

# Civil-military relations in post-Cold War Mozambique

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## The Southern Africa region

In the Southern African context, the abolition of apartheid and advent of majority rule in South Africa in 1994, the end of civil war in Mozambique and other important political changes that have occurred following the democratisation process in the region have brought revolutionary changes to the prevailing security environment.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that the Cold War and apartheid were two of the major factors behind violence and confrontation in the Southern African Region. When the two faded from the scene, the region entered a new era that required an institutional process of restructuring in all spheres of defence and security, particularly civil-military relations.

Despite the continuing civil war in Angola, the complex conflict that erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo which drew in other countries in the region and the concerns over the latest developments in Zimbabwe, there is still room to reason that a decompression of political tension has taken place. There has been demobilisation in many countries, even if this is reflected only in military downsizing. Many armed forces in the region have undergone a conceptual transformation in their core strategic orientations. Despite all the setbacks, there is still reason to affirm that the South African process continues to set an example of racial and political compromise and the relative upholding of professional standards in the challenges posed by such a complex integration of such varied military formations.

South Africa's economic, political, and military power makes it important for the region that her process of transformation should prevail so as to shape regional stability for the near future.

What is at stake is the legitimacy and survival of several newly established democratic governments. Thus, recent experiences suggest that each country should agree on a political vision of security and defence and that governments should initiate and facilitate this debate while involving as many citizens as possible. Experience proves that without overtures to the legislature and civil society, attempts at reforming the defence and security sector get nowhere.

There is a need to develop a strategy in order to implement the political vision. Urgent priority must be given to stemming any further destabilization of the political environment so that there is no further occurrence of conflicts similar to those in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone or the DRC, where security institutions melt down and governments collapse. Equally, it is important that

governments strive to create conditions that allow for the transformation of their defence institutions, that they overcome the lingering causes of their military weaknesses, and that they empower state institutions to follow up and support the entire process of security sector reform.

It is therefore government's duty to ensure the collective security of the citizenry. It is an urgent requirement short of which states will collapse. According to current trends the security of the state hinges on the security of the people and not the converse as was the case in the recent past. Security cannot continue to be run in the same manner. It is impossible to develop civil-military relations without involving all the stakeholders impacted by the newly expanded scope of the security concept, conceptually and practically speaking.

## **Mozambique**

### **Geo-strategic situation**

The world around Mozambique has changed. More quickly and fundamentally than we had thought possible just a few years ago. Indeed, the present conditions are probably better than ever before. The Cold War atmosphere of mutual suspicion and threat has been replaced by a world where threats among nations are no longer the order of the day.

Apartheid has been abolished, and the military threat it constituted no longer operates. The country is now in a sort of negative peace<sup>1</sup>—for the first time in its independent history, it is surrounded by friendly nations seeking to build common values regarding democracy, rule of law, economic prosperity and social justice.

Just less than ten years ago, the situation was completely different for almost every SADC country, but especially for Mozambique: the country was fighting a prolonged proxy war, more than 150,000 soldiers were deployed within its borders on both sides of the conflict, and Mozambique had to face unpredictable external aggression from next door. Therefore Mozambique's security policy was mainly concentrated on defending the country against external threats and upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is fair to acknowledge that both the end of the Cold War and apartheid undoubtedly influenced recent political and socio-economic developments in Mozambique.

All considered, the country has faced an enormous challenge in making the triple transition from a single to a multi-party system, from civil strife to peace and from a centralised to a market economy. In a nutshell Mozambique, like many other vulnerable countries, is going through a transitional process to an unknown future, with little or no experience of liberal democracy, multi-party systems, market economics or stable relations with its neighbours.

The changes made in the fundamental law (Constitution), in 1990, to accommodate the multiparty system, made room for the official existence and operation of other political parties in the country, and facilitated the peace process which led to the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome in October 1992.

Following the GPA, the Mozambique Defence Force (FADM) was created by abolishing the government army, the 'old' Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM-FPLM) and integrating selected elements with the non-statutory components of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) forces, in equal proportion. This complicated process was held up as a brilliant example of national compromise and the resolution of political differences in spite of the difficulties of integrating formerly belligerent forces. The country's first ever multiparty election was held successfully in 1994.

Mozambique is well known in the region as a country that achieved its independence through a fairly successful liberation war, characterised by strict respect to certain tenets of people's war. As in many people's wars one important aspect was that there was no distinction between the military wing and other sectors of the liberation movement, FRELIMO. All members considered themselves as political-military combatants since they assumed that 'the liberation war was a political-military task, being performed by the whole people'<sup>2</sup>. This vision created harmonious and sophisticated civil-military relations made up of the people and their 'armed wing' the people's liberation forces (FPLM). The peculiar civil-military relations forged during the liberation struggle and post-independence experience are now being challenged by the events that took place in the country as a result of the merging of the former belligerents into a new defence force.

One of the important aspects that characterized the country's civil-military relations was that in Mozambique's experience, any policy that sought to undermine this two-legged base was considered bound to lead to internal divisions and conflict. However, since the euphoria of independence has been eroded by long civil strife, and the single movement tenet no longer holds, the pattern of civil-military relations needs to be adjusted. It is the aim of this article to examine the changing nature of civil-military relations in the context of the complex transformation taking place in Mozambique, bearing in mind the interesting experience that has characterised the ten years of national liberation war and the first years of the country's independence—the rhetoric of an enigmatic power constituted by: the people, and their 'armed wing'—the People's Liberation Forces (FPLM).

On the basis of this article, it is proposed that detailed case studies aiming to better understand the emerging patterns of civil-military relations in the region at large, be undertaken, and in particular the prospects for broader democratic control of armed forces in post-war Mozambique be examined.

## Current security developments in Mozambique

Today, together with the colonial legacy, the challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling regime is causing and feeding instability everywhere. The rationale behind this assumption is threefold. First, Mozambique's opening up to multi-party democracy has prompted civil society to demand more of ruling authorities, to be less forgiving of discriminating and dividing policies, bad governance and mismanagement of social tensions. Secondly, the consequence of the spread of the recent civil strife is a shortening of time available for the government to react to new forms of violence that they are, anyhow, unable to counter: the rising criminality is a clear example of this. A third explanation, is that the need for a legitimate national power is no longer clearly justified since the government seems neither legitimate nor necessary in the eyes of common citizen.

Regional policy is no longer aimed at securing the individual nation's integrity. At the same time, regional cooperation has been gradually strengthened, first through the consolidation of SADC restructuring, later through the adoption of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. The current developments have offered Mozambique a wider scope for action. In the field of security, the changes are accompanied by new challenges. The importance of territorial defence has diminished compared with the pre-1992 situation.

On the other hand, Mozambique is more vulnerable to non-military threats. The concept of security itself has widened in the region. Aspects of security other than the use of armed force have been given greater emphasis and this also applies to civilian/ non-military aspects of security. The new risks relate to issues such as ethnic rivalries, extreme poverty and, more generally, political, economic and social insecurity, the resulting problems of refugees and organised crime, as well as transboundary environmental problems.

The instability that characterises parts of the region is a matter of concern for the country. Mozambique is affected by political, economic and social conditions outside its national boundaries. When crises arise in and among Mozambique's co-operation partners, the repercussions are felt far beyond those places. And instability can proliferate fast, as recent events in Zimbabwe demonstrate. It is equally important to note that unless the conflicts are tackled in the right manner and in time, there is a risk that local conflicts may develop into military threats to the neighbouring countries. It should therefore be a high-priority policy in Mozambique to contribute to solutions to conflicts before they develop into more comprehensive armed confrontations. This may be achieved partly through preventive diplomacy and partly through military action in conjunction with peace-keeping operations.

Mozambique's security policy must be adjusted to match the constant changes in its surroundings. It is important for the country not to cling to outdated structures. Both politically and militarily, the country must be prepared

to take up the new challenges and develop the tools that are most effective in the new context. The security policy aspects are thus an important element of Mozambique development policy. Viewed from this angle relevant aspects of civil-military relations are to be addressed.

## FADM professionalism

Politicians in Mozambique have been faced with huge challenges over the last decade in responding to sudden and drastic changes to the internal and regional order. Regardless of the much-praised GPA implementation, the new FADM very soon started to show some cracks. Some of the problem areas are dealt with below.

First, force structures and existing equipment could not be radically changed overnight. It is probably fair to say with hindsight that effective change was also impeded by the race for 'peace dividends' and rhetorical theories about the uselessness of defence forces. A more rational approach will come about through more measured reflection, such as the ongoing strategic defence review.

Second, the GPA provisions did indicate that the FADM should be composed only of volunteer elements characterised as 'professionals'. However, it is clear that the very idea of professionalisation was accompanied by considerable confusion.

Competing debates evolved over the defining characteristics of the 'professional soldier' (i.e., those who voluntarily choose the armed forces as a professional career, as distinct from conscripts who usually serve in the armed forces for a shorter period), the extent to and ways in which professional soldiers differ (especially in their social and political attitudes and values) from civilians and the significance and implications of these differences. This includes professional socialisation, a process through which individuals adopt an awareness of the issues and challenges of the military profession. Some of these aspects were well explored in Morris Janowitz's work *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Janowitz 1960).<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, in the spirit of the GPA, professionalisation was regarded only in so far as it aided or impeded democratic and civilian control of the military, and guaranteed the silence of the guns.<sup>4</sup>

It is apparent that there is some conceptual confusion surrounding the ideas of 'professional' armed forces and 'professionalisation' of the military. For some, professionalism is largely a descriptive term relating to the dominant sociological and political characteristics and values of any society's professional soldiers (i.e., volunteer as distinct from conscript). By this definition all non-conscripted soldiers are implicitly professional, although it is acknowledged that the professional character of any given country's armed

forces may vary. The case of Mozambique clearly demonstrates that the army created under the framework of the GPA (the FADM), although it was non-conscript, was nevertheless a far from professional one.

Reflecting on some of the implications of the integration process one can see the following:

Firstly, internal rifts are apparently rife in the FADM. The process of creating the FADM entailed integration of extremely varied groups into what was meant to be one professional army. Riots and other incidents that took place in Matola and Nampula just after the creation of the FADM point to the difficulties experienced during this process. There have been mounting reports indicating that many soldiers apparently feel that the process of integration has not been “equitable” and this dissatisfaction is often referred to as a time bomb that could explode at any time.

Secondly, the readiness of the defence force is at the lowest thinkable level, with only a few companies available for deployment—aircraft are unavailable, few vehicles are in use, and only a few of the Navy’s boats are operational. This situation is exacerbated by the rising average age of combat personnel, which prompted the Ministry of Defence to submit a proposal for the reintroduction of military conscription which was abandoned in 1992.

There are very low levels of operational spending. Due to the fact that almost 60% of the national budget is still donated by the international community, significant cuts have had to be made. The defence budget was cut by more than 70% in real terms between 1992 and 1999, totalling now less than 2% of the GNP.<sup>5</sup> Despite the procurement of some transport helicopters in 1999, spending cutbacks have led to the closure of many barracks and their hand over to the education and health authorities, a process termed as rationalisation of the defence infrastructure.

Thirdly, the prevalence of HIV/Aids, estimated to be very high in some units, is also likely to have a major impact on readiness levels. Treatment of personnel for Aids-related illnesses will be an enormous annual requirement in the near future.

The negative public impression created by the apparent lack of investment in the army linked with the bad image of existing conditions of service makes recruitment difficult. On the other hand, in the post-war scenario the demands placed on personnel and their expectations have changed considerably; their training and retention now represents a bigger challenge than before. Meanwhile, aggressive recruitment drives by civilian companies have ensured a steady exodus of high quality personnel from the military. Overall, the uniformed personnel quota has been reduced by over 80% since 1992. Demobilisation involved moves for more than 90,000 servicemen and their families.

As a result of these factors, the country faces a lack of volunteers who regard military service as a vocation. The defence forces are competing against

an ever more voracious civilian job market where incentives abound.

This rather bleak picture has to be read in conjunction with the reality of the country's need to build a reasonable defence capability. There is little doubt that, not only will the region remain unstable well into this new era, but the pressure on FADM to act as a force for good will increase. However, to be a force for good requires a credible and effective fighting capability.

There is another dimension to be looked at in the discussion around military professionalism in Mozambique. At first the term professional was often also used to describe all-volunteer (as distinct from conscript) armed forces, often with the implicit normative assumption that states should aim to establish all-volunteer forces. But the term can also be used normatively to describe armed forces which accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government (rather than themselves engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the overall direction of defence policy), who focus on conducting their professional military activities in an effective and efficient manner and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions—whether they are full-time or not.

From this perspective a professional armed force is an 'ideal type' goal, an analytical construct that serves to determine the extent to which real types are similar and how they differ from it. An ideal type does not correspond to concrete reality but is a description to which reality can be compared. Correspondingly, professionalisation is a set of processes whereby armed forces become closer to the ideal type professional military, but also, to the extent one accepts that the development of professional armed forces is a desirable end state, a normative goal.

Therefore following from the twin assumptions outlined above, one can argue that professional armed forces are to be defined by some characteristics, namely:

- *Their Role*, clearly defined and widely accepted.
- *Expertise*, necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently—this includes fixed standards and formal qualifications for entry into the military in terms of education, training, experience, health and age, etc.
- *Responsibility*, clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution and of individual soldiers.
- *Promotion* based on achievement, that includes promotion procedures which are transparent and based on notions of competence or achievement. Appointments to posts made according to specialised qualifications rather than ascribed political or other similar criteria.

Issues of allocating appropriate resources, and keeping well balanced civilian oversight and control mechanisms are also relevant here.

Given these core characteristics of professional armed forces, professionalisation should imply a process involving the defining of the military's role, revising the force structure to be consistent with the redefined role and adopting professional standards (in particular in areas of expertise, responsibility and promotion) so that the armed forces can carry out their missions. From there, professionalisation as a form of policy adaptation, can occur for a wide range of reasons, which can be internal and/or external, imposed or voluntary. In all this, the role of the armed forces is the most important element of any professionalisation.

If we look at the resources required for this to happen, they clearly contradict the notion of peace-dividend. Mozambique has to make its defence forces more attractive. It has to put emphasis on making them more family friendly so that people feel they will have a worthwhile career in the armed forces and not have to sacrifice their right to a happy family life. In this regard, the value for money argument shouldn't prevent the government from making efforts to try to modernise accommodation for example, to make sure that employees and their families are properly and sensitively housed. Just to give an example of this difficulty, out of almost 1,000 men recently given the option of demobilisation, only some 30 volunteered to remain in the FADM. It is important to underline that in democracy people complain freely and many people with military service connections have great concerns about family life. If the conditions of service are not good enough, people will not choose to remain in the armed forces.

These factors tell us that professionalism has varied characteristics in different countries. The current FADM inherited elements of professionalism (e.g. force structures that reflected broad defence goals set by a civilian government), and also elements of 'unprofessionalism' (e.g. advancement on the basis of party loyalty rather than military merit, resulting in 'top heavy' personnel structures).

To compound the problem, FADM inherited force structures, equipment and operating practices (tactics, training, etc.) which no longer reflect and in some cases contradict newly redefined domestic and regional objectives. That is to say that, departing from the threat analysis, the conceptual thinking, organizational structures and the perceived civil-military relations all require transformation.

Against this background, the following factors are important to consider in reforming the security policy of the country. The following crucial aspects need to be addressed:

External factors:

- *Threat perceptions*; what are considered to be the primary external military threats to the country? How serious and immediate are these threats perceived to be?

- *Other missions* How far is it accepted that the country's armed forces should perform missions other than defence of national territory?
- *Foreign pressure*: what are the pressures from the international community in shaping policy adaptation?

Internal factors:

- *Domestic politics and society*. To what extent has there been domestic political consensus, or lack of it, on the role of the armed forces externally (threats, missions, policy, force structure) and domestically (constitutionally defined roles in relation to domestic politics, management of domestic unrest/conflicts, disaster response etc.)? To what extent has there been domestic pressure to maintain or abandon particular policies (e.g. conscription)?
- *Economic constraints*. How far have economic constraints impeded reforms or pushed the country towards a particular model for its armed forces?
- *Military culture*. How do national military cultures influence the professionalisation process?

## Securing democratic control of the armed forces

There are reasons to be worried about the prospects of securing democratic control of the armed forces in the post single-party system in Mozambique. During the previous system, the military was one of the pillars of FRELIMO rule, whose loyalty was secured by a combination of penetration by the party, political education and the provision of substantial resources to support the armed forces. During the war period, armed forces intervened in the domestic politics in the provinces, often alongside or in support of the ruling party.

The national and regional context of political, economic and social transition was likely to take place against a background of domestic and regional instability. In these circumstances, fears of military intervention in domestic politics were not unwarranted.

When the single-party system was abandoned in Mozambique in 1990, there were some fears that the armed forces might intervene to halt the process by force. Surprisingly, both FAM/FPLM and the police stood by as the system they had been a part of was transformed into a multiparty-system.

Since then, patterns of civil-military relations across the country have become more complex, more varied and more difficult to assess. Democratic, civilian control of the military remains open to some questions. The armed forces remain relatively intermeshed with domestic politics and weak state structures. In reality, the understanding of the nature of civil-military relations and the extent and effectiveness of democratic control of the military remains relatively poor.

The debates evolve along three distinct but closely related issues: the non-involvement of the military in domestic politics; democratic control of core ele-

ments of defence policy (size and structure of the armed forces, defence spending, recruitment system and procurement); and the role and missions of the armed forces (including decisions on the external use of force).

The main factors that play a role in shaping civil-military relations in Mozambique can clearly be identified as emerging from the ways in which historical patterns of civil-military relations that were forged during the liberation war and post-independence period still influence contemporary developments. These include:

- the RENAMO guerrilla experience of civil-military relations;
- the broad domestic, political, economic and social context of the country;
- the regional context, in particular the influence of the emerging 'SADC security community' in the post-apartheid era;
- domestic institutional factors (particularly, changing constitutional, governmental and administrative arrangements relating to control of the armed forces); and
- the issues of 'military culture' and military professionalism.

## Understanding the military

There has been a tendency to treat the military as a single, coherent whole. In reality, the situation in Mozambique is often more complicated and this affects the development of democratic civil-military relations. The military may, for example, be divided itself, both as whether to intervene in politics and on whose side to intervene. Additionally, there is often a distinction between the permanent officer corps and mass conscripts, as well as issues concerning the degree to which the officer corps has control over these conscripts. Aside from the regular army, paramilitary forces (including paramilitaries, militarised police, border guards and state security personnel) may also be important. This range of forces may have different roles, constitutional arrangements and a different ethos than the regular armed forces, and may be more likely to interfere in domestic affairs.

Complications may also arise from the presence of armed groups made up of former guerrillas and militiamen and demobilised soldiers who may owe only abstract allegiance to a particular political party, and could at any time, move in and out government control. All these may well fuel the perception of a country with a lack of transparency, accountability and professionalism in the military that needs to be addressed.

## Enforcing democratic control of the FADM

In discussions of the role of the armed forces in Mozambique, the phrases 'civil-military relations', 'democratic control' and 'civilian control' are familiar and widely used terms. They are, however, rarely defined and are often used

inter-changeably, implying that they are the same things. This vague use of these terms often produces confusion or ambiguity in debates on the extent to which democratic models of civil-military relations are being established in the region. A better understanding of these issues requires more explicit definitions of what is meant by civil-military relations in general, and in particular, democratic control of the military.

To capture the global context of these issues, it is suggested that the term 'civil-military relations' should be understood to encompass all aspects of relations between armed forces (as a political, social and economic institution) and the society (state or political/social/ethnic movements) of which they are part. The political function and position of the military—that is to say, their relationship with the institutions and patterns of political power in the society concerned—forms the core of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations, however, also involve wider issues: the broader attitude of the military towards civil society and civil society's perceptions of and attitudes to the military. In this framework, one defines 'democratic control' of the armed forces as control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state.

Another important issue is the relationship between civilian and democratic control of the military. The two are often treated as the same thing, with the terms used interchangeably and sometimes conflated. The relationship between the two needs to be considered in a more nuanced way. It is possible to have civilian control of the military which is not democratic, i.e., to have military either subordinated to a certain political party or to have civilian control despite the absence of liberal democracy. Similarly, it is possible to have high-level democratic, civilian control of the military but largely non-civilian control of defence policy.<sup>6</sup> The important aspect is to establish the appropriate balance between civilian and military control of defence policy.

Democratic, civilian control is meant to be exercised by the Standing Committee for Defence and Security Matters of the Parliament. However, like other state institutions, this committee is still finding its way. Is therefore important that a thorough educational process should be undertaken within society and the defence establishment to clarify the role of both the military and the state institutions in this regard. In this process aspects of historical legacies, the regional context, the western democracy model vs. the eastern model and the prevailing external and internal security threats and conflicts should be considered as impinging factors.

## Military intervention in domestic politics

The role of the military in domestic politics often pits civilian and military leaders against one another. Achieving democratic control of the military is also conceived in terms of securing the disengagement of the armed forces from politics—with the implicit assumption that the primary problem is the military's desire to intervene in domestic politics. The argument here has been that democratic control of the armed forces in 'Western democracies', involves three distinct but inter-related issues. The first issue is the extent to and ways in which civilian government regulates the influence of the armed forces in the domestic politics of the state/society.

Following this thought, the idea of democratic control of the military is based on the core normative assumption that the military should not be involved in domestic politics and should remain the apolitical servant of the democratic government.

During the one-party system in Mozambique, the military did not intervene in domestic politics in its own right but rather because they were one of the instruments of power controlled by the leadership and both penetrated by and subordinated to the party leadership. This has left a tricky legacy in terms of disentangling the armed forces from that system of which they were a significant, but not controlling part.

In the former FAM/FPLM under the single party system, because of the revolutionary model of civil-military relations then prevailing, the army was considered a reservoir of soldiers of the party; the army was meant to be under party control and not that of the government (party and government were one). For that, the top military leaders were at the same time top party leaders and the core issues of defence policy were decided at the top level of the party leadership. In that system, the Minister of Defence and the Defence Chief (Chief of Armed Forces General Staff) were both under direct control of the party hierarchy in which they held high positions. This situation was extended down to the provinces and districts where, practically, the military commanders were the second in command in the party and the governmental structure at the local level at least until 1990.

Through the chain of political military commissars or the assistant commanders for political affairs the military carried many responsibilities to ensure not only political control and indoctrination in the armed forces but also in civil society.

From this point of view, civil-military relations should not necessarily be seen as a one-way process whereby the military actively seeks to intervene in politics against the will of civilian/democratic authorities. The picture is often considerably more complicated, with the civilian elite seeking to draw the military into politics and/or divisions within this elite forcing the military to make

difficult decisions as to where and with whom their loyalty should lie. This has been a fundamental issue in the case of Mozambique where the FADM came about via the merger of former belligerents. Only clear constitutional arrangements and chains of command may exclude the military from the need to face difficult political and moral dilemmas concerning whom they should be loyal to, and how to respond when called upon to perform domestic tasks.

This perception can most readily be grasped by reflecting on some of the implications of events that occurred in the country, during discussions around the issue of whose responsibility it was to chase the *chimwendges* and Young Pioneers, allegedly hiding somewhere in the bush.<sup>7</sup>

Another key issue is whether the military should be tasked with domestic duties like enforcing road discipline, internal law and order and fighting crime. Mozambique is very much divided over the issue of using or not using the military in domestic roles like enforcing law and order, perhaps because of the way the merging of FADM was conducted.

## The armed forces and defence policy in Mozambique

The second element of democratic control of the military relates to the control of defence policy. This term implies a decision or, more usually, a set of inter-related decisions concerning the selection of goals in the defence arena and the means of achieving them. Defence policy context does have its own distinctive groups of actors, individual decision making process, preferred methods and agendas and set of objectives.<sup>8</sup> In particular, it entails the broad direction of the development of the defence establishment, encompassing defence budgeting, force structure, recruitment process, equipment procurement and overall defence strategy. Democratic control of the military implies that the definition and development of defence policy should be under control of democratic, civilian authorities and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities.

A seminar on 'national defence and armed forces' that was held in Maputo in early 1996 with the participation of civil society representatives, government officials, as well as senior officers of the armed forces, underlined that in the current political environment, defence policy is the responsibility of the elected government, answerable to the legislature and to the electorate. It no longer has primary responsibility for the armed forces, although it was acknowledged that the defence force should have some say in the core process.

The seminar did stress the need for broad consultation within the underlying process of conceptual transformation that guides a fundamental shift in the realm of strategy i.e., the basic ideas that shape when, where, and how armed forces should perform their functions. The public should understand this holistic approach to defence policy issues developed by civilian and mili-

tary leaders.

The abrupt end of Cold War and the demise of apartheid, two of the forces that generated armed conflict in the Southern African region, resulted in a dramatic change in the core security environment of the region. For example, Mozambique's strategic calculation, judiciously, if hastily built under the late President Machel, no longer holds true. Mozambique's security no longer needs to be built against the external threatening giant South Africa but rather with all regional counterparts. This paradigm shift requires, above all, a conceptual transformation.

Since the development and implementation of defence policy involves related military-technical issues on which the military may be the most knowledgeable and qualified to provide advice and expertise, the meaning of 'control of defence policy' is problematic and gives rise to difficult issues as to the appropriate balance between civilian control and sensible deference to military expertise.<sup>9</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Life teaches us that history does not end, but historians sooner or later must. Factors like: the patience of readers, the constraints imposed by publishers, the limits of our own energy and insight—all these require that we find convenient points at which to conclude our writing. It is always easier to give an account of an event that is over. This is why historians generally wait until wars are over to begin writing about them. Beginnings, endings, and consequences tend to be, by then, self-evident.

Because apartheid and the Cold War are two things that have collapsed one can attempt to bring more objective accounts of what is now known but wasn't known, at least not as clearly, while both were still in place. The implications of the end of the Cold War and apartheid on the restructuring of strategic security in Southern Africa (including civil-military relations) are not yet fully clear. We may know the beginning of these implications, but as yet we don't know their scale and end. Mozambique is at the beginning of a complex process.

As stated elsewhere in the article, civil-military relations should be understood as involving all aspects of armed forces relations within the society of which they are part. At the core of these relations is the way a state and society answer the questions of how far the military should reflect the composition and values of the wider society, and what is the appropriate role of the military in national policy.

The lack of an holistic approach to these issues often leads to confusion as to what is actually at the centre of the debate on civil-military relations in a changing security environment.

This article has sought to provide a framework for understanding the range

of factors shaping the prospects for establishing democratic civil-military relations in Mozambique. It argues that civil-military relations revolve around complex and inter-related issues like the non-intervention of the military in domestic politics, the military's role in defence policy formulation and design of national strategy. This encompasses defence spending, force structure, procurement, recruitment etc.

In all this, the core normative assumption is that the armed forces should remain neutral, the apolitical servant of democratic, civilian leadership and that their role should be limited to implementing the policy choices of that leadership rather than engaging in domestic politics or playing a central role in determining the direction of any of those aspects.

The Mozambique Defence Force (FADM) was created as a direct result of implementing the Rome Agreement, in a situation where the country did not have legal instruments like the Law on Defence and Security Policy, the Law on National Defence and Armed Forces and the National Strategic Concept among others. Since some of those tools have now been approved by the National Assembly there is a need to adjust their organization and structures and their managerial framework to be in line with the ongoing democratic transformation in the country.

## Endnotes

1. Here it is taken that peace in Galtung's words is a revolutionary process that can be viewed developing from negative into a positive stage.
2. For more see the declaration of national insurrection by Dr Eduardo Mondlane the founder of FRELIMO.
3. For more on that see also, Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 1988.
4. This view felt well in line with Huntington, 1957, on his argument that professionalisation is central to civilian and democratic control of armed forces.
5. Gen Teofilo Joao Interviewed by the author, Maputo, June 2001.
6. In Italy for instance the Ministry of Defence is highly controlled by the military. During the discussions over the issue of whose responsibility was to chess the Chimewndges and Young Pioneers in countryside in late 90s.
7. M Edmonds, Policy Analysis in *JM Shafritz (ed), International Encyclopaedia* Westview Press, Oxford, 1998.
8. One should note that even long-established democracies face periodic controversy over this very issue, with military authorities accusing civilian leaders of ignoring realistic military advice and vice versus.