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Lake Chad Basin: Youth-led stabilisation amid a pandemic

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Summary

Youth-led peacebuilding initiatives play an increasingly important role in stabilising Boko Haram-affected communities in the Lake Chad Basin. This report analyses the role and impact of the Youth Network for the Lake Chad Region in peacebuilding efforts, and recommends ways to strengthen these efforts and enhance intra-regional collaboration.

Key findings

- The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a setback for youth efforts at peacebuilding and stabilisation in the Lake Chad Basin, as it has limited human interaction within local communities.
- Transitioning to entirely virtual engagements with communities is neither sustainable, nor is there sufficient buy-in for youth-led support of this type in the fragile region.
- Many donor organisations have down-sized partnerships with youth-led entities since the advent of the pandemic. This creates an opportunity for increased reliance on volunteer-based human resource capacity.
- In the face of COVID-19 and related challenges, there is increased willingness among youth-led organisations to engage the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union for the benefit of the communities in which they operate.

Recommendations

To the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union:

- The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) should craft a comprehensive plan of action for engaging youth-led organisations in the region. The plan should integrate continental youth-engagement strategies and the Youth, Peace and Security agenda within the context of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy.
- The African Union (AU) should continue advocating among Lake Chad Basin region member states to amplify the work of the Youth Network of the Lake Chad Region (YoNeLCR).
- The AU and LCBC should strengthen their partnerships with local youth organisations that have an in-depth understanding of both the terrain and community dynamics.

To the Youth Network of the Lake Chad Region:

- When the pandemic started, funding challenges were anticipated for all donor-reliant organisations. Members of the Youth Network of the Lake Chad Region (YoNeLCR) should create a culture of continuously developing multiple and innovative sources of sustainable funding.
- COVID-19 restrictions have hampered inter- and intra-state movements. Members of the YoNeLCR should harness local capacity that can operate independently, without external experts needing to travel to their communities.
- YoNeLCR members should prioritise their awareness of LCBC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU activities to explore possible areas or entry points for collaboration and engagement.

As the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin region – namely Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – continue to battle with the Boko Haram insurgency, local youth-led organisations are also having to find ways of mitigating this threat. Youth-led efforts, especially by the 60+ member organisations of the Youth Network of the Lake Chad Region (YoNeLCR), aim to cultivate resilience and peacebuilding in affected communities. Since the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, their efforts and initiatives have been affected by restrictive measures, including partial to full lockdowns and physical-distancing regulations.

In 2020, the African Union Commission (AUC) partnered with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the Institute for Security Studies/Training for Peace (ISS/TfP) Programme to engage with the YoNeLCR on challenges to peacebuilding and stabilisation in affected communities. This enquiry led to a set of findings and recommendations, which are intended to enhance YoNeLCR engagement in the region.

Additional research undertaken for this policy brief by the AUC and the ISS/TfP further explored how these youth-led organisations have been faring, particularly in their peacebuilding efforts, during the COVID-19

pandemic. The research examined existing practices and policies, focusing particularly on their inclusion in intergovernmental efforts. Additionally, the research identified challenges and opportunities for consideration by regional and continental policy- and decision-makers.

This policy brief analyses the current activities of the YoNeLCR, and offers recommendations for consideration by the network, the LCBC and the AUC. The policy brief is divided into four sections. The first explores peacebuilding and stabilisation in the region; the second considers the roles of young people in peacebuilding and stabilisation during a pandemic, particularly that of COVID-19; the third examines the challenges of youth-led interventions in the region; and the fourth focuses on fostering good practices to help make youth contributions count.

The AUC and ISS/TfP conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS) Secretariat and of the YoNeLCR. Research among the latter focused on the following questions:

- What activities was your organisation carrying out before the COVID-19 pandemic?
- What impact did the COVID-19 pandemic have on these activities?
- What challenges are you currently facing, and how do you plan to tackle them in a ‘COVID-19-proof’ manner?

The Youth Network of the Lake Chad Region

The YoNeLCR was established on the sidelines of the second Lake Chad Basin Region Governors’ Forum held in Niamey, Niger, in July 2019. This occurred after a meeting of grassroots-based, youth-led organisations in areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. Those in attendance agreed that the absence of a common platform and unified youth voice had contributed to the marginalisation of their inputs during high-level engagement at the forum. The YoNeLCR was established based on the common needs and interests of their pioneering members, and garnered the support of international organizations and influential African leaders. Today, the entity is made up of at least 50 youth organisations operating in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. All members are based and work in affected areas, and identify as non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, faith-based organisations or women-led organisations.

Peacebuilding and stabilisation in the Lake Chad Basin




Figure 1: Lake Chad Basin region map

The Boko Haram insurgency, which started in 2002 in northern Nigeria, now also encompasses areas of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It poses tremendous consequences for regional stability, peace and security. The insurgency and subsequent military responses have disrupted livelihoods across the region.¹ This, in turn, makes young people increasingly susceptible to recruitment by the group. At the same time, young people in these areas have also been affected in other ways – often either as victims or as perpetrators.²

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – an ad-hoc initiative supported by the AU and the United Nations (UN) – was established by heads of state and government during the extraordinary summit of LCBC member states and Benin in Niger, October 2014.³ In January 2015, Boko Haram invaded and overran the MNJTF base in Baga, Nigeria,⁴ leading to its reconfiguration the same year by affected countries.⁵

In addition to unilateral state actions to counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, the MNJTF, by design, is set up to provide a multidimensional military response utilising personnel from affected countries (including Benin). The MNJTF is both a counter-insurgency and stabilisation mechanism, with civilian oversight by the LCBC, to combat Boko Haram and other groups labelled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin.

As the AU and regional mechanisms have strived to provide a sustainable response to the crisis, Boko Haram has also modified its tactics. The group has shown resilience, and is increasingly targeting civilian populations through kidnappings and suicide attacks. Recent research has linked Boko Haram to violent abductions beyond the northeast of Nigeria.⁶ Young men as well as women are key victims for the group, with men becoming foot soldiers for the insurgency, while young women are often forced to become suicide bombers and sex slaves. More broadly, harsh socio-political and economic environments turn many young people into long-term victims of the insurgency.

As the AU and regional mechanisms have strived to provide a sustainable response to the crisis, Boko Haram has also modified its tactics.

Despite Boko Haram's apparent resilience, efforts by national governments, as well as cross-border cooperation, have led to significantly improved tactical coordination, and also facilitated the exchange of security-related best practices. These developments have, over the years, significantly reduced the group's ability to attack.⁷

The RSS as a model for stabilisation in Africa

To balance military and civilian responses to the crisis, the AU, in partnership with the LCBC, convened the first Conference on the Development of a Framework for a Regional Stabilisation Strategy in November 2017 in N'Djamena, Chad. The conference set the stage for the development of a comprehensive strategy, which would facilitate a transition from active military engagement to stabilisation, recovery and resilience. The AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) served as the basis for the launch of the stabilisation process. The process also relied on operational guidance drawn from the PCRD Guidelines Notes.⁸ It is for this reason that stabilisation remains a critical component of the AU's peace and security agenda for the region.

In line with Agenda 2063, the RSS represents the AU's efforts to Silence the Guns in Africa.⁹ It also aims to actualise the conditions necessary for sustainable peace and development in the Lake Chad Basin region, and to attain the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030.

The experience and efforts of the AU in leading the Lake Chad Basin regional stabilisation process serves as a record for best practices on enhancing coordination, complementarity and

subsidiarity between the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs). The result is a significant milestone in fostering greater cooperation and partnership between the AU and the UN, as advocated by the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in Africa.¹⁰

The analysis in this policy brief partly draws on the RSS pillar that focuses on the empowerment and inclusion of women and youth as a primary demography at the centre of the crisis. The RSS points to context-specific vulnerabilities that make young people in the region vulnerable to recruitment. These further drive radicalisation, migration, youth crime and delinquency, and drug abuse. This, in turn, hampers progress towards a productive and positive future.¹¹

Together with women, young people represent a demography whose situations are insufficiently understood. As such, the RSS recommends a comprehensive strategy to ensure the capacities of these groups are effectively harnessed in the implementation of the stabilisation process through gender-and-youth-sensitive approaches.¹² The RSS's two-year action plan includes establishing a regional civil society organisation (CSO) platform, serving as an entry point for the active participation of youth and women-led organisations in the stabilisation of the region.

During a pandemic, roles matter

The aforementioned response to the Boko Haram insurgency does not explicitly spell out the role of the youth – particularly those leading civilian efforts. Instead, it leans towards a predominant narrative of young people being either victims or

villains during times of trouble. Such an approach fails to acknowledge needs for assisting, guiding and reforming a vulnerable population group; nor does it adequately recognise the imperative of empowering or partnering with these groups to bring and sustain peace. These roles are both timely and significant amid the current COVID-19 pandemic.

It is of critical importance to note that some young men and women avoid or survive recruitment and other atrocities related to Boko Haram. Many of these individuals are willing to lead in conflict resilience, and they have organised their fellow youth and other community members in that regard. The diagram below illustrates the roles that young people are playing in the region – and how they get the job done.




Figure 2: What and how youth are contributing to peacebuilding in the Lake Chad Basin

In August 2020, the AUC, ISS/TfP and CMI hosted a 2-day virtual workshop for the YoNeLCR titled: Peacebuilding and Stabilisation in The Context of COVID. The workshop was intended to facilitate discussion between YoNeLCR members and the AU about efforts to bring lasting peace to their region, despite the pandemic. More than 40 youth-led organisations were able to describe their mandate and the initiatives they conduct.

From the workshop, it transpired that young people in the region generally agree that their main role is to advocate for youth inclusion and leadership in making their communities safe. They view themselves as playing the roles of messengers of peace, even in a voluntary capacity.

Inter-faith dialogue interlocutors were identified as giving young people space to lead in religious or related discussions. Some young people were found to use their tertiary education training in information and communication in technologies to create innovative platforms, such as digital applications, to facilitate the work of young peacebuilders. In some instances, these platforms are meant to function as early-warning tools in case of reprisal attacks by insurgents.

The most common finding among participants at the workshop was the role they play as conveners and leaders of CSOs that work to complement peacebuilding efforts by other stakeholders.

Further to these findings, the research sought to establish how they implement and fulfil these roles. This was highlighted during discussions with participants who expressed interest in forging partnerships with donor organisations and CSOs, including those that are youth-led. According to the youth participants, partnerships

like these help to secure the financial and human resources required to achieve their goals.

“90% of the time, it is inadequate resources that stop us from fulfilling our mandates.”

– YoNeLCR member, 2020

Some participants described encouraging young people to participate in and initiate community-driven initiatives as a means of resisting recruitment efforts by Boko Haram. One such example can be seen in sporting ventures that are undertaken to enhance social cohesion. Participants observed that some soccer clubs in the region serve as a meeting ground for both men and women. This activity enables youth organisations focused on reintegration to encourage and stimulate meaningful discussion with the community members.

Participants expressed their willingness to work with national governments where possible. They stated that their skills in platform creation could be useful in enabling ordinary civilians in affected communities to converse with government officials about their grievances.

“We don’t work against our governments. We want to complement their peacebuilding efforts.”

– YoNeLCR member, 2020

The discussions provided an opportunity for YoNeLCR members to reflect on some of the diverse roles of youth in the region, and introduce them to practical approaches and tools they

could use to engage with communities as well as lobby policy- and decision-makers.

The outcome of this intervention was a set of strategies amplifying high-level youth advocacy for youth issues, including creating partnerships to ensure sustainable support for relevant capacity building for young peacebuilders. Additionally, the realities of COVID-19 present what was identified as ‘trigger moments’ to catalyse other aspects in the drive by young people for inclusive mobilisation and coalition-building; particularly to promote partnership between the private sector and local communities (grassroots).

A highlight of the deliberations was a call on youth to seize the pandemic as an opportune moment for a ‘mindset reset’. The AUC called upon youth to remain flexible in their efforts to overcome the challenges of resource constraints and visibility despite the challenges posed by COVID-19. They were equally encouraged to make the most of both online and offline tools for engagement, combined with targeted messaging to positive influencers.

Challenges of youth interventions in the region

While young people in the Lake Chad Basin region can be commended for organising themselves and championing grassroots initiatives on peacebuilding and resilience, they are faced with various socio-economic and political challenges. As noted, these challenges

have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic – with the YoNeLCR being no exception. The work of its members has largely relied on human interaction within local communities. This has not been possible since early 2020.¹³ The terrain in which they work requires face-to-face interaction and engagement with local communities who learn about and benefit from their work. Since the start of the pandemic, programme implementation has operated at less than 20% of the usual level.¹⁴

YoNeLCR members do not have the luxury of working from home or remotely,¹⁵ not least because most members operate in rural communities that lack sufficient access to technology and Internet infrastructure. Another key challenge of having to continue working during the pandemic is a lack of funding for planned activities. At the start of the pandemic, fears of funding cuts circulated in the NGO community. YoNeLCR members were not spared either:

“We have had to suspend our customary activities and take up those that relate to health issues. That’s what the donors want, and that is where the money is. If we don’t, our operations will cease and we might never recover.”

– YoNeLCR member, 2021

Local Youth Corner Cameroon

The Local Youth Corner Cameroon is a youth-led organisation that contributes to peacebuilding and preventing violent extremism in northern Cameroon. This YoNeLCR member organisation partners with local volunteers for education and skills development among youth who are vulnerable to recruitment into terror groups.

As part of their activities, Local Youth Corner conducts its interventions in Mora, Mayotanga in Northern Cameroon. Based on the needs of communities, they provide training to young people who are at risk of being recruited into violent extremist groups. These training programmes include skills acquisition classes on carpentry and tailoring for unskilled youth.

Having most of its interventions limited due to COVID-19 related challenges, the organisation also highlighted existing difficulties that predate the pandemic. These include various cultural barriers that still exist in local communities where they operate, including scepticism of not only youth-led solutions, but also those led by women. The organisation has had to suspend activities due to the inability to travel and physically work within communities. This is primarily due to the impact of the pandemic on the organisation's resource mobilisation, which also had a direct impact on staffing required for community-led interventions.

This means the number of personnel sent into the field had to be minimised. One YoNeLCR member said they framed this as an opportunity to build the capacity of youth within remote communities. If such youth are trained to carry out the work without having to travel far, costs would be saved and the job would get done.

Borno Women Development Initiative

The Borno Women Development Initiative (BOWDI) is a female-led youth organisation that operates in Borno state in northern Nigeria. The organisation is a vital part of the YoNeLCR, and focuses on women empowerment in peace and security, food security and gender-based violence.

BOWDI's interventions and activities aim to raise awareness and create sensitisation in Borno in partnership with the United Nations Refugee Agency. With donor funding, the organisation established a support network for young women from Borno and Yobe states to play an enhanced and visible role in countering violent extremism and peacebuilding. A key initiative is a current intervention aimed at training young female leaders in Borno's capital city, Maiduguri, on strategies to counter violent extremism and their role in promoting the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

COVID-19 has drastically impacted BOWDI's activities, as the organisation has to adhere to government-induced regulations. As a result, they have been reaching fewer women since the start of the pandemic. BOWDI also experienced budgetary constraints as some international donors have had to reduce their support.

Fostering good practices: making youth count

The N'Djamena-based RSS secretariat is well aware of youth-led efforts in the region. Therefore, the YoNeLCR should plug itself into this key initiative – even through the CSO platform is still in a preliminary phase.¹⁶

Like the AUC, the RSS Secretariat functions in a coordinating capacity at the regional level. The burden of implementation is largely dependent on member states and national-level CSOs.¹⁷ Despite this, the development of local action plans is underway in the region. The secretariat has convened town hall meetings with different communities to articulate issues surrounding stability, resilience and recovery. According to the RSS Secretariat, youth groups were invited to these town hall meetings, and their contributions were adequately captured.¹⁸

“The value-addition by youth-led CSOs is great. They can highlight unique solutions and provide access to hard-to-reach communities”

– RSS Secretariat representative, 2021

The RSS Secretariat has since revealed that the pandemic has slowed their operations, and the setback for the implementation of their strategy could be at least a year.

In 2020, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted and endorsed the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security.¹⁹ This was arguably the first African framework of its

kind to have the AU and its RECs guide and collaborate on the work of young peacebuilders across the continent.

Additionally, the PSC endorsed the study on the roles and contributions of youth to peace and security in Africa.²⁰ The West Africa segment of the document explicitly highlights the positive roles that youth in the region play in boosting peace and security. However, it notes that the socio-political and economic milieu is not conducive for young people's safe participation in peace processes. The framework and study are resources for both the YoNeLCR and the RSS Secretariat to draw on in regional stabilisation efforts.

Conclusion

This research revealed that young people contribute significantly to leading and supporting responses to COVID-19 in their communities. These efforts are made possible by the expansion of youth activism from issues of political inclusion and participation, and socio-economic challenges. This will go a long way in contributing to the long-term recovery and resilience of the region.²¹

As the pandemic has introduced new realities in the young people and youth-led organisations operate, it poses new challenges for peacebuilding and stabilisation. It is important for policy- and decision-makers (including at the AUC and LCBC) to likewise continue engaging young people in innovative and practical ways. Youth networks like the YoNeLCR need to remain knowledgeable through evidence-based research and analysis that focuses on regional and local dynamics to deliver targeted and appropriate responses.

Furthermore, such measures would contribute to a process that links young peacebuilders to local and national governance structures, allowing these entities to tap into the vibrant youth activism in the region, and to ensure that young people are at the centre of inclusive mobilisation. This will help to ensure a multi-sectoral approach towards the domestication of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda. The youth-led organisations that participated in this research called on policy- and decision-makers to integrate youth engagement into an effective strategy to advance good governance, which would in turn ensure that youth are included in the process of stabilising the Lake Chad Basin region.

Annex

The YoNeLCR member list:

SN	Name of Organisation (Nom de l'organisation)	State/Province/ Region of Operation (État / Province / Région d'opérations)	Country (Pays)
1	Coordination des associations pour le développement du lac	Lac	Tchad
2	Association de cercle des jeunes pour la promotion socioéconomique du lac	Lac	Tchad
3	Association des femmes pour la paix et la cohésion sociale	Lac	Tchad
4	Collectif des jeunes et des femmes pour le développement de Kaya	Lac	Tchad
5	Coordination des associations et groupements pour le développement socio-économique de Wayi	Lac	Tchad
6	Association des jeunes de Liwa pour la lutte contre VIH/Sida et la violence basée sur le genre	Lac	Tchad
7	Entente des jeunes de karal pour prévention de l'extrémisme violent et la lutte contre le chômage	Hadjer-Lamis	Tchad
8	Association des jeunes pour le développement de Mani	Hadjer-Lamis	Tchad
9	Association des jeunes de la sous-préfecture de karal	Hadjer-Lamis	Tchad
10	AIRTIBAT	Hadjer-Lamis	Tchad
11	Le Contort	Lac	Tchad
12	Alliance nationale d'entre aide sociale	Lac	Tchad
13	HANANA	Lac	Tchad
14	Association des jeunes élèves et étudiants du Lac	Lac	Tchad
15	Association pour le développement socio-économique de la province	Lac	Tchad
16	Initiative des jeunes volontaire pour la protection de l'environnement IJVPE-DIFFA CHAWA	Diffa	Niger
17	Association des jeunes pour la promotion de la paix AJSUP	Goudoumaria	Niger
18	Hangin mata (vision des femmes)	Chétimarie	Niger
19	Association Nigérienne pour la promotion des jeunes (ANPJ)	Mainé Soroua	Niger
20	Association des jeunes pour la promotion de la paix dans le bassin du lac Tchad AJPAP	Diffa	Niger
21	Conseil communale des jeunes de Gueskerou	Gueskerou	Niger
22	Cadre de concertation et d'action des jeunes	Diffa	Niger

SN	Name of Organisation (Nom de l'organisation)	State/Province/ Region of Operation (État / Province / Région d'opérations)	Country (Pays)
23	Conseil régionale de la jeunesse	Diffa	Niger
24	Conseil communal de la jeunesse N'Guigumi	N'Guigumi	Niger
25	Conseil communale de la jeunesse de Bosso -Bosso	Bosso	Niger
26	North East Youth Initiative for Development - Yobe	Yobe	Nigeria
27	Child Protection and Women Empowerment Initiative	Yobe	Nigeria
28	Grow Strong Foundation	Borno	Nigeria
29	Yobe Young Generation Development Association	Yobe	Nigeria
30	Borno Social Media Frontiers	Borno	Nigeria
31	Youth Advocate for Peace Initiative	Adamawa	Nigeria
32	Youth Initiative 4 Sustainable Development	Yobe	Nigeria
33	Hope Interactive	Yobe	Nigeria
34	Women and Youth for Moral Awareness	Adamawa	Nigeria
35	Women in Sahel Initiative	Yobe	Nigeria
36	Create A Wonderful World Initiative	Borno	Nigeria
37	The Spotlight Ng	Yobe	Nigeria
38	Rayuwar Mu Ayau Youth Awareness Association	Adamawa	Nigeria
39	Center for Advocacy, Transparency and Accountability Initiative	Borno	Nigeria
40	Standard Cultural Initiative	Yobe	Nigeria
41	African Initiative for Safe Shelter	Yobe	Nigeria
42	Like Minds Progressive and Empowerment Foundation	Adamawa	Nigeria
43	Borno Women Development Initiative	Borno	Nigeria
44	Sahel Magazine	Yobe	Nigeria
45	Portrait of Lake Chad	Yobe	Nigeria
46	Youth Center for Lasting Peace and Development	Mora	Cameroon
47	Association des Jeunes Activistes de Garoua	Garoua	Cameroon
48	Action for Peace	Kousseri	Cameroon
49	Local Youth Corner	Maroua	Cameroon
50	Action pour le Developpement et la Consolidation de la Paix	North Region	Cameroon

Notes

- 1 Conflict Monitor (2020). Lake Chad Basin: Conflict and Food Insecurity. Retrieved 23 April 2021, from https://cropmonitor.org/documents/CONFLICT/reports/Conflict_Report_20200801_Lake_Chad_Basin.pdf.
- 2 As victims, youth in the region are likely to be turned into 'Boko Haram wives', or be subjected to rape and other forms of physical and emotional abuse, amongst other violations. As perpetrators, they are likely to be recruited into Boko Haram as foot soldiers or even suicide bombers.
- 3 The MNJTF is a combined multinational formation comprising troops from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin. It was first configured in 1994 by the military government of General Sanni Abacha to check the activities of cross-border criminal activities and facilitate the free movement of persons and goods on the north-eastern borders. It's headquarters are currently located in N'Djamena, Chad, and its mandate was upgraded to include counter-insurgency towards ending the criminal activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad Region.
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- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Interview with member of Youth Network of Lake Chad Basin, 2021.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Interview with member of Youth Network of Lake Chad Basin, 2021.
- 16 The RSS implementation plan calls for the establishment of a Regional Civil Society Platform to be represented on its Steering Committee. Retrieved 8 April 2021, from <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/regional-stabilisation-recovery-and-resilience-strategy-rss-.pdf>.
- 17 Feedback from Interview with LCBC RSS team.
- 18 Ibid.

- 19 African Union Commission. Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security. (2020). Retrieved 8 April 2021, from <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/continental-framework-on-youth-peace-and-security-english.pdf>.
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Alvin G Odinukwe joined the AU Commission in 2017 in the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, supporting the development of the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience Strategy and the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security. He is an advocate for the inclusion of youth in policy- and decision-making.

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