Ethiopia has seen a sharp rise in conflict and violence among state- and non-state actors since 2018. This is mainly due to protracted and multi-layered conflict, growing and unabated nationalist contentions, elite rivalry and fragile institutions. This report suggests how diverse actors can contribute to the conflict resolution mechanisms underway such as national dialogue, transitional justice and the overall ongoing political reform.
Key findings

- In post-2018 Ethiopia, conflict and violence have surged, and have proven to be different in form, intensity and nature from pre-2018 conflicts. Recognising these complexities is essential for defining and understanding the constructive role both state and non-state actors could play.

- Simmering nationalism, elite rivalry, fragile state and party institutions, and international political and economic dynamics have contributed to the complexity of the conflict. This has resulted in one of the deadliest civil wars in Ethiopia’s recent memory.

- Political dialogue, as part of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), remains vital for building durable peace and engaging all actors across various conflict-and violence-affected regions.

- Conflict resolution mechanisms such as the national dialogue and transitional justice processes currently underway present an opportunity to introduce political reforms that can pave the way for building inclusive democratic institutions.

Recommendations

- Expand the political space and build a consensus-based political culture. The falling out of key players during and after the formation of the Prosperity Party has led to an increasingly narrow political space for the engagement of moderate political views.

- Commit to enabling the CoHA to achieve sustainable peace. The CoHA should not be seen as an end but as a means for continued dialogue through parallel frameworks or bilateral engagements (such as the one with the Oromo Liberation Army).

- National dialogue is not the be-all and end-all to realise sustainable peace. Stakeholders should recognise that national dialogue is a political process that needs an institution and individuals with accumulated political capital to convene key actors and engage on serious issues.

- Transitional justice requires commitment, persistence and patience. The transitional justice process is a viable tool for addressing the legacies of systemic, widespread and serious human rights violations that have deeply traumatised populations across Ethiopia. It is essential that the mechanism be perceived as independent, impartial and adequately resourced.
Understanding conflicts in post-2018 Ethiopia

Most post-2018 conflicts have roots in the political landscape established after 1991 and are partly outcomes of contending nationalist mobilisations. The attempt at establishing a new political settlement brought in new actors with visions that diverged from those of the Ethiopian state. The state’s record of weak conflict management and lack of preparedness meant that state institutions and the security/law enforcement apparatus were unable to manage the multi-layered tensions and violent conflicts that the new political settlement exposed.

Since Ethiopia’s political liberalisation in the post-2018 era, conflict and violence have dramatically increased despite the expectation that liberalisation would lead to less conflict and considerable satisfaction. A recent study shows that 57% of all conflicts between 2000 and 2022 have taken place since 2018, with 21% occurring in 2021 alone. The most affected regions were Oromia, Tigray and Amhara.

At a conference organised by the Institute for Security Studies and the Open Society Foundation in March 2023 on ‘A Comprehensive Peace Deal for Ethiopia’, participants asked about the factors that explain this surge in violence. The discussion pointed out four major drivers: identity-related contentions leading to political polarisation; elite rivalry and competition over power and economic resources; the state and party’s institutional fragility; and the internationalisation of domestic conflict, including arms smuggling across borders and the direct and indirect involvement of foreign actors.

These conflict drivers are inter-related. For instance, weak political institutions contribute to the growth of competing nationalisms. And contending nationalisms contribute to institutional fragility and elite rivalry. The confluence of these factors leads to violence. When there is more intense elite competition and institutional fragility, competing nationalisms become more heightened.

Simmering nationalisms in Ethiopia have historical roots. Before 1991, Ethiopia displayed a unitary state, autocratic in nature with the character of a nation-building state, aspiring to build a collective identity. However, this process lacked the support of all Ethiopians. The southern Ethiopian elites, for example, perceived this nation-building project as a nation-destroying one, which led to anti-state counter movements.

Unlike its actions in the past, in 1991, the Ethiopian state abandoned its nation-building project and adopted a multi-nationalist one. But the state had its own internal contradictions. First, it was a federal state presumed to empower regions, but at the same time, it was controlled by a centralised party system with a hierarchical structure which defied its multinational character.

Second, the restructuring of power and formal decentralisation of the state both empowered and disempowered various groups simultaneously. This, in addition to other factors, led to the rise of three types of conflict: Ethiopian nationalists vs. ethno-nationalists; anti-regime movements; and conflict and competition among ethno-nationalist groups.

Since Ethiopia’s political liberalisation after 2018, conflict and violence have dramatically increased

Despite a period of stability, protests in some regions started in 2015. Suppressed conflicts, in conjunction with the internal fracture of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led to a political change that paved the way for post-2018 violent conflicts.

Contending nationalisms are also manifested in elite rivalry. The trend in Ethiopian history, including the post-2018 dynamics, has been an opening up of the political space that is followed by reform and change. This gives rise to public euphoria. Elites then strike alliances that raise expectations, but the alliances are usually short-lived and followed by disruption and the re-making of new alliances, which generates conflict.

In the process, some elites are sidelined while others consolidate power. Recent examples in the Oromia and Amhara regions demonstrate the rise and fall of inter-elite pacts, punctuated by attempts to consolidate power and the rise of opposition networks. With such rivalry over power and economic resources comes rampant violence and conflict.
Recent years have indicated that the state’s ability to stop the violence and conflict has been severely weakened, likely as a result of tensions within the ruling party and the state’s inability to project power throughout its territories. Such weakness has contributed to the spread of conflict due to a lack of collective vision, direction and ownership of conflict management.

In fact, the division and weakness of the party has reproduced further societal cleavages. It is evident that the state security apparatus, which reflects party weakness and indifference, is guilty of inaction in the face of impending violence – because of weak state institutions. The inability of the state to deal with conflict has contributed to the co-existence of state inaction and state overaction. Both fuel long standing and deeply rooted grievances.

Selected examples of conflicts that defined post-2018 dynamics include: the Gedeo-Guji conflict (2018/19), the ‘Jawar incident’ (2019), the Hachalu incident (2020), the OLA insurgency (2019 and ongoing), Qimant conflicts (since 2019), the Benishangul conflicts (2019–2020) and finally, the civil war in Tigray that spread across three regions from November 2020 to Sept 2022.

The CoHA is a commendable beginning to build durable peace between the warring parties

The Tigray war further demonstrated the confluence of these major conflict drivers. Heightened clashes between nationalist rhetoric in Tigray vs. the rest of the country, competition between a rising and losing elite over ideological, political and economic factors, and the state’s institutional weaknesses in managing conflict paved the way for a destructive war. In addition, Ethiopia was re-inserted into regional and global power plays that contributed to the intensification and prolonging of the conflict.

After two years of brutal civil war in the regional territories of Tigray, Amhara and Afar, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) was signed in November 2022 by the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Pretoria, South Africa. The peace process was led by the African Union (AU).

The CoHA and its contradictions

The CoHA came at a significant cost to the warring parties. It was signed after the international community applied soft diplomacy, economic/development aid sanctions, weapons sanctions, calls for investigations of human rights abuses that arguably amounted to war crimes, and shuttle diplomacy of special envoys.

The conflict that broke out between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF in November 2020 was effectively a culmination of a show of force that began in early 2018. With this in mind, any peace agreement (like the CoHA) needs to be accompanied by a comprehensive approach that addresses the fault lines that caused the armed conflict. The underlying factors that have played into the conflict must be tackled to achieve lasting peace.

Building on the CoHA’s momentum

The CoHA is a commendable beginning to build durable peace between the warring parties. Although it suffers from a lack of buy-in from all actors involved in the two years of armed conflict (especially the Amhara associated armed groups, and Eritrea), it has opened a door for continued political dialogue to overcome deeper divisions. It is imperative that the full implementation of the CoHA brings consensus among actors beyond the parties to the agreement.

The revocation of the designation of TPLF as ‘terrorist’ organisation, a relatively smooth formation of the interim government in Tigray, and the celebration of this progress in the Addis Ababa Friendship Park in April 2023 in the presence of all central players – except Eritrea – involved in the conflict, demonstrates a commitment to settling the chapter of armed conflict and opening a new one.

However, despite the CoHA and the public appearances that followed, there are still dangerous fault lines that need to be examined. For instance, little has been said on the issue of how to administer the contested areas where there is a convergence of ethnic, territorial, economic and psychological factors. In addition, the shifting of political alliances post-2018 has severely affected trust between the federal government and the
Amhara region’s political and social elites, both in and outside the regional government. This mistrust and dissatisfaction among the Amhara elite was manifested in the recent confrontation that occurred during the disbandment of the regional special forces. While the decision did not have significant opposition from many regions, it caused an upheaval in the Amhara region, indicating high levels of mistrust and fear among armed groups there.

These significant recent events are a reminder that fault lines beyond the mandate of the CoHA remain, and will have a direct consequence on the success of its implementation. This indicates the need for political dialogue to be taken seriously so that it can help address multi-layered grievances. The national dialogue for example can be a platform to launch these discussions.

The critical role the international community played in achieving the CoHA indicates an interest in seeing the agreement through. The international community should be careful not to sideline itself – even if implementation is the task of the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. At a minimum, the international community should provide technical and financial support for peacebuilding, monitor compliance with the agreement, and engage with conflicting parties to find lasting solutions to the underlying drivers of conflict.

Fault lines beyond the CoHA’s mandate remain, and will affect the success of its implementation

In May 2023, the US State Department released a statement commending all parties to the CoHA on their effort to keep to the agreement’s terms, including the opening of access to humanitarian aid, disarming the Tigray Defence Forces, restoring basic services in Tigray, and establishing an interim government in Tigray to spearhead these processes. The special envoy to the Horn of Africa has frequently travelled to Addis Ababa and Tigray to speak to leaders and those in the AU and the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).

But a year into the agreement, significant power shifts resulting in the re-alignment of various players has had an impact on the implementation of critical components of the peace deal. New and strong interests have emerged, necessitating a re-think of the initial agreement, including:

• The deterioration of the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
• The outbreak of conflict between the federal government and armed groups in the Amhara region (also known as Fano) over the disarmament of all informal armed groups that participated in the war against the Tigray Forces.
• The disbandment of regional special forces.
• The ongoing political rift between key Amhara elites and the Ethiopian government.

The conditions on which the deal was made have shifted enough – albeit to the dismay of all parties to the agreement – that fulfilling the CoHA’s conditions to its fullest extent is no longer possible. A deal that includes, at a minimum, the internal actors, i.e. Amhara political elites and the Fano, can no longer be ignored. The continued undermining of the Fano by the federal government – while it may secure it some legitimacy in the troubled Oromia region – will not hasten the implementation of the COHA.

The key terms of the CoHA, especially the ambiguous status of the contested territories between Tigray and Amhara, the process of establishing a transitional institution, and the slow progress – if not holding back – of the federal budget has frustrated the interim regional government of Tigray and the Amhara region.

The US and the AU continue to follow up but express concern about the ongoing war in Amhara region, which is threatening the already fragile peace. This has the potential to draw other actors into the conflict, such as the Eritrean Defence Forces and the Tigray regional government.

The CoHA seems to have silenced the guns in one region but has sparked conflict in another, with the Amhara Fano claiming that it is not a peace deal but an alignment of the TPLF and the federal government against the Amhara region. With the federal government unable to broker peace through a new political settlement within
the Amhara region’s new powers – the Fano – the federal government has more to lose in the stalemate than any other party to the CoHA.

**Inclusivity, ownership and sustainability**

Despite diverse groups taking part in the conflict, the peace-making approach adopted by the AU and its negotiating team was traditional. It limited participation to the federal government and the TPLF combatants/TDF to the exclusion of the Amhara, Afar and Eritrean forces. In addition, although the conflict affected vulnerable groups including women, children, disabled persons and others, the Pretoria agreement did not include any representation of these groups or of civil society advocates. The CoHA was an elite negotiation.

For comprehensive and sustainable peace, it is necessary to examine the conflict in the northern part of the country from the perspective of those that participated – the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the TDF, the Amhara organisations, and Eritrea. At the same time, the severe impact of the conflict on women, children and the elderly must be considered. Unfortunately the process has, from the beginning, excluded major actors. That will make its implementation an uphill climb. Upcoming dialogues need to stress that the level of inclusivity will determine the failure or success of any process, which means it is in the best interest of political actors to garner the support of important stakeholders.

**National dialogue**

Due to several internal and external factors, the Ethiopian government has embarked on national dialogue as a potential mechanism for broad-based conflict resolution. While the initiative is commendable, there is still both over-expectation and under-estimation of the process from contending actors.

The national dialogue process has the potential to provide a platform for various views and groups to speak about the issues that gave rise to the many conflicts in Ethiopia – namely the tension in Oromia, the northern Ethiopia conflict, ethnic conflicts across regional states and inter-regional borders. It can address the contributing factors that broadly have had an impact on political and social issues and could be a platform to manage the current elite rivalry aimed at dominating the Ethiopian political landscape.

A critical consideration is that the contemporary political space is filled with grievances. The process needs a deliberative stage appropriate for the elite level. It also requires agonistic dialogue to address the more emotive and intense discussions at community level in a relational, reciprocal and sustained manner.

Ethiopia’s federal government has more to lose in the stalemate than any other party to the CoHA.

Key challenges in conducting national dialogue in Ethiopia emanate from facts and perceptions stemming from the ruthless war that the country has recently experienced. In the face of so much discontent and so many grievances, it is necessary to include critical segments of society, particularly those who may have been excluded from power or who have been marginalised as a result of the conflict.

Another major challenge is building trust. Any dialogue process is at risk when it takes place in a post-war society that has experienced deep divisions and traumas. Addressing power imbalances is vital, especially between different groups with historical grievances. This can create an equal playing field for all participants in the process and help overcome polarisation that has simmered for decades but has surfaced and magnified due to post-war trauma.

It is also crucial that all stakeholders commit to accepting the outcomes of the process. They also need to build consensus around issues which will likely be extremely challenging (particularly when there are deeply held differences between different groups). Ensuring that the dialogue process is sustainable and that momentum is maintained is also essential.

**Transitional justice process and policy**

Via the Ministry of Justice, the Ethiopian government shared a green paper to invoke discussion among various stakeholders on the policy framework for
transitional justice. There is a lot that remains unclear with the process and discussions have so far focused more on technical rather than political aspects.\textsuperscript{13}

If carefully implemented, transitional justice can complement the national dialogue process, and have a positive long-term impact on sustainable peace. It is important however to address issues for all conflict affected regions, including considerations that marked the pre-2018 era. Reconciling the competing demands of retribution and reconciliation – as some victims may seek punishment and accountability for past crimes while others want healing and social cohesion – requires careful deliberation and management.

Moreover, ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of transitional justice institutions, such as truth commissions and tribunals, can be difficult, particularly when state institutions may be weak, corrupt or constrained by a lack of independence from ruling parties. Finally, ensuring adequate resources and political support for transitional justice programmes will be an essential success factor – and will require sustained commitment from international partners.

**Need for political reform**

Commitment to reform at a political level will be instrumental, particularly before national dialogue processes become visible and elements of transitional justice including truth, justice, reparation and guarantees surface. Current government responses – where it appears the government has locked horns with its Amhara constituency who feel isolated on major political developments including the Pretoria agreement and other processes – will only result in further grievance.

An important aspect is building consensus on the nature of the state and creating dialogue around the type of constitution Ethiopia needs and how best to manage its diversity. Such a discussion will provide equal footing for all political actors and establish a trust-based interaction as opposed to competitiveness and the unconstitutional use of state power. Equally crucial is ensuring all stakeholders are included in the reform process, including opposition groups, civil society organisations (CSOs), and marginalised communities.

Historically, non-state actors in Ethiopia have mirrored the state, perpetuating the government of the day’s ideas and beliefs, and contributing to the consolidation of state power.\textsuperscript{14} Independent and impartial non-state actors are yet to be established. This culture makes CSOs, the media, academics and religious organisations extensions of state power. A case in point occurred when non-state actors sided with one or the other of the warring parties in Tigray to propagate violence and conflict. These actors must examine their roles and begin to build their independence.

**Challenges ahead**

As Ethiopia stands at a critical juncture, multiple challenges cast a shadow over the path to peace and stability. These are shaped by the complex and multifaceted interplay of domestic and international dynamics:

- As elites attempt to carve out a bigger piece of the pie in the political space, tensions will continue to disrupt state institutions. The oscillation among elites will likely export tensions to constituencies, disrupting social cohesion and introducing divisive politics into societal values and discourse for everyday Ethiopians. The absence of clearly defined rules in this competition means that actors (mainly elites) are even prepared to invoke painful historical wounds to counter arguments and win constituencies. The reliving of these memories or constructs will breed new resentments, perpetuating the cycle of violence and conflict.

- If a genuine dialogue takes place, it could lead to power restructuring and changes in political reform that could severely affect the incumbent. Fearing that outcome, it is likely that processes like the national dialogue and transitional justice will be used to consolidate regime power by sidelining key opposition and rival elites. This could become another missed opportunity to address past and present challenges. Protecting and shielding these processes requires intense alliance building, lobbying and negotiation by key political players in Ethiopia.

- The rising interest of neighbouring countries and international actors in Ethiopia’s internal politics adds the dimension of proxy wars fuelled by various interests and resources.
**Recommendations**

### National dialogue

For the government:

- Take the opportunity to use institutional spaces to introduce change. Political will is key to initiating and executing any process, and despite all its challenges, the national dialogue can help the country face its demons, past and present.

- Recognise that national dialogue is a political process that needs an institution and individuals with accumulated political capital to convene key actors and engage on serious issues. The government needs to commit to appropriate levels of engagement and action that will enable genuine dialogue.

The national dialogue should be seen as a contested political process, not an apolitical technical process

- Ensure the relative independence of the local and regional dialogues from the National Dialogue Commission’s influence in operational matters. The commission can provide support and facilitation. The commission must make the most of the successes achieved in the community and local dialogues as it crafts the road map for a post-national dialogue process.

- Build the right space and complementarity of the various efforts for national consensus across the board, to avoid competition between current processes – especially between the national dialogue and transitional justice processes.

For non-state actors:

- Play an important role in facilitating dialogue and mediation between conflicting parties, and providing a neutral forum for discussion and promote understanding and trust-building between different groups.

- Provide expertise and research on key issues relevant to the national dialogue process. This could include research on best practices for national dialogues, technical guidance on constitutional and legal reforms, or analysis on issues such as political reforms, inclusivity and equal participation.

- Engage in public awareness-raising campaigns to promote the goals of the national dialogue process. Use traditional and social media platforms to disseminate information about the process, its objectives and outcomes to a wider audience.

- Advocate for accountability and transparency in the national dialogue process. Monitor the process, provide feedback, and push for increased transparency in decision making. This can help to ensure that the national dialogue process is inclusive, credible and accountable to citizens.

### Transitional justice process and policy

For the government:

- Create a national mechanism to investigate and prosecute human rights violations committed over the years and during the recent war. The mechanism should be independent, impartial and adequately resourced to carry out its mandate effectively.

- Pay attention to state weakness. As a party to the conflict for the past two years, transitional justice process will adversely affect public officials, national military and other actors that are believed to have participated in committing atrocities.

- Offer reparations to victims of human rights abuses, including financial compensation, medical care and psycho-social support. Reparations can help to address some of the harm caused by past atrocities.
• Establish truth-telling mechanisms that encourage closure and healing. This could include setting up public inquiries or providing legal protection for witnesses and offenders who testify.

• Hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes to promote justice and prevent future abuses. Work with local and international partners to bring perpetrators to justice, including through domestic courts or international tribunals.

For non-state actors:

• Dedicate themselves to principles of truth and reconciliation, which is vital for social healing and social cohesion.

• Ensure that the programmes are inclusive and address the needs of all affected communities, particularly marginalised groups such as women, children and ethnic or religious minorities.

• Manage the challenge of reconciling the competing demands of retribution and reconciliation, as some victims may seek punishment and accountability for past crimes while others may prioritise healing and social cohesion. The process can also be hijacked as an instrument to punish political opponents.

• Ensure adequate resources and political support for transitional justice programmes. This is another significant challenge, as they often require sustained funding and commitment from national governments and international actors.

Political reform

Political reforms rarely take place at the will of the incumbent government. The post-2018 government’s actions of introducing reforms and at the same time attempting to consolidate power has disappointed those who were initially hopeful about the democratisation of the Ethiopian state. The national dialogue and the transitional justice processes are opportunities to think about political reforms, some of which might be introduced immediately while others can be sequenced as building blocks for democratic institution building.

For the state:

• Manage the ongoing violence and ethnic tensions, continue political reforms and re-negotiate the political settlement. Ruling elites need to refocus towards establishing clear and practical means to return to democratisation – with reform packages for political and civic spaces with freedoms of speech, expression and association as well as actively reducing the state’s ‘natural’ authoritarian tendencies to achieve consensus on constitutional matters.

The ruling party should adopt an infrastructure for inter-group dialogue within party structures

For the ruling Prosperity Party:

• The ruling party should adopt an infrastructure for inter-group dialogue within party structures to arrive at a negotiated vision for both the party and the country. The expansion of the Prosperity Party’s constituency base since 2019 to include all former peripheral/affiliate parties has resulted in competing (and even incongruent) visions that have negatively affected the peace and security landscape. Arriving at a negotiated collective vision within the party would allow for coordinated and synchronised efforts for upholding rule of law and ensuring a shared commitment to conflict transformation.

For the interim administration of the Tigray Region:

• Manage multiple layers of interests, internally and externally. A consensus-based process that resulted in the interim government leadership needs to extend to a longer-term political settlement for TPLF old and young elites as well as opposition parties operating within Tigray. The interim government which will represent the region in the CoHA to implement the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants needs to be a consensus government giving voice to all segments of the affected population. The current internal division and internal power competition needs to be managed.

• Bring a level of stability that will allow a peaceful and stable regime for CoHA to be implemented, and remain level-headed towards outside actors such as Eritrea.
and its proxies. As the Eritrean government and its army are not signatories to the CoHA, it is imperative to coordinate and work in tandem with the Ethiopian government to ensure the safety and security of Ethiopian territory and its inhabitants.

- Engage in meaningful action to rebuild trust and cohesion with its neighbouring regions and affected populations, considering that the conflict expanded from Tigray into the Amhara and Afar regions.
- Work carefully for a solution for parts of the Tigray region that are now under the administration of Amhara forces mainly in crafting solutions and re-establishing civilian government of the contested areas.

Opposition parties should overcome the culture of ‘boycotting’ when achieving consensus is difficult

- Work towards a people-to-people engagement to ensure that such conflict does not arise again and identify ways of building trust. In the long term, the interim regional government of Tigray will need to be part of the national dialogue process as well as the transitional justice processes.

For opposition parties:

- Support the CoHA and other dialogue processes by committing to peaceful political engagement – provided that the government provides a meaningful space for participation – and by encouraging supporters to refrain from any acts of violence or aggression. Political differences should be managed through non-violent institutionalised mechanisms.
- Commit to democratic principles and the rule of law, and engage in constructive dialogue with other stakeholders to find and/or craft a common ground and ensure that the interests of all parties are considered.
- Work with the government and other stakeholders to address underlying issues such as political exclusion, economic inequality and social injustice that may have contributed to the conflict in the first place.
- Overcome the culture of ‘boycotting’ when arriving at a consensus is difficult and when conditions are not met. Learn to stay within the open space to fight for more open democratic space.

For CSOs, academics, religious organisations:

- Provide independent oversight of process such as the CoHA, but also the national dialogue and transitional justice processes. Independent monitoring of the situation on the ground is needed, along with reporting violations or breaches of the agreement to relevant authorities, and supporting local efforts to build peace and promote dialogue between conflicting parties. This would involve engaging with communities affected by the conflict, working with marginalised groups, and helping to create spaces for dialogue and reconciliation.
- Conduct fact-finding missions to determine the extent of violence and human rights abuses in conflict-affected areas; submit reports to relevant authorities and international organisations documenting human rights abuses and violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement; provide technical assistance and training to local organisations working on peacebuilding and conflict resolution; advocate for justice and accountability for human rights abuses committed during the conflict; support the participation of women, youth, and other marginalised groups in peace processes; and provide humanitarian assistance such as food, water, shelter and medical care to those affected by the conflict.

For the international community in close consultation with the Ethiopian government and local actors:

- Support the agreement, including by providing assurances of continued funding for locally led peacebuilding initiatives that promote dialogue, reconciliation, and trust-building between conflicting parties.
- Support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters from armed groups.
- Offer technical support for the implementation of the agreement, including support for security sector reform and humanitarian assistance programmes.
- Provide expertise in conflict resolution and negotiation to help parties reach a lasting peace agreement.
• Monitor compliance with the agreement through mechanisms such as short term observation missions.

• Collaborate closely with the Ethiopian government and keep communication channels open on the implementation of the CoHA and lasting peace for northern Ethiopia and conflict-affected parts of the country.

• Link local actors – CSOs, academia, religious organisations – with international like-minded organisations to pursue their involvement in the national dialogue and monitoring of CoHA. Those platforms can provide learnings and experience from other countries as academia provides knowledge, expertise and experience for successful engagement, monitoring, and support.

• Recognise the need and deliver the financial, technical and political support the national dialogue and transitional justice processes need. This engagement may need to piggyback on high-level dialogue with the Ethiopian government and continued encouragement to ensure the process remains independent and effective.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

2 Ibid.
3 These factors were based on Semir Yusuf’s presentation at the conference on “Conflict Dynamics in Post-2018 Ethiopia”.
5 Interview, peace and security expert/conference attendee, April 2023.
11 Interview, conference panelist, April 2023: Interview, (Ethiopians for Incisive Dialogue) EID member, April 2023.
12 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WtWw91tIebKmNZUtZM-Y5xoTqKBsE格力/view?usp=drivesdk.
13 Interview, peace and security expert, April 2023.
14 Interview, political analyst, April 2023.
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