Peace and Security Council Report

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Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda.

Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union.

Early warning issues for July 2013

During July, the threat of attacks by al-Qaeda-linked Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria and al-Shabaab terrorists in East Africa remains ever-present. The fact that Boko Haram is also deliberately targeting school children as soft targets lends even greater urgency to removing this terrorist scourge and its allies from African soil. In the meantime, the chaotic state of insecurity in Libya and street protests in Egypt and Tunisia continue to forewarn of difficult times ahead for these North African countries in their separate quests for peace and stability. In Madagascar the constitutional crisis remains an obstacle to future peace and stability, requiring the close attention of SADC and the AU.

Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Jacques-Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule

Current posts: Cameroon's Ambassador to Ethiopia
Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA
and Chair of the PSC

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Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

Country analysis

GUINEA

Introduction

The last country analysis on Guinea was published in the December 2010 edition of the Peace and Security Council Report. The present analysis looks at the current crisis pitting the government against the opposition on the issue of the legislative elections. Readers interested in previous events are invited to consult the December 2010 issue.

Previous PSC AU communiqués

In a press release on 10 May 2013, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), called for 'all Guinean parties' restraint and a sense of responsibility', and asked them 'to conform to the Declaration signed on non-violence, on 23 April 2013, by the Government, the political parties of the opposition and the presidential alliance'. She also expressed the AU's intention to engage in the facilitation process implemented by the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for West Africa, Said Djinnit, which is supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

In a press release on 2 March 2013, Dr Dlamini-Zuma expressed her concerns regarding the situation in the Republic of Guinea. She was referring in part to the incidents of violence observed in Conakry during and after protests organised by opposition parties on 27–28 February 2013, and the resultant 'growing tension'. She reminded 'Guinea's political leaders, both the ruling coalition and the opposition, to uphold their responsibility to maintain peace and tranquillity in the country and work for the emergence of a necessary consensus for strengthening the democratic process and solving the socio-economic challenges of the time'.

Crisis escalation potential

The ongoing political crisis, punctuated by a violent crackdown on opposition protests, has further widened the political gap and aggravated sectarian tensions. The challenge is not only political. Social protests, fuelled by ethnic divisions, have become grafted onto the ongoing political crisis. Communitarian identity and ethnicity have become the political language affecting greater social cohesion. Since the 2010 elections, politicians have increasingly referred to ethnic issues in their speeches, either to exacerbate ethnic divisions or to highlight the dangers of such divisions.

The reaction of the police, whose tactics caused several protesters' deaths, is seen by the opposition as a deliberate attempt to suppress it, especially the Fulani community. The heavy-handed police reaction has been described by opponents such as Cellou Dalein Diallo, the leader of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), as 'targeted repression'.

The situation is exacerbated by mutual suspicion between the government and opposition politicians, who portray each other as radicals. The political crisis has taken an ugly turn in that political leaders seem unable to effectively address the concerns of the increasing number of radical activists ready to take to the streets. Rumours are rife about preparations to topple the government, the importing of weapons into Conakry and the mobilisation of the security forces.

The opposition suspects the presidential majority of having deployed, in Conakry, traditional dozo hunters and militias comprising former Malinke rebels from the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). The ruling coalition, on the other hand, suspects the opposition of importing weapons in preparation for overthrowing the government.

In this context, the compromise about the legislative elections that has started to emerge since the resumption of talks on 3 June 2013 is a notable achievement, given that those in power seemed determined to hold elections with or without the opposition and that the latter had decided to 'prevent the holding of these elections'. These positions could plunge the country into a cycle of pre-and post-election violence fuelled by ethnic rivalry that only political actors have the power to prevent.

The unstable situation in the sub-region could lead to the escalation of violence. Guinea's neighbours have porous borders and suffer from security problems, factors that are conducive to the unchecked flow of arms and mercenaries.

Furthermore, the army remains a considerable source of concern in Guinea. Despite the security sector reform (SSR) that has led to the retirement of 4 000 military personnel and the demilitarisation of Conakry, the army is still not entirely under civilian control. It now maintains a spectator position, but could once again get involved in politics if the current crisis turns violent.

Key issues and internal dynamics

Long awaited, repeatedly announced and then postponed, the legislative elections to replace the National Assembly and complete the political transition in Guinea have still not been held. The last parliamentary elections held in the country took place in 2002. Moreover, the elected parliament was subsequently dissolved and replaced by the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was intended to serve as a legislative body for six months. Two years after the presidential elections, the NTC is still an ad hoc legislative body that is often ignored by the executive branch and lacks a mandate from the people, which raises concerns regarding its legitimacy.

The mere replacement of the parliament through legislative elections is not all that is at stake in Guinea. The completion of the political transition through the establishment of key checks and balances is also an important consideration. In addition to the presidential alliance, grouped within the *RPG-Arc-en-ciel* or Rainbow Covenant, there are four opposition coalitions that will be competing for the legislature. These are the Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP), the Collective of Political Parties for the Completion of the Transition, the Republican Club (CDR), and the United Front for Democracy and Progress (PDF).

The conditions for holding these elections have divided the Guinean political class. Apart from the cancellation of the 13 April 2013 decree and the opposition's demand for an election date, the dispute between the regime and the opposition revolves around two main points: one technical, the other institutional. These are the reliability of the voter registration list and the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) in the organisation of the elections.

Regarding the reliability of the voter registration list, the Guinean opposition has frequently expressed concern over the unilateral decision of the government to engage with a new operator, a South African company called Waymark Infotech, while the French operator, Sagem, employed during the 2010 presidential election, could easily have been used. The opposition has cast doubt on the new operator for three reasons. Firstly, transparency is an issue as Waymark was hired without a due tender process. Secondly, Waymark's technical capacity to establish a secure voter register has been questioned. Thirdly, there are fears that the ruling coalition could conspire with Waymark to commit electoral fraud, bringing its neutrality into question.

With respect to the CENI, disagreements have emerged on two issues, namely the CENI's operations and its independence. Opposition parties have pointed to the lack of consensus and consultation in its decision-making processes, arguing that conditions within the institution favour the ruling coalition and intentionally disadvantage the opposition. The independence of the CENI is also being challenged as the result of a recent decision to postpone the deadline for candidates' applications from 2 to 8 May. The opposition believes this decision was dictated by the ruling coalition, which was facing internal divisions concerning the nomination of coalition candidates.

There has been some progress in managing the crisis since the resumption of dialogue on 3 June under the auspices of the College of Facilitators, which was created on 10 May 2013. The College of Facilitators consists of Djinnit and two national facilitators chosen by the opposition parties and the government. Although no agreement has yet been signed, both sides seem to agree on certain issues. The ruling coalition has accepted that Guineans living abroad should be able to vote and the opposition is prepared to participate in the elections under certain conditions. These include the revision of the voter registration list, the correct and statutory operation of the CENI, recruitment by the opposition of two experts to oversee and assist the CENI, and the recruitment of a new operator for the next

round of elections, including the 2015 presidential elections.

Following the conclusion of the dialogue, the CENI proposed 28 July 2013 as the election date, but the opposition rejected it. The opposition parties have stated that some important issues still remain unresolved and they will become part of the electoral process only after the signing of a comprehensive political agreement.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and the RECs

Violent opposition protests have characterised the current political crisis. Consequently, regional communities could not have remained indifferent even if they had not been heavily involved in trying to resolve the crisis. In press release No. 151 of 29 May 2013, the Special Representative of ECOWAS in Guinea 'invited the Guinean political actors to meet urgently around a negotiating table, without taboos [or] preliminary judgment, in order to end the cycle of violence and impasse that has paralysed the country. The office of the Special Representative further pledged its availability to support this process.'

During a working visit within the framework of the Mano River Union in Conakry on 10 March 2013, Presidents Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, Dr Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone, and Alassane Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire encouraged their Guinean counterpart, Alpha Condé, to promote dialogue in order to preserve the peace and trust necessary for development in a country shaken by violence.

United Nations

The United Nations (UN), through Said Djinnit, is engaged in trying to ease tensions between the different political actors. The first attempt at dialogue in February was unsuccessful because the opposition was upset that the date for the legislative elections had been announced without proper prior consensus. The second attempt on 3 June resulted in an agreement in principle between the opposition and the ruling coalition. This time, the opposition accepted the principle of dialogue 'without taboos or prejudgement' and made a concession regarding Waymark provided that the operator filed reliable commission checks. Through the UN's mediation the government accepted the eligibility of expatriate Guineans voting outside the country.

Also, on 1 March, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for reconciliation and urged Guineans to refrain from any actions likely to undermine the peaceful and democratic process in the country. He urged all political actors to pursue the path of dialogue to resolve outstanding issues related to the electoral process and to create conditions for the holding of peaceful and democratic parliamentary elections. His statement was in response to the clashes that followed the events of 27 and 28 February.

International community

The international community is involved in the resolution of the political crisis in Guinea and is trying to break the stalemate that has developed since the 2010 presidential elections. On 14 June 2013, the spokesperson of the United States (US) State Department, Jen Psaki, welcomed 'the Guinean political leaders who have shown goodwill, flexibility, and a mutual interest in holding inclusive and peaceful elections in accordance with international standards'.

In a press release on 3 June, the French ambassador to Guinea, Bertrand Cochery, stated that France 'welcomes the holding of a meeting of the Guinean political actors in Conakry, under the aegis of the facilitator of the international community, Mr Said Djinnit'. At the same time, France 'urged all Guinean political actors to act responsibly and to engage without ulterior motives in a substantive dialogue in the best interest of the country, its stability and its development'.

Following the initiation of dialogue between the opposition and the ruling coalition, the European Union's (EU) High Representative, Catherine Ashton, expressed her satisfaction at the results recorded. However, she was unhappy with the timetable set unilaterally by the CENI and in a letter addressed to Condé on 13 June threatened to withdraw from the process. The International Organisation of the Francophonie (IOF) states and the EU are jointly involved in auditing the voters' roll. On 8 February 2012, a mission of electoral experts visited Guinea on their own initiative to help solve the technical and administrative failures of the electoral commission. Following

this mission, several recommendations and accompanying measures were proposed to help improve the electoral framework.

Civil society

The political crisis has profoundly affected Guinean civil society. The radicalisation of both the government and the opposition has weakened civil society, which plays an important role in the resolution of many disputes in Guinea. Alongside formal mediation, some national initiatives have also emerged. Besides the religious intervention by the National Council of Guinean Civil Society Organisations, an informal group of Guinean women leaders was heavily involved in the search for a solution to the crisis. In fact, the polarisation and radicalisation of the political system have seriously undermined national mechanisms for conflict resolution. It is therefore difficult to express an opinion about the crisis without being labelled a partisan, as has happened to local facilitators.

Nonetheless, the progress in promoting dialogue under the direction of Djinnit has raised great hopes of future success among civil society organisations. At a press conference held on 13 June, Mamdy Keita, the Secretary General of the National Confederation of Organizations of Guinean Civil Society (CONASOG), invited the CENI to develop a new electoral timetable for parliamentary elections previously scheduled for 30 June. Keita said 'civil society is committed to being more actively involved in Guinean public life and ongoing dialogue is the only course of conduct between the actors that will ultimately ensure that Guinea finds its place among the nations of the world'.

Scenarios

In view of the above analysis the following scenarios are possible:

Scenario 1

Despite the progress in the mediation process led by Djinnit, the government and the opposition still have to agree on the conditions for holding the elections. An overall political agreement is yet to be signed because of the ruling coalition's reluctance to agree to the conditions demanded by the opposition. This lack of agreement creates protracted negotiations and violent protests. The electoral process is blocked and Guinea plunges into a political crisis that exploits the existing socio-economic and ethnic divisions.

Scenario 2

As a result of discussions between the opposition and the ruling coalition, a political agreement is reached. However, difficulties arise in the implementation of this agreement, prompting the opposition to withdraw from the process and thus creating uncertainties over the holding of the elections.

Scenario 3

An agreement is signed between the opposition and the ruling coalition. All parties show diligence and commitment in the implementation of this agreement and a new election date is consensually set. The election campaign and voter operations take place without violence. Everyone accepts the results announced by the CENI. A new National Assembly is inaugurated, allowing Guinea to achieve its transition.

Options

The following are among the options available to the PSC or ECOWAS:

Option 1

The College of Facilitators could be extended to other institutions, such as ECOWAS and the AU, to serve as a collaborative platform for social and political actors in preparation for the presidential elections of 2015. This is important because the suppression of the international contact group that was previously used as a framework for consultation has left a void and may have contributed to the accumulation of problems that now beset the legislative elections. ECOWAS and PSC involvement will reinforce regional involvement and help to break the resistance of political leaders to making concessions and honouring their commitments.

Option 2

The CENI needs to ensure that all agents have the same level of technical competence in and understanding of its operations. In addition, CENI officials should be objective and neutral in carrying out its functions and should acquire and demonstrate technical attributes and independence in the management of the electoral process. It should also improve

communication both within the CENI and between itself and political actors. ECOWAS and the PSC could motivate the international community to provide assistance in supporting the electoral commission's initiatives in this regard, both politically and financially.

Option 3

There is a need to support national and local initiatives, such as Guinea's women's groups, and involve religious and traditional leaders in the easing of social tension and the promotion of national cohesion. ECOWAS and the PSC could add their voices to those calling on the authorities to refrain from using violence, hate speech or any other initiative that could jeopardise peace and stability in Guinea.

Documents

AU documents

Press statement, 10 May 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Press release, 2 March 2013, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

ECOWAS documents

Press release No. 151/2013, 29 May 2013

Country analysis

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Previous PSC and AU communiqués

On 26 January 2013 the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security held its sixth meeting in Addis Ababa. At this meeting, in addition to the discussions about the proposed Neutral International Force (NIF), later termed the Intervention Brigade (IB), and the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the region, it was decided that both the AU and the UN would work to strengthen the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM). On 24 February 2013 the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework was finally signed in Addis Ababa. The signatories included the DRC, Angola, the Republic of Congo, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Zambia.

After its 375th meeting on 10 May 2013, the PSC issued a communiqué welcoming the commitment of all the signatories in their renewed efforts to bring peace to the region. During the meeting the efforts of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, the current chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR), were praised, while stressing the importance of implementing the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The PSC welcomed the deployment of the Tanzanian battalion as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC's (MONUSCO) International Brigade (IB). The PSC also expressed its support for continuing the ICGLR-facilitated dialogue between the M23 rebel group and the government of the DRC. The importance of cooperation between the AU, UN, ICGLR and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was reiterated. The PSC then decided to undertake a field mission in the DRC from 11–14 May to assess the peace and security situation in the region.

On 27 May 2013, the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework held its first meeting in Addis Ababa. The communiqué issued after this meeting highlighted that the Regional Oversight Mechanism welcomed the appointment of Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region. The importance of economic integration as a driver for peace was stressed. The meeting called upon donors to

support the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework as well as the development needs of the region.

Crisis escalation potential

On 20 May 2013, the eastern DRC saw the heaviest fighting since November 2012 when renewed fighting broke out between the M23 rebels and the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) shortly after the first IB troops arrived. When UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Goma on 23 May 2013, M23 agreed to an extended ceasefire. For now, it seems as though M23 is willing to return to the negotiation table headed by the ICGLR in Kampala, from which it withdrew previously. Meanwhile, the IB deployment has been slow, as it has suffered numerous logistical delays. This is the situation at present, despite Ban's call for the IB deployment to be speeded up.

The IB, which is mandated to neutralise the armed groups in the region, reduce the threat to Kinshasa, protect Congolese civilians and secure areas for stabilisation activities, faces numerous challenges. Although the IB has a new, robust mandate to carry out targeted operations against armed groups such as M23, expectations of its future success may be too high. The eastern DRC has for some time suffered political instability, human rights violations, a lack of rule of law and ongoing ethnic strife, while remaining a haven for national and regional rebel groups. Given how the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and subsequently MONUSCO has failed to protect civilians and stabilise the region, it is clear that the IB has a big task ahead. Meanwhile, MONUSCO is undergoing a change of leadership, with the German diplomat, Martin Kobler, replacing Roger Meece, and Lt Gen. Carlos Santos Cruz appointed as the new force commander.

The M23 rebel group has been particularly aggressive, sending a letter to the South African parliament warning that it will kill the South African soldiers in the IB. A similar letter was sent to the Tanzanian government. In the meantime, there have been efforts in Kampala to get the ICGLR negotiations back on track. However, a number of issues concerning the M23 rebels are quite intractable at this point.

Firstly, there is the issue of reintegrating the M23 rebels into the FARDC. Many of the M23 members had been integrated into the FARDC in the past. There are two problems with reintegrating them again. Firstly, such an integration clearly does not seem to be a solution to the persistent mutiny problem, given that it was not the first time that M23 had defected. This is particularly due to the unresolved challenges of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process and the concessions made in integrating rebel groups into the national armed forces without dismantling their chain of command. Indeed, the M23 rebellion was successful primarily because they managed to defect with their command and control structures intact. Secondly, M23 is not likely to accept low-ranking positions in the FARDC.

There is little that Kinshasa can offer M23, and also little that the rebel group is willing to sacrifice. There is also the issue of M23 members who have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It will be difficult for Kinshasa to once again reintegrate alleged war criminals into the FARDC, especially considering the prominent role Bosco Ntaganda played in the M23 rebellion. In 2006 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for Ntaganda's arrest. However, he was integrated into the FARDC despite Kinshasa being well aware of his ICC indictment. While Ntaganda has since turned himself over to the US Embassy in Kigali and has been transferred to The Hague, it will be very difficult for the international community to accept the reintegration of others who stand accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The current M23 leader, Sultani Makenga, has been identified as a notorious human rights abuser by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay.

M23 also has political grievances that Kinshasa may not be willing or able to address. From the start of the rebellion, M23 claimed that it wished to renegotiate the so-called March 23 2009 agreement under which it had been integrated into the FARDC as members of the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (National Congress for the Defence of the People, or CNDP). Now its demands include the release of prisoners who

previously collaborated with M23, and an amnesty for crimes committed since 2009.

Just as the IB started to deploy in the eastern DRC, there was renewed fighting between M23 and the FARDC. On 20 May, M23 fought against a pro-government militia, leaving 19 people dead. This was the heaviest fighting since M23 took over the town of Goma in November 2012. At the end of May, M23 fired rockets into Goma. Just a day before Ban visited Goma on 23 May there was another skirmish around Goma that left 15 people wounded and one dead. The timing of the renewed violence, coupled with the letters written to South Africa and Tanzania, makes it clear that M23 views the UN as an aggressor and as part of the problem. There may very well be deadly clashes between the IB and M23 in the coming weeks, which is likely to prolong the suffering of civilians who are already in dire need of humanitarian assistance.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

On 26 May 2013 the first meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement was held in Addis Ababa. This meeting welcomed the support of a technical advisory committee, stressed the importance of regional economic integration as a driver for peace and called on donors to provide coordinated support for the framework agreement. The members of the Regional Oversight Mechanism agreed to meet again in September 2013 to discuss the specific benchmarks for implementing the framework agreement. On 15 June SADC held an extraordinary summit in Maputo, after which a communiqué was issued appealing to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to consider engaging all the 'negative forces' under the guidelines of the Framework Agreement to work toward lasting peace in the region. Significantly, this communiqué followed Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete's statement at the special meeting for the heads of state of the Great Lakes countries held in Addis Ababa. In his statement, Kikwete called for Kinshasa to engage with M23, for Uganda to engage with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and for Rwanda to engage with the *Forces democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR). Kikwete's call for engagement with the FDLR led to a bitter spat between Kigali and Dodoma. Kigali insists that Rwanda cannot be expected to negotiate with the FDLR, which it claims is largely responsible for the genocide that took place in Rwanda between April and June 1994.

United Nations

Under Resolution 2098 the UN Security Council (UNSC) called on its special representative to the DRC to assist Kinshasa in establishing a rapid reaction force that would form the backbone of an effective national defence force. The special representative is also to assist in SSR and design a single DDR and demobilisation, demilitarisation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reinsertion (DDRRR) plan for Congolese combatants not suspected of genocide. The special representative would also be required to monitor human rights violations and establish a national civilian structure to control mining activities. The special representative is also to assist with building upon the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) as well as the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) to establish state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in the eastern DRC. The mandate of the special representative, as set out in Resolution 2098, is in line with and supports the implementation of the Framework Agreement.

Ban and World Bank president Jim Yong Kim undertook a joint trip to the DRC in May 2013 to work on re-establishing the credibility and improving the image of the UN in the country. Ban stated that the UN intended to do more to assist in ending the violence in the DRC, and said the IB was the first step towards realising this objective. The credibility of the UN, and especially MONUSCO, as a meaningful peace partner suffered a resounding setback when MONUSCO failed to prevent the fall of Goma in November 2012.

International community

Rwanda and Uganda continue to play a key role in the security situation in the eastern DRC. M23 and the ADF are among the most significant security threats in the region. While M23 is the most obvious current security

threat, Rwanda remains concerned about the FDLR, even though its numbers have significantly decreased over the past two decades. However, the ADF, while it has not received as much media attention as M23, should not be disregarded. The ICGLR talks between Kinshasa and M23 are being led by Museveni. According to the 2012 UN Group of Experts reports, Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Uganda, have been providing M23 with recruits, weapons and other forms of support. It has also been alleged that M23 receives its commands directly from Kigali. In May 2013, almost two months after the surrender of Ntaganda, M23 leader Makenga was photographed with a large number of new recruits at the Rumanbago military camp in the eastern DRC. It was also reported by the UN that M23 recruited at least 59 child soldiers in May 2013. At the end of May 2013, Uganda arrested an individual suspected of recruiting for M23. A number of students also fled from Rwanda to Uganda, fearing forceful recruitment into M23. While there is still some confusion about the arrest and the students' claims, there is also a lack of clarity about Rwandan and Ugandan relations with M23. In all likelihood, given the history of the group, Rwanda and Uganda still exert at least some influence over the current M23.

Civil society

At the signing of the Regional Framework Agreement on 24 February 2013, a group of Congolese and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) welcomed the initiative and called on countries in the Great Lakes Region, along with their international partners, to ensure that the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in Addis Ababa was given the political backing necessary to bring an end to the war in the eastern DRC. The Framework Agreement consists of two components. One is aimed at Kinshasa's domestic politics, urging a number of political reforms, and another is aimed at the region as a whole, urging neighbouring countries to stop interfering militarily and politically in the DRC. The NGO group also called for the creation of a donor fund to support projects aimed at deepening regional economic integration to emphasise the benefits of regional stability; UN-mediated negotiations with armed groups that avoid the kind of impunity characteristic of past deals; and substantial donor engagement to promote the demobilisation of rebel soldiers.

Civil society organisations have urged the key protagonists in the eastern DRC to display political will and commitment to overcome challenges in terms of the implementation of the Regional Framework Agreement. They are also attempting to draw the world's attention to the scourge of rape and the need to reinforce the international community's engagement in ending blatant assaults on women.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis, a number of scenarios could unfold:

Scenario 1

The IB is successful in quelling the M23 rebellion. There are minimal casualties among the IB troops. The members of the Oversight Mechanism successfully assist Kinshasa to implement its part of the framework agreement in terms of substantial governance reforms. The credibility of the UN is restored as it continues to assist the DRC with SSR, DDR and peace-building processes.

Scenario 2

The IB suffers numerous casualties and MONUSCO's image becomes even more tarnished in the eyes of the Congolese. The IB fails to win the hearts and minds of the local population by failing to protect them from violence. This situation creates fertile ground for more community self-defence measures such as the Mai Mai groups, while M23 continues to receive support from neighbouring countries. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the chronic instability in the region.

Scenario 3

There is limited progress with the ICGLR negotiations, but Kinshasa manages to come to an agreement with M23. Some agree to join the FARDC on government conditions; others remain in hiding to perpetuate the war economy.

Options

In view of the likely scenarios that have been identified, the following are among the options that could be considered by the PSC:

Option 1

There is a need to ensure that the IB has as much financial, logistical and political support

and intelligence as possible. Although a large section of the IB has been part of MONUSCO and in the eastern DRC for a long time, it has never had to operate with such an aggressive mandate. It is important that the IB takes into account human rights imperatives and avoids abuses that could further damage the image of the peace mission.

Option 2

The deployment of the IB and a strong mandate against the armed groups in the eastern DRC is not the only option. Kikwete's suggestion of direct talks between Kigali and the FDLR, Kinshasa and M23, and Kampala and the ADF, should be considered. While it is a sensitive suggestion, it remains relevant given the complexity of the security situation and the necessity of creating conditions for sustainable peace.

Option 3

While dealing with M23 and other negative forces in the region is of immediate importance, there are many other issues that also need attention to put an end to the chronic instability in the eastern DRC. It is vital that the DRC government undertakes the necessary political reforms as requested by the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement. Equally, Kinshasa needs to gain control over its resources management in the eastern DRC. It is also important that the land issues and crimes committed against civilians are addressed in a fair and just manner. In this regard, the DRC needs a coherent transitional justice process, so that unresolved issues likely to spark future violence can be addressed effectively.

Security analysis

LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

Previous AU/PSC communiqués

In its follow-up on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) issue, the PSC listened to the report of the AUC Chairperson on the 'Implementation of the African Union-Led Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI) for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army' in its meeting held on 17 June 2013. The Commissioner for Peace and Security also briefed the Council. Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Uganda (as member countries of the RCI-LRA), Rwanda, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the United States (US) also addressed members of the Council. The Chairperson's report PSC/PR/2 (CCCLXXX) was prepared and presented subsequent to a request made by the Council through its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CCCXXI) following its 321st meeting held on 22 May 2012. The comprehensive report covered numerous developments and challenges concerning the operationalisation of the RCI-LRA, the operations of its various components, activities being undertaken by the AU Special Envoy for the LRA and interaction with the UN, as well as efforts to mobilise international support for the regional initiative to combat the LRA.

The report included updates on the activities of the RCI-LRA involving the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda and the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM). The JCM is chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and comprises the Ministers of Defence of RCI-LRA members and the Regional Task Force (RTF), which in turn is composed of units provided by the affected countries. The Chair of the JCM referred to the situation in the CAR as one of the most serious problems affecting efforts to hunt down the LRA. He said that incessant threats and provocation against the RTF Unit by Seleka elements, who control the government in Bangui, had resulted in the suspension of RTF operations in the CAR.

Following discussion of the Chairperson's report and statements by various stakeholders, the Council

released communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXX) on the implementation of the RCI-LRA. The PSC commended the operationalisation of the various components of the RCI-LRA and the contribution of troops to the RTF as well as 'the increasing military pressure being exerted on the group, which led to the capture of key commanders and the surrender of a number of its elements'. The communiqué highlighted the negative impact of the illegal seizure of power in the CAR on the operations of the RCI-LRA in the CAR and beyond. It also strongly urged the rebel leaders in Bangui to comply with the CAR's international commitments under the RCI-LRA and facilitate the resumption of counter-LRA operations in the CAR. The Council further called on members of the RCI-LRA to fulfil their commitment to provide the required logistical support to their respective contingents, in accordance with decisions of the 3rd meeting of the JCM held in Addis Ababa on 24 April 2013.

At its meeting on 22 May 2012, the Council also renewed the mandate of the RCI-LRA for an additional year.

Crisis escalation potential

In June 2013 a clash between LRA militants and villagers in the central mining region of Bria, CAR left 16 people dead. The AU's RCI-LRA commission recently stated that the LRA was far from being neutralised. The group is still active and poses a huge danger to the security and wellbeing of people living in the CAR, the DRC and beyond.

In a report released in June 2013, it was confirmed that the LRA had committed 58 attacks between January and March 2013, resulting in 28 civilian deaths and 79 abductions, compared with 36 attacks between October and December 2012 that resulted in 11 deaths and 111 abductions. The figures, compiled by The Resolve, a US-based organisation, show that whereas the number of LRA attacks has increased, as has the number of civilian deaths, abductions have decreased in number even though remaining unacceptably high. The report noted that the violent LRA attacks and killings took place in countries experiencing serious security incursions, such as the DRC and the CAR. According to the report, 72 per cent of the rebel attacks took place in the DRC and 28 per cent in the CAR. While more than two-thirds of the attacks were carried out in the DRC, most of the killings took place in the CAR. The security and political crisis in the CAR and the subsequent change of government seriously affected the military operation against the LRA in that country.

The DRC government is still troubled by its own security issues, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Consequently, the LRA has been able to take advantage of the vast ungoverned and uncontrolled areas in the DRC to carry out its brutal attacks and to establish safe havens where it can regroup. The AU-led initiative faces numerous operational, political and logistical challenges that are obstacles it must overcome in order to fulfil its regional mandate. The possibility of the LRA forming opportunistic alliances with regional governments or other rebel groups in Darfur and the Great Lakes region is still a real possibility that can pave the way for the survival and revival of the terrorist group. Given the fragile security structures in Central Africa, the LRA continues to present a grave threat to the wellbeing of civilians in the DRC, South Sudan and the CAR, as well as to the ongoing peacekeeping and political processes in these countries.

Key issues and internal dynamics

The number of RTF troops fighting the LRA totals 3 350. Uganda's contribution of 2 000 troops is the largest, followed by the DRC and South Sudan with contributions of 500 each. The internally troubled CAR has provided 350 soldiers. Brigadier General Dick Prit Olum from Uganda heads the Regional Task Force.

Besides the crisis in the CAR, another factor that has dominated the LRA issue in recent months is an allegation by The Resolve that Khartoum is guilty of sheltering and supporting the LRA leadership. In a report launched in June 2013, The Resolve said that LRA leader Joseph Kony recently directed killings from the Kafia Kingi enclave, which is protected by the Sudanese military establishment. The report further claimed that Kony and other high-level officers of the LRA were periodically operating from the enclave, which is one of the disputed areas on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and currently under Khartoum's control. The Resolve's

report also stated that elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Kafia Kingi actively sheltered senior LRA commanders and provided them with limited material support. The Resolve stated that 'according to LRA defectors and other sources, LRA leader Joseph Kony himself first traveled to the Kafia Kingi enclave in 2010. He returned to Kafia Kingi in 2011 and was present there throughout parts of 2012.'

The LRA's ability to operate in Kafia Kingi with Sudanese support poses a severe threat to regional efforts to eliminate the rebel group. If The Resolve's allegations are verified, the situation described would be a big blow to the regional operation against the group. It would also strain regional relations and possibly weaken cooperation to eliminate the group. Sudan's support for the LRA dates back to 1994. In the absence of effective diplomacy, Sudanese government officials have refused to cooperate fully with regional counter-LRA initiatives and have denied allegations about the LRA's presence in Kafia Kingi. Michael Poffenberger, the executive director of The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative, said: 'As long as Kony is able to find a safe haven in Sudan, he can avoid pursuit by Ugandan forces by simply crossing the border whenever they get close.' Sudan has consistently denied the accusation.

However, Olum, the commander of the regional force, recently said he believed Kony had crossed into the CAR. He said that the lack of cooperation by the new government in the CAR had forced the AU to suspend military operations against Kony, who over the years had taken advantage of porous borders and weak governments to regroup. According to Olum, the LRA is significantly weaker than in previous years, and its forces do not exceed 500. He claims that many of Kony's fighters defected in the past year and that some of his top lieutenants have been captured or killed in combat.

The CAR crisis poses probably the biggest challenge to the AU-led operation against the LRA. The political and security crisis in the CAR, which saw rebels overthrow the government, has further destabilised the north-eastern region of the country that borders Kafia Kingi and has made the enclave even more attractive to LRA commanders. The report of the Chairperson the LRA stated: 'The evolution of the situation in the CAR since the resumption of hostilities by the Seleka rebel group in December 2012 has negatively impacted on the implementation of the RCI-LRA. The CAR Armed Forces (FACA) Unit that was deployed in Obo as part of the RTF (Regional Task Force) disintegrated. Additionally, since the unconstitutional change of government in the CAR, on March 24, 2013, there have been incessant threats and provocation by Seleka elements against the RTF.' Following the illegal change of government in the CAR and subsequent attacks by the ruling Seleka rebels on regional forces, RTF troops were compelled to suspend counter-LRA operations inside the CAR.

The 3rd meeting of the JCM of the RCI-LRA that took place on 24 May 2013 noted the numerous challenges faced by the operation. The meeting identified the persistent difficulties being experienced by some of the RCI-LRA member countries in providing logistical support, including mobility (air and ground), medical support, rations and effective communications, to their contingents operating as part of the RTF. Furthermore, funding for the RTF HQ and the JCM Secretariat lacks the required level of predictability and sustainability.

The LRA is taking advantage of the current situation in the CAR and exploiting the instability in the DRC. The terrorist group is trying to re-generate its forces and increase its attacks in the region. The activities of the RTF are seriously compromised by the changing security and political situation in the CAR. The rebel leaders in Bangui have limited the operations of RTF troops to the Haut Mbomu Prefecture, excluding other major LRA operational areas along the rivers of Chinko and Vovodo all the way to the CAR border with Sudan and South Sudan. These areas had been part of RTF operational areas until March 2013. The current operational limitations present a serious challenge to the continued effective implementation of the RCI-LRA in the CAR. Currently, the LRA is poaching and trading ivory from the Garamba National Park in the north-eastern DRC. Reports claim that LRA elements are conducting raids on villages in the DRC and the CAR and along

major trade routes in the north-eastern DRC to loot food, batteries, clothing and pharmaceutical products. The LRA also continues to abduct civilians in the north-eastern DRC and the south-eastern CAR to serve as porters, fighters and sex slaves. The human rights abuses and humanitarian consequences of the LRA's brutal activities in these countries are of utmost concern to all African and international actors who are working to bring an end to these atrocities.

Geopolitical dynamics

Africa and RECs

On 24 April 2013 the 3rd meeting of the JCM was held in Addis Ababa with the objective of reviewing the implementation status of the RCI-LRA. The JCM expressed grave concern over the volatility of the situation in the CAR and its impact on the RCI-LRA operations. It noted that phase one of the RCI-LRA had been completed, as the RTF forces were deployed and the key mission documents had been adopted. The meeting acknowledged the logistical challenges facing the RTF and urged troop-contributing countries to demonstrate even greater commitment by providing critical minimum support to their respective contingents.

In his June 17 briefing to the PSC, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, noted the negative consequences of the unconstitutional change of government in the CAR on the implementation of the RCI-LRA. The commissioner highlighted efforts to re-engage the CAR government in the anti-LRA operation. On 2 May 2013 a delegation of the AU, led by the UN Special Envoy for LRA issues, Francisco Madeira, met the CAR Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, and the leader of the CAR transitional government, Michel Djotodia, in Bangui. Lamamra said that the delegation 'obtained a green light from both, for the continued operations of the RTF in south-eastern CAR'. However, military confrontation and clashes at the end of May again raised tensions in the region. The AU Special Envoy for LRA issues and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Central Africa, Abou Moussa, undertook a joint mission to Bangui, Kampala and Juba, from 6–13 June 2013, to engage the authorities in these countries with a view to building mutual confidence about RTF operations in the CAR and resuming anti-LRA operations. The mission ascertained that the CAR remains committed to the continued implementation of the RCI-LRA. It also found that Seleka rebels were ready to participate in RTF operations.

The briefing by the commissioner also noted that the governments of Uganda and South Sudan had expressed interest in participating in the ECCAS-led stabilisation process for the CAR through the Libreville Peace Process and the Follow-up Committee on the Libreville Accord.

The allegations by The Resolve that Khartoum and the SDF are hosting and supporting the LRA could further complicate the already challenging regional politics in East-Central Africa. Sudan's army spokesperson Sawarmi Khaled Saad predictably rejected the charge and said that Sudan could derive no benefit from hosting rebels of another country. Sawarmi stated: 'SAF has no renegade leaders. It is a united army and has no place for individual acts. SAF has no interest in adopting or sheltering rebels from other countries.'

United Nations

On 29 May 2013 the UNSC expressed concern that security challenges in the CAR were spiralling out of control and adopted a statement expressing concern about the resurgence of attacks by the LRA. The UNSC said that the power grab by the Seleka rebels had stalled operations to neutralise the LRA.

According to the AU report, the AU and UN are collaborating closely in the overall coordination of the counter-LRA operations, particularly through the joint initiatives of the AU Special Envoy and the UN Special Representative. At operational level, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) provides logistical support to the staff of RTF HQ, particularly in terms of air transportation to and from Juba and Yambio, while the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is extending operational support to the RTF contingent in the Dungu Sector. The RTF and the Commission are also working closely with the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in the RTF's planning and support process, as well as on related issues.

The UNSC has strongly condemned the attacks and

atrocities carried out by the LRA and has demanded an immediate end to these violent acts. It has also urged the LRA 'to release all those abducted, disarm and demobilise'. The UN Strategy in the region was endorsed by the UNSC in June 2012. The strategy focuses on five key objectives to address the LRA threat, namely: (i) support for the full operationalisation and implementation of the AU regional initiative against the LRA; (ii) enhancing efforts to promote civilian protection; (iii) expanding current disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities to cover all LRA-affected areas; (iv) promote a coordinated humanitarian and child protection response in these areas; and (v) support LRA-affected governments in the fields of peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and development, to enable them to establish state authority throughout their territories.

International community

In June 2013, Madeira briefed the UNSC in New York on the progress in the implementation of the RCI-LRA. He also attended the meeting of the International Working Group on the LRA, which is a consultative forum bringing together the AU, the UN, the EU and some of its member states, the US and the World Bank, in order to harmonise and coordinate international efforts on the issue of the LRA.

The EU is the major donor to the RCI-LRA under the African Peace Facility (APF). These resources are used for the operations of the RTF HQ, the functioning of the JCM Secretariat in Bangui and the activities of the Special Envoy, as well as for other related tasks. The US military advisors in the region have been actively supporting RTF operations in the Obo Sector, in terms of logistics, information-sharing and operational planning, through the Counter-Operation Fusion Centres (COFCs).

In June 2013 the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, appointed former Senator Russ Feingold as the new US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and the DRC. Applauding his appointment, 19 advocacy groups and Congolese experts sent Feingold an open letter, calling on him to employ both pressure and incentives to achieve critical democratisation reforms in the DRC. Feingold is expected to address drivers of regional violence and tension that impact so negatively on the people of the DRC, including the issue of the LRA.

Scenarios

Given the nature of the LRA and the state of security in the regions where this group is active, the following are potential scenarios:

Scenario 1

The continuation of the crisis in the eastern DRC and the CAR further widens the security vacuum in an area vulnerable to LRA attacks. Continued LRA activity in the region and beyond could lead to even more deaths and displacement, creating a more pronounced security and humanitarian crisis.

Scenario 2

The possibility of a rift in the LRA leadership could result in more high-level defections from the group or captures by RTF forces. Such a scenario would help the regional force to gather vital information about the locations and operational plans of the group, thereby leading to further operational successes. The possible capture or killing of Kony, possibly with external support, could restrict the LRA's sphere of activity and help capture or kill more LRA leaders and fighters, thereby significantly reducing, if not putting an end to, LRA atrocities.

Scenario 3

Significant numbers of additional troops and equipment could bring more energy to the RTF and hasten the elimination of the LRA.

Scenario 4

The possibility of Kony's presence in Sudan could escalate regional tension and continue the legacy of proxy conflict in the region. The possible merger of the LRA with other regional armed militias in South Sudan, Darfur, Rwanda or the DRC could effectively multiply the magnitude of the existing security threat.

Options

Given the above scenarios, the following options could be considered by the PSC to improve security and stability in the region:

Option 1

The PSC could continue to pressure the government in Bangui to respect its commitments in fighting the LRA and encourage the CAR's urgent transition to stability and constitutional order.

Option 2

The PSC could continue to request the involvement of partners and the UN to resolve the logistical and financial challenges faced by the regional task force and to improve aerial surveillance and human intelligence resources in Central Africa. The PSC could design a specific hybrid plan with the UNSC to develop a joint response strategy, which would be based on a close partnership with UN missions in the affected countries and address defensive gaps in the eastern CAR as well as much of the northern and eastern DRC. Such mechanisms could also help improve the safety of civilians in the region.

Option 3

The PSC, through the AU special envoy to the LRA issue, could initiate a sustained effort to include Khartoum in the efforts to eliminate the LRA. The envoy could also initiate discussions between the DRC and Ugandan governments to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation.

Option 4

The PSC, in collaboration with members of civil society active in the area, could encourage countries affected by the LRA to take measures for healing trauma through traditional and state conflict resolution and legal institutions. The PSC, through the AU envoy to the LRA, could initiate improved trust-building measures and relations between the DRC and Uganda.

Option 5

The AU could consider the possibility of convening a mini-summit of the RCI-LRA member states and other countries like Sudan at the heads of state level on the sidelines of the next AU Summit to thoroughly discuss the LRA issue and develop ways to effectively and permanently eliminate this scourge while ensuring greater protection for potential LRA victims.

Documentation

Relevant AU documents

PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXX) Communiqué on the implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (17 June 2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

PSC/PR/2 (CCCLXXX) report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the 'Implementation of the African Union Led Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI) for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army' (17 June 2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Press Release: Democratic Republic of Congo hands over 500-strong contingent to the African Union-led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army African Union (13 February 2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Press Release: Important action-oriented decisions adopted by the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (16 January 2013) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

(PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCXLI)(13 November 2012) Communiqué on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Press Release on the 2nd Regional Ministerial Meeting on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (6–8 June 2011) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Assembly/AU/6(XIII) (1–3 July 2009) Report of the Peace and Security Council to the African Union on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya

(PSC/PR/2(CCXV) (8 January 2009) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the Central African Republic

PSC/MIN/Comm.2 (CLXIII) (22 December 2008) Communiqué on the situation in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

PSC/PR/Comm. (CCI) (25 August 2009) Communiqué on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

UN documents

S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) Resolution adopted by the Security Council on the Central African Republic (CAR)

Important dates to diarise

18	July	Nelson Mandela International Day
30	July	International Day of Friendship
9	August	International Day of the World's Indigenous People
12	August	International Youth Day
19	August	World Humanitarian Day
23	August	International Day for the Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition
30	August	International Day of the Victims of Forced Disappearances

Country	Election	Date *
Mali	Presidential, National Assembly and Local	7 July 2013
Togo	National Assembly Local	21 July 2013
Madagascar	Presidential	24 July 2013
Zimbabwe	Presidential, National Assembly, Senate and Local	31 July 2013 (date under review)
Swaziland (Primary)	House of Assembly	24 August 2013
Rwanda	Chamber of Deputies	16 September 2013
Swaziland (Secondary)	House of Assembly	20 September 2013
Mauritius	Presidential (indirect)	September 2013

**could change, dependent on circumstances*

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