

# Civil-military relations in Zimbabwe: Is there a threat?

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One of the important characteristics of the current crisis in Zimbabwe has been the role of the armed forces in politics, the levels of military and security expenditure and the 'use' of law enforcement agencies against actual and perceived 'opposition' political opponents. In short, the place and function of Zimbabwe's armed forces in society has created considerable tensions. While tentative signs of civil-military relations strains were evident during the 1990s, the three events of—the rejection of the Referendum on the Draft Constitution in February 2000; the close parliamentary elections of June 2000<sup>1</sup> and the presidential elections of March 2002—have witnessed a clear deterioration and polarization of society.

As a consequence of the above, at least three levels of international opinion-makers have dispatched investigative teams, at different times in a bid to arrest the deteriorating situation. The SADC Summit mandated a Committee to visit the country in a process that was followed by a similar team from the Commonwealth. Finally, the Organization of African Unity deployed an investigative delegation from its African Commission on People's Rights. The delegation leader, Jainaba Johm of Gambia told a press conference that they had come:

“... because of the allegations of violations of human rights by law enforcement agencies and the threats to civil liberties as well as charges of invasions of the rule of law and concerns about the independence of the judiciary”<sup>2</sup>

Taken as a whole, the above is testimony to the civil-military relations crisis that is presently gripping Zimbabwe.

This discussion is a second comment by the author on Zimbabwe's civil-military relations. In January 2000, just before the Referendum in February, a *Working Paper* was rushed into print seeking to sound a warning towards what was perceived as an unhealthy trend, a development that was likely to undermine existing stable civil-military relations.<sup>3</sup> Because of time constraints at the time, the *Working Paper* did not delve into such aspects as context nor did it analyze the deeper politico-military schisms that characterized the society's historical relations which could have provided the rationale for the decisions.

For a country that gained political independence against an unjust colonial system in 1980 and was therefore associated with the lofty ideals of justice and democracy, what explains the current trend? Put differently, what pressures are 'coercing' the executive to rely on 'the military approach' in order to solve the country's problems?

This paper argues that Zimbabwe's politico-military institutions were forged under a highly competitive framework. The struggle has manifested

itself in political, economic and military spheres. For the nationalists, each created its own military wing and the reliance of this arm to advance political objectives is synonymous with the liberation movement model of civil-military relations. In practice, however, any one of the groups, as shall be explained below, achieving dominance, translates into an 'uneven' contest with the 'defeated' group(s). This contradiction characterizes the complex nature of stable relations as dominance must be tempered with deliberate efforts to allay the concerns of the minorities. Secondly, the paper argues that the ruling party's approach to politico-socio-economic problem-solving during this critical period of late 1999 to 2002 has not moved out of the revolutionary war context. This, generally, perceives internal and external political confrontations as amenable to resolution through coercive tools and methods. However, given the perceived adverse impact of these methods, it is suggested that, perhaps it is high time that we take stock and re-evaluate the place of this strategy for other alternatives that result in consensus building? Finally, the paper also argues that the country's leaders need to be sensitive as to the evolution and structure of our institutions in order that they are sensitive to their likely impact when employed. A salutary lesson must be drawn from the country's recent history where, as has been publicly admitted by government, "in a moment of madness" troops were deployed in Matebeleland in the early 1980s and succeeded to wreck havoc on a section of society in that region.

## **Definition and models**

The strained civil military relations environment is a manifestation of the triad, i.e. the security sector, government and other sectors of society. According to Samuel P Huntington and Andrew J Goodpaster civil military relations have been broadly defined as:

“... representing a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the Armed Forces and other Social structures. The spheres (where) it is most apparent include Politics, the Economy, Science and Technology.”<sup>4</sup>

The same authors have also suggested indicators that can be relied upon to assess the stability of civil military relations. These have been paraphrased as follows:

- The extent of the role of the armed forces outside the military sphere—i.e. whether or not that has an impact on the political processes, culture or information technology.
- The manner of resolving conflicts and disputes—is this characterized by tolerance, dialogue or is there participation of the armed forces where they are in dispute?

- The attitudes characterizing the relationship—do they reflect mutual respect, tension or professional competence?
- Finally, does the existing relationship indicate effective observance of the parameters regulating civil military relations?<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, Huntington had earlier argued that these indicators manifest themselves at:

- The level distribution of social power of military Officers in relation to that of the rest of society.
- At the ideological level—does the armed forces purport to uphold the sovereign or other state principles or are these shared with the rest of society?<sup>6</sup>

Having provided a working definition for civil-military relations for purposes of this paper, we also need to acknowledge the existence of different types or models. These inform the actions of key actors in the Zimbabwe crisis.

There are at least three distinct civil military relations that can be attributed as common to the communist or socialist system; the capitalist or liberal democratic system and for our purposes, the liberation movement model. While the dominant focus of the current debate leans towards measuring civil military relations according to the Capitalist cum-liberal democratic type, this has ignored the model that is familiar to most Southern African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.<sup>7</sup> The Liberation Movement model is generally based on popular causes and mass participation. Strong personalities generally emerge as the leadership and enjoy cult status. In history, these are not unlike the combined Napoleonic politico-military system, allowing to a greater degree to force down hierarchical control. The model is also much more cohesive in its structure compared to the 'separation of powers' that is the cornerstone of the liberal democratic model. The more common examples include Mao's China, Castro's Cuba, Ben Bella's Algeria and Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization. In all these instances, there was/is almost undivided political and military fusion representing the interests of the majority.

### **A brief history: 1980–1985.**

Zimbabwe's security sector institutions are unique in that these emerged from a different paradigm and ethos before independence in 1980. The struggle since has been how to dominate and consolidate that position once achieved.

In 1963, ZANU broke away from ZAPU in order to pursue a more vigorous challenge to the settler minority Rhodesian regime.<sup>8</sup> This development was followed by untrammelled black on black violence that has continued to char-

acterize the country's political relations.<sup>9</sup> The Roman Catholic Church Bishops in the country at the time made an impassioned plea to the dominant ZAPU leadership to curb its assault on the new Shona dominated party to no avail.<sup>10</sup> As we write, this is the splinter movement that is now the dominant political power having subordinated ZAPU and banished the colonial Rhodesian structure to the dust-bin of history. To reach this politico-military pinnacle, at least three important groups competed in the struggle. The Rhodesian regime banned both ZAPU and ZANU while created security institutions whose mandate was to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile both ZAPU and ZANU proceeded to establish military wings whose focus was to challenge not only the Rhodesian regime but, by default, also each other.<sup>11</sup> At the height of the armed struggle and at the behest of the Front Line States (FLS) Presidents, the two liberation movements were 'pushed' towards establishing the Patriotic Front in order to coordinate their political and military strategies against the colonial regime in Salisbury.<sup>12</sup> A farcical relationship was set up in order to satisfy the FLS. The late Dr Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, is on record asserting that this relationship was only on paper and did not go beyond fundamental political accommodation or military strategy coordination.<sup>13</sup>

An important point to take away from the above political divisions of the nationalists in then Rhodesia is that two competing military wings were established that owed allegiance to a particular party and leader. Furthermore, in the prosecution of the war, these fought each other whenever they met in the operational zones. Finally, at cease-fire before the supervised elections of February 1980, in December 1979, the political parties abandoned the charade of the Patriotic Front. At the end of December 1979, ZANU announced that it was going to "go it alone" in the elections. Following the cease-fire, as the guerrilla forces assembled, separate camps had to be established for ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants as a result of repeated clashes and animosity.

The political results of 1980 also created three political constituencies. The white minority regime had 20 guaranteed white seats while the Africans vied for the remaining 80 seats in the 100 member chamber. Of these, ZANU had secured 57 against ZAPU's 20, with three going to the United African National Congress of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Significantly, ZAPU's seats reflected its hold on the Western part of the country in which the Ndebele lived. A political attempt to establish a coalition between ZAPU and ZANU formed the basis of the new government in April 1980. However, according to the late Dr Joshua Nkomo this had ceased to function by early 1981 and had collapsed by March 1983 when he fled into exile. The reasons for the early collapse of the coalition regime were political differences. Local government elections scheduled for November of 1980 again culminated in ZAPU-ZANU inter-party politically motivated violence. The now ruling party, ZANU (PF), relied on government forces to put down the "dissident war" resulting in excesses for which the President has, on at least two

occasions, expressed regret citing a 'moment of madness'.<sup>14</sup> Part of the explanation for the excess I would submit, lay in the traditional rivalry of the two parties and their armed wings. Secondly, the deep mistrust that had characterized the political relations of the nationalists had not dissipated as a result of independence in 1980. Thirdly, ZAPU's 'Turning Point Strategy' launched after 1976-77 was a military plan designed to fight either the colonial regime or any other group in Salisbury by conventional means.<sup>15</sup> This was to be followed by 'Zero Option' that was mooted as aimed toppling the regime in Salisbury after 1980 was a major factor that fueled the subsequent internal military under the auspices of the 'dissident war'. Significantly, however, the survival of this political pattern until year 2000 confirmed the entrenchment of the ethnic factor in local politics. In the elections of 1985, 1990 and 1995, ZAPU continued to hold onto its ethnic and regional seats in western Matebeleland. Even under the Unity Accord of December 1987, one could discern the contribution of ZAPU within the expanded ZANU (PF). This factor attests to the deep polarization of the country's political structure. It was only after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999, a party enjoying widespread urban, labour and middle-class support, that the Matebeleland region appears to have tactically switched allegiance from ZAPU to the new party which also appeared to enjoy urban support.

Against this background, the security sector institutions established in the country between 1980 and 1984 were to prove critical to the future dominance of ruling party. At least three components established are illustrative. These are the intelligence, the police and the armed forces. Zimbabwe's institutions were established under serious threat from both *external* and *internal* forces.<sup>16</sup> On the external front, the *apartheid* South Africa regime served notice that the new Zimbabwe government would be attacked if it harboured militants from the African National Congress the *Umkonto we sizwe* (MK). Furthermore, South Africa proceeded to undermine the stability of the new nation through economic sanctions, sabotage and the launching of destabilization forces both inside and outside the country. The struggle for control of the intelligence entity became a critical battle for survival. South Africa also inherited the proxy forces created by the Rhodesian Security in the form of the counter-revolutionary Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). After 1980, this re-located to Pretoria and had its elements deployed against Zimbabwe's road and rail routes to and from the sea along the Nyamapanda and Beira Corridor. This was part of the destabilization strategy.

An initial attempt to integrate the forces from the three armies had begun soon after independence. This occurred with the help of a nucleus of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force now expanded under the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). The new army had been predicted roughly on the structures inherited from the colonial organization. This had

four infantry brigades, with supporting arms, located in each of the provinces of Mashonaland, Manicaland, Matebeleland and the then Fort Victoria, now Masvingo.

The struggle at the Intelligence organ level was to pit the surviving Smith regime's Central Intelligence Organization and that of ZAPU-ZIPRA intelligence elements versus ZANU and ZANLA's security branch. While the Rhodesian CIO was slowly edged out, senior officials from ZAPU and its military intelligence arm were to find themselves in custody before 1982-83.<sup>17</sup> Political leaders such as Joshua Nkomo and Akim Ndlovu were forced to flee into exile by March 1983 as a consequence of the political and military infighting. In the end, the former ZANU-ZANLA security branch succeeded in wresting the control of the country's intelligence organization from the other two competitors.

At the military level, once internal conflict broke out, the ruling party and government turned towards the creation of "a more loyal cadre" rather than the scrupulously 'national' structures that were being established under the BMATT assistance. The Presidential Guards, a 5th Brigade and a Peoples' Militia<sup>18</sup> were set up with the assistance of the Korean Military Training and Assistance Team between 1982 and 1984. As is now common cause, some of these units were to participate in the debacle in Matabeleland that has been regretted by government.

The political and military differences between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU ended with the signing of the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987. Following this political merger, political, military and diplomatic positions were shared out between members of the enlarged party. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that this was absorption of the all powerful ZAPU of 1963 by the splinter group ZANU based on ethnic representation.

At least two lessons can be drawn of this early period before the tumultuous events of 2000. On the one hand, after nearly thirty years, ZANU (PF) had achieved the impossible, replacing both the white colonial politico-military machine as well as subjugating ZAPU. However, it must be recognized that the mere fact that a particular party achieved dominance, because of the historical and ethnic make up, this posed a threat to the 'defeated' group. Put differently, in as much as one measured the rate of satisfaction within ZANU (PF) as it reached the pinnacle of political power the very converse of that measurement in civil-military relations terms, reflects the fears, anxiety and sense of helplessness of ZAPU adherents. Secondly, the fact that, in the words of the president, "in a moment of madness" the same security elements had been used in Matebeleland showed that there existed no compunction to use the military institutions against the other party albeit sometimes regrettably. This dominance and willingness to unleash the armed state agencies represents the dilemma facing the civil-military environment as the country entered the political contest of the late 1990s and early 2000.

The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change, established in September 1999, brought together disgruntled labour, urban and the general intelligentsia, leaving the ruling party dependent on rural and peasant support.

### **A Civil-Military Relations Audit: 1999-2002**

While the country is in a crisis in which civil-military relations has and continues to play a role, this discussion will isolate some of the more prominent examples to try and build a case for identifying trends, patterns, causes and effects. To this end, at least four instances representing different facets of indicators as argued by Goodpaster and Huntington in *Civil Military Relations* above will be discussed. These will include “the reliance on the military approach” to resuscitate mismanaged and corruption hit organizations; military expenditure and the role of parliament; security institutions and the media and finally, the launching of the National Service scheme.

### **The international military relations rupture: 1999–2002**

In my view, because of the misunderstanding of the correctness of the country’s involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from August 1998, for reasons best known to themselves, some first world countries slapped sanctions on Zimbabwe including suspending relations with its military. In practice, this action has meant the denial of local officers to participate in educational and other exchange programmes as well as putting a higher price on procuring spares, ammunition and other military hardware as these have to be undertaken by middle-men. In March 2001 for example, the long standing military co-operation between the country and BMATT came to an abrupt end.

In late 1999 before the June 2000 elections, the military, under pressure from civil-society organizations, issued two statements asserting that they would not be involved in party politics. This liberal democratic ‘apolitical’ stance was to drastically change after the near defeat of the ruling party in the June 2000 elections. The subsequent bruising campaign for the presidential election in March 2002 witnessed a “no-holds barred” involvement.

### **A perceived expanding role of the military in politics?**

On 9 January 2002 the military chiefs made an extraordinary statement setting out the criteria for candidates to contest for the country’s presidential office. In their own words, this “was a straight-jacket office whose incumbent” had to meet a defined criteria. In other words, the action was designed to impact favourably on the prospects of the ruling party’s candidature.

However, this intervention ignored the Constitutional provisions and the Constitutional Court that had set and accepted nominations from aspiring candidates. The statement by the Service Chiefs, therefore, effectively nullified the forthcoming electoral process.<sup>19</sup> Its impact on opposition politics and other civil society groups was also to evoke condemnation and disillusionment. Dr Lovemore Madhuku, Chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly wrote an open letter to the Defence Forces Chief, General Vitalis Zvinvashe challenging him to withdraw his statement. Secondly, the SADC Chairman of the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security, Mozambican President, Joachim Chissano publicly condemned the statement calling on Zimbabwe's military to desist from engaging in politics.<sup>20</sup> Other foreign governments including that of the Ghana, Senegal, the United States, Britain and South Africa also weighed in condemning the blatant involvement of the military in politics. In their view, the military had crossed the thin dividing line by positioning themselves in the manner that they had done. However, these remonstrations failed to take into account the intricate linkages between Zimbabwe's political and military entities. In moments of crisis, the interwoven liberation movement politico-military relationship acts in support of the survival of the whole.

Secondly, taken as a whole, the combined budget line for defence and security expenditure in Zimbabwe has been "second to none" since 1980.<sup>21</sup> Expenditure and regular increases on the police, militia, war veterans<sup>22</sup> and armed forces has been unequalled compared to civil service and other productive sectors. Curiously, a ZANU (PF) dominated parliament during the second half of 1997, refused to grant permission to the then Minister of Finance, Dr Herbet Murerwa in order to raise taxes required to pay the War Veterans grants, pensions and compensation. This has also adversely affected allocations and state commitments to social welfare demands. Significantly, salary benefits and awards for the security sector escalated by more than 100% in the run up to the much contested March presidential elections. This was against much lower percentages accorded to the other groups in the country. Naturally, this created a sharp division between the groups.

In 1990s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) had demonstrated to government that their defence expenditure put them into 'one of eighteen global worst spenders.' In 1999 and 2001, the defence budget allocation had stood at 15% and 14% respectively, of total national budget.<sup>23</sup> This was before this escalated rapidly to over 20% against a background of acute impoverishment country-wide. According to the authoritative Human Development Report produced by the UNDP, already at this time, over 75% of Zimbabweans were living below the poverty line with their life expectancy plummeting from 62 years for males to less than 40 during the same period. By implication, this meant that any allocation to sectors that were not directly

related to poverty alleviation, would send signals of a lack of concern with the sorry plight of the majority. As we write, last year's high defence expenditure, amongst other things, left delivery of health services in an even more parlous state. According to Nyasha Masuku, Chairperson of the Hospital Doctors Association of Zimbabwe, "Defence expenditure remains the highest year we are not at war...<sup>24</sup> Health has received less than what is required to meet employee's salaries."<sup>25</sup>

The rise in defence expenditure for a country at war such as Zimbabwe was in the Democratic Republic of Congo is understandable. However, authorities appear to have been unable gain the confidence the population by explaining the rationale for such a foreign policy. Judging from the comments by the man in the street, there exists a serious credibility gap. This is unfortunate as the writer firmly believes that the country is engaged in a Pan-Africanist exercise in the DRC that should enjoy the support of the majority.

## **The military and the media**

The current political crisis in Zimbabwe has also involved the role of the media, and the contested legal framework that regulates this dimension has also drawn in participation by the armed forces. The opening shots of the strained relationship involved the media and the political parties with the private press appearing to champion the opposition point of view while the public stable presented a favourable press for the government. This debilitating polarization in the media soon spilled over to the relationship between the armed forces and the private press.

In an incident that is now in the public domain, reporters from the private media speculated on a story about a military coup while yet another stable published the return of a headless soldier killed in the war in the DRC. The military reacted by 'arresting' the journalists concerned, creating problems with the judiciary regarding the line that separates civilians from being subjected to martial law. No remonstrating comment was forthcoming from government, perpetuating the view that they were in agreement with the controversial decision against one of the tenets of democracy, which is a free, vibrant and critical press.

## **The military approach to cases of mismanagement and corruption**

The response to waning political support as a result of the effects of globalization, the internal policy hiatus and a host of other factors elicited different responses from government. First, just prior to the critical 1999-2002 period, the

state resorted to appointing Commissions to run urban areas instead of organizing elections. When this was eventually attended to, the initial fears were not misplaced as the opposition took control of cities such as Masvingo, Bulawayo, Chegutu and eventually the capital Harare. In all these towns and cities, the normal term of office had long expired before the hotly contested local elections were held. Given the opposition triumph in the urban local elections, key utilities found themselves exposed to the 'military approach' i.e. the seconding of the armed forces to revive and expedite cases of serious maladministration.

## **The military approach and its implications**

A series of events have occurred in which the military approach has been relied upon by government, raising civil-military concerns. It has been argued that the military approach can sometimes be found useful by political leaders as it presents obvious objectives; a clear time-line in which to attain these as well as an inherent efficiency that is normally missing from other approaches. However, herein lies the nemesis of relying on this approach: it is difficult to devise an early exit strategy. In practice, once in politics they tend to expand and consolidate their position, effectively undermining the careful balance that is required for a stable civil-military relations framework. In the case of Zimbabwe, the challenge will be how to fashion a useful role for the military within society in the context of the close liberation movement model, broadening this to become national and less threatening to other members of society. As it stands, the 'selective use of laws' and the enthusiasm to detain and arrest elected opposition members by state law enforcement agencies has undermined the fine balance that is recommended above. Consequently, the security institutions are perceived as partisan and lacking in professionalism. A few examples will be given.

The most controversial role played was the use of the armed forces as the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) after both the chair and his deputy had resigned, citing lack of adequate funding and government interest in the body. The security dominated ESC was mandated to run the hotly contested presidential elections and Independent Electoral Supervisors from South Africa and elsewhere, publicly commented on how this should have been avoided in Zimbabwe in the interests of impartiality and electoral confidence. Next, the country ran out of fuel as a result of, amongst other reasons, serious mismanagement and corruption according to the then departing Minister of Transport, Enos Chikowore.

In a justified move for this writer, government deployed a military contingent that has since provided a solution to the crisis. However, what was not tackled was the actual mismanagement and alleged corruption. Some cases are now

coming to the courts as a result of intervention by some public spirited citizens.

Next, government also hurriedly deployed forces to supervise the import and distribution of the staple maize following widely reported corruption and mismanagement at the Grain Marketing Board that normally handles the matter. Again a situation characterized by acute shortages and long queues, where limited supplies were available, had become the norm. Both the responsible Minister of Agriculture and the Head of the GMB are appeared in court to answer charges of corruption and theft.

The use of the military approach to solve the GMB crisis elicited a sharp rebuke from the opposition MDC shadow Minister of Agriculture, Renson Minyekile Gasela. The latter has posited that the ruling party, "ZANU (PF) is now using hunger as a campaign tool."<sup>26</sup> Again, as in the case of the fuel crisis, one is treading on a fine line that demarcates, on the one side an acute debilitating shortage and the need to bring about normalcy and perhaps save lives in the shortest possible time against the dangers of creating an opening for the armed forces in civil matters?

The ready resort to the military approach reveals two important dimensions in the politics of the country. Over the last few years, increasing civilian institutional weaknesses have had to be propped up by elements from the armed forces as the lack of delivery has translated into political problems for the ruling party. Secondly, based on a long tradition of familiarity and service during the liberation period, political leaders and the service chiefs have complete confidence in each other and have no second thoughts in marshalling all on board towards solving the country's problems. While this does not challenge liberation movement politico-military structures, any change in the make up of the key institutions appears likely to result in a crisis.

## Conclusion

Zimbabwe's civil-military relations must be understood in the context of a country attempting to harmonise the liberation movement civil-military relations model with the liberal democratic principles in its nation building project. Whether those responsible for policy and their subordinate practitioners are *aware* of this huge challenge is still a moot point. Secondly, cases of serious mismanagement and corruption have not been directly addressed while their effects have been ameliorated by the urgent resort to the military approach. Even where this is justified, a clear exit strategy and rationale for military involvement needs to be canvassed with the populace in order to allay fears of going beyond the Rubicon. Furthermore, costs related to the funding of the armed forces need to be widely debated in order to break the current conspiracy between the major actors that has occurred by default. While the ruling party is keen to be seen to be the rightful owners of the armed forces the lead-

ing opposition party is openly positioning itself as the future partner. This has pushed the country's economy to the wall and urgent and realistic defense cuts need to be undertaken without delay.

## Endnotes

1. The actual results were 62 for ZANU (PF), 57 for MDC and 1 seat to ZANU (Ndogo).
2. The Organization of African Unity has since dispatched a delegation from its African Commission and People's Rights. See S Nyaira, Human Rights Mission collects damning reports, *Daily News*, 1 July 2002, p 16. In this paper, the armed forces referred to includes the defence and security establishments.
3. M R Rupiya, Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe – Is there a threat?, *Working Paper No 1*, Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, pp 1–12.
4. A J Goodpaster & S P Huntington, *Civil Military Relations*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1977, p 31.
5. Goodpaster et al, op cit, p 7.
6. S P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Harvard University, Massachusetts, 1959, p 17.
7. S P Huntington, op cit, pp 13–17 & p 466.
8. Despite this assertion, however, charges of ethnic differences have also been leveled as having contributed to the split. See N Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1999, p 75. Citing the inaugural ZANU Congress in Gweru, 12–13 May 1963.
9. N Bhebe, op cit, pp 91–93. A and B articulating ZANLA and ZIPRA war strategies and their differences.
10. J McLaughlin, *On The Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Baobab, Harare, 1998, p 14.
11. See ZANLA operational map that resonates with the ethnic and regional distribution: in G Mafuranhunzi alias D Inus, *Guerrilla Snuff*, Baobab Books, Harare, 1995, xiv.
12. M Raeburn, *Black Fire! Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Rhodesia*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, London, 1978, pp 138–181 for ZAPU and ZIPRA guerrilla accounts and pp 182–232 for ZANU and ZANLA military operations.
13. J Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, Methuen, London, 1984, reprint SAPES, Harare, 2001, pp 200–202.
14. *Breaking the Silence Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1988*, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, Harare, 1997, documenting the military excesses committed in Matebeleland. This had been preceded by a government Commission led by Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku whose findings have not been released.

15. N Bhebe, op cit, pp 93–102.
16. Numerous acts of sabotage, attempts to assassinate the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe including an early morning drive past shooting at State House by elements who turned out to be from amongst the ‘dissidents’ characterize this period.
17. The late General Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa were held in prison at this time.
18. The late Deputy Minister William Ndangana led Peoples’ Militia that had served as “eyes and ears of the security forces” during the Dissident era was disbanded in the 1990s as a result of costs. However, a similar element was resuscitated under the National Service “Border Gezi Scheme” just months before the highly contested Presidential election of March 2002.
19. C Nduna, Mugabe’s last gasp, *The Standard*, 13 January 2002, p 6. In the same paper, Lawyers blast army boss, by own Staff referring to the comments by the President of the Law Society of Zimbabwe, S Moyo. M Quintana (ed), How loyal is Zimbabwe’s Army?, *Africa Defence Journal*, at <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid\\_1754000/1754063.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_1754000/1754063.stm)> (14 February 2002).
20. C Hove, Targets of a dictatorship, *The Standard*, 21 April 2002, p 7.
21. See IMF International Financial Statistics report at <<http://www.sadctopcompanies.co.zw/topzimbabwe.html>>, (18 May 2002).
22. As things stand, the payments are now beyond the emoluments received by the average factory.
23. *Zimbabwe: Estimates of Expenditure For the Year Ending December 31, 1999*, presented to Parliament of Zimbabwe by the Minister of Finance, Government Printer, Harare, 2000, pp 32-34 and *Zimbabwe: Estimates of Expenditure, For the Year Ending December 31, 2001* presented to Parliament, pp 34-36.
24. S Zindoga & D Mavunduse, Hopes of Helath for all by 2000 in Southern Africa Fade, *Southern African New Features* at <<http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sanf/1999/10/29-10-1999-nfl.htm>> (18 May 2002).
25. In practice, as a result of mid-year Supplementary allocations Defence ends up at the top.
26. Comments by the political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Shadow Minister of Agriculture, himself a former GMB official, R M Gasela, ZANU (PF) using hunger as campaign tool, *The Daily News*, 1 June 2002, p 4.