeria'.[5] In the Rennes case, women constituted 19 of the 23 members on trial.

In the Birmingham case, a female nurse, the sole accused, was the leader of a Europe-wide trafficking ring. In the Paris case, 11 of the 14 people sentenced to imprisonment of three to eight years were women. This constitutes a considerable departure from the usual gender representation in organised crime, where women are depicted as 'victims' rather than perpetrators of such crimes.

This monograph seeks to examine the involvement of women as agents in human trafficking rings, with a focus on Nigerian sex trafficking to Europe. Nigeria largely dominates the sex trafficking 'sector'. Sex trafficking is worth a staggering US$99 billion, representing two-thirds of the total revenue generated from human trafficking worldwide.[6] In Belgium for instance, over 60% of illegal entries there are trafficked for sex work from Nigeria.

This chapter examines the social, cultural, economic and political contexts in West and Central Africa, and specifically in Nigeria, where prominent roles for women in human trafficking have developed.

Finally, the chapter makes recommendations on ways to mitigate the occurrence of sex trafficking and hence curtail the roles of female agents, taking into account the supply from Nigeria and demand from Europe.

Sex trafficking: protocols and processes

At a continental level, the contexts[7] of West and Central African countries in recent years, including economic crises, armed conflicts and subsequent displacements of populations, have been responsible for an increase in people's mobility. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM),[8] over 70% of global migratory movements in the past decades have been internal and intra-regional.

Conflicts in Libya and other African regions, however, have recently resulted in (mostly illegal) movements of people to other regions of the continent and internationally, principally to Europe for employment. Unaccompanied minors are a common feature, and are often at risk of abuse, exploitation and trafficking. It is against this background that young girls and women from West and Central Africa, and particularly from Nigeria, are trafficked annually to cities across Europe. In the recent court cases above, many of the victims were under 18.

Since 2014, prosecutors across Europe have investigated Nigerian human trafficking rings in European countries. The process victims go through, as compiled from court cases and media reports, generally entails various steps: recruitment; oath and debt bondage; and then the actual journey from their home city to Libya via other West African countries such as Niger, and finally Malta or Italy. Once they reach their destination country in Europe, victims are often placed in the 'care' of 'madams'.[9]

The growing trafficking of humans globally led to the adoption in 2000 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, widely known as the Palermo Protocol. This supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

It defines human trafficking as 'the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of persons having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs'. (Article 3)[10]

This protocol refers to an abuse of power: vulnerable people being taken advantage of without their consent. Many victims trafficked by Nigerian women have testified that after leaving Nigeria, they only then learnt about the

real purpose of their trip when forced into prostitution in Libya or after reaching Europe.[11]

A victim who testified in a media report indicated that she knew she had to pay money to leave Nigeria. This implies that in many instances, people were consenting candidates for smuggling[12] at the point of agreeing with the madam in Nigeria, but not for sex trafficking. These issues of consent, which have implications for the exploitative nature of the role of the madams, are not clearly captured by the United Nations (UN) definition of human trafficking.

The process of trafficking of women in Nigeria specifically would usually start with a Nigerian madam based in Europe visiting Nigeria for recruitment. Young women, including teenagers, are often encouraged by family or social networks such as churches to travel on the promise of employment as nannies, housekeepers or restaurant staff.

Before leaving Nigeria, they are taken to a voodoo priest for oath and bondage rituals, during which they are put under a spell to obey or fear the madam, or are promised 'protection from bad spirits' for their journey. In this way the madam aims to have psychological control over the 'victims'.

During these rituals they also contract travel debts amounting to tens of thousands of euros,[13] and are threatened with punishment or harm to their families should they fail to repay these debts. After the oath rituals, the young women are given fake passports and visas before embarking on a journey usually via the Mediterranean.

Young women are often encouraged by family or social networks such as churches to travel on the promise of employment

This journey usually starts in Benin City in Edo State, travelling through Kano, Zinder or Maradi in Nigeria, then Agadez in Niger, Tamanrasset in Algeria and Sabha, or Agadez and Sabha in Libya, before reaching Tripoli. From Tripoli they are taken via the dangerous sea route to Lampedusa in Italy, or Malta. Libya often serves as a transit point where illegal migrant women and girls first encounter forced sex work and thus become victims of human trafficking.

From Italy or Malta, the girls and women are 'distributed' throughout Europe by prostitution networks that force them into sex work on the streets and in brothels across Europe including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK. They are generally accommodated in the homes of madams, where they can face abuse and ill treatment.[14]

The 'enrolment' and 'care' provided by the madams in Nigeria and later in Europe are facilitated by the common and well-accepted practice in West and Central Africa of 'placement' of children, particularly young and teenage girls, in the custody of wealthier relatives. It is often motivated by the quest to provide children

and their families with better opportunities for education and employment. More often than not, trust is placed on female relatives or friends, generally referred to as 'auntie', to look after these young people.

This does not of course imply that families consent to sending their children to be sexually exploited in Europe. But it means that approaches to counter human trafficking need to be more nuanced, allowing for the feminisation of the process of recruitment and the transition of the process of smuggling to that of trafficking.

This gives credence to the proposition by Tuesday Reitano[15] that definitions and analysis of human trafficking depend significantly on perspective, and the debate about ways to address human trafficking is more complex than it seems.[16]

The feminisation of exploitation – a new phenomenon?

The need for a more nuanced definition and approaches to human smuggling and human trafficking in the West and Central African contexts also extends to the involvement of women as traffickers in criminal networks.

History provides examples of women involved in the sexual exploitation of other women in human trafficking around the world. In their article 'Women who traffic women: the role of women in human trafficking networks – Dutch cases', for instance, Dina Siegel and Sylvia de Blank trace this practice to the 19th century in the Netherlands.[17]

They also refer to a study showing that 'a quarter of all offenders [of prostitution-related human trafficking in the Netherlands during the period 1997–2000] were women', including '14% registered by the police as leaders of criminal organisations'.[18]

In the recent Paris sex trafficking case cited above, one of the Nigerian accused claimed she had been 'forced into sex work in France by her own family for five years' and that 'after she became pregnant, her family sent her two sisters to replace her, and she eventually started arranging for others to travel to France'.[19] Her lawyer argued that although she was now a sex trafficker, she was a former victim.

Some women who start work in the sex industry eventually climb to the position of madam. Siegel and De Blank have also documented the ambivalent and sometimes prominent role played by Nigerian victims-turned-perpetrators of sexual exploitation in their study.[20] From the 1980s Nigerian women worked as sex workers themselves while recruiting other women. New recruits trusted and respected madams' professional skills because they had already worked in the sex industry.[21]

Legislation and policy frameworks: do they work?

Responses to trafficking in persons worldwide have generally focused on adopting new legislation and setting up enforcement mechanisms. For Nigeria

specifically, applicable mechanisms include the international framework led by the UN, African Union (AU) mechanisms, and regional responses under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The country also has its own internal framework discussed below. But implementation of these instruments has been slow.

The European Union (EU) and the AU adopted the Ouagadougou Action Plan in 2006[22] to combat trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, out of the necessity to address the issue through 'a comprehensive regional and international approach involving countries of origin, transit, and destination'. The AU endorsed the plan through its Executive Council Decision of January 2007.[23]

The decision called on the AU Commission (AUC) chairperson to advocate for the implementation of the Action Plan, in collaboration with the IOM and other partners. It also urged the commission and the IOM to help member states with the development and implementation of sound migration policies aimed at addressing human trafficking.

The plan focused on prevention, creating awareness, victim protection and assistance, and called on member states to institute appropriate legal regimes, policies and law enforcement as well as cooperation and coordination.

Some women who start out as sex workers eventually climb to the position of madam

In a call for tenders to hire a consultant for the 'evaluation and revision' of the Ouagadougou Action Plan in early 2018, the AU admitted that the plan had 'never been evaluated to determine its contribution to combating crime' on the continent.

One of the plan's shortcomings in this respect was the failure to set up mechanisms 'to monitor and evaluate [its] effectiveness on the continent, and there was no schedule to guide members on priority areas to be implemented'. As a result, it is difficult to determine the extent to which members have taken action on the plan.[24]

The Ouagadougou plan stressed the importance of the 'socio-economic situation and cultural and traditional practices' as well as the 'increasing phenomenon of sex tourism and other sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls'. Accordingly, the former director of Nigeria's National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Julie Okah-Donli, said solutions to human trafficking should originate from Nigeria because it is a 'Nigerian tragedy'. But she argued that at the same time, those prosecuted in Nigeria are 'small fries' (sic), and therefore 'something should be done to reduce demand in destination countries'. In her view, 'the number one problem is the inability of destination countries to clamp down on their own criminal networks'.[25]

This is echoed by ECOWAS's policy statement, which says that 'human trafficking has become a worldwide criminal enterprise, second only to trafficking in drugs and weapons, involving the exploitation of the most vulnerable, mostly women and children, and usually within the context of poverty, weak or transition economies, insecurity and political instability'.[26]

At a regional level in West Africa, combating human trafficking was deemed 'a moral and humanitarian imperative' (Principle 3 of the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration). The ECOWAS approach, however, prioritised transnational policy cooperation, data collection, capacity building of national staff, and facilitating police and judicial cooperation.[27]

Authorities in Italy for example treat and process all arrivals like all other migrants, because at that point they are not yet considered victims of human trafficking or sexual exploitation. New arrivals are placed in reception centres, but these are reportedly also 'increasingly being used as pick-up points'.[28] Mobsters wait here until the women obtain refugee status documents or residence permits, then pick them up to fulfil their 'contractual obligations' and be prostituted.

In response, anti-trafficking experts have recommended that women arriving in Italy be placed in specialist shelters instead of reception centres in order to escape the chain of sexual exploitation.[29] But such responses might also fuel more sinister strategies of collusion between women and traffickers.

> Legislative and regulatory frameworks are important but won't be enough to deal with this complex issue

The AU responded to the call to help member states with migration policies with the AU.COMMIT Campaign (2010) to promote the Ouagadougou Action Plan. The campaign aimed to fight trafficking, particularly of women and children, in the Regional Economic Communities.

It prioritised prevention, prosecution of offenders and protection of victims, and was included as part of the AU development agenda.[30] In its assessment of the campaign, the AU stated that AU.COMMIT 'reached out to member states, the Regional Economic Communities and civil society organisations in taking serious measures against trafficking in human beings, while encouraging all actors to use the Ouagadougou Plan of Action as a reference to develop and reform their policies, laws and intervention on trafficking in human beings, especially women and children'.[31]

The AU also used inspiration from AU.COMMIT to establish the 'African Union Horn of Africa Initiative on human trafficking of migrants in 2014, in response to the irregular migration flow within and from the Horn of Africa to different

destinations'. These and other lessons from the AU.COMMIT campaign were integrated in the Valetta process.[32, 33]

At a national level, Nigeria remains one of the few countries with national legislation on anti-trafficking in persons. The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act (2003) is implemented under NAPTIP.[34]

Nigeria's former attorney-general and justice minister, Michael Aondoakaa, indicated in April 2009 that 'Nigeria's strategy of prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership' had resulted in the 'dismantling of organised criminal groups'.[35] The current predominance of Nigerians in the human trafficking rings across Europe as indicated above obviously shows that this was not the case.

Beyond regulation

Legislative and regulatory frameworks constitute an important and necessary basis on which to address human trafficking, and particularly sexual exploitation. However, in view of the impact of context and the root causes of trafficking in persons in West and Central Africa, which include poverty and solidarity among members of communities who place children with relatives,[36] they are insufficient responses to a complex issue. In addition, international mechanisms and Nigerian laws haven't yet looked specifically at women's role as traffickers.

From the wider European and international perspectives, recent cases against madams as cited above provide much-needed awareness on what truly transpires with 'placement' with 'aunties'. But potential victims of smuggling, who often subsequently become victims of sexual trafficking, and the madams who run prostitution rings, do not seem deterred.

The IOM reported a 600% increase in potential sex trafficking victims arriving in Italy by sea, from 1 317 arrivals in 2011 to 11 000 arrivals in 2016.[37] The IOM also estimates that over a third of the 37 000 Nigerians arriving in Europe are women, and over 40% of them end up in prostitution.[38] According to the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 'Nigerian human trafficking rings are one of the biggest challenges for European police forces'.[39]

'Victims' who revolt against madams are often 'rewarded' with refugee status documents, residence permits and citizenship of their host countries.[40] This might well encourage more denunciation, but victims are not always sincere about being unaware of the motive of their trips, as hinted by the defence argument in the Paris case referenced above.[41]

Siegel and De Blank (2010), as quoted by Siegel (2013),[42] already showed that in some Nigerian cases, 'verbal and written contracts were concluded between the madam and her girls. In these cases women knew what kind of work they were going to do in the Netherlands'.[43]

It could be that prospective victims, independently or in collusion with madams, are now using denunciation as a tactic to facilitate their insertion into Europe. More research needs to be carried out on the real motives of madams and trafficked women across Europe beyond that gathered during court cases.

As already shown, cultural and traditional practices and beliefs hold a central place in the involvement of women as leaders in sexual trafficking in Nigeria and West Africa more generally. Current depressed economic conditions and unstable conflicts facilitate the movement of people out of Nigeria and its region.

The practice dates back to the 1980s, when 'pioneer' African sex workers from Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon discovered the strong demand for African prostitutes in Europe.[44] They established their own networks, which today represent listings of hundreds of girls and women, and are extremely lucrative businesses with each sex worker worth up to €70 000, according to general reports and cases.[45]

Unlike the findings by Siegel and De Blank, many of the madams today are not career sex workers, but they hold 'respectable' positions in European countries as nurses for instance.[46] Often they are also not dependent on a European partner for residence permits, and already hold the citizenship of their host country in many instances.

UK nurse Josephine Iyamu's case, mentioned above, is a good illustration of this new breed of women-led traffickers of sexual exploitation networks.[47] Back in Nigeria they invest their ill-gotten gains in property, and through their visible wealth serve as role models for many local Nigerian girls and their families.

Cultural practices and beliefs hold a central place in the involvement of women as leaders in sexual trafficking in Nigeria

With a decline in the moral judgement of migrants by current generations, the symbol of 'successful crime boss' could be stronger than government anti-trafficking messages.[48] This makes the work of both international and local prosecutors more difficult. Prevention might therefore be a more promising response to women trafficking women, particularly in the case of Nigeria.

As indicated above, the role of women in organised crime, particularly Nigerian madams, is in part rooted in a more laudable tradition of solidarity among families and communities to support the less privileged by placing children with richer relatives. However it is also associated with harmful traditional practices and beliefs such as witchcraft and voodoo.

Using tradition to fight tradition might be part of the solution, as human trafficking cannot realistically be eradicated under the current state of African and specifically Nigerian political, economic and social contexts.

The Oba of Benin, Ewuare II of the Kingdom of Benin (Edo State), the original home of most women who are trafficked from Nigeria to Italy,[49] took the step to 'curse' traditional priests who take an active role in the trafficking of women from his kingdom.[50] Given his influence on and authority over local doctors, this is an innovative step in the right direction.

Destination countries with a high demand for sex workers could also be persuaded to impose visa sanctions on people from concerned Nigerian states to force local Nigerian authorities to take action.

Conclusion

Nigerian madams have become prominent crime bosses who have created wide and successful sex trafficking networks into Europe. Their feminisation of the transnational organised crime of human trafficking has created challenges for legislation and law enforcement both nationally and internationally.

The transition of the crimes of madams, from smuggling to sex trafficking, occurs en route. Their 'duty of care' – albeit exploitative and abusive – aligns in Nigeria with an accepted tradition of 'a trusted relative'. This process necessitates a more nuanced response to trafficking in international and national legislation.

Powerful European destination countries, however, are in a position to adopt more rigorous measures to curb sex trafficking than impoverished African states. In Nigeria, amid concerns of successful woman traffickers becoming role models for local women and girls, there are calls for community and government responses to this phenomenon. These include to use specific cultural traditions to strengthen the state's reputation tarnished by accusations of facilitating human trafficking and dissuade communities from indulging in the proceeds of sex trafficking, thereby supporting sex trafficking.

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Chapter 4

Boko Haram and girls' education in north-east Nigeria: tackling harmful beliefs

by Uyo Yenwong-Fai

From Chibok in April 2014 to Dapchi in February 2018, the abduction of schoolgirls has become more frequent in north-east Nigeria. The terror group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram), which means 'People committed to the Prophet's teachings for propagation and Jihad',[1] has publicly taken responsibility for these and other attacks against girls. Such attacks have hampered girls' attendance at, and in many cases hindered their completion of, school.[2]

Another potent, but less emphasised, threat to girls' education is that of harmful beliefs in communities in north-east Nigeria. For the purpose of this chapter, harmful beliefs are existing perceptions, often of a sociocultural nature, that limit the prospects of girls receiving an education.

Harmful beliefs act in three ways to deter girls' education. First, they prevent families and communities from sending girls to school. Second, Boko Haram instrumentalises these beliefs by using them to further convince families and their children against school attendance. Third, harmful perceptions contribute to the effects of Boko Haram attacks, justifying community prejudice against girls with previous Boko Haram affiliation. This can further jeopardise girls' school attendance and education.

This chapter unpacks how Boko Haram and these sociocultural beliefs deter girls' education in north-east Nigeria. It starts with a brief overview of Boko Haram and the nature of its attacks on girls' education in that area. The chapter then presents an overview of how the effects of Boko Haram attacks further hamper girls' education. It then looks at the intersection between Boko Haram and harmful beliefs.

Finally it addresses how actors should respond to these dynamics. The chapter can inform policy audiences on how countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives can be enhanced through investment in girls' education across north-east Nigeria.

Overview of Boko Haram and attacks on girls' education

Nigerians gave the name Boko Haram to this terror group.[3] It is roughly translated from Hausa as 'western education is forbidden'. The name Boko Haram is exemplified by the group's strategy of attacking schools where western-style education is imparted.[4]

The group's existence can be traced back to 2002, when extremist Islamic clerics led by the group's charismatic founding leader, Mohammed Yusuf, established it in Borno State to shape Nigerian society to ensure rigorous adherence to Sharia teachings.[5] The group was at first not considered a serious threat to security. Actual violence began in 2009 and coincides with the death of its founding leader.[6]

Boko Haram is known to be particularly lethal, carrying out both major and smaller indiscriminate attacks against government entities and civilians across north-east Nigeria. In its nine years of terror to date, the group has carried out suicide attacks, abductions, robberies, looting and gun battles, among other types of attack.[7] Although the frequency, nature and intensity of the group's attacks have been inconsistent, it has maintained a presence in this area and has perpetuated a massive humanitarian crisis.[8]

This crisis has devastated the education sector in the Lake Chad area. The group has destroyed 1 400 schools and killed at least 2 295 teachers.[9] More than 19 000 teachers have been forced to flee violence in Nigeria.[10] The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that it has abducted over 1 000 schoolchildren and killed more than 2 000.[11]

2014 signalled a radical shift in Boko Haram's strategy towards girls through its targeting of mass numbers of schoolgirls for widespread sexual and gender-based violence.[12] Since then, mass abductions, attacks on girls of schoolgoing age and the general insecurity associated with the insurgency have significantly impeded girls' education in north-east Nigeria.

Two main attacks on schoolgirls in Nigeria stand out due to the large number of girls targeted. The most recent is the February 2018 abduction of 110 schoolgirls from the Government Girls Technical College in Dapchi, Yobe State. The Nigerian government says one girl is yet to be found.[13]

This attack drew similarities to the abduction of 276 girls from the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, four years earlier. Fifty-seven girls escaped from the vehicle that transported the abductees. Of the 219

taken, although more than 100 have been recovered, more than that number remain missing.[14, 15]

Although these attacks drew much attention, there were several other less publicised deadly attacks against schools and children of schoolgoing age both in and outside the confines of schools. Some attacks involved both boys and girls.[16]

They include the 300 children held hostage and then abducted from Zanna Mobarti Primary School in November 2014,[17] and the 59 schoolboys murdered in Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, in February 2014. Here Boko Haram divided the group into two, separating boys from girls. The boys were killed, and the girls' release was accompanied by a warning to never return to school.[18]

Although boys have also been attacked, Boko Haram's more recent gender ideology is reflected in the specific attacks against girls' schools in Chibok and Dapchi. The group's messages regarding girls confirm this. The warning militants gave to the Dapchi girls against returning to school after their release also underscores it.[19] The notion that women and girls ought to play domestic roles and stay out of western schools, which they say corrupt virtues, instructs this approach.[20]

Effects of Boko Haram attacks on girls' education

Attacks on schools and schoolgirls, and on areas where girls of schoolgoing age live, result in the disruption and sometimes termination of girls' education. The impact can differ according to the category of the attacks.

The first category of affected schoolgirls is the missing Chibok and other schoolgirls who have been traumatised, forcibly married and sexually violated. They may become pregnant,[21] or may be trafficked to other countries and sold as wives to militants in neighbouring Chad or Cameroon.[22] Without their release or escape, the prospects for the continuation of their education are bleak or non-existent.

2014 signalled a radical shift in Boko Haram's strategy towards girls through its targeting of mass numbers of schoolgirls

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The second category of schoolgirls are those who have escaped Boko Haram or been released after having stayed with the group. In some cases, the girls may be averse to returning to school. In Dapchi for example, although the school has reopened and some of the former abductees have resumed their schooling, many girls have discontinued their education to avoid being abducted again.[23]

In other cases, their successful reintegration into school and education can be challenging due to their unique needs. Trauma, injury,[24] disease, unwanted pregnancies, stigma and other societal pressures and complications linked to

their affiliation to Boko Haram often impair their ability to thrive in school. More so, the extended absences from school have meant that they struggle to, or never, finish their schooling.

The third category are the peers of abducted girls. Though not abducted themselves, they have been affected by lengthy school closures and disrupted curricula. Parents' and students' fear of Boko Haram returning to abduct more children also prevents some girls from attending school.[25] Many teachers have fled the areas impacted by Boko Haram attacks, leaving children without anyone to teach them.

A further factor is the high cost of tuition and other fees in areas where violence has damaged families' earning potential. This is so for some of the 57 girls who managed to escape from Boko Haram.[26]

Girls displaced from their communities by Boko Haram violence and forced to live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) form the fourth category of affected girls. In these cases, the violence has uprooted the girls from their schools and forced them to continue schooling in IDP camps or host communities.

In Borno State (the insurgency's epicentre) where the highest number of IDPs are located, and other states where IDPs live, various organisations and entities provide education to counter the abrupt interruption in girls' education. Although the first couple of years of the insurgency were marked by a reluctance to send children to makeshift schools in Borno State, with Boko Haram's withdrawal to the more rural areas there has been an increase in the number of children attending these schools.[27]

In northern Nigeria, anti-education beliefs have contributed to the low rates at which girls complete schooling

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The quality of education has however been questioned, because there is a shortage of classrooms, teaching and learning materials and doubts regarding the competence of teachers in some IDP camps and communities.[28] This affects both boys and girls.

The final category of affected schoolgirls are those from communities where attacks have occurred, but who haven't directly experienced an attack, and have remained in their communities. In these areas, the fear of attending school and the delivery of poor quality education due to limited resources affect girls' education.[29] There are however also instances where communities and the schoolgirls in them have acted defiantly and insisted on going to school despite the risks.[30]

Militants are thus helping to widen the gap between the number of girls and boys attending school in north-east Nigeria – where girls' education already lags

behind that of boys, and where literacy levels are higher among boys than girls. By doing this, they're making it difficult for the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 4 – equal education for all.

Boko Haram's ideology concerning girls' education should not come as a surprise however, building as it does on existing traditional beliefs in northern Nigerian society.

Sociocultural beliefs, Boko Haram and their impact on education

For some time in northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram originated, anti-education beliefs have contributed to the low rates of completion of school – for both sexes, but mostly for girls.[31] Deep cultural and other harmful beliefs intermingle with financial and educational challenges and create an uneven landscape for overcoming barriers to girls' education.

High rates of child marriage, low school enrolment rates and high drop-out rates among girls are some of the observable symptoms of this trend. The fact that at least 75% of young women in the rural parts of north-east and north-west Nigeria had never attended school even before the onset of the Boko Haram crisis illustrates the low prevalence of education among girls.[32]

Additional sociocultural beliefs exacerbate prevailing impediments to girls' school attendance and completion.[33] Faced with dismal socioeconomic realities, most families in these areas have considered education as a luxury and prioritised other expenses over it. Parents in many cases were also more likely to spend their limited income on boys' rather than girls' education.

This is due to traditional inheritance law, in which boys inherit the family's wealth and thus keep the wealth in the family, but girls leave the family and take any investments made in them to another family.

In addition, marrying off daughters earns the family a bride price, which could provide instant financial gratification, compared to the gains from education that might show fruition only years later. Inheritance customs have also influenced the high rates of child marriage in the north.

Families also sought to protect their daughters from criminals en route to school, which is often a distance from home in the north's rural areas.[34] This issue has affected girls' enrolment in and dropout from school.

According to Mbanefoh, patrilineal cultures that affirm male supremacy over women, coupled with interpretations of Islam that oppose western education and espouse conservative views concerning women, have historically impeded girls' access to education in northern Nigeria.[35]

The delayed introduction of western education into northern Nigeria – 60 years after its arrival in the south – and its designation as the preserve of sons of royal families only, are also effects of these beliefs.

Mbanefoh says concerning the issue in the northern Nigeria, 'The girls and women perceived as being more vulnerable had to be protected from its [western education's] effects.'[36] This is based on the view in local communities that the education of girls may be linked with westernisation and the prevalence of loose morals. This has limited girls' school enrolment levels.[37]

This extremist ideological position is not unique to Nigeria. Taliban insurgents in Pakistan hold the view that 'schools are [still] being run under a system introduced by the British and promote obscenity and vulgarity in society'.[38] A dominant part of their strategy for several years has been to terrorise girls attending schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan.[39]

In Nigeria, sociocultural beliefs served as the foundation for Boko Haram's ideology.[40] Analysts such as Barkindo, who have interviewed Boko Haram militants, say that Boko Haram is known to generally exploit the Kanuri people – the dominant ethnic grouping in Boko Haram – by reminding them of their historical cultural superiority.[41]

Similarly, the narrow and strict gender role Boko Haram asserts for women in their interpretation of Sharia law underpins the discriminatory and abusive practices found in cultural interpretations of northern Nigeria.[42] Boko Haram uses women and girls as suicide bombers and human shields more for tactical than ideological reasons, but it uses them primarily for sexual gratification, reproduction and domestic tasks.[43]

As 'Boko Haram wives', kidnapped girls are stigmatised on their release from captivity.[44] Many are referred to as 'annoba', which means 'epidemic' or 'plague' in Hausa, due to their association with Boko Haram, which has ravaged communities.[45] This can mitigate their reintegration into community and school life, making education even more challenging.

The effects of violent extremism on girls' education have been discussed in depth above. Education, however, strengthens resilience to violent extremism. According to Pakistani girls' education activist Malala Yousafzai, 'I don't want to kill terrorists, I want to educate the children of terrorists. That is the true way to eradicate extremism in my country.'[46]

Education helps empower individuals to stand up against the pull factors of radicalisation.[47] It is also important in developing economies as it helps create employment, which narrows the space for radicalisation.[48] The large numbers of uneducated and unemployed Boko Haram recruits reflect the linkages between lack of education, unemployment and violent extremism.[49] It follows that addressing the challenges to girls' education demands efforts to strengthen the links between CVE and education.

What should be done?

Resolving the multifaceted Boko Haram crisis requires a multi-pronged approach that involves both addressing the 'hard' security-related elements to the crisis as well

as the 'softer' socioeconomic elements that make the north-east conducive to recruitment by and susceptible to the activities of Boko Haram.

Given the focus of this chapter, the recommendations that are presented relate to harmful beliefs concerning girls' education and the effects these in turn have on girls' education as described above.

The need to address the broad range of effects of the crisis cannot be overstated. Given the unique setting in communities affected by terrorism, the initiatives to promote girls' education can't be generic. The international community should, in partnership with the government of Nigeria, direct funding and resources to addressing the needs of the five categories of schoolgirls who have been affected by Boko Haram both inside and outside IDP camps in north-east Nigeria.

The specific needs of girls who are married or pregnant, young mothers, traumatised girls, girls who have become disabled and others should be taken into consideration in the design and implementation of education programmes.

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Incentives are needed to encourage girls to complete their education and counter the allure of bride price payments

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The international donor community should identify and fund the work of local community organisations to enhance their skills and resources, and to address the effect stigma has on girls and their education in local communities.

This approach will augment local-level initiatives to organise truth-telling and other mechanisms that promote healing and reconciliation in Boko Haram-affected communities. This will improve education on the dangers of stigmatisation and foster tolerance between terrorism perpetrators and victims.

Countering the decades of beliefs that oppose girls' education cannot be achieved if it doesn't target the relevant stakeholders. Countering the negative traction of Boko Haram's anti-girls' education messaging also requires sustained action to maximise effectiveness. Actors should therefore strengthen the links between girls' education and CVE in Nigeria.

International humanitarian actors and state governments in the north-east should continue to work with elders and religious leaders, civil society organisations and public personalities to counter the effects of Boko Haram's anti-education campaign. They should sensitise local communities even in remote villages to the need for girls in north-east Nigeria to receive an education. The partnerships should be geared to create visible incentives for girls to complete their education to counter the allure of money received from bride price payments.

Closely linked to this is the need to understand the range of sociocultural beliefs that continue to counteract girls' education efforts in the north. It is recommended

that donor governments commission studies that interrogate how Boko Haram's ideology and methodology fit into the framework of existential sociocultural beliefs.

Given cultural and religious beliefs about the role of women in the home and the stronghold these have on girls' access to education, efforts to educate girls should deepen awareness on the drawbacks of child marriage and other harmful practices relating to girls. Sensitisation efforts that have been under way should not only increase, but be conducted using multiple channels and partners to reach all sectors of northern society.

Religious and traditional leaders should partner with the media, the state government and elites from northern Nigeria in creating platforms to spread this message.

Both Boko Haram ideology and existing harmful beliefs oppose girls' education in Nigeria's north-east

Quality education should be seen as an indispensable part of girls' education. The international community and the Federal Government of Nigeria should partner with elites in northern Nigeria to allocate increased funding to girls' education.

Equipped schools and classrooms, the hiring and training of teachers and the provision of teaching and learning materials, and the provision of sanitation in schools across the northern part of Nigeria are some of these areas.

Finally, given the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, it would be difficult for some children to attend school without security. Efforts to educate girls should be made with their security in mind. The government should increase resources available to security in the north-east by allocating security personnel to guard all schools in the affected areas where learning is ongoing. Implementing all aspects of the Safe Schools Initiative, aimed among other issues at providing community-geared safety strategies to keep school children safe, should complement this.[50]

Conclusion

Boko Haram has both amplified global attention on, and itself intensified, existing challenges to girls' education in Nigeria. Both Boko Haram ideology and existing harmful beliefs oppose education for girls in Nigeria's north-east.

The effects of terrorism on schoolgirls in the north-east can be divided into five categories, ranging from girls whose education stopped due to captivity, to girls who live in IDP camps. Girls associated with Boko Haram also suffer secondary victimisation from conservative community perspectives, which can impede their ability to attend and thrive in school.

The powerful effect of Boko Haram's harmful beliefs on girls' education is compounded by the deeply embedded views that mould attitudes and behaviours

towards educating girls. Certain sociocultural tenets limit opportunities for girls to receive an education, or cause male education to be seen as more important. These instilled beliefs, similar to those of Boko Haram, allow the extremist group to reinforce these harmful views.

Actors responding to the Boko Haram crisis should see this as an opportunity for a renewed focus on efforts to promote girls' education in the north-east. Development and humanitarian partners responding to Boko Haram, and the Nigerian state and federal governments, would do well to assess how harmful beliefs in the north-east have been exploited by Boko Haram.

The effects of the stigma of Boko Haram association should also be addressed. This would advance efforts to holistically address the links between girls' education and CVE, as part of sustainable responses to fighting terrorism.

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Chapter 5

We are not listening hard enough: sexual violence against men and boys in the Central African Republic

by Allan Ngari

Sexual violence against men and boys in the Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the worst crises of modern times. A large majority of the country's 4.5 million people are affected by an ongoing conflict between armed rebel movements that control 70% of the country.

The deteriorating humanitarian situation is compounded by a weak government operating almost exclusively in the capital Bangui, and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations whose capacity to protect is slowly diminishing in the eyes of an exploited and violated population.

This chapter begins by contextualising the ongoing conflict and the parties to it, then invites the reader to appreciate a gendered approach to addressing sexual violence in conflict, which affects all – women and girls, and also men and boys.

It then highlights the reported incidents of sexual violence in the CAR, paying particular attention to that against men and boys in a society where there is a complete breakdown of the rule of law. In doing so, intersectionality of the identities of men and boys of a particular ethnicity, religion, age or other identity plays a key role in the perpetration of this form of sexual violence and the lived experiences of survivors.

Sexual violence has been overlooked in much research, and policy development tends to focus exclusively on women. This results in an incomplete response to sexual violence with devastating effects for the victims. The next section demonstrates that sexual violence against males in the CAR is both opportunistic and a weapon of war by the rebel groups.

The penultimate section deals with the barriers to addressing sexual violence against males. It concludes with recommendations that would assist in implementing interventions to address sexual violence against males in the CAR.

The conflict in the CAR

The CAR has been fraught with cycles of violence since obtaining independence from France in 1960. The complexities of the effects of colonisation and external interference in governance in many African states impact too on this Central African nation. Analysis of post-colonial dynamics is beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice to state that the CAR's numerous challenges emanate from a colonial legacy.

The civil war of 2012-14 involved government forces, led by President François Bozizé; a coalition of varied rebel groups called Séléka, led by Michel Djotodia; and a rebel group called Anti-Balaka. The Séléka are largely Muslim and the Anti-Balaka, Christian and animist.

While the current conflict in the country has an ethno-religious component and likely external interference, it is the thirst for political power, and through that, control of state resources, that is at the heart of the conflict.

From late 2012 to early 2013, Djotodia's Séléka militia took over several towns in the CAR, including the capital city Bangui in March 2013, forcing Bozizé to flee the capital. Djotodia declared himself president and later disbanded the coalition of Séléka militia, which was no longer united.

> While the focus has been largely on women and girls as victims of sexual violence, boys and men are equally at risk

During that time there were renewed hostilities between the ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka rebel groups, which facilitated an international intervention in the country to cease the hostilities and instal a transitional government headed by Catherine Samba-Panza in January 2014.

The conflict between the ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka continued, despite an agreement to end hostilities signed in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, in July 2014. The transitional government of Samba-Panza was unable to control the entire CAR territory, leaving the ex-Séléka controlling the north and east, and the Anti-Balaka controlling the south and west. A successful election was held in February 2016, installing Faustin-Archange Touadéra as president and ushering in relative peace between the rebel groups.

The conflict however resumed in late 2016 and continues across various parts of the country and in varying levels of intensity. The civilian population of the

CAR has borne the brunt of the conflict between the government and the rebel groups.

After a 10-day visit to the CAR, Keita Bocoum, an independent expert on the situation of human rights in that country, noted in her 28 June 2018 report to the United Nations Human Rights Council that she had 'found a population that is suffering more and more, in the grip of a growing sense of insecurity'.[1]

Armed groups in the CAR are responsible for the massive humanitarian crisis and severe suffering of the people, mostly operating in ungoverned spaces and controlling 70% of the country. About 690 000 people were internally displaced in 2017 alone, following conflict between armed groups, the CAR army and UN operations personnel.[2] Millions of civilians continue to live in fear for their lives and are increasingly losing confidence in those meant to protect them.

In the context of a restive CAR, serious human rights violations including sexual violence are rife and remain largely unaddressed.

Gendered approach to sexual violence in conflict

Sexual violence in conflict refers to incidents or patterns of sexual violence including rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, against women, men, girls or boys.[3]

Such incidents or patterns occur in conflict or post-conflict settings and other incidents of political strife. They are also believed to have a direct or indirect connection with the conflict or political strife itself either by a temporal, geographical or causal link.[4]

In addition to the international character of the suspected crimes, the link with conflict may be evident in the profile and motivations of the perpetrator, the profile of the victim/survivor, the climate of impunity or weakened state capacity, cross-border dimensions or the fact that it violates the terms of a ceasefire agreement.[5]

The nature of such crimes can, depending on the circumstances, constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or acts of torture or genocide.

Sexual violence against women and girls in conflict situations is devastating.[6] International jurisprudence has established that rape has been used as a weapon of war in several conflicts, including the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda.[7] Efforts to arrest this vice and address survivors' needs for both physical and psychological treatment must continue.

While the focus has been largely on women and girls as victims of sexual violence, boys and men are equally at risk. They usually suffer in silence.[8] No form of violation is more personal; and victims are often internally conflicted as to what exactly happened to them.

The focus of interventions and programming on sexual violence in conflict has been on women and girls. With the increasing evidence of men and boys as victims, it is clear that there are gaps in interventions and programming that would address male victims of sexual violence.[9]

While some of the interventions and programming to redress victims of sexual violence might be similar for both females and males, there are gender-differentiated lived experiences of the stigma and shame of victimhood.[10]

These differentiated experiences are both physiological, in the sense of the differences between the male and female anatomy; and psychological and sociocultural, in the sense that the lived experiences of men and women after the ordeal differ.

For example, in studies conducted in the Central Africa region, some male survivors reported that they suffered low self-esteem and depression, which caused sexual dysfunction and destabilised gender and sexual relations.

These might be similar to what female victims of sexual violence experience. However it is the intersectionality of male identities, which include their traditional roles as protectors and defenders of their families and society, and their dominant societal role that are put into question after falling victim to sexual violence.

Some male survivors reported that they were scorned by their female partners as no longer being 'men'

In some cases, male survivors reported that they were scorned by their female partners as no longer being 'men'. This is related to sentiments that sexual subordination of men by the perpetrator is a way of feminising men.[11]

Male victims of sexual violence are at further risk of not receiving appropriate responses simply because there are few or no interventions and programmes by humanitarian workers, the criminal justice system or other key actors. The absence of these interventions and programmes, particularly in African countries, can be traced to societies' views around same-sex relations, perceived to be taboo.

Although this is arguable, as studies point to some form of same-sex relations in some cultures,[12] the general response to same-sex relations in African traditional societies is often negative.[13] This finds support in what has been portrayed as the religions and practices of many African people. The law in at least 33 African states criminalises same-sex relations.[14]

This doesn't however prevent the perpetration of sexual violence against men and boys in many African conflicts. It rather entrenches the stigma, shame and to some extent the guilt that male victims of sexual violence endure.[15] In some cases

the fear of prosecution for homosexual activity further discourages men from reporting such crimes.[16]

In concert, all these circumstances deny the existence of the lived experiences of male victims of sexual violence. Victims are silenced by the fear of social ignominy, and risk being ostracised from their communities should they report that they were sexually violated.[17]

Sexual violence in the CAR

Women and children, already vulnerable groups in times of conflict, face enormous challenges in the crisis-ridden CAR. A recent study by Human Rights Watch documented 305 cases of rape and sexual slavery carried out against 296 women and girls by members of the predominantly Muslim Séléka and largely Christian and animist militia, Anti-Balaka.[18]

The report traces the use of sexual violence by armed groups as a specific tactic of war. These horrific acts are perpetrated with the full knowledge of the commanders of the armed groups, with reasonable grounds to believe that these commanders either ordered their forces to commit sexual violence or perpetrated these crimes themselves.

Girls as young as 10 and women as old as 75 from the capital Bangui, and towns and villages around Alindao, Bambari, Boda, Kaga-Bandoro and Mbrès, located in the central, southern and western parts of the CAR, bravely shared their experiences of sexual violence by militia groups over the period of 2013 to 2017.[19] As the woman survivors shared their stories, it emerged that men too were raped by the armed groups.

Based on those women's stories, armed groups evidently use sexual violence as punishment for alleged alliances of survivors' male relatives to other armed groups. Woman survivors reported instances of armed groups first raping and then killing their husbands before they themselves were raped.

In numerous reports, including those of national commissions of inquiry and investigative bodies, there is a tendency to legally recharacterise sexual violence against men as acts of torture.[20] This is partly due to what has been described above as a concert of circumstances in conflict societies.

A recent study by the All Survivors Project (ASP) in the CAR points to a 'discernible pattern of male sexual victimisation that warrants urgent attention'.[21] ASP has recorded at least 121 cases from different parts of the CAR during the period from 2017 to early 2018. Men and boys were subjected to rape or other forms of sexual violence by members of non-state armed groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army operating in the CAR and ex-Séléka armed groups.[22]

The nature of sexual violence against men and boys in the CAR includes rape, forced nudity, forced masturbation and genital mutilation. These horrific acts are

used by armed groups as a weapon of war. These crimes fall within the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.[23]

However, not all instances of sexual violence against males in the CAR are part of a political strategy to attack the civilian population. Due to a general lack of effective governance and a breakdown in the rule of law in the country, there are opportunistic attacks against males by armed groups that operate with impunity.[24] Some men and boys are waylaid by armed groups and fall victim to sexual violence.

Barriers to addressing sexual violence against males in the CAR

One of the key challenges faced by all victims of sexual violence in and out of conflict settings is the limited or lack of willingness to report this crime to the relevant authorities. A range of issues impede reporting by victims. In most cases, it is the stigma attached to this form of violence that acts as the greatest barrier to reporting.[25]

When it comes to the reporting of sexual violence by men and boys that they themselves have suffered, there are additional factors such as destructive cultural stereotypes. For example where men are viewed to be sexually dominant and women to be submissive, male victims of sexual violence who are penetrated define themselves as 'less manly'. In the CAR, homosexuality is not criminalised, but sexual relations between males remain taboo.[26]

Outside of areas controlled by the UN peacekeeping operations, centred in Bangui, the security situation in the CAR is dire. Vast territories of the country are under armed rebel command. Most of the population are outside of Bangui, necessarily meaning that they are at the mercy of conflicting armed militias.

With an ongoing conflict and little or no presence of peacekeeping operations, there is a total collapse of state accountability mechanisms where reporting of such crimes would ordinarily be done.

Summarily stigma, underreporting and security-related restrictions in the CAR prohibit a comprehensive documentation of the extent and character of sexual violence. Without adequate reporting and documentation, male sexual victimisation will remain beyond the reach of appropriate interventions for both perpetrators and victims alike. Consequently, male victims suffer devastating physical health consequences and rapidly deteriorating psychological well-being. These can destroy livelihoods and healthy familial relations.

Conclusion and recommendations

Serious human rights violations such as sexual violence against males can only be stopped in the CAR through the cessation of the internal conflict, responses to the dire humanitarian crisis and a commitment to institutional rebuilding. Interventions by the government and the United Nations are under way. They are however

at different levels of implementation and a disjointed approach diminishes the capacity to address serious crimes like sexual violence.

Multi-sector and intersectional responses are needed. First, there needs to be awareness building through the training of humanitarian workers to detect male victims of sexual violence. Humanitarian workers in the field are often the first point of contact for victims who need help. Adequately trained and resourced humanitarian workers can lift the barriers to reporting and direct male victims to the help they need.

Intersectional approaches are necessary because they allow an appreciation of individual victim-survivor identities of gender, ethnicity, religion, age and others, in order to design appropriate strategies to address sexual violence against males.

Second, rehabilitation strategies must be designed and implemented for male victims of sexual violence. Greater support is needed for medical services in the CAR to provide the necessary treatment for both physical trauma and the longer-term mental health concerns.

Communities should develop social support and coping mechanisms including correcting stereotypes and discriminatory practices relating to gender and sexuality that further victimise male survivors.

Trained and resourced humanitarian workers can lift the barriers to reporting and direct male victims to the help they need

The third strategy is to ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are not allowed to act with impunity. The CAR's Special Criminal Court prosecutor should be continually encouraged to consider investigating and prosecuting in cases of sexual violence against males. A reflection of the elements of this particular crime is required for this and would greatly benefit the prosecution services not just of the CAR but other jurisdictions.

As ASP director Charu Lata Hogg notes, domestic laws in the CAR are adequately gender-inclusive, yet nobody has been prosecuted for sexual violence against men and boys.[27] There is no precedent in the CAR to deal with perpetrators of sexual violence against men and boys. She says the justice sector, which includes the police and gendarmerie, 'needs to be sensitised and trained in receiving and documenting sexual violence against all individuals, including men'.[28]

The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is conducting investigations into serious crime committed in the CAR, with a view to instituting charges against alleged perpetrators of international crime.

As acts of sexual violence against males are aptly recognised in the policy on gender crimes of the ICC, it would be a missed opportunity if they were not addressed in ongoing investigations and future cases.

Brunger speaks of the potential of the ICC as a site of gender justice that can bring about meaningful implementation of the policy on gender crimes and institutional gender-neutral understanding of the pervasive nature of sexual violence.[29]

There is increasing evidence of conflict-related sexual violence against men and boys not only in CAR but in other conflict areas globally. Multiple parties to the conflict are responsible for this form of violence, and its occurrence exacerbated by a breakdown in the rule of law and the incapacity of state institutions with a protective mandate. With a large part of the CAR controlled by armed rebel forces, men and boys are targets of sexual violence. This stark reality requires appropriate and immediate responses by states, international and local organisations in the CAR to avert the devastating, multi-faceted impacts of sexual violence on males in that country.

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Chapter 6

Engaging men in violence prevention in South Africa: issues and dilemmas

by Anne-Marie Hilsdon and Diketso Mufamadi

The #MeToo Movement, an international movement against the sexual harassment and assault of women, went viral on social media in 2017 with allegations of long-term sexual misconduct being made against former United States film producer Harvey Weinstein.

During 2018 the movement has grown globally to highlight the widespread prevalence of sexual assault and harassment of women perpetrated by men in positions of power (such as CEOs, politicians etc.), in workspaces and communities and in government and NGO spaces.

In May 2018, public attention was focused on South African Revenue Service (SARS) commissioner Tom Moyane, already suspended on criminal charges, when he was accused of allegedly assaulting the 17-year-old mother of his baby grandson.[1] Similarly, there was widespread discontent concerning the NGO Equal Education as three male staff members, accused of sexually harassing their female colleagues, denied the allegations. Though all have finally resigned or been dismissed, they have not been brought to justice.[2]

These two cases are indicative of the recent calls to ensure men are held accountable for the gender-based violence (GBV) experienced in South Africa, now in the top 10 countries for the highest levels of violence on the globe – with a large proportion of murders relating to domestic violence.[3] Four women are murdered each day in the country, the majority by their partners or ex-partners; and many of those murdered by strangers are raped first.[4]

On the continent the rape of women has also been used systemically as a weapon of war: women are raped not only because of their gender but also their ethnicity and religion.[5] Researchers such as Dworkin, Treves-Kagan and Lippman and Manirakiza and Niyonzima, writing about Africa, and Pease and

Flood writing about the West, all argue that uneven power relations between men and women in both public and private circles underlie behaviours of physical violence. A higher social worth placed on men than women supports the physical violence enacted.[6]

Men need to be involved in stopping violence against women in South Africa. While there is much debate in the field about the distinction between prevention and response, especially in cases where there is ongoing violence, we argue in this chapter for a stronger state focus on prevention of violence where previously responding to violence has been dominant.

For the purposes of this chapter, prevention refers to all measures taken before violence is experienced in order to ensure it doesn't occur. Response refers to acts taken after the experience of violence in an attempt to prevent revictimisation and further perpetration.

The chapter makes the case for men's engagement in prevention through interventions that address gender social norms including the lower value placed on women. It acknowledges and explains men's disquiet in becoming involved in such programmes and how this might be addressed. Finally, it emphasises the need for more research and praxis to create a rich knowledge base for continuing work on violence prevention.

Response and prevention

As indicated above, GBV against women has many forms and takes place in all settings – homes, workplaces and other public and private spaces. The relations involved in workplace hierarchies between employers and employees, and social hierarchies between men and women mean that the person higher up in the hierarchy assumes and is attributed with more power to act without being challenged.

Because of this and the shame experienced by survivors, GBV can often remain unreported, hidden and unspoken. Hence holding perpetrators to account and proving their guilt is difficult. As in the case of sexual assault at Equal Education, decisions are often taken to not act against men who hold senior positions due to the perception that the men involved are often 'doing good work', which is seen as more important than both the crime against, and feelings of, their victims.[7]

Strong response systems that work to tackle GBV appropriately in the country are needed. To this end, the government has increased funding for the criminal justice system (CJS) over the past 10 years. However a policy brief developed by the Institute for Security Studies makes a different case as authors argue for more state resources to be spent on prevention rather than response strategies. Increased CJS funding has not succeeded in decreasing violent crime.[8]

Further, the World Health Organization argues that effective violence reduction and prevention is dependent on tackling public, domestic, community and

individual predisposing factors as these increase the chances of victimisation and perpetration.[9]

Therefore although it is essential to address and expose violence after it has occurred, responses may be more costly to the country's economy than approaches that focus on prevention. Prevention requires a stronger investment in programmes that address the predisposing factors for GBV.

Engaging men in violence prevention: a gender-transformative approach

Gender-based violence prevention interventions have undergone global change over the past decades, from the imperative of working with women for their empowerment to resist male violence, to an acknowledgement of the importance of the actual inclusion of men. The violence prevention field has been characterised by the growing assertion that male participation is pivotal to the success of violence prevention interventions.[10]

The concept of 'patriarchal dividend' emphasises that men receive rewards (in the form of status, command and material assets) when assuming male gender roles.[11] Worldwide, men remain in principal possession of economic and political power, and they control most technology and weaponry as well as agencies of force such as armies, police and judicial systems.[12]

> Men are most often the perpetrators of gender-based violence, so they should be part of the solution

It has therefore been argued that violence links with power in situations where men perceive their rewards to be under threat. Thus men can use violence as an attempt to secure their rewards.[13] Male participation in violence prevention interventions is thus pivotal: men are most often the perpetrators of gender-based violence so they should be part of the solution. In addition, male participation means that societal norms regarding manhood can be addressed and challenged.[14]

Morrell, in his exploration of men, masculinities and gender politics in South Africa, explains that though violence is not inevitably a part of masculinity, there is a link between the two.[15] Morrell and other South African researchers explain that men's continued use or experience of violence is sustained by social norms attributed to both manhood and womanhood.[16]

Women have been socially expected to exist under the control of men. Therefore physical or sexual force and threats can often be justified as ways to achieve this control or reinforce it if women transgress the cultural boundaries of womanhood. On the other hand, Morrell argues that violence is also used by men because of

their own experiences of violence in childhood.[17] As such, issues of manhood and masculinity in childhood and adulthood have moved to centre stage in violence prevention programmes.

As in the case of empowerment programmes for women – where all women attend regardless of being victims – participation of all men is required in violence prevention. Just as all women are not victims of violence, not all men are perpetrators. Gender-transformative principles emphasise that all men and boys can play a positive role in helping to end violence against women.[18]

Knowledge, attitudes, values, beliefs and emotions that actually or potentially drive men into acting in violent ways towards women need to be addressed. In addition, men who are able to model non-violent behaviour act as allies in the reduction of GBV and can hold their male counterparts accountable for their violent behaviour.[19]

Programmes embodying non-violent principles, albeit on a small scale, have been undertaken in some parts of Africa, particularly in South Africa. Dworkin, Colvin, Hatcher and Peacock reviewed 15 global violence prevention interventions, five of which were implemented in Africa (one in Ethiopia and Kenya, and three in South Africa).[20] These interventions aimed to transform the manner in which men regard themselves as men, their use of violence, and their sexual and other behaviour towards women.[21]

The NGO Sonke Gender Justice has implemented similar programmes such as MenCare and MenCare+ in South Africa.[22] These aim to promote gender equality and non-violent fatherhood by changing gender attitudes, improving caregiving and fatherhood skills, and teaching sexual and reproductive health.[23]

Why men resist GBV interventions

Although research is scarce, we know that GBV interventions in South Africa (and elsewhere) are underpinned by assumptions and marked by dilemmas. Many men have reportedly questioned whether they should even engage in gender-transformation programmes. Their ambivalence means that GBV interventions face considerable resistance which must be addressed.

Perhaps the strongest response from men is the assertion that not all men are violent, and that there are more men who do not commit gender-based violence than those who do. Consequently, if men become involved in violence prevention programmes, they fear they may be judged and condemned as perpetrators.[24]

It seems men remain unconvinced of any links between GBV and aspects of masculinity; and there is probably disagreement, too, about what actions might constitute GBV against women.[25]

On the whole, men seem to perceive few personal benefits in taking part in violence prevention programmes. Further, some think they may experience

losses. Those who have identified themselves as non-violent consequently believe men's violence to be an issue of little concern to them.[26] Such men distance themselves from perpetrators and see no need to participate in violence prevention programmes.

Men also may not see the need to challenge other men in their violent behaviours. Others fear a loss, both of control of and 'respect' for women if they challenge their ideas of manhood. This might be a felt loss of identity or 'rights' enjoyed within patriarchal systems. Researchers report that though structural changes (for example equal pay for women) might result from gender-transformative strategies, they have been said to result also in men feeling frustrated, disempowered and destabilised.[27]

Overcoming men's resistance: prospects and possibilities

The question of how to engage men in violence prevention and how to do so effectively in South Africa and elsewhere has not yet been satisfactorily addressed in either research or practice. Because GBV is a multilevel phenomenon, we know the reach of programmes must be broad, encompassing both workplaces and communities in private and public spaces.

We also know that programmes must be offered to a broad spectrum of people, those in powerful positions and 'ordinary' men. In this light, researchers and practitioners propose, with caution, the following possibilities for overcoming resistance to violence prevention.

> There may be incompatibilities between available programmes and South African men's history, cultural norms and values

Using the evidence-based evaluations that exist for gender-transformative violence prevention interventions implemented in South Africa, research is currently being carried out at the Institute for Security Studies to ascertain what works.[28] Preliminary results indicate there may be incompatibilities between the activities of, for example, Sonke Gender Justice's MenCare and MenCare+ programmes and South African men's history, cultural norms and values.

Connell, an Australian sociologist, has suggested that programmes need to be compatible with some of the interests of men in order for men to want to participate, and to become allies.[29] This means acknowledging the differences (and inequalities) between men that have shaped their social identities through experiences grounded in wealth and poverty, urban and rural life and differences in race, culture, age and sexuality.

For example in South Africa, social identities of older, white, middle-class suburban men differ markedly from those of younger black men living in

townships. To address this, Carlson, Casey, Edleson, Tolman and Kimball, writing about United States programmes, suggest that existing social networks be used in the initial outreach to different groups of men to gain their involvement in violence prevention.[30]

Once recruited, though, men need to see and move beyond their socially constructed interests and become allies towards change.[31] The South African Faith and Family Institute for example calls on all religious leaders to become allies in challenging patriarchal traditions and other causes of GBV.[32]

Hence programmes need to appeal to different 'types' of men and masculinities in both recruitment and design. Additionally, while there has been some investigation by researchers of the multifaceted interweaving of privilege and disadvantage in the lives of men, there needs to be more:

> When men use violence, their social locations influence how they are treated. Male perpetrators are more likely to be held accountable and criminalised, and their crimes are more likely to be seen as linked to their ethnicity if they are poor, black or men of colour.[33]

If men are provoked to draw parallels between issues of GBV and oppressive structures that impact on them like racism, colonialism etc., they might be able to identify their own disadvantage or privilege and change can occur.[34]

This approach has been adopted by gender reconciliation programmes in South Africa.[35] One of the main objectives is to evoke empathy especially of men towards women, but also vice versa. Female victims of GBV tell their stories in a mixed-gender group and heal from this process of sharing and vocalising their experiences.

Men are also encouraged to share their experiences, including feelings about and reasons for perpetration of violence. Through this process men have been able to hear and empathise with female victims in a way that called for a change in their views and attitudes towards GBV.[36] As one male participant explains:

> It changed my life a lot in a sense that I never respected a woman before; I always thought that men were always right, not knowing that what I was doing was unacceptable. But now I am singing a new tune … what is left is to reconcile with my victims.[37]

This creates a personal or emotional connection where men are helped to acknowledge the effect of violence through engaging with women's experiences or possible future victimisation.[38]

Researchers suggest several ways to contest the perpetrator-victim binary, an inhibiting factor in men's involvement in violence prevention, as indicated above. Casey suggests a positive and hopeful approach that emphasises the roles and responsibilities of men in contributing to ending violence.[39]

This is exemplified in bystander programmes where non-violent bystanders are encouraged to intervene (in a positive manner) when witnessing acts of violence in communities and workplaces. The idea is to help change sociocultural beliefs including religion which underpin gender norms and practices associated with GBV. This is done through highlighting the negatives of the action perpetrated and providing the necessary support to the victim.[40]

Another option is to focus not only on gender inequalities but also the disadvantages of masculinity for both men and women. This might assist in maximising the synergies between men and women in programmes while minimising tensions.[41] A final option uses strategies to entice men's participation such as sexual health and fatherhood.[42]

Violence prevention is the most cost-effective strategy because it addresses the problem before it occurs

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In all these strategies, however, researchers such as Flood caution against reinforcing social norms of gender. For example, appealing to men as 'protectors of women' runs the risk of reiterating the presumed weakness of women and their dependence on men.[43]

Flood suggests that men use violence against their partners because they benefit directly from this act. There are rewards and privileges involved here, however unjust, and for such men, engaging in violence prevention could be perceived as a loss.[44] But the hope is that men will see these losses, associated as they are with gender inequalities, as short term.

Conclusion

While the #MeToo movement in South Africa has brought a renewed focus on accountability for GBV, particularly that perpetrated by powerful men in workplaces, it is clear that effective responses to and the reduction of violence remains elusive. The South African government has taken a response approach by increasing funding to the criminal justice system.

Though response to violence is important in addressing immediate damage caused, violence prevention is arguably the most cost-effective strategy for the country: one that addresses the problem before it occurs.

While most violence prevention programmes have targeted women to increase their resilience against male violence, we suggest that engaging men in violence prevention should now be the priority in ending violence against women.

Though praxis regarding violence prevention programmes is still in its infancy, researchers are nonetheless convinced that such interventions must be

gender-transformative: they must address unequal relations of power between men and women.

Men's objections to participation in such programmes revolve around a perpetrator-victim binary. Though this poses considerable difficulty for the success of interventions, men who are allies have already contested this binary. An important recommendation from researchers is to approach men as potential allies, embracing and addressing their resistance instead of dismissing or ignoring it.

One key strategy on which all researchers agree is to understand and address the heterogeneity of men including their different social histories, varying privilege and disadvantage in the recruitment and design of programmes. In addition, our understanding as practitioners of why men commit violence will demonstrate to men their acceptance into intervention programmes in a way that could transcend the victim-perpetrator binary.

> Men should be approached as potential allies – embracing and addressing their resistance instead of dismissing or ignoring it

More research is needed to produce evidence that violence prevention programmes engaging men produce lasting attitude and behaviour change which models non-violence. In addition, as has been mentioned, sexual assault and harassment of women by men in positions of power is prevalent in all workspaces and communities, and in government and NGO spaces. It is clear that harmful social norms and values that promote gender inequality in our workplaces and communities must continue to be addressed in violence prevention programmes.

The broad prevalence of gender-based violence thus means that interventions must be offered and implemented at all levels of society. Failure to do so undermines any work aimed at reducing and preventing gender-based violence.

Notes

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About this monograph

Human security is the right of all people regardless of sex, religion, ethnicity, gender and other axes of oppression. There is growing global recognition that gender equality is a major prerequisite for achieving it. Human security relates not only to personal and community safety during times of violence, war and conflict, but also includes access to education, health and economic life, and political representation. Through perspectives from Africa, specifically Nigeria, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Africa and Liberia, this monograph explores security-related gender inequalities for women and current responses to them.

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