



2010
MAKE PEACE HAPPEN

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Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early Warning Issues for December

The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of December is Mali. In the absence of a country's representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month.

Benin

There is currently a trend toward the radicalisation of both the opposition forces and the government, complicated by the recent flood that affected 680 000 people in Benin. Sixty people were reported to have died and many more were suffering from waterborne diseases. The socio-political crisis in Benin could add to the ongoing deterioration of the security environment in West Africa, with tensions around the electoral processes in Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and chronic instability in Guinea Bissau.

While those cases have seen a consolidated engagement of regional and extra-regional actors, the international community's attention to the Benin situation is rather non-existent.

Côte d'Ivoire

On 31 October 2010, Côte d'Ivoire successfully conducted the much delayed and repeatedly extended presidential election. Marking an important step towards ending the protracted political crisis triggered by the civil war that started in September 2002, the election was held in an atmosphere that was generally free of violence. The election also registered a high voter turn out of 80 percent, signifying the strong desire of the public for the crisis to end. These successes in the election raised cautious optimism among observers that the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) may at long last be working and that Africa may be witnessing the end of a violent conflict.

However, whether Côte d'Ivoire overcomes the political crisis that bedevilled the transitional process will depend on the run-off election scheduled for 28 November and its aftermath. Ultimately, the country's path towards lasting peace will depend on the measures that the future government will take to deal with the many outstanding issues including national reconciliation, curbing impunity and lawlessness, socio-economic insecurity, and justice and security sector reforms. (Note: This analysis was conducted shortly before the November run-off election)

Guinea

The second round presidential election that took place in Guinea on 7 November, 2010 was originally scheduled to take place on 19 September and was postponed several times because of a lack of preparation and ongoing political and ethnic tensions and violence. Unlike the first round election that took place on 27 July, 2010, the period preceding the second round

Livingstone Formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

was filled with violence, instability and fear. Hopes were raised that the post election violence that followed the first round polls would not be repeated, particularly after both candidates in the presidential run-off election had signed an agreement, on 6 November, 2010, committing themselves to a peaceful and stable election campaign and pledging to follow established legal procedures in the event of election disagreements and disputes about the outcome.

Unfortunately, ethnic division and violence has been exacerbated in the wake of a series of pre election clashes and the perceived partiality of some state institutions in favour of specific ethnic groups. The task of creating national reconciliation and sustaining the democratic process, awaits the new government in addition to the task of restoring Guinea's membership of, and role in, regional and international organisations and the resuscitation of its economy which has suffered greatly during the political instability of the past two years.

(Note: The August Peace and Security Council Report, volume 13 contains additional background information about this topic).

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Benin

Previous PSC and AU Communiqués and Recommendations

The AU PSC has not yet made any pronouncement on the situation in Benin

Crisis escalation Potential

Since August 2010, Benin's social and political stability has come under threat as a result of what is seen as the most serious financial scandal in 20 years of its democratisation process. Inspired by the misdeeds of the American banker, Bernard Madoff, Benin's Investment Consultancy & Computerising Services (ICC-Services) has been the key factor at the heart of that crisis. The ICC-Services were set up as a credit and financial structure that would provide returns of 200% on savings deposited by citizens, mainly women, who own small or big businesses. From this scheme and at the expenses of its vulnerable clients, the company made an estimated 100 Billion CFA (152 Million Euro). The scam was uncovered when people never received their returns. It appears from preliminary investigations that the money was used for political and religious activities at the behest of President Yayi Boni. Some funds went through money laundering schemes.

A commission of inquiry hurriedly set up by the government revealed the connection between government officials and the establishment of a fraudulent credit and financial scheme, which bypassed all existing financial regulations. ICC-Services were provided with a license by the Minister of the Interior who prepared the ground for the

institution to operate dishonestly with the alleged protection of the government. Although the President claims he has no knowledge of the scheme and the involvement of his cabinet, and has since dismissed the minister and the Attorney General, many in the country believe it is the responsibility of the government and the state to protect citizens from financial scams of such a scale.

A decision by the government to refund the victims of the scam has not been successful so far, in curbing the rising tensions in the country. And the kidnapping of the alleged whistle-blower, an official from the Finance Ministry, Pierre Urbain Dagnivo, has added to the controversy and heightened the crisis. Pierre Urbain Dagnivo was kidnapped by unknown men a few days after it was suspected that he might have been behind the denunciation of the scandal. Efforts by his family and the government to find him or apprehend his kidnappers have not yielded any conclusive results while there is a fear that he might have been killed by state security elements.

This event has contributed to the polarisation of the situation and served as a political instrument in the hands of opposition parties' leaders. The national situation has deteriorated with frequent street protests that the government subsequently decided to ban to avoid violent confrontation. To enforce the ban, security forces were deployed at strategic places throughout the country. Trade union leaders and civil society organisations vowed to challenge the government's decision, arguing it amounted to a violation of citizens' fundamental rights and political oppression.

Two outstanding issues remain controversial with the potential for worsening the already tense political atmosphere. Firstly, the delay by the government in

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Key Issues and Internal Dynamics

Various political actors in the country accuse the president of wanting to weaken state institutions for his own benefit. These accusations followed attempts by President Yayi Boni, at the expense of the principle of separation of powers, to co-opt leaders from key state institutions, political parties and civil society organisations, in order to consolidate his power. They argue that while Yayi Boni has promised upon his election to fight corruption and promote

Indeed, Benin's political system continues to suffer from a high degree of political immobility. Since the successful completion of the "democratic renewal", all major reform projects have advanced only very slowly or have stalled. In addition, governing through client networks has at best led to a high degree of politicisation of the administration. Politicisation, in combination with a low level of resources, rigid bureaucratic norms, a sub-optimal distribution of personnel (across regions and sectors) and weak intra-administrative control and sanctioning mechanisms, has largely contributed to the low effectiveness of the administration in implementing government decisions. In that sense, large sections of the administration, at least partially, escape central control.

More than a financial scandal, the ongoing crisis has brought to the fore the deterioration of the socio-political environment in Benin five

For the main opposition leader, Andrien Houngbeji, the government and the President in particular, are to be held responsible for the scandal. He contends that the president only set up a commission of enquiry to ease popular discontent over a nationwide financial fraud organised by ICC-Services with the complicity of members of government; and for the president to possibly cover up his own complicity. Houngbeji's accusations have been strongly rejected by Boni Yayi who has now come under increasing pressure to react.

As the speaker of the parliament

In a report submitted at the end of July, the Mediator of the Republic, Prof. Albert Tevoedjre, who was instrumental in Yayi Boni's election in 2006, highlighted the weak leadership of the president and the disintegration of national institutions. According to Tevoedjre, Benin is in danger and urgently needs a new national conference to re-craft the political scenery, refine the social contract and bring back a sense of national consciousness based on republican values. The report raised concerns over politics, the economy, education and other vital sectors of life that are becoming increasingly

During his visit to the country in June this year, Ban Ki Moon, the United Nations Secretary-General, against the advice of

Civil society organisations have played and continue to play a key role in the promotion of democracy in Benin. It was under the leadership of CSOs that former president Mathieu Kerekou's attempt to manipulate the constitution to hang onto power failed in 2006, paving the way for the election of an independent candidate as a new president. According to the International Press Institute (IPI), Benin has one of the region's most vibrant media landscapes. Most local and international observers believe that

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In the current crisis, the initiative taken by the Catholic Church to ease tension is underway with the hope that each actor will show commitment to social peace and cohesion. The archbishop of Cotonou held a meeting with trade union leaders and the president to uplift the ban on peaceful street protests and marches. While the president agreed to the proposals to uplift the ban on protests, civil society organisations continue to challenge the government over its responsibility to meet the demands of the ICC-Services victims and the truth about the disappearance of the Finance Ministry's official.

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

The ability and the willingness of

Scenario 3

Early Response Options

Option 1

Benin has not experienced a crisis of this intensity since its national conference in the early 1990s. The resurgence of radical opposition emanates from unresolved corruption cases, abuse of power and the risk of failure of democratic institutions. There is a need to resort to a national dialogue, a strategy used in the late 1980s that saw the country emerge from a Marxist Leninist dictatorship to lay the foundations for a democratic process that still needs consolidation.

Option 2

Option 3

While the national conference undoubtedly represented a significant step towards democracy, it did little to change the country's deep rooted political-economic structures. It is understandable that the donor community wish to refrain from getting involved in "the domestic affairs" of Benin, but the implications of this approach could be detrimental to all. Therefore, there is also a need for regional and extra regional actors to pay attention to the situation and to anticipate the outcomes.

PSC Retrospective: Exercise AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise (CPX)

During its 248th meeting held on 13 November 2010, the AUC Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Lamamra, briefed the PSC on the Exercise AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise held in Addis Ababa from 13 October to 29 October 2010. The CPX was the culminating event of a two-years long process involving a series of conferences and exercises jointly organized by the AU-EU to serve as tools both to facilitate and test the operational readiness of the ASF. In the statement, **PSC/PR/BR (CCXLVIII)**, issued following the briefing, the PSC welcomed the successful completion of the Exercise. The PSC also rightly deemed the completion of the exercise a 'significant step towards the operationalisation of the African Standby Force.'

The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of the critical components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that is intended to endow the African Union (AU) with a multidimensional capability for undertaking both peace support operations (PSOs) as per Article 13 of the PSC Protocol and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. While at its core, the ASF is composed of civilian, military and police capabilities that are raised and prepared at the level of the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/ Regional Mechanisms (RMs), it also has a management capability known as the Planning Elements (PLANELMs), both at strategic and mission levels, based at the AU and RECs/RMs respectively. The RECs/RMs have been responsible for establishing their respective PLANELMs and raising and preparing the ASF capabilities. The AU, for

its part, has been responsible for providing leadership for RECs/RMs and establishing strategic level management capability and developing the necessary policy framework documents such as the AU PSO Doctrine, the decision-making procedure, operational processes such as the SOPs and technical concepts and documents addressing various aspects of the AU PSO from logistics to medical issues.

According to the timeline envisaged by the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee, the operationalisation of the ASF would take place in two phases from 2003 until 2010. At the end of Phase II in 2010, the proposal was for the ASF to achieve operational readiness to be deployed both for PSOs and intervention missions.

Exercise AMANI Africa was thus originally conceived as a vehicle to assess and determine the operational readiness of the ASF. It was thus thought that at the end of this process the ASF might be declared operationally ready. In the run-up-to and when the CPX was held in October, the level of ambition was realistically moderated. Accordingly, the AU pitched the objective of the CPX to mainly focus on determining the level of progress made in operationalizing the ASF and identifying gaps in the development of required capabilities, the existing structures, policy documents, procedures and concepts.

The CPX was conducted based on a fictitious crisis situation unfolding in the imaginary AU member state of Carana. While the PSOD served as the AU Strategic Headquarters responsible for the planning, strategic direction and

management of the AU Mission in Carana (AMICA), participants from the RECs/RMs PLANELMs constituted the personnel for Mission HQ. Other components of the Exercise included Exercise Director (DIREX), Exercise Control (EXCON), an Evaluation Team and Observers. The Exercise saw the active involvement of the AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Department of Peace and Security and notably the PSC itself.

The events simulated in the exercise involve developments that are believed to arise in an *ASF Scenario 4* peace support operation. Those hypothetical events arising on the ground were played out over the course of the exercise by EXCON and were designed to assess whether the established structures and the personnel filling them had the capability to adequately respond to, and handle, the imagined incidents and do so in accordance with the AU PSO Doctrine, SOPs and other established documents and concepts.

As such, the exercise offered a good opportunity to put the established policy frameworks, processes and concepts, as well as AU level structures and their personnel, to the test. Even though it was sometimes compromised by its artificiality, the Exercise made it possible to observe and make an assessment of whether the policy frameworks, AU PSO processes and concepts proved adequate and to identify areas that need refinement as well as others that may require change or further development. The exercise also made it possible for PSOD staff to practically test and apply the various processes and concepts and as such have an

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PSC Retrospective: Exercise AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise (CPX)

understanding of the level of their knowledge and skills with respect to the planning and management of AU PSOs.

Seen from this perspective, the exercise was indeed a success and marked, as the PSC rightly observed, a 'significant step ... towards the operationalization of the African Standby Force.' Other major achievements of the exercise include the opportunity it offered for participants, particularly from the AU and RECs/RMs, to deepen their knowledge, and for senior AU leaders and participating member states to broaden their awareness of the ASF capabilities, procedures and requirements.

In terms of assessing the progress made in the operationalization of the ASF, the exercise revealed that although there are some gaps, the established policy guidelines, the structures and procedures provide a good starting point. Seen in the light of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the ASF, the exercise revealed that more work needs to be done to develop the ASF as a fully multidimensional body. More specifically, it was observed that it would be worthwhile to establish clarity about how some of the structures of the PSOD such as the operations room relate to, and operate with, other AU commission structures such as the Conflict Management Division, Department of Political Affairs and office of the legal council. At the policy level, gaps identified include the lack of clarity with respect to the role of the ASF regarding humanitarian action. The gaps observed in terms of strategic level operational procedures and guidelines include procedures

to obtain legal input to determine the legal appropriateness of proposed courses of action; guidelines defining the division of responsibility between strategic level and mission level work; and established formats or guidelines for strategic level analysis, briefings and communication.

At the level of the personnel involved, the Exercise showed that there was a knowledge gap with respect to not only the applicable legal rules and policies but also with respect to basic ASF concepts including scenarios, processes and documentation and how they would apply. The need for training in all aspects of the ASF is thus one of the lessons identified from the Exercise. The need to fill the proposed PSOD structure with personnel having the minimum knowledge and skills required for their specific roles was also identified.

There were also more fundamental issues identified during the exercise. The most important of these relates to the respective role of RECs/RMs and AU member states with respect to the deployment of ASF capabilities. In the Exercise, the PSC communiqué mandating AMICA, called on the Regional Economic Communities and Coordinating mechanisms to provide military and other personnel, equipment and services for the successful deployment of AMICA.

This directive seems to wrongly assume that AU member states have surrendered their sovereign authority to decide on the release of the capabilities they pledged to form part of the capabilities that the RECs/RMs raise and prepare. Given that the ASF is composed of 'multidisciplinary contingents ... in their countries of origin' as per

Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, member states continue to have the ultimate authority for deciding to release troops and personnel as well as equipment that they earmarked for ASF purposes. The role of RECs/RMs is simply one of facilitating the preparation of those troops for deployment. According to the AU PSO Doctrine as well, military and civilian components and equipment of the ASF are obtained from contributing countries through a process of force generation. It would therefore be necessary for the AU to establish the necessary legal arrangements with the RECs/RMs and at the level of AU member states in order to clarify this issue. This includes revising the existing Memorandum of Understanding signed between the AU and RECs/RMs in 2008.

It is important to note that this exercise did not involve an assessment of the entire ASF. In terms of its scope, therefore, the focus of the exercise was limited to assessing the capability of the AU strategic level management structure at the AU PSOD, mainly with respect to the management and provision of strategic guidance to an already deployed AU PSO. At the AU level, the processes leading to the establishment of a mission, and its capability to launch a mission, were not exercised.

With respect to the RECs/RMs, although they have conducted various exercises, the level of progress made in developing their regional level capabilities was also not part of the exercise. Accordingly, where the regional capabilities stand in terms of development and operationalization is not yet adequately known. Similarly,

PSC Retrospective: Exercise AMANI Africa Command Post Exercise (CPX)

given that the exercise focuses on a mission *Scenario 4* peace support operation, the development of the Rapid Deployment Capability designed for intervention missions and the processes surrounding its deployment or use were also not tested.

It is therefore clear that the next steps towards full operationaliza-

tion of the ASF need to be built on, not only the lessons identified through Exercise AMANI CPX but also a full examination of the various aspects of the ASF. These most particularly include an AU evaluation and verification of the progress made at the RECs/RMs levels in developing the necessary capabilities and the progress made in developing the RDC and

mechanisms to be put in place for its eventual operationalization.

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Côte d'Ivoire:

Presidential Election

On 31 October 2010, Côte d'Ivoire successfully conducted the much delayed and repeatedly extended presidential election. Marking an important step towards ending the protracted political crisis triggered by the civil war that started in September 2002, the election was held in an atmosphere that was generally free of violence. The election also registered a high voter turn out of 80 percent, signifying the strong desire of the public for the crisis to end. These successes in the election raised cautious optimism among observers that the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) may at long last be working and that Africa may be witnessing the end of a violent conflict.

However, whether Côte d'Ivoire overcomes the political crisis that bedevilled the transitional process will depend on the run-off election scheduled for 28 November and its aftermath. Ultimately, the country's path towards lasting peace will depend on the measures that the future government will take to deal with the many outstanding issues including national reconciliation, curbing impunity and lawlessness, socio-economic insecurity, and justice and security sector reforms.

Previous PSC Communiqués and other AU statements

In the communiqué, **PSC/PR/Comm.1(CCXLVI)**, that was issued on 28 October 2010, the PSC stated that 'the holding of a peaceful, free, open and transparent presidential election on 31 October 2010, constitutes an important step in the crisis exit process and the resolution of outstanding issues in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement.' Subsequently, the PSC in a press statement, **PSC/PR/BR.(CCXLVIII)**, issued on 13 November 2010 welcomed the successful holding of the first round of the presidential election and 'appealed to the different actors concerned to do their utmost for the successful completion of the process, by increasing their efforts and by creating all the conditions required for the proper conduct of the second round of the presidential election.'

While welcoming the successful holding of the 31 October 2010 presidential election, the AU Chairperson, Jean Ping, in a press statement, declared the election 'a historic vote, which marks a crucial step in the process for a way out of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.' Noting the delicacy of the situation in the country, the Chairperson called on the Ivorian parties to accept the outcome of the poll upon declaration by the electoral

commission and without resorting to any unilateral public statement.

Background and context

The organization of this presidential election constitutes a critical part of the peace process. Although it was considered a key factor towards ending the conflict in the country, the election has been postponed several times since 2005. This was due to the security situation, disagreements between the various political actors over voter lists and the implementation of other aspects of the OPA and its supplementary agreements. When the voter identification and registration process ended in November 2009, it produced two lists, a provisional voters list of 5,277,392 whose national identity had been confirmed and a list of 1,003,985 persons whose identity still remained to be confirmed.

Early this year, following the dissolution by President Laurent Gbagbo of the *Commission Electorale Indépendante* (CEI) and the government, the election process was discontinued. This was due to allegations by the ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) party that the revised voters' list compiled by the CEI contained a fraudulent list of 429,000 persons. The government also complained of the reluctance of the former rebel group, New

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Forces or *les Forces Nouvelles* (FN) to demobilize and disarm before the presidential election. While the ruling party insisted that the provisional list had to be audited in order to remove fraudulently included individuals, opposition parties called for the resumption of the appeals process over the list of persons whose nationality was not confirmed.

General, Y.J. Choi, subsequently certified the list on 24 September 2010.

It was during the month before the election date that the CEI conducted the identification, recruitment and training of 66,000 polling staff. This was also facilitated by the supporting hand of the UNOCI. However, it was reported that the training of the local staff of the CEI, particularly polling staff, took place very late, with most of them receiving training 48 hours before polls opened.

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the election, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of 500 additional uniformed personnel for a period of no more than six months. Accordingly, the UNOCI augmented the integrated command in providing security.

Campaigning

In terms of the electoral timetable announced on 25 August 2010, the period 16 to 30 October 2010 was set aside for election campaigning. The CEI called on candidates to abide by a Code of Conduct that was adopted on 24 April, 2008, by more than 40 political parties in the presence of the U.N. Secretary-General. The presidential candidates also expressed commitment to the Code of Conduct. This, together with international pressure and the visit undertaken by the AU PSC, encouraged the parties to conduct their campaign largely within the terms of the agreed Code.

It was reported that immediately before the start of the campaign period, representatives of candidates and sometimes candidates themselves made pronouncements capable of raising tension. During the campaign period, there was tension in some areas between supporters of two of the major candidates, the President and the former Prime Minister, Allassane Ouattara, and isolated incidents of violence and rioting were also reported.

During the campaign period, the campaign became very heated. It reportedly aroused passions and emotions. However, it was conducted in a generally peaceful manner throughout the country.

A major concern for the various candidates was also the issue of equitable access to the state media. During the AU PSC's visit to the country during late September and early October, while opposition party candidates expressed the need for equitable access to the

media, the ruling party complained of the existence of various media and TV networks, including TVNP, which were being used by only one candidate. It is clear that prior to the campaigning period some candidates particularly the incumbent, used their advantageous positions in using public media to reach supporters.

The presidential election of 31 October was contested among 14 presidential candidates, whose candidacies were approved by the Constitutional Council announcement of 19 October, 2010. All except one were men. While 10 of the candidates represented, and were backed by, political parties, the remaining four were independent candidates. The main contenders for the election were the leaders of the three major political parties in Côte d'Ivoire. These are the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo of the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), former Prime Minister Allassane Ouattara of *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) and former President Henri Konan Bédié of *Parti démocratique Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI). As representatives of the largest parties in the country, these three candidates have the advantage of relying on established political support and have the financial support to reach out to their supporters.

In the first round of the election, Gbagbo, who was elected in 2000 and remained in power after the expiry of his term of office in 2005, drew much of his support from the southern and south-eastern regions of the country, including Abidjan, in addition to some areas of the west. He enjoys the support of militant youth and militia groups as well as the state security apparatus. Allasaane Ouattara, who was previously precluded from standing to contest earlier presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire on account of the national origin of his parents, drew support from people in the Muslim dominated north under the control of FN. Henri

Konan Bédié, who was removed from his presidency in 1999 by a military coup, has his main support base in the Akan ethnic group, one of the largest in the country.

Voting

Most polling stations reportedly opened on time at 7:00 am. Voters started to turn up at polling stations much earlier than the official opening hour. Although the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General expressed concern that the low turn out of voters for the 2000 election might recur again, the 31 October presidential election witnessed a record turn out of about 80 percent. This high level of public participation increased the legitimacy of the polls and demonstrated some success in the preparations and campaigning and most importantly the enthusiasm of the public for a return to normalcy.

Because the number of voters per polling station was limited to 400, voters managed to cast their ballots within the stipulated voting hours. Accordingly, polls also closed on time at 5 p.m.

The polling was conducted in an atmosphere that was largely free of violence. Security forces assigned to monitor the election provided security for the smooth conduct of the elections, but the level of their presence varied from place to place. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Choi Young-Jin, subsequently informed the UN that no major human rights violation had been recorded during the voting.

While no major technical and logistical problems were reported, the opening of some polling stations, including in the economic capital, Abijan, was delayed by as long as two hours. Some observer groups reported some operational flaws such as the failure of polling officials to check

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Vote counting, tabulation and announcement of the results

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the counting and tabulation process was conducted peacefully and in a transparent manner. Observers and representatives of candidates were allowed to witness the entire process.

Lacs and N'ZI Combe, where Bédié garnered the most support. Gbagbo also scored the highest votes in the northeastern region of Zanzan, formerly a stronghold of Bédié's PDCI.

The prospects for the runoff election and beyond

Prior to the first round, a coalition

The second round of the election is likely to reflect the north-south divide in the country, with the moderating factor being the vote of Bédié's supporters from the centre. Additionally, neither of the two candidates represents a change in the political tradition of the country. They were both part of the old political system. Given the widely held perception that the two represent different and seemingly opposing constituencies in the country, the winner will face a daunting task in terms of pursuing genuine reconciliation.

A victory for Gbagbo would signal the entrenchment of a certain level of nationalism, particularly because of Gbagbo's resistance to external intervention and pressure and his strong stance against the rebellion. An Ouattara victory, on the other hand, will be symbolic of a reconciliation of the nation and

The fact that the two candidates are on different sides in Côte d'Ivoire's political division reinforces cleavages and presents potentially a serious risk of violence during the run-off or after the announcement of a winner, particularly if the process is not deemed by the loser to have been transparent. Signs of this are already beginning to emerge. People in the South, particularly the para-militias and the so-called "Young Patriots" have made pronouncements that they are willing to accept no winner other than the incumbent. The risk of violence is reinforced by the fact that both in the north and south there are various groups in possession of, and having access to, arms. These include not only militias but also bands of armed youths who present a serious threat to stability and security, including in some of the main cities such as Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and San-Pedro.

Apart from the peaceful conduct of the election, Côte d'Ivoire will need to contend with many outstanding issues for achieving a sustainable peace and democratic order. Genuine national reconciliation processes need to be pursued. The first and most important issue is to overcome the deep divisions in the country. It is of paramount importance that if the run-off

The country also needs to address the insecurities of many sections of the population, including those that arise from control and ownership of land. Apart from finalizing the DDR process, including through disbanding militias and informal armed groups, there is also a need for implementing effective security sector and justice sector reform in the country. To end impunity and prevent a cycle of violence, not only do measures need to be taken against perpetrators of serious violations of human rights, but also law and order needs to be established, particularly in the violence affected western part of the country. The unification of the north and the south has also to be finalized.

Clearly, while the immediate focus of many in the international community, including the AU and ECOWAS, is on the run-off election, equal attention needs to be paid to the aforementioned outstanding issues facing the country as it strives to make a successful transition to peace and stability.

Given the above variables and possibilities, the following courses of action are proposed for the PSC to consider:

1. The PSC could request the Chairperson of the Commission to closely follow developments surrounding the run-off election and consider undertaking a mission in the event of the eruption of a crisis.
2. The PSC could also mandate the AU Commission to maintain its election observation mission for the run-off election and mandate the AU office to work together with others including the UNOCI in supporting the election process and establishing a level playing field by also ensuring that both candidates have equal access to media coverage, particularly in the case of national radio and TV.
3. The PSC could also issue a press statement calling on the candidates, their supporters and the public in general to follow peaceful and legal avenues for any contestation that may arise in relation to the run-off election and bring the electoral process to a successful end.
4. As the country strives to establish a new government, the PSC could extend the AU's support to the country, including through soliciting and encouraging various kinds of external support for Côte d'Ivoire including its consideration for support by the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Documentation:

Relevant AU Documents:

PSC/PR/Comm.1 (CCXLVI)
(28 October 2010) Communiqué
of the Situation in Cote d'Ivoire

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(5 March 2010) Statement on
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(29 March 2007) Communiqué on
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PSC/PR/COMM.2(LXXII)
(19 March 2007) Communiqué on
the situation in Cote d'Ivoire

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(17 October 2006) Communiqué
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(10 January 2010) Communiqué
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PSC Retrospective- the operationalisation of the Pelindaba Treaty

The first Conference of States Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) took place at the AU Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, on 4 November 2010 sixteen months after it came into force. The Conference was held in accordance with Articles 12 and 14 of the Treaty. Article 12 of the Treaty states that, following the required provisions for ratification, African countries will establish an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). In addition to serving as a compliance mechanism, the AFCONE will be responsible for encouraging regional and sub-regional programs for

co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, thereby becoming a hub for African nuclear expertise. Article 14 of the Treaty also recommends that an AU conference of all parties should be convened to establish the way forward and intensify the wider ratification process among those states that have not yet ratified the treaty. The conference was held to further articulate and draft specific guidelines for AFCONE which could ideally function as a regional partner for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The PSC issued a communiqué **PSC/PR/Comm (LIII)** on 31 May 2006, on the African Nuclear-

Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) **PSC/PR/2/ (LIII)**. In this communiqué, the Council expressed its concern at the delay in the entry into force of the Treaty and urged member States to sign and ratify the treaty. On 15 July 2009, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone which covers the entire African continent, as well as surrounding islands, entered into force after Burundi became the 28th party to ratify the treaty, some fourteen years after it was adopted in July 1995. As at 1 November 2010, thirty African states have ratified the treaty.

The Treaty of Pelindaba is named

PSC Retrospective- the operationalisation of the Pelindaba Treaty

after the South African nuclear research facility, now devoted to peaceful nuclear energy research, which originally developed a nuclear weapons capability that was subsequently discontinued during the 1990s in the twilight of the apartheid years. The treaty seeks to ensure that nuclear weapons are not developed, produced, tested, or otherwise acquired or stationed on the African continent. The Treaty also prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste in Africa and promotes the peaceful application of nuclear technology and science among member states. The treaty is supplemented by three additional protocols. The first protocol targets nuclear powers; the second prohibits nuclear tests; and the third addresses states which *de jure or de facto* have territories under their jurisdiction in the Treaty application area. In addition, the treaty commits its parties to apply the highest standard of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities, and equipment to prevent theft and unauthorized use, as well as to prohibit armed attacks against nuclear installations within the zone.

The convening of the long awaited Conference in Addis Ababa marked a new step in the AU's overall efforts to further the implementation of the objectives of the Pelindaba Treaty. The Conference called upon the AU Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba without further delay. It also appealed to concerned non-African states to speedily sign and ratify the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba, to comply with all the commitments contained therein and to refrain from any action that could undermine their objectives. Within the framework of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research,

Development and Training, related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), the conference also discussed the promotion of safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear security and the combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material. The prohibition of the testing of nuclear explosive devices was also a major focus of the conference.

The First Conference of Parties was attended by the following AU Member States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition, representatives of countries not yet party to the treaty, were also present, including Egypt, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ghana, Namibia, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sudan and Uganda, as well as nuclear weapon states. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) were also present.

The conference elected Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia to be members of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) while endorsing the decision to establish the headquarters of ACNE in South Africa. It was also agreed that the next Conference of States Parties should be held within six months to finalise decisions on the structure and budget of ACNE, as well as its programme of activities. The commission will be responsible for ensuring that African States and Nuclear Weapon States comply

with the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing Africa as a nuclear weapon-free zone.

The African Union (AU), Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Romtane Lamamra, stated that the AU is committed to achieving the Universality of the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and emphasised that the establishment of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs), especially in the Middle East region, would enhance the security of Africa. He said the AU would remain committed to strengthening the nuclear weapon-free zones regime, thus contributing to the nuclear disarmament and the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with a view to achieving a nuclear-weapons free world.

Article 7(n) of the AU PSC protocol empowers the Council to promote and encourage the implementation of OAU/AU, UN and other relevant international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament. Accordingly, the PSC could continue to encourage other parties to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and accelerate the establishment of AFCONE.

The ratification and operationalisation of the Treaty of Pelindaba re-articulates Africa's commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, both globally and at the continent level. Therefore, Africa will have the moral legitimacy to speak with authority on these issues at international meetings, focusing on nuclear as well as wider peace and security issues.

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Republic of Guinea

Previous AU Documents and Recommendations:

Manifesting the close monitoring and great interest of the PSC in the situation and developments taking place in the Republic of Guinea, the country has featured more than a dozen times on the agenda of the PSC since the beginning of 2009. Recently, following the long awaited second round presidential election, the Council discussed Guinea in its 248th meeting held on 13 November, 2010.

In a press release that followed the meeting **PSC/PR/BR.(CCXLVIII)**, the Council expressed appreciation for the peaceful conduct of the election and praised the large electoral turn out. The Council also commended the Guinean public for showing its commitment to democracy and the return to constitutional order in terms of the Ouagadougou Agreement of 15 February 2010. In addition, the Council expressed its appreciation for the independence and effectiveness of the National Independent Electoral Commission or *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* (CENI), urged it to continue being transparent and called for candidates to accept the results of the election and to follow proper mechanisms and procedures in the event of possible election disputes.

In a press release dated 8 November 2010, the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU, Jean Ping, praised the peaceful atmosphere of the presidential election that had taken place the previous day in the presence of several election observer missions, including the African Union. Noting the contribution and effort already made by the President of the Transition, General Sékouba

Konaté, The Chairperson called on the incumbent and other political actors to prioritise the interests of their people.

A week later, in response to the release of interim results on 15 November that gave Alpha Condé 52.52 percent of the vote, against 47.48 percent for Cellou Dalein Diallo, who cited major irregularities in the polls and declared himself the winner, violent conflict and demonstrations brought Conakry to a standstill. Consequently, many of Diallo's supporters took to the streets of Conakry and other cities, protesting the results. Guinean police clashed with several hundred protesters who burned tires and threw stones at security forces. According to a hospital source in Conakry, seven people died (some reports referred to twelve deaths) and at least 326 people were injured during post-election violence, including more than 50 with gunshot wounds. A total of 46 people, the majority of them, gunshot victims, remained in hospital.

Following these incidents of violence, the AU Chairperson, in a press statement of 15 November, 2010, expressed his concern about the 'regrettable incidents' and appealed to all parties in Guinea to work for the preservation of peace, security and stability. He stressed that complaints should follow proper procedures and called for national unity.

Crisis Escalation Potential:

Interim Prime Minister, Jean-Marie Doré, blamed Diallo's supporters for the violence, describing them as hooligans, while Diallo accused the security forces of 'savage brutality' against his supporters and members of his *Peul* ethnic group.

In the midst of growing political, security and ethnic tension and unrest on 17 November 2010, the interim president, General Sékouba Konaté, declared a state

of emergency after three days of sporadic violence. His statement announced that the emergency would remain in force until the election results were confirmed by the Supreme Court.

Members of Guinea's civil society and the international community accused the country's security forces of using excessive force. On 18 November, 2010, the International Crisis Group (ICG) warned of the possibility of political tensions translating into large-scale ethnic violence and regional instability. ICG accused the defence and security forces of systematic attacks against supporters of Diallo's *Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée* (UFDG) or Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, a party associated mainly with the *Peul* ethnic group in major urban areas in the Fouta region. Earlier, UFDG supporters were involved in attacking and destroying properties belonging to ethnic *Malinké* and *Peul* supporters of Condé's *Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée* (RPG) or Rally of the Guinean People's party.

Ethnic tensions began to rise in the run up to the second round of elections and according to a report by The Red Cross, some 2,800 ethnic *Peul* supporters of Diallo were displaced over a two-day period in October, 2010. Members of the UFDG party claim that the total number of displaced people is between 15,000 and 20,000.

The election fraud allegation that followed the first round of polls has become more ethnicized and violent since the recent November elections. The polarization and ethno-regional basis of Guinean society which has deteriorated considerably, coupled with possible divisions in the army and long running drug trafficking interests in the country, could further exacerbate the crisis and hamper Guinea's transition to democracy.

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Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:

Nonetheless, hours before the official announcement by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) of the election results, former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo and head of the *Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée* (UFDG) party, had already declared himself the winner. The move was not surprising as, the previous day, Diallo had suspended his participation in the CENI verification process and had pledged to refuse acceptance of any results until complaints of voter fraud had been thoroughly examined and addressed. Diallo further declared he would not accept the outcome of the vote because the election commission had refused to throw out ballots

Diallo's stance has heightened tensions in an election divided along ethnic lines. Security forces have arrested demonstrators and fired tear gas at them for burning tires and protesting in the downtrodden suburbs of Guinea's capital. In addition, some of Diallo's younger supporters from the *Peul* ethnic group emerged from alleyways to throw rocks at the police in protest of Alpha Conde's apparent victory.

displacement and human rights violations against his ethnic *Peul* supporters.

As the situation currently stands in Guinea, the stability of the country is dependent on how well the allegations of fraud will be addressed between Condé and Diallo. Ethnicity played a major role in the results of the second round polls and the events leading up to the November election, as well as post election developments, have caused ethnic divisions and polarization in the country to deteriorate. Condé's offer to constitute a government of national unity as a gesture of reconciliation, if accepted by Diallo, may help ease tensions somewhat. However, such a move will do little to reverse the deteriorating situation which is now far more serious than party supporters protesting against unpopular election results. On 19 November, the interim president,

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Unfortunately, ethnic division and violence has been exacerbated in the wake of a series of pre election clashes and the perceived partiality of some state institutions in favour of specific ethnic groups. The task of creating national reconciliation and sustaining the democratic process, awaits the new government in addition to the task of restoring Guinea's membership of, and role in, regional and international organisations and the resuscitation of its economy which has suffered greatly during the political instability of the past two years.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Guinea is located in the Mano River Basin region which has experienced a series of violent conflicts in the past two decades and the region is still volatile, where a conflict in one country has the potential to spill over borders easily. It was no surprise that Sierra Leone's Office of National Security declared it had elevated security and was monitoring the situation in Guinea as Conakry declared a state of emergency in the wake of post-

In a regional effort to resolve the crisis the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, held talks with Guinea's presidential election winner and runner-up over disputed poll results on November 18, 2010. Wade reportedly requested Diallo to appeal to his supporters to stop any protests on public roads.

UN Dynamics:

off and to resolve any differences through legal means. Ban has also appealed for the international community to provide concrete support to Guinea as the country enters a new phase toward peace consolidation and development. After receiving a briefing on the situation in Guinea on 17 November, 2010, by Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), he condemned the violence that marred elections in Guinea and urged Guinea's political leaders to refrain from acts that could incite further violence and to appeal to their supporters to remain calm. The Council emphasised the responsibility of national security forces and government officials to maintain order and protect citizens and urged all parties to 'follow the existing legal procedure, to resolve their differences peacefully and respect the final decision of the Supreme Court.'

The United Nations human rights office also expressed its deep concern at reported abuses committed during the violence that erupted in Guinea following the presidential election, including use of excessive force, use of live ammunition and incitement to ethnic hatred. According to the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), red beret troops have been collaborating with groups of ethnic *Malinké* youth to target the property and homes of members of the *Peul* ethnic group. Other agencies of the UN have also requested investigations into human rights abuses during post election violence.

In the past year, Guinea has drawn the attention of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In July 2009, the UN deployed its drug and crime prevention experts on a fact-

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Wider International Community Dynamics:

In a statement dated 17 November, the US State Department condemned the violence in Guinea, stating that such incidents have no place in the democratic society that Guinea aspires to

Guinea is the world's largest exporter of the aluminum ore, bauxite, with about a third of the world's known reserves and also holds vast iron ore reserves that have attracted billions of dollars in planned investments from companies such as Vale and Rio Tinto. There is substantial interest by international companies in investing in this sector once stability in the country is restored.

Civil Society Dynamics:

On 6 November more than a hundred international and local civil society organizations and NGOs, including Amnesty International, *Federation internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme* or Guinean

In a press release on 22 November, the Carter Center stated that observers, both domestic and international, found that the run-off election was transparent and credible, despite some weaknesses. However, the focus of most civil society representatives had been mostly on the post election period and election preparations rather than the actual polling day process. The International Crisis Group, in a press release dated 18 November, 2010, accused Guinea's security forces of "systematic attacks" against supporters of defeated presidential candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo. Local members of civil society like the OGDH also claimed that soldiers raped women in northern Guinea during violence that erupted following the release of presidential election results. The ICG urged Guinea's leaders and the international community to 'take urgent measures to halt widespread attacks against defenseless civilians

and to prevent political tensions from degenerating into large-scale ethnic violence and regional instability.’

Scenario Planning:

The situation in Guinea could take a number of courses based on actions taken by the various parties to the crisis. These are the possible scenarios:

Scenario 1:

A peaceful settlement of the fraud allegations and agreement between the candidates could consolidate democracy and restore civilian rule and constitutional order in Guinea and its acceptance back into the AU and ECOWAS and the lifting of sanctions by various actors.

Scenario 2:

The high level of ethnic affiliation coupled with election allegations fraud and possible division in the army may result in further unrest and instability.

Scenario 3:

Continued ethnic and political instability could create an

opportunity for the military junta to extend its mandate.

Early Response Options:

Given the above scenarios the following options could be considered by the PSC to consolidate democracy in Guinea

Option 1:

The PSC, in tandem with ICG-G, its special representative and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights could closely follow up the transition process

Option 2:

The PSC could liaise with the

UNSC and ECOWAS to commission a Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in Guinea.

Option 3:

the PSC could request an independent investigation by the AU to assess the level of violence and human rights abuses in Guinea.

Documentation

Relevant AU Documents:

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(13 November, 2010)
Press Statement on the developments in the situation in the Republic of Guinea

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(17 JUNE 2010) Press Statement on the developments in the situation in the Republic of Guinea

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(10 July 2009) Report of the Commission on the situation in the Republic of Guinea.

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(26 March 2009) Statement on the situation in the Republic of Guinea.

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Controlling Drug Trafficking in Africa: Review of continental and regional mechanisms

According to the AU Solemn Declaration on Common African Defense and Security Policy of 2004, drug trafficking is identified as one of the factors that engender insecurity on the continent. However, until recently, Africa played a relatively limited role in the global illicit drug trafficking and trade. The region's location in terms of its relative distance from the major centers of drug production and consumption, the relatively low consumption rate of drugs in part due to low purchasing power and cultural influences, all contributed to insulate the African region from large scale trafficking of drugs.

Since mid 2000, Africa has become a hot spot for the trafficking of drugs. The rise in trafficking is attributable to a number of factors. Major among these is the structural and institutional set up of many African States which makes monitoring and tracking of drug trafficking a difficult task. State institutions are characterized by weak law enforcement and judicial systems, lack of adequate surveillance systems, and poor transportation and communications infrastructure. In addition, internal instability due to economic pressure and political strife, including wars and deteriorating social conditions, creates the conditions that facilitate trafficking. The rise in trafficking in Africa is also attributable to the success in law enforcement and tracking down of drug traffickers in the formerly well-established routes and destinations of, for example, Central and South America. This has forced traffickers to look for alternative routes.

The trafficking problem is prominent in particular in the western, southern and eastern regions of Africa. Western Africa is said to be ideally situated in terms of its geographic location to serve

as a staging post for trafficking drugs, mainly cocaine, from South America to Europe. The widespread corruption and poor law enforcement in some countries of this region make the region an ideal route for trafficking. Eastern Africa is another route for trafficking. Mostly drugs such as heroin, smuggled from Southwest Asia, in particular Afghanistan and Pakistan, are trafficked through eastern Africa which has long standing trading ties with the countries of South Asia and the Middle East. Southern Africa is both a source and a route for trafficking of illegal synthetic drugs.

The rise in illicit trade and trafficking of drugs is becoming a major regional and international concern. This is because, in addition to the economic and health related hazards, trafficking poses a major security threat to African countries which serve as routes for the illicit drug trade. The security threat comes in different forms. Studies have shown that in these countries, drug abuse and usage have been increasing. In addition, levels of corruption, particularly in the state bureaucracy, are also likely to increase. This in turn serves to undermine the law-enforcement machinery of the states in question with the potential consequence of putting the state under the control of drug traffickers. It is in recognition of this danger that the Common Defense and Security Policy regards drug trafficking as one of the threats to security in Africa.

Furthermore, many African states are either in conflict situations or emerging from conflicts. Wealth and money derived from illegal trafficking may end up empowering those in opposition to governments, such as in the case of criminal or rebel forces. This threat has recently been witnessed in Guinea-Bissau. Consequently, the Security Council of the UN voiced its concern at

the major threat posed by drug trafficking and organized crime to the consolidation of peace in Guinea-Bissau. It further warned of the danger that the illicit drug trade poses for a country struggling to make political and economic progress.

Generally, the major security threat comes from the concentration of wealth in the hands of those with interests in undermining the state machinery and rule of law.

The rise in trafficking, coupled with the seriousness of security and related challenges, demonstrates a need for designing and adopting effective programmes to combat this illegal trade. Indeed, various initiatives at the multilateral, regional and national levels are underway to combat this phenomenon.

At the international level, three complementary instruments have been adopted to combat drug trafficking. These are the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the United Nation's Convention against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. These instruments codify internationally applicable control measures and include various provisions on trafficking and drug abuse. Some African countries are signatories to the 1988 Convention.

As part of the multilateral initiative to combat illicit trafficking in Africa, the United Nations Security Council established in 2001 the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Part of the mandate of this body extends to controlling cross-border illicit activity in the sub-region. It is also expected to help raise awareness

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of the challenges of drug trafficking among governments.

In addition to multilateral or international initiatives, several regional efforts have also been underway on the African continent. In what follows, these regional initiatives will be reviewed.

AU

There is a general consensus among African states that the rise in illegal trade and trafficking of drugs requires comprehensive and effective programmes that require the active involvement of all concerned states. In 1996, the OAU adopted the first Plan of Action on Control of Drug Abuses and Illicit Drug Trafficking (1997-2001) in Africa. However, the plan was difficult to implement effectively due to a number of problems. For example, the emergence of new phenomena that exacerbated the drug problem, including diseases such as HIV/AIDS, a growing variety of new types of synthetic drugs, and the emergence of new policies and strategies to fight drug trafficking, made it important to revise the 1996 Plan of Action. The revision took place in 2002 during the First OAU Ministerial Meeting on Drug Control leading to the adoption of the 2002-2006 Plan of Action.

Some key areas have been identified as important points in the revised Plan of Action. These are institution building and policy development; information, research and networking; legal systems and implementation of laws; integrated drug demand reduction; National Law Enforcement and Control Capacities; Regional Law Enforcement and Control Measures; and International Cooperation. In order to successfully implement

these objectives, the OAU/AU was tasked with implementing the following strategies: advocacy, policy development, mobilization of resources, coordination and monitoring, as well as capacity building.

Further revisions were introduced in 2007. This led to the 'Revised AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012)'.

Seven key priority areas have been identified in this revised Plan of Action (2007-2012). These are:

1. Effective continental, regional and national policy formulation and coordination in the domains of drug control and crime prevention;
2. Enhancing collaboration, shared responsibility and harmonised action to address drug trafficking, organised crime, corruption, terrorism, small arms related violence and crimes within the community;
3. Building institutional capacity for the law enforcement, criminal justice and forensic service systems on drug control and crime prevention;
4. Mainstreaming drug and crime concerns into development strategies;
5. Regional and National capacity building and training to enhance prevention and care of substance abuse and related HIV and AIDS;
6. Enhancing understanding of the dynamics of drugs and crime for policy - making purposes;

7. Broad based responsibility for the promotion of sport and culture in the service of social development to combat drugs and crime.

In order to monitor the progress towards addressing these priority areas, a mechanism for implementation and follow up and evaluation of the revised AU plan of action was adopted. The follow up mechanism intends to assess and evaluate progress made in the implementation of the revised Plan of Action. The evaluation mechanism is implemented at three levels, the national, regional and continental levels. The AU, in particular the Bureau of AU Conference of Ministers for Drug Control and Crime Prevention through a regular meeting, is tasked with providing oversight for the evaluation and follow up process. The specific tasks include reviewing progress in the implementation of the decisions of the AU Conference of Ministers for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and preparing relevant reports.

In March 2009, the AU Commission and the UNODC launched a joint project to support the implementation of the AU Plan of Action building on earlier joint efforts. This initiative builds on efforts focused on drug demand reduction and drug trafficking, among other crime prevention and criminal justice issues. The main objective of the joint project is to strengthen the capacity of the AUC and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in implementing the Plan of Action by supporting data-gathering, policy-making, norm-setting and capacity-building at the continental, regional and national levels in the areas of drug control and crime prevention.

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Some challenges have been identified as posing obstacles to the successful implementation of these objectives aimed at combatting drug trafficking. Major problems include lack of adequate resources, including lack of sufficient or well trained manpower to counter the drug problem; limited political will; and inadequate institutional capacity, including the porous nature of borders, inadequate surveillance systems, lack of adequate social structures and a lack of coordination in response to the problem.

ECOWAS

The regional response towards the illicit drug trafficking problem has a long history. ECOWAS has been in the forefront in this struggle. ECOWAS, in an effort to play a greater role in combating drug trafficking in the region, has adopted a number of initiatives, among them, the resolution relating to the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse in West Africa; the Recommendation C/98 on the establishment of a Regional Fund for Financing of Drug Control Activities in West Africa; and the Decision on the establishment of a regional fund for financing drug control activities. .

In October 2008, an ECOWAS ministerial conference, organized in collaboration with the UNODC and NOWA and held in Praia, Cape Verde, adopted a draft Political Declaration on Prevention of Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa. The political declaration mandates the ECOWAS Commission to:

- Establish a strong coordination mechanism to forge close links with member states' governments and civil

institutions and organizations involved in drug control in order to achieve better coordination in the control of drug trafficking and abuse in the sub-region, and for that purpose;

- Establish an ECOWAS Drug Control and Crime Prevention Division responsible for the overall coordination of regional initiatives undertaken in the area of drug abuse and crime prevention, treatment and rehabilitation as well as the collection and analysis of data on crime and drug phenomenon in the sub-region;
- Establish the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Centre (ECPCJS) to serve as a focal point for mutual legal assistance both amongst ECOWAS members and non-members; and
- Mandate the Department of Peace and Security under the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security with the task of facilitating the formation of the Network of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies/Units within the framework of the West African Joint Operations for the coordination of efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking and related transnational organized crime in the ECOWAS sub-region.
- Initiate negotiations towards an ECOWAS convention against drug trafficking and abuse. The plan is complete the process and come up with the Convention in 2009.

Although these initiatives are encouraging, analysts are of the view

that it is too early to determine the outcomes in either positive or negative terms. Nonetheless, these initiatives are indicative of the fact that drug trafficking is beginning to be recognized as a major concern among policy makers in the region.

SADC

In an effort to combat illegal drug trafficking in the region, the SADC secretariat has developed a comprehensive and multi-sectoral five years drug control programme. This programme was approved by technical experts from the member states in Botswana in 1998. The programme was subsequently approved by the SADC Council of Ministers.

The SADC Regional Drug Control Programme (SRDCP) covers six main areas of intervention:

- Regional Capacity Building and Coordination, This aspect focuses on the establishment of and support to a SADC Drug Control Committee. It also aims at strengthening the SADC Secretariat by recruitment of a Regional Drug Control Adviser;
- National Capacity Building and Coordination, focuses on the establishment of National Multi-Sectoral Drug Control bodies, and the elaboration of National Master Plans for Drug Control;
- Legal Development, which will, inter alia, assist SADC Member States to develop and harmonize their national laws, facilitate extractions and mutual assistance, and establish legal frameworks for dealing with problems of

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money laundering;

- Supply Reduction, which will entail, among others, the establishment of formal and informal networks for fast and secure exchange of information, enhancement of forensic laboratory capacities; and
- Demand Reduction whose main focus will be on primary and secondary prevention, that is general and targeted prevention, interventions and support to treatment and rehabilitation activities; and
- Illicit Drugs and HIV/AIDS which is aimed at assessing and determine relationships between Illicit Drugs and HIV/AIDS. Five studies are planned to be undertaken under this component of the Programme.

The protocol entered into force in 1999. The primary objective of this Protocol is to reduce and eventually eliminate drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption and the illicit use and abuse of drugs through co-operation among enforcement agencies and reduction of demand for drugs through coordinated programmes in the Region. A committee established by member states is entrusted with the task of implementing the protocol.

Towards coordinated approach to implementation of existing mechanisms

Both at the AU and RECs levels, there are some nascent initiatives for addressing the threat that drug trafficking poses in Africa. For these initiatives to have stronger impact in checking this serious problem, consideration should be given to achieve a more coordinated approach to implementation

of existing mechanisms. This coordinated approach may range from exchange of experiences and lessons learned among the various RECs to developing a common framework for collecting data and sharing and to designing a framework for undertaking joint operations. The AU is in this regard better placed to play the role of facilitating the development of such a system and its active operationalisation. Building on its current initiative, it can also consider focusing on supporting and facilitating such collaborative action for implementation within and between RECs. In this regard, the AU Conference of Ministers for Drug Control and Crime Prevention is an important forum for developing such a framework and addressing many of the challenges. To enhance the legal regime at the national level, the AU may also encourage member states to accede to the 1988 UN Convention.

Important Forthcoming Dates

1 December	World AIDS Day
9 December	International Day Against Corruption
10 December	International Human Rights Day

Country	Election	Date
Comoros	Local	26 December 2010
Sudan	Referendum	9 January 2011
Cape Verde	National Assembly Presidential	January 2011 February 2011
Nigeria	National Assembly, Presidential State Assemblies and Governors	January - April 2011
Niger	Presidential	January 2011
Central African Republic	Presidential and National Assembly	First Round: 23 January 2011 Second Round: 20 March 2011
Chad	National Assembly Local elections Presidential	20 February 2011 27 March 2011 8 May 2011
Uganda	Presidential, National Assembly and Local	13 February – 9 March 2011

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