In January 2016, the European Union placed a cap on the amount it would provide for AMISOM peacekeeper stipends. This decision widened a rift between the mission and its partners over its record of achievement and future trajectory, eventually leading to a more concrete strategy for an AMISOM withdrawal. Nonetheless, in the absence of conditions that would allow a withdrawal, all involved in AMISOM may have to compromise to ensure that fragile security gains are not reversed.
Introduction

In 2007, African leaders established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), knowing that operational costs would be dependent on a partnership with the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and others. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiqué that established AMISOM called on:

- the United Nations and its Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM and the effective accomplishment of its mandate... and the provision of financial support, bearing in mind that in deploying a mission in Somalia, the African Union is acting on behalf of the entire international community.

This emphasised that the problems facing Somalia extend beyond the country, region and even continent, thus demanding a truly global partnership. Indeed, the AU’s partnership with international donors has inspired optimism for Somalia’s stabilisation, but has also been fraught with challenges that have had adverse effects on the outcome of the mission, particularly in terms of support and financing. Much current AMISOM funding comes from UN logistical support packages through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and the EU, which pays troop and police allowances and related expenses, within the framework of its African Peace Facility (APF).

**Key recommendations**

- The AU and UN should urgently come up with a specific funding plan for AMISOM beyond October 2018.
- AMISOM should do more to highlight its achievements in Somalia and demonstrate its value.
- The UN and AU should continue to develop realistic timelines for AMISOM’s exit, considering the challenges of building strong institutions in Somalia.
- The UN, EU, AU and other partners should devise concrete strategies to empower AMISOM and the Somali National Army to carry out major offensives to degrade al-Shabaab.
- Both AMISOM and non-AMISOM troops present in Somalia should avoid the sudden withdrawal of forces without prior communication.
- The AU, UN and international partners should carefully consider the future of African peace support operations and the means to fund them.

The AU’s partnership with international donors has inspired optimism for Somalia’s stabilisation, but has also been fraught with challenges.

Also relevant are donations from individual states, including the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK). The reality of the AU’s poor financial status has meant that it could neither pay for a portion of the peace operation nor cover funding gaps, including being unable to foot some bills pending the receipt of funding from donors.

Ten years ago, former AU Commission chair Alpha Oumar Konaré pre-empted the financial challenges that AMISOM continues to face. In a report on the situation in Somalia in January 2007, Konaré noted that:

- Indeed, unlike the United Nations... we rely to a very large extent on the support of our partners. This means that the funding of our operations remains precarious.

Although AMISOM has always faced challenges related to delayed payments and lack of adequate resources, the mission’s financing came into question in January 2016 after the EU placed a cap on the amount it can contribute from the APF for peacekeeper allowances. The new rates – a 20% reduction to US$822 from US$1 028 per month – had ramifications for troop-contributing countries (TCCs), given that the mission was dependent on the EU for the entirety of the troop allowance contribution.
The EU cap on allowance payments led to an outcry from the AU and TCCs (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda), and set off a debate about external support, while bringing into the open concerns over the mission’s performance and future after 10 years of operations in Somalia. The lack of forthcoming financial support to pay AMISOM personnel from other sources, such as UN-assessed contributions (beyond those already used for UNSOS), the AU Peace Fund or other donors, highlighted the dependence on EU funding for allowances. The debate reached a tipping point with the PSC’s endorsement in June 2016 of a new concept of operations (CONOPS), which unveiled a tentative plan for the mission to begin a drawdown in 2018, ahead of a pullout scheduled for 2020.6

While the EU allowance cap ultimately triggered new thinking over an exit strategy for AMISOM, it also widened the rift between TCCs and donors over the nature of AMISOM itself, its record of achievement, and collective responsibility for Somalia’s stabilisation. This has brought to the fore a number of issues regarding the AMISOM mission and its future trajectory.

This report examines the drivers and dynamics of the partnership debate between AMISOM and its international donors, particularly the EU, outlining some of the key concerns on both sides and implications for the mission. The EU’s January 2016 decision serves as a microcosm of the partnership complexities that characterise AMISOM.7 In this sense, the decision is the focus of this paper, due to the substantial impact it has had in terms of spurring thinking about a more concrete exit strategy, and its lasting ramifications in terms of continued concerns over mission funding.

The report notes that while the question of future AMISOM funding risks undermining the state-building project in Somalia, it has also raised genuine concerns about the strengthening of Somali institutions, the conditions needed for a stable Somalia and the nature of security assistance, as AMISOM undergoes a transition and eventual exit from Somalia.

AMISOM after 10

In 2017, the AU celebrated 10 years of peace operations in Somalia. AMISOM has been extraordinary in adapting to the precarious and delicate situation in Somalia. The mission transcended its initial mandate of protecting the Somali Transitional Federal Government and installations, to playing an active role in Somalia’s stabilisation and peace process (see Appendix A for AMISOM’s original and current mandates).8 Today, AMISOM seeks to degrade al-Shabaab, extend the authority of the government, and foster peace and reconciliation processes in the region.

In this vein, staying the course in Somalia is one of AMISOM’s greatest achievements, despite shortcomings and challenges. The AU created the mission as an interim arrangement with a six-month mandate in anticipation of a takeover by a better-resourced UN peacekeeping body. The UN, however, was unwilling to send peacekeepers to the high-intensity and conflict-prone Somali environment, where there was no peace to keep.

Staying the course in Somalia is one of AMISOM’s greatest achievements, despite shortcomings and challenges

In November 2007, when AMISOM’s six-month mandate expired, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia was ‘neither realistic nor viable’ due to the precarious security context.9 While hoping the UN would reverse its position, the AU adapted the mandate of AMISOM over the years in conjunction with the shifting context, becoming a party to the conflict by directly confronting al-Shabaab.

AMISOM’s engagement played a key role in stabilising Somalia, especially by late 2010 when the mission took on a more offensive posture against al-Shabaab. In August 2011, AMISOM in collaboration with the Somalia National Army pushed the militants out of the capital Mogadishu and seized large areas of southern and central Somalia. This ushered in conditions for the 2012 selection of Parliament and a new government, a process that ended eight years of transitional rule, following the formation of the Transitional Federal Government in 2004. AMISOM also oversaw the selection of two houses of Parliament and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as ‘Farmajo’) as President in early 2017, another key step in Somalia’s stabilisation and growth.
A report in early March 2017 from an AU-led conference discussing the lessons learned in AMISOM’s 10 years of operations summed up the success, noting that:

AMISOM had achieved its principal strategic goals, notably protecting the successive Somali authorities (the Transitional Federal Government and Federal Government of Somalia) and later the Interim Regional Administrations, degrading al-Shabaab, and securing two election processes. These milestones have been pivotal indicators of Somalia’s gradual comeback from state collapse. Albrecht Braun, a representative of the ACP-EU (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific-European Union) observed, ‘it is obviously clear to everybody that without AMISOM, Somalia wouldn’t be where it is today. A lot has been achieved, thanks to AMISOM, which has provided the space for the political process to progress.’ As an indicator of this success, there have been international discussions about ‘an AMISOM model’ to address crises in other parts of the continent.

Lack of progress in certain areas within Somalia is not solely the responsibility of AMISOM, as it also relates to difficulties in ensuring political will and unity among Somali actors. Nonetheless, the mission is extraordinarily complex, requiring coordination across a broad range of actors, including the AU, UN, EU, bilateral donors such as the US and UK, UNSOS, the five TCCs and six police-contributing countries, and of course the Federal Government of Somalia and its Federal Member States themselves. The resulting coordination challenges extend well beyond the realm of funding, to all aspects of the mission, and at times have hampered operational effectiveness.

Amid this coordination challenge, critics have also accused AMISOM of having been able to do more. Al-Shabaab remains a potent force, controlling significant swathes of territory and capable of carrying out deadly attacks in the region. The lack of offensive operations against al-Shabaab since 2015 is often noted as a sign of AMISOM’s stalled progress.

Lack of progress in certain areas within Somalia is not solely the responsibility of AMISOM, as it also relates to difficulties in ensuring political will and unity among Somali actors. Yet it is this tension between the mission’s achievements and the perception that it could be doing more that colours its relationship with donors and partners. Such dynamics were evident following the EU’s January 2016 decision to cap AMISOM peacekeeper allowances.

**EU funding for AMISOM**

Several major themes lay behind the EU’s decision, and characterise the EU’s continued engagement and perception of the mission.
Donor fatigue

Rising discontent within the EU over the large amounts of funding committed to AMISOM over the past 10 years, combined with questions over the mission’s accountability, effectiveness and compliance with various regulations has been a concern. In March 2017, the EU noted that it had provided more than €1.3 billion in support to AMISOM since 2007, a major demonstration of its commitment.16 Indeed, the EU has been a key donor to AMISOM because it pays the peacekeeper troop allowances.

The UN also plays a major role through UNSOS in terms of logistical support, such as repairing and maintaining mission equipment. Uniquely, UNSOS is a mechanism by which the UN directly channels logistical support for a peace support operation conducted by a regional organisation.17 UNSOS relies on UN-assessed contributions and the EU has noted that it thereby pays twice: firstly through its direct commitments to cover AMISOM troop allowances; and secondly through the assessed contributions to the UN member states provide that make up part of the UNSOS budget.18

Other partners have also provided targeted support packages to the AU, AMISOM and troop- and police-contributing countries in the mission. But the EU has been the partner that has footed increasing bills for AMISOM troop allowances, as staffing of the mission has jumped from fewer than 10 000 troops to 22 126.

The EU began in 2007 with a budget of €700 000 (about US$824 187) per month for peacekeepers over six months, pending the envisaged UN takeover in November 2007.19 Ten years on, the EU’s financial commitment to AMISOM has expanded in line with the increased authorised troop numbers and rising cost of individual peacekeeper allowances.20 By 2016, the budget hovered around €20 million per month, a steep increase on the initial pledge.

The EU’s financial commitment to AMISOM has expanded in line with the increased authorised troop numbers

The troop allowance cap thus brought to the fore the key role of the EU in supporting the AU mission in Somalia. EU Ambassador to Somalia Michele Cervone D’urso emphasised this, arguing that if it had not been for the EU, the mission would not have been formed.21

Figure 1: Average EU commitment to AMISOM per month (in euros)22

Source: ISS.

Note: Chart includes total EU commitment from the African Peace Facility to AMISOM (beyond just allowance payments), with contributions averaged over the course of the year.
At the same time, the EU expressed concern over its predominant role and lack of cost sharing. At a five-day partner meeting on Somalia, held in Nairobi in March 2017, Braun insisted that the mission should “mobilize additional financial support from other donors and specifically from African governments and other partners. Peace and stability is a collective effort.”

These twin aspects – the largesse of the EU combined with the frustration of being the sole partner responsible for troop allowances – was demonstrated when after the cap was announced, the AU made several attempts to close the gap by soliciting funding from other potential partners.24 Despite nearly a year’s advance notice of the EU’s decision, these efforts bore little fruit.

This emphasises the importance of EU funding to the AMISOM TCCs, but also the EU’s weariness with being the only AU partner on the hook for such a large contribution, despite the shared benefits.25

The EU has also expressed a greater desire for Africa to finance its own peace operations, and the allowance cap played into such dynamics. But this seems a long way off. African intergovernmental organisations have been working to attain self-sufficiency for over 50 years, dating back to 1963 when the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was formed.

Financial independence has been at the top of the AU’s agenda since 2002, when it replaced the OAU. At the twenty-fifth summit in June 2015 in Johannesburg, the AU agreed in principle to develop the capacity to fund a quarter (25%) of its peace and security activities. A year later, during the July 2016 Summit in Kigali, the AU adopted a decision to support this financial input by introducing a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to the continent.

Yet implementation has been problematic, with the decision suffering from challenges among member states themselves.26 Nevertheless, the funding decision is likely to mean little to AMISOM, given the time needed for implementation, and continued questions surrounding the commitment of member states and their institutional capacity in this regard.

**Shifting priorities**

Other pressing crises in Africa are increasingly drawing the EU’s attention, including migration concerns and the threat of terrorism in the Sahel region. The EU provided €50 million to support the formation of the G5 Sahel mission, a joint force established in February 2017 to combat terrorism and transnational crimes.27

This is similar to the level of support that it gave to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is confronting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad
Basin. Cervone D’urso highlighted these dynamics, stating the EU knows “that al-Shabaab has not been defeated and we are committed to the mission, but there are other missions to be accomplished in other areas and we have to give our support.”

In 2011, a review of EU funding for security in Africa noted that the conflicts in Darfur and Somalia would be the main beneficiaries of EU funding; it did not anticipate additional needs beyond them. But a range of other conflicts demanding EU attention have emerged subsequently, including those in the Lake Chad Basin, Central African Republic and Mali, in addition to continuing efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa.

Taken in this light, the EU funding to AMISOM has been disproportionate given the other security concerns afflicting the continent.

The disparate interests of EU member countries in various geopolitical regions of Africa also play an important role. France has led the charge to shift funding away from AMISOM in favour of the G5 Sahel mission, which is taking shape in five former French colonies.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Mali twice soon after his election in May 2017, highlighting the significance of the mission for France. This is likely to be tied in with hopes that advancing the G5 Sahel mission could in turn serve as an exit strategy for French troops operating in the Sahel under Operation Barkhane since August 2014, thus bringing EU funding closer to home. Germany has since also voiced strong support for the French position with regards to the G5 Sahel mission.

The EU funding to AMISOM has been disproportionate given the other security concerns afflicting the continent.

In addition, interviews with EU officials demonstrated the likelihood that the impact of the UK’s decision to leave the EU following a referendum in June 2016 – so-called Brexit – six months after the allowance cap went into effect, will shift the balance of power within the EU, with ramifications for future support for Somalia.

Figure 2: Total APF assistance to African missions, including AMISOM’s role (in million euros)

The UK has been the strongest advocate of EU involvement in Somalia, and reportedly resisted the AMISOM allowance cap. Post-Brexit, the UK will have less impact on the direction of EU funding, with other countries taking on a more prominent role that may have fewer vested interests in Somalia.

**Use of African Peace Facility funds**

Other internal EU issues are also a major third determinant behind the troop allowance cap. EU member states are increasingly raising reservations that the funds used to support the African Peace Facility, which come from the European Development Fund (EDF), are meant to focus on development initiatives. Despite consensus on the link between development and security, the use of the APF for peacekeeping remains a divisive issue, and such funds are explicitly prohibited from being used for arms or military assistance. One of the measures to address this contradiction was to place an 80% ceiling on contributions to peace support operations, thus the January 2016 decision that affected AMISOM.

**Growing impatience over stalled operations**

Impatience is growing over the progress and operational performance of AMISOM, especially considering the amount of funding donors have provided since 2007. Continued insecurity in south-central Somalia ties into persistent impressions that AMISOM has not been consistent in taking the fight to al-Shabaab. The table below provides a snapshot of major AMISOM-related operations since 2012.

**Table 1: Major AMISOM operations since 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Major achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Jubba Corridor</strong></td>
<td>Liberate militant-held areas, disrupt supply routes, prevent illegal tax collection (Gedo, Bay, Bakool focus)³³</td>
<td>Mid-2015</td>
<td>Liberated Baardhere and Dinsor, among other areas⁴²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Ocean Build</strong></td>
<td>Hold key population centres, protect main supply routes⁴¹</td>
<td>Late 2014–mid-2015</td>
<td>Maintained hold in liberated areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Indian Ocean</strong></td>
<td>Liberate militant-held areas, disrupt supply routes, prevent illegal tax collection⁴²</td>
<td>Mid 2014–mid-2015</td>
<td>Liberated many coastal towns, including al-Shabaab stronghold Barawe⁴³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Eagle</strong></td>
<td>Liberate militant-held areas, disrupt supply routes, prevent illegal tax collection⁴⁴</td>
<td>Early 2014–mid-2014</td>
<td>Liberated 11 districts across sectors⁴⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Sledge-hammer</strong></td>
<td>Liberate Kismayo</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>Pushed al-Shabaab out of Kismayo⁴⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following a wave of operations to take back territory from al-Shabaab between 2011 and mid-2015, progress on this front stalled, with few activities in the past two years, as troops have been forced to hold captured areas. This lack of activity ties into a perception among donors that AMISOM has been stagnant. During an interview for this report, a European official evaluating the progress of the mission complained, ‘I don’t think AMISOM is taking the fight to al-Shabaab at all, they are just sitting in their barracks.’³⁸

This is coupled with frustration that AMISOM liberates towns, but often withdraws haphazardly to al-Shabaab’s benefit, especially in the wake of low local Somali security sector capacity. For example, after a major assault in Lower Shabelle in August 2017, a Ugandan
AMISOM contingent pulled out of the town of Leego, apparently without even informing the regional government. Al-Shabaab reportedly retook the town immediately, emblematic of their continued presence in surrounding rural areas, despite being dislodged from major population centres.

A planned offensive in the Juba Valley to follow up on the gains made in 2015 and displace al-Shabaab from remaining strongholds in Middle Jubba, including Jilib and Saakow, has repeatedly stalled, a symbol of continuing frustrations (see below), and further contributing to the perception that AMISOM’s offensives have slowed. In this sense, the EU may see little benefit in extensive investment in a mission that is not actively taking the fight to al-Shabaab, and prefer to shift its priorities elsewhere (including development of the Somali security sector).

Hearts, minds and local capacity

There are also concerns about the conduct of AMISOM troops, tying into mission accountability. Reportedly, Ugandan peacekeepers have sold some of their weapons in Somalia, while the Kenyan army has been accused of benefiting from the smuggling of sugar and charcoal from the port of Kismayo. International non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch has also detailed reports of sexual abuse by AMISOM troops.

It is increasingly highlighted that AMISOM is a short-term fix to a long-term problem. The mission, however, remains imperative in terms of creating conditions for stability and peace.

The misconduct of AMISOM peacekeepers does little to enhance the credibility of the mission, given that it already has a tenuous level of popularity within Somalia. This is in part because troops from neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, countries with which Somalia has complicated historical relations, comprise a major component of forces. These aspects further reinforce donor concerns, especially regarding the need to win the hearts and minds of the local population to cement security gains, a key critique of the mission from the 10 Years Lesson Learned Workshop.

These concerns are likely to intersect with more long-term thinking, which sees the stability of Somalia as dependent on improving the capacity of the Somali security sector itself. In this sense, it is increasingly highlighted that AMISOM is a short-term fix to a long-term problem.

In many ways, the mission has achieved its initial goals to provide space for political processes to occur and thus has served its purpose, despite the need for further consolidation of gains made. With that success comes a new phase in struggle to rebuild Somalia, one in which the current level of funding for AMISOM at the expense of local security institutions may be inappropriate.
Troop-contributing countries' reaction to the EU funding decision

The AU and TCCs reacted negatively to the EU’s January 2016 troop allowance cap, viewing it as a fait accompli because the EU had already made up its mind, rather than engaging in a process of consultation and negotiation first.53 The TCC reaction varied by country, but was marked by common themes.

Threats to withdraw

Although the five AMISOM TCCs – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – were not uniform in their response, their reaction was overwhelmingly negative, with most noting it would force them to pull out of the mission.

Uganda and Kenya were the most vocal in this regard. In fact, Uganda, the first country to participate in AMISOM, stated that the allowance cap would force it to abandon the mission by December 2017, even ahead of the 2018 drawdown date.

Still disappointed over the UN’s decision not to reimburse the cost of three helicopters that crashed on their way to Somalia in August 2012, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Ugandan generals said that the country’s position in Somalia was no longer tenable. Ugandan Minister of State for International Affairs Henry Oryem Okello stated, ‘we went there with a view of clearing and getting rid of the terrorism in Somalia, we did not go there to be Somalis. We should re-examine the mission and the objective of the mission.’54

Uganda initially stated that the allowance cap would force it to abandon the mission by December 2017, even ahead of the 2018 drawdown date.

Nonetheless, once cooler heads prevailed, Uganda and Kenya walked back some of their statements. Despite still expressing reservations over the allowance cap, in July 2016 Museveni argued that his country’s withdrawal from Somalia was open for negotiation, noting ‘we [Uganda] shall not pullout if we are moving in the right directions, helping Somali people to build the institutions they need, especially the army.’55

In this sense, Museveni tied his country’s continued presence in Somalia less to specific funding commitments, and more to the development of institutions to ensure the eventual withdrawal would occur in a manner conducive to the long-term security of Somalia, and thus the region (see below).56

The interests of the TCCs in seeing a stable Somalia, due to its impact within the region, underlie sentiments that the strongly worded statements after the EU funding decision were more political talk than anything else.57 Kenya eventually committed to staying until 2020, in line with the new exit strategy.
Like Ethiopia, Kenya’s position is complicated because it shares a long and porous land border with Somalia, especially in areas near a high al-Shabaab presence, and has suffered from waves of al-Shabaab violence. Kenya’s national interest in a secure Somalia was further expressed when in late 2011, it sent troops to Somalia outside of the AMISOM mission, followed by Ethiopia.

Both countries eventually redeployed their troops within AMISOM, largely due to the financial security provided. Once the initial anger over the cap on funding wore off, national priorities prevailed as the driving force behind intervention in Somalia, and thus Kenya has continued its participation in AMISOM (see below).

Table 2: Major Ethiopian withdrawals since mid-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 17</td>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>El Lahelay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 17</td>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>El Bur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16</td>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>Tiyeeglow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16</td>
<td>Hiiraan</td>
<td>El Af</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16</td>
<td>Hiiraan</td>
<td>Moqokori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16</td>
<td>Hiiraan</td>
<td>Haglan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 16</td>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>Bud-Bud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 16</td>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>Garasweye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 16</td>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>Gal’ad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 16</td>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>Burdhuhunle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 16</td>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>Rabdhure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collection of news articles.

Regardless of the official or underlying reasons, the result has been an increased al-Shabaab presence in key towns from which the group had previously been driven out. This has undermined the gains AMISOM troops made on the ground, and serves as a potent warning about the expected outcome of a premature larger-scale withdrawal of AMISOM forces.

Perceptions of underappreciation

Another effect of the funding decision was a belief among TCCs that the EU does not fully appreciate the sacrifices they have made over the past 10 years in an incredibly difficult operating environment, which no one else has been willing to enter.

Despite the lack of an official tally, some speculate that AMISOM’s casualties total more than UN losses in over 70 years of peacekeeping operations, making it not just one of the most complex missions in the history of international peacekeeping, but also the deadliest.
These losses have been magnified as direct al-Shabaab attacks on AMISOM forward operating bases have caused high casualties. This is likely to have further contributed to the perception that AMISOM’s sacrifices and gains in a difficult environment have not been fully appreciated.78

Table 3: Major al-Shabaab attacks on AMISOM bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan 17</td>
<td>Kulbiyow, Lower Jubba</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Kenya Defense Forces denies base overrun, despite local claims79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct 16</td>
<td>Beledweyne, Hiiraan</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Similar tactics as previous attacks, but repelled80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 16</td>
<td>Haglan, Hiiraan</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Attack repelled and base not seized81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan 16</td>
<td>El Adde, Gedo</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Deadliest attack, troops abandoned base82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Sep 15</td>
<td>Janale, Lower Shabelle</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Militants overrun base83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun 15</td>
<td>Leego, Bay</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Militants overrun base84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collection of news articles.

One interviewee said bluntly, “the UN failed in the early 1990s but the AU created stability – now everyone wants to jump in.”85 Another compared the situation with continued UN funding of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which operates in a less risky environment than AMISOM, giving it as evidence that the mission was underappreciated. All the more so, given the TCCs’ greater willingness to put the lives of their troops on the line in Somalia when no one else would.86

This underlines a comparative advantage of the AU missions, in that they are willing to operate in places UN missions are not. However, some interviewees felt this aspect was not always fully acknowledged, using the EU allowance cap as a point of reference.

Under-resourcing concerns

TCCs also perceive the overall lack of appreciation in the general under-resourcing of the mission. For example, the mission has lacked requisite force enablers and multipliers, such as attack helicopters. Also, AMISOM officials regularly complain about the state of disrepair of their armoured personnel carriers (APCs), clearly pointing out that this responsibility lies with the UNSOS support mission.87

These have been more than mere complaints, but linked to mission effectiveness. Uganda explained that a major al-Shabaab assault in early August 2017 on its troops travelling in Lower Shabelle led to the death of AMISOM
peacekeepers because they were not travelling in armoured vehicles, given their state of disrepair.88

AMISOM has long argued that the lack of additional funding and force enablers is the primary reason behind its lack of progress, rather than a lack of will or desire to take the fight to al-Shabaab. Many, including Somali actors, are pushing for a renewed AMISOM offensive ahead of the proposed withdrawal timeline, to further degrade al-Shabaab and hand over security to Somali forces in an improved state.89

The status of the proposed Jubba Valley offensive is instructive in this regard. Since mid-2015, this option to remove al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds in the Upper Jubba region has been on the table. TCCs have argued that additional manpower is needed given the vast area of operation, and the demands to consolidate previously captured territory, in addition to those that may be acquired in the future. In this sense, TCCs regard the current number of troops as inadequate to fully launch the offensive while also maintaining territorial consolidation, considering the limited ability of the Somali security sector to hold territory.

Initial proposals called for 4,000 troops from Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to join AMISOM forces for a period of six months. The TCCs argued that their troops were ready, but they were waiting for US$25 million in funding to cover additional operational costs.90 With no one willing to pick up the cost, the TCCs eventually said they were prepared to go it on their own, with just material support instead.91 The continued lack of forthcoming assistance has fuelled TCCs’ complaints that they are prepared to do more in Somalia, but unable to do so because of lack of resources.

Given the complications over the funding of current AMISOM troops, along with the idea that previous troop authorisations were designed to be a temporary measure, there appears to be little appetite to authorise and support additional troops for the Jubba Valley mission.92

AMISOM may now continue with the operation, reconfiguring existing troop deployments, rather than seeking authorisation for additional troops. It remains to be seen how that plays out in a mission already considered to be overstretched. But the idea of a renewed offensive against al-Shabaab has gained momentum in the aftermath of Somalia’s deadliest militant attack to date on 14 October 2017, when a truck bomb in central Mogadishu killed over 500 civilians.93 However, major operations in the Jubba Valley have yet to commence.
Nonetheless, the debate cuts to the core of the gap between AMISOM TCCs and international donors about perceptions of who should be doing what, and where the blame for slow progress lies. Interviewees stressed that TCCs such as Kenya and Ethiopia would like to be doing more in Somalia, but blame partners for lack of support. In turn, donors appear to want to see AMISOM do more with the resources already at its disposal. Nonetheless, given the complaints from the mission in terms of inadequate resources and funding, the TCCs feel there is a certain hypocrisy in the partners’ urging AMISOM to do more, but not providing the necessary support. Despite praise in important documents, actions speak louder than words, and the allowance cap combined with continued equipment issues fuel perceptions of underappreciation.

**Inadequate local capacity**

TCCs have also expressed concerns that the international community has not adequately supported the development of a security sector that would enable Somalis to take over from AMISOM, in effect holding AMISOM hostage to an exit strategy that does not appear to be advancing. At the height of the funding saga, Uganda accused the broader international community of failing in its commitments to train and provide sustainable support for the development of a coherent Somali National Army (SNA), thereby complicating AMISOM’s efforts to eventually wind down its mission. TCCs have also expressed concerns that the international community has not adequately supported the development of a security sector that would enable Somalis to take over from AMISOM.

UNSOS is supporting 10,900 Somali troops to conduct joint operations with AMISOM and gain experience, while earlier this year Farmajo unveiled a plan for an SNA consisting of at least 18,000 soldiers, excluding special forces, the air force and navy. A further 32,000 police, including federal and state police, were also part of the plan.

A funding conference for the Somali security sector was held on 4 December 2017, but implementation of the overall agreement remains to be seen. Persistent problems have stymied the achievement of a coherent national army. These include lack of coordination in training by external actors, an inability to secure consistent troop payments and the clan-based nature of the Somali security sector.

A recurring concern is that if AMISOM recovers territory from al-Shabaab on a massive scale, who will administer public services if the government is not ready? Al-Shabaab’s immediate recapture of towns following the withdrawal of troops demonstrates the current inability of local Somali governing structures to take over security. This undermines AMISOM’s campaign to
In some instances, limited local capacity has endangered civilian lives, as AMISOM has taken certain areas but has been unable to hold on to them in the absence of local support, allowing al-Shabaab to resume control. Indeed, many towns such as Merka have passed back and forth from al-Shabaab to AMISOM and vice versa. When al-Shabaab returns, there are typically retaliatory killings against those the militants suspect of supporting AMISOM troops.

The need to develop the Somali security forces to allow AMISOM to successfully exit the arena, while also providing continuing security to prevent the problems of Somalia from spilling over into the wider region, is an important issue for TCCs. Some believe the international community needs to take a greater role.

Money versus interests

Another lingering sentiment among interviewees, spurred by reactions to the allowance cap, was that TCCs are primarily motivated out of financial interest. Most interviewees discounted this, but the perception continues, as one official involved in the planning for an AMISOM exit strategy conceded: ‘the TCCs will stay as long as possible – they benefit too much.’ In reality, while financial aspects are likely to facilitate involvement, a variety of other interests also influence AMISOM participation dynamics.

The TCCs have no doubt benefited financially from their presence in AMISOM. Most TCCs deduct a fee from the troop allowances the EU provides, for administrative purposes. Furthermore, UNSOS reimburses certain equipment and supplies the TCCs provide, and such benefits are likely to have played a role in Kenya and Ethiopia’s decision to re-hat troops under the AMISOM mandate in 2012 and 2014.

In addition, there are allegations of corruption and troops’ involvement in illicit trading, such as of sugar and charcoal as previously mentioned, which may provide opportunities for financial gain.

Nonetheless, these benefits are likely take a backseat to other considerations on a national level. As indicated above, the sacrifices AMISOM TCCs have made amid resource constraints, in concert with their steadfast commitment to a withdrawal process, paint a different picture.

As also mentioned above, national security interests are particularly important for Kenya and Ethiopia, given their long, shared borders with Somalia. Both countries retain troops in Somalia that are not part of AMISOM, but based on bilateral agreements with the Somali government. These additional troops are funded at the expense of their own governments, play a supporting role to their national AMISOM contingents at times, and are likely to remain behind in some capacity even in the event of an AMISOM withdrawal from Somalia.

National security interests are particularly important for Kenya and Ethiopia, given their long, shared borders with Somalia

In this sense, Kenya and Ethiopia maintain legitimate security interests in Somalia, which they have demonstrated through their willingness to confront al-Shabaab, even out of their own pocket. This is an indication of the non-financial interests driving Kenyan and Ethiopian participation in Somalia – as part of AMISOM and bilaterally – in an attempt to prevent the Somali conflagration from spreading to their national territory.

Beyond this, and perhaps even more relevant for Uganda and Burundi given their long-term participation in AMISOM, are less tangible non-financial benefits. These revolve around the prestige of playing a leading role in an important peacekeeping mission in a difficult context where others are not willing to go, while also providing an outlet to keep a national army busy and productive.

The reputation of Uganda and Burundi as regional peacemakers is one both governments are keen to maintain, which they can leverage to distract attention from internal country dynamics, while burnishing their image abroad. Museveni in particular appears intent on portraying himself as a helpful regional actor, while Burundi continues to establish itself as a major peacekeeping nation in Africa.

In one manner, the financial support the TCCs receive clearly helps with their participation in AMISOM and
can explain Ethiopia and Kenya’s desire to re-hat their forces, along with TCCs’ reaction to the EU’s January 2016 troop allowance cap. But other national interests are also part of the story. In this sense, while economic rewards may serve as one form of motivation, other factors beyond basic financial calculations motivate AMISOM TCCs, which complicates the picture. These are likely to outweigh a simple desire for financial remuneration as an explanation for their participation in AMISOM.

The case of Burundi

Burundi’s reaction to the EU’s January 2016 decision, which occurred in concert with external pressure on its political dynamics, however, appeared to be the most closely linked to financial considerations. The EU sanctioned the country in March 2016 over accusations that President Pierre Nkurunziza had manipulated his country’s political process to stay in office for a third term.

These sanctions prevented the EU from directly paying the Burundian government for its AMISOM contingent, to the point where by November 2016 Burundian troops had not been paid for 10 months, and Burundi’s Parliament called for their withdrawal from the mission.

The EU planned to introduce a different payment procedure for Burundi, either paying soldiers directly or going through the AU rather than the government. However, the AU and Burundi rejected the move, calling it discriminatory. In January 2017, Burundi ordered its troops to leave Somalia, before a last-minute deal to pay the troops through a private bank resolved the issue. Without remuneration, Burundi was willing to forgo the reputational and other benefits accrued: the country was willing to participate in the Somali missions, but not at its own cost.

Consequences for the mission

The EU allowance cap has led to two major interrelated developments with ramifications for the future of Somalia: renewed consideration over an exit strategy for AMISOM; and increasing momentum behind plans to strengthen the Somali security sector. In addition, continued questions regarding funding during AMISOM’s transition period have not yet been resolved, despite the passage of nearly two years since the EU’s January 2016 decision.

Discourse on AMISOM exit strategy

One of the key developments from the funding rift is the serious consideration given to a detailed exit strategy for AMISOM. Technically, an exit strategy has always existed because the mission was expected to transition to a UN peacekeeping operation, and/or because AMISOM would withdraw once Somali security forces were prepared to provide security for the country.
The renewal of AMISOM’s mandate also hinges on the inquiry into whether AMISOM is achieving its mission or not. However, the funding crisis prompted serious thinking about AMISOM’s future.112

In the June 2016 CONOPS, the AU developed a tentative exit strategy for Somalia, beginning with a drawdown by October 2018, and a planned pullout by 2020.113 This was partly an effort to get the international community to respond to the urgency of the stabilisation needs in Somalia. Given the need to ensure a responsible exit, there has been a push to redefine the rigid focus on dates in favour of a more conditions-based exit that aims to ensure the Somali forces are built up in a sustainable manner, rather than rushing to meet an impending deadline.

There is a tension between an adherence to timelines and the emergence of the necessary conditions to facilitate withdrawal, with a realistic need to loosen one or the other.

The development of a cohesive and efficient national army by 2020, a key aspect of the withdrawal strategy, appears to be an imposing timeline. In this sense, there is a tension between an adherence to timelines and the emergence of the necessary conditions to facilitate withdrawal, with a realistic need to loosen one or the other given the improbability of both coinciding at the same time.

Discussions have already begun to demonstrate signs of a more flexible timeline. Given that the next Somali elections are not scheduled to take place until 2021, because the most recent round were delayed, AMISOM may delay its withdrawal until after those elections are completed.114

Table 4: Current AMISOM drawdown plan115

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorised personnel</th>
<th>Current (as of October 2017)</th>
<th>31 December 2017</th>
<th>31 October 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>21 586</td>
<td>20 586</td>
<td>19 586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1 040</td>
<td>1 040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 126</td>
<td>21 626</td>
<td>20 626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Security Council Resolution 2372.

Indeed, the outcome of a joint AU-UN review in May 2017 recommended that 1 000 troops leave in December 2017, to be replaced in part by 500 police officers to shift the focus to the non-military component of the mission. While the effort to increase the police component is positive, the reduction of AMISOM troops comes on the heels of requests for additional troops to degrade al-Shabaab.116
An additional 1,000 soldiers will withdraw in October 2018, with future reductions based on security and political assessments, with a view to avoiding the reversal of fragile security gains; in other words, a gradual and phased reduction. The UN Security Council has endorsed this, but the pace after 2018 remains ambiguous and subject to future assessment. There has also been talk of AMISOM remaining beyond 2021 in some capacity, probably as a smaller rapid reaction counterterrorism force with a police component.

In this sense, the EU allowance cap brought into the open the need for AMISOM to start considering its options for withdrawal after 10 years of operations. The pace and mechanism of that withdrawal are still in dispute, but the mission and its partners are actively working towards a withdrawal with greater vigour than before January 2016. The source and level of funding for AMISOM after 2018 are also unclear, which will influence dynamics (see below).

**Given the complexity of building up the SNA to take over security responsibilities from AMISOM, it is necessary to consistently revisit commitments to the desired timelines**

What is clear, however, is that AMISOM will withdraw with 2018 serving as a key milestone, but developments after that are still to be determined based on updated assessments and funding estimates.

Nonetheless, it is unclear what will happen if the assessments prove more pessimistic than envisioned, especially with reference to the desired timelines. The development of the Somali security sector is the key determinant that will drive AMISOM’s withdrawal process, and slow progress on this front will have a direct impact on the future of AMISOM.

The Somali government recently noted that in the absence of guaranteed funding for AMISOM after 2018, it would not be prepared to take over, and that any withdrawal would be a ‘recipe for disaster.’

The Somalia Security Conference held in Mogadishu on 4 December 2017, also called for a draft transition plan for the transfer of security from AMISOM to Somali forces by the end of the month, which would be ‘realistic, phased, conditions-based … with clear target dates.’ This should provide some clarity on the envisioned plan, but given the complexity of building up the SNA in a manner that preserves fragile security gains, it will be necessary to consistently revisit commitments to the desired timelines.

**Prioritising the development of the Somali National Army**

Increasingly, donors are exploring ways to prioritise the development of the Somali security forces to take over from AMISOM. The progress made on outlining the details of the Somalia National Security Architecture at the May 2017 London Conference on Somalia may alleviate some concerns. However,
AMISOM’s exit is directly tied to the development of a capable Somali security sector, and progress remains to be seen.

The London conference primarily aimed to develop the internal capacity of Somalia. At the conference, international donors agreed to a New Partnership Agreement for Somalia that details international support, and a security pact for Somalia’s stabilisation.

The renewed focus on internal Somali capabilities also indicates a realisation by international partners that prioritising funding for AMISOM could distract attention from the need to fund and develop the SNA. This ties into concerns that continued EU funding for AMISOM is an unsustainable short-term solution, given that long-term stability rests on the capacity of the Somali security forces.

The SNA remains a clan-based institution, with uncoordinated training by the various partners and irregular troop payments. It is this last factor that has led to persistent concerns about the impact of meagre funds and continuous payment delays on the development of the Somalia security sector, similar to how the payment issue has affected AMISOM.121

In fact, a nationwide series of demonstrations over this issue came to Mogadishu in March 2017, shortly after Farmajo’s election, when disgruntled soldiers blocked streets in the capital.122 Prime Minister Ali Khaire promised the soldiers would receive their allowances by the middle of May, but later said that this could take until the end of 2017.123

Nonetheless, the allowance cap combined with AMISOM’s commitment to withdraw has refocused efforts on local capacity, for more sustainable long-term Somali security prospects.

Continued funding uncertainty

The future of allowance payments for the troops who remain in AMISOM after 2018 is a major question mark. The EU has been clear that funding through the APF will be limited, leaving the door open for other donors, but no one else has come forward.124

This uncertainty has led TCCs to emphasise that their presence in Somalia is subject to funding, despite the need for a conditions-based withdrawal. At a meeting on 3 July 2017 on the margins of the 29th AU Assembly, AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries noted that the mission faces a real prospect of an untimely withdrawal, without the provision of additional support.125

A meeting by the Military Operations Coordination Committee for AMISOM on 5 September was more direct, declaring that the mission would withdraw by 31 May 2018, if funding, force enablers and force multipliers were not forthcoming.126

To avoid this, TCCs and others have reiterated calls for predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for the mission. As mentioned above, the prospects for internal AU funding mechanisms to be in place by next year are remote. In this regard, the AU has repeatedly appealed to the UN Security Council to use UN-assessed contributions to support the payment of AMISOM personnel, especially given the UN’s authorisation of the AMISOM mandate and its contribution to global peace and security efforts.127 United Nations Secretary General António Guterres concurs with the AU position, saying, “it’s my belief that there is a responsibility of the international community to fund AMISOM.”128 He is expected to address this topic in a future report laying out funding options for AMISOM, which should provide some clarity.

The allowance cap combined with AMISOM’s commitment to withdraw has refocused efforts on local capacity

Nonetheless, the use of UN-assessed contributions beyond UNSOS appears to be a sticking point within the Security Council, as the US administration of President Donald Trump has sought to cut overall peacekeeping costs. Resistance to extending UN-assessed contributions to AMISOM is based on the argument that it is primarily a counterterrorism force, and the US does not wish to set a precedent in terms of UN funding for such operations.

A similar debate over the counterterrorism emphasis in peace operations has played out in the G5 Sahel force, which also faces an unresolved funding gap.129

In a further indication of the current climate, the budget for UNSOS has also been reduced, which has already
affected operational mission dynamics, reducing elements such as mission flying hours to deliver supplies.  

The message regarding the remote possibility of UN-assessed contributions has been received. A May 2017 UN-AU joint review did not call for funding through this mechanism. Nonetheless, it stressed the need for sustainable and predictable funding beyond October 2018, without providing much input about possible sources. This is a key unanswered question that will influence AMISOM in terms of its operations and planned drawdown next year; and which is likely to require some level of compromise on the part of those involved to ensure a feasible outcome, and avoid reversing the gains AMISOM has made in Somalia over the past decade.

Conclusion and recommendations

This paper has highlighted the impact of the EU’s January 2016 decision to cap its allowance payments to AMISOM troops. At its core, the EU decision reflects wider thinking about the future of EU support to African peace operations, and an increasing consensus that the AMISOM model of funding is obsolete.

The EU decision reflects wider thinking about the future of EU support to African peace operations, and an increasing consensus that the AMISOM model of funding is obsolete.

There is now a shift away from situations whereby external donors pay peacekeeping troops’ allowances, rather than supporting specific logistical mission elements. The EU’s support for the MNJTF and emerging G5 Sahel have followed this latter approach, with regional coalitions themselves paying allowances to troops (who are often operating in or near their home countries). This ensures costs to donors are kept down, as they avoid open-ended commitments to missions with unclear timeframes, while also supporting the capacity and development of the forces, which contributes more to long-term stability prospects than a few years of troop stipends.

In addition, the funding question reflects critical perceptions regarding AMISOM itself and its record of achievement.

There is no denying the progress AMISOM has made over its 10-year mission in an incredibly difficult environment, but the questions surrounding its current role and how much further it can go loom large. The complexity of AMISOM and the number of actors involved demand a massive coordination burden, and ensure it is near impossible to keep everyone happy.

Nonetheless, the wide-ranging calls against a premature withdrawal demonstrate the mission’s value, even if some feel this has not always been matched in terms of material support.
In the long term, another lesson is that it is only possible to guarantee sustainable funding for AU peace support operations by prioritising African capacity to fund itself. The lack of willing donors ready to close the gap after the EU’s January 2016 allowance cap made this obvious.

The AU is making progress on this front, as described above, but many issues with implementation remain. Without prioritising this element, AU missions will constantly be subject to the same funding uncertainty that has characterised AMISOM, and more recently the MNJTF and G5 Sahel.

AMISOM itself is a costly mission, and the ability of the AU to fund such an operation in the near term is low. But increasing the capacity of internal funding mechanisms would allow the AU greater flexibility and predictability in terms of future missions, even if another on the scale of AMISOM is not in the works.

Indeed, the EU decision to reduce AMISOM TCC allowances by 20% not only raised criticisms from TCCs and encouraged discussion about the efficacy of AMISOM in Somalia, but also set off a genuine debate about what to do to stabilise Somalia and ensure a responsible withdrawal from the country.

Keeping these considerations in mind, the AU and international donors can observe the following recommendations to help ensure a sustainable exit from Somalia:

1. The AU and UN should urgently come up with a specific funding plan beyond October 2018, to avoid a situation as in January 2016 when the decision regarding EU funding came into effect before alternatives had been developed.

2. AMISOM should do more to highlight its achievements in Somalia, to demonstrate its value to current and potential future donors.

3. The UN and AU should continue to develop and consistently revisit realistic timelines for AMISOM’s exit, considering the challenges of building strong institutions in Somalia. This requires reconciling the tension in the AMISOM exit strategy between timelines and conditions, with a more realistic view about the specifics of each.

4. The UN, EU, AU and other partners should devise concrete strategies to empower AMISOM and the SNA to carry out major offensives to degrade al-Shabaab. This entails ensuring that AMISOM receives requested logistical support, ahead of any new offensives to degrade al-Shabaab before October 2018. Specific measures such as the repair and maintenance of APCs, ensuring adequate fuel supplies for UNSOS, or the provision of force enablers and multipliers for AMISOM, can have a significant operational impact, and fall within the remit of already promised, rather than new, support.

5. Both AMISOM and non-AMISOM troops present in Somalia should avoid suddenly withdrawing forces without informing local governments and/or devising plans to ensure towns do not fall into the hands of al-Shabaab. Regardless of whether these troops are part of AMISOM or operating on a bilateral basis, it is necessary to coordinate movements in the face of a common enemy.

6. The development of the Somali security sector is key to any AMISOM withdrawal. Efforts need to focus on shifting its character away from a clan-based entity that suffers from disjointed training and irregular payments. Specific actions that could be useful include, for example, ensuring coordination in training, and providing external support for troop payments while the Somali government builds up a more robust and sustainable revenue base.

7. In the long run, the AU, UN and international partners should devote serious thought to the future of African peace support operations and the means to fund them. Efforts to make the AU self-reliant have stalled, but the AU needs to reinvigorate this process with appropriate buy-in from member states and the international community. The UN also needs to clearly define the future possibility of assessed contributions. In addition, the AU should emphasise a focus on non-traditional donors, to ensure common benefits of peace and security in Africa are shared by all with an interest in the continent.
## Appendix A: AMISOM’s initial and current mandates

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<tr>
<td>• To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the process referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3&lt;br&gt;• To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure&lt;br&gt;• To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces&lt;br&gt;• To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance&lt;br&gt;• To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel</td>
<td>• Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia&lt;br&gt;• Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups&lt;br&gt;• Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia&lt;br&gt;• Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritising the main population centres&lt;br&gt;• To assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peacebuilding, and security for key infrastructure&lt;br&gt;• To protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council&lt;br&gt;• To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU&lt;br&gt;• To conduct targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces&lt;br&gt;• To mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture&lt;br&gt;• To reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorised AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the Secretary-General&lt;br&gt;• To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

This report is based on desktop research, interviews with key officials on both sides of the debate, and general author observations from a series of conversations with stakeholders over the future of AMISOM. Interviews were conducted with African Union, European Union, AMISOM and troop-contributing country officials, and also researchers familiar with AMISOM, to solicit a broad range of perspectives.

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers who reviewed an earlier draft of this report. Their critiques and suggestions greatly enhanced its content.

1 The AU initially created the mission as an interim arrangement with a six-month mandate in anticipation of a takeover by the United Nations (UN).


3 The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established in 2009 to provide support to AMISOM, given that the UN was not prepared to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Somalia. UNSOA became the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) in 2015.


6 The concept of operations was revised in April, endorsed in June by the Military Operations Coordination Committee and adopted in July by the Peace and Security Council (PSC); AU PSC, 608th Communiqué, 29 June 2016, www.peaceau.org/uploads/608th-psc-communique-on-somalia-29-06-2016.pdf.

7 One EU official described AMISOM as simultaneously a flagship project in the partnership between the EU and the AU, but also a source of frustration for both sides; public lecture by EU official, Addis Ababa, 5 December 2017.

8 The mandate of AMISOM at the time of its formation was to ‘support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders, to provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions,’ African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, 69th meeting Communiqué, 19 January 2007, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/reporten-69th.pdf


13 For example, TCCs do not always communicate with each other and work together; interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 26 July 2017.

14 Authors’ impression from a number of meetings with AMISOM donors and stakeholders.

15 Meeting with EU member country representatives, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2017.


18 Interview with researcher familiar with AMISOM, Washington DC, 25 September 2017.


20 Ibid.; furthermore, the additional troop increase the UN authorised in 2013 was always meant to be temporary, rather than permanent.


22 Data based on table of APF support obtained by authors. We’ll support AMISOM, pledge donors, AMISOM, 3 March 2017, http://amisom-au.org/2017/03/well-support-amisom-pledge-donors/; E-mail exchange with EU official, 24 November 2017.

23 AMISOM, We’ll support AMISOM, pledge donors, 3 March 2017, amisom-au.org/2017/03/well-support-amisom-pledge-donors.


25 Interview with EU consultant, Addis Ababa, 21 July 2017; for example, actors such as Turkey and some Gulf countries, which have been involved in Somalia since 2011, ostensibly benefit from the peace dividend and enlarged operating space AMISOM has provided. In addition, degrading al-Shabaab is considered tantamount to reducing the spread of violent extremism and terrorism, a benefit not just for the region but also beyond, given the global struggle against Islamic extremism.


27 ISS, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan at top of the security agenda at the 29th AU Summit, Peace and Security Council Report, 12 June 2017,
IMPACT OF EU FUNDING DYNAMICS ON AMISOM


29 Interview with EU consultant, Addis Ababa, 21 June 2017.

30 For example, an EU official familiar with APF funding remarked to the authors that for every euro spent on the MNJTF or G5 Sahel force, seven are spent in Somalia. To be fair, however, AMISOM’s authorised troop allowance is double that of the MNJTF; Interview with EU official, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017.

31 Meeting with AU official, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2017.


33 Chart taken from APF Annual Review 2016.

34 Interview with researcher from a European think tank focused on AMISOM, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017.


36 Interview with EU official, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017.

37 The APF was established in December 2003, to support peace and security efforts across the African continent. Over €2.1 billion has been dispensed through the AU and Regional Economic Communities. Much of this has gone towards peace support operations, but other funding has supported the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and Early Response Mechanism; European Commission, African Peace Facility Annual Report 2016, 2017, http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/african-peace-facility-annual-report-2016

38 Meeting with EU member country representatives, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2017.


52 Of course, it is not as straightforward as reducing funding for AMISOM and then revisiting its military component, but the idea of AMISOM taking up a disproportionate amount of funding for Somalia in general seems to be an imbalance some would like to address; Interview with AU official, Addis Ababa, 6 June 2017.

53 Interview with EU consultant, Addis Ababa, 21 June 2017; Interview with researcher from a European think tank focused on AMISOM, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017. Others have noted that the EU previously gave the impression the payments were open ended; see International Crisis Group, Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations, 17 October 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/255-time-reset-african-union-european-union-relations


56 Museveni in September 2017 reportedly told lecturing US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto that his country would be willing to deploy 5 000 additional troops, if international donors provided funding and other support. This demonstrates TCC commitment, but also the need for external support to facilitate it; Uganda to Deploy 5 000 Troops in Somalia Outside AU, UN Mandate, Radio Shabelle, 9 November 2017, http://radioshabelle.com/uganda-deploy-5000-troops-somalia-outside-au-un-mandate/.

57 Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 8 July 2017.

59 After Somalia, Kenya is country most affected by al-Shabaab. The country has witnessed the development of domestic groups sympathetic to al-Shabaab’s vision, recruitment of its citizens into the Islamist group and a high rate of attacks, especially along the border. In 2017, al-Shabaab actively targeted Kenya in its messaging and in terms of violence ahead of the August presidential election, to dissuade Muslims from voting, but also to influence the process in favour of a government that was more likely to reduce its military footprint in Somalia.


61 Ethiopia plays a controversial role in Somalia, given the history of animosity and conflict between the two countries. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia to dissolve the Islamic Courts Union present in Mogadishu in 2006, proved highly unpopular and helped facilitate the rise of al-Shabaab. Ethiopia pulled out in January 2009, but entered Somalia again in late 2011 on the heels of the Kenyan intervention, likely driven by a desire to avoid being left out, given the emerging dynamics. Ethiopia re-hatted its forces to become part of AMISOM in January 2014, but Ethiopian involvement in Somalia extends further, with estimates of up to a few thousand troops present under a bilateral agreement with the Somali government; Interview with researcher, Addis Ababa, 4 October 2017.


63 Ibid.


71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.


75 The withdrawals may ultimately have been designed to put pressure on the international community to get additional support for AMISOM. However, given Ethiopia’s national interests in securing its border with Somalia and preventing the inflow of militant activity, the locations of the withdrawals were also ostensibly calibrated in a manner to minimise future risks to Ethiopia itself.

76 Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 26 July 2017.


78 At the same time, the TCCs have not been forthcoming in providing details of these events. For example, Kenya has not released a full account or death toll of the El Adde attack; Email exchange with researcher familiar with AMISOM, Addis Ababa/Washington DC, 5 July 2017.


85 Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 8 July 2017.

86 Ibid.; in addition, troops operating in the UN system are paid on a higher allowance scale, generating further resentment in the context of the AMISOM allowance cap.

87 According to its mandate, UNSOS must keep mission APCs at a minimum 75% operational rate; during a meeting in June 2017, AMISOM officials complained that only 64% of the mission’s APCs were serviceable; Meeting at AU, Addis Ababa, 16 June 2017. Nonetheless some of the equipment is partner owned, rather than contingent owned, and thus complicates UNSOS maintenance and repair support; Interview with EU official, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017.


after the attack in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017, which killed over 500 people.

90 Meeting with AU and AMISOM officials, Addis Ababa, 24 March 2017.

91 Interview with an AU official, Addis Ababa, 5 October 2017.


93 After the attack, Farmajo traveled to Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti to secure additional support for a renewed offensive against al-Shabaab, gaining promises of additional troops. Nonetheless, the funding and mechanisms surrounding any potential new deployments remains unclear; Djibouti plans to deploy additional troops to Somalia, Shabelle News, 11 November 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201711130144.html.

94 Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 8 July 2017.


97 Email exchange with AMISOM official, Addis Ababa/Mogadishu, 29 September 2017.

98 The focus on territorial control versus degrading al-Shabaab was a critique of the mission during the Workshop on Ten-year Lessons Learned on the African Union Mission in Somalia, 9–10 March 2017, however, because the mission became overstretched as it tried to hold territory as the Somali security sector was not ready to assert itself. Yet in the absence of key force enablers, such as military helicopters, it is unclear how AMISOM could have operated very differently; Interview with researcher familiar with AMISOM, Washington DC, 25 August 2017.


100 Authors’ impression from a number of meetings with AMISOM donors and stakeholders.

101 Interview with AU official, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2017; however, officials from two AMISOM TCCs noted that they cannot stay in Somalia forever.

102 Part of the reality is that they are poor countries as well and despite good intentions related to other aspects, the financing element cannot be ignored; Interview with researcher, Addis Ababa, 4 October 2017.

103 The actual number of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops present in Somalia is unclear; as one TCC official described it, the situation is fluid because many troops are present along the border and tend to cross in support of operations or other dynamics, before returning back across their border. According to one estimate, Ethiopia’s non-AMISOM contingent hovered around 3 000 troops; Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 8 July 2017; Interview with researcher, Addis Ababa, 4 October 2017; Interview with AU official, Addis Ababa, 10 October 2017.

104 As one interviewee put it, ‘when Somalia burns, others are affected.’; Interview with TCC official, Addis Ababa, 26 July 2017.

105 For example, Uganda used this leverage by threatening in late 2012 to pull out of AMISOM, after a UN report criticised it for supporting M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Elías Biryabarema, Uganda says to pull out troops from Somalia over Congo charges, Reuters, 3 November 2012, www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-congo-unesco-rebels-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-idUSBRE8A11U220121103.

106 Elizabeth Murray, Berouk Mesfin and Stephanie Wolters, Weak Ugandan Democracy, Strong Regional Influence, United States Institute of Peace and Institute for Security Studies, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW120-Weak-Ugandan-Democracy-Strong-Regional-Influence.pdf, 16. A common refrain in interviews with regards to Burundi was that the country has undergone civil war and divisions, too, but has emerged from them, and thus is motivated to share its experiences with Somalia. Burundi has also benefited from taking part in peacekeeping, which has provided an outlet for soldiers who do not wish to be demobilised; Nina Wilén and Gérard Birantamije, Contributor Profile: Burundi, Providing for Peacekeeping, 27 October 2016, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Burundi-Wilen-Birantamije-27Oct2016-1.pdf; Richard Moncrieff and Thierry Vircoulon, The Burundian Army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping, African Arguments, 1 September 2017, http://africanarguments.org/2017/08/01/the-burundian-armys-dangerous-over-reliance-on-peacekeeping/.

107 Moreover, the Burundian government has been accused of benefiting from its presence in AMISOM. For example, in 2016 the Burundian government noted having received 3 000 000 000 Burundian francs in ‘AMISOM extraordinary income,’ a decrease from 29 000 000 000 two years before. The lack of explanation behind this decrease has given rise to suggestions of embezzlement; Nina Wilén and Gérard Birantamije, Contributor Profile: Burundi, Providing for Peacekeeping, 27 October 2016, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Burundi-Wilen-Birantamije-27Oct2016-1.pdf.


109 Ibid.


116 The head of the AU Mission in Somalia, Francisco Madeira, stated in early December 2017 that unless AMISOM was equipped with ‘proportionate forces multipliers,’ even the first phase of the withdrawal would have an adverse effect on the mission. He also appealed to the UN to find a way to make up any gaps; Mission chief: Somalia’s peacekeeping mission could be hurt by a cut in force size, Reuters, 4 December 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/amisom-set-to-lose-soldiers/4149583.html.


Interview with an AU official, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2017.

Interview with researcher from a European think tank focused on AMISOM, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017.

It is likely that the EU has not decided on a set amount either, as an EU official noted it could range between 10% and 70% of current funding needs; interview with EU official, Addis Ababa, 20 June 2017. In addition, the size of the APF for 2019/2020 is likely to be slightly lower than in previous years given that the European Development Fund from which the APF originates is drawing to a close by 2020 and there is less left in the pot. But a draft of the declaration from the 5th AU-EU Summit in Abidjan on 29-30 November 2017 noted that support to the three major African PSOs of AMISOM, G5 Sahel and the MNJTF will continue; public lecture by EU official, Addis Ababa, 5 December 2017. While silent on funding thus far, the US has provided equipment to AMISOM, such as 19 combat vehicles to the Ugandan contingent in September 2017; Sergeant Andria Allmond, AFRICOM delivers equipment for strategic partner, Uganda, United States Africa Command, 27 September 2017, www.africom.mil/media-room/article/29947/africom-delivers-equipment-for-strategic-partner-uganda.
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