

Peace and Security Council Report

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Current members of the PSC Council: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe

Peace and Security Council Protocol

'The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union

Early warning issues for April 2012

During April, events leading up to elections in Mali in the wake of the recent coup, the impact of the *Tuareg* rebellion, ongoing divisions in Libya and simmering resentment in Egypt, as well as resurgent conflict between South Sudan and Sudan, the

implications of the EU's anti-piracy strategy for Somalia and Puntland, and the continuing *Boko Haram* attacks in Nigeria, are among early warning issues that merit close attention.

► Current PSC Chair

Bio data: H.E. Mr Arcanjo Do Nascimento
Current posts: Angola's Ambassador to Ethiopia, Permanent Representative to the AU and Chair of the PSC

Madagascar

Against the backdrop of serious obstacles in the process of implementing the Roadmap, the Malagasy military staged protests in March 2012 to air their grievances about poor living and working conditions. Their demands included tax-exempt salaries and a

reimbursement of taxes deducted from their salaries since 2005. Dissension in army ranks can be a recipe for a mutiny threatening the regime, particularly when the relationship between the transitional government and the influential military is so delicately poised.

Livingstone formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – **PSC/PR/(CLX)**, 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

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Guinea-Bissau

The death of President Malam Bacai Sanha came at a time when Guinea-Bissau seemed to have found a semblance of stability and was preparing to consolidate the fragile balance among major military and political conflicting interests, domestic and foreign. Persistent internal divisions could be aggravated by the ambitions of potential candidates currently vying to replace Sanha.

Libya

Some reports claim that as many as 700 militia groups are present in Libya, which is yet to establish a strong and unified army and integrated security institutions. The NTC chairman, Mustafa Abul Jalil, has repeatedly warned of the possibility of a 'civil war' if these armed groups are not brought under control. The Cyrenaica declaration has further escalated tensions among contending parties in Libya.

Country Analysis

MADAGASCAR

Previous AU/PSC Communiqués and Recommendations

In its decision, **Assembly/AU/Dec. 408(XVIII)**, the 18th session of the AU Assembly commended the signing of the Roadmap in Antananarivo, on 16 September 2011, to end the crisis in Madagascar. While acknowledging the role that the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) played, the Assembly requested the AU Commission to continue to support the implementation of the Roadmap and to mobilize the support of the international community to this end, including through the expeditious opening of the AU/SADC Liaison Office in Antananarivo.

The PSC discussed the situation in Madagascar at its 303 meeting held on 8 December 2011. In the communiqué, **PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCIII)**, issued at that meeting, the PSC, among others, highlighted areas of concern when it expressed *'its intention to lift the sanctions it imposed on Madagascar upon receipt of a report from SADC confirming satisfactory progress in the implementation process of the Roadmap, in particular its article 20, as well as the establishment of INEC and the determination of the electoral calendar.'*

In a press release dated 26 January 2012, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) Troika, comprising South Africa as Chair, Tanzania and Zambia, expressed concern about the events surrounding former President Marc Ravalomanana's attempt to unilaterally enter Madagascar on 21 January 2012. Noting that there was already an agreed process in which the MCO Troika had undertaken to ensure the safe and secure return of all Malagasy political exiles, in line with Article 20 of the landmark

SADC-brokered Roadmap of September 2011 'To End the Crisis in Madagascar', the MCO Troika described Ravalomanana's action as 'unfortunate as it had the potential to further jeopardise further implementation of the Roadmap.' The troika was equally disappointed by the Transitional Authority's immediate response to close Madagascar's airspace, thereby forcing the plane carrying Ravalomanana to make an airborne *volte-face* to Johannesburg, South Africa, as well as the threats by authorities to arrest him if he returned to the island nation. The MCO Troika demanded 'that the Transitional Authority and all stakeholders involved, urgently find a consensual approach for the implementation of the Roadmap in its entirety.'

Crisis Escalation Potential

SADC's failure to resolutely monitor and guarantee the implementation of the fragile Roadmap risks a relapse into violence in Madagascar.

Notwithstanding the Malagasy parties' agreement on 14 October 2011 about the Framework for the Implementation of the Roadmap and the provision for SADC to establish a liaison office to effectively support and monitor the implementation of the peace process, the regional body has dragged its feet over the issue. The inevitable result was the lack of progress on a number of key issues, including the enactment of amnesty legislation, which is critical for the full implementation of the Roadmap. The controversial events of 21 January 2012, in which former president Marc Ravalomanana was denied entry into Madagascar, powerfully demonstrated how key outstanding issues can unhinge the execution of the Roadmap, threatening to plunge the country into chaos once again. The deep-seated personal animosity between Ravalomanana and the incumbent, President Andry Rajoelina, aggravates the situation even further.

Although Article 20 of the Roadmap, to which both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina are signatories, provides for the 'unconditional return' to Madagascar of all exiled political leaders, Rajoelina and the Malagasy security 'mandarins' have threatened to enforce a warrant of arrest issued against Ravalomanana in absentia in August 2010, should he ever return to his homeland. In the absence of amnesty laws covering violent crimes, Rajoelina has argued that his nemesis, Ravalomanana, must serve his sentence of life in prison with hard labour for the death of 30 opposition protestors, allegedly killed by his presidential guard in February 2012. Ravalomanana has denied any wrongdoing, arguing that he was tried by the kangaroo court of an illegal regime. Following Ravalomanana's thwarted attempt to return, his party walked out of the fledgling unity government and has since boycotted parliament. The question of Ravalomanana's return hangs over the prospects of the successful implementation of the Roadmap and future stability in Madagascar.

Against the backdrop of serious obstacles in the process of implementing the Roadmap, the Malagasy military staged protests in March 2012 to air their grievances about poor living and working conditions. Their demands included tax-exempt salaries and a reimbursement of taxes deducted from their salaries since 2005. Dissension in army ranks can be a recipe for a mutiny threatening the regime, particularly when the relationship between the transitional government and the influential military is so delicately poised. Rajoelina's regime is heavily dependent on some elements of the military to maintain control of the country. Believing that the discontent is related to prevailing social conditions and political rivalry and fearing possible political manipulation of the situation the transitional authorities have engaged and made concessions to

the disgruntled soldiers. Following negotiations, the government agreed to reduce the income tax for the military from 25 per cent to 4 per cent. It also agreed to reimburse taxes deducted from soldiers' salaries for the first two months of 2012. Although it is unclear whether an agreement has been reached on the remaining demands it appears that the military officers have accepted the proposals made by the government.

The government's capitulation to the demands of the army has the danger of leading to a domino effect upon other sectors demanding similar concessions. Madagascar has, indeed, recently experienced strikes in the education sector demanding improved working conditions. Madagascar currently does not have adequate resources to meet all possible demands of civil servants in view of the continued absence of critical external aid from donors, particularly the United States and the International Monetary Fund. This situation increases the risk of a popular uprising in the wake of deteriorating economic conditions, particularly in an environment already rife with political tension.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics

Madagascar has experienced protracted political instability since early 2009, when tensions between President Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, the former mayor of the country's capital city, Antananarivo, escalated, culminating in the removal of President Ravalomanana through a military coup d'état on 17 March 2009. Following a two-year period during which the radicalism of the opposition parties and the intransigence of the coup leader, Andry Rajoelina, tore apart any efforts at resolving the political crisis emanating from the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, SADC succeeded in persuading the Malagasy parties to adopt the landmark Roadmap on 16 September 2011.

There have been some positive steps in the establishment of Transitional Institutions in line with the SADC Roadmap. In October 2011, Prime Minister Omer Beriziky was appointed by consensus and named a 35-member government of national unity in November that was meant to stabilise the crisis-wracked Indian Ocean nation ahead of democratic elections in 2012 as per the Roadmap. A Transitional Parliament, comprising two chambers, the Transitional Congress and the Higher Transitional Council, was also established.

Madagascar's inclusive national-unity government has agreed on a new election management body, the Independent National Electoral Commission of the Transition (CENIT) or *Commission électorale nationale indépendante pour la transition*. CENIT will replace the Independent National Electoral Commission or *Commission électorale nationale indépendante* (CENI) that was unilaterally appointed in March 2010 by interim President Andry Rajoelina. CENI was blamed for holding a controversial and much-maligned referendum to decide on a new constitution on 17 November 2010. CENIT comprises 21 members drawn from civil society, the administration and signatories of the roadmap, including two former ministers of the Interior. The establishment of a credible and acceptable electoral commission that will prepare and conduct polls that reflect the popular will of the Malagasy population is part of the critical reform process concerning Madagascar's electoral system as per the SADC Roadmap. This development has raised hopes for the feasibility of Madagascar holding elections this year as required by the Roadmap. A realistic electoral timetable will, however, still need to be proposed. The customary election period in Madagascar is during the dry season that runs from May to November.

Significantly, however, the Malagasy parties have stumbled in their walk towards finalising and agreeing on

an amnesty law. Analysts claim that Rajoelina's designs to foil the return to Madagascar of his main political rival, Ravalomanana, has undermined progress on the amnesty legislation. Indeed, Rajoelina allowed the uncomplicated return from exile of another former Malagasy president, Didier Ratsiraka, soon after the inauguration of the transitional inclusive government in November 2011, even though a Madagascar court had sentenced him *in absentia* to 10 years' hard labour for corruption.

The draft amnesty bill that was recently rejected by parliament excluded violent crimes from the amnesty, thereby effectively preventing Ravalomanana from returning home free of risk of arrest and being eligible to stand in the presidential poll. The bill is being revised and will be discussed by a panel of legal experts before being re-tabled for ratification by parliament before elections take place. However, the procedural and legal delays have resulted in Madagascar missing the 29 February 2012 deadline it was given by SADC to finalise the amnesty legislation following the blocking by Rajoelina regime of Ravalomanana's unilateral attempt to fly home in January 2011.

Geo-political dynamics

Pan-African and RECs dynamics

The African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar from the organisation on 20 March 2009, following the unconstitutional change of government in the island nation. In a move that demonstrates the AU's steadfastness in this regard, the continental body barred Madagascar from voting for the AU Commission's chairperson at the 18th AU Summit in January 2012. At the Summit, the AU Assembly urged the Malagasy parties to spare no effort to bring the transition to a successful conclusion. On its part, the PSC, at its 303rd meeting, examined all the dimensions of the crisis and the efforts for resolving it. The Council noted the need for resolving

continuing differences between the main political actors in the peace process. Additionally, the PSC appealed to the bilateral and multilateral partners of Madagascar to urgently provide adequate assistance to the Malagasy population, particularly with respect to social services, and to envisage the resumption of their cooperation with the country on the basis of progress made in the implementation of the Roadmap, the return to constitutional order and the promotion and protection of human rights. The Council also encouraged the AU Commission Chairperson to mobilize international support from within and outside Africa, for the transition process, and to speedily dispatch a mission to assess Madagascar's needs.

Applying the principle of subsidiarity, the AU has largely delegated the resolution of the Malagasy political deadlock to SADC, although the PSC remains seized of the matter and the AU continues to work closely with SADC in the effort for resolving the crisis.

On 21 January 2012, following Ravalomanana's failed attempt to return to Madagascar after three years of exile in South Africa, SADC was jolted into action in a bid to bring its Roadmap for the Indian Ocean nation back on track. The regional body's MCO Troika that is dealing with Madagascar's political hiatus swiftly summoned the Malagasy parties to a meeting in South Africa on 24 January. South African deputy minister for international relations, Marius Fransman, President Jacob Zuma's designated Special Envoy on Madagascar, chaired the meeting with Rajoelina and Ravalomanana's representatives as well as those from the Malagasy transitional inclusive government, to add impetus to the SADC Roadmap.

The SADC MCO Troika exhorted the Malagasy stakeholders to implement all the outstanding articles of the Roadmap and subsequently gave the parties a 29 February deadline to

finalise the amnesty legislation. The regional body also undertook to urgently set up a liaison office in Madagascar to facilitate the implementation of the Roadmap.

Following the expiry of the 29 February deadline for the enactment of amnesty laws, SADC granted the Malagasy parties a two-week extension. In the meantime, SADC established its Liaison Office to support the implementation of the Roadmap that ten of the eleven political parties in Madagascar endorsed and which is ultimately expected to lead the Indian Ocean nation to return to constitutional normalcy and a democratic dispensation.

On 20 March, after handing over the SADC report on the draft amnesty law to his ministers for implementation, Andry Rajoelina said: "This memorandum will allow the Malagasy side to advance towards an effective implementation of the Roadmap, particularly with regards to the amnesty. This is already a big step to ending the crisis. International experts were satisfied with your work."

UN Dynamics

As indicated in our earlier reports on the crisis in Madagascar, the United Nations (UN) position on the Indian Ocean nation has increasingly softened in comparison to that of SADC and the AU, both having imposed sanctions on the country. In May 2011, Rajoelina was invited as Head of State to participate in the 4th UN Conference on least developed countries (LDCs), held in Istanbul in Turkey. Rajoelina also addressed the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2011. In February 2012, the UN also granted Madagascar \$150 million for a one-year (2012-2013) development programme.

Wider International Community

The International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), in its communiqué of 8 December 2011, encouraged the Malagasy parties to implement all the provisions of the

Roadmap, including the consensual setting of the electoral calendar, with a view to the holding of free, fair and transparent elections, as well as the implementation of the provisions of Article 20 of the Roadmap. Following the Malagasy parties' adoption of the SADC Roadmap in September 2011, the European Union (EU) considered that conditions were then conducive to supporting the transition process in Madagascar and decided to gradually restore development cooperation with Madagascar. In a press statement dated 28 January 2012, the spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, reiterated 'the EU's willingness to give political and financial support to the ongoing transition process, in close cooperation with the international community, provided that this process is consensual and leads to the holding of credible, free and transparent elections allowing a swift return to constitutional order.'

Civil Society Dynamics

Malagasy civil society organisations continue to actively participate and continue to play an instrumental role for the successful implementation of the Roadmap. Following the controversial failed bid by Ravalomanana to return to Madagascar, the SADC MCO troika has called upon civil society and the media to guard against rumour-mongering, disinformation and slandering of the Malagasy leadership. Under article 13 of the Roadmap, Malagasy civil society is expected to observe the elections to ensure the Malagasy political actors' compliance with the Code of Ethics and of the Good Conduct of Elections.

Scenarios

Given the above analysis the following could take place:

Scenario 1:

The Malagasy parties agree to fully implement the Roadmap including the enactment of amnesty legislation

and electoral reforms allowing for the conduct of peaceful and credible elections to facilitate the country's return to constitutional normalcy and a democratic dispensation.

Scenario 2:

The recent protests by the military may have an instant domino effect on the other sectors resulting in the flaring up of popular protests in Madagascar. Such a scenario could plunge the country back into anarchy including a possible military takeover.

Scenario 3:

The current deadlock in the implementation of the Roadmap and the process for returning Madagascar

to constitutional order could persist. Although it may not cause a major backlash in the short term, this would frustrate the SADC mediation process, and deepen the political uncertainty and deteriorating economic and social conditions in the country.

Early Response Options:

The early response options that the PSC could consider include the following:

Option 1:

The AU PSC could declare the September 2011 Roadmap and its Implementation Framework to be the only legitimate mechanism for resolving the Malagasy crisis and

urge SADC, the AU Commission and the wider international community to redouble their joint effort to resolutely persuade the Malagasy parties to effectively implement the SADC Roadmap to the letter.

Option 2:

The PSC could reiterate its earlier request to the AU Commission to dispatch a mission to Madagascar, not only to assess the current situation and needs of the country, but also to boost the effort to unlock the current deadlock and resume the process of the full implementation of the Roadmap.

Country Analysis

GUINEA-BISSAU

Previous PSC and AU Communiqués and Recommendations

On the passing of Guinea-Bissau's President, Malam Bacai Sanha, on 9 January 2012, ECOWAS issued a statement to express its sympathy to the citizens of that country. At the summit of the regional body held on the 16 February 2012, both the Nigerian President, and Chairman of ECOWAS, and the President of the Commission paid tribute to the late president and invited his compatriots to pay homage and merited tribute to the memory of President Sanha. President Goodluck Jonathan urged Guinea-Bissau to continue to safeguard the peace and stability of the country and its democratic institutions by ensuring an orderly transition of power that was in keeping with the country's constitutional order and the rule of law. In a separate statement, ECOWAS Commission President, James Victor Gbeho, expressed his heartfelt sympathy and condolences"

to the family, Government and people of Guinea-Bissau over President Sanha's death.

James Gbeho observed that "President Bacai Sanha had dedicated his entire life to the liberation and nation building of his beloved country, Guinea-Bissau. He took office as a democratically elected President in September 2009 at a most difficult period in the life of the young nation, and provided exemplary leadership that contributed in no small measure to the stabilization of the political situation."

Crisis Escalation Potential

Guinea-Bissau, over the past few years, has oscillated between stability and uncertainty. Merely two years into his presidency and after decades of political violence, President Malam Bacai Sanha still had to face one of the most serious challenges to his authority with the mini-coup within the army on 1 April, 2010. The incident had a tremendous impact on Guinea-Bissau's political situation and shaped President Sanha's political action in a significant way. Nonetheless, the political and security situation has

remained stable since, despite the controversial subsequent decisions of President Sanha to appoint the leaders of the mutiny, General Antonio Indjai and Admiral Bubo Na Tchuta, to top military leadership positions (Army Chief of Staff and Chief of the Navy, respectively), much to the dismay and disappointment of the international community.

Nonetheless, President Malam Bacai Sanha struggled to manage the fragile balance of power between the country's political and military leadership despite his ill-health. Those challenges raised concerns about his ability to complete his presidential mandate. Therefore, the official announcement of his death on 3 January 2012 was seen as another lost opportunity for the much needed reforms in Guinea-Bissau. However, the change of leadership could also provide a fresh opportunity to complete the reform process, build on the existing fragile stability and consensus, provided that key local and external actors remain focused and are able to devise coherent strategies that clearly identify the main challenges

and priorities for the normalisation of the socio-economic and political situation in Guinea-Bissau; one of the most volatile countries in West Africa. It is quite likely that Sanha's succession and the transitional presidential elections are important milestones in Guinea-Bissau's quest for lasting peace. A key question is whether this transition will usher in the much needed stable political dispensation for the completion of the necessary reforms in Guinea-Bissau.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics

The events that took place on the 1st April 2010 served as a sharp reminder of the cyclical dimensions of some of the threats still hanging over the post-conflict reconstruction project in Guinea-Bissau. Given the fact that the country was still recovering from the double assassinations of President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira and his army chief of staff, General Batista Tagme na Wai, in the previous year, many observers jumped hurriedly to the conclusion that there was little hope for national peace and stability. The expectations raised by the assassinations of President Vieira and General Tagme Na Wai, that political rivalries would diminish, were to some extent dashed. Yet, carefully analysed, it seemed that the April mutiny and subsequent developments provided a platform for a political dialogue and compromise that managed to create some sense of stability in 2011.

The return in December 2009 of Rear-Admiral Jose Americo Bubo na Tchuto, accused of being the mastermind behind the 2008 foiled coup, cast a further shadow on Guinea-Bissau's political and military future. Therefore, the April mutiny provided the opportunity for generals Bubo na Tchuto and Antonio Indjai, primary instigators of the mutiny, to become prominent and influential in the post-Vieira's national political landscape. Indeed, the April mutiny led effectively to the dismissal of Chief of Staff, General

Zamora Induta, seen as committed to the long awaited reforms of the army and uncompromising in his opposition to drug trafficking. Rear Admiral Bubo na Tchuto was rehabilitated, cleared of all charges in the coup attempt and alleged drug trafficking, and reappointed as the Chief of the country's navy. Similarly, Antonio Indjai, the mutiny leader, was confirmed as the new army Chief of Staff. Therefore, the survival of Sanha's regime hinged on this newly found balance among the three centres of power, the presidency, the military establishment and the office of the Prime Minister.

Evidently, these developments had serious implications for the then newly elected president, Malam Bacai Sanha. His move to bow to the new army leaders was diversely affected by at least two major consequences. Firstly, many observers pointed to the perpetual fragile base of civilian power as projected by the Sanha-led executive in Guinea-Bissau and by extension, the inability of the President to define his authority. Secondly, Guinea-Bissau's international partners adopted a radical stance, with some, including the European Union, suspending their involvement in the country's security sector reforms (SSR), a key process in the stabilisation process of the country. There were therefore real concerns that the withdrawal of the EU and other major donors would compromise the completion of some key reforms, including SSR, leaving Guinea-Bissau in a constant state of vulnerability and instability. The president himself appeared desperate when he called for a regional stabilisation force to be deployed in Guinea-Bissau, sparking controversies and resistance from the armed forces. The call by president Sanha for a stabilisation force in Guinea-Bissau responded to an immediate threat hanging over his rule and the country's security. Yet, key political and military actors in the country did not share his concerns, both fearing and resenting

the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau.

The official announcement of the death of President Malam Bacai Sanha reignited the struggle for control among the main political forces in the country. Sanha finally succumbed to his illness, depriving Guinea-Bissau of a leader who, in spite of his failing personal health and the structural weaknesses of the national political leadership, was seen by many as a unifier and consensus builder. His death, once again serves as a reminder that, since 2000, no president has been able to complete his term in office. President Sanha was somehow successful in striking a deal with the Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Jnr and the controversial army Chief of Staff, Antonio Indjai, to create the semblance of stability necessary for the completion of pending reforms. Although superficial, this renewed understanding between President Sanha and the Prime Minister helped to maintain dialogue on some of the main challenges affecting the post-conflict reconstruction of Guinea-Bissau, particularly SSR and the issue of pension funds, and to seek to mobilise new partners for resolving Guinea-Bissau's many challenges. There are now fears and concerns about the transition. Indeed, President Sanha's demise could either perpetuate the atmosphere of instability or become an opportunity to keep the reforms on track through a peaceful transfer of power.

Yet, the foiled attempted coup in December 2011, a few days after the transfer of the President to the military hospital of Val-de-Grace in Paris, was seen as the manifestation of a continued fight to control the reins of power. While it is not clear what prompted the coup attempt, speculation remains rife that the event was an attempt to settle scores between the Head of the Navy, Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Antonio Indjai, over control of narcotics trafficking. It could also have been a

deliberate move to politically neutralise Bubo Na Tchuto, seen as a potential threat to Antonio Indjai's authority and, more broadly, to democracy in Guinea-Bissau. It is however important to stress that in the context of Guinea-Bissau, the army is not interested in attaining executive power to exert influence. In contrast, Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto is a naval officer with presidential ambitions and he would be unlikely to miss any opportunity to take control of the country. In the past he was accused of masterminding a number of nefarious plots and remains on the United States blacklist as a major supporter of drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau. His arrest has for now cleared the way for General Antonio Indjai, but the ever-present threat remains of further political assassinations, as occurred in 2009.

For the second time in two years, Guinea-Bissau went to the polls on 18 March 2012 to elect a new president; not because the incumbent had completed his term and was seeking re-election, but because his rule had been interrupted this time by circumstances beyond national political and military intrigues. The death of President Malam Bacai Sanha came at a time when Guinea-Bissau seemed to have found a semblance of stability and was preparing to consolidate the fragile balance among major military and political conflicting interests, domestic and foreign. Persistent internal divisions could be aggravated by the ambitions of potential candidates currently vying to replace Sanha and this could affect the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde or *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC).

Interestingly, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior has indicated his intention to stand for election and he is potentially likely to win. The antagonism between leaders with liberation credentials and those

reformists within the ranks of the party has resurfaced yet again. While Carlos Gomes Junior was endorsed by key structures of the party as its main candidate, two other contenders, Serifo Nhamadjo (interim National Speaker) and Bacirola (Defense Minister), broke ranks and stood as independents. However, Gomes enjoys significant support among external actors, including Angola, a country that has become a major player in the national politics of Guinea-Bissau. In addition, the prime minister faces close to 13 other candidates, including Kumba Yala, former President of Guinea-Bissau (2000-2003) and candidate for the Party for Social Renovation (PRS) and Henrique Rosa (former interim president of Guinea-Bissau, 2003-2005) among others. While the PRS was expecting to take advantage of the divisions within the PAIGC, the high price of basic commodities and the government's reluctance to successfully conclude investigations into the political assassinations in Guinea-Bissau means that the proposed timeframe for transitional elections might not be favourable for Kumba Yala to try to win back power as President of Guinea-Bissau.

Since the 2008 legislative elections that saw the PAIGC win 67 out of 100 seats in the parliament, the hegemony of the party has been under serious duress, even though it has managed to win the previous presidential elections and is likely to win the upcoming electoral contest. In spite of internal contradictions, the PAIGC remains a strong contender because of the weakness of the opposition parties. The opposition Party for Social Renovation (PRS) is still suffering from the absence of a credible socio-economic and political alternative to the PAIGC and the lack of credibility of its leader, former president Kumba Yala. The results of the first round confirmed the hierarchical order even though some irregularities were noticed. Carlos Gomes Junior took the lead with

48.97% of the vote followed by Kumba Yala with 23.36% while the independent candidates from the PAIGC, Serifo Namadja and Bacirola won 15.74% and 3.26% respectively. The run-off slated to take place on 28 April is already subject to controversy. The PRS leader and four other candidates threatened to boycott the run-off election, arguing that existing and anticipated irregularities would compromise the fairness of the result.

Geo-political dynamics

Pan-African and RECs Dynamics

Opposition by the army, coupled with the EU's withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau in February 2011, forced the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) to streamline their involvement in the security sector reform process. In fact, in August 2010, ECOWAS and CPLP army chiefs met to work on a new roadmap for the SSR as a key step in the stabilisation of the country. In July 2011, the road map was adopted. The roadmap did not however provide any innovation. Instead, it simply drew upon the existing EU-SSR strategy without allocating any particular time-frame. In substance, Guinea-Bissau's authorities have to re-introduce a military hierarchy, with a firm commitment to ridding it of senior leaders or commanders allegedly involved in illegal acts of violence or those who have reached retirement age. This specific provision has been problematic as it has been interpreted as specifically targeting Generals Bubo na Chuto and Antonio Indjai.

Indeed, the most important development in Guinea-Bissau has been the opportunity created by the EU's decision to withdraw from the SSR to enable other potential and actual partners to step in to assist the country. Paradoxically, very active diplomatic initiatives by President Sanha and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior to fill the vacuum,

helped mobilised a variety of partners both in Africa and outside the continent to seek to address the main security and political challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. Angola, for example, has emerged as one of the most important partner-countries in the process.

Following the agreement reached with political and military actors in September 2010, Angola committed to sending a team comprising 200 members of the Angolan armed forces. The main task of the team was to provide assistance in restructuring Guinea-Bissau's national armed forces and police over an initial period of two years. The team was also to provide security for state institutions such as the executive branch, including the office of the prime minister.

Moreover, Angola pledged over 30 million USD for SSR, while moving ahead in renovating essential military barracks. The leading role of Angola in Guinea-Bissau appears to be appreciated, and also seems to have won acceptance by the military hierarchy that previously threatened to turn the country upside down in the event of a peacekeeping force in Guinea-Bissau. Notwithstanding the assistance by Angola, some observers criticised the lack of transparency and public communication about that country's involvement and others pointed to Luanda's suspected hidden agenda to increase its influence in the Gulf of Guinea through access to Guinea-Bissau. Regardless of the interpretation of Angola's role in Guinea-Bissau, its involvement and interest in the country also arises from historical, political, economic and strategic factors. In addition to a shared Portuguese colonial history and linguistic heritage, Guinea-Bissau offers some attractive investment opportunities for Angola in the mines (Bauxite) of Guinea-Bissau as well as oil exploration, while confirming Angola's ambition to also play an increasingly continental role.

In spite of its increased prominence, Angola is not the only African partner providing assistance to Guinea-Bissau. The regional organisation ECOWAS and the CPLP have also been instrumental in assuming some degree of responsibility towards the stabilisation of Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, to support Angola's efforts, ECOWAS committed to disbursing 63 million USD to support the SSR in addition to the sending of a Security Assistance Team (SAT) into the country. SAT's mission was to set up a special police unit responsible for the protection of key national institutions. SAT was also to support the national commission of inquiry investigating Guinea-Bissau's many coups and the double political assassinations of President Bernardo Vieira and the army chief of staff Tagme Na Wai. So far, there has been no real progress and the police investigation is likely to be closed.

All Guinea-Bissau's partners are aware that the stability of the country hinges on the successful completion of SSR. The final objective is to reduce the size of the national army to 4000 men. Close to 1300 soldiers, mainly those who were involved in the liberation struggle were due to retire in July 2011. This programme, however, is far from being completed. Nonetheless, the partnership between ECOWAS and CPLP still offers great hope for the completion of the process if the political environment also improves. While the EU has played an important role in post-conflict reconstruction, mainly in the context of SSR, its decision to withdraw has, at least currently, made Europe a secondary actor in Guinea-Bissau.

UN Dynamics

The United Nations is one of the major actors in the post-conflict reconstruction in Guinea-Bissau. The UN office in Guinea-Bissau took an active part in various processes including the planning of the national conference and the SSR. The

report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPO) in October 2011 is quite explicit. As far as SSR is concerned, the report indicated that the first phase of the vetting and certification process targeting police institutions, which was launched in February, had been completed. In addition, with technical and financial assistance from the UN, the National Technical Independent Mixed Commission in charge of the process finalized the registration of 3,024 police officers, including 407 females and 2,617 male officers, from the Public Order Police, immigration services, the border guard, the firefighter department and the security information service. The report also indicated that the selection process was completed on 29 September. The first model police station, in the Bissau suburb of *Bairro Militar*, established with the support of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), was inaugurated on 12 September and is now operational. Twelve additional model police stations will be built throughout Guinea-Bissau with support from the Peace building Fund. Following the attempted military coup, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, called on Guinea-Bissau's military and political leaders to resolve their differences peacefully and show respect for the rule of law.

Wider International Community

The consultations that took place in Brussels in March 2011 to set the conditions for the return of the EU to Guinea-Bissau still need to restore the EU to the forefront of the SSR process. The EU laid a number of conditions. In a press release of January 2011, the EU stated it was necessary to open consultations with the authorities in power in Guinea-Bissau in order to examine possible solutions to the crisis and ways to re-establish democratic order. The main aim of such consultations was

to discuss a list of undertakings with the authorities, including:

- an end to the illegal detention of Vice Admiral Zamora Induta and others arrested during the events of 1 April;
- the opening and conclusion of fully independent investigations into the events that took place between 1 March 2009 and 1 April 2010;
- the appointment of persons of integrity not implicated in acts of violence and unconstitutional conduct, to lead Guinea-Bissau's armed forces; the acceptance by the authorities of any experts' mission and civil and military support that may be proposed by ECOWAS/the CPLP and/or other partners to supervise and support the reform of the security sector and protect political staff;
- adoption, enactment and publication of the Security Sector Reform legislative package;
- adoption by the government of an operational programme to implement the SSR package; and
- any other undertaking likely to improve the country's democratic governance and security-sector reform.

However, it has proven difficult to have all of these conditions accepted by Guinea-Bissau's authorities before resuming development aid. Unfortunately, Guinea-Bissau is still viewed by most European countries and the United States through the prism of drug trafficking and other transnational crimes. Therefore, a firm stance is needed to break the resistance to reforms. While this is important, it will also be appropriate for the EU to join forces with ECOWAS, CPLP and other major partners to support the political stabilisation process (democracy and good governance, fight against impunity) that could lay the foundations for the normalisation of the current national socio-political and economic situation. The window

of opportunity created by the April mini-coup attempt, albeit controversial, should not be missed.

It is this understanding, the possibility of reform, which informs the Bretton Woods Institutions in their willingness to continue lending their support for the country's economic recovery, which is now showing some positive signs. In September 2011, a mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Guinea-Bissau to assess the progress made on structural reforms undertaken by the government of President, Malam Bacai Sanha. The IMF praised the country for its efforts to stabilise its economy and decided to reopen its office in Guinea-Bissau. The prospects for growth look encouraging according to the IMF and Guinea-Bissau was able to meet all its benchmarks and quantitative targets by December 2011. Unfortunately, the events that subsequently took place, including Sanha's death and the series of attempted coups, serve as constant reminders of the obstacles that unexpectedly appear in the way of sustainable socio-economic stability.

Civil Society Dynamics

In Guinea-Bissau, the activities of civil society organisations continue to be undermined by the general socio-political environment. In addition to chronic political instability, a lack of resources remains the main challenge to their effectiveness. Yet, their contribution to peace and stability is widely recognized, both in regard to SSR and the ongoing discussions on a national conference for reconciliation. In 2011, the office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Guinea-Bissau signed a \$30,000 grant agreement with the Bissau-Guinean Civil Society National Movement to assist the organization in implementing a Security Sector Reform (SSR) awareness campaign programme. According to the agreement the Civil Society National Movement was to carry out several activities, including information and awareness regional

workshops and cultural activities in areas close to military areas in the capital, Bissau, and the countryside. Hopefully, the financial support, though insufficient, will help civil society actors to play an active role in the Post-conflict Reconstruction (PCR) process.

Scenario Planning

In the light of the above developments and considerations, one or a combination of the following scenarios may unfold in Guinea-Bissau.

Scenario 1

Free, fair and peaceful elections: opportunity for political stability

Guarantees for holding of a free and fair run-off election and dialogue resulting in convincing the opposition to abandon their threatened withdrawal from the process would provide an opportunity for conducting a free and peaceful election. If this materialises, it will present Guinea-Bissau an opportunity for consolidating political stability, pursuing national reconciliation processes and a successful security sector reform programme.

Scenario 2

Boycott and election-related violence

The opposition could follow through its threat of boycotting the election. This may create conditions for protest and violence and even the staging of a coup by the security establishment in the name of securing the country from chaos and political uncertainty.

Scenario 3

Stagnant political process

This scenario could see renewed stagnation of the political process with serious implications for SSR. The election of Carlos Gomes Junior as president might not usher in a new dispensation if the army and its leadership fail to seize the momentum to diligently complete their required reforms. Current

relations between Carlos and the army chief of staff, Indjai, are believed to be dictated by a mutual realisation that collaboration is essential for national stability. If these relations deteriorate as a result of divergence on the pace and modalities of SSR, Guinea-Bissau could once again find itself in a situation of political stagnation involving rivalry and intrigue among the political class and the security establishment with attendant violence and uncertain political outcomes.

Early Response Options

Option 1

The PSC could urge all political actors and the people of Guinea-Bissau to exhibit similar levels of commitment and participation for the conduct of the run-off election as they did for the first round. To facilitate the

smooth conduct of the election, the PSC could encourage the AU Commission, in collaboration with ECOWAS and the UN, to facilitate dialogue among the major political actors for holding an inclusive, free and transparent election.

Option 2

The PSC could request the AU Commission, ECOWAS, and the EU to pursue coordinated election-monitoring activities, as further assurance to key actors that the electoral process will be free and fair and that the outcome will genuinely reflect the will of the people. While it is true that the conditions of these elections do not allow for profound reforms, such reforms should be considered as essential before the legislative elections take place in November 2012.

Option 3

Depending on the outcome of the election, the PSC could encourage the AU Commission to facilitate coordinated support from ECOWAS, CPLP, EU, the UN and individual partner countries for implementing an inclusive national reconciliation and political process and for finalizing SSR by continuing to provide both political support and financial assistance. The EU's role is still crucially important and necessary in this regard.

Documentation

The Council of the European Union, EU Opens Consultations with Guinea-Bissau, Press Release PRESSE 13/5750/11, January 31, 2011, Brussels, Belgium.

Country Analysis

LIBYA

Previous PSC and AU Communiqués

In a press release dated 13 March 2012, the AU announced a visit by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, to Libya on 12 March. During his visit the Chairperson met with the chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), Mustafa Abul Jalil, and discussed a wide range of issues, including peace and security matters and issues relating to the transition toward a democratic government. Their discussion also covered relations between the AU and a post-Gaddafi Libya in the light of the continental body's role in supporting the transition process in Libya. The meeting also saw the formal introduction of Mr. Mondher Rezugui, the AU Chairperson's Special Representative to Libya, who will head the AU liaison office in Libya that is expected to become

operational soon. The Chairman of the NTC, Mustafa Abul Jalil, pledged to cooperate with the AU and African countries, but warned that his government would not tolerate intervention. He also emphasised that his government would not accept that 'any African country should become an incubator for those who want to destabilize Libya'.

Crisis Escalation Potential

In a manifestation of longstanding grievances and division among the different regions and tribes of Libya, about 3,000 delegates who met in Benghazi on 6 March 2012 announced the establishment of a separate regional council to run Cyrenaica, the oil rich eastern Libyan province. The announcement was swiftly followed by outright rejection by the leadership of the NTC. Head of the Council, Mustafa Abul Jalil, called the move a 'conspiracy against Libya' and a 'betrayal of the revolution,' while warning that the NTC would defend national unity, using force if necessary. In the days that followed the announcement, protesters in

Tripoli and Benghazi also denounced the move and claimed that it would eventually lead to the disintegration of the country. Demonstrators condemned the move, chanted unity slogans and pounded photos of Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, the newly assigned head of the Cyrenaica regional council, with their shoes.

On 9 March, a counter demonstration supporting the autonomy of the region, was attacked by armed men wielding rifles and knives, denouncing the newly established regional council and accusing its leaders of separatism. Subsequent reports indicated that one person was killed while many were injured. The supporters of the new regional council stated that the creation of the council and regional autonomy was necessary to end the marginalization their region had suffered for decades under Gaddafi's rule.

Regional and tribal divisions, coupled with lawless armed groups and pressing socio-economic

demands, are adding to the significant pressure already placed upon the TNC. Deep-rooted internal divisions and tensions have also become increasingly prominent in Libya, a country that is facing numerous security challenges. The threat posed by uncontrolled rebel groups is becoming more complex by the day. Some reports claim that as many as 700 militia groups are present in Libya, which is yet to establish a strong and unified army and integrated security institutions. Most of these militias have so far refused to be disbanded and are therefore a threat to national stability. The NTC chairman, Mustafa Abul Jalil, has repeatedly warned of the possibility of a 'civil war' if these armed groups are not brought under control. The Cyrenaica declaration has further escalated tensions among contending parties in Libya.

Key Issues and Internal Dynamics

Following independence in December 1951, the then Kingdom of Libya was divided until 1963 into three autonomous regions: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. The decision on 6 March 2012, by tribal leaders and militia groups in Eastern Libya, called for the creation of an autonomous region or self-governing state within a federal Libya. However, the newly declared autonomous region was widely condemned as a source of further division, particularly in the context of territorial aggrandizement and oil. The proposed self-governing state extends beyond historical Cyrenaica, includes parts of oil-rich Fezzan in the Gulf of Sirte and stretches from the Egyptian border in the east to the city of Sirte in the west. The declaration which established an 'Interim Council of Cyrenaica' also appointed Sheikh Ahmed Zoubair al-Sanoussi, a cousin of Cyrenaican King Idriss of Libya (1951-1969), as head of the new body.

Cyrenaica accounts for about 25 percent of the Libyan population and 66 per cent of its oil production. Political and cultural marginalization,

coupled with economic neglect, has contributed to the impoverishment of the Cyrenaican region, particularly when compared with the western region of the country, Tripolitania. The new Council has demanded a regional parliament as well as control over the police force and the region's courts. The Council envisions a regional government and administration that will manage the region's financial affairs, while leaving the control of oil revenues, foreign policy and the national army to the central government in Tripoli. The Benghazi Council has emphasized that it has no plans for the future independence or separation of Cyrenaica.

The Chairman of the NTC, Mustafa Abul Jalil, responded to the declaration by condemning the move and describing it as 'unilateral' and 'dangerous' for the unity of Libya. He rejected the move toward Cyrenaican autonomy in strong terms by stating that the NTC would defend national unity, using force if necessary, and accused some Arab countries of being behind the 'sedition'. The head of the NTC also called on leaders of Cyrenaica to engage in a national dialogue. Cyrenaica's quest for autonomy, which did not surprise observers, has further deepened the mistrust between various political and security groups in Libya.

The NTC which is tasked with transforming Libya toward democracy is also faced with another mammoth challenge; that of creating a united and structured military force under one command. So far, attempts by the government to persuade rebel fighters to hand in their weapons and join the national army have barely succeeded. Members of some rebel groups who decided to lay down their arms and join the army, and who have yet to receive a salary, have since complained that other groups have not complied. They claim they are now ignored by the government, since abandoning their weapons. Other fighters are now reluctant to give back their weapons until the

government's revived national army and police force are seen to be strong enough to take control. The militias also complain that they do not want to integrate with the government because they say the ministries and armed forces are infiltrated by remnants of the Gaddafi regime. Such complaints discourage other fighters from laying down their arms.

Scandals surrounding the medical fund intended for wounded fighters have also created controversy, damaging the image and reputation of the NTC. The NTC announced in September 2011 that it would set aside \$400m (£250m) to fund medical care for wounded fighters in overseas hospitals. Initially this was handled by the Global Health Programme, an internationally-supervised scheme. However, by October it had been handed over to the transitional government. A number of reports then circulated alleging instances of abuse of the fund by people who had used the money for purposes unrelated to the conflict.

Various reports now show that some of the brigades of former fighters are accused of inflicting horrific abuses on prisoners in unofficial detention centers. Amnesty International has stated that there is widespread and persistent evidence of torture, including prolonged beatings and electric shocks.

The government has been heavily criticized for failing to rein in the various militia groups operating across the country. Leaders of the National Transitional Council have admitted that their government does not have enough power to deal with militias refusing to allow the army and police to take over vital border crossings and airports. The Head of the NTC, Mustafa Abul Jalil, said that his government does not have the capacity to control borders and force the rebels to lay down their arms.

On 8 March 2012, one of Libya's most powerful militias which had controlled the country's busiest airport since the overthrow of

Gaddafi, relinquished control to the government. The decision by the Zintan brigade is seen as a positive move to convince other groups to relinquish control of vital institutions and key government installations. However, many still doubt that government forces can ensure the security and safety of airports and other important operations in Libya.

Arms and ammunition allegedly shipped from Qatar and other Arab and European countries to the rebel groups fighting the Gaddafi regime in the early days of the uprising are still at large, posing a serious security challenge to the Libyan population and the state. The ongoing events in Libya signify that the country is at a high risk of profound and enduring instability that may lead to another civil war if effective measures are not taken in time.

On 7 March 2012, the Libyan authorities confirmed the arrest in Mauritania of Gaddafi's former intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi. Al-Senussi was detained at Nouakchott airport. Al-Senussi, 63, was Gaddafi's brother-in-law, and has been described as one of the former dictator's most trusted aides. The capture of al-Senussi is considered significant as he was implicated in a number of crimes, including the downing of a French airliner over Niger in September, 1989. The Libyan government is trying its best to convince Mauritania to handover the ex intelligence head. The Government of France and the International Criminal Court are also competing to put Senussi on trial.

In another positive move by the Government of Libya the country's stock exchange reopened on 15 March 2012 for the first time since the fall of Gaddafi's regime. The relatively small exchange has 10 companies listed and on its first day shares totaling some 3.9bn Libyan dinars (\$3bn; £2bn) were traded

However, the economy still suffers from a lack of skilled civil servants capable of effectively implementing the socio-economic programs of the

new ruling Council. The transitional body finds itself in a position where it cannot fulfill the rising expectations of the Libyan public. In the short term, it will also not be able to disband the myriad of militias that are destabilizing the country, because the NTC cannot guarantee their fighters the vocational training they will need if they are to confidently resume their respective roles in Libyan civilian life.

The NTC remains a very heterogeneous group, initially with just one shared purpose: to get rid of the Gaddafi regime. It lacks the technical capacity, and the stable political and security environment required to achieve most of its objectives before the holding of the elections tentatively scheduled for the summer of 2012. Observers are calling for the NTC to concentrate on achieving a smaller number of important initiatives, before relinquishing power to an elected government. Problems faced by the ruling Council range from human rights abuses and atrocities occurring across Libya to the large number of militias that continue to harass and abuse the population, as well as the slow pace of political reforms.

Geo-political dynamics:

Pan-African and RECs dynamics

On 12 March, 2012, in a show of solidarity with the government of Sudan, the NTC allowed the Sudanese Defence Minister, Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein, to take part in a regional conference in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, making it his first trip abroad since the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for him earlier in March 2012. The previously poor relations between Libya and Sudan improved significantly after the revolution.

Following news of the arrest of Libya's former intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, the Libyan government started a diplomatic campaign to step up pressure on

Mauritania to hand over one of the most feared officials of the previous regime. The Libyan Deputy Prime Minister, Mustafa Abu Shagour, flew into Mauritania's capital, Nouakchott, to urge the West African country to hand Senussi over, citing what he called a "community of interests" between the two Arab League members.

The insecurity exported by the Libyan crisis to the country's southern neighbors could rebound on a much larger scale, to Libya's detriment. Failure to deal effectively with the consequences of regime change in Libya and the subsequent proliferation of arms in the region has fuelled rebellion and terrorist activities in West Africa and the Sahel region. One such negative outcome is the *Tuareg* rebellion in Northern Mali, where the *Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad* (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) or MNLA launched an insurgency against the government in Bamako which recently resulted in a military coup in Mali.

UN dynamics

On 14 March 2012, following a UN report which found that both sides had committed war crimes during last year's conflict, and that killing, torture and pillage were continuing, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, said that Libyan authorities should address human rights violations. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has accused Libyan revolutionary brigades of torturing detainees, many of whom are sub-Saharan Africans suspected of fighting for the toppled government of Gaddafi. The UN report also recommended that the Libyan government should further investigate the death of Gaddafi and human rights violations committed by the revolutionary fighters who captured him and members of his entourage.

In a statement that perturbed some members of the UNSC, the Secretary-General also noted that U.N. Human

Rights Council investigators found that NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libyan air strikes. The Secretary-General stated that the actions taken by the international community were consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Russia had criticized the investigators for failing to adequately probe deaths caused by NATO bombs.

Wider international community dynamics

On 9 March 2012, Russia's ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, accused Libya of establishing "a special training center for Syrian revolutionaries who are combating the "legal government" of President Bashar al-Assad. The ambassador expressed his concern about the special training centre for the so-called Syrian revolutionaries and referred to the action as unacceptable as it would undermine stability in the Middle East. In response, the Libyan Prime Minister denied the Russian allegations, but said his country would stand with the people of Syria opposed to President Bashar Assad's regime. Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib also said he was unaware of the alleged training facility and that if one was operating in Libya it was doing so without his government's knowledge. However, he admitted that the Libyan government would continue to support the "good" cause of Syrian opposition.

Libya's relations with countries of the Middle East have improved since the revolution. Consequently, the Libyan government is in the process of sending former rebels to receive police training in Jordan and Turkey in an effort to rebuild the country's battered security forces. The transitional government has announced plans to send more than 2,500 trainees for the first round of training. Some 10,000 Libyans will eventually train in Jordan, with more than 1,300 going to Turkey, in accordance with signed agreements.

In a recent statement, Human Rights Watch (HRW) called on the UN Human Rights Council to condemn serious, ongoing, human rights violations by militias in Libya. HRW suggested the council should also appoint an independent expert to document the abuses and monitor the government's response. According to HRW, despite commitments by Libya's transitional government to prevent abuses, the group has documented ongoing killings, torture, and forced displacements by militias.

On 19 March 2012, Amnesty International also called on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to investigate civilian deaths resulting from its bombing campaign in Libya last year. The human rights group said it had evidence that 55 civilians, including 16 children and 14 women, were killed in air strikes. NATO said it had looked into all credible reports of civilians being harmed, and would continue to do so.

Scenario Building

The situation in Libya could take a number of courses, based on the actions taken by the various parties to the crisis in the coming months. These are the possible scenarios:

Scenario 1

A peaceful resolution of differences between the central government and the Cyrenaican council would help reduce tensions between the various tribal and regional groups. An agreement on the issue could moderate the strong feelings in the east and result in a new system approved by both sides.

Scenario 2

Success by the transitional government in disarming the various brigades and creating a unified army would improve security and facilitate conditions for the peaceful holding of upcoming elections.

Scenario 3

The continued refusal by armed rebels to disarm and join the national

army and the failure of talks between the NTC and the Cyrenaican council to reach an agreement about devolution of power could lead the nation toward civil war, thereby threatening the territorial integrity of Libya, derail the democratic process and destabilize its neighbors.

Early Response Options

Given the above scenarios the following options could be considered:

Option 1

The PSC could call for acceleration of the establishment of the AU liaison office in Libya. The Council could follow developments in Libya closely and engage with the NTC officials through the AU Chairperson's Special Representative to Libya.

Option 2

The PSC, in collaboration with the Arab League, could continue to monitor the situation in Libya and initiate talks between the different groups in the Libyan political sphere. The Council could also use the Panel of the Wise of the AU to mediate differences with the objective of creating a safe and stable platform for the scheduled elections.

Option 3

The PSC could call for an end to the violation of human rights by militants and urge and support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Libya. The Council could also call for an independent inquiry concerning claims of such abuses by Libya's various armed groups.

Documentation

Relevant AU Documents

Press Release (March 13, 2011)
Chairperson of the AU Commission meets in Tripoli with Chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya.

PSC Retrospective

WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS IN ARMED CONFLICTS

At the 223rd meeting held on 30 March 2010, the PSC received a briefing note from the AU Commission and heard statements made by Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

In a press statement, **PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXIII)**, adopted at the end of the meeting, the Council expressed its decision to devote every year to an open session on the theme of women and children and other vulnerable groups in armed conflicts. The Council is expected to convene this annual open session during the month of April.

The press statement of the 23rd meeting noted that the theme on women and children reflects and draws attention to the wider human security dimensions of the AU peace and security agenda, as articulated in the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy. The Council also acknowledged that despite the existence of a comprehensive human rights architecture that is meant to address issues concerning women and children in situations of armed conflict, women and children continue to be

disproportionally affected by conflicts and violence. Apart from calling for member states to ratify treaties on women and children and report on measures taken to implement commitments they made for the protection of the rights of women and children, the PSC outlined the various steps that should be taken.

Among others, the PSC asked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to take the necessary steps to ensure the mainstreaming of gender aspects into the AU's efforts aimed at promoting peace and security, including through the deployment of a gender expert in the AU Liaison Offices/Peace Support Operations as well as the involvement of women in peace processes.

Following the experience of the UN and to give prominence to the subject, the PSC also encouraged the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint a Special Representative on Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children. This is a request to which the AU Commission has yet to respond.

Additionally, the PSC stressed the need to address the gender dimension of violence against children, to prioritise prevention by identifying the root causes of the vulnerabilities of women and children and to respond with recommendations to mitigate risk, while ensuring accountability and ending impunity by prosecuting perpetrators of violence against women and children at the national and regional levels.

The PSC again held its follow-up annual open session on women and children in armed conflict during its 269th meeting held on 28 and 29 March 2011. Apart from reiterating its earlier calls for states to take certain steps, including ratification of relevant treaties, and its concern on the situation of women and children in conflict, the PSC's press statement, **PSC/PR/BR(CCLXIX)**, welcomed the statement made by Mrs. Margot Wallström, the United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, on the need to develop a joint AU-UN response to eradicate conflict-related sexual violence.

The Council also considered and welcomed the AU Commission's efforts for implementing the measures that the Council outlined during its 2010 meeting. In this regard the Council also importantly expressed its support for the decision of the Chairperson of the Commission in appointing a Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security.

A very important outcome of the 2011 session of the Council on the theme of women and children and other vulnerable groups in armed conflicts was the express emphasis that the Council made on the importance of developing strategies at the continental and regional levels, to enable the monitoring of women and children in conflict. The best approach could be for the AU Commission to submit a report outlining such monitoring strategies. This has to be accompanied by response tools.

The focus on women and children in armed conflict is very pertinent. Situations of violence and armed conflict continue to have a disproportionate impact on women and children. In the post-electoral violence witnessed in several countries and situations of unconstitutional changes of government, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Madagascar, widespread gender-based violence took place. Women continue to bear the brunt of the conflict in the DRC as rape and gender-based violence continues to be used as an instrument of violence. In conflicts in Somalia and those involving the Lord's Resistance Army, children are forcibly conscripted. Both in situations of armed conflicts and other cases of violence, women and children are among the most vulnerable and the most disproportionately affected.

Clearly, the decision of the PSC to make this a standing thematic issue is commendable. The steps that the PSC has outlined are important starting points for mainstreaming this theme in the works of the PSC and in the structures and processes of the wider African Peace and Security Architecture. The PSC needs to follow up or, where necessary, revise the measures it adopted during 2010 and 2011. Most importantly, building on its previous decisions, the PSC needs to pay attention to specific dimensions of addressing the challenges facing women and children in conflict situations and to develop mechanisms for doing so.

First of all, it is crucially important that the scope of the theme, as formulated in the PSC decision, needs to be expanded beyond situations that are properly classified as armed conflicts in international humanitarian law. This would ensure that the challenges facing women and children in all situations of violence are adequately addressed.

Second, the PSC should identify specific areas of intervention that will substantially contribute to addressing the challenges facing women and children when and wherever violence erupts in Africa. One such area is the participation and representation of women in decision-making processes and structures in the context of conflict prevention, management, resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Another area would be the prevention and fighting of conflict-related sexual violence and abduction of children and their forcible conscription into armed movements.

Additionally, attention needs to be given to the utilization of existing mechanisms of early warning and responses (including through investigation and rehabilitation) by specifically tailoring them to monitor and formulate responses to violence against women and children in conflict. This should include the modalities for practical operationalization of such a mechanism, including through establishing partnerships with local and regional civil society organizations, regional economic communities (RECs)

and UN offices and missions present in various countries. It is also important that consideration be given to the issue of harnessing the work of various AU institutions dealing with women and children and similar programmes present in the different RECs.

Importantly for the work of the PSC, an area of particular concern is to develop a framework for mainstreaming the issue of women and children in situations of conflict into all aspects of the work of the Council on conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development. This is particularly important because it would also determine the role of the Council in its response to all the other areas of specific intervention as outlined above.

To take this theme further on its agenda, one possible consideration for the Council would be to proceed beyond the convening of the annual open session on women and children in conflict situations. To this end, the PSC could request the AU Commission to submit an annual report on progress made about measures outlined in previous sessions and on developments surrounding women and children in conflict situations. Additionally, the PSC could request the Chairperson of the AU Commission to submit a report on a framework for mainstreaming/integrating the issue of women and children in situations of conflict into all dimensions of the work of the Council.

Important dates to diarise

23-24	April	Panel of the Wise Workshop, Tunis, Tunisia (Strengthening Political Governance for Peace, Security and Stability in Africa)
1	May	South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty enters into force.
9-11	May	World Economic Forum on Africa: 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Accelerating Quality Growth, Creating Shared Opportunities)
12	June	World Day Against Child Labour
16	June	Day of the African Child

Country	Election	Date *
Egypt	Local	April 2012
Mali	Presidential 1 st Round	29 April 2012
Burkina Faso	Legislative and Municipal	May 2012
Cape Verde	Local	May 2012
Seychelles	National Assembly	May 2012
Algeria	Legislative and Local	10 May 2012
Lesotho	National Assembly	26 May 2012
Egypt	Presidential	May / June 2012
Libya	Constituent Assembly	Before June 2012
Republic of Congo	National Assembly	June 2012
Democratic Republic of Congo	Senate (indirect)	13 June 2012
Senegal	National Assembly	17 June 2012
Cameroon	National Assembly and Communes	June / July 2012

**could change, dependent on circumstances*

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