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Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early warning issues for August 2013

During August, the possible unstable aftermath of what some observers view as rushed elections in Mali and the continuing volatile and increasingly violent situation in Egypt, with the possibility of a wider regional impact on Tunisia, Libya and Israel, will warrant the close attention of the Peace and Security Council. In the south, the aftermath of elections in Zimbabwe and coming elections in Madagascar also merit attention, particularly in terms of both the potential for increased political,

economic and social instability in these countries and SADC's rocky relationship with them. The accompanying country analysis on Mozambique also forewarns of the need to pay close attention to the stability fault lines in this important Southern African country. In addition, the recent al-Shabaab attack in Somalia on the embassy of Turkey, a NATO member, is a stark reminder of the ever-present terrorist threat in Africa.

► Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Lazare Makayat Safouesse

Current posts: Congo's Ambassador to Ethiopia
Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA
and Chair of the PSC

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Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

Country analysis

EGYPT

Introduction

The last country analysis on Egypt was published in the April 2013 edition of the Peace and Security Council Report, no. 45. Readers interested in earlier analyses about Egypt are also invited to consult the March, May, July and September 2011 issues, as well as the January, March, June, July and September 2012 editions.

Previous PSC and AU communiqués and statements

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 260th meeting on 16 February 2011, took note of the ardent aspirations of the Egyptian people, especially its youth, for change and the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically establish and designate institutions that are truly representative and respectful of human rights and freedoms. The PSC expressed the AU's solidarity with the Egyptian people, whose desire for democracy is consistent with the relevant instruments of the AU and the continent's commitment to promoting democratisation, good governance and respect for human rights. It strongly condemned acts of violence against the demonstrators, which led to the loss of human life. The PSC also requested the Egyptian authorities to shed light on such acts of violence and to bring their authors and perpetrators to justice. The PSC reserved the right, in the light of developments in the transition process and on the basis of the relevant AU instruments, to take any measure that the situation might warrant, with due respect for the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people.

However, at its 384th meeting on 5 July 2013, the PSC, in the presence of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, recalled its previous pronouncements on the situation in Egypt, in particular communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCLX), adopted at its 260th meeting on 16 February 2011. In this communiqué, the PSC, among other observations,

again noted the deep aspirations of the Egyptian people, especially its youth, for change and the opening of political space. It also expressed the AU's solidarity with the Egyptian people, whose desire for democracy was consistent with the relevant AU instruments, and recognised the exceptional nature of the situation then prevailing in Egypt.

The PSC noted that despite significant progress in the transition process, Egypt continued to face serious challenges, marked by the growing frustration of many Egyptians over the management of the country, cumulative economic difficulties, deteriorating security, political and social polarisation and a general lack of consensus on the best way forward.

It further expressed deep concern at the risks the prevailing situation posed for the long-term stability of Egypt and the cohesion of its people, with far-reaching national and regional consequences.

Furthermore, the PSC stated that the overthrow of the democratically elected president did not conform to the relevant provisions of the Egyptian Constitution and, therefore, fell under the definition of an unconstitutional change of government as provided for in the instruments mentioned in the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of January 2007, which provides for the automatic implementation of specific measures whenever an unconstitutional change of government occurs, and reiterates the AU's condemnation and rejection of any illegal seizure of power. Accordingly, and as mandated by the relevant AU instruments, the PSC decided to suspend Egypt's participation in the AU's activities until the restoration of constitutional order.

The PSC further encouraged and urged the new Egyptian authorities to engage, without delay, in inclusive consultations towards the adoption of a consensual timeframe for the organisation of free, fair and transparent elections.

Crisis escalation potential

Following the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi, the political

situation in Egypt remains volatile. More than 170 people, mainly Morsi supporters, have been killed during protests, while violent confrontations are occurring among parts of the population, including between the army and Morsi supporters. On 8 July, the army fired live ammunition at the ex-president's supporters during a demonstration, killing more than 50. TV footage has shown soldiers firing live bullets at civilians, while rapes continue in Tahrir Square with TV networks also broadcasting scenes of women being taken by force by the angry crowds.

Since the military coup d'état, Morsi has been under house arrest while his supporters complain of a return of the Sadat and Mubarak eras. TV networks face tremendous difficulties in covering the events occurring in Egypt. The offices of Al Jazeera Mobasher, sister network of Al Jazeera, were looted while numerous Islamist channels have been closed down. CNN also experienced censorship when its live broadcast from the Six October Bridge was interrupted by the military. On 26 July, a huge protest by Morsi supporters confronted army supporters in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities. According to the media, more than 100 people were killed during these protests in Cairo and at least five died in Alexandria.

The situation of the Copts, who account for ten per cent of the Egyptian population, is also of great concern. Assassinations and clashes with other groups have been reported.

In addition, the dire economic situation worsens Egypt's socio-political burdens by the day, and there is an urgent need to resolve the country's economic crisis.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Political issues

When elected in June 2012, Morsi and his supporters thought that their political time had come after decades of oppression and underground political activity. However, its lack of political experience soon betrayed the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi, who was elected with a very slight margin, won mainly because Egyptians did not want those who represented the old

Mubarak regime, the *feloul*, to win. However, Morsi soon realised that he did not control large parts of the state apparatus, as many institutions, including the police, army, media and civil service, had become powerful tools for opposing the Muslim Brotherhood.

Faced with such open opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to place its supporters in strategic institutional positions, which in turn created further resistance. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood's opponents feared an Islamisation of the state, while the other major Islamic party, al-Noor, even accused the Muslim Brotherhood of trying to control the country's mosques. Morsi's decision in December 2012 to assume control of the three divisions of government (the executive, legislative and judicial branches) only deepened the divide.

Confronting the reality of political stagnation, millions of Egyptians demonstrated on the first anniversary of Morsi's presidency, on 30 June. Despite the situation on the ground, Morsi categorically refused to negotiate any compromise, which in time led to the military coup and his arrest, as well as the detention of several of his comrades.

The interim president appointed by the army, Adly Mansour, then dissolved the high chamber dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and nominated a new chief of the General Intelligence Agency, the retired Major General Mohamed Ahmed Farid.

Morsi is under house arrest in a secret venue, accused of murder, kidnapping and entering into a conspiracy with the Palestinian Hamas party. Moreover, a warrant of arrest was issued against the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badie, as well as other leaders of the politico-religious party. His arrest has fuelled anger among a large section of the Egyptian population and deepened the ongoing political crisis. Opposing camps, as well as the police force and the army, have been involved in violent clashes leading to numerous injuries and deaths. A bomb also exploded recently in an abandoned building near a police station in Mansoura, the capital of Dakhalia province.

Key actors and political groups that are deeply involved in the current crisis as opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood are the Tamarrod, the Salafists, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Coptic Christians.

Tamarrod

This movement, led by three former journalists and militants of the *Kefaya* movement (meaning 'enough' in Arabic and a precursor of the 2011 uprising), is behind the fall of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Tamarrod (Arabic for 'rebellion') was meant to invigorate the revolution and give it its initial popular and non-violent identity.

These young journalists voted for Morsi in the second round to prevent Ahmed Shafik, symbolising the Mubarak era, from winning the elections. However, when Morsi attempted last December to take control of all constitutional powers, they became worried and circulated a petition, which had reportedly been signed by 22 million people by 30 June 2013.

This movement could, however, not be successful without external support. The Coptic business tycoon Naguib Sawiris openly supported it, lending the activists offices in Heliopolis. He allowed the movement access to his TV network as well as his daily newspaper, *Al-Masri al-Yom*. Other anti-Morsi TV channels such as CBC, Al-Hayat and Dream also provided Tamarrod with media access.

It is also believed that the *feloul*, those who held power under Mubarak, used their network to facilitate Tamarrod's success. In this regard, many analysts point out that it is not a coincidence that electrical power cuts were a daily nuisance until 30 June, but suddenly ceased after the military coup against Morsi.

Before the coup, the leaders of Tamarrod met General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, who informed them that he wanted to organise a referendum 'for or against' Morsi's continuation in power. The Tamarrod leaders categorically rejected such a proposition, calling instead for the army's forceful intervention.

A major grievance against Morsi is that during his year in power, he was more

focussed on leading the Muslim Brotherhood than all Egyptians. Moreover, Morsi's leadership failed to restore growth, investor confidence, tourism and a general feeling of hope about Egypt's economic future, or to create a social justice agenda that showed a commitment to fairness or improved conditions for the poor or minorities. It is now clear that Morsi and his team lacked the competence and will to uphold those basic economic and equity expectations that were among the core objectives of the anti-Mubarak movement.

In addition, many news media organisations also contributed to Morsi's negative image. TV channels and newspapers such as CBC, ONTV, al-Qahira wal-Nas, *al-Destour*, *al-Watan* ou *al-Tahrir* and *al-Masri al-Youm* conducted an aggressive and permanent anti-Morsi campaign.

The 30 June mobilisation managed to oust Morsi and his government. However, the protesters, who united under a single slogan, *irhal* ('get out'), had neither a coherent organisation for the post-Morsi future nor any agreed-upon policy prescriptions for a new government seeking to provide bread, freedom and social justice. Likewise, they did not seem to have any more convincing solutions to the problem of representation in a democratic Egypt than did the Muslim Brotherhood.

Salafists

The Egyptian army seems to be playing a divide-and-rule strategy by exploiting the Salafist-Muslim Brotherhood rivalry. Indeed, the Salafists hope to take advantage of this situation to gain more electoral support during the next elections. Al-Sissi also attempted to seduce the Salafists by promising them a key role during the new transitional political period. However, the al-Noor Salafist party withdrew from talks with the army and condemned the killing of Muslim Brotherhood supporters by the army.

Since the uprising in January 2011 and its subsequent formation, the al-Noor party has positioned itself as an alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Noor leaders even accused Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of trying

to take control of Egypt's mosques. As a result, al-Noor joined the opposition forces denouncing the perceived Islamisation of the State.

Al-Noor's support for the overthrow of Morsi has been badly received by the majority of Islamist groups and by al-Noor sympathisers who still support the former president and do not understand why their leaders did not support Morsi in defence of Islamic solidarity.

Representing 29 per cent of Egypt's electorate, al-Noor was the second largest party in the Egyptian parliament after the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a party that has sufficient mobilising power to dampen radical religious fervour within its ranks and at the same time reassure the army and the anti-Morsi factions in the country. On the other hand, al-Noor can also be a nuisance to the military, as it demonstrated when it attempted to block the appointment of both Mohamed ElBaradei as Vice-President and Ziyad Baha al-Din as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and Minister of International Cooperation.

Furthermore, an agreement between the army, secular parties and al-Noor may be a mere convenience that in the medium to long term could face deeper antagonisms. As long as the questions of religion and Egyptian identity do not become a subject of constitutional debate, no serious antagonism will rise between these protagonists. Al-Noor's participation in the anti-Morsi coalition was also based on guarantees by secular parties and the army that Salafist concerns in this regard would be respected. However, if the army and the secularists attempt to review the role of religion within the Egyptian society, al-Noor is highly unlikely to accept any amendment to articles 2 and 219 in the current Egyptian constitution, which relate to Shari'a laws.

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

The Egyptian population has largely applauded the army's coup d'état. According to a poll conducted three months ago, 82 per cent of Egyptians wanted the army to intervene. Nonetheless, the SCAF is very unlikely to govern directly in the short term.

However, al-Sissi's call for protests to give the military a mandate to confront 'potential terrorism' shows who is really in charge in Egypt and that both the interim president, Mansour, and his vice president, ElBaradei, picked by the military, have no real power when compared with the military itself. Moreover, some observers argue that al-Sissi could be a presidential frontrunner in the years to come. In the meantime, the army is well aware that the country is very difficult to govern and that unpopular economic measures are necessary. The SCAF does not want to take the risk of becoming unpopular again, especially now that it enjoys great sympathy among the population. The SCAF would rather find a civilian who will protect their economic interests and, importantly, act as a buffer that can absorb blame for the relentless worsening of Egypt's many problems.

In fact, unlike in 2011 when it was taken by surprise and had no post-Mubarak plan, the SCAF has had plenty of time since Morsi's election to tighten its invisible grip. It is very likely that the army is aligned with neither the revolutionaries nor the democrats, but rather remains at the centre of a revanchist alliance with the *feloul* as well as a number of crony capitalists.

Copts

Copts, who represent ten per cent of the Egyptian population, have become the target of a fringe of radicalised Egyptians. At least nine Copts have been killed since the fall of Morsi while churches have been set on fire and looted by alleged Islamists.

Copts, who tried to remain neutral after the fall of Mubarak, have supported the isolation and fall of Morsi, arguing that he attempted to radically Islamise Egyptian society, thereby endangering the country's religious minorities.

As an indication of the Copts' support for the army, their spiritual leader, Pope Tawadros II, appeared alongside the leader of the Al-Azhar Muslim institution and al-Sissi during his speech broadcast live on TV.

As a result, many Islamists and Morsi supporters have argued that the Copts are behind a plot against them.

Economic issues

In addition to the turbulent political situation, Egypt's economy remains precarious. Cairo has been negotiating a loan of \$4.8 billion with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for months (see PSC Report no. 45), but no final agreement has been reached yet. Egypt desperately needs this loan, which would in turn reassure foreign partners and other lending institutions such as the World Bank and the African Bank for Development. The IMF demands that Cairo stops subsidising food prices, which the Egyptian government cannot afford to abandon as this would trigger more social upheaval.

Egypt urgently needs alternative sources of funding before its economy collapses. Already, foreign direct investments (FDI) and tourism, an important component of the national economy, are plummeting, leading to a steep rise in unemployment.

Foreign currency reserves have dropped sharply in the past two years, from \$36 billion to \$13 billion, equivalent to the cost of three months' worth of wheat and petroleum imports.

During his time in office, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood never showed any ability or inclination to develop a real economic programme that would lessen social tensions across Egyptian society. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood has had no economic ideas beyond what it inherited by default from Mubarak's neo-liberal cabinet ministers.

Geo-political dynamics

Africa and RECs

The PSC, at its 384th meeting on 5 July 2013, recalled its previous pronouncements on the situation in Egypt, in particular communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCLX), adopted at its 260th meeting on 16 February 2011. In this communiqué, the PSC expressed the AU's solidarity with the Egyptian people, whose desire for democracy was consistent with the relevant AU instruments, and recognised the exceptional nature of the situation then prevailing in Egypt.

The PSC further expressed deep concern at the risks the prevailing

situation posed for the long-term stability of Egypt and the cohesion of its people, with far-reaching national and regional consequences.

Accordingly, and as mandated by the relevant AU instruments, the PSC decided to suspend the participation of Egypt in the AU's activities until the restoration of constitutional order.

The PSC also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to establish an International Consultative Forum that would bring together Egypt and relevant international stakeholders to facilitate coordinated action in support of a transition leading to the restoration of constitutional order, the deepening of the democratic process, and the mobilisation of economic and financial support commensurate with the needs of Egypt and the challenges facing the country.

Arab League

The Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nabil al-Araby, embarked on an international tour in order to drum up support for the military coup in Egypt and to try to convince people that it was a 'popular revolution'.

According to al-Araby, what is happening in Egypt is the first popular revolution with the largest gathering of people in history. As such, 'everyone ... must understand the exceptional circumstances Egypt is going through'.

The Arab League chief's tour is meant to gather international support for Egypt and its 'leaders' so that they can complete the steps of this 'sensitive transitional phase' that will help them to implement their 'road map' for Egypt's future.

United Nations

United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has condemned the reported killing of more than 50 people at a mass protest in Cairo and urged all sides to 'do everything possible to avoid further escalation' of the political crisis that has gripped the country.

The Secretary-General called for the killings to be thoroughly investigated by independent and competent national bodies, and said those

responsible needed to be brought to justice.

Ban urged all sides to act with maximum restraint, calling on all Egyptians to be mindful of the precarious path the country was now on and to do everything possible to avoid further escalation. He added that protests had to remain peaceful and the security forces had to abide strictly by international standards.

He urged all Egyptians and political parties to work constructively to forge a consensus on the way forward through peaceful means. He added that 'the United Nations (stood) ready to assist as necessary'.

Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, urged all parties in Egypt to ensure calm and the protection of human rights during this 'delicate' period, stressing the need for dialogue to peacefully re-establish the rule of law and civilian authority.

Pillay also voiced support for all Egyptians striving for a state that would safeguard their human rights and freedoms. She called on the interim authorities, and all political parties and social groups, 'to respond to the expectations of the Egyptian people through the initiation of a meaningful and truly inclusive dialogue, involving all parts of society, in order to achieve reconciliation and reinforce democratic principles and the rule of law, under civilian authorities'.

She also reaffirmed the readiness of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to assist the Egyptian people in the transitional process and, in particular, in efforts by future administrations to promote a society based on the principles of democracy and social justice, guided by internationally recognised human rights and freedoms.

The UN's human rights chief has also requested detailed information from the Egyptian authorities on the legal basis on which Morsi and his team are being detained, why arrest warrants have been issued, and how many people are currently in custody following the recent change in government. Pillay said that she would like to deploy a team to follow developments in Egypt on the ground.

International community

United States

According to the United States (US), the arrests of different groups do not correspond to the national reconciliation spirit that both the army and the transitional government claim to seek. Although Washington has joined several other nations in calling for Morsi's release, it has nonetheless declined to characterise his overthrow as a coup, which would force a suspension of US aid as stipulated in terms of existing US law. However, Washington has decided to suspend the delivery of four F-16 warplanes to the Egyptian air force, while Israel has called on Washington not to suspend its financial assistance to Egypt, arguing that such an action could have a negative impact on the security of the Jewish state. Annual US military aid to Egypt is estimated at \$1,3 billion.

European Union

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, has stated that 'the EU have been strongly supportive of the people of Egypt and want to see the country move forward and swiftly in its democratic future'.

Ashton also issued a declaration on behalf of the EU calling for 'a broad-based and substantial dialogue, inclusive of all those political forces committed to democratic principles'. The EU urged 'the interim authorities to make every effort so that politically motivated arrests and other forms of harassment do not take place. All political detainees must be released, and criminal cases reviewed promptly in a transparent manner'.

She stressed that 'the military must accept and respect the constitutional authority of the civilian power as a basic principle of democratic governance'.

'It is for the Egyptian people to decide on the way forward, including a path to free and fair elections in which all parties can compete, and work to agree [on] a constitution as a solid foundation for a united, democratic and prosperous Egypt with the checks

and balances of a democratic system that respects the rights of all Egyptian citizens as key elements of Egypt's transition.'

Furthermore, the EU strongly urged that 'the rule of law, including accountability, human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of assembly and expression, religion or belief, are fully respected. All media must be free to function and journalists should not be penalised as a consequence of their professional work'.

The EU 'deplores the violence and use of excessive force involved in the recent clashes [and] stresses that peaceful protest must be permitted and protected by the authorities'. It remains 'concerned about the continued deterioration of the Egyptian economy and invites the Egyptian interim authorities to take urgent and concrete measures to tackle the economic challenges'.

Gulf states

In this dire economic situation, Cairo could find some financial assistance from the Gulf states. Kuwait has offered to lend it \$4 billion, composed of a \$1 billion donation, a \$2 billion deposit to the central bank of Egypt and goods worth \$1 billion. Likewise, Saudi Arabia, which welcomed the removal of Morsi, may deposit \$2 billion in the central bank of Egypt, along with a gift of \$1 billion and \$2 billion in oil and gas. The United Arab Emirates announced that they would deposit \$2 billion in the central bank and donate \$1 billion. Finally, Qatar, which is the main supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, reacted mildly to Morsi's overthrow and reaffirmed that Doha would continue supporting Cairo, providing the latter with economic assistance totalling \$8 billion.

Civil society

The global civil society alliance CIVICUS expressed shock and sadness at the deaths of at least 51 pro-Morsi supporters and the hundreds of injured on 8 July.

CIVICUS' secretary-general, Danny Sriskandarajah, 'urged the interim government of Egypt and the armed forces to start an investigation into this atrocity immediately in order to restore

faith in both the transitional government and the armed forces' ability to protect the freedoms of association and assembly of all Egyptians, and not just the "victors" of this second uprising'.

'While respecting the right to freedom of expression, we need to caution against the use of incendiary language by all Egyptian political parties and call for constructive dialogue to unify Egypt,' said Sriskandarajah.

CIVICUS also expressed concern at the issuance of arbitrary arrest warrants for members of the Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing), and their confinement in illegal places of detention.

According to CIVICUS, 'any targeting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be seen as a step back into Mubarak-era authoritarianism and as a move that will not work positively towards the healing and unification of a polarised state. It is important that the army and the transitional Government do not close their eyes to the fact that Egyptians must continue living side by side with one another regardless of their political opinions'.

Scenarios

From the above analysis, the following are the most likely scenarios:

Scenario 1

Egypt remains unstable for many months. Egyptian society is divided and continues to seek compromises that will enable Egyptians to achieve their preferred state model.

Scenario 2

Strong pressures from the Muslim Brotherhood are exerted on the interim government and in the streets across the country. This could lead to further clashes and divisions across Egypt.

Scenario 3

The dire economic situation could deepen the socio-political crisis if a solution, including foreign assistance, is not rapidly found.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered

by the PSC to consolidate democracy in Egypt:

Option 1

In order to lessen tension and give some satisfaction to the entire Egyptian population as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, the AU should actively work on initiating an ad hoc commission that would bring together Egypt and relevant international stakeholders to facilitate coordinated action in support of a transition leading to the restoration of constitutional order, the deepening of the democratic process, and the mobilisation of economic and financial support urgently required in Egypt.

Option 2

The army, Mansour, the secular forces and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence in Egyptian society cannot be discounted, ought to cooperate in order to find a solution to end the crisis and move forward. The PSC could provide experts and facilitators to assist in finding a solution to the crisis.

Option 3

Unless valid criminal charges are presented, Morsi and his supporters should be released immediately and efforts to prosecute them by means of a highly publicised trial should be abandoned. The PSC may warn Cairo that this would be an additional condition for Egypt to return as a full participant in the activities of the AU and PSC.

PSC retrospective

RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY (RDC) AND AFRICAN CAPACITY FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO CRISIS (ACIRC)

After government forces lost northern Mali to armed rebels, Islamist groups soon assumed control over the territory. Upon the request of the transitional president of Mali for help in repelling attempts by the Islamist forces to push further into southern Mali, the French launched a military intervention called Operation Serval. As the AU acknowledged in the PSC's report to the AU Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa, the inability of the AU to intervene in Mali in mid-January 2013 to counter the attacks was a great disappointment. While AU member states acknowledged the role played by France in supporting Mali, the AU's ineffective response was seen as a failure of leadership on the part of Africa.

This failure of leadership was attributed to the lack of an emergency response capability. The AU thus acknowledged that 'the existence of a truly operational capability at continental level would have enabled Africa to play a more effective role on the ground and assert its leadership'.

The recognition by AU member states of the need to prevent such a failure of leadership from being repeated prompted the summit level meeting of the PSC on 25 January 2013, which stressed the need for the speedy operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of the African Standby Force (ASF). Additionally, the PSC requested the AU Commission (AUC) to submit a report on progress made and challenges encountered before the 21st ordinary session of the AU Assembly set for May 2013.

In response to this request, the AUC convened a meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety (STCDSS) on 29–30 April 2013. At that meeting the AUC presented a report by the AUC Chairperson on the Operationalisation of the RDC of the ASF and the establishment of an 'African Capability for Immediate Response to Crisis'.

With respect to the operationalisation of the RDCs, the report observed that '[j]udging from the current status of their establishment and, given the capacity disparities between the regions and the Member States, it appears unlikely that we can upgrade the regional RDCs to a satisfactory operational level within a reasonable timeframe, in a way that translates the political will expressed at the highest level by the Member States into practical action, to be able effectively to respond with the required urgency to situations such as those that Mali experienced in January 2013'. Other factors that account for the slow progress of the operationalisation of the RDCs include the different levels of cohesion, operational and institutional capability, and levels of development in the various regions. The AU accordingly acknowledged that the operationalisation of the RDC of the ASF was a medium-term objective.

As a transitional formula and to provide the AU with an immediate emergency response capability pending the operationalisation of the RDC, the AUC Chairperson proposed the establishment of an operational collective security instrument in the form of an 'African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC)'. According to the report, the ACIRC is based on the principle that member states 'contribute on the basis of equity and their capacity'.

The 6th meeting of the STCDSS and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security that considered the report at the end of April 2013 failed to adopt measures for the establishment of the proposed ACIRC. They referred it back to the AUC, suggesting that a review of the factors that impeded the operationalisation of the RDC of the ASF should be conducted and submitted to them. At the time, the proposal received full support for adoption from Uganda and Rwanda.

When the 21st ordinary session of the AU Assembly was held on 26–27 May 2013, the AUC presented the report it had previously submitted to the STCDSS for adoption by the Assembly. In a decision on the report, Assembly/AU/Dec.489 (XXI), the Assembly decided, in principle, to proceed with the immediate establishment of the ACIRC.

According to the Chairperson's report, the ACIRC would be 'a flexible and robust force, made up of military/police capabilities, force enablers and multipliers, equipment and resources'. Its objective would be to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with an enhanced ability to respond swiftly to emergency situations arising from political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent. Upon its establishment, the ACIRC would become an efficient, robust and credible force, which could be deployed very rapidly and would be able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations.

The kind of missions that the ACIRC would be expected to undertake are: a) stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention missions; b) neutralisation of terrorist groups and other cross-border criminal entities as well as armed rebellions; and c) emergency assistance to member states within the framework of the principle of non-indifference towards the protection of civilians.

The ACIRC has a number of features. First, it is a temporary arrangement established to provide the AU with an immediate response capability pending the full operationalisation of the RDC of the ASF. Second, it is mainly composed of military elements and has force enablers. Third, it is based on direct contributions from AU member states, although it can also draw from regional capabilities. Clearly, unlike the RDC of the ASF, it is not tied to Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Fourth, it is intended to operate under the direct authority and control of the PSC. Fifth, it has high readiness and is rapidly deployable and very well equipped. The composition of the ACIRC's initial capacity will differ according to circumstances, but it must be rapid (within a maximum period of ten days) and strong enough to contain the situation. Furthermore, it must be sufficiently autonomous, with the capacity to sustain itself for a minimum period of 30 days.

While the ACIRC is clearly a product of both a critique of the operationalisation process of the ASF and its RDC and

Africa's dissatisfaction with external intervention, its operationalisation and success depend on a number of factors.

One such factor is political consensus on the ACIRC. Despite the fact that the establishment of the ACIRC was decided, in principle, by the AU Assembly, member states have misgivings about the concept and the process for its adoption. There are concerns that the ACIRC may divert attention and energy away from the operationalisation of the RDC of the ASF. Others fear that this concept will assign too much power to big states and may be used to the detriment of smaller countries. There are also concerns that this will bypass the RECs and concentrate too much power in the AUC. What kind of impact the ACIRC will have on the ASF is also an issue that requires clarification.

The most serious reservation expressed about the ACIRC relates to the process used for its adoption by the Assembly. At a meeting of the Permanent Representative Committee held after the 21st summit, many participants stated that the AUC did not follow the required procedures and that it presented its report by circumventing the PSC and the Executive Council.

It is clear from the above that political consensus about the ACIRC remains weak and contested. Despite this, a number of countries are reported to

have expressed their desire to make contributions towards the ACIRC, including South Africa and Uganda. The expectation is that the AUC will receive such commitments from at least a dozen countries. As part of its task to facilitate the operationalisation of the ACIRC, the AUC is developing a concept of operations, outlining the various needs and demands of the ACIRC. It has sent out a letter requesting member states to elaborate their contributions and plans to organise a pledging conference.

Another factor is the mobilisation of financial resources for funding the ACIRC. While it is envisaged that contributing countries would bear the cost of deploying the ACIRC for a period of one month, this expectation is premised on the eventual reimbursement of those costs by the AU. The expectation of the AUC is that countries not in a position to contribute in terms of personnel and logistics would make financial contributions to the ACIRC. This is an expectation that has yet to be tested.

Other factors that could affect the operationalisation and success of the ACIRC include the availability of airlift capabilities and logistical support, the availability of well-trained and rapidly deployable troops and the existence of an effective strategic management capability.

In terms of the next stages for the operationalisation of the ACIRC, a number of processes are anticipated. On 30 July 2013, the AU PSC will meet at ministerial level to consider the proposal on the ACIRC. Additionally, the Assembly decision establishing the ACIRC tasked the AUC 'to work out the detailed modalities for the operationalization of the ACIRC and to submit recommendations in this respect to a meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Security and Safety (STCDSS) to be held not later than the last quarter of 2013'. Finally, the Chairperson of the AUC is expected 'to submit to it [AU Assembly] a report on the implementation of this decision at its [Assembly's] next ordinary session, in January 2014'.

The ACIRC could be the answer to the AU's need to respond to crises promptly and effectively, provided that the various political, technical, logistical and financial issues impacting the operationalisation of the ACIRC are adequately addressed and the AU manages to fully operationalise the ACIRC. This will be known when the AU convenes the 22nd ordinary session of the Assembly in January 2014.

Country analysis

MADAGASCAR

Introduction

The last country analysis on Madagascar was published in the November 2012 edition of the PSC Report, no. 40. Readers interested in earlier analyses about Madagascar are also invited to consult the July 2009, February and June 2010, June 2011 and April 2012 editions.

Previous PSC and AU communiqués

On 16 January 2013 the AU issued a communiqué in which the chairperson

of the AU Commission, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, praised Madagascar's transitional president, Andry Nirina Rajoelina, after he announced that he would not stand in the presidential elections, initially planned for May 2013. It was stated that this decision would greatly contribute to the possibility of finding a way out of Madagascar's political deadlock, especially since former President Marc Ravalomanana had indicated in 2012 that he would not stand in the presidential elections. The AU committed itself to continue working with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to restore constitutional order in Madagascar. The AU intended to

re-evaluate, along with the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), the progress made with regard to the road map for ending the crisis, and thereafter to take appropriate decisions.

At its 355th meeting on 13 February 2013, the PSC once again welcomed the decisions made by Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, and took note of the updated election calendar, which scheduled the first round of presidential elections for 24 July 2013. The PSC reiterated that although it intended to lift sanctions against Madagascar as soon as possible, the country would remain suspended from AU activities, mainly due to the lack of

implementation of article 20 of the road map. In this regard the PSC demanded that the Malagasy transitional institutions remain neutral during the electoral period and emphasised the importance of the independence of the National Electoral Commission for the Transition (CENI-T). At the meeting it was recalled that the PSC had intended to lift the suspension on Madagascar, imposed in December 2011, and that the chairperson of the AU Commission needed to report on the implementation of the road map at the next meeting. The AU Commission's chairperson was asked to enhance the AU/SADC office in Madagascar, particularly so that it could have a greater presence during the electoral period.

At its 368th meeting, held on 22 April 2013, the PSC reiterated its commitment to the September 2011 road map while welcoming the progress that had been made towards its implementation. The PSC reiterated its appreciation for the SADC mediators and the efforts of the EU, the Indian Ocean Commission, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Japan, Norway and Switzerland. It was also noted that the provisions of the road map pertaining to the neutral, inclusive and consensual nature of the transition had not yet been fully implemented. Malagasy political stakeholders were called upon to hasten the resolution of the crisis. The AU committed itself to reject every effort or attempt to undermine the road map or the electoral calendar. Once again the PSC announced its intention to lift sanctions against Madagascar as soon as the road map was fully implemented. Madagascar was also urged to deal with issues concerning the admission of candidates, to prevent jeopardising the elections and to ensure free, fair and credible elections in Madagascar. The importance of strengthening the AU/SADC liaison office and the urgent appointment of the head of this office in accordance with the African Peace and Security Architecture was stressed. The international community was called upon to increase its financial support for these elections. The chairperson was encouraged to convene a meeting with the ICG-M as soon as possible in order to coordinate action by the international community

in support of the implementation of the road map.

At its 376th meeting held on 16 May 2013, the PSC expressed concern over the decision by the Special Electoral Court (CES) to validate the candidatures of Lalao Ravalomanana, former President Didier Ratsiraka and Rajoelina. The PSC expressed its regret over Rajoelina's decision not to honour the commitment he had made in January not to put forth his candidature for the presidential elections. The PSC recalled the decision adopted by the 14th ordinary session of the AU Assembly, stating that the perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government could not participate in elections to restore democratic order. It also stressed that it would not recognise Malagasy authorities elected in violation of the relevant AU and SADC decisions. The PSC expressed its appreciation for the commitment of former President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, and encouraged him to intensify his efforts.

At the seventh meeting of the ICG-M on 26 June 2013, it expressed concern over the difficulties encountered in efforts to end the crisis, with specific reference to the decision by the CES mentioned above. The group noted that the decision by the CES had compromised its credibility and Malagasy stakeholders were encouraged to recompose and restructure the CES. Due to this development, the group recognised that the election date of 24 July 2013 was no longer viable, and the CENI-T was encouraged to decide on new dates and approve a new list of candidates. The group also urged the international community to exert diplomatic pressure on Madagascar and not to recognise elections held in contravention of AU and SADC decisions. It was recommended that international support for the elections be frozen until the illegal candidates withdrew from the process. In addition, it was recommended that the international community impose robust sanctions against Malagasy stakeholders undermining the elections.

Crisis escalation potential

With the controversy around the three candidates and the decision to halt all political campaigns, Madagascar's

transition has stalled. Almost two years after consensus was reached on the road map on 11 September 2011, a move necessitated by the political crisis born out of the 2009 unconstitutional change of government, Rajoelina remains the interim president, determined to do his utmost to shape the political landscape. While some progress was made in terms of the establishment of key institutions in line with the provisions of the road map, it can be argued that the government has ignored a substantial part of it. The electoral process has now become contentious.

At the heart of the stalemate is the dispute around the participation of three candidates: Lalao Ravalomanana, the wife of Ravalomanana; Ratsiraka; and Rajoelina. The main protagonists in the crisis had vowed not to stand in the presidential elections. However, this decision was not respected, as Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, through his wife, remain candidates despite calls by the AU, SADC, the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* (La Francophonie) and the UN that they keep their initial promise not to stand for election.

According to external partners, their participation does not only violate national and regional laws, but is also a recipe for fraudulent and manipulated elections. Given the past record of violent elections and political changes in Madagascar, the controversial candidatures of Rajoelina and Lalao Ravalomanana are likely to jeopardise the fragile gains made since the signing of the road map and can only prolong the agony of Madagascar's citizens.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Adopted in September 2011, the road map was to provide a framework for the completion of the political transition. It was seen as an important step as it provided guidelines for the presidential elections, meant to restore constitutional order in Madagascar. Vital for the normalisation of the crisis and the electoral process, the implementation of the road map has become a cause for serious concern. When Ravalomanana announced his decision not to stand in the presidential election, followed by Rajoelina's commitment to do the

same, many saw this an important step in finally resolving the four-year political crisis in Madagascar. It was certainly the outcome of continuous discussions, mediation, pressure and compromise, all of which ultimately contributed to an opportunity for political normalcy in Madagascar.

However, subsequent developments within the political movements (*mouvances*) of each camp have undone this opportunity. In fact, the current debate could be approached from either of two perspectives. From external actors' perspective, it is argued that three out of the 41 candidates authorised to run in the presidential elections violated both regional electoral laws and Madagascar's national electoral legislation. Two of the candidates (Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka) failed to satisfy the six-month residence requirement as stipulated by law. As for Rajoelina, it is argued that his candidacy is a violation of his own commitment not to stand, as well as of the electoral laws of the country. Rajoelina is said to have submitted his application long after the legal closing period for submission.

It is argued that, to some extent, the decision (Decision No1-CES/D du 3 mai 2013) by the CES to approve and uphold the candidacy of the interim president as well as those of Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka undermines its credibility and independence. This has raised concerns with external partners, prompting calls for the immediate withdrawal of the 'controversial three' and a restructuring of the CES. The CES based its decision allowing Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka to contest the election on the contention that the provisions of the residency requirements cannot be strictly applied to the two given that they were kept out of the country by circumstances beyond their control. As for the approval of Rajoelina's late application, the CES believes it is its duty to uphold the right of every citizen to stand for election and to be able to choose whom to select as leader in order to create a peaceful environment for credible, free and fair elections.

From a political and perhaps strategic perspective, it is not unreasonable to argue that the announcement of the

main actors' controversial decisions, even through proxy representation, manifests a lack of trust among both those who oppose and support the *Haute autorité de la transition* (HAT). HAT supporters were not successful in reaching consensus on a candidate to stand on behalf of the interim President. At the same time, Ravalomanana's camp was also at pains to select a consensus candidate. It was initially rumoured that Rakotonirina Manandafy, vice president of the opposition coalition and long-time president of the *Mpitolona ho amin'ny Fandrosoan'i Madagasikara* (Progressive Party of Madagascar, or MFM), had been chosen. Then a last-minute decision was reached with Lalao Ravalomanana as an alternative. Members of Rajoelina's camp viewed the decision as an attempt by Marc Ravalomanana to govern the country through his wife. Rajoelina used this as a justification to renege on his initial commitment not to stand. He argued that the candidacy of Lalao Ravalomanana was equivalent to the former president himself contesting the presidential elections.

Meanwhile, the fundamental issue at hand is whether the international community's approach to the problem – insisting that all three controversial candidates withdraw – will have any impact on the actors concerned. Malagasy citizens are divided on the issue. Many believe that it is unfair to insist on the withdrawal of Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka since neither has violated the country's laws. As far as her supporters are concerned, Lalao Ravalomanana and her husband are not the same person and any attempt to block her is a violation of her basic human rights and of the road map. Indeed, while article 20 of the SADC road map called upon the transitional authorities to allow all Malagasy citizens in political exile to return unconditionally, including Marc Ravalomanana, most of his attempts to do so have been blocked by the government.

In staging an unconstitutional change of government, Rajoelina clearly contravened AU and SADC doctrine on the issue and should not be allowed to stand in elections intended to restore the constitutional order. His decision to stand at all costs and his attempts to prevent his opponent from returning

to the country are designed to allow him to retain power against the will of the people. At the same time, violence and intimidation are being used to discourage any internal mobilisation of opposition forces against his regime. Many opposition leaders have been arbitrarily arrested and detained while security forces only allow pro-Rajoelina gatherings.

It is now feared that Rajoelina intends to legitimise his rule through a fraudulent electoral process. Not only has the interim president failed to keep his word, and thereby contravened the AU provision on unconstitutional changes of government, but his application also failed to meet the legal deadline for registration. Therefore SADC, the AU, the EU and *La Francophonie* would be justified to insist on his resignation. If Madagascar cannot hold the presidential elections in 2013, Rajoelina will have been in power for five years without having been elected. As he gains control of the resources of the country while turning a blind eye to the massive trafficking in natural resources such as rosewood, various financial institutions have warned about the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Madagascar, the high unemployment rate and the potential risk of generalised unrest and violence.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

The summit of the SADC Troika, held on 10 May 2013, expressed its discontent with the decision by the CES and Rajoelina's announcement that he would be a candidate for election. The summit also expressed discontent about Lalao Ravalomanana's proposed candidacy and urged both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana to withdraw. The summit invited the UN to oversee the elections in collaboration with the AU.

While it is understandable that SADC and the AU have insisted on the withdrawal of all three controversial candidates, their position raises some concerns. Many observers have questioned whether African leaders are not aiming at the wrong targets and whether they should not rather insist on excluding the Interim President, whose stance clearly contradicts regional norms about

unconstitutional changes of government. SADC's approach to the Madagascar crisis has been criticised for the apparent contradictions in its engagement with the main protagonists. Many Malagasy citizens feel that the regional body's strategy to end the crisis has shown many weaknesses. In a statement released on 28 July 2012, the SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ Troika noted with dismay an attempt by Lalao Ravalomanana to enter Madagascar in contravention of existing engagements with the Troika and the transitional government while the issue surrounding the return of Ravalomanana and his family was still being negotiated.

Public perception in Madagascar is that SADC has been inconsistent, particularly with regard to the provisions of article 20 of its own road map. Whereas SADC condemned Lalao Ravalomanana for attempting to return to her country, it failed to do the same when Rajoelina neglected to implement substantial parts of the road map. It took a special agreement between Lalao Ravalomanana and SADC for her to visit her mother, who had been admitted to hospital. The Malagasy public has interpreted this need for official permission as a restriction that makes the Ravalomananas 'second-class citizens' in their own country, in contradiction with fundamental human rights enshrined in various international instruments ratified by both Madagascar and other SADC member states.

In an interview with French Radio RFI, Ambassador Ablasse Ouedraogo, the former AU mediator in the crisis, warned that SADC and the AU should refrain from deciding on behalf of the Malagasy people. The AU's credibility was also criticised in the Malagasy media over its Seven-Point Plan that, among other requirements, calls for the restructuring of the Special Electoral Court, the amendment of electoral laws and the 'voluntary' withdrawal of the three contentious candidates, while threatening to impose targeted and robust sanctions against anyone seen as undermining the resolution of the crisis. If Malagasy authorities have begun discussions on the restructuring, it is not clear whether this exercise will result in the

annulment of initial decisions to authorise the 'contentious three' to compete in the presidential election.

United Nations

In its interim programme for Madagascar 2012–2015, the UN highlighted its commitment to assist the political transition. It has identified several areas requiring urgent attention, including support for the political transition and national reconciliation with due regard to human rights and the promotion of a peace culture; lending assistance to the most vulnerable citizens; providing improved access to basic services; and providing support for economic recovery. Meanwhile, the most urgent challenge the UN faces is to successfully complete the transition through free and fair elections, which have now been compromised. The UN has aligned itself with the position taken by the AU, SADC and *La Francophonie* in that it is imperative that the three controversial candidates withdraw from the presidential election. There are also calls that, given the difficulties of the mediation process, the UN and the AU should seek to impose coherence and reinforce the necessary leadership in order to effectively resolve the ongoing impasse. Some are asking whether it would have been more productive to support the CENI-T and ensure that relevant mechanisms were in place to hold credible polls under the leadership of the UN.

International community

Through the ICG-M, the international community has been applying pressure on the main actors in Madagascar for the past four years. This might well be the longest transition period following an unconstitutional change of government and by far one of the most complex the international community has had to confront. Immediately after the signing of the road map, the EU pledged to give financial and political support to the transition in Madagascar, provided that a number of conditions concerning the implementation of the road map were met. In June 2013, the ICG-M reiterated its call for Lalao Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Rajoelina to withdraw in the interest of peace and stability. It also supported the international community's threat to apply robust,

targeted sanctions against all Malagasy stakeholders undermining the smooth running of the electoral process and the full implementation of the road map. The sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets of the three leaders, their relatives, collaborators and close business partners. In the meantime, funding for the electoral process has been suspended and a 31 July ultimatum has been given to the three 'illegal' candidates to withdraw. At this stage, it seems highly unlikely that they will do so.

Civil society

Recent developments have drawn reactions from three sets of actors in Madagascar: religious groups, the media and the military. However, it is the renewed engagement of the churches that signifies the determination of civil society organisations (CSOs) to influence the resolution of the crisis. The Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) comprises four churches, namely the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar, and the Lutheran and Anglican churches. The FFKM has played a significant role since the start of the crisis, and has also been influential in resolving the country's political crises in the past. On 18 April 2013 the FFKM facilitated a meeting with Madagascar's politicians with the aim of promoting national reconciliation. Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy attended the meeting. After this meeting the FFKM held consultations throughout Madagascar with both church and civil society leaders, with the purpose of sharing and receiving feedback on the discussions that took place on 18 April. Between 3–5 May 2013 more than 200 representatives of political parties and civil society met again to discuss the way forward. On 3 July 2013 the head of FFKM, Bishop Odo Razanakolona, held a conclave with Zafy and Ratsiraka. Rajoelina declined to attend. While the FFKM proposed alternatives to the road map, key members of the international community insisted that strict adherence to the road map was the only way out of the constitutional impasse for Madagascar.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis, three scenarios are envisaged:

Scenario 1

The three controversial candidates succumb to the international community's pressure and withdraw from the presidential race. This will pave the way for the holding of elections with a new polling date and enough guarantees for a fair, transparent and credible contest. Given the determination of Rajoelina to remain in control and his poor record of respecting commitments, this scenario is highly unlikely.

Scenario 2

The international community bows to the argument that it cannot decide on behalf of the Malagasy people and concedes that all 41 intended candidates should stand. In these circumstances, the transition authorities make concessions on some of the main requirements in the AU's Seven-Point Plan, including points one, two and four, while ignoring points three and five. The elections could take place, with the interim president winning and presenting international partners with a fait accompli.

Scenario 3

No concession is made, either by the 'contentious three' or by the

international community, and the impasse persists. Robust targeted sanctions are activated and Madagascar is further isolated. This is likely to lead to a Côte d'Ivoire scenario where former President Laurent Gbagbo assumed power unelected for ten years before exposing the country to devastating post-electoral violence.

Options

Option 1

A compromise is necessary at this stage to save Madagascar from stagnation, which could worsen the already dire socio-economic situation and fuel popular revolt. A shift in approach could consist of assisting the electoral commission technically, logistically and financially to hold free, fair and credible elections with the minimum risk of fraud. SADC, the AU and the UN, among others, could act as guarantors of the process through a certification process that ensures a true reflection of the expressed will of the Malagasy citizens.

Option 2

SADC and the AU still have leverage over the crisis, as their position in regard to the electoral process is significant for international recognition

to be conferred on the elected leader. This advantage could be used as a stick to force the Malagasy leaders to accept SADC and AU authority in overseeing the electoral process; from voter registration to the tallying and proclamation of results. The international community is likely to follow suit should SADC and the AU declare the electoral process to be fraudulent.

Option 3

Failure to heed the international community's call for Lalao Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Rajoelina to either withdraw or to allow it to thoroughly oversee the electoral process, or to undertake the restructuring and reforms requested by the AU and other partners, could result in reactivating the sanctions regime against Madagascar and more specifically against the leaders who are undermining attempts to fully implement the road map.

Country analysis

MOZAMBIQUE

Previous SADC communiqués

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is yet to make a pronouncement on the volatile political situation in Mozambique, which went from tensions in October 2012 to outright violence in April 2013. The conflict is between the rebel-group-turned-main-opposition-party Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo). SADC's silence may be attributed to several factors. These include the restricted structure and operational capacity of its regional early warning system (REWS) that provides for the

collection and analysis of information on any real or potential crisis to inform response strategies; the weakness of domestic SADC institutions responsible for early warning in Mozambique, which appear to be mere extensions of government intelligence systems; and the fact that Mozambique currently chairs SADC's foremost decision making body, the Summit, until August 2013, when Malawi assumes the chairmanship for the next 12 months. Significantly, SADC's current executive secretary, Tomaz Salomão, is also a former minister in the ruling Frelimo government. It is highly unlikely that Mozambique as a SADC chair will place itself on the SADC security agenda. Other offices in SADC, including that of the executive secretary, have limited leeway to engage in independent diplomatic action primarily because of SADC's

decision-making and agenda-setting protocols and the SADC doctrine of 'non-interference', which guards national sovereignty from early warning and early action.

Criticism should be directed at the REWS's failure to detect and raise the alarm about new conflicts in the region in general, and weak preventive diplomacy on Mozambique in particular. Political tensions have risen significantly in Mozambique since October 2012, when the leader of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, along with about 800 ex-guerrilla fighters, decamped to the party's former civil war base at Satangura near Gorongosa National Park, threatening to reignite war with Frelimo. The country's immediate neighbour, Zimbabwe, is reported to have requested through its Defence Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, that the situation be

tabled for SADC's consideration. In a *Herald* newspaper article dated 22 June 2013, Mnangagwa is quoted as urging SADC action against Renamo, warning that the former rebel group could destabilise the region. Indeed, the security situation in Mozambique and possible regional contagion effects are early warning issues that require close monitoring. A meeting to discuss the bloody inter-party spat between Renamo and Frelimo and likely regional spill-over effects is overdue.

Crisis escalation potential

Tensions between Frelimo and Renamo, which have been characterised by violent incidents and the loss of lives since April 2013, have the potential of escalating further if concrete steps are not taken. In April, Renamo members attacked a police station in the town of Muxúnguê, killing four officers. The resultant rounds of negotiations between representatives of Frelimo and Renamo failed to yield an agreement. On 19 June, Renamo threatened the closure of the main EN1 road, which links northern and southern Mozambique as well as the economically crucial Sena railway line used by foreign companies to transport coal from Tete province to an export terminal at the port city of Beira. Two days later, Renamo attacked civilian vehicles, leaving two people dead and five injured. Following this series of events, President Armando Guebuza announced his willingness to negotiate with Dhlakama. On 3 July, Dhlakama ordered a suspension of the armed attacks, but imposed preconditions for the talks, including that national security forces retreat from strategic positions close to his remote base camp and stop persecuting the party. Guebuza subsequently announced that he was calling a meeting of the Council of State for 29 July in order to fix the date of the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as dates for talks with Dhlakama. According to reports, Dhlakama was to boycott the scheduled Council of State meeting despite past complaints by Renamo about the lack of face-to-face contact between Guebuza and Dhlakama. The Council of State is a body that advises Guebuza and, upon its creation in 2005, Dhlakama was included in his role as leader of the opposition. He and the other members of the Council were sworn in on 23 December 2005.

However, Dhlakama did not take office as a member of the Council of State in 2010 as he failed to attend the swearing-in ceremony that year.

The latest developments have put a damper on the possibility of high-level talks between Frelimo and Renamo, despite the fact that similar talks have often petered out into a dialogue of the deaf. At this juncture, there is a real danger that the decades of peace that Mozambique has enjoyed since the 16-year civil war between the armed wings of the two parties ended in 1992 could be reversed. Clearly, the capacity of Renamo to wage a full-scale war, 20 years after the end of the civil war, may have declined as the party's war veterans have aged and it no longer enjoys support similar to what it received from South Africa's apartheid regime. However, the risk of instability due to armed banditry by Renamo's former guerrillas remains real. The recent violent incidents demonstrate that Renamo is still capable of acting upon its threats to launch a campaign to sabotage key infrastructure.

Key issues and internal dynamics

In October 2012, Dhlakama set up camp in the remote Gorongosa mountains, sparking fears of a return to military engagements between former Renamo guerrillas and the national security forces. Dhlakama often accuses Frelimo, the ruling party in Mozambique since independence in 1975, of pushing Renamo to war through its 'exclusive governance strategy', illicit enrichment and squandering of the country's growing wealth; the partisan nature of state institutions such as the security forces and the national electoral commission (CNE); and electoral fraud. Dhlakama has managed to regroup some Renamo ex-combatants, partly thanks to an ineffective post-war disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration strategy. There is concern that the unemployed and destitute Renamo war veterans may actually be holding Dhlakama hostage, forcing him to push for their stake in the country's natural resource wealth.

Additionally, Dhlakama's warmongering needs to be understood in the context of waning political support for Renamo and its leadership, as well as his hope to strengthen his political position in the

country in general and among his party's cadres and sympathisers in particular. Frelimo has dominated the political, economic and social set-up of the country ever since it edged out its erstwhile civil war rival in the country's first democratic elections in 1994. Renamo is facing a 'struggle within the struggle' in addition to its fight to remain a viable political alternative for the many Mozambicans opposed to the political agenda of the ruling Frelimo elite.

Previous threats by Renamo to resume armed conflict and cause public disruptions have proven hollow. Following Renamo's crushing defeat in the 2009 general elections, Dhlakama threatened to hold nationwide demonstrations against what he claimed were fraudulent election results. However, not a single protest was held. Renamo deputies elected in 2009 also ignored Dhlakama's call for them to boycott the new parliament. More importantly, the capacity of Renamo to wage a full-scale war may have greatly diminished due to its depleted ex-fighter base and lack of logistical capability.

Significantly, Renamo's warmongering and banditry strike at the heart of Mozambique's core values of peace, unity and harmony and could dent the country's image as a secure place to do business, with an attendant adverse impact on economic development. For example, Anglo Australian mining giant Rio Tinto was forced to suspend coal shipments along the Sena railway for two weeks due to Renamo's threats. The interruption of coal transport on the Sena Line caused significant losses for the Mozambican state railway company.

Renewed military conflict would hamper the Mozambican government's response to the country's enormous development challenges, including alleviating widespread poverty of more than 54 per cent; combating corruption; decreasing the heavy dependence on external donors; diversifying sources of economic growth; integrating capital-intensive mega-projects with the government's poverty reduction strategy; and developing the agriculture sector, which employs close to 80 per cent of the workforce but remains largely unproductive and

subsistence-based, and suffers from a growing 'feminization of poverty'.

Notwithstanding the challenges affecting Renamo, the party remains an important role player with enormous responsibilities in terms of the greater political future of the country. The party still has 51 out of 250 parliamentary seats and continues to represent a potentially viable political alternative to Frelimo. Some Renamo supporters believe that in order to play this role effectively, Renamo must abandon its warmongering strategy, which could taint the opposition party in the eyes of the electorate; reshuffle its leadership by giving room to a younger cadre of political actors; reformulate and communicate its priorities in relation to the country's needs on issues such as poverty, development and corruption; and start a decentralisation process in order to implement effectively its strategies at the local level. Renamo could also urge the government to institutionalise remedial mechanisms to address the needs and expectations of former Renamo combatants, who remain in dire straits 20 years after the war. Otherwise, the opposition party Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), established in 2009 as an offshoot of Renamo, could build on its control of two of the largest municipalities (Beira and Quelimane) and emerge from the forthcoming municipal elections in November as a stronger force in Mozambican politics. Against the backdrop of Renamo's accusations of an uneven electoral playing field and possible fraud in favour of Frelimo, it is vital that the polls are credible, conducted in a transparent manner and are accepted by the majority of Mozambicans, to ensure peace and stability.

Mozambique is among the poorest countries in the world and the Frelimo government is facing growing domestic pressure to allow citizens to benefit more from the country's vast coal and gas deposits. Since 2010, Mozambique has discovered huge natural gas reserves, estimated at more than 100 trillion cubic feet, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. The country has a historic opportunity to reduce its dependency on external assistance and invest in a better standard of living for its citizens.

However, the short-term selfish interests of political actors are undermining long-term national interests as natural resource extraction is associated with high levels of corruption, rent capture by well-connected elites and ineffective governance, which has contributed to provoking the current volatile situation. The majority of Mozambicans reportedly still scrape by on an average of \$400 per year despite annual national economic growth of around 7,5 per cent in the last five years. Many of the country's poor lack basic public services such as health, education, sanitation and transportation. There is a danger that they, feeling neglected by the government, may buy into Renamo or MDM's rather parochial propaganda. Furthermore, with Mozambique poised for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, Frelimo has to clarify its leadership succession and candidature for the country's top job sooner rather than later, to stem intra-party divisions. There is also concern that Guebuza has been tightening his grip on Frelimo by purging dissident leaders of the party's youth and women's league structures and replacing them with his loyalists.

Geo-political dynamics

Africa and RECs

Mozambique has not been discussed at recent SADC meetings and the political situation is yet to be tabled for discussion by its security body, the Organ Troika. As such there has not been any official regional position or, at the least, early warning or mediation efforts. This is despite defined laws and processes in its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) Protocol and the Defence Pact guiding the nature of issues over which the Organ and Summit may seek to prevent, resolve or manage conflicts. SADC encourages mediation and preventative diplomacy in situations that exhibit 'significant conflict' at inter-state and intra-state levels. Inter-state conflicts, which include the current Mozambican situation, are defined in the OPDSC Protocol to include 'conflicts over which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened'. Moreover, the Organ's subsidiary bodies such as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) can

also be tasked with advising on early warning and security issues in Mozambique without Mozambique officially being tabled on the SADC agenda. In terms of the AU's role and response, the pan-African body is most likely to defer to SADC, as stipulated by the subsidiarity principle. The situation is seemingly also a 'low-level risk' despite the high potential for its escalation. For now, tensions between Frelimo and Renamo and the volatile security situation in Mozambique remain a domestic matter.

Of the countries that share a border with Mozambique, only Zimbabwe has voiced its concern. Even before the country's minister of defence expressed concern at the rising tensions between Mozambique's two main political parties, Zimbabwe in November 2012 reportedly increased its military presence along its 1 231km border with Mozambique to monitor the threat of armed conflict. Zimbabwean officials feared that Dhlakama could be used by 'hostile forces' to destabilise the country's Marange diamond belt and threaten the 287km-long Feruka pipeline from Beira to Zimbabwe's oil refinery just outside Mutare. Indeed, Mozambique's 16-year civil war did spill into Zimbabwe with Renamo orchestrating heinous crimes against Zimbabwean citizens, particularly those in Manicaland Province.

International community

Nineteen international donors, working together as Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), play an important role in Mozambique's politics. The grouping, known as the G-19, provides substantial direct support to the Mozambican state budget. At one time the PAPs funded about 51 per cent of the country's national budget. Although the international donor community claims to follow a non-interventionist approach in its relations with the Mozambican government and to respect the country's sovereignty, the G-19's exertion of pressure on the Frelimo government on matters concerning the management of external aid, transparency in the public sector and inclusive growth, is well documented. Mozambique is highly dependent on international development aid and is therefore vulnerable to, and heavily influenced

by, external pressure. This situation has raised concerns about the sovereignty of the country in terms of its ability to plan and manage its own budget in relation to domestic policies and priorities. Donor pressure on the government is aimed at implementing effective measures to make the state stronger, more effective and accountable. Some observers view these donors as a de facto opposition, regularly confronting Frelimo and the government on issues such as security, corruption and development. The international donor community also provides backing for civil society to act as government watchdogs.

Meanwhile, China has also become a crucial international actor due to its economic importance in Mozambique. Bilateral trade between China and Mozambique has been growing at a fast rate, reaching \$1,1 billion in the first ten months of 2012. China's growing trade with Mozambique is centred on, but not confined to, the country's agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector. Mozambique's imports from China comprise mainly manufactured goods and machinery. China is also an increasingly important player in Mozambique's construction industry with over one-third of the country's new road construction projects now being carried out by Chinese contractors. Although China insists on separating economics from politics (based on a non-interventionist policy) in its engagement with Mozambique, as with other African countries, it has an interest in promoting stability as war or instability in Mozambique would damage Chinese economic interests.

Civil society

Civil society activists and the media have continued to call upon Frelimo and Renamo to engage in sincere dialogue in pursuit of a political resolution to the inter-party tensions. Civil society is playing an increasingly instrumental role in the country's electoral processes, one of the contentious issues between Frelimo and Renamo. The CNE is now headed by a prominent figure in Mozambican civil society: Sheikh Abdul Carimo Nordine Sau, who is deputy chairman of the Islamic Council (the *Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique*) and executive director of the *Observatório Eleitoral*, a

civil society group very active in electoral scrutiny. Civil society, as with all Mozambique's political parties and the media, is heavily engaged in scrutinising and politicking over the country's new electoral register. The compilation of the register should be completed by the end of July to ensure that it is ready for use in local elections on 20 November. The electoral register will also be used in next year's general elections. Despite a problematic start to voter registration, including equipment and logistical failures, the process was improved owing to the unprecedentedly strong monitoring by civil society. Civil society monitoring reportedly helped curb historically manipulative Frelimo habits. A civil society watchdog, the *Centro de Integridade Pública*, has played an instrumental role in monitoring voter registration, including the publication of periodic reports.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis the following could take place:

Scenario 1

Renamo's warmongering leads to another chapter of hostilities between Renamo and Frelimo in the build-up to the 2014 elections. This could become protracted and propel instability that would impede Mozambique's economic development.

Scenario 2

The logjam in the inter-party negotiation process could persist but without an outright violent confrontation similar to previous ones. In this scenario, political tensions would be on the rise. However, this could be moderated by the fact that Frelimo has now put Renamo's demands up for discussion in parliament.

Scenario 3

Frelimo and Renamo put national interest first, detoxify their relationship and reach a political solution to the crisis in order to place Mozambique firmly on the path to stability and economic prosperity.

Options

The early response options that the Mozambican parties and SADC could consider include the following:

Option 1

Negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo remain the best means for defusing tensions between the two parties. Mozambican civil society and the media should continue to urge the leaders of the parties to engage in sincere peace talks.

Option 2

With presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2014, electoral reform – one of the issues causing friction between Renamo and Frelimo – could be addressed. With the unlikelihood of such a move, confidence-building measures could be put in place by government, including dealing with the attendant Renamo allegations of electoral fraud.

Option 3

There is a need to focus on the nation-building project and to prevent possible popular protests. The government of Mozambique would need to accelerate investment climate reforms; improve the provision of public goods to facilitate inclusive growth (e.g., infrastructure, education, health); set up well-targeted safety nets for the most vulnerable; and promote greater public and citizen participation while building transparent and accountable systems, including those related to the country's extractive industries.

Option 4

Malawi, as the incoming chair of SADC from August 2013 and a state party that would be directly and adversely impacted by instability in Mozambique, should consider initiating a fact-finding mission to Mozambique as a precursor to a possible SADC mediation.

Open page

OAU/AU SUCCESSIONS AND FAILURES

From its founding fifty years ago, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) inspired and led the struggle against colonialism and racism to ensure freedom and independence for all African states. However, the vision of pan-Africanism and African unity became distorted soon after its establishment, as nationalist sentiments and the question of national sovereignty assumed precedence.

Today, the debate about the unification of the continent is half a century old. On one side there are those who advocate Africa's immediate unification (maximalist) and, on the other, those who champion a gradual or step-by-step approach (gradualist). These two conflicting positions on institutional arrangements for unifying the continent have created a major obstacle and thereby impeded the quest for continental unity. Ultimately, though, the issue of unification is not whether to establish a united government on the continent, but how and when to do so, and to clarify the concept and constitutional design of such a government.

Looking back at the OAU, it made several attempts to overcome the challenges posed by inter-state and intra-state conflicts that plagued the continent following the independence of many African states. These include the establishment of three mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution in an attempt to find the most effective mechanism to prevent conflict in Africa. However, due to the shortcomings of these mechanisms, as well as a human and financial deficiency, the OAU did little to protect Africans from ongoing conflict and economic deprivation.

Consequently, its inability to meet its financial obligations, lack of experience in managing emerging conflicts and lack of political will weakened the

OAU's position and prevented it from playing a fundamental and effective role in securing peace and security in Africa. After the African Union (AU) succeeded the OAU, the conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives that were initiated by the OAU were incorporated in the Constitutive Act of the AU. This mechanism laid the groundwork for the AU to assess its capability in meeting the challenges of conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. To this end, a refashioning and restructuring of the continental body with better funding for the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPMRM), in addition to the Integrated Conflict Management Mechanism (ICMM), have placed the AU in a better position than ever to meet the challenges of dealing with conflict. In general, the AU objectives are different from, and more comprehensive, than those of the OAU. The AU is now becoming a much stronger organisation and is playing a more proactive role. The most decisive and significant principles of the AU are the right to intervene in member states; respect for good governance, democratic principles and human rights; and the promotion of social justice and gender equality.

However, the decision to form the AU in 1999 in Libya, the adoption of its Constitutive Act in Togo in 2000 and its inauguration in South Africa in 2002 created many challenges for the AU in terms of forming its organs and determining its programmes, in both the short and longer term. It should be remembered that the OAU had only one year to prepare for the transition from the OAU to the AU, and the AU Commission had a one-year interim period to set up the core organs of the AU and develop its various programmes.

Looking forward, a major concern for the AU seems to be long-term issues, including its relationship with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which is key to economic cooperation and integration as well as issues of development, peace and conflict resolution. There are also issues concerning the AU and its relationship with the New Partnership for Africa's

Development (NEPAD) and how these two important inter-governmental organisations work within the AU structure, since each has established its own secretariat and organisational structure. In addition, the relationship between the different organs within the AU system is not always sound structurally and some often operate on ad hoc bases. Most importantly, while all AU member states have equal status and rights in theory, in practice it has been shown that such rights and perceived standing are relative and therefore unequal. This is because of the AU's inability to meet its financial obligations, which opens the door for larger and more powerful countries to exert leverage and establish a form of hegemony, thus playing leading roles in African affairs.

Moreover, while some organs of the AU Commission have done relatively well in terms of achieving AU objectives, other organs are yet to be established or remain barely functional. For example, the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the establishment of the Court of Justice and the establishment of 'financial institutions'. In fact, Article 19 of the Constitutive Act requires the establishment of the African Bank, the African Monetary Fund and African Investment Bank, none of which has to date been established. Furthermore, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), its rules of procedure and work programmes within the AU framework still remain unclear.

The objective of the AU to achieve greater unity and solidarity between individual African countries and the people of Africa is still in the making. The OAU dedicated most of its resources and energy to fighting colonialism in Africa, therefore the priorities and ambitions of the AU should be to integrate and eventually unite Africa economically and politically.

Country analysis

SOUTH SUDAN

Introduction

The last country analysis on South Sudan was published in the October 2012 edition of the PSC Report, no. 39. Readers interested in earlier regional or country analyses covering South Sudan are also invited to consult the July and September 2009, February and November 2010, February, June, August, October and December 2011, and February and May 2012 editions.

Previous AU and PSC communiqués

On 23 July 2013 President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan declared the dissolution of his government, including Vice President Riek Machar, all the members of his cabinet, and all the deputy ministers. Pagan Amum, the secretary general of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), was also removed. A day after the decision, on 24 July 2013, the AU Commission and representatives of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Addis Ababa to discuss the development and its implications.

In a subsequent statement the AU and other members of the group urged the various South Sudanese parties to maintain calm and prevent violence. The meeting also called on the leaders of South Sudan to accelerate the formation of a new cabinet 'in a manner that reflects the diversity of the South Sudanese people and in conformity with its Transitional Constitution and the democratic ideals the new country has espoused'. The group further emphasised that the national vision of the two-year-old state could only be realised through 'sustained commitment to democracy and good governance, justice and accountability, and respect for rule of law and the human rights of all of South Sudan's people'.

Crisis escalation potential

The state of security in South Sudan is fragile. There are numerous rebel

groups fighting the government in Juba and long-running challenges in the form of communal clashes that have escalated to a whole new level in recent months. The communal wars have caused one of the most serious humanitarian crises in Africa. The latest move by the president in dissolving his whole government has raised fears of increased instability or fresh outbreaks of violence. Following the declaration, heavily armed security forces began guarding government offices in Juba.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Jonglei state have said that the humanitarian situation in the region is dire. Reports show that since September 2012 thousands of civilians have been killed in clashes or died of other causes related to the crisis, and tens of thousands more have been forced to flee their homes due to indiscriminate violence and insecurity arising from the armed conflict between South Sudan's armed forces and non-state armed actors.

In March clashes erupted in Jonglei between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and militants led by David Yau Yau. In May, the head of the UN mission in South Sudan said that due to a lack of troops and aircraft, UN peacekeepers were unable to protect civilians affected by the fighting. According to the UN World Food Programme (WFP), tens of thousands of South Sudanese face severe food insecurity because of the recent violence and are in hiding in the bush in Jonglei state. The WFP also said that more than 100 000 people were out of reach of humanitarian support since violence broke out earlier this month between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities. Over the past six months, about 120 000 people have fled to the bush amid heightened insecurity.

The existing security crisis caused by the fighting between the government and rebel groups and the escalating communal clashes, coupled with political instability in Juba, could further escalate the fragility of the security situation in South Sudan. The outstanding issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and claims and counter-claims

between Juba and Khartoum, accusing one another of supporting rebel groups, are additional contributors to insecurity. Machar and Amum had prominent roles in the ongoing talks between Sudan and South Sudan. It is unclear who will replace them and the implications of such a change. It is also feared that the dissolution of the government, an action which allegedly targeted specific individuals, could complicate the succession struggle in the SPLM and escalate the ethnic divisions and tensions between the Dinka and the Nuer, South Sudan's two largest ethnic communities.

Key issues and internal dynamics

South Sudan is in a political crisis following the dissolution of its government. The president has a constitutional mandate to change his government and what he did was therefore quite legal. South Sudan's transitional constitution, which was adopted in 2011, gives Kiir broad authority to dismiss senior government officials. Article 104(2) specifically allows him to remove the Vice President and Article 112(1) allows for the removal of all 'ministers of the national government'. However, the political implications of his actions in firing his vice president and dismissing Amum have created a situation of uncertainty. The decree, which effectively and significantly reduced the size of South Sudan's governmental structure from 29 to 18 ministries, has left the world's newest country without a government. The undersecretaries who head the various government departments have been put in charge until such time as a new government is formed.

Analysts and some members of South Sudan's government are of the view that a good number of the previous cabinet members will return to form part of the new government. The obvious power struggle between the president and his deputy could be the primary reason for Kiir's action. The sackings removed the powerful Machar, who recently made public his interest in challenging Kiir for the presidency. The next elections are scheduled for 2015 and the succession struggle has begun to dominate the

political discourse in recent months. The other target of Kiir's declaration, Amum, has also shown interest in pursuing the top job. Amum has since criticised Kiir's actions as politically motivated.

The latest decree is therefore part of the visible ongoing power struggle in South Sudan. Tensions have been simmering in the top levels of government for some time. On 15 April this year Kiir issued a declaration that stripped Machar of his delegated powers under the constitution. Many saw this as a signal of what was still to come. The decree followed an announcement by Machar that he planned to contest the presidency.

Kiir also removed Taban Deng Gai, governor of the oil-producing Unity State, from his post. Deng was allegedly involved in the internal political struggle and has publicly said that his removal was unconstitutional. Kiir, who has repeatedly accused top members of his government of corruption, also recently suspended two of his most powerful ministers, Deng Alor Kuol, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, and Kosti Manibe Ngai, the Minister of Finance. Like other dismissals, both Kosti and Deng Alor have claimed they were wrongly accused and that their removal was politically motivated. The security sphere and related institutions also experienced a reshuffle. The 23 July decree removed 17 top security officers and in mid-February Kiir fired 117 top army commanders, including deputies to the Chief of General Staff. He also relieved 23 other senior officers of their positions by means of presidential decree.

The political power struggle in South Sudan is heavily dependent on ethnic identity. The president is from the Dinka ethnic group, while Machar comes from the Nuer community, the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan. There is a history of animosity between the Dinka and the Nuer stemming from the guerrilla days of the SPLA. Machar left the SPLA and created an alliance with Khartoum in the 1990s, following infighting among the SPLA leadership. The division gave rise to a brutal chapter in the SPLA's history, which is sometimes referred

to by historians as the 'civil war within the civil war'. Although the possibility of further division looks very distant, the latest development may exacerbate ethnic tensions.

During a press conference following the presidential decree, Machar said people should remain calm and not give the president an excuse to declare a state of emergency. He said: 'This is a constitutional mandate of the president to remove and form a government. This is within the powers of the president. There should be no violence.' The former deputy president reaffirmed that he would run for the chairmanship of the ruling SPLM before South Sudan holds its next national election in 2015, the first since independence. Machar condemned Kiir's failure to appoint a new government immediately after sacking the cabinet and warned that a vacuum created apprehension.

The woeful economy is another major challenge Juba faces. The country is very poor and underdeveloped and depends on oil and aid for almost its entire budget. The production and sale of oil is unstable mostly because of its relationship with Khartoum, which recently threatened to shut down the oil pipeline after accusing Juba of supporting Sudan's rebel foes. Corruption is the most serious obstacle negatively affecting economic stability and growth. According to a leaked World Bank report, as much as \$4 billion has been lost to graft in South Sudan in recent years.

The deteriorating humanitarian situation, mostly in the eastern part of the country, is another concern. According to figures from NGOs, out of an estimated population of 149 000 in Pibor County, over 100 000 people have been forced to flee their homes. Out of the six major population centres (Lekonguele, Gumuruk, Pibor, Manyabol, Boma and Muruwa Hills) in Pibor County, five have been almost entirely depopulated. Civilians in these areas are currently without access to clean water, food, shelter and critical medical services. As the rainy season is beginning, large groups of people may become trapped in flood-prone areas that will then turn into malaria-infested

swamps. These areas are also in close proximity to armed groups, with the threat of violent clashes ever-present. Humanitarian assistance has been severely disrupted in the country due to increasing insecurity and the violent targeting of humanitarian actors and services. Earlier this year many agencies were forced to suspend services and evacuate their personnel from parts of Pibor.

On 27 July Kiir started forming his new government. He appointed his former Information Minister, Barnaba Marial Benjamin, as the new Foreign Minister. Benjamin is a close ally of Kiir and an SPLM veteran. The new government faces a significant challenge in creating political unity in the state and building an inclusive governmental apparatus. The negotiations with Khartoum and efforts to address the threat posed by rebel groups in the midst of communal wars are other mammoth tasks. Stabilising the economy and addressing the humanitarian crisis are also issues that require urgent action by the state.

Geo-political dynamics

Africa and RECs

On 24 July 2013, following a request by the AU, Sudan extended a deadline for closing the oil pipelines to South Sudan until 22 August, thereby providing a wider timeframe for negotiations between the two countries. Last month, Khartoum said it would close two oil pipelines with South Sudan by 7 August unless Juba stopped supporting rebels operating across their common border. South Sudan denied the allegation and responded by accusing Sudan of supporting rebel groups operating in Juba's territory. The Head of the AU High Level Panel on Sudan and chief mediator, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, and the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Tedros Adhanom, travelled to Khartoum on 24 July 2013 and met with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, successfully persuading him to extend the deadline.

Khartoum says the rebel groups of Darfur, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains are harboured and

supported by the South Sudanese government. In turn, Juba accuses Khartoum of promoting and backing the ongoing rebellion led by Yau Yau in Jonglei.

Recently, the AU and IGAD launched an investigation committee to probe the mutual accusations by Sudan and South Sudan. The Ad Hoc Investigative Mechanism (AIM), which comprises three senior military officers, will visit Juba and Khartoum to examine the situation. The current chair of IGAD's Council of Ministers, Adhanom, said that IGAD hoped 'that this mechanism (would) resolve that longstanding problem, the allegation by both parties of hosting rebels against the other'. The AIM is expected to complete its work within six weeks, by early September.

United Nations

The UN is faced with a huge challenge in reaching out to people in the violence-affected areas in eastern South Sudan. Chris Nikoi, the South Sudan country director for the WFP, said that aid agencies had begun airlifting food by helicopter to tens of thousands of people displaced by the escalating violence, with many having spent weeks hiding in the bush. He said: 'We believe these people need food now and cannot wait for much longer after hiding in the bush for weeks.' He added that the WFP was doing all it could to provide lifesaving assistance, but it needed more food supplies in the country and more helicopters to take this food to those who most needed it. The WFP, which is sharing two helicopters with other aid agencies, has launched a \$20 million appeal for three extra helicopters and over 3 600 tonnes of food to help 60 000 people for the rest of the year.

International community

The US played a significant role in realising the independence of South Sudan. On 24 July the US expressed its deep concern about the risk to stability posed by Kiir's decision to dismiss Machar, his cabinet, deputy ministers and a number of police brigadier generals.

The US urged all parties to maintain calm and prevent violence, and called upon South Sudan to quickly and

transparently form a new cabinet. 'We encourage South Sudan to do so in a manner that reflects the diversity of the South Sudanese people, and that respects its Transitional Constitution and the democratic ideals the new country has espoused.'

The EU also asked the government to maintain calm and prevent violence.

Civil society

In June 2013 a coalition of civil society organisations in South Sudan, the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, met with an advisor to the president and discussed 'issues of national concern'. In a six-point declaration that focused on a range of issues, the alliance urged the government to be more participatory and responsive. It referred to the general human rights situation in the country as being of great concern and noted the increasing number of detentions without trial. The declaration noted that the general security situation of the people of South Sudan was deteriorating and raised the issue of an amnesty for rebels, the question of a National Security Bill, coming elections and future co-operation between the government and civil society.

Scenarios

Given developments in South Sudan, the following are potential scenarios:

Scenario 1

Continuation of the unhealthy power struggle and power vacuum could weaken the government in Juba to the advantage of the country's enemies, including rebel groups fighting against the government.

Scenario 2

The change of government may negatively affect the ongoing negotiations with Khartoum, further exacerbating tensions between the two states.

Scenario 3

Creating a representative and inclusive government will stabilise the political sphere and result in a stable government that can respond to the humanitarian and security challenges the nation faces.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to improve security and stability in South Sudan:

Option 1

The PSC, in tandem with IGAD, could continue to monitor the situation in South Sudan and encourage talks with Khartoum.

Option 2

The AU could partner with the UN to look for ways to address the humanitarian crisis in the eastern region of South Sudan.

Important dates to diarise

9	August	International Day of the World's Indigenous People
12	August	International Youth Day
19	August	World Humanitarian Day
23	August	International Day for the Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition
30	August	International Day of the Victims of Forced Disappearances
15	September	International Day of Democracy
21	September	International Day of Peace

Country	Election	Date *
Madagascar	Presidential 1st Round	23 August 2013
Swaziland (Primary)	House of Assembly	24 August 2013
Rwanda	Chamber of Deputies	16 September 2013
Swaziland (Secondary)	House of Assembly	20 September 2013
Guinea	National Assembly	24 September 2013
Madagascar	Presidential 2nd Round National Assembly	25 September 2013 25 September 2013
Mauritius	Presidential (indirect)	September 2013
Guinea-Bissau	Presidential	24 November 2013

**could change, dependent on circumstances*

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