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# Peace & Security Council Report

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## On the Agenda

### Heads of state at the PSC summit backtrack on a military force for Burundi

Burundi topped the agenda of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting of Heads of State and Government held on 29 January 2016, on the eve of the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa. The PSC also tried to revive the faltering peace process in South Sudan and called for a collective effort against the spreading terrorist threat in Africa.

Despite high expectations that the PSC would confirm the decision made by its ambassadors in Addis Ababa on 17 December 2015 concerning a troop deployment to Burundi, several PSC heads of state backtracked on this decision.

#### No force for Burundi, for now

The PSC discussions on Burundi were held behind closed doors, but Gambia's Yayah Jammeh told journalists after the meeting that he would not support a deployment without the consent of the government in Bujumbura.

However, Nigeria's Muhammadu Buhari, in his opening speech at the PSC summit, supported the deployment of a force 'to stop the escalation of the crisis'. He was the only head of state to explicitly support the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) during the opening ceremony.

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In the end, it was decided that a high-level delegation would be sent to Bujumbura to speak to President Pierre Nkurunziza about accepting the force and to kick-start talks between the government and the opposition.

In his closing press conference, Peace and Security Commissioner Smail Chergui said the situation in Burundi is 'very worrying' and that the AU condemns the human rights violations committed in the country. 'The inclusive dialogue has not yet shown any results and we support the efforts of President Yoweri Museveni [of Uganda],' he said.

He said Burundi is clearly hostile to the AU's proposed MAPROBU, but that if it is accepted, it will serve to disarm militias; protect civilians, together with the police; and facilitate the work of the human rights monitors. It will also deploy along Burundi's borders if need be, Chergui said. 'The aim is not to attack Burundi.'

He added that the composition of the high-level delegation to Burundi and when it would visit Bujumbura would be announced in due course.

#### Terrorism: in search of a global approach

In the aftermath of the terror attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cameroon and Somalia over the past few months, one of the main themes of the PSC summit was terrorism.

#### PSC Chairperson

**H.E. Ambassador Wahde Belay**  
Ambassador of Ethiopia  
to the African Union

#### Current members of the PSC

Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia,  
Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia,  
Guinea, Libya, Mozambique,  
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa,  
Tanzania, Uganda

There was a general consensus on the global nature of the threat and the need for a collective response at a regional level. The heads of state and government asked for additional support from the international community. The PSC stressed in its communiqué ‘the need for renewed efforts and increased mobilization to combat terrorism and violent extremism. It also encourages Member States to effectively meet their obligations under the different regional and global counter-terrorism [measures] and encourages Member States to deepen mutual efforts in security and in the fight against terrorism.’

In his speech, Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ramtane Lamamra detailed six areas of intervention: the improvement of structural prevention and cooperation in early warning between the AU, the United Nations (UN) and the regional economic communities (RECs); the creation of programmes of ‘deradicalization’ for former militants; the intensification of the fight against cyber criminality; the need to criminalise the payment of ransom to clamp down on the funding of terrorism; a swift implementation of the PSC acts regarding terrorism; and the reinforcement of the capabilities of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism based in Algiers.

## There is a race between some groups when it comes to the scale of the horror of their acts

Chergui told journalists at the press conference that ‘there is a race on between some groups when it comes to the scale of the horror of their acts’, referring to the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya and other terror groups in the Sahel. He said the AU has various instruments in place, such as the Nouakchott process and the Djibouti process, to strengthen the fight against terror.

There are currently two AU-sanctioned operations against terrorist insurgencies – against Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries and against al-Shabaab in Somalia. These have yielded uneven results. Heads of state at the summit commended the impact of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) launched by the Lake Chad Basin Commission, saying that Boko Haram does not control any more territory in the subregion. However, those who believe the ongoing brutal attacks by Boko Haram are not necessarily an indication that Boko Haram is now on its last legs refuted this claim.

Chergui said more and more partners are signing up to financially support the MNJTF. On 1 February, the AU also organised a donors conference to finance the force. Donors and partners pledged US\$250 million both in support of the MNJTF and to provide humanitarian and development assistance.

Speaking about the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta acknowledged that AMISOM failed to have the same impact in Somalia. He stated that ‘the rules of engagement need to be changed to allow AMISOM to launch pre-emptive attacks against al-Shabaab’.

### No strong focus on the roots of terrorism

The main PSC meeting on terrorism was characterised by its focus on security issues and the lesser consideration of social and economic factors that could explain the spread of this threat in Africa. During the summit, only Burkina Faso’s President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi addressed development issues. Kaboré notably emphasised ‘the need to make development

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\$250 million  
PLEDGES FOR THE TASK FORCE  
AGAINST BOKO HARAM

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a tangible reality for many through education and better conditions of life' as part of efforts against terrorism.

The PSC noted at the very end of its communiqué that 'terrorist groups exploit vulnerabilities caused by conditions such as poverty [and] prolonged, unresolved conflict'. However, the council did not provide any framework to address these conditions at the regional level. The RECs lack both the competency and capacity to implement common policies to address the conditions that create fertile ground for terrorist groups.

The absence of proper cooperation in the security sector also remains an issue. Despite being AU operations, both missions in the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia are characterised by the separation of the different national contingents and uneven coordination among them. This trend is also visible in non-security areas.

## South Sudan: a balanced approach

The deadlocked political process in South Sudan was the second theme of the PSC summit. This deadlock is largely due to the decision of President Salva Kiir to create 28 states instead of the 10 set out in the peace agreement signed in August 2015. The rebels – the Sudan's People Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO) – then refused to join the Transitional Government of National Unity as it had agreed to do on 2 January 2016.

The PSC has tried to adopt a balanced position. While it stresses the negative impact of this decision, the AU approach favours the implementation of the agreement's other provisions. In its communiqué the council 'calls on the South Sudanese Parties to urgently establish it [the government of national unity] without further delay nor any preconditions'. The matter of the states is to be tackled by 'an inclusive, participatory national boundary commission which should review the proposed states and their boundaries'.

Uncertainty remains about the parties' reaction to this statement. On the one hand, it contradicts the government,

which maintains that the creation of the 28 states is an irreversible decision. On the other, it is unlikely that the SPLM-IO's Riek Machar – urged by the PSC to take up his post as vice president – has the backing of his troops to accept this post. The AU's approach differs from that of the UN Security Council, which is considering sanctions against the warring parties for the multiple violations of the peace agreement. The PSC has called on the AU Commission to speed up the process of setting up the AU Mission in South Sudan.

## AU supports the UN-led process in Libya

A meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya (ICGL) was convened on 28 January, chaired by Chergui and UN Special Envoy Martin Kobler.

This meeting had two outcomes: first, the AU declared its support for the process led by the UN. At the meeting Chergui outlined the areas where the AU could show its support, namely security sector reform and the reconciliation process. Second, the participants raised their concerns about the spread of ISIS, which is happening faster than the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015.

It was decided to replace former Djibouti prime minister Dileita Mohammed Dileita as AU special envoy in Libya with former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete. Moreover a high-level panel of heads of state will be sent to Libya to convince the parties to agree to a unity government. The members of the IGCL have pressed for the formation of a government in order for them to have representative in the fight against ISIS.

Another point of consensus was the opposition of most participants to a military intervention. They stressed the potential negative impact of an external military intervention on the situation. Furthermore, Chad and Niger stressed the need to assess the regional implications of the Libyan crisis. The participants agreed on a further meeting to reassess the security threats in the Sahelo-Saharan strip.

## Quotable quotes from the 26<sup>th</sup> AU Summit:

- 'We want to identify those who want to work for the continent' – Amine Idriss Adoum, AU Commission Director for Human Resources and Administration, on the AU's new Leadership Academy that was launched at the summit.
- 'We are deeply ashamed when peacekeepers exploit their position,' – UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.
- 'If we have 5000 troops to spare they should go to Somalia,' – The Gambia's President Yaya Jammeh in an interview with Radio France International following the PSC Summit.
- 'We should speak, eat and why not dress African?' – new AU Chairperson, Chad's President Idriss Déby.
- 'It's beginning to dawn on them [AU member states] that there is a need for self-reliance,' – AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

# On the Agenda

## AU summit concludes with strong calls for UN reform and withdrawal from the ICC



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe concluded his term as AU chair with a speech that had delegates attending the 26<sup>th</sup> AU summit in Addis Ababa on their feet, applauding especially his calls for the reform of the UN.

Mugabe did not spare UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who was one of the representatives on the front stage. 'If the UN is to survive, we [Africa] must be equal members of it,' Mugabe said. 'You are a good man, Mr Ban Ki-moon, but we can't make you a fighter. That's not what your mission was. But we shall fight for our own identity and personality as Africans.' Africans 'are also human, not ghosts. Tell them, that we also belong to the world,' he said.

Ban responded the next day, telling journalists that the reform of the UN Security Council was at the core of changes needed. Member states had been discussing it 'for decades' and the consensus was 'the Security Council must be reformed in a more democratic, representative and transparent manner'.

### The reform of the United Nations Security Council was at the core of changes needed

However, a lack of consensus on how the reforms should be implemented was delaying the process. 'I think they have identified many important elements to make Security Council reform possible and effective. At the same time it is true that almost all the member states have presented all different ideas which will not be able to be reconciled among so many important elements,' he said. 'It's a matter of how they reconcile all this to make some consolidated proposals to the member states. That's up to the member states.'

### Reform of the ICC or withdrawal *en masse*?

Although the sentiments of some leading campaigners for the AU's withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) are clear, it is less clear what the continental body's actual decisions were at the summit. Three days after the summit the final decisions of the Assembly were still being drafted.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta does not hold out much hope for reform. Even though he said in his statement to the AU that he hoped ICC reform would succeed 'so that we can return to the instrument we signed up for', he called on the ministerial committee on the ICC to get a renewed mandate 'to develop a road map for withdrawal from the Rome Statute as necessary'. His concern was to get the case against his deputy, William Ruto, quashed. Charges against Kenyatta himself had been withdrawn due to lack of evidence.

South African President Jacob Zuma reflected the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) tough stance following the controversy over Sudan President Omar al-Bashir's

visit to South Africa to attend the mid-year AU summit in June 2015 in Johannesburg. He told heads of state attending the 26<sup>th</sup> summit: ‘Our strongly held view is that it is now impossible, under the circumstances, for South Africa to continue its participation in the Rome Statute. South Africa is seriously reviewing its participation in the Rome Statute and will announce its decision in due course.’

The Bashir incident seems to have given new impetus to the argument that AU member states should withdraw from the ICC, but changes needed to be effected to domestic laws for this to happen. AU Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, however, told journalists that AU member states could consider withdrawal ‘if the ICC behaves in a way where countries have to choose between the AU and the ICC’.

Chad’s President Idriss Déby, the new AU chair, said at the press conference after the summit that issues around the ICC were ‘extensively debated’, but added nothing about decisions by the continental body to withdraw as a bloc. ‘What we observed is that the ICC focuses much more on African leaders and African heads of state and even sitting African presidents, whereas elsewhere in the world a lot of things are taking place, many blatant violations of human rights, but nobody is speaking about it. Therefore there is a double standard here,’ he said.

## Funding for the APRM has been sought from the United Nations Development Programme

### Plans to revive the APRM

At the AU’s June summit last year Kenyatta had called for a special summit on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Nairobi in September to revive the flagging project. However, not enough heads of state committed to attend and the summit was reduced to a two-hour meeting on the sidelines of the recently concluded AU summit.

Despite some disquiet among civil society organisations that this could be the death knell for the tool, there are signs that the APRM could be revived. At the meeting, heads of the APRM’s 35 member states heard that the first new chief executive officer in eight years would be Eddy Maloka, an adviser to South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, special envoy to the Great Lakes Region and a former academic.

In addition, the first country review since 2011 – Djibouti – was done this year after funding had been sought from the UN Development Programme, and four new country reviews – Sudan, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Chad – will be added next year to the 17 already done.

Kenyatta said at the meeting that the APRM needed to be revived politically and financially. He called on member states to ‘reaffirm our commitment to the purpose, spirit, and values of the APRM and to do all we can to make it something we can all be proud of’. He said those countries that have not joined yet should be encouraged to do so, and all should honour their financial obligations to the tool. ‘Let us be the generation that entrenches good governance across our continent for the advancement of our people and future generations,’ he said.

### How to make the AU self-funded?

The drive to make the AU independent from funds outside Africa, an initiative that goes back to 2003, continued at the summit, AU Commission Deputy Chairperson

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THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES  
REVIEWED BY THE APRM

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Erastus Mwencha told journalists. A team of eminent persons under the leadership of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo had made recommendations several years ago, varying from a tax on incoming flights into Africa or a hospitality tax on hotels to an import tax, with bigger countries contributing more.

Mwencha said the AU was ready to 'implement' these, with member states being given a choice as to how they wanted to collect the funds, following disagreements on some of the fundraising methods. 'Some chose X systems and some chose Y systems, and we have to reconcile these,' he said.

Mwencha noted that African economies did not grow as much as in 2014, by just under 4%, 'but amidst this contraction our commitment to move forward is a sign of dedication that we want to take responsibility for our security'.

The AU was also looking at combating illicit financial outflows and harnessing funds from the diaspora. He said 80% of AU member states had paid their dues. The ultimate aim is that Africa will fund all the AU programmes and 25% of the peace and security budget.

### The ultimate aim is that Africa will fund all the AU programmes

Dlamini-Zuma also told journalists that more and more countries were prepared to commit to an increase in their contributions to the AU. Angola, which was asked to join the group of African heavyweights that contribute 12% to the AU's budget, increased its contribution from 5% to 8%. Others, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire, came forward voluntarily to pay more than their dues. 'It's beginning to dawn on them [member states] that there is a need for self-reliance,' she said.

## Women's rights and Agenda 2063

The summit theme for the first time focused on human rights, and particularly women's rights, which Dlamini-Zuma said should be at the centre of the AU's developmental Agenda 2063. These range from basic rights such as education, food, nutrition, health, safe water and sanitation, and safety to third-generation rights of freedom of speech and of the media. 'We are making progress, but the pace is very slow,' Dlamini-Zuma said in her opening address.

### More countries are prepared to increase their contributions to the AU

'To unlock the full potential of our continent we must put an end to the pervasive culture that limits full participation of girls and women in all spheres of society. There is progress but not at the expected level approved in Agenda 2063.' She told journalists that the AU had no way of sanctioning countries that, for instance, have not outlawed child marriages, but she said she hoped it could get to such a point.

Déby supported her call in his maiden speech at the end of the summit. Work was also being done to get as many countries as possible to domesticate Agenda 2063, with 23 countries having done it so far, and 30 countries in total interested.

There was also a decision to facilitate the free movement of Africans across the continent by 2018. 'In the past there has been too much concentration on the type of government, whether it is the united states of Africa ... We lost a lot of time debating those things over the years 1999 to almost 2009.' She said the AU got 'bogged down' by those debates while practical steps such as free movement were set to yield better and more immediate results.



## Situation Analysis

### Are African heads of state dropping the ball in Burundi?

The question of Burundi, and the deployment of a 5 000-strong AU force to the country – against the will of the Burundian government – was always going to pit the institutions of the AU against the political will of African heads of state. At stake for the AU and the continent was setting a precedent that would allow the AU to intervene in a sovereign country against its will. For Burundi, what hung in the balance was a concrete mechanism that could restore stability and the rule of law.

At the end of last month, the unwillingness of African states to set this precedent won the day. In many ways, this is not surprising. Few believed that the Assembly of Heads of State meeting at the 26th AU summit in Addis Ababa would vote in favour of such a bold interventionist strategy and, in the end, the vote was never actually submitted to the heads of state. What did surprise many was the apparent about-turn that took place among the PSC member states.

### What drove the apparent about-turn on Burundi that took place among the PSC member states?

The bold decision from 17 December to deploy AU forces to Burundi was made by the 15-member PSC meeting in Addis Ababa at the level of ambassadors. According to the PSC communiqué, it was driven, among other things, by information from a mission by members of the AU Commission for Human and People's Rights. The mission had 'noted violations of human rights and other ongoing abuses, including arbitrary killings and targeted assassinations, arbitrary arrests and detentions, acts of torture, suspension and arbitrary closure of some civil society organizations and media'. The PSC decision was a response to the sense of urgency about the crisis in Burundi, and the serious domestic and regional impact of the crisis if it escalated.

### Disconnect between ambassadors and heads of state

On Friday 29 January, on the eve of the Assembly of Heads of State meeting at the summit, the PSC met at the level of heads of state and a very different discussion took place. Some heads of state and members of the PSC, like The Gambia, openly rejected the deployment of a force without consent from the Burundian government. On the other hand Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, spoke in favour of sending troops.

The discussion of the PSC at summit level seems to have given significant consideration to the Burundian government's interpretation of the situation. According to an ambassador from one of the PSC member states, the information that underpinned the December decision to deploy the force 'exaggerated the threat of civil war and genocide.' The official added that there are far more serious

crises across the continent, more deserving of additional peacekeeping capacity, than the situation in Burundi.

This raises a number of serious questions. Is this one-sided view of the situation really shared by other PSC member states and if so, did it drive the backtracking of the PSC heads of state? Or, is it just a cover for the fact that the PSC heads of state did not want to take a stance against a fellow government, and set a precedent for AU deployment against the will of a sovereign state? How much high-level support did the force deployment ever have from the presidents of the member states?

### Bolstered by solidarity from African leaders, would Nkurunziza agree to speak to the opposition?

Procedurally, the 17 December decision did not need review by another PSC meeting, this time at the heads of state level. It is a standalone decision of the PSC, and ambassadors are mandated by their countries to take decisions. The next step would have been referral to the assembly, a risky move which was never a given. Does the about-turn signal a fundamental disconnect between ambassadors and heads of state?

#### An appealing tone

Peace and Security Commissioner Smaïl Chergui has taken the lead on the force in the past. But his statement during a press conference at the summit reflected a much more appealing tone. Chergui said that the issue was discussed at the assembly and that a decision had been taken to send a high-level delegation – likely at heads-of-state level – to Burundi to discuss the resumption of the East African Community (EAC) talks and the deployment of an AU mission.

If the Burundian government accepts the AU mission, its mandate would be to disarm the various militias, protect civilians in conjunction with the Burundian police, facilitate the work of human rights observers, recuperate illegal weapons and possibly patrol Burundi's borders.

Where does this leave Burundi? Even Chergui acknowledged that the government is hostile toward the AU force. And there is no indication that the AU's softened tone will lead the Burundian government to accept a force deployment.

Burundian Foreign Minister Alain Nyamitwe told journalists at the end of the summit that the government's position had prevailed; adding that the AU delegation was welcome in Burundi, but that a force would not be accepted. The AU now has very little leverage, and even fewer tools to influence the government, although some believe that it is too soon to declare the AU force dead.

#### Mediation off to a false start

Much emphasis was also placed on a resumption of the EAC-mediated talks. No new date has been set, and the question of who will be represented has yet to be resolved. Some AU officials have suggested that by taking the threat of the force off the table, African countries hope to coax Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza back to the negotiating table, where the deployment of a force will be on the agenda.

But, bolstered by the solidarity of African heads of state on the question of the force deployment, will Nkurunziza agree to speak to the political opposition? Or will he balk at the presence of the 'coup leaders' – a catch-all category that his government has applied to many of its political opponents?

### If the AU is to maintain momentum on Burundi, it needs to act fast and concretely

There is the further question of the mediation. Behind the scenes, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the EAC-appointed mediator, has been criticised for allowing the talks to lose momentum, and there is a suggestion that another EAC country take over. Agreeing on the mediator, the agenda and the participants will take time. So will designating the members of the AU's high-level delegation to Burundi. This is one thing that the crisis in Burundi does not have.

On the eve of the summit, Amnesty International published a report indicating the existence of mass graves, which may contain the bodies of those killed in the government crackdown that followed the 11 December attacks. Critics of the government continue to be targeted, and the killings have not stopped. If the AU is to maintain momentum, and not look like it is dropping the ball in Burundi, it needs to act fast and concretely.



## Addis Insight

### Is the PSC becoming an African Security Council?

The AU Executive Council has elected the 15 new members of the PSC. The election, on 28 January 2016, took place amid much suspense over who would occupy the crucial seats, allocated along regional lines, on the main decision-making body of the AU in the area of managing crises and conflicts.

The new members of the PSC are:

- West Africa: Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo
- North Africa: Algeria, Egypt
- Central Africa: Burundi, Chad, Republic of Congo
- East Africa: Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya
- Southern Africa: South Africa, Botswana, Zambia

Three facts become apparent from these results. Firstly, four of the main military powers of the continent – Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa – are on the PSC. The only one missing is Ethiopia – the continent’s biggest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. The main challenge in this regard will be to match these capabilities with the PSC’s commitment to ensuring peace and security on the continent.

### The rotation process and the absence of any permanent members display a sense of equality and fairness

Since its creation, the PSC has been lauded for the manner in which its members are elected, which contrasts with that of the UN Security Council. The rotation process and the absence of any permanent members display a sense of equality and fairness that Africa has always deemed to be absent in New York.

However, it seems that an informal principle of semi-permanent membership has started to emerge. Regional powers (Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa) were all victorious in these elections. This could be an indication of the regional powers’ commitment to the AU and their clout within the organisation. Many within the AU has asked whether it is in fact possible for the PSC – which has displayed a strong sense of leadership in tackling various crises over the years – to function without such regional powers among its ranks.

#### **Burundi re-elected**

Secondly, and to the surprise of observers, Burundi remains a member despite its rejection of the PSC decision of 17 December 2015 authorising the deployment of an African force to the country. Burundi’s re-election is said to be the outcome of a pre-existing agreement in Central Africa that states already serving on the council (such as Burundi and Chad in this case) almost automatically get a second term.

Burundi's election also shows that a country's internal situation is not as relevant as one might expect when member states elect the PSC. Indeed, both the Republic of Congo, another Central African member, and Burundi face internal turmoil due to the issue of presidential third terms.

Thirdly, the prospect of a continental rule banning presidential third terms has been dealt a serious blow by this election. It is unlikely that countries such as Togo – which last year blocked such a decision within the Economic Community of West African States – Chad, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda would agree to such a rule. Many observers present at the summit repeatedly wondered why the AU would not address the issue of 'endless' rule in Africa. This issue, which is seen as a major cause of instability, has apparently not been considered as such by the AU member states in electing the PSC.

To the surprise of observers, Burundi remains a member of the Peace and Security Council

### **Ethiopia's absence raises questions**

The outcome of this PSC election could also be viewed in terms of a greater dynamic within the AU structure. It is likely that the results of the election are in one way or another related to bargaining among member states ahead of the election of the eight members of the AU Commission, as well as the chairperson and his/her deputy at the next AU summit in July. Some countries might, for example, have agreed to step out of the PSC in exchange for important positions on the AU Commission. Some of the questions raised by the new PSC membership – like the absence of Ethiopia – could thus be answered after those equally important elections in Kigali in six months.



## PSC Interview

The UN increasingly realises the need for peace enforcement

Haile Menkerios, head of the UN office to the AU, speaks to the *PSC Report* about the 'division of labour' between the UN and the AU when it comes to peacekeeping. He also addresses the issue of UN funding for AU peacekeeping missions and whether the two institutions see eye to eye on the issues of human rights and robust peace enforcement.

### Who is responsible for peace and security and fighting terrorism in Africa, the UN or the AU?

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has the primary responsibility for global peace and security, but at the same time the regional organisations and countries also do have the authority and definitely the responsibility to address threats within their region. This is particularly when it comes to any intervention on the basis of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.

### How pro-active is the AU in this regard?

There has been a proliferation of threats to international peace and security in Africa and the continent has been actively engaged in trying to solve them, to the point of establishing a PSC at the AU. It engages in every threat to peace and security in Africa and it is only when there is a decision or a need to intervene militarily that it has to get the endorsement of the UNSC. The AU, as well as the RECs (regional economic communities), has been getting engaged in situations where peace enforcement is needed, in other words, intervention when there is violent confrontation. The UN has generally intervened when there is peace to keep.

Both the AU and the UN are involved in mediation, but African countries, because they are more affected by these conflicts directly, are then more prepared to intervene and stop wars. They are next door and therefore the consequences of violent conflict influences every aspect – economic, political and social – of their situation. The UN intervenes with political means.

### How strong is the AU–UN partnership?

There has been growing recognition both in the AU and in the UNSC that it would be very difficult for either one of them to address the threats and challenges of peace and security alone. Therefore there has been the realisation of the need for collaboration and for partnership.

This partnership has been developing more or less ad hoc. When a threat or an issue becomes paramount then we address it. We ask, what is the AU PSC's thinking on it? What is the UN's thinking on it? Then we try to find a means to address it.

Now, with time, I think we've reached a level where both recognise their interdependency. There is a need to systematise this partnership and make it more strategic. Perhaps move to a partnership, a division of labour where Africa

is prepared to intervene at the earlier stages of conflict when there is no peace to keep and for the UN to sort of take over when it is necessary with a much broader multi-faceted intervention.

### **This has been happening in Mali and the Central African Republic?**

Yes, in reality this has developed as a matter of course and this division of labour has been the pattern lately, with the AU starting and then the UN taking over. So you can say, whereas there is no question about who is primarily responsible [for peace and security] – the primacy still rests with the UNSC – all African countries are members of the UN also and in practice there has been more delegation, more recognition that African countries' taking action is very positive. They are contributing to international peace.

### **The AU would like to access UN-assessed contributions to fund its peacekeeping operations. This issue of predictable funding was discussed at the UN General Assembly in 2015. Is there a final decision?**

It is still under discussion. First of all, in principle it is agreed that collaboration between the two [UN and AU] is needed. What form this collaboration should take is an issue not yet finalised.

Troop contributors are not ready to send people to fight wars in Africa

Number two is financing. How can we utilise the relative advantages that both organisations have? Africa is ready to intervene, but it doesn't have the resources. The rest of the world has the resources but troop contributors are not ready to send people to fight wars in Africa. Therefore there is an interdependent relationship. So support to finance has generally come from voluntary contributions and some in the form of assessed contributions. For example in Somalia, there are some contributions [to the African Mission in Somalia] from assessed contributions and some still from bilateral contributions. But there is now an attempt to see how we can formalise this, particularly when Africa came up with the decision that it would raise 100% of the funds necessary for the management of the AU and its work, 75% of projects and 25% of peacekeeping.

I think this has encouraged others also to then consider that the UNSC could pay the 75% [needed for peacekeeping] from assessed contributions. But then it would require that the AU would spend it and engage in peace enforcement and

peacekeeping on the same bases and principles that the UN does. It would be required to adhere to the same stringent control mechanisms as well and this is being discussed.

### **What are the timelines or deadlines for this?**

The secretary general has said that in pursuing the proposal of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (the Hippo report) it was decided that the AU and UN, at secretariat level, would sign a new framework for cooperation. That would then define the relationship, which has already been part of the draft that my office has prepared along with the Peace and Security Department of the AU. We have agreed on these principles and it is a question now of trying to expand on these principles to be UN-wide and AU-wide. In his report to the General Assembly, he said that he would like to see such a framework signed within the coming year. Once that is done, it will be the basis for everything, including financing.

Once we agree on the framework there will be a plan of action

### **Does it contain institutional changes?**

Well, it is a framework. It is not a programme. A framework for cooperation. Once we agree on the framework there will be a plan of action on how to implement it.

### **Some say the UN won't fund the AU's Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram given fears that it might not adhere to the UN's requirements on respect for human rights, etc. How do you get around that?**

The question is not just that alone. Yes, it is an issue, but I think once the framework is there you can agree on the basis for intervention – for human rights, accountability, and all that. Once that framework is established it becomes easier to establish a common basis for engagement. The AU has a misconception that the UN – and the UNSC – doesn't want to get involved in fighting terrorism. It does and it has been supportive of countries that are fighting against terrorism. It's just that the UNSC has not yet decided to get engaged in peace enforcement and this is peace enforcement. So when others are getting engaged in peace enforcement, it would like to see it on the same standards and principles that the UN stands for – that there would be no support for those who abuse human rights in any way and also accountability.

### **Has this been the problem with cooperation between the UN and the Congolese forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?**

That is one problem. There should be consistency when it comes to international law. If people had committed international crimes, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, etc., then they have to be brought to justice.

When countries don't want to do that or if the AU doesn't want to enforce it on the same level then the partnership becomes selective. And it is those kinds of principles that we would have to agree on before there could be smooth support to Africa's engagement. There is growing recognition in the UN that you can't stick to this old idea of peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep. There is increasing realities on the ground that even if 60% or 75% of a conflict is resolved, most wars don't simply end, because these wars are not being fought between two nations, not between two organisations but between a multiplicity of actors. Therefore you can't say 'we have to wait until there is 100% peace'. If there is 80% you have to keep it. What happens with the 20%? How do you assist? I think there is increasing recognition in the UN as well to assist countries and governments to establish durable peace.

There is growing recognition that you can't stick to this old idea of peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep

### **Your office in Addis Ababa has been strengthened. What is your role?**

Our role is not to do everything that has to be done for partnership with the AU. It is a facilitator of dialogue. To facilitate and enhance the relationship and not necessarily getting engaged with the AU to implement what has been decided. The [entire] UN office represents the peace and security architecture of the whole UN, which includes the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. So whatever actual work has to be done, is done by these departments. This is a liaison office that actually proposes and studies the AU and then proposes that this is how the AU sees it and then gets New York's positions and views. And [it] builds this relationship, including the relationship between the two councils.

### **Are the UNSC members in agreement on this strategy?**

We represent the secretary general, not the UNSC, but the secretary general works with the UNSC. There is growing recognition in the UNSC as a whole that on the threats to international peace in Africa they cannot do it without the collaboration of the AU.

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The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance.

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
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The *Peace and Security Council (PSC) Report* is an initiative of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) through its office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was established in 2009 with the principal aim of supporting and complementing the work of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council through the provision of regular, independent and research-based information on and analysis of the PSC and its activities. The *PSC Report* offers the wider constituency of the AU, as well as African civil society organisations, the media and the international diplomatic community a reliable means of following and tracking the work of the PSC.

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