



The United Nations and Africa

*From layered response to an integrated
system for conflict prevention,
management and post-conflict
reconstruction*

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SA Background paper



- For the UNSC debate on 28 March 2007 on the relationship between the UN and regional orgs
 - Strengthening UN support to regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security;
 - Forms of direct partnership between the UN regional organizations;
 - The implementation of previous Council decisions and recommendations of the UN and regional organizations;
 - The issue of direct resources;
 - The possibility for the UNSC to incorporate outcomes of bodies such as the AU PSC in its own decisions.

Minister Dlamini Zuma



“... circumstances have changed and therefore we need new solutions to address today’s realities. The rigid doctrines of the past on how we supported peacekeeping missions can no longer hold.”

UNSG requested to prepare a report with specific proposals on how the world body could foster collaboration and deepen partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations

‘In Larger Freedom’

I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that they place upon it. In particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options by creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations arrangements. United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition with the admirable efforts now being made by many regional organizations but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very valuable complement to our own efforts. Indeed, I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.



The (first) step change

- Establishment of the African Union and adoption of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council in Durban, 2002
- Sequential model for the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts
- Authority to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and threats against the legitimate order.

Also Conflict Prevention & Post-Conflict Reconstruction




- ***Structural conflict prevention*** - NEPAD, APRM, Court of Justice and Human Rights, Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights, etc
- ***Direct conflict prevention*** - PSC itself, Panel of the Wise, office of the Chairperson, special envoys, etc
- ***Post conflict reconstruction framework***

ASF Establishment Timeline




- **By 30 June 2005 (delayed by one year):**
 - AU: PLANELM for management of political mission and co-deployed AU observer mission, deployable within 30 days
 - Regions: Regional standby arrangements for Chapter VI and preventive deployment, deployable within 30 days
- **By 30 June 2010:**
 - AU: Ability to manage complex missions
 - Regions: Deployment of mission HQ for Chapter VI and preventive deployment within 30 days


Top Twenty Military Contributors to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations: October 2006




Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006




Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006



Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006



UN Police Contributions by Region: 31 October 2006





Other factors

- Cost - UNOB in Burundi \$322 million per annum - AMIB one third of that
- UN overstretch
- Availability of peacekeepers from developed world given Iraq and Afghanistan
- (US driven) approach to outsourcing



The (second) step change

- African Peace Facility of □250m, □50m and proposed □300m
 - Darfur (EU incl MS □400m by March 2007)
 - CAR
 - Comoros
 - Sudan
- Bilateral support, e.g.
 - Burundi (UK, USA,
 - Darfur (USA \$350m, Norway, Canada, UK ...)

Reality of Peacekeeping by the AU



- ASF cannot replace UN peacekeeping under current conditions
- Probably two types of autonomous AU ops:
 - Small missions in support of peacemaking
 - Early entry and Chapter VI
- Exit strategy = a UN mission
- Best example - Burundi
- AU overwhelmed by Darfur and challenge to create an ASF - compounded by AMISOM in Somalia

Darfur




- Refusal to accept a UN mission, leading to AMIS that is today serving:
 - As a litmus test for African peacekeeping and
 - As a figleaf to cover international inaction
- Eventually three phases - UN light then heavy support package and eventually a mission under AU command, but containing substantial UN components.
- The hybrid mission would have to be 'logistically and financially sustainable'. Whilst maintaining a 'predominantly African character', '[b]ackstopping and command and control structures will be provided by the UN.'



UN assistance

- AU/UN action plan for UN assistance to AU peacekeeping capacity of 2006
 - UN DPKO AU Peace Support Team
- UN Liaison Office in Addis Ababa
- Advice, advice, advice, advice, advice ... when what is needed is capacity

Peace & Security Division





Trends

- The current debate - African solutions to African problems consisting of a layered response to African peace and security issues through which regional organizations are supposed to accept increased responsibility for peace and security but without a commensurate funding obligation from the international community
- Most recent trend - a focus on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

Current situation in Addis



- Complete overstretch in PSOD where support available exceeds the AU absorption capacity by a significant margin
- Operational requirements (Darfur and Somalia) dominate
- Lack of confidence in AU ability and systems to manage support
- Inability to realize limited capacity development due to recruitment procedures



Political reality

- AU member states cannot fund African peacekeeping
- Funding African peacekeeping thro assessed UN system not do-able
- Bilateral and multilateral partners prepared to pick up part of the tab but want to maintain oversight and control
- Result - no predictability, administrative and financial overload

Third step change: the move towards an integrated system



In line with original vision of the ASF

- Outcomes of AU PSC included in UNSC decisions where appropriate
- E.g. AU log bases part of UN log system
- E.g. AU standby systems part of UNSAS
- E.g. Staff seconded by partners through UNDPKO to AU at:
 - Strategic level (within AU PSOD)
 - Operational level (within mission headquarters)
 - Field level (in operational area)



Key result

- As demonstrated financial, logistic and donor management improves, funding will increase
- Clearer, simpler and more practical funding arrangement will become possible:
 - Basket funding (Complementary Peace Fund)
 - Direct support to TCCs (as in Burundi)
 - Draw down facilities/funds
 - Use of commercial support

Contrast this to Somalia



- No central coordinating capacity for AMISOM
- Each TCC to 'come with his international partner'
- Inability to:
 - Plan, sustain and maintain operations
 - Manage external support
- An inevitable mess even without the challenges of the external environment



Conclusion

- The African Standby Force is off to a good start, but has a long way to go, consisting of lots of policy but little capacity
- Serious questions about the level of autonomous capacity that can be expected from the ASF
- Need to align AU into the UNSC (legitimacy) and UN systems (capacity)

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QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

‘In Larger Freedom’

The United Nations and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges to international peace and security. **In this connection, donor countries should pay particular attention to the need for a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union.** To improve coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, I intend to introduce memoranda of understanding between the United Nations and individual organizations, governing the sharing of information, expertise and resources, as appropriate in each case. For regional organizations that have a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, these memoranda of understanding could place those capacities within the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System.

Continued

- I also intend to invite regional organizations to participate in meetings of United Nations system coordinating bodies, when issues in which they have a particular interest are discussed.
- **The rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contributions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or the participation of regional organizations in multi-pillar peace operations under the overall United Nations umbrella.**

Principles adopted by EU could be adopted for use by UN



- A partnership involving mutually agreed objectives based on international law and human rights
- Equality and mutual accountability
- African ownership and responsibility where possible without derogating from UNSC responsibility for international peace and security



Response and Discussion

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