Chapter 8: Angola – A case study of private military involvement

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Introduction

Angola has experienced more than its share of conflict in the past thirty years. The period prior to independence was characterised by violent clashes in which the major parties comprising the liberation movement – the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) – fought against the Portuguese forces and each other. Following independence in November 1995, a brutal civil war ensued between the MPLA government and UNITA, progressively engaging the former Soviet Union, Cuba, the United States and South Africa and resulting in increasing levels of death and destruction, which stunted Angola’s growth and ensured its underdevelopment.

Even the signature of the Angolan Peace Accords by President José Eduardo dos Santos and Dr Jonas Malheiro Savimbi on 31 May 1991, following Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola, brought no lasting respite. Sixteen months later, after a tense interregnum that can be described as only relatively peaceful, Angola was again at war. The period of most intense violence in the country’s history was between late October 1992 and January 1995. A private military company played a significant role during this episode of the conflict, influencing both its course and duration.

A tentative and uncertain peace

On 9 April 1997, almost four and a half years after Angola’s first multiparty elections, seventy UNITA nominees were sworn in as members of the National Assembly, giving that body its full component for the first time. Two days later, a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated in the presence of African heads of state, the President of Portugal, and senior representatives of the United Nations, the US, Russia and other countries.

Those present at the inauguration appeared relieved that the ceremony had taken place at last. They would also have been conscious that, even as the Angolan war was being ceremoniously ended for the second time in a decade, Laurent Kabila’s rebel forces were continuing their advance against the debilitated army of President Mobutu Sese Seko across the border in Zaire. All must have been aware that both the Angolan government and UNITA had forces in Zaire, the former in support of Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and the latter attempting to help Mobutu offer enough resistance to justify a negotiated settlement. The question uppermost in many minds, therefore, was whether the inauguration of the GURN would bring peace to Angola.
Historical overview

Policy-makers, economists, academics and commentators, whether concerned with African foreign policy issues and conflict management, or interested in advancing the integration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have long shared the frustration of those directly concerned with resolving the protracted and apparently intractable Angolan conflict.

Foreign engagement

Three South African National Party governments, the ANC (until Mr Mandela’s assumption of office) and South Africa’s first democratic government since then, have grappled with the challenges of Angola’s transition from a Portuguese ‘overseas territory’ to an independent state at war. Nor were they the only ones engaged: Angola has played a major role in Portugal’s modern history, eventually affirming the latter’s identity as a European, rather than a Luso-African state. It defined and tested the limits of Cuba’s commitment to socialist internationalism and afforded combat experience to many units of its armed forces. It represented a southern beachhead in Brezhnev’s drive into the Third World to exploit US weakness after Watergate and Vietnam, at the height of Moscow’s effort to advance the ‘world revolutionary process’ through the encouragement of the ‘national liberation movement’ in the non-industrialised world.

Washington’s engagement with Angola, given the nature of its political process, was less consistent. It became an icon in the Ford Administration’s efforts to reassert the President’s authority to direct foreign policy. Under President Carter, the US government, desiring détente with Moscow, seeking friendship with ‘black’ Africa and convinced of Pretoria’s moral turpitude, suggested that the Cubans were a stabilising force in Angola, deterring a South African invasion. Reagan’s victory over Carter in November 1981 brought the Republicans back to power not only in the White House, but with a majority in the Senate as well. This set the stage for a modest, ostensibly covert, though widely discussed, military support programme for UNITA, administered by the CIA. It continued until mid-1991 and was followed by an electoral support programme to help UNITA convert to a political party participating in national elections.

In addition to these direct interventions, Angola’s modern history has also seen the engagement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN, the Front-Line States (FLS), Morocco, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, the former Zaire and various Arab states committed to an anti-communist stance.

Angolan fissures

To suggest, however, that the Angolan civil war was driven exclusively by foreign ideological agendas would be to misrepresent the conflict and would fail to explain why a solution has proved elusive even after the withdrawal of Soviet, US, Cuban and South African support for

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the warring parties. This answer must be sought in Angola’s experience of Portuguese rule. Portugal’s subjugation of Angola’s indigenous peoples was effected chiefly by conquest and fuelled by slavery. Between 1580 and 1680, some 1,500,000 slaves are said to have been exported from Angola to Brazil. The slave trade continued until 1878, by which time perhaps 3,000,000 Angolans had been transported abroad, and was followed by a system of indentured labour enabling metropolitan Portuguese who had settled on the rich farmland of Angola, to have access to workers at minimal cost.

Many of Angola’s indigenous peasants were dispossessed of their land and forced into contract labour, either as farm workers or unskilled industrial workers. Portugal’s own capital shortage, however, precluded its engagement in effective capital formation in Angola, a function undertaken by other investors.

Over time, Portuguese private and corporate entrepreneurs established significant agricultural landholdings. A burgeoning manufacturing sector developed out of these activities, focused on food processing, textiles and clothing, with most surplus production being exported to the metropole.

Portuguese colonial possession thus resulted in the formation of three distinct classes among indigenous Angolans: a petit bourgeoisie comprising intellectuals and commercial traders, a near-proletariat divided into industrial and agrarian components, and the residual peasantry whose members were engaged in subsistence agriculture and were seen as a source of contract labour by the industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie. Even in the last decade of Portugal’s occupation of Angola, the government provided almost no education or health services for the indigenous people outside the main cities. Such services as were available for indígenados in rural areas were provided by missionaries (Catholic and Protestant) and private landowners.

The emergence of Angola’s three ‘liberation movements’ in the 1950s and 1960s, reflected this pattern of colonial development.

• The MPLA was founded by the educated left-wing, urban élite concentrated in Luanda. Its leadership culture was (and is) Luso-African; its leading cadres were seminarians educated in Catholic schools, or other assimilados, with a high percentage of mestiços, some of whom received higher education in Portugal before independence and in Eastern Europe thereafter. Its limited rural base was essentially Kimbundu.

• The FNLA, out of which UNITA was later born, in its guise as GRAE (Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile), was pre-eminently a Bakongo movement, led by Holden Roberto, the brother-in-law of Mobutu. The FNLA was originally rural in character, although many members later gravitated to the northern coastal cities, where they came to be reviled as Zairenses, envied for their trading skills and mistrusted for their good French, clumsy Portuguese and distinctive style.

• UNITA was founded in 1966 by Savimbi on a peasant, largely Ovimbundu base, although its founding took place in Chokwe territory and its leadership structures have always included Cabindans, Bakongo, Lunda-Chokwes, Nganguelas and others. Moreover, its
support in Bakongo areas grew strongly in recent years, as that of the FNLA declined. Its institutional culture is rural-traditional African, in contradistinction to the MPLA’s urban, Luso-African character.

The Angolan urban élite of the coastal corridor, many of whom are traditionally supporters of the MPLA, are the products of the Portuguese colonial administrative culture. The more promising *assimilados* were seen as the natural partners and, later, heirs of the Portuguese, succeeding them as cultural surrogates after Lisbon’s disorganised withdrawal from Angola in 1975. Their sense of superiority to the Ovimbundu of the central plateau, whose economic roles were menial in colonial times and have continued to be since independence, is palpable even today.

Political mobilisation among the urban élite since 1975 has been a function of this feeling of superiority to, and fear of the *pretos/mutumbas* (pejorative terms for non-*assimilado* black Angolans), whose resentment of the domination of the *mulatos* and *Luandenses* has fuelled UNITA’s campaign against the MPLA since 1975. It will be impossible to build a sustainable peace in Angola without confronting this core reality.

There is, as such, no Angolan nation. The élite of Luanda have an exclusive concept of their Angolan identity that is chillingly similar to that of the majority of South African whites a decade ago. UNITA’s resentment of Luanda’s domination has often boiled over into racist outbursts against *brancos* and *mulatos*. The antagonism of each side to the ‘other’, apparent when their diplomatic guards are down, can be frightening. The challenge of overcoming deep-rooted resentments, fears and suspicions, defining common visions, developing common values and building a nation, still lies ahead in Angola.

**The Bicesse Accords**

Angola’s move toward peace in 1989-91 was not indigenously motivated. Neither side had a desire to reach out to the other. The peace accords were the product of a compact between the superpowers after Gorbachev’s accession to the Soviet leadership, based on their understanding that their proxy confrontations were counterproductive, in Afghanistan especially, but also in Central America and Angola.

The first phase of the movement towards peace was thus the agreement in the trilateral talks between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, facilitated by then US Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, with the discreet assistance of the USSR, to link the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola to Namibia’s independence. South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola and Namibia and its cessation of military assistance to UNITA, were the *quid pro quo* for Castro’s withdrawal of his Cuban combat troops and logistic specialists from Angola.7

The object of the New York Accord, signed on 22 December 1988,8 was to bring Namibia to sovereign independence and progressively deprive the warring Angolan parties of the external resources that had sustained the civil war throughout the 1980s. Neither Washington, which
had supported UNITA since 1985, nor Moscow, with its long ties to the MPLA, intended that its protégé should be defeated on the battlefield; both had agreed by then, in the interests of a wider détente, that a political solution was needed to the military conflict to which each had contributed.

In 1989, the Portuguese government, sensing an opportunity to play a decisive role in a territory of great economic and emotional importance to it, offered its services to both Angolan parties as mediator. The troika of observer nations were composed of the Portuguese mediator and representatives of the US and Russia, joined in an awkward endeavour to protect and advance their own national interests, while bringing an end to the Angolan war. These negotiations led to an agreement that a Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC), comprising representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA and the three observer nations, would oversee the transition to elections after the cease-fire had taken effect.

The Bicesse Accords of 1991 relieved Angolans of the shocks of war for sixteen months between June 1991 and early October 1992. Deep-seated mutual suspicion, inadequate management of the challenges of the pre-electoral period, exploitation by both the Angolan government and UNITA of the inability of the UN observer mission to effect compliance with the provisions of the Accords, and electoral manipulation led to resumption of the civil war. The Guardian later described the disastrous performance of the international community as an attempt to “… get peace on the cheap.”

The UN had a tiny team of military monitors (UNAVEM I) in Angola since early 1989 to observe the progressive withdrawal of Cuban troops. The UN, however, was drawn into the JPMC as an observer and charged to monitor the two Angolan parties’ compliance with their undertakings. Until just before the elections, UNAVEM II’s resources throughout Angola were limited to 350 unarmed military observers, 130 unarmed police observers and 100 electoral observers; the last increased to 400 during the actual elections.9

Second civil war

The second phase of armed conflict began at the end of October 1992 and lasted officially until 20 November 1994, when the Lusaka Protocol was signed in the Zambian capital on behalf of, but not by President dos Santos and Dr Savimbi, the latter fearing for his life if he left his safe haven near Huambo. Negotiating the Protocol had taken just over a year, following the announcement of UNITA’s unilateral cease-fire in Abidjan on 14 September 1993, and was marked by the relentless energy of the new UN Special Representative, Maitre Alioune Blondin Bèye from Mali; the introduction of a US Special Envoy with experience of both Southern African and Middle Eastern conflict, former Ambassador to Zambia, Paul Hare; and, on the margins, sympathetic interest by the ANC hierarchy in South Africa.

The success of these negotiations, after the failure of earlier attempts by the UN to broker peace – in Namibe in south-west Angola (November 1992), Addis Ababa (January and
February 1993) and Abidjan (April to May 1993) – was due largely to the frenetic persistence of Bêye, and the dogged serenity of Hare.

Following the signature of the cease-fire and the Protocol, however, the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) – supported since September 1993 by former South African forces on mercenary contract (including elements of 32 Battalion and Koevoet assembled and led by field grade special forces officers) – continued their advances for several months against UNITA positions in Huambo and Uíge provinces in an effort to eliminate UNITA’s military capability. Savimbi’s decision to abandon the city of Huambo in November 1994 without offering resistance frustrated this attempt, leaving both FAA and FALA (UNITA’s military wing) units largely intact and deeply suspicious of the intentions of the other.

Although one may be sceptical of the UN’s lamentations early in 1994 that the new phase of the war was killing 1 000 Angolans every day, it is clear that more than 500 000 died during the two years of resumed hostilities: the ethnic cleansing of Ovimbundu and Bakongo citizens between November 1992 and January 1993; revenge killings by both sides of those suspected of supporting the other in cities which changed hands; as well as from landmines, starvation and disease. More Angolans died as a result of war in the two years between October 1992 and November 1994 than in the sixteen years of conflict before 1991.

The explanation for this lies in the technological sophistication of the newly imported weaponry of the FAA and, to a lesser extent, UNITA (with extraordinary profits and commissions characterising the purchase chains), and the superior efficiency of the private military forces which helped to plan and lead the FAA counterattack against UNITA after Savimbi had announced his unilateral cease-fire in September 1993.10 Unwilling to accept a cease-fire when UNITA effectively controlled four-fifths of Angola, and relieved of the prohibition on arms sales to either Angolan party that had earlier comprised part of the Bicesse Accords, the government simply ignored UNITA’s termination of hostilities, disregarded the ensuing peace negotiations in Lusaka and deployed its new weapons and better trained and led forces, along with mercenary special forces units, against cities occupied by UNITA, with devastating effect. Special forces teams were also used against logistical staging points and diamond areas in UNITA hands, providing the basis for the subsequent transfer of ‘concessions’ to companies associated with Executive Outcomes.11

Originally under instructions to defend themselves but not to attack, UNITA commanders, starved of weapons and fuel – the UN Security Council having imposed a prohibition on sales of these items to UNITA, but not to the government’s forces – succumbed to pressure. The unilateral cease-fire collapsed and middlemen who were prepared to deal with UNITA made big profits – though on a smaller scale than those supplying the government – from exchanges of weapons, ammunition and fuel for diamonds recovered from areas under UNITA’s control. The war became one of attrition throughout much of 1994, with each side systematically shelling or bombing cities held by the other.12

What little was left of Angola’s economy after almost sixteen years of civil war was destroyed between 1992 and the end of 1994. The GDP declined by seventy per cent over three years;
total external debt, as a percentage of GDP, almost quadrupled, as did military spending, while social expenditure was halved.13

Civilian security companies and a private military company

A review of private military activities in Angola is necessarily dominated by an analysis of the performance of Executive Outcomes (EO). A number of other companies have also provided private security services in Angola: Defence Systems Limited (DSL), Gray Security Limited, Alpha 5 Lda and Tele Service Sociedade de Telecomunicações, Segurança e Serviços (TeleServices) being the most prominent among them. None of these companies, whose parentage differs from that of the EO family, appears to provide combat, military advisory, or military training services of the sort provided by EO; although TeleServices has the capacity to do so and Alpha 5 has been accused by UNITA of harbouring EO personnel14 since the latter company ostensibly withdrew its military staff in January 1996.

Both TeleServices and Alpha 5 are registered public enterprise security companies (PESCs), controlled by Angolan military officials, able to divert FAA officers and men into these companies when deemed appropriate. They have had no reason to do this for military purposes, although TeleServices, assisted by Gray Security, provides site protection services at Soyo and in certain diamond areas, while Alpha 5, again with assistance from Gray Security, offers similar services in Luanda and at other diamond sites. DSL, a British company, was expelled from Angola in 1998 after many years of providing site and other asset protection services to foreign embassies and private companies.

DSL’s expulsion was effected by Angola’s Minister of the Interior, ostensibly because the company had contravened the law relating to the registration of PESCs by concluding contracts with foreign corporate nationals directly through London, rather than through DSL’s Angolan subsidiary.

In a broadcast by America’s Defence Monitor on 7 December 1997, Isenberg pointed to the proliferation of private security groups in Africa, alleging that there are over 100 on the continent of which about eighty are in Angola.15 Other commentators make similar estimates, but few of these other companies are known outside their immediate circle. Moreover, as far as can be established, the PESCs registered there, including DSL, have provided only ‘asset protection’ services: guarding and protection services for embassies, hotels and corporate premises, warehouses, diamond fields, oil refineries and terminals, and of cash-in-transit.

While there is no doubt that retaining a significant number of former military personnel, some of whom carry modern arms, gives a private security company the ability to influence events in microcosm, and that such activities need to be regulated and monitored carefully, it is not these companies that have attracted attention in Angola. Although control of companies like TeleServices, Alpha 5 or DSL might enable their owners to displace others from control of economic assets, for example, and secure the control for themselves, these companies have not undertaken such tasks to date in Angola. Angolan security forces have been used when the government wished to clear diamond fields, whether of garimpeiros,16 or of UNITA elements,
although private companies such as TeleServices and Alpha 5 have subsequently been charged to protect the resource for its owners.

What distinguishes EO in Angola, therefore, is not that it was a private security company. It was, in fact, a private military company, capable of delivering private, specialised, military forces, thus providing services that no civilian security company is equipped or licensed to provide. In a recent paper, Shearer offers an interesting definition of ‘private military companies’:

“They essential purpose is to enhance the capability of a client’s military forces to function better in war, or to deter conflict more effectively. These companies are distinct from organisations operating in other areas of the security industry in that they are designed to have a strategic impact on the security and political environments of weak states facing a significant military threat.”

Howe has drawn a further distinction between EO and other similar companies. He speaks of three layers of ‘private military groups’ operating in Africa:

“One layer is that of training [and] maybe guarding military installations, fairly benign operations. The second might be combat support; for example, ferrying troops up to the front in transport helicopters. And then the third layer is actual combat. Executive Outcomes is an incredible, what we call ‘force multiplier’. It can do all three of those. Most other organizations can do only one, or perhaps two, of the three.”

Others providing combat services

Foreign mercenaries

EO is thus not simply a species of the same genus as the civilian security firms providing asset protection services in Angola. What distinguishes it is that it provided combat services to the Angolan government in its military campaign against UNITA. Although EO appears to have been unique in providing such corporate services in the last five years in Angola, however, mercenary services antedate the 1990s in the Angolan conflict, as elsewhere in Africa.

In November 1975, FNLA President Roberto, suddenly deprived of Western support after the passage of the Clark Amendment, and faced with the retreat of the Zairian forces provided by Mobutu, recruited mercenaries in Britain, the US and the Netherlands. Bridgland writes:

“The quality of the mercenaries was exceptionally low ... They were the new young unemployed of the mid-1970’s, and for the most part they were the most socially ill-equipped of their generation – poorly educated and from poorer homes, many of them real intellectual innocents ... Most had very little combat experience. Some had no military training at all, and two were London street sweepers recruited with the lure of $US300 a week and sent from their jobs straight to Angola.”
These mercenaries were unable to assist the FNLA in avoiding defeat. The psychopathic behaviour\textsuperscript{22} of Costas Georgiou, whose \textit{nom de guerre} was Colonel Callan, became notorious. Callan and twelve other mercenaries were captured after the FNLA’s rout on the border with the former Zaire in the north-west of Angola on 6 February 1976. The ten Britons and three US citizens were brought to trial for war crimes before a People’s Revolutionary Tribunal by the Angolan government in June and convicted in July. Three Britons and one American were executed by a firing squad on 10 July 1976. The others were imprisoned.

\textbf{Congolese Katangans and Angolan Bakongo}

The MPLA used Katangan forces\textsuperscript{23} in the battle for the control of Luanda in 1975,\textsuperscript{24} and later to invade the Shaba province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978. These forces, approximately 4,000-strong, originally comprised part of the Katangan \textit{gendarmerie} which had fought under Moise Tshombe for Katanga’s secession in 1961 and 1962, and fled to Angola after their defeat by UN forces. The Portuguese military authorities thereafter exploited the \textit{Katangenses}’ resentment of Mobutu, who had assumed the presidency of the Congo for the second time in 1965, and mobilised a Katangan unit against the FNLA forces\textsuperscript{25} commanded by Roberto. These \textit{Katangenses} were later incorporated into the armed forces of the Angolan government, where they gained a reputation as one of the most effective fighting units.

On the other side of the Angolan conflict between 1976 and 1989, many members of the defeated FNLA forces were brought south to Namibia by Colonel Jan Breytenbach of the South African Defence Force (SADF), and constituted as 32 Battalion. This battalion, known colloquially as ‘Buffalo Battalion’, was frequently used as an element of the SADF’s support operations for UNITA in southern Angola. Barlow, who later founded EO, served as the second-in-command of the reconnaissance wing of 32 Battalion in the early 1980s.

This activity, while involving foreign forces (the Katangans), or indigenous forces under foreign command (32 Battalion), does not constitute \textit{private} military support. Both the Katangans and the former FNLA troops in 32 Battalion were deployed as units of national military forces.

\textbf{Did UNITA use mercenaries?}

Since the outbreak of the ‘second civil war’ in October 1992, General João de Matos, Chief of Staff of the FAA, and other persons have accused UNITA of making use of mercenaries. General Matos was cited in January 1995, as saying that “… \textit{some 300 South African mercenaries serve with the government forces and slightly less with UNITA} …”\textsuperscript{26}

Venter wrote late in 1995: “\textit{Savimbi, too, is recruiting mercenaries and transport pilots in South Africa. Specialists from Belgium, Israel, Morocco, France, Germany and Zimbabwe are training UNITA forces in northern Angola near the Zaire border and in Zaire itself, which is his main conduit of supplies. Many of these professionals are employed to teach special forces tactics to counter the FAA accent on dislocating enemy command and control centres.}”\textsuperscript{27}
Human Rights Watch/Africa claimed that EO was providing assistance to UNITA on contract until April 1993, and observed that, “... in the first quarter of 1993, EO employees found themselves assisting operations against each other.”

This remarkable assertion seems to relate to a vague reference in the report of Ballesteros, the UN Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries, to the UN Economic and Social Council on 12 January 1994:

“... the South African firm Executive Outcomes, headed by Esben [sic] Barlow ... [recruited] ... former members of South Africa's 31st and 32nd Battalions as security guards at Angolan oil refineries and installations, who are alleged to have fought in Huambo alongside the UNITA forces ... Three mercenaries ... were wounded in fighting in Huambo and evacuated on a clandestine Propilot flight to South Africa on 11 March 1993.”

Ballesteros appears misinformed: the three EO employees were injured in the attack on Soyo by EO.

Ballesteros makes a number of other references to UNITA’s use of mercenaries. In the same report, he notes “… reports [on] the presence of foreign mercenaries in the ranks of UNITA, most of them from South Africa and Zaire ... UNITA's control of the eastern provinces reportedly facilitated the arrival in Angola of mercenaries from Zaire to fight alongside the rebel forces ...”

Ballesteros also cites other reports of mercenary activity in support of UNITA, and refers to clandestine flights from Durban and Johannesburg to Mucusso and Jamba, transporting mercenaries and equipment. Unfortunately, he offers no particulars of the companies involved in any of these, or dates that would permit further investigation. He refers to a warning by the Chief of the SADF on 11 September 1993 about the illegality of mercenary service, but seems not to understand that this related to EO’s recruitment activity.

No further information on the identity of the mercenaries allegedly supporting UNITA is thus available. Companies and individuals domiciled in Belgium, Zaire/DRC, South Africa, Namibia and perhaps elsewhere, undoubtedly provided logistical support to UNITA in the course of the war. This included deliveries of weapons and petroleum products, both of which were prohibited in September 1993 under a UN Security Council resolution. Arms deliveries to any Angolan party were also prohibited, after April 1991, in terms of the ‘triple-zero’ prohibition in the Angolan Peace Accords. This ban was effectively lifted by the Security Council, in respect of the government of Angola, in September 1993.

Even the FAA, which has supplied details of companies providing logistical support to UNITA and of aircraft violating Angola’s air space to the UN, the US, Russia, Portugal and the South African government since 1993, has apparently not been able to gather particulars on the identity of mercenaries said to be assisting UNITA.

EO would thus appear to have had the field essentially to itself, in the provision of battlefield support in Angola’s ‘second civil war’.
Executive Outcomes in Angola

Did EO provide ‘mercenary’ services and to what effect?

If EO is the only private military group known to have had a strategic impact on the security and political environment of Angola, certain questions must be addressed:

- What was the objective character of its role there? Were the men in EO’s employ in Angola between 1993 and 1996 ‘mercenaries’, within the scope of the technical meaning of the term according to international law?

- What were the effects of their engagement, firstly on the enhanced efficiency of the FAA, and secondly on contemporary efforts at international conflict resolution in Angola?

The first question is relatively easy to answer. Three international conventions provide definitions that offer a framework for analysis. To qualify as a ‘mercenary’, there must be:

- recruitment for, and direct participation in hostilities in an armed conflict;

- in a country of which the person is neither a national nor a resident, nor a member of its national armed forces, or of the armed forces of another country sent to the country in conflict on active duty;

- by a person who “… is motivated to take part in these hostilities essentially by a desire for private gain …”;

- who “… is promised … material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party ...

Mercenary activities are regarded as undesirable and illegal. The legal scope of the prohibition against mercenarism, however, is unclear, particularly whether the provision of such services to recognised governments in civil wars falls foul of the prohibition. If one leaves aside the technical debate – which is explored elsewhere – the nature of EO’s activities and the capacity in which they were performed, are clear.

Detailed descriptions of incidents involving EO units, based on interviews with EO personnel by journalists such as Venter and commentators such as Howe and Shearer, make it clear that they saw combat in Angola and were intended to do so. They were not simply advisors or trainers. Similar evidence – albeit from wives (or widows) and other family members of persons admitted lost in combat – and gruesome photographs released by UNITA of the uniformed corpses of EO employees, prove the same point.

These former SADF soldiers from the Reconnaissance Regiments and 32 Battalion, airmen from the fighter and helicopter squadrons of the SAAF, and members of Koevoet and perhaps MK, did what they were trained to do, notwithstanding the formal denials by
company spokesmen. Their senior officers helped to plan the campaigns against UNITA with members of the FAA General Staff; their pilots flew reconnaissance, support and operational missions including aerial bombardment of towns held by UNITA; small special forces units undertook independent operations, as well as others in company with Angolan special forces personnel. On at least one occasion, a senior officer commanded a joint armoured assault on a UNITA logistics base. In addition, officers and especially non-commissioned officers (NCOs), trained Angolan personnel to fight better and taught them the tactics that they had earlier taught UNITA, in order to neutralise them more effectively.

With Russian and Portuguese training on offer and a history of both in the FAA, and with Portuguese former commandos readily available, the FAA would not have turned to a group of former South African specialists – many of whom had fought in support of UNITA while in the SADF – in their hour of greatest need, and paid them very large sums of money, if the South Africans had refused to use their skills on the battlefield. Nor would EO have deployed at least 500 men – mostly former private soldiers drawn from 32 Battalion and paramilitary forces from Koevoet who were not known for their training skills – if the purpose was merely to advise and train. There is thus no doubt that the company, and at least many of its recruits for service in Angola, were “… specially recruited … in order to fight in an armed conflict … [and took] … a direct part in hostilities …”

Neither EO itself, nor the most senior EO personnel were nationals of, or resident in Angola when they were recruited between 1993 and 1995. Many men from 32 Battalion, and perhaps Koevoet, however, may have been Angolan nationals.

There is no doubt that their motive was financial. Barlow and other EO spokespeople repeatedly made it clear that they were motivated by money, while ideology played no role. The officers and men recruited for Angola were offered exceptionally high remuneration, far higher than that available to serving members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) or the FAA.

**EO’s actions in context: Angola’s second civil war**

Analysing the effects of EO’s operations in Angola poses a different challenge. Human Rights Watch and to a lesser extent Africa Confidential, as well as Venter, have provided a partial chronological account of the firm’s activities between 1993 and 1996. The Angolan peace process, the elections in September 1992 and the early stages of the war that followed them, have likewise been the subject of several overlapping accounts. A number of people have written personal memoirs of the events which led to the resumption of the war at the end of 1992. These diaries are often at odds on key questions, however, and the diversity of the writers’ experiences makes it difficult to understand elements in the causal chain leading to the resumption of the war and its subsequent prosecution.

In order to understand the context of EO’s involvement in the war and in efforts to resolve the Angolan crisis, it is necessary to summarise the events between the resumption of conflict at
the end of October 1992 and the cease-fire proposal by Savimbi in August 1993, shortly before EO’s formal engagement by the Angolan government.

Angola’s first democratic elections were held on 29 and 30 September 1992 and were characterised by the enthusiasm and commitment of millions of voters. Tensions arose within a short time after the close of the polls, however, when government media began to broadcast results, not released by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), reflecting victories for the MPLA and President dos Santos in many constituencies. Five small opposition parties, as well as the FNLA and UNITA, protested to the NEC, UNAVEM and the troika, citing catalogues of irregularities, documented with varying degrees of accuracy.

Savimbi broadcast to UNITA supporters on VORGAN, its radio station, on 3 October, suggesting that UNITA would not tolerate electoral fraud. He withdrew from Luanda to his personal house at Huambo shortly thereafter, on the advice of ministers of the government of Côte d’Ivoire, who suggested that his life was at risk in the capital. In an effort to force the NEC to address the alleged instances of fraud, UNITA general officers in the FAA issued a statement demanding that these should be investigated and declaring their intention to abandon the FAA until this had been done. Other UNITA officers and men began to leave the camps where forces had been concentrated before the elections and fanned out into neighbouring municipalities.

The intervention of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and members of the troika, and the arrival of a UN team despatched by the Security Council, persuaded UNITA, which had by then presented a detailed list of serious irregularities, to await the results of the UN investigation called for by fourteen opposition parties. When UN Representative, Margaret Anstee, declared victory for the MPLA, however, and a plurality for Dos Santos – requiring a second presidential ballot in elections that, despite irregularities, were said to be generally free and fair – tensions rose alarmingly. Clashes multiplied between UNITA units and members of the paramilitary riot police, into which most members of Angola’s special forces units had been transferred before the elections, with each side accusing the other of aggression.

In an effort to avert a crisis, negotiations were arranged in Luanda in the last week of October between teams representing the government and UNITA. The two sides exchanged position papers containing proposals to end the clashes, restore the peace process and govern the country until the second round of presidential elections could be held.

Between 31 October and 2 November 1992, however, while negotiations to resolve the crisis were still under way, the riot police and other FAA units attacked and destroyed all UNITA’s residences and party offices in Luanda, leading to the death of many and the capture of almost all its military and civilian cadres in the capital.

UNITA’s troops had by now occupied many more municípios, as well as the strategically important towns of Uíge and Negage. A number of international diplomatic initiatives were launched at the end of November and the first half of December in an effort to staunch the ominous slide to war.
On 18 December, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that “… UNITA forces continue to occupy up to two-thirds of the municipalities in Angola …” Government emergency police, army troops and government-armed vigilantes (fitinhas), meanwhile, had concentrated on destroying UNITA’s party offices and killing its putative supporters in Angola’s main cities. At least 10 000 Ovimbundu and Bakongo were reported to have been killed in these purges within a few weeks. Maier notes that “… the battle for Luanda ignited a wave of urban clashes and massacres of unarmed civilians [by government forces] that continued for the next three months and saw UNITA crushed in key cities such as Benguela, Malange and Lubango.”

Just one week after the Security Council called for a resumption of political dialogue between the government and UNITA, and Savimbi had accepted Boutros-Ghali’s proposal for a meeting with Dos Santos in Geneva, government forces began a concentrated drive on 29 December to cleanse Angola’s main cities of UNITA supporters. UNITA offices and other positions at N’dalatando, Caxito, Dondo, Lubango, Benguela, Lobito, Namibe and Cuito had been attacked by 6 January 1993.

McGreal reported on 8 January 1993, that “… the Government has made it clear that it has no intention of halting its push against the rebels until they are cleared from Angola’s main cities.”

Reporting on events in Benguela, Catumbela and Lobito, McGreal noted a week later: “In all three towns the fighting was heavy. UNITA offices were blown apart, spewing party membership cards onto the pavement amid smashed glass and rubble. Once the UNITA soldiers and officials had been dealt with, government forces, led by the police, turned on the rebels’ civilian sympathisers.” He suggested that some 1 000 to 2 000 were killed in this way and cites a relief worker from Médecins sans Frontières as saying: “They didn’t just kill men, they killed families.”

Savimbi had seemingly been traumatised by the events in Luanda in which many of his senior officers and party leaders were killed or captured. He was unexpectedly compliant with UN and troika demands throughout November and December. After an air and ground attack on Huambo between 9 and 11 January had destroyed his personal house near the airport, as well as much of the surrounding area, however, he advised Portugal’s President Soares, among others, that he was obliged to “… put on my General’s uniform, or we shall all be killed.”

Savimbi’s assumption of command turned the tide. UNITA regrouped its forces and counterattacked in Huambo, Cuito, Menongue, Cuito Cuanavale, M’banza Congo, Saurimo and Soyo.

When UN Special Representative Anstee convened peace negotiations in Addis Ababa at the end of January, the UN estimated that UNITA controlled 105 of the country’s 164 municipalities. Although both sides sent delegations to the Ethiopian capital, the talks did not result in a cease-fire. By 3 February, the Christian Science Monitor was quoting diplomats in Luanda who said that UNITA controlled “… between 60 and 70 per cent of the country.” The same report cites UN officials estimating that 2 000 people died in Benguela alone and 154 people died in Benguela alone and
about 1,500 in Lobito, as a result of killings (of suspected UNITA supporters) by armed civilians and special police, with fears of more to come.

Anstee sought to convene a second round of peace talks in Addis Ababa at the government’s request, between 26 February and 1 March, motivated partly by Luanda’s desire to avoid defeat in Huambo, the recapture of which had become a matter of honour for Savimbi. UNITA did not send a delegation from within Angola, but two representatives from abroad. Savimbi’s aim was evidently not to be distracted from a victory in Huambo.

By 6 March, after 55 days of bloody clashes, UNITA had recaptured Huambo and Savimbi gave a seminal speech, opening a window on one side of the fear and antagonism that had driven the Angolan civil war. On 11 March, however, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 811, condemning UNITA for its violation of the Angolan Peace Accords and demanding an immediate cease-fire.

Washington took the initiative to arrange talks in Abidjan with delegations representing the Angolan government and UNITA. On 28 March, US Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeff Davidow announced that both Angolan parties seemed ready to meet under UN auspices before 12 April, to discuss a cease-fire and a means of restoring national reconciliation, “... with broadened participation by UNITA in the government at the national, provincial and local levels.” UNITA’s Political Commission confirmed its willingness to attend and issued a statement proposing a suspension of hostilities by troops on the ground, followed by a cease-fire that was premised on the formation of a single national army.

Three principles – a cease-fire, resumption of the Bicesse Accords and “… national reconciliation, to include broadened participation by UNITA at the national, provincial and local levels …” – were adopted as the basis for the negotiations between 12 April and 21 May 1993 in Abidjan, convened under the auspices of Anstee. These principles echoed those which had provided the framework for the negotiations in Luanda in October 1992 when the government decided to crush UNITA in the capital.

The Abidjan talks failed after almost six weeks because UNITA was not prepared to withdraw and quarter its forces until a UN peacekeeping force had been deployed in Angola. In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, Anstee wrote:

“... there might have been agreement on a new cease-fire during the six weeks of negotiations at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, if I had been able to commit to the UN providing a small symbolic force of ‘Blue Helmets’ to oversee it from the outset. However, I was told that even if a cease-fire were agreed, no UN troops could be available for six to nine months … because of all the other peacekeeping calls on the UN and the difficulties of obtaining more troops …”

In the light of subsequent events, UNITA’s demand that a UN peacekeeping force should be put in place before its troops were confined to cantonment areas seems understandable. The Clinton Administration, reflecting profound frustration at what it saw as UNITA’s intransigence, however, extended immediate diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, thereby estranging UNITA.
The UN Secretary-General described the breakdown of the talks as “… a major and tragic setback to the peace process.” The Security Council, in response, adopted Resolution 834 of 1 June 1993, holding UNITA “… responsible for the breakdown of the talks and for thereby jeopardising the peace process … [demanding that] … it immediately cease [its] … actions and armed attacks.”

When UNITA returned to the offensive in the aftermath of the Abidjan talks and the US’ recognition of the government, African peace initiatives moved to centre stage. In August and September, discussions were proposed between the two Angolan leaders and UNITA also invited a senior OAU delegation to Huambo for talks. Nothing came of these proposals, however.

EO’s entry and subsequent role: Inducing Savimbi to negotiate or prolonging the war?

Although EO apparently signed its first contract with the Angolan government in September 1993, a small contingent had been in the country for at least six months before that. News reports suggest that EO began recruiting men who had served in the SADF Reconnaissance Regiments and 32 Battalion in February. There are conflicting reports on the origin of the initiative. A British subject, Anthony Buckingham, seen to be representing either Ranger Oil, a Canadian company, or Heritage Oil, reportedly approached Barlow to assemble a team of special forces operatives to recapture Heritage assets overrun by UNITA at Soyo. The fact that Ranger’s and Heritage’s petroleum interests at that time, were apparently concentrated 120 kilometres south of Soyo, gave rise to a belief that Buckingham was acting either for a consortium of international oil companies, or for the Angolan government.

Whatever the origin of Buckingham’s mandate, the first contingent of between eighty and a hundred EO troops, deployed under the leadership of Luitingh, and “… backed by two Angolan battalions …”, recaptured Soyo in May 1993, though UNITA retook the town after the EO contingent withdrew. In August 1993, the Angolan government, apparently encouraged by the South African group’s success at Soyo, began negotiations for a contract under which EO was to train 5000 troops from the FAA’s 16th Regiment, as well as thirty pilots, and to direct front-line operations against UNITA. This agreement was concluded in September 1993.

EO’s engagement for two periods of twelve months, from September 1993 to September 1995, and for a further three months thereafter, until January 1996, undoubtedly contributed significantly to the FAA’s subsequent military ascendancy. The company multiplied the effect of other factors – including major new weapons purchases and the dynamic leadership by General de Matos – in turning the tide of the Angolan civil war in 1994 and 1995, by enabling the FAA to recapture a great deal of territory from UNITA’s forces.

EO has also claimed, however, that its intervention in Angola forced Savimbi to the negotiating table. This impressive claim has been carelessly repeated by some commentators and, if accurate, would enable the company to argue that it made a positive
contribution to the resolution of the Angolan conflict. Other interpretations of the influence of EO’s intervention are also possible, however.

On 11 August 1993, before it was known that the government was negotiating with EO, Savimbi proposed a cease-fire in a radio broadcast from Huambo. The proposal was rejected by Luanda. On 3 September, Savimbi phoned President Soares, repeating his proposal for a cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations. He made similar calls to Boutros-Ghali and US Assistant Secretary of State, George Moose on 4 September. Soares, in response to Savimbi’s call, sought unsuccessfully to have talks resume between the Angolan parties before the UN Security Council meeting scheduled for 15 September, at which the possibility of lifting the arms embargo against the Angolan government by imposing a new ban on oil and arms sales to UNITA alone, was to be decided.

In response to Savimbi’s call to Moose, Washington pressed UNITA for detailed proposals. After a visit to Luanda (but not Huambo) by Robert Cabelly of the US State Department to explore possibilities, Savimbi sent specific proposals to Moose in a letter on 10 September.

UNITA’s Chief of Staff, General Arlindo Chenda Pena ‘Ben-Ben’, met President Soares, as well as members of the Portuguese and European parliaments in Lisbon just after this. It seems that he intended to meet the troika there as well – the observers having assembled in Lisbon in preparation for the UN Security Council meeting – and to announce UNITA’s cease-fire proposal. As the troika (and the Portuguese government) were ‘unable’ to meet the UNITA delegation, however, it apparently decided to make its announcement in Abidjan.

On 13 September, General Pena issued a formal statement at a media conference in Abidjan, after consultations with the Ivorian government, announcing that UNITA would observe a unilateral cease-fire from midnight on 20 September. As a result, Bêye flew to Abidjan to meet the UNITA delegation on 14 September; Boutros-Ghali encouraged the UN Security Council to postpone the imposition of oil and weapons sanctions against UNITA for ten days until 25 September, to allow time for a cease-fire to take effect. Washington sent Ed Brynn, the new senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, to Abidjan to discuss the agenda for a new round of talks, and King Hassan II of Morocco travelled to Lisbon on 20 September to consult with President Soares on means to advance a negotiated solution.

On 20 September at 11:00, in a broadcast over UNITA’s VORGAN network, Savimbi confirmed General Pena’s earlier announcement by formally declaring “... the implementation of a unilateral cease-fire throughout the Angolan national territory, beginning at 24:00 on Monday, September 20 ...” This would permit the evacuation of foreign nationals from Cuíto and the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries as demanded by the UN Security Council, as well as the resumption of talks on the basis of the Abidjan principles.

Unlike the Angolan armed forces, Bêye responded positively to this proposal. On 21 September, following a telephone conversation with Savimbi, he announced a meeting, scheduled for 23 September on São Tomé and Principe, between the Chiefs of Staff of the FAA and UNITA, with Lieutenant General Garouba, head of the UNAVEM II military
mission, and the military attachés of the troika. UNITA’s General Pena attended, accompanied by four officers. General de Matos sent his regrets at the last moment.86

Although the UN Security Council’s oil and weapons embargo on UNITA became operative on 25 September, as no cease-fire between the two sides had come into effect,87 UNITA’s Political Commission reaffirmed its acceptance of the 1992 electoral results certified by the UN, pledged to maintain the cease-fire, and to work with Bêye in seeking a peaceful solution on 6 October.88

On 7 October, Bêye issued the following statement in response:

“One cannot help but welcome UNITA’s wish to maintain the cease-fire contained in its declaration of 20 September 1993. One must also acknowledge with satisfaction that UNITA accepts the validity of the Bicesse Accords, reiterates its acceptance of the September 1992 elections, as well as considers that the Project of Abidjan constitutes a serious basis for negotiation.”89

On 8 October, the US State Department issued a press advisory statement in reaction to UNITA’s statement of two days earlier: “UNITA’s communiqué goes a long way in removing lingering obstacles to the peace process. We believe the Government must take advantage of this opportunity for peace.” 90

On 9 October, however, President dos Santos issued a remarkable statement, calling on FAA troops to stand up to UNITA. Two days later, he ‘demanded’ that UNITA clarify “… ambiguities and, in some respects, contradictions in its positions …” taken on 6 October.91

On 18 October, the UN Special Representative called for a meeting between the Angolan parties in Lusaka to clarify points in the UNITA statement required by the government, and to lay the foundations for serious peace talks. Talks began on 25 October in Lusaka and continued until 31 October, but the government delegation refused any direct contact with UNITA members. On 15 November 1993, however, the Lusaka peace talks were formally convened by Bêye. These talks eventually gave rise to the signature of the Lusaka Protocol by representatives of both leaders on 20 November 1994.92

Nothing in this chronology supports the proposition that EO played any role in inducing Savimbi to negotiate. The Lusaka peace talks were initiated by a cease-fire proposal made by Savimbi on 11 August 1993, approximately one month before EO’s first formal twelve-month $40 million contract was signed with the Angolan government.

EO’s impact on the FAA’s military capability and on efforts to resolve the conflict by peaceful means

Savimbi’s call for a cease-fire in the second week of August 1993 is intelligible only in the context of the African efforts at mediation that began after the failure of the Abidjan talks. He had frequently said that Anstee did not understand the issues at stake and that only an African
could facilitate resolution of the crisis. He had thus welcomed Bêye’s appointment when Anstee stepped down.

But it was not only the fact that he expected a better hearing from Bêye and the Africans then engaged that had an influence. Other factors contributing to his cease-fire proposal no doubt included the realisation that the war had reached a stalemate; pressure from the US in the aftermath of the failed Abidjan talks; the move afoot in the UN Security Council to permit arms sales to the Angolan government, formerly forbidden under the ‘triple-zero’ provisions of the cease-fire included in the Bicesse Accords; and the announcements by the British and Russian governments that arms sales to the Angolan government would be resumed.

By 20 September, when Savimbi’s cease-fire took effect, the government could only claim control of the coastal plain from Ambriz in the north to the Namibian border, and the interior cities of Malange, Saurimo and Luena. UNITA controlled a significant part of the rest, with the larger part of the country, however, either hotly contested, or not seen by either side as being of strategic importance. UNITA was besieging Cuíto, pounding it with artillery fire with seemingly as little regard for human life as the government’s forces had displayed when attacking Huambo.

FAA units, already strengthened by General de Matos' restructuring programme, Portuguese training, and the consignments of new weapons received from former East-bloc countries and Brazil, were advancing on Huambo along four routes – from Waku Kungo, Lubango, Cubal and Balombo. UNITA’s forces had checked their advance from the coastal plain to the west, shortly after the climb up to the central plateau had begun. The Angolan Air Force was conducting regular bombing raids on Huambo.

Certain well-informed and prescient observers outside the UN understood both the risk and the opportunity in September 1993. Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, had written a trenchant opinion piece in October 1993:

“Today a new stalemate may be emerging. UNITA is stronger on the ground and better organised ... But the MPLA holds Luanda, the revenue from some 500,000 barrels of oil per day output and universal diplomatic recognition. Washington, Lisbon and Moscow, meanwhile, have dropped a key restriction from the 1991 package, thus enabling the MPLA government to return to the world arms market with the means to attract mercenaries, contractors and assorted hired guns from around the world.”

The purpose of EO’s engagement was to recover the territory captured by UNITA between January and August 1993, and to shift the balance of military power in the Angolan government’s favour. The principles of the peace embodied in the Lusaka Protocol – a cease-fire, resumption of the Bicesse Accords and “... national reconciliation, to include broadened participation by UNITA at the national, provincial and local levels ...” – had been settled in Abidjan in April 1993, and were almost identical to those introduced in the crisis negotiations in October 1992 in Luanda. The Angolan government, having been freed formally from the restraints of the triple-zero arms sale ban and having secured the services of EO, preferred to seek military victory.
Areas of UNITA operations, control and influence: September 1993

[Map showing areas of operations, control, and political agitation in Angola and neighboring countries.]
The government therefore refused to accept the cease-fire even after the peace talks had begun in Lusaka in November 1993. EO was given a chance to show its mettle. The approximately 500 men initially deployed by EO in Angola had a significant effect on the overall operational efficiency of the FAA from an early stage. By helping the FAA General Staff define their requirements for armour, artillery, fighter and bomber aircraft and special accoutrements, and acquiring specialised materiel for them on world arms markets, EO was able to engage and permit its trainees to fight with state-of-the-art equipment. Drogin’s estimate of US $2 billion spent on new equipment by October 1994 is not far off the mark, to judge by the catalogues of armaments actually imported.

Secondly, EO’s delivery of tactical advice, training and combat capability rendered UNITA – whose forces maintained the cease-fire for perhaps three months after 20 September, despite severe provocation and loss of territory previously captured – especially vulnerable to FAA attacks. By October 1994, “… EO ha[d] trained 4,000 to 5,000 government troops and about 30 pilots … at three camps, located in Lunda Sul, Cabo Ledo and Dondo … reportedly … [in] basic fighting techniques, weapons maintenance, signals, engineering and specialised skills such as reconnaissance.” HRW/A also recorded its training of the FAA Reconnaissance Regiment and Special Tactical Units. Furthermore:

“EO also maintains two ‘Special Units’ of its own, which since February 1994 have been active in front-line operations against UNITA. One was deployed in Uige province, the other in Lunda Norte province in August 1994. Human Rights Watch has been told that three ex-SADF helicopter pilots regularly transport both EO employees and Angolan soldiers, including in combat situations.”

The decisive role of EO units in ground combat and aerial bombardment in this period has already been highlighted. HRW/A cites the somewhat more circumspect account of the mercenaries’ contribution to the capture of Cafunfo in July 1994, provided by Brummer in the Weekly Mail & Guardian, alleging that “… about 20 Executive Outcome ‘advisers’ had been spread through the column, from platoon to command level, and air support had been given by Executive Outcomes-trained pilots.” Venter’s detailed accounts of more extensive engagement are more persuasive.

Shearer (1998) offers a useful thumbnail sketch of EO’s activities in 1994:

“In January 1994, the FAA’s 16th Regiment was airlifted to N’dalatando, a key town southeast of Luanda, and retook it with tactical assistance from EO. The Cafunfo diamond fields in Luanda [sic] Norte province were captured in June 1994 in an operation in which EO personnel participated directly. In August the FAA regained Soyo and took the provincial capital Uíge, and, in September, the key town of Huambo fell to government forces.”

The following map, reflecting the situation in February 1995, illustrates, by comparison with that for September 1993, the FAA’s successes with EO’s help.

It is arguable, therefore, that the effect of the heightened capability afforded to the FAA was not to shorten, but to prolong the war. Without better capacity – at least in prospect – there
Areas of predominant control: February 1995
is every reason to believe that the Angolan government would have responded favourably to the cease-fire proposal made by Savimbi in August 1993, and implemented unilaterally by UNITA on 20 September. The government had sent representatives to negotiate in November 1992 and January, February and April 1993. It was only from August that it no longer had any interest in a cease-fire.

The government’s hard-line

EO’s continued availability and efficiency – together with substantial arms deliveries from several countries – gave the Angolan government reason to believe that the FAA could continue to disregard the cease-fire throughout the Lusaka talks. Drogin observed late in October 1994: “As a result [of international legitimacy and superior military capability], government hardliners insist that Savimbi can now be beaten, or at least pushed back into the bush. They want to force UNITA from diamond-producing areas and cut its supply lines to Zaire.”

Angolan government ministers and FAA military commanders made no secret of this in private discussions. Even after the initialling of the Lusaka Protocol on 31 October and formal signature of the truce provided for in the Protocol on 16 November 1994, the FAA military attack, assisted by EO, did not end.

Huambo fell to government forces on 6 November, after Savimbi abandoned the city rather than take the casualties that defence would have entailed. Uíge was captured on 17 November after a night of intense aerial bombardment; FAA troops then moved on Negage. Cuito Cuanavale was captured on 19 November. The FAA continued to move against UNITA positions in strength until 22 November 1994 and then, for at least two months, in a more discreet way with its Special Forces, with EO support, to recapture territory from UNITA.

EO’s engagement and the FAA’s progressive advance continued less visibly until December 1995, when President Clinton, in the course of President dos Santos’ first official visit to Washington, brought pressure to bear on the Angolan President to instruct EO forces to withdraw. EO senior officers, however, boasted privately after the company’s formal withdrawal of 178 men on 15 January 1996, that their withdrawal was stage-managed by agreement with the Angolan government, and that sufficient forces for essential tasks were retained within Angola.

Diamond interests contaminate the equation

Control of Angola’s rich diamond fields was another factor in prolonging the war. In further payment for EO’s services, substantial concessions were granted to Branch Energy, Buckingham’s company, which were transferred to Carson Gold (later converted to DiamondWorks Limited) through Hansard Management Services Limited and Hansard Trust Company Limited, in exchange for shares in DiamondWorks. Numerous concessions were also secured by FAA generals and other senior officers. Capture and occupation of these areas for personal benefit were important goals for the combatants.
Likewise, of course, UNITA occupied and exploited the diamond areas under its control, to give it the resources needed to continue fighting. Many of these alluvial fields were worked by South African and other fortune-seekers. UNITA’s income from its diamond operations has been estimated at between $300 million and $600 million per year. Enormous damage has been done by parties on both sides to the alluvial diamond fields by bulldozers and amateurish incompetence.

Results of the prolonged war

EO unquestionably helped the FAA to achieve its military objective, but at a terrible cost. When the second contract was signed in September 1994, the determination of the government and EO to continue the war despite UNITA’s unilateral cease-fire, had cost the lives, in that year alone, of perhaps 200 000 Angolans, destroyed most of the remaining national infrastructure, and fractured the Angolan economy. Social and economic

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<td>GDP ($ million)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>8 702</td>
<td>6 645</td>
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<td>5 529</td>
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<td>Exports(^1) ($ million)</td>
<td>3 630</td>
<td>3 796</td>
<td>3 005</td>
<td>3 113</td>
<td>3 625</td>
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<td>Oil exports ($ million)</td>
<td>3 238</td>
<td>3 573</td>
<td>2 826</td>
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<td>3 588</td>
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<td>External Debt(^2) (% of GDP)</td>
<td>67,3</td>
<td>106,1</td>
<td>149,7</td>
<td>233,8</td>
<td>193,8</td>
<td>152,3</td>
<td>140,1</td>
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<td>Debt service ratio(^3) – %</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>47,1</td>
<td>63,8</td>
<td>53,6</td>
<td>47,8</td>
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<td>Overall BoP (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-12,4</td>
<td>-15,4</td>
<td>-25,9</td>
<td>-28,1</td>
<td>-18,9</td>
<td>-10,9</td>
<td>-8,4</td>
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1 Exports of goods and non-factor services
2 Excludes some oil company debt (data not available)
3 Ratio of debt service obligations to exports before debt relief
Composition of government spending (percentage of GDP)

Gross domestic saving (percentage of GDP)
conditions in Angola were markedly worse in September 1995, when EO signed a contract for the third time.

The IMF’s comparative analysis, presented on the previous page, of the key features of the Angolan economy in December 1992 and December 1994 illustrates the impact of the prolonged war most effectively.\textsuperscript{114}

**Current assessment**

There is no doubt that EO’s engagement by the FAA in 1993 contributed to the prolongation of the war – greatly worsening the suffering by Angola’s civilian population.\textsuperscript{115} It diverted attention from the need to address the root causes of the conflict and helped to create an Angolan military capability that has not been wisely used in regional affairs since then. This is not to say that, without EO’s engagement, none of this would have happened; nor, of course, that it bears all, or even most of the blame. There is, however, a causal link between its activities after deploying of its substantial capabilities, and a series of consequences apparent in Angola and other parts of Central Africa today. At the least, EO contributed to the results.

Worse yet, peace is still not at hand in Angola, or its surrounding region, in part because the Angolan government, just as the old South African government, appeared to believe that it could resolve its domestic challenges by internal suppression and military pressure on its neighbours.\textsuperscript{116} Savimbi’s failure to overcome his (likely well-founded) fear of assassination if he travelled to Luanda, led to his refusal to demobilise his troops and, indeed to his rearming them against the likelihood of attack. UNITA’s response to provocation by those in Angola’s security services who believe that a final confrontation is inevitable, has thus contributed to the inevitability.

Persons associated with EO, in whatever corporate guise thereafter, were still engaged in the Angolan government’s efforts to resolve the conflict by military means in 1998, albeit that they provided services that could not fall foul of the definition of ‘mercenary’. Training of special forces units were undertaken by South African specialists, to the great satisfaction of the FAA General Staff, at the training unit in Huambo, and South African pilots flew the King Air electronic reconnaissance aircraft and other Angolan Air Force craft, that intercepted aircraft on illicit flights to supply UNITA in contravention of the UN Security Council resolution prohibiting such flights.\textsuperscript{117}

These services were not intrinsically objectionable. What gave rise to concern was the fact that they were provided in the context of a rising tide of tension in Angola, which, many seasoned observers believed, presaged a new round of war with serious consequences for neighbouring states, despite the ostensible progress made in 1997 in implementing the peace accords.\textsuperscript{118}

This insight proved prescient. In the face of evidence that UNITA had not disarmed and had in fact rebuilt its army in expectation of a FAA attack, FAA forces, under instructions from President dos Santos, moved against UNITA-controlled Andulo and Bailundo early in
December 1998, thereby formally beginning Angola’s third civil war. UNITA seems, moreover, to have learned from the FAA’s book. Recent reports suggest that it has recruited Ukrainian and South African mercenaries, some formerly employed by EO,119 to train its troops and provide advisory services on the battlefield.

Another round of war in Angola, however, will offer no solution. Indeed, in the face of wider regional conflict, encompassing both the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), where Angolan belligerents have fought proxy wars in recent years, a new war can only contribute to the economic exhaustion of the region. Both Angolan parties should be dissuaded from war with all the capacity at the command of the international community.120 It stands to reason that there is no place for the sale of private services which encourage one side, or the other, to believe it can benefit from further violent military clashes.

ENDNOTES

1 The Bicesse Accords, after the location on the outskirts of Lisbon where the signing ceremony took place.


3 It did not. As of the date of publication of this book, Angola is again embroiled in civil war.


6 The petit bourgeois comprised whites, persons of ‘mixed race’ and acculturated black Angolans.

7 Crocker, op. cit., pp. 120 and 425-446; see also South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal, Pretoria, May 1989.


10 VORUGAN radio broadcast, 11:00, 20 September 1993.


12 Huambo and surrounding towns suffered most under FAA bombardment; Cuito (Bié) under that of UNITA.


14 While this is not impossible, no independent confirmation of UNITA’s allegations could be found.

15 America’s Defence Monitor, Conflict Inc.: Selling the Arts of War, broadcast on Private Security Groups, 7 December 1997. Isenberg is a Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, and author of Fortune
‘Illegal’ diamond miners, recovering stones without a concession.


America’s Defence Monitor, op. cit.

Prohibiting US support to any Angolan party in the conflict.


Ibid., p. 178

Surviving members of these forces and their descendants now comprise a large part of the 40th Brigade of the armed forces of the DRC, after their repatriation in the wake of Mobutu’s demise in 1997.


Ibid.


Ibid., para. 40. This report of mercenary activity seems less plausible. The Bakongo straddle the borders between Angola, Zaire (as it then was, now the DRC) and the Republic of the Congo, and members of the same families belong to UNITA and owe allegiance to Kikongo chiefs, while Mobutu provided all types of assistance to UNITA, and earlier to the FNLA. None of this fits the description of mercenary activity, and it is unlikely that UNITA would have paid soldiers for such support. It did ‘pay’ for Mobutu’s support in other ways, such as percentages of the proceeds of diamond sales from UNITA-controlled areas where such stones were sold through Zaire.

Ibid., para. 59. Ballesteros says that he “… has been informed that foreign mercenaries are training members of the Angolan rebel UNITA forces at Kamina … which is also reportedly being used for the transport of weapons and equipment of the Angolan rebels. It has also been reported that South African mercenaries have settled in the area of Moanda, Zaire, and that the territory of Zaire is being used for the transport of South African and other mercenaries, weapons, equipment, medicines and food, on clandestine night-time flights, to the areas of Angolan territory under UNITA control.” Regrettably, he provides no names of companies, or dates, or allegations of participation in particular actions. EO and Propilot are the only companies named in connection with Angola in the 1994 report, making one cautious about offering definitive statements on the basis of such unsubstantiated, information.

The possibility that individuals may have decided to fight with UNITA cannot be ruled out, although there is no evidence of recruitment efforts, or an identifiable group being involved in combat.
The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, article 47(2); the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4 December 1989; article 1; the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, 1977, which combines some elements of each of the other conventions; see Chapter 10.

Article 47(1) of 1977 Additional Protocol I prescribes that “... a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.” Articles 2 through 6 of the 1989 Convention define the following as offences for the purpose of the Convention: acting as a mercenary, using, financing or training mercenaries; attempting to commit one of these offences; or being the accomplice of any person who commits, or attempts to commit one of these offences. The government of the then People’s Republic of Angola became a signatory to the 1989 Convention on 28 December 1990.

Shearer, op. cit., p. 19, asserts that Article 47 of 1997 Additional Protocol I “... does not ... apply in a civil war ...”, and secondly, that, “... if companies work only for recognised governments, as most [private military companies] argue that they do, then they are exempt from terms of these conventions ...” Ballesteros, though harshly critical of mercenary activities, observes that “... the legal framework for mercenary activities is ... not clear and specific enough ... the contracts which private military advisory, training and security companies conclude with States and the personnel working for them, even when they have a military background and are highly paid, cannot be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status as defined in the reference material.” Emphasis added. See E B Ballesteros, Report to the Economic and Social Council, E/C no 4/1997/24, 20 February 1997, p. 23 para 106. See also Sandoz’s extensive arguments in Chapter 10.

Especially A J Venter, Combat Group Bravo, Penthouse, date unknown; A J Venter, Targets of Opportunism, Soldiers of Fortune, April 1996.

See L Smerczak, Soldiers of Misfortune, Fair Lady, 10 March 1996.

EO’s original contract with each person recruited for service in Angola provided that, while the duties he is to perform may be extremely dangerous and may lead to death, the contracting party will forfeit his salary and pay an amount of R100 000 as liquidated damages to EO, if he breaches an undertaking “... not to divulge any information relating to this contract or his duties to any person or body.” See HRW/A, op. cit., p. 33; ibid., p. 54.

See, for example, Venter, April 1996, op. cit., pp. 61-62.


Again, estimates vary, as did numbers employed at different times in the period between September 1993 and January 1996. See Brummer, ibid.; Africa Express, ibid.; Rake, November 1995, op. cit.; Howe, op. cit.

International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, op. cit., Article 1(1)(a); see also Chapter 10.

It would appear to have been a closed corporation at the time the original contract was concluded. Barlow refers to having registered the ‘company’ in 1989, but details seem to differ. See, for example, A Johnson, Broker of War and
Death, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 28 February – 6 March 1997; Brummer, September 1994, op. cit.; B Drogin, *Hired Guns Turn the Tide in Angola War*, Los Angeles Times, 30 October 1994. The registered number of Executive Outcomes (Pty) Ltd is 95/02016/07, indicating that it was only registered in 1995.


48 Estimates vary, but the most frequently quoted range for Sierra Leone is between US $2,000 and $7,000, with top pay in other contracts ranging around $10,000 a month. See, for example, Cohen, op. cit.; Rubin, op. cit.; Drogin, op. cit.; HRW/A, op. cit., p. 31; Smerczak, op. cit., p. 54; Howe, op. cit., p. 39; F de Lange, *UK Oil Company is Hiring Mercenaries*, Citizen, 4 March 1993, p. 11; I Capraro, *Die MPLA Werf in SA, Toon Pak Foto's*, Beeld, 2 March 1993, p. 1; E Gibson, Onderneming Lewer net 'n Diens – Hoë, Beeld, 20 August 1996, p. 5.


51 Personal communication of members of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire.

52 See Roque, op. cit.

53 See Anstee, op. cit.


55 Maier, op. cit., p. 124.

56 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, 22 December 1992.


59 Personal communication by a member of Soares' staff.

60 This is the context of HRW/A's remarkable claim that EO was providing assistance to UNITA on contract until April 1993. See HRW/A, op. cit., p. 30.

61 Ibid., p. 20.


63 According to a UNITA press release datelined Huambo, 6 March 1993. HRW/A gives the date as 8 March; HRW/A, op. cit.

64 The speech addressed three themes: a definite, though defensive, celebration of African culture (ubuntu) contrasted with domination by what he disparagingly called the 'creole culture of the mulatos'; an attempt to regain Ovimbundu unity.
as a building block for national unity, rejecting secession while calling for administrative decentralisation on a regional basis; and expression of a desire for peace and national reconstruction in a Government of National Unity, coupled with a warning that UNITA had the strength to do serious damage to any force seeking to harm it.

The other side is the fear of the élite in Luanda of the consequences of the pretos/Bailundos/kwachas, represented by Savimbi and UNITA, coming to power. There are echoes of earlier white fears of emergent black power in South Africa in all this.

This resolution was prompted chiefly by anger at Savimbi’s determination to recapture Huambo after its loss to the FAA and emergency police units in January, and his failure to support the cease-fire talks in Addis Ababa in late February.


UNITA, Conversações sobre a paz em Angola, Abidjan, 12 April 1993

M Anstee, Why the UN has Failed Angola, Daily Telegraph, 7 September 1993.

UNITA’s persistent demand for a far larger UN presence with a mandate to keep the peace also supports Roque’s assertion that it feared its troops would be massacred in the camps if they remained there in October 1992; Roque, op. cit.


R Kennedy, Pretoria Troops to Fight UNITA, The Times, 1 March 1993; Capraro, op. cit.; De Lange, op. cit.

He is recorded in the DiamondWorks Limited preliminary prospectus, 11 February 1997 as Director: International New Business Ventures, Ranger Oil Limited, Calgary, Alberta prior to being Founder and Director of Heritage Oil and Gas Limited, London, since 1992. Heritage Oil was apparently formed by Buckingham’s Branch Energy with Premier Consolidated – then headed by Roland Shaw – and Fleming Mercantile Investment Trust to acquire and develop proven hydro-carbon reserves in developing countries.

Economist Intelligence Unit, map of Angolan exploration and production areas.

De Lange, op. cit., p. 20; Capraro, op. cit.


Shearer, ibid., p 46.

See Venter, December 1995, op. cit., p. 76; South Africans go to war in the jungles of West Africa, Sunday Independent, 27 August 1995; A Brown, You Can Take Men Out of War, but Not the War Out of All Men, The Star, 8 August 1995.

See Howe, op. cit.


UNITA proposed a formula for a cessation of hostilities, followed by a cease-fire on 12 April 1993. The Angolan government did not permit publication of this proposal by Savimbi in Angola; see Mesagem de Jonas Savimbi não foi
difundida no país, O Dia, 13 Agosto 1993; Apelo Indeferido, O Público, 13 Agosto 1993. General de Matos responded on 14 August that the Angolan government rejected the cease-fire proposal and that the FAA would continue with air strikes against Huambo.


84 UNITA was laying siege to Cuito, resulting in one of the greatest tragedies of the war.

85 This refers to three principles – a cease-fire, resumption of the Bicesse Accords and “… national reconciliation, to include broadened participation by UNITA at the national, provincial and local levels …” – set as the basis for the inconclusive negotiations between 12 April and 21 May 1993, in Abidjan, under the auspices of UN Special Representative Anstee.

86 The purpose of the meeting was “… to analyse the strategy of a bilateral cease-fire in Angola as well as studying other means to implement an effective cease-fire.” C Garuba, Extract from a Letter to the Chiefs of Staff of both Angolan parties, UNAVEM II military commander, 21 September 1993. Translated from Portuguese.

87 It is clear that the Angolan government had no incentive to agree to a cease-fire, as this would have prevented the embargo against UNITA – and in effect, the government’s release from the ban on weapons sales to all Angolan belligerents under the ‘triple zero’ provisions of the Bicesse Accords – from coming into effect.


89 UNAVEM II, Media Release, Luanda, 7 October 1993. (Translated from Portuguese.)

90 US Department of State, press advisory, Washington DC, 8 October 1993


92 Manuvakola, then Secretary-General of UNITA, signed for Savimbi under full powers issued by fax on 19 November after Savimbi had refused to travel because of an ongoing attack on Huambo by government forces; Foreign Minister de Moura signed on behalf of President dos Santos, who was present in Lusaka.


94 This provision of the Bicesse Accords reflected an obligation on the US, the former USSR and third parties not to provide any further war material to either of the two armed parties in Angola.

95 See Chapter 5.


97 Including night bombing and fighting capability; see Drogin, ibid.

According to the estimates of HRW/A, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

Ibid., p. 32.

Brummer, September 1994, op. cit.

Venter, April 1996, op. cit., pp. 59-61 and 82-85, based on interviews with Blaauw.

Shearer, op. cit., p. 48.

See Venter, 1996, op. cit.

This initially caused confusion and frustration in Washington, which believed in January 1994 that an agreement would be achieved by mid-February. Personal communication, US Department of State.

Drogin, op. cit.

Venter, April 1996, op. cit.

EO’s combat role continued far longer, according to Venter, 1996, op. cit.

Shearer, op. cit., p. 48.


Buckingham appears to control all the shares owned by the two Hansard entities, but the prospectus indicates that “… under the terms of a discretionary trust, Anthony L.R. Buckingham may become a beneficial owner of up to 12,750,000 common shares.” DiamondWorks, ibid., p. 55.

Estimates of the death toll vary, though UN Special Representative Bêye’s claim that 1,000 Angolans were dying each day, may be excessive.

The explanation for this destruction is the vastly greater spending on armaments by the government forces and the greater destructive efficiency that EO brought to its application. See Drogin, op. cit.; also Venter, November 1995, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

International Monetary Fund, unpublished reports, 1995; material sourced from Angolan government and IMF data.

Santos’ enthusiasm in helping to effect Mobutu’s overthrow in Zaire, followed by that of Lissouba in the Republic of Congo, in 1997 proved misplaced. Kabila was no more reliable in curbing UNITA, and the retention of Sassou-Nguesso in power in Brazzaville became too demanding and expensive for Angola’s troops.


There is evidence of links between UNITA and Hutu Interahamwe units and other refugees who fled into UNITA-controlled areas of Angola ahead of Kabila’s Tutsi army, former FAZ troops, Lissouba’s and Kolelas’ militias from Congo-Brazzaville and dissident groups from Burundi – an alliance of the dispossessed – seeking to reverse the setbacks of the past eighteen months.

Which, according to media reports, has since closed its doors and reportedly no longer provides military support services.
Licklider, paraphrased by Stedman: “... in civil wars fought over identity issues, negotiated settlements tend to be less stable than military victories; two-thirds of negotiated settlements fall apart within five years, and only twenty-one percent of wars that end in military victory see a resumption of fighting in the same time frame ...” See S J Stedman, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, American Political Science Review, 89(3), September 1995, pp. 681-690. Stedman also notes his finding that “… in civil wars over identity issues, genocide was carried out in nineteen percent of military victories ...” (p. 687). The evidence of this tendency in Angola is already available. Outsiders surely ought not to facilitate the destructive capacity of either side. That is the spirit that underlies the prohibitions on mercenarism.