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## Peace and Security Council Protocol

The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council' – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union.

### Early Warning Issues for May

The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of May is South Africa. In the absence of a country's representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month.

### Djibouti

Although the April presidential election ended rather smoothly, it has not produced any political and leadership change. This election was preceded by popular protests in February and March 2011. Given the high level of unemployment, increasing corruption and inequalities, the potential for political unrest is ever-present.

In terms of regional security, Djibouti's tensions with Eritrea are very far from completely resolved. Worries about further Eritrean aggression have in part been fuelled by unsubstantiated accusations of Eritrea's support for Djiboutian armed groups. There is also a widespread

belief among Djiboutians that Eritrea has yet to achieve its regional strategy, namely to re-establish its influence in the Horn of Africa, disrupt the Djibouti corridor and break the geo-political deadlock with Ethiopia.

### Egyptian Update

On 19 March, Egyptians voted in large numbers on a referendum for changes to the Egyptian constitution after the military council had suspended the previous constitution. The changes, which intended to bring democratic reforms, were passed overwhelmingly, with 77 percent favouring the amendments. Under the proposed new amendments to the constitution, the future president would only be allowed to serve two four-year terms, instead of unlimited six-year periods. He or she would also be obliged to appoint a Deputy President. Other amendments would make it easier for individuals to qualify to run as a presidential candidate and re-introduce judicial supervision for elections. It would also be more difficult for any leader to maintain the ongoing state of emergency.

However, potential presidential candidates, including the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Amr Moussa, and the former UN nuclear watchdog chief, Mohamed El Baradei, want a new constitution to be drawn up from scratch before any elections are held. Meanwhile, the two largest political forces in the country, the former ruling National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, are encouraging members to vote in favor of the amendments, warning of the dangers of a legislative power vacuum. They are most likely to benefit from early elections as dozens of smaller parties set up following the uprising, have yet to fully organise themselves. The largest organized political opposition force in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, is campaigning to be recognised as a formal political party. On 30 April, the Muslim Brotherhood announced plans to form a party named the Freedom and Justice Party, which aims to contest between 45 and 50 percent of parliamentary seats in the September 2011 elections.

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## Livingstone Formula

'Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC' – PSC/PR/ (CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

## Tunisian Update

The lack of legitimate leadership in Tunisia poses difficulties in establishing the foundations for political reform and the legitimacy of state institutions in Tunisia. Regarding the foundations of political reform, the ordinary Tunisian people, the elite, and the remnants of government, including the civil service, have vacillated between constitutional reform and revolutionary change. The Higher Political Reform Commission has been entrusted with amending the legal framework to ensure a free, fair, transparent, and inclusive presidential election. Composed of independent experts in public law and political science, the council includes judges and law professors and has consulted closely with political parties and civil society organizations. However the transitional process and the caretaker administration will face numerous challenges from the liberal youth, the Islamist fundamentalists, members of the previous regime and the international community. The strength and commitment of the transitional body to address the requests of the various interest groups, while retaining peace, order and building democracy, is yet to be seen.

## Libyan Update

Despite early expectations that the enforcement of resolution 1973 through air attacks by allied powers would tip the balance of power in favour of the rebel forces, the air attacks have not helped the rebels except by way of halting the march of Gaddafi forces toward Benghazi and giving them a window of opportunity to push government forces back for a short while. Whereas the air raids by coalition forces have succeeded in destroying much of the air capabilities of government forces, they achieved very little in dismantling Gaddafi's ground military capabilities. As a result the battles between government forces and rebel groups intensified on the ground. With government forces showing a great deal of resilience and military superiority, the armed conflict has evolved into a protracted conflict that neither side may succeed in winning. Indeed, after government forces retook the territories they had temporarily lost to the rebels, the fighting seemed to have reached a stalemate.

## COUNTRY ANALYSIS

## Djibouti

***Previous AU Documents  
and Recommendations:***

In response to the invitation from the Republic of Djibouti, Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Mr. Mahboub M. Maalim, Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Mr. Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), Mr. Abdou Diouf, Secretary General of the OIF (International Organisation of the French Speaking World) and Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), sent observers who formed the international observer mission for the Djibouti presidential elections held on 8 April, 2011.

The International Election Observer Mission was led respectively, for the African Union by H.E Mr. Jacques Baudin, a former Foreign Minister of Senegal; for the League of Arab States by Ambassador Mahmoud El-Souri, Head of the Division of the Horn of Africa; for the Organisation of Islamic Conference by Ambassador Habib Kaabachi, Director, Political Department; for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development by Netsannet Asfaw, Director of the Division Peace and Security; and for the Organisation of the French Speaking World (Francophonie) by Mr. Saidou Kane, Head of Mission.

The International mission of about forty members, was composed of Ambassadors, Pan-African Parliamentarians, heads of electoral institutions, officials of the League of Arab States, Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and members of civil society

The International Mission arrived in Djibouti starting from 1 April, 2011 with a mandate to observe the presidential election on 8 April, 2011. The observation focused on the regularity, transparency, fairness and proper conduct of elections in accordance with relevant

provisions. For the African Union, the OAU *Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa* **AHG / Decl. 1 (XXXVIII)**, the AU guidelines for observation and monitoring of elections; for the League of Arab States, the Resolution of the Ministerial Council of the League of Arab States concerning the observation of elections; for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the 10 year Action Plan adopted by the Extraordinary Summit of Makkah in December 2005 and the Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Conference adopted by the eleventh Islamic Summit in Dakar in 2008; for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, The agreement establishing IGAD; for the International Organisation of the French Speaking world, the Bamako Declaration as well as the Constitution and the laws of Djibouti.

## Crisis potential

All in all, the one-sided presidential elections held on 8 April 2011 will not have a significant impact on the distribution of power in Djibouti. The electorate recently extended President Ismail Omar Guelleh's 12-year hold on power for another 5 years in a political milieu that already enables him to run practically unchallenged. Too far removed from fairness and competitiveness, the elections will not result in a more pluralist political dynamic and will only further aggravate the existing problems in Djiboutian politics.

Nevertheless, in the period after these elections, all political parties ought to play the democratic game of give-and-take. In the first place, opposition political parties must act with a sense of responsibility by moderating political rhetoric. They should not fail to notice their unpreparedness for power and their need for more time to gather strength and experience. The opposition political parties should learn how to function as an organised, united and especially responsible force operating within the boundaries of the democratic process, however restricted such boundaries may be.

For its part, the government should show more tolerance to the opposition political parties and be more open to criticism. It should

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More importantly, the government should acknowledge that repression can only calm down agitators temporarily. In the longer term and in the face of endemic poverty, the degradation of livelihood sources, the inequitable distribution of revenues, widespread corruption, human rights abuses and the lack of real political reform, repression will only spur the very upheavals that the government wishes to avoid. Nonetheless, pre-election protests in February and March, evidenced to a large extent opposition aspirations that were encouraged by events sweeping North Africa and other parts of the Arab world. With unemployment reportedly in the region of forty to fifty percent, high corruption and a hobbled opposition, the potential for political unrest is ever-present.

Under Djibouti's 1992 constitution, the president is to be elected for two terms of six years. Accordingly, President Guelleh was re-elected in 2005 for his second and supposedly last term. However, in April 2010, the National Assembly pushed through constitutional amendments that removed term limits and cut the presidential term to five years from six. Moreover, in June 2010, following Qatar's mediation efforts, Eritrean troops withdrew from the contested border areas between Djibouti and Eritrea. A Qatari observation force was deployed to monitor the border area and a joint committee was formed to demarcate the common border.

at between 1 000 and 2 000. The protesters demanded that President Guelleh step down and threw stones at the police and burnt several vehicles. After two days of violent unrest, the government arrested more than one hundred party activists and briefly detained three prominent opposition figures.

According to the final results released by the Ministry of Interior, President Guelleh obtained about 80.63 per cent of the votes, expectedly defeating Warsama who garnered the remaining 19.37 per cent. It is widely believed that the lack of a viable opposition candidate enabled President Guelleh to be re-elected for a third term. Voter turnout was officially recorded at about 70 per cent of some 152 000 registered voters.

In Djibouti, political parties can be broadly classified into two types: the political parties of the ruling coalition and the political parties of the opposition coalition. The ruling coalition is the Union for a Presidential Majority or *Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle* (UMP). It is dominated by the People's Rally for Progress or *Rassemblement populaire pour le Progrès* (RPP), the ruling party which has won all elections since attaining political power in 1977 and provides much of the coalition's leadership. President Guelleh is the president of the RPP.

(UPR) led by Ibrahim Chehem Daoud. The ruling coalition is mostly advantaged as it has unrestricted access to the media and makes use of state resources for party financing. The ruling coalition also comprises a network of members implanted in virtually all government institutions at all levels and maintaining a tight control over the day-to-day direction of their decision-making.

The opposition coalition is the Union for a Democratic Alternative or *Union pour l'Alternance Démocratique* (UAD) which is headed by Ismail Guedi Hared, a former *directeur de cabinet* of Djibouti's first President, Hasan Gouled Aptidon, from 1977 to 1999. The coalition has boycotted four elections since 2005, including the 2005 presidential elections, the 2006 regional elections, the 2008 parliamentary elections and also the April 2011 presidential elections. This coalition includes the Republican Alliance for Democracy or *Alliance Républicaine pour la Démocratie* (ARD). The ARD was established in 2002, was headed by Ahmed Dini Ahmed until his death in 2004 and is currently led by Ahmed Youssouf Houmed who previously held a ministerial position. It also includes the Movement for Democratic Renewal or *Mouvement pour le Renouveau Démocratique et le Développement* (MRD) headed by Daher Ali Farah, who previously edited a governmental newspaper, and the Union for Democracy and Justice or *Union Djiboutienne pour la Démocratie et la Justice* (UDJ), headed by Hared who is shy and reserved and lacks the guile and charisma of Dini. The Union of Democratic Movements or *Union des Mouvements Démocratiques* (UMD) headed by Aden Robleh Awaleh is aligned with the UAD.

The country's opposition political parties have failed in many respects to mount a strong and effective challenge to the ruling coalition. They have been disadvantaged by the first-past-the-post electoral system and also by the government's domination of the media, its regular intimidation of the opposition and its restrictions on the freedom of speech, association and assembly. Moreover, the opposition political parties are very weak in terms of organisational and financial capacity, membership and material resources. They have

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also become paralysed by defections and divisions into rival factions.

### Geo-Political Dynamics:

### ***Pan African and RECs Dynamics:***

In terms of regional security, Djibouti's tensions with Eritrea are very far from completely resolved. Worries about further Eritrean aggression have in part been fuelled by unsubstantiated accusations of Eritrea's support for Djiboutian armed groups. There is also a widespread belief among Djiboutians that Eritrea has yet to achieve its regional strategy, namely to re-establish its influence in the Horn of Africa, disrupt the Djibouti corridor and break the geo-political deadlock with Ethiopia.

Djibouti, where the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is headquartered, hosted IGAD's 33rd Council of Ministers meeting on Somalia and Sudan on 7-8 December 2010. Djibouti has been training African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and has been a conduit for Algerian arms shipments to the TFG in Mogadishu.

Djibouti also provides a crucially important lifeline for land-locked Ethiopia's access to the sea, an important motive for Ethiopia to ensure that Djibouti remains a stable and friendly neighbour.

***UN Dynamics:***

Tensions over the ongoing border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti were reduced considerably when, in mid-2010, Eritrea withdrew its forces from the border, under pressure from the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations, following UNSC Resolution 1862 of 2009. Djibouti had withdrawn its own troops from the border in 2008.

More recently, Djibouti has been facilitating the delivery of speedboats to Puntland for the purpose of combatting piracy and has been collaborating with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations, to serve as a regional center for counter-piracy activities.

### ***Wider International Community Dynamics:***

The US and France will continue to maintain their military forces in Djibouti and to lend their support to President Guelleh, encouraging the notion that Djibouti's stability rests on him. Uppermost in current US and French policy towards the entire Horn of Africa region will remain the need to gain the cooperation of accessible and relatively stable governments in the global war on terrorism and the fight against piracy, neither of which shows any signs of abating over the next 5 to 10 years. A secondary priority for the US and France may be to contain Eritrea's moves to sow instability in the region.

## Scenario Planning

Given the above analysis the following could take place:

### Scenario 1:

President Guelleh will most probably finish his third term and groom a successor. There is a low probability for Egyptian or Tunisian style protests to succeed in Djibouti and unseat President Guelleh. The opposition political parties will remain divided and unable to effectively mount a challenge to President Guelleh. The Qatari mediation between Eritrea and Djibouti will succeed and the relations between the two countries will normalise.

### Scenario 2:

President Guelleh maintains himself in power, but faces growing criticism and dissent from within and outside the ruling party. Djibouti may be vulnerable to sustained popular protests. These protests may turn violent and lead to a government clampdown and further political tensions. The Qatari mediation fails and an isolated Eritrea increases its support to Djiboutian armed groups which could pose an increasing challenge to the Djiboutian military and even hamper Ethiopia's access to the port of Djibouti.

## Early Response Options

**Option 1:**

The PSC could, as part of its upcoming report to the next AU Assembly, call on President Guellah to implement political and economic reforms as part of his renewed mandate to consolidate the democratisation process, peace and stability in the country.

**Option 2:**

The PSC could reiterate the January 2011 call of the AU Assembly on Djibouti and Eritrea to pursue, in good faith, the scrupulous implementation of the 6 June 2010 Agreement reached under the mediation of the Emir of Qatar, in order to resolve their border dispute and consolidate the normalisation of their relations.

## Documentation

Joint Statement of International  
Observer Missions of the Djibouti  
Presidential Elections held on 8  
April, 2011, issued on 9 April, 2011

## COUNTRY ANALYSIS

### Update on Egypt

#### *Previous AU Documents and Recommendations:*

The recent developments in Egypt have been among the most challenging cases to be discussed by the Peace and Security Council as the regime change in the country was neither an orderly and democratic transition nor an unconstitutional change of government, the latter case necessitating a PSC sanction. The Council was briefed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and Permanent Representative of Egypt to the AU at its 268th meeting on 23 March 2011, on the evolution of the transition in Egypt. In a press release **PSC/PR/BR.3(CCLXVIII)** that followed the meeting the Council welcomed the positive evolution of the situation and referred to the constitutional referendum and preparations for holding presidential and legislative elections in September and October 2011. The council further encouraged the Egyptian authorities and parties to persevere in their efforts to complete the transition. The press release also mentioned the planned visit to Egypt of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping and the AU Panel of the Wise.

Previously, on 3 February 2010, the Chairperson of the Commission, Jean Ping, expressed his concern over the escalating violence and loss of life in Egypt. He also stressed the need for a consensual solution that takes into account the aspirations of the people as well as the need for appropriate reforms. However, he fell short of identifying the nature of the solution and the appropriate areas of reform. In calling for restraint and the finding of a consensual solution to the crisis through dialogue, the AU again emphasized the need for appropriate reforms. The AU also appealed to all parties to put the interest of Egypt above all other considerations.

#### **Crisis Escalation Potential:**

In the eyes of the protestors, the removal of Mubarak was not the end of the revolution. Consequently, the thousands of protestors who took part in the uprising that removed

the president are referring to their movement as the 'Unfinished Revolution' and Egypt has witnessed a number of demonstrations since Mubarak's departure. Anti-government demonstrators at Cairo's Tahrir Square barricaded the square with a burnt-out army truck, barbed wire and pieces of wood. The demonstrators are also accusing the army generals of being members of the previous regime.

Following weeks of sometimes violent demonstrations, Egypt's public prosecutor summoned Mubarak and his sons for questioning on 11 April, 2011. Two days later Egypt's prosecutor general ordered the further detention of Mubarak and his sons, Alaa and Gamal, ahead of an investigation into corruption and allegations of abuse. Mubarak, 82, is still in hospital after reportedly suffering heart problems, news that temporarily eased the strong feelings of bitterness and a sense of betrayal amongst, particularly the Egyptian youth and which initiated the revolution that removed Mubarak from power in February.

However, the situation in Egypt remains fragile and recent conciliatory moves by the interim administration are no guarantee for future political and security stability. Divisions have already emerged within the protest movement and some are calling for the resignation of the head of the ruling military council, Field Marshal Mohamad Hussein Tantawi. Tantawi, who was defence minister under Mr Mubarak, was very close to the former president. Many within the protest movement believe the military figures now overseeing political transition are also protecting Mr Mubarak and his allies. The Muslim Brotherhood which has been working closely with the interim administration has announced that it will join demonstrators frustrated by the slow pace of change.

As clear evidence of rising tensions between the military and protestors calling for speedier reforms, a military court in Egypt sentenced an internet activist to three years in jail on 11 April, 2011 for criticizing the armed forces. Maikel Nabil was arrested in March for blogs that criticised the Egyptian army's role during anti-government protests. The 26-year-old is thought to be the first blogger

jailed in Egypt since the ousting of President Mubarak. Activists said the blogger's trial set a dangerous precedent at a time when Egypt was trying to move away from the abuses of the Mubarak era. At least 846 Egyptians died in the nearly three-week-long popular uprising that toppled long-serving President Hosni Mubarak, according to the recently announced findings of a government fact-finding mission. The report also held Mubarak ultimately responsible for the killing of the protestors since his interior minister, Habib el-Adly, had issued the orders to open fire.

#### **Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:**

The resignation of Mubarak from power in mid February 2011 did not stop the protests in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt as many protestors wanted the revolution to run its course. Subsequently the first two weeks of April witnessed a number of measures taken by the military administration to ease the growing opposition to the pace of the transition process. In a historic decision, and much to the delight of the revolutionaries, Egypt's supreme administrative court, on 16 April 2011, ordered the dissolution of Egypt's former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), fulfilling a key demand of the protest movement. The court further ordered the nationalization of the NDPs assets, believed to total in excess of \$12 million. The NDP had been ruling Egypt since its establishment by former President Anwar Sadat in 1978 and had effectively turned Egypt into a one-party state.

However, the court order was only partially effective in hobbling the NDP as it soon came up with a new name and leader. NDP members elected Talaat Sadat, the nephew of Anwar Sadat and a strong critic of the NDP before the revolution that removed Hosni Mubarak. Mr. Sadat announced that he was renaming the party the New National Party and would be purging the group's ranks of unpopular and corrupt officials. The party has decamped to a new headquarters in the Cairo suburb of Heliopolis after their former offices in the capital's downtown area were razed by protestors in the early days of the revolution.

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However, potential presidential candidates, including the Arab League Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, and the former UN nuclear watchdog chief, Mohamed El Baradei, want a new constitution to be drawn

The group is not trusted, and is feared by many who suspect it has a conservative Islamist agenda, referring to its historical links to radical and sometimes violent groups. It is feared and mistrusted in the West and to some extent in Egypt. However, it is waging a campaign to create a more secular and democratic image of itself before the elections. Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned in 1954 and its members ran in previous elections as independents. In the 2005 People's Assembly elections, it won about one fifth of the seats. The leaders of the group have also stated that the new party would be secular and that it would also solicit support from liberals, Copts and women. The group claimed it did not seek a majority in parliament and would not field a presidential candidate.

The most defining foreign policy shift in Egypt since the revolution is the development regarding its ties with Iran. In a statement on 19 April 2011, the Iranian foreign ministry confirmed that moves were under way to appoint its first ambassador to Cairo since 1980, but denied a state media report that it had already appointed the son of a prominent cleric to the role. Egypt's new foreign minister, Nabeel al-Arabi, has already said the new regime is willing to 'turn a page' in relations with Tehran. The interest in commencing diplomatic relations was further confirmed by foreign ministry spokeswoman, Ambassador

The other major change in Egypt's foreign policy has been in regard to Israel. In mid-April the Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced that Foreign Minister Nabil El-Arabi was planning to visit Gaza, thereby showing Egypt's solidarity with the people of Gaza, a territory that has labored under an Israeli blockade since 2006 and which shares a border with Egypt. The Egyptian announcement was welcomed by Hamas, which administers the region. The Mubarak regime had been accusing Hamas of having links with the then banned political group in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Exclusion of members of the previous regime as candidates in forthcoming elections could create rifts within the

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the care taker Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, a former Ben Ali appointee, on February 27. Subsequently, protestors began targeting other figures in the transitional body who had worked closely with Ben Ali. Young Tunisians are continuing to push for speedy and fundamental reforms of Tunisian governmental institutions and practices.

### Key Issues and Internal Dynamics:

After a very divisive and heated debate, a commission tasked with preparations for the election of a constituent assembly decided by a simple majority on 12 April that any member of the *Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique* (RCD) or Constitutional Democratic Rally should be banned from running for public office for 10 years. The ruling excludes members of the deposed president's Cabinet, his advisers and attachés, from seeking election to the Constituent Assembly on 24 July 2011 on the grounds that they were directly involved in decision-making under the former regime. Members of the executive council, the central committee, and the general secretaries of coordination committees and the heads of local party cells of Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally will also be regarded as ineligible to seek election. The party has been a pillar of support for the increasingly corrupt and repressive regime for more than two decades.

Two days after the decision to ban members of the old regime from future elections on 14 April 2011, Tunisian authorities said they intended to try former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 18 different charges, including conspiracy against the state, voluntary manslaughter, drug use and drug trafficking. Justice Minister Lazhar Karoui Chebbi announced that the charges were among 44 to be brought against Ben Ali, his family and some former ministers in his government. An international warrant for Ben Ali's arrest is in force. Authorities said at the time that they had arrested 33 members of his family, reportedly on suspicion of plundering the country's resources. Ben Ali is accused of ordering security forces to crack down on the revolt that began in mid-December. Caretaker authorities have appointed a new government and the notorious and all-pervasive secret police service has since been dissolved. Authorities of the Tunisian caretaker administration have already issued a request to Interpol to freeze the assets of Ben Ali and his family, and indicated that a delegation would be sent to Interpol headquarters in Lyon, France, to try to speed up the enforcement of the asset-freeze request.

The lack of legitimate leadership in Tunisia poses difficulties in establishing the foundations for political reform and the legitimacy of state institutions in Tunisia. Regarding the foundations of political reform, the ordinary Tunisian people, the elite, and the remnants of government, including the civil service, have vacillated between constitutional reform and revolutionary change. The Higher Political Reform Commission has been entrusted with amending the legal framework to ensure a free, fair, transparent, and inclusive presidential election. Composed of independent experts in public law and political science, the council includes judges and law professors and has consulted closely with political parties and civil society organizations. However the transitional process and the caretaker administration will face numerous challenges from the liberal youth, the Islamist fundamentalists, members of the previous regime and the international community. The strength and commitment of the transitional body to respond to the requests of the various interest groups, while retaining peace, order and building democracy, is yet to be seen.

## Geo-political dynamics

### ***Pan-African and RECs Dynamics:***

The African Union sent a delegation of the Panel of the Wise, comprising Miguel Trovoadá, former President of São Tomé and Príncipe, and Mrs. Mary Chenery Hesse, a former Ghanaian diplomat and international civil servant, to Tunisia from 11 to 12 April 2011, to monitor the transition in that country and to offer support and identify possible accompanying measures to be taken by the AU. The delegation met with the Interim President of Tunisia, President Fouad Mebazaa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mouldi Kefi, and the Minister for Planning and International Cooperation, H.E. Mr. Abdelhamid Triki, and members of the international community and UN agencies residing in Tunisia.

The team's assessment of the situation in Tunisia has been mostly positive. A statement by the AU said that the team was satisfied by the efforts to realize the transition to a new constitutional order in accordance with the democratic and

developmental aspirations of the people of Tunisia. The delegation also hailed the peaceful nature of the revolution which was working to fulfill the democratic aspirations of the Tunisian people. The Chairperson of the Commission also paid an earlier visit to Tunisia on 21 and 22 March 2011 and pledged the AU's support for the democratic transition in Tunisia.

On 28 April, 2011 Tunisia condemned the violation of its territory by Libyan rebels and forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi after fighting between the Libyan sides spilled over the border into Tunisia. Tunisia said it had informed Libya of its “extreme indignation”. Rebels and pro-Gaddafi troops were fighting for control of the border post between Dahiba and Wazin that rebels had captured a week earlier, when shells reportedly fired by pro-Gaddafi forces landed on Tunisian soil.

***UN Dynamics:***

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 117 people have been killed since the start of demonstrations in Tunisia, including 70 people killed by security forces using live ammunition. Under pressure from the UN, an independent commission was set up by Tunisia's new government to investigate the role of security forces in the deaths of dozens of protesters during weeks of anti-government rallies.

### ***Wider International Community Dynamics:***

The Tunisian revolution has enjoyed international attention and Tunisia has been invited to attend the next meeting of the G8 in France. On 28 April 2011 the Tunisians received further support through the visit by Poland's communist-era opposition icon and Nobel laureate, Lech Walesa, who said that he wanted to share his "know-how" about how to manage the peaceful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. On 28 April the UK's Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, signaled that British troops could be deployed in Tunisia to protect refugees fleeing the Gaddafi regime.

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## Key issues and internal dynamics

Even with the support of the allied forces, the armed opposition groups lack the necessary military capability (in terms of fire power, command and control, training and discipline) to defeat Gaddafi. The rebel forces are a rag-tag group of inexperienced and disorganized people most of whom have had very little or no previous military training. They

The Transitional National Council (TNC), Libya's rebel government in waiting, is becoming more organized with increasing international support. With Italy and Kuwait extending recognition to the TNC on 4 April 2011, the number of countries that

Notwithstanding these losses, Gaddafi continues in his diplomatic efforts to get external support for breaking his increasing isolation. These efforts have taken two forms. The first involves diplomatic visits to countries willing to give a hearing to Gaddafi's government. In this respect, on 2 April 2011 the acting Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdulati al-Obeidi, undertook an official visit to Greece, Turkey and Malta. The minister reportedly discussed with Greek

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## PSC Retrospective:

### ***Women, Children and other vulnerable groups in Armed Conflict***

In its 269<sup>th</sup> meeting the Peace and Security Council of the African Union **PSC/PR/BR(CCLXIX)** held the second Open Session of the PSC about "Women and children and other vulnerable groups in armed conflicts" held in Addis Ababa in the framework of the Livingston Formula that created a mechanism for interaction between the PSC and Civil Society Organizations. The PSC meeting was held on 28 March, 2011 in pursuance of the decision adopted by Council at its 223rd meeting held almost a year earlier on 30 March 2010. It was the first time women victims of sexual violence had the opportunity to give their own testimonies to the PSC in the presence of all African Union representatives and the Commission leadership. More than 25 representatives of women's organizations, including victims of sexual violence from various conflict areas of Africa, attended the meeting. The PSC reiterated the need to involve the Panel of the Wise, supported by civil society and women's organizations, in a coordinated advocacy campaign for the ratification, domestication and implementation of relevant instruments relating to the situation of women and children in conditions of armed conflict.

The Council urged states to ratify and domesticate the Protocol (to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights) on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted in 2003 in Maputo. The PSC further urged Member States to ensure that their annual reports on the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2005), the African Charter on the Protection and Welfare of the Child (1999), and the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2009), be submitted on time. The Council also acknowledged the contributions of many civil society and women's organizations that had successfully campaigned for the participation of women in mediation and negotiation

processes, as well as in security sector reform and peace building.

The recent unrest in African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt and Libya, has resulted in the victimization of women and children who were not, in most cases, part of the conflict. In the context of conflict and unrest even though both men and women are victims of war, it has become evident that civilian women and children are more vulnerable to indiscriminate attacks. Gender-based or sexual violence has, in some cases, achieved epidemic proportions and some analysts have argued that the violence that often emerges against women in conflict zones is an extension of the gender discrimination that already exists in those countries during peacetime.

On 5 March, 2011 it was reported that pro-Ouattara women who were protesting were shot and six women died. In addition to these killings in Côte d'Ivoire there were also horrific crimes of rape and sexual violence against women who, like their male counterparts, took their questions and demands to the streets of Abidjan. It has been recorded that the two forces in Côte d'Ivoire have been deliberately targeting women and young girls for sexual abuse as a means of defiling the other side, as is the case in most other violent conflicts in Africa. Human rights watch in its report has revealed the fact that forces loyal to President-elect Alassane Ouattara have killed hundreds of civilians and raped more than 20 alleged supporters of his rival, Laurent Gbagbo, as part of the 'civil war' that is taking place in the country. It was also reported that pro-Ouattara fighters were abducting dozens of women and repeatedly raping them in front of their children.

Egypt, in the African context, has tended to have a more appealing environment for women's rights movements. However, in the wake of the revolution the reality was somewhat different. On 8 March, 2011 during a demonstration commemorating International Women's Day, women were harassed and sexually abused in Cairo's Tahrir Square, a symbolic venue made famous by the recent Egyptian

revolution. Women were dragged, forced to the ground, and sexually harassed by about 200 men on the day of the demonstration. Although a small circle of men held hands around the protesters to protect them from the crowd, the police and military failed to act. Many have since regarded this event as an indication that it was going to take much more than a revolution to overhaul the deep-seated misogyny that some Egyptian men have demonstrated and also that the problem is deep rooted within the system as a whole. It seems like the desire for freedom, justice and equality and the supporting slogans chanted in the revolution did not include or show respect for the many women who actively contributed to the realization of that revolution. Many believe that the Egyptian revolution will have achieved nothing if it does not recognize the basic right of Egyptian women to exist, to demonstrate, to work, and to live and walk the streets with dignity. Since the revolution, Egyptian women have begun to demand that "Now is the time" to address "women's issues" and that there can be no freedom for men in Egypt without freedom and equality for women too.

In its 269<sup>th</sup> **PSC/PR/BR (CCLXIX)** meeting in Addis, the Peace and Security Council emphasised the importance of developing strategies at the continental and regional levels to ensure the monitoring of the situation of women and children in conflict. In order to complement the council's efforts and focus on gender, the PSC still needs to consider developing and enhancing a range of mechanisms that can be deployed by the AU and member states to ensure the security of women, children and other vulnerable groups, both in times of war and times of peace.

## Important Forthcoming Dates

16 May: World Debt Day  
 5 June: World Environment Day  
 12 June: World Day Against Child Labour  
 16 June: Day of the African Child  
 20 June: World Refugee Day

| Country               | Election               | Date           |
|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------|
| Chad                  | Presidential           | 8 May 2011     |
| Seychelles            | Presidential           | May 2011       |
| South Africa          | Local elections        | 18 May 2011    |
| Madagascar            | Presidential           | 1 July 2011    |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | Presidential           | July 2011      |
| Tunisia               | Chamber of Councillors | July 2011      |
| Cape Verde            | Presidential           | 6 August 2011  |
| Liberia               | Presidential           | 23 August 2011 |

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