



POLICY BRIEF

Coups are back in Africa What are continental and regional responses missing?

Hubert Kinkoh

Efforts by the African Union and regional economic communities (RECs) to address the coup resurgence, notably through legal frameworks and instruments, have come under heavy scrutiny and strain. This worrying outlook raises questions about the ability of the Peace and Security Council and RECs to hold member states accountable, and about states' commitment to democratic and accountable governance. New thinking and alternative approaches are essential.

Key findings

- ▶ The number of coups in Africa is rising dramatically again despite ongoing efforts by the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) to stem the threat.
- ▶ Drivers are circumstantial and related to unique dynamics within states and regions. These include the dismal governance record of elected leaders, poor quality of democracy, fissures between civilian or transitional governments and the military, and failure to deal with Islamist insurgencies.
- ▶ Arguably, the AU has invested well in coup-prohibiting frameworks and instruments. Yet the capacity of the AU and RECs to deter military takeovers has weakened as responses remain reactive.
- ▶ Enforcement of normative frameworks has also grown steadily inconsistent. Complicating matters is the lack of coherence between AU and REC approaches to dealing with these crises.
- ▶ A growing movement by military personnel in favour of military rule further complicates continental and regional responses.
- ▶ Different contexts leave continental and regional interventions torn between upholding anti-coup dogmatism and pursuing pragmatism.
- ▶ This outlook raises questions about states' commitment to promoting democratic and accountable governance and silencing the guns in Africa. It casts doubt over the ability of the Peace and Security Council and RECs to hold member states accountable.
- ▶ As the phenomenon makes a comeback, the chronic dominance of military personnel in the politics of some African countries underlines the need to reset regional and continental responses.

Recommendations

- ▶ The AU and RECs need to focus on prevention. To this end, the capacity of regional and continental policymakers to monitor and contain drivers must be strengthened.
- ▶ Efforts should also focus on building and maintaining democratic societies, with electoral monitors calling out leaders for disregarding citizens' demand for change.
- ▶ Sanctions should be more targeted and forceful to avoid negative impacts on entire populations. Speeding up the establishment of the AU sanction regime could strengthen both coup deterrence and enforcement of anti-coup norms.
- ▶ The AU and RECs must apply normative instruments strictly, non-selectively and consistently.
- ▶ The uneasy collaborative dynamics between the AU and RECs need to be reset, enabling them to harmonise their responses to unconstitutional changes of government.
- ▶ New strategies and partnerships are also needed to fight insurgencies. This is especially in the Sahel and in the context of withdrawal of foreign troops and peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and soon the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- ▶ Strengthening civil-military relations in member states is also crucial. Security sector reform is needed to promote greater professionalism among national armies.

Introduction

Coup numbers in Africa are rising dramatically again. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the continent witnessed a decade-on-decade average of 40 successful and attempted (alleged) coups. The frequency halved in the 2000s and 2010s, with no coup activities in 2007, 2016 and 2018. But this decline has not lasted long.¹

Since 2020, nine successful coups have taken place: two each in Mali and Burkina Faso, and one each in Chad, Guinea and Sudan. Recent events in Gabon and Niger in the ousting of presidents Ali Bongo and Mohamed Bazoum are the latest examples of the military seizing political power.

In a little over three years, six coups have occurred in West Africa, two in Central Africa and one in East Africa

As part of this broader trend, six failed coup attempts occurred during the same period – in Niger, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Burkina Faso. In a little over three years, six coups have occurred in West Africa, two in Central Africa and one in East Africa. North and southern Africa were coup-free.

The re-emergence of military takeovers is occurring against ongoing efforts by the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) to stem what the UN Security General has now labelled an ‘epidemic’. Their frequency, however, limits optimism that the threat is likely to be contained in the short term. This has

raised alarms within policy circles and stirred debate around the drivers and dynamics of the comeback. The worrying trend also raises questions about the efficacy of continental and regional efforts to combat the contagion.

This policy brief draws on analysis of secondary data on political and conflict dynamics underlying the resurgence in West Africa and Central Africa. It also builds on primary data, including conversations with policy actors and insights provided by panellists and participants at an ISS seminar on 14 September 2023 on the subject.²

The brief continues with a dissection of the key factors and actors. It then singles out responses to the scourge and delves critically into how dynamics continue to complicate and limit the effectiveness of these efforts. From this, the analysis underlines implications for policy consideration, contextualised against anti-UCG normative frameworks. It ends with suggestions for policy interventions that could help halt the trend of military leaders ascending to political power in Africa.


Why are coups resurfacing?

A closer look at the situation in Africa since 2020 reveals worrying trends. Although drivers are circumstantial – while not unrelated, owing to unique dynamics within states and regions – they result from the following broad drivers.

Governance dysfunction


A major factor, often overlooked in policy circles, is the poor governance record of elected leaders. This manifests in leaders’ failure to fulfil their mandates to deliver public goods, lack of accountability and

Chart 1: Successful coups, 2020 to 2023*



* Chad is contested as the AU does not recognise its event as a coup

Chart 2: Failed or alleged coup attempts, 2020 to 2023



transparency most visible through endemic corruption and security agents' brutality of security exacted with impunity against civilians. It is also demonstrated in manipulation of power by incumbents to serve narrow elite and foreign interests, the judiciary's failure to be a neutral arbiter in delivering justice and crippling economic development outlooks.

The incredibly low economic performance ranking of countries that have experienced coups continues to be cited as a driver of the resurgence on parts of the continent.³ Those in policy circles are acknowledging that rising citizen frustration with government performance has played out in recent events.

The resurgence of coups is indicative of the failure of civilian leaders to uphold democratic values

Having lost patience and trust in their governments' commitment to create better socio-economic conditions necessary for human security, citizens' open support for leadership change through military means is also a factor. Citizens are not necessarily supporting coups in themselves, but pursuing change. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)⁴ noted in a recent report, more than half of affected countries still prefer and continue to embrace democratic approaches to governance.

Democracy decline

Poor-quality democracy across the continent has also created a conducive environment for the recent

unconstitutional seizures of political power by the military. Democracy has focused largely on promoting regime durability, normative frameworks – which have failed to improve civilians' quality of life – and the legality of democratic processes rather than the legitimacy of outcomes. Additionally, citizens' aspirations for democratic change through electoral processes continue to be manipulated. Against this backdrop, the resurgence is a clear sign of the decline of democracy. It is symptomatic of failed and complex political transitions as seen in Chad, Sudan, Guinea and Mali.

It is indicative of the failure of civilian leaders to uphold democratic values. This is reflected in concerted efforts to close political space and legitimise abuse of constitutionalism and rule of law through attempts to erode presidential term limits, as in Guinea. After changing Guinea's constitution during his second term to extend his term, Alpha Condé won the October 2020 polls, which were believed to be flawed and marred by electoral violence. Almost a year into his third term, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya announced he had been deposed for 'personalisation of politics', endemic corruption and poverty.

In other instances, elections have been passed by monitors as credible and democratic even as this was contested domestically. A reason cited for the Gabon palace coup through which General Brice Oligui Nguema established himself as transitional president was the electoral malpractice in the contentious election that Ali Bongo had purportedly won.⁵ But Gabon is only one of several African countries whose elected leaders have been overthrown recently by military rulers.

Although Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's election to another term was marred by violence and opposition allegations of fraud, the AU deemed Mali's 2018 polls credible⁶ and anti-government protests led to a coup in early-2020. Similarly, AU election monitors labelled peaceful and democratic the second round of Niger's 2021 presidential elections won by Mohamed Bazoum, although this was contested locally.

Civil-military tensions

Widening fissures between civilian or transitional governments and the military over control of transitional governments are yet another factor in coup resurgence. The overthrow in Niger was the culmination of months of acrimony⁷ between Bazoum and his chief guard over the former's attempt to emerge from the shadow of his predecessor. Tensions between military officers (ex-National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland leaders) and the transitional government of Bah Ndaw was a factor in the Mali 2021 coup by Assimi Goïta.

Widening fissures between civilian or transitional governments and the military are yet another factor in coup resurgence

This dynamic was also visible in Sudan, where a push for more pro-military civilians to control the transitional government led to the coup on 25 October 2021. The protracted fighting in the country is explained in part by the military's continued refusal to relinquish power to civilians. In Burkina Faso, grievances within the army and tensions between the military and the democratically elected government of Roch Kaboré built for months ahead of the January 2022 coup.

The attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022 is believed to have been the result of tensions between then-prime minister Nuno Nabiam (a close ally of the military) and President Umaro Embaló. Meanwhile, in The Gambia, Adama Barrow's distrust of the military was a factor in the failed coup of December 2022. This mistrust was reflected in Barrow's use of Senegalese troops for his personal security and Nigerian and Ghanaian troops to guard the main international airport and seaport.

Dealing with jihadists

Failure to deal with Islamist insurgency in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger also created an enabling environment for the recent spike in military takeovers. Despite foreign military support in the fight against Islamists in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional insecurity persists and continues to be cited by juntas as justification for coups. In Mali, weakness in dealing with the Islamist threat was a factor in the 2021 takeover.

Similarly, the March 2021 coup attempt in Niger followed mounting jihadist attacks that led to one of the country's worst incidents, when suspected



FAILURE TO DEAL WITH
ISLAMIST INSURGENCIES
PLAYED A ROLE IN
MILITARY TAKEOVERS

militants killed 137 people on 21 March in villages in the southwest.⁸ The failure of the government to contain the rising jihadist presence was also used to justify the January 2022 plot in Burkina Faso. Worsening Islamist insurgency in the country led to a 'coup within a coup' barely eight months later.

Continental and regional responses under strain

The AU has arguably invested well in coup-prohibiting frameworks and instruments. The AU Assembly has also adopted various decisions to strengthen its capacity to deal with the scourge of UCGs. RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also advocate strict adherence to constitutional norms in electoral practices while rejecting unconstitutional accession to or maintenance of power.

Ineffective blanket sanctions

Despite endeavours, AU and REC capacities to deter military takeovers have weakened considerably. At its 178th meeting on 13 March 2009, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to establish a committee on sanctions as part of AU efforts to prevent UCGs. However, this is yet to materialise.⁹ The AU and RECs have generally responded with threats and imposition of suspensions and sanctions – including threat of military intervention as recently witnessed with ECOWAS following the Niger coup.

While responses have rightly condemned coups, they have focused heavily on blanket and economic sanctions in line with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. Unfortunately, the threat and enforcement of sanctions, and refusal to recognise putschist regimes, no longer deter coup behaviour. They have been able to secure only barely maintained pledges of a political transition back to civilian rule in these states and have failed to reinstate deposed leaders.

Even when nominally civilian governments were in place, such as in Mali (in September 2020) and Sudan (after its 25 October 2021 event), real power lay with the military leaders.¹⁰ This lack of consequences for plotters and the ineffectiveness of sanctions continue to incentivise military officers to depose civilian authorities.

Reactive approach

Within policy circles, there is consensus that the heavy focus on sanctions is reactive and counterproductive. Sanctions and political condemnations have not succeeded in convincing military rulers to hand over power to civilian leaders. In the face of misgovernance and democratic regression within member states, regional and continental bodies have generally remained silent. The conclusions of AU and REC observer missions rarely challenge official results even when judiciaries and citizens identify malpractice.¹¹ Legitimacy issues stemming from questionable electoral processes and outcomes were triggers in the Mali and Gabon takeovers.

In a departure from this, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) concluded that Zimbabwe's August polls – which announced President Emmerson Mnangagwa the winner – fell short of minimum standards in the country's Constitution and Election Act. SADC also noted that they breached RECs' principles and guidelines governing democratic elections.¹²

Inconsistent application of norms

At the same time, enforcement of coup-prohibiting normative frameworks has grown steadily inconsistent. The suspensions of Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Gabon from all AU activities were decidedly swift. However, the AU expressed only 'deep concern'¹³ over the military takeover that saw President Mahamat Déby replace his deceased father, Idriss Déby Itno. The continental body's PSC has yet to recognise the classic coup for what it is or to suspend Chad's AU membership. It also delayed its suspension of Niger following the July coup.

This is attributable to concerning dynamics within the Council where debates are deliberately nuanced to protect the sensitivities of concerned countries and the principle of 'sovereignty' often invoked to block robust conversations. The precedent for this inconsistency in enforcement had already been set with the selective approach to coups in Mauritania (2008), Egypt (2014) and Zimbabwe (2017). Because it tacitly endorsed *de facto* coups in these countries, the PSC now struggles to uphold most of its praiseworthy anti-coup norms. Within this context, its credibility has come under heavy scrutiny.

Incoherent AU-REC approaches

Efforts also remain complicated by the lack of coherence between AU-REC approaches to dealing with the problem, based on differences in the application of ‘subsidiarity’. The lack of consensus between the PSC and ECOWAS on an appropriate response to Niger’s situation points to AU-REC fissures that hamper effectiveness of responses.¹⁴

While the AU suspended Niger from its activities, ECOWAS has yet to follow suit. This reluctance is troubling and brings into question the credibility of the PSC in dealing with the resurgence. Fragility in the ECOWAS region also shone the spotlight on the legitimacy and credibility of member states to deploy a military intervention in the pursuit of diplomatic efforts to restore constitutional order in Niger.

New dynamics

Increasingly, new dynamics are also complicating continental and regional responses. Solidarity among coup plotters against responses underlines a growing movement by military personnel in favour of military rule across the continent. Furthermore, differentiated contexts leave interventions torn between upholding anti-coup dogmatism and pursuing pragmatism.


Solidarity among coup plotters against regional responses underlines a growing movement for military rule across the continent

Although it led to suspensions, the coup that deposed Ali Bongo and ended the Bongo family’s decades-long rule in Gabon certainly left the AU conflicted. The organisation’s choice was insisting on maintaining Ali Bongo in power or allowing the country a real chance for change by endorsing the military action.

The AU faced similar dilemmas¹⁵ after the 2011 Arab Spring that deposed leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the November 2017 coup that toppled Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and, recently, the Niger coup that ousted Bazoum. The AU’s quandary in responding to these contexts contravenes its own norms and threatens to erode its zero-tolerance policy on UCGs.

Implications

Doubt is being cast on the ability of the PSC and RECs to hold member states accountable. Recent military overthrows continue to contravene AU Assembly decisions¹⁶ and declarations¹⁷ that unequivocally condemn and reject all forms of UCG. Accordingly, the capacity of the AU and RECs to address the contagion has drawn critical attention. This has resulted directly in the erosion of the bodies’ credibility in the eyes of African citizens and observers of the continent’s political scene.



THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND
REFUSAL TO RECOGNISE
PUTSCHIST REGIMES NO
LONGER DETER COUPS

There is also doubt about AU member states' commitment to promoting democratic and accountable governance¹⁸ and silencing the guns in Africa enshrined in AU instruments and the continent's Agenda 2063. They also disregard Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which condemns and rejects UCGs.

As coups make a comeback to the continent, the chronic dominance of military personnel in the political scene of some African countries is evident. Cumulatively, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Niger have 316 years of independence among them, 116 years of military rule and 88 years of military leaders who have transitioned to civilian administrations.¹⁹ This has serious implications for the trajectory of democratic consolidation and the future of peace and security.

Halting the trend

The Lomé Declaration of July 2000 rightly noted that coups are 'sad and unacceptable developments' in Africa. To halt the trend of military leaders ascending to political power, new thinking and alternative approaches are needed.

Regional and continental responses should be reset. The AU and RECs must apply normative instruments strictly, non-selectively and consistently. This would deter UCGs and ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted. Popularising the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) could also help entrench accountable governance and promote constitutionalism in member states.

Efforts should address the root causes of coups, notably misgovernance, democratic decline, insecurity and underdevelopment

At the same time, the trend must end to wait for coups to occur – ignoring warning signs – to issue condemnations, suspensions and threats or imposition of sanctions. Additionally, the PSC and RECs should seriously reconsider the nature of sanctions. These should be more targeted and forceful to avoid any negative impact they may have on entire populations. The AU should speed up the establishment of its sanctions regime to strengthen both deterrence and enforcement of targeted sanctions. Behaviours that could lead to coups should also be sanctioned.

Prevention is key. The narrow focus on isolation of coup leaders and states must give way to proactive building and maintaining of democratic societies in Africa. Efforts should address the root causes of coups, notably misgovernance, democratic decline, insecurity and underdevelopment.

Therefore, the capacity of policymakers to monitor and shape the nature of interference needs bolstering. The PSC should activate its anticipatory and



AU AND RECS MUST APPLY
NORMATIVE INSTRUMENTS
STRICTLY, NON-SELECTIVELY
AND CONSISTENTLY

preventive role by signposting worrying governance dysfunction, democratic regression and insecurity trends simmering in member states and regions. The AU reforms process effectively disbanded the early warning unit that could monitor warning signs, thus helping shape interventions. Its placement under the conflict management directorate needs to be reconsidered. Capacitating and employing its preventive diplomacy tools, including the Panel of the Wise, FemWise, and the Office of Special Envoys, could ensure timeous response to situations that could trigger crises.

With elections still disputed across the continent, popularising and domesticating existing continental and regional normative frameworks and instruments is crucial. This would include ACDEG, which seeks to entrench accountable governance and the rule of law. It is also important that electoral monitors call out leaders for disregarding citizens' demand for change through the ballot. The focus of monitors needs to shift from privileging the legality of elections to ensuring their legitimacy.

The uneasy collaborative dynamics between the AU and RECs on subsidiarity need to be rethought. This could enable continental and regional bodies to harmonise their

responses to UCGs to enhance coherence. Devising new strategies and forging partnerships to fight insurgencies are also much needed, especially in the Sahel and given the withdrawal of foreign troops and peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. The AU should rally much-needed technical and financial resources and lead consultations with think tanks and partners on new counterinsurgency approaches in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin.

Electoral monitors must call out leaders for disregarding citizens' demand for change through the ballot


Member state civil-military relations should be strengthened to help thwart unconstitutionality. States must introduce security sector reform to promote greater professionalism in the army. Army promotions must be transparent and based on merit. The Cameroon government initiative²⁰ to create a security and defence professional school, albeit specialising in peacekeeping, is a positive step.

Notes

- 1 See data from M Duzor and B Williamson, By the numbers: coups in Africa, 2 February 2022, <https://projects.voanews.com/african-coups/>, updated by the author from February 2022 to September 2023.
- 2 See event details in Coups are back in Africa: what are we missing? <https://issafrica.org/events/coups-are-back-in-africa-what-are-we-missing>.
- 3 UNDP, Soldiers and citizens: military coups and the need for democratic renewal in Africa, 14 July 2023, www.undp.org/africa/publications/soldiers-and-citizens.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 N Gbadamosi Gabon's palace coup, 23 September 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/13/gabon-bongo-nguema-palace-coup/>.
- 6 AU Rapport de la mission d'observation electorale de l'Union africaine pour la présidentielle des 29 Juillet et 12 Août 2018 en République du Mali, 15 May 2019, <https://au.int/en/documents/20190515/rapport-de-la-mission-dobservation-electorale-7-juillet-12-aout-mali-0>.
- 7 M Aksar, D Lewis and D Gauthier-Villars, Insight: behind Niger's coup. A feud over the former president's legacy, 7 August 2023, <https://rb.gy/3x5fo>.
- 8 *The New York Times*, 137 people killed in Niger in series of attacks on villages along Mali border, 22 March 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/world/africa/Niger-village-attacks.html.
- 9 AU PSC, Communiqué of the 178th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 13 March 2009, www.peaceau.org/uploads/communique-2-of-the-178th-eng-.pdf.
- 10 J Chin and J Kirkpatrick, African coups in the Covid-19 era: a current history, *Frontiers in Political Science*, 2023, 5.
- 11 P-S Handy, F Akum and F Djilo, What causes Africa's coups? That is the question, *ISS Today*, 8 September 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-causes-africas-coups-that-is-the-question>.
- 12 SADC Electoral Observation Mission (August 2023), Preliminary statement on the conduct of the 2023 harmonised elections in the Republic of Zimbabwe, www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2023-08/ZIMBABWE%20SEOM%20-2023%20PRELIMINARY_STATEMENT-Revised%20adopted-25%20August%202023%2012pt.pdf.
- 13 AU, Communiqué of the 99th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the consideration of the report of the fact-finding mission to the Republic of Chad, 14 May 2021, 16 June 2021, www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-996th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-of-the-african-union-on-the-consideration-of-the-report-of-the-fact-finding-mission-to-the-republic-of-chad-14-may-2021.
- 14 P-S Handy and F Djilo, Niger: another symptom of Africa's weak crisis-response capacity, *ISS Today*, 28 August 2023, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/niger-another-symptom-of-africas-weak-crisis-response-capacity>.
- 15 L Louw-Vaudran, The African Union's chequered history with military coups, *ISS Today*, 22 November 2017, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-unions-chequered-history-with-military-coups>.
- 16 See Decision AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV), Assembly/AU/Dec.220(XII), Assembly/AU/Dec.253(XIII).
- 17 See: 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration (2013), Accra Declaration (April 2022), Malabo Declaration (May 2022).
- 18 Enshrined in AU instruments such as the Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of Measures in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2009), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981).
- 19 UNDP, Soldiers and citizens: military coups and the need for democratic renewal in Africa, 14 July 2023, 61, www.undp.org/africa/publications/soldiers-and-citizens.
- 20 AU, Communiqué: The 1175th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at the Ministerial level, on 23 September 2023, on financing AU peace support operations (PSOs), 2 October 2023, www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-the-1175th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-psc-of-the-african-union-au-at-the-ministerial-level-on-23-september-2023-on-financing-au-peace-support-operations-psos.

Visit our website for the latest analysis, insight and news

The Institute for Security Studies partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa's future



Step 1 Go to www.issafrica.org

Step 2 Go to bottom right of the ISS home page and provide your subscription details

About the author

Hubert Kinkoh is a Researcher in the African Peace and Security Governance programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Addis Ababa. He has a Master's degree in international relations and peace studies from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Kenya.

About the ISS

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa's future. The ISS is an African non-profit with offices in South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal. Using its networks and influence, the ISS provides timely and credible policy research, practical training and technical assistance to governments and civil society.

Development partners



Government of the Netherlands

This policy brief was funded by the government of the Netherlands. The ISS is grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union, the Open Society Foundations and the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

© 2023, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies and the author, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the author and the publishers.

The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.

Cover image: AFP

