Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries

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Executive summary

This monograph provides a long-term forecast for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries in Africa using the International Futures forecasting system. It is based on an initial technical paper prepared for the African Development Bank (AfDB) High-level Panel on Fragile States. The forecast is based on a model of dynamic interaction among long-term structural drivers of fragility, which is presented in terms of a mutually reinforcing system or syndrome of fragility. The forecast is presented as a base-case scenario and in terms of an optimistic and pessimistic manipulation of the base-case trends.

Approach

Fragility can be defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide for the security and development of its citizens. The majority of citizens in highly fragile countries in Africa (1) are poor, (2) experience high levels of repeated or cyclical violence, (3) experience economic exclusion and inequality, and (4) suffer from poor/weak governance. The drivers of fragility are clustered in terms of these four groups or dimensions. Each group includes internal, external, deep and proximate drivers of fragility. There is no claim that these dimensions operate at the same level or are mutually exclusive – indeed, they are not. Poverty is in many senses a deeper and less direct driver of fragility than poor governance or violence, for example. There are also considerable interrelationships among these four groups, which are accounted for in the construction of the forecasts.

The list of ‘more fragile’ states consists of the 19 African countries that have benefitted from the financial support of the African Development Bank (AfDB) since 2008, plus seven additional countries (in bold), giving a total of 26: Burundi,
Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

The remaining grouping of African states are considered ‘more resilient’ and are used as a reference group to compare with those in the ‘more fragile’ grouping.

In sum, the monograph finds that ten presently fragile states (Comoros, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Togo) will continue to experience poor governance, chronic poverty, potentially widening inequality, and continued vulnerability to violence and armed conflict well into the future.

The base-case forecast is that by 2030 at least Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda and Zimbabwe would have escaped from the current ‘more fragile’ label: they are forecast to experience sufficient progress in security and development equivalent to today’s more resilient grouping. By 2050 it can be expected that Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone would also have exited the ‘more fragile’ grouping.

The monograph features a base-case forecast, and an optimistic and pessimistic scenario. An optimistic scenario would envision better-than-expected gains in governance, conflict prevention and development. In such a scenario one could expect a combination of advances in technology, or better regional and global governance, or more effective approaches to capacity development at the national and local levels, or breakthroughs in inclusive growth (perhaps related to better-than-expected global growth and the integration of Africa more fully into international trade and financial systems).

On the other hand, there could be many origins for a pessimistic or worst-case scenario such as an increase in local-level conflict over resources such as land, water and grazing, and in crowded urban settings, as the impact of ever higher levels of greenhouse gases disturbs the current climate balance. This forecast could see ten countries remaining in the ‘more fragile’ category by 2050.

The scenario analysis reveals three major future risks: extreme poverty may widen in fragile states, and the gap between ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ states may widen considerably; democratic deficits, in terms of which Africa’s fragile countries evidence less political inclusion than could be expected for similar levels of education and economic growth, could increase; and vulnerability
to conflict could grow worse, particularly over natural resources such as land and water.

**Recommendations**

Based on an understanding of the potential role that organisations such as the AfDB could play in responding to the challenge in Africa's 'more fragile' countries, the monograph concludes with a set of recommendations that are grouped in accordance with the four dimensions of fragility. These comprise recommendations for:

- Thinking long term by planning for long-term fragility and data innovation. This proposes a collective approach with each of the ten long-term ‘more fragile' countries to facilitate the development of individual long-term national development plans to be monitored by a self-assessment process and the establishment of an associated financial facility. The use of big data and innovations in data interpretation can help fill many of the current gaps in understanding causality in Africa, particularly at the substate level.

- Preventing and managing conflict by responding to a bad neighbourhood and the security dilemma, as well as an enhanced partnership with the United Nations (UN). These could address cross-border interference and eventually result in appropriate security sector expenditure and practice. Much more can be done to improve interaction and mutual support between the African Union and the UN, to their mutual advantage.

- Reducing poverty and inequality by reforming the extractive sector (by adopting and implementing recommendations from the Africa Progress Panel, including paying appropriate tax) and handing a large share of future oil/gas income as unconditional taxable cash transfers directly to citizens in poor countries.

- Improving governance by building the foundations of the state, including support in the establishment of tax systems and essential infrastructure, while balancing security demands with other requirements.

The forecasts presented are an aid to understanding one set of possible futures – they are not predictions of the future, which will inevitably unfold quite differently. Such analysis is, however, useful in thinking creatively, yet in a structured and ‘bounded’ way about what futures could be possible in the years
that lie ahead, because it is deeply rooted in past patterns and rates of progress. If human development is about today’s investment in the future – in education, health, infrastructure and stable political institutions – we need to understand how to shape that future.
Introduction

In recent years the concept of ‘state fragility’ in developing countries has received considerable attention in both the academic and policy environment; in sum, the argument is that countries with fragile state institutions are beset by conflict, chronic poverty and poor development progress. In global listings of ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘conflict-affected’ or ‘conflict-vulnerable’ states, countries in Africa typically occupy the top ranks. For example, the 2013 Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index lists 33 countries in Africa in the top 50 in its annual ranking, and five African countries appear at the top of the list.1 International partners, neighbours, and regional organisations are concerned about how their interventions can make positive contributions to statebuilding processes in fragile states and avoid doing harm. Although still contested, in the policy community the term ‘state fragility’ increasingly reflects conceptual convergence around the notion that such fragility can manifest itself in both a lack of political commitment and of capacity in a particular state to deliver key public goods. In turn this reinforces conflict dynamics, and that fragility needs to be assessed against a spectrum with state failure at one extreme and resilience at the other, rather than as a static category.2

Based on a recent Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research report by Cilliers
and Schünemann that provided a forecast of intrastate violence in Africa, the African Development Bank (AfDB) requested the support of the African Futures project at the ISS to provide a forecast of fragility to inform the work of its recently established High Level Panel on State Fragility. The present technical monograph benefits from the work done for the AfDB, as well as additional support provided by the Open Society Foundation South Africa and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. It seeks to assess long-term structural dynamics in Africa through a forecast of the likely future for Africa’s 26 ‘more fragile’ countries using a time horizon of 2030 and 2050. For the forecasts the analysis relies on the International Futures (IFs) system, an integrated forecasting system hosted at the University of Denver.

Although diverse, fragile contexts are commonly characterised by high levels of political instability; severely degraded institutional and administrative capacity; deteriorated or non-functioning physical infrastructure; low human development; demographic instabilities featuring large cohorts of youth without access to livelihoods or deeply entrenched group inequalities; and acute levels of poverty. Violent conflict particularly affects economic performance and individual livelihoods, and conflict episodes can reverse years of progress in terms of life expectancy or infant mortality. At least one reason for the poor development outcomes in fragile states is the deep and long-lasting effects of conflict on health systems and on the provision of basic services such as maternal and child health care.

As discussed below, fragile-state contexts are also characterised by recurring or cyclical patterns of violence, so that fragility itself can be self-reinforcing. The 2011 World development report finds that ‘where agreements among elites to end fighting do not result in a transformation in state-society institutions and better governance outcomes, they remain vulnerable to the same stresses that precipitated fighting in the first place’. The chronic poverty and deteriorated governance capacities that conflicts leave in their wake fuel subsequent cycles of violence. The AfDB’s Millennium Development Goals report for 2013 succinctly sums up the most important findings about the deleterious effect of conflict on human development: ‘Conflicts impinge on poverty reduction ... Development can be achieved only during peace.’

A central characteristic of fragility is the persistence of chronic poverty, as a result of which there is a continued, high risk of human insecurity, recurring cycles of violence and poor/weak governance. The fact that fragile
and conflict-affected countries made dramatically less progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) during the 2000s has added a new urgency to the assessment of contexts and global comparisons of fragility, and the need to measure progress or benchmark pathways out of fragility. Recently there has been some progress in seeing progress in some contexts away from fragility, and in the last two years some fragile states have begun to make progress on some of the MDGs. In Africa, countries such as Guinea have reduced extreme poverty and others such as Burundi have begun to make progress in education goals. Observers oscillate between hope for progress and despair about the long-term possibilities for development in fragile states.

Deriving better conceptualisation and improved analytical measures for fragility are central as the next generation of sustainable development goals are finalised beyond the year 2015. Common sense would suggest that each fragile context has its own peculiar set of root causes and its own pathway and patterns of improvement or deterioration, and countries emerge from fragility under very different conditions. At the outset it is therefore necessary to point to an important caveat related to the role that desktop ‘structural analysis’ can play compared to contextual field-based investigation and monitoring. Carment and Samy have provided a solid justification for the need to combine nuanced, context-specific assessments of fragility with comparative, quantitative indictors across contexts:

There is a ... need to combine an understanding of root causes with a systematic understanding of the dynamic and agency-driven processes and exogenous shocks that often constitute the immediate triggers for deepening crisis, failure, and state collapse – hence the need for a focus on both qualitative case studies as well as macro-level comparisons.

This monograph, organised in five sections, provides such a macro-level analysis; it is intended to facilitate comparison and broad-based conclusions about the drivers of fragility. Following this introduction, the first section sets out the authors’ conceptualisation of the debate on the root causes of fragility and argues that fragility should be understood as a syndrome or set of related conditions that operate in a system that is mutually reinforcing. The framework captures some of the key relationships among four dimensions or groups of drivers of fragility: poor or weak governance; inequality and economic exclusion;
conflict and violence; and poverty. The variables and their composition that are used for the subsequent forecast for a list of Africa’s ‘more fragile’ countries are then set out, which are motivated in the second section.

The IFs tool is then used in the fourth section to provide dynamic forecasts of three alternative futures for the ‘more fragile’ states in Africa looking toward 2030 and further to 2050, i.e. a ‘base-case’ scenario; a more positive scenario, in which there are mutually reinforcing gains in better security, more development and better governance; and a pessimistic scenario, in which increases in armed conflict reinforce the drivers of fragility, undermining development and effective governance. The findings presented in this section are a forecast (one of many that are possible using different tools), not a prediction, and the caution is reiterated about the limits of such endeavours.

The ‘base-case’ forecast reveals the likelihood of frustratingly slow progress in reducing fragility. The authors find principally that in 2013 Africa’s ‘more fragile’ states face a collective paradox: on the positive side, the frequency and intensity of armed conflict as it is traditionally measured have been halved compared to peak levels in the early 1990s, new institutions and approaches to preventing conflict have been created, and recent gains in development are encouraging. The base-case forecasts, however, show that these positive developments yield only modest improvement in Africa’s ‘more fragile’ states over time – fragility will be doggedly persistent. Improvements in governance and new approaches to wealth sharing and providing social safety nets for the chronically poor seem essential to making progress in improving development outcomes and as a part of regional efforts to prevent and manage conflict.

In the pessimistic scenario, vulnerability to conflict may worsen in many countries and localised contexts in Africa, primarily as a result of climate-change-induced increases in resource scarcity (water; the availability of arable land), food insecurity, natural resource competition (over arable land and minerals), and social-change factors such as migration. This does not mean that fragility will worsen from current trajectories, but it does mean that expected gains may not occur and that progress in reducing fragility will be frustrated by the worsening of root-cause drivers in some areas.

The type of long-term and structurally based forecasting done in this monograph does not readily lend itself to specific short-term policy interventions, but instead such forecasting helps to identify those interventions today that may pivot the future towards a more optimistic scenario. The final section provides
a set of strategic recommendations for further enhancement of long-term approaches to the multi-dimensional conflict prevention, governance and development challenges in Africa’s ‘more fragile’ states, given the expected long-term nature of the fragility challenges they face.

It is hoped that this analysis and the policy recommendations are useful in two ways: firstly, to stimulate discussion about the reconciliation of short-term imperatives with long-term engagement and commitment in fragile states; and, secondly, to help identify the key interventions today that may pivot the future or help realise a more positive long-term scenario for facilitating pathways from fragility in Africa’s most-affected countries.

Finally, three annexes summarise the efforts by the World Bank and AfDB to respond to fragility (Annex A), provide additional technical notes on the forecasting tool and associated methodology (Annex B), and explain the methodology for compiling the list of ‘more fragile’ countries (Annex C).

The authors would like to express their gratitude to a number of reviewers who have contributed to this publication, namely Prof Rita Abrahamsen from the University of Ottawa, Prof Barry Hughes from the University of Denver, Dr Julia Schünemann and Ms Hanna Camp from the Institute for Security Studies, anonymous reviewers from the AfDB, and Prof Robert Muggah from the Igarpé Institute in Rio de Janeiro. We also acknowledge comments from the AfDB high-level panel members at the Monrovia meeting on 2 September 2013. The analysis and conclusions presented in this monograph are subject to controversy and interpretation; these interpretations, as well as omissions and inaccuracies, are the authors’ own.
Although African states that have experienced fragility vary widely, making some initial generalisations is essential to producing the basis for the subsequent forecasts and is important to make the mental model explicit on which they are based.

Fragility can be defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide for basic human security or create the public goods and conditions needed for gains in human development. Particularly, vulnerable groups such as the chronically poor, women, or historically disadvantaged groups experience high levels of recurring violence and suffer most from poor/weak governance. This definition distinguishes fragile states from captured, kleptocratic states or from authoritarian monarchies that may have the capabilities for effective governance, but whose leadership fails to enable the state to perform these functions, such as Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland.

Drawing on scholarly and practitioner literature, a fourfold grouping of the drivers of fragility is offered. These are: (1) poor or weak governance, (2) high levels of conflict/violence, (3) high levels of inequality and economic exclusion, and (4) poverty. Collectively, these four groups or dimensions result in poor state
performance or fragility – but they obviously conflate deeper and more direct drivers as well as the internal and external drivers of fragility referred to earlier. Each dimension includes internal, external, deep and proximate drivers of fragility, and the monograph argues that fragility emerges from their interaction. This is not to imply that these dimensions operate at the same level or that they are mutually exclusive – they are not. Poverty is in many senses a deeper and less direct driver of fragility than governance or violence, for example. Each dimension therefore consists of a cluster of drivers and there are considerable interrelationships, which are explored below.

Figure 1 presents a summary view of the context within which state fragility occurs, presenting high levels poverty in all its complex manifestations as the essential context and deep driver of fragility.

**Figure 1: Foundational dimensions of fragility**

Fragile countries evidence ongoing and successively high levels of violence, which is a debilitating condition that reverses development gains and destroys infrastructure. Conflict-affected countries, communities or cities are particularly fragile in the sense that they appear to be caught in a vicious cycle in which conflict undermines development and governance, and the absence of security provides an enabling environment that further exacerbates conflict drivers. Poverty and violence result in weak or limited governance capacity in particular – an aspect that is explored in some depth in a separate section below. Inequality is often driven (and enabled) by revenue earned from large resource flows from
primarily commodity exports, and these resource flows often constitute the lion's share of overall country-level gross domestic product (GDP).

What distinguishes many fragile countries from others is the existence of high levels of inequality and economic exclusion, the skewed allocation of benefits to particular ethnic/clan groupings, a pugnacious urban/rural imbalance in the allocation of resources (as can often be seen in the use of tax revenues for education systems that benefit urban elites), and particularly high levels of recurring violence.

The task of constructing a forecast is approached by first briefly discussing the historical context that in so many instances has given rise to poor state performance in post-independence Africa. This allows a discussion of governance in fragile states and the associated challenges of peace- and statebuilding. Three views are then presented on the causes of armed conflict and armed violence, a common characteristic of fragile countries. A subsequent section reviews the relationship between fragility and inequality, and concludes with a discussion of the broader context of chronic poverty in the most fragile contexts. Based on these considerations, the final section uses these dimensions as a departure point to forecast the possible futures for Africa’s ‘more fragile’ countries and a context to inform the subsequent recommendations.

The challenge of causality

Any debate about the root causes of fragility such as poor or inadequate governance, conflict, poverty and inequality often come round to a discussion of the extent and direction of causality. Causality – the relationship between a set of factors (causes) and their direct (or even indirect) effect(s) – is the subject of much debate, because identifying what is a ‘root’ or original cause begs the question of how far back historically, or socially ‘deep’, one wishes to go in pursuit of what is the original cause in a complex chain of human, geographic and environmental systems. Equally, there is the question of direction – what drives and what is driven? Thus, the causation debate about fragility should be approached with a degree of caution and humility, and with the recognition that ‘root causes’ can be found in both internal (or endogenous) factors and external (or exogenous) factors that may affect the internal situation.

As a first distinction, it is helpful to separate out largely external from internal considerations when considering the situation in African countries. For example,
regional and global power struggles have allowed numerous African governments to be protected from challenge or external interference facilitated the development of armed opposition groups during the cold war era. The result was a series of proxy wars. Other external drivers of internal fragility may originate from transnational crime and drug smuggling, conflict in neighbouring countries and subsequent refugee flows, and the ready availability of arms across porous borders. Although difficult to measure, account needs to taken of the impact of the diffusion of ideas and ideologies, and global ties to the broader international system through, for example, trade and a large diaspora community, which are particularly evident in the large Ethiopian and Nigerian communities resident in key Western countries, as well as the impact of the Somali diaspora on the conflict in that beleaguered country and its surrounding region. Various forms of transnational crime – drug trafficking in particular – can threaten political, economic and social development. In Guinea-Bissau, which is increasingly considered to be Africa’s first ‘narco-state’, the drug trade has exacerbated political instability, including the double assassination of President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira and Chief of Defence Staff General Batista Tagame Na Wai. Organised crime fosters corruption and violence, undermines the rule of law and good governance, jeopardises economic growth, and poses potential public health risks.

Fragility is experienced locally and not necessarily nationally as such. For example, in areas experiencing fragility such as contemporary South Sudan, there are parts of the same country that may be reasonably secure and positioned well for a longer-term development-oriented approach, while in Nigeria, an apparently stable country, severe problems of substate fragility are evident in areas affected by Boko Haram attacks and the subsequent state-of-emergency counterinsurgency response by the government. Currently there is much debate about the challenges evident in a number of Africa’s cities, and evidence is mounting that the slums of Nairobi, Lagos, and elsewhere are a potential hotbed of city-level fragility and instability.

Social action theory holds that interactions among complex factors gain their own ‘logic’ over time, particularly if the nature of social interaction changes (such as from generally peaceful interaction to violence or extreme levels of social atomisation). Thus, repression may trigger a revolt, but once violence erupts, it gains momentum and features self-reinforcing dynamics (perhaps best illustrated by the continued turbulence in Egypt in 2012 and into 2013). The best efforts to address the political, social, and economic causes that gave rise to the
Arab Spring and re-establish peace and stability may be unsuccessful. Violence attracts new actors and leadership, forces of moderation are sidelined, and violence begets violence as a cycle of retribution is established at a time when peaceful norms of cohabitation have lost their immediate salience.

This view of the changing logic of social action goes beyond a differentiation between the need to establish short-term stability and then to proceed with reforms that address the root causes of instability. Not only do demands escalate and change over time, particularly amid times of new, uncharacteristic patterns of social interaction, but also efforts to respond to root causes sometimes appear to have little impact, partly because many of them require considerable time and investment. If the Tuareg revolt in northern Mali is really a result of decades of the political and economic marginalisation of northern Malians from the country’s political and economic largesse, it will probably take considerable effort, resources and time to reverse this situation – and even then the Tuaregs may now demand/desire more than greater attention or autonomy from Bamako.

This perspective presents conflict analysts (in particular) with a number of obvious dilemmas in identifying and responding to instability and associated fragility. How, indeed, does one build peace if efforts to respond to the root causes are unsuccessful? There is no scholarly consensus, for example, on the causal pathways linking climate-change-induced factors, such as desertification, and the outbreak of conflict in Sudan (Darfur) and more recently in Mali.21

Similar to causation in biological systems, causation in social systems is complex, often indirect, and there may also be ‘pushback’ as different factors interact with one another. Thus, improvements in economic growth rates – a prerequisite to building state capacity by providing increased tax and other revenues – may simultaneously increase inequality and hence reduce stability, offsetting any capacity gains. In this way there are often important feedback loops across the various dimensions, some of which may be counterintuitive. By adopting systemic causation it must be assumed that the ‘system often pushes back’ due to inertia, countervailing factors or other considerations. The IFs tool used here for forecasting is unique in this regard, given the comprehensive nature of the associated modelling that has been developed over several decades, the interrelationships among the hundreds of variables and the care taken in linking theory to forecast. Today the literature on the causes of fragility (particularly as informed by the analysis of the root causes of criminal and interpersonal violence, political violence, and civil war) has moved increasingly
toward an appreciation of the interaction among various types of root causes in historical and regional contexts.

Social and economic stress, accompanied by political tensions and weak governance capacity, leaves post-war countries highly vulnerable to renewed or recurrent violence. Often, too, new social tensions emerge in post-war contexts, such as increased criminality, parallel economies, youth violence, and gender-based and sexual violence. Countries such as South Africa and Liberia have seen upsurges in crime in post-conflict environments to include gender-based violence in the immediate post-war period. Violence can also emerge along ethnic or sectarian lines, e.g. in Nigeria's fault lines of religious difference, along Nuer-Dinka lines in South Sudan, and more recently in Guinea-Bissau.

**Africa: the compression of the state formation process and sequencing**

In Africa's fragile states the process of state formation has followed a particular route: a brief reference to the historical context is therefore important in understanding current fragility.

Theories and approaches to state formation and statebuilding are generally embedded in the influential writings of Max Weber on the sociology of the state and his views on legitimacy, and on subsequent work on the processes that led to the formation of European states, most of which emerged from war, or waged war, as part and parcel of the state formation processes. In this analysis, state formation generally occurred as the result of the state being able first to provide security (although the nature of the subsequent state depended on the type of conflict) – but eventually also development, security of employment and social welfare – to its citizens. In exchange for taxation and the support of its citizens, the state was required in some respects to become more inclusive. From such interactions and its associated analysis, a distinction emerged between state and society, where the former ‘is equated with its institutions, state collapse is understood in terms of the collapse of state institutions, and statebuilding implies their reconstruction’.

Counter to historical experiences in the West (from where much of the associated theory of state formation and the extension of capacity emanates), the process of state formation currently is sometimes viewed as a technical process of institution building (hence the general use of the term 'statebuilding'
in development assistance discourse) somehow divorced from society and politics, instead of the messy, mostly endogenous, and personalised processes of state formation often evident from yesteryear in which strong leaders were the driving force behind extending the state’s authority.

The result is to equate state formation with the construction of systems and institutions that draw on those evident in modern, Western, developed countries, many of which went through this process many generations ago and over an extended period of time. ‘Development’ is therefore compressed as a process of closing the gap between the idealised version of a modern state (reflected in the rational-legal example of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD – countries) and the current underdeveloped situation in much of Africa.

Key donor policies, as well as those of the World Bank and others, therefore understandably focus on the ‘capacity of the state to deliver basic public goods, in particular security, and the degree to which it is responsible and accountable, especially democratically accountable, to citizen demands’. This may be an appropriate end state, but these notions are difficult to reconcile in a typically fragile country that has very limited government capacity and where stability is based on successive elite agreements and constant bargaining, not popular consent and participation.

Today state formation in Africa and elsewhere is a process that takes different forms across a spectrum, depending on where a country finds itself, ranging from state fragility and crisis, on the one hand, to stable and resilient states, on the other. Conflict and violence constitute an integral part of the historical statebuilding process, and the category ‘post-conflict’ has little meaning in a continent where most countries have experienced cycles of violence (including in some instances genocide), secessionist claims or foreign armed intervention.

All societies experience conflict, and those with the youthful population structures, high levels of social exclusion and limited job opportunities evident in most African countries are more prone to intra-state violence than others. There is every indication that the future of many African countries will include substantial levels of internal violence, despite (and sometimes because of) the sterling levels of economic growth evident in recent years. Fragility will be widespread and apparently stable countries may experience occasional and sometimes intense episodes of instability and turmoil, such as that experienced in Kenya in 2007/8, Nigeria in 2012 and 2013, and South Africa in 2013.
Hughes et al build on the extensive literature on state formation and state-building globally: they observe that the development of the modern state involves governance transitions towards greater security, enhanced capacity, and broader and deeper inclusion. Historically, these three fundamental transitions occurred somewhat sequentially and over a lengthy time period of several centuries. In Africa, this endogenous process was cut short by colonisation during the late nineteenth century, which eventually demarcated the boundaries of African countries with little consideration for the preceding groupings built around tribe, ethnicity and kinship. The resulting national boundaries sometimes cut across ethnic groupings and allocated nominal citizenship on arbitrary grounds.

When African countries became independent during the 1950s and 1960s they entered a system that demanded stark choices in orientation to either the West or East. Instead of being largely dependent for their stability and prosperity on their own capacity and the support of domestic populations, the weakness of the post-colonial state, combined with the bipolar structure of the international system and the dependence of many on official development assistance (and military garrisons from former colonial powers), saw many African leaderships externalise their need for security, capacity and inclusion. Instead of drawing on the support of their citizens, security and capacity were sought from external parties, requiring limited domestic inclusion or an assumption of legitimacy based on liberation struggle credentials.

Much has been written about the subsequent deficiencies, including poor service delivery, the absence of tax systems, and the inability of states in Africa to project their power beyond capitals or provincial hubs. The absence of the state has also undermined its output- or service-related legitimacy. In the absence of a solid domestic basis for their legitimacy, government services in many areas outside of the capital city often atrophied, withered and/or became dysfunctional, and many African regimes became ‘neo-patrimonial’ or based on patterns of clientelism and patronage, providing internal or domestic drivers for demands for multipartyism beginning in the early 1990s. Global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and the industrialised community of nations in the West had by then embarked on a programme of development assistance, some of which served as an instrument in the bipolar struggle for power. From 1989 onwards development assistance shifted ground, with its modern focus on democracy, good governance and anti-corruption campaigns.
becoming part of the efforts to correct some of the more egregious misuse of public money and abuse of power.

The potential for the normalisation of African politics as primarily domestically oriented would only occur in the years following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which allowed an escape from what was an effective policy straitjacket. Today the momentum from a burgeoning population and the growth of China, India and others present a much more positive economic picture. Africa’s rates of economic growth appear to have reversed the previous trend and provide the means to continue with the endogenous African state formation project.

As will be discussed, the key differences today compared to the historical process described above relate to (1) the sequencing of the associated transitions and (2) a more internationalised context (there is a much greater infusion of global/external concepts and ideas that effectively reduce the ability/agency of government to determine outcomes compared to a few decades earlier). In addition, (3) the private and financial sectors today are much more powerful actors – particularly in developed countries, but also globally – than at any time previously, with multinational corporations operating at a level between and above states. These historical developments, the current context of globalisation and the rise of private capital therefore provide important differences in terms of which organisations and the international community, including international financial institutions, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the AfDB and the African Union (AU), respond to the numerous instances of continued state fragility.

The liberal view of peacebuilding in the context of a global, interconnected world has generally sought to reverse the original historical sequence of security, capacity, and inclusion by insisting that statebuilding first requires the fostering of legitimate and credibly inclusive systems ahead of the other two transitions, i.e. the establishment of security and capacity. The results have not been encouraging and have often been messy; in one recent example, a divided international community eventually insisted on elections in Mali during late July 2013 as a prerequisite to various measures of support.

Legitimacy and authority are not only a function of the effectiveness and efficacy of state institutions and state–society relations. A government may obtain sociopolitical cohesion and legitimacy from other sources than the effective delivery of services.\textsuperscript{30} The best historical example of this can be found in numerous post-independence countries (and still generally in those in Southern Africa), where liberation parties have morphed into governing parties,
often delivering poor public services (having learnt to mobilise against, but not to govern for), yet generally maintain their authority and legitimacy for at least a generation in the eyes of the broader public, based on their ability to continue to extract loyalty along the lines of the struggle for liberation.

Zaum adds an additional dimension in pointing to the extent to which corruption can be an important part of the ‘glue’ that holds a country together, literally buying stability and support from key elites. Nigeria is a commonly cited case that has seen the country successively increase the number of states from three to the current 36 to accommodate additional influential elites that have to be brought in and paid out through the patronage system. Moreover, many of the associated statebuilding tasks are extremely complex and there is little clarity on how best to proceed with them. For instance, dilemmas abound as to how outsiders can help to provide security in an unstable and violent environment, or to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants successfully in a post-war context. It remains practically impossible to address high levels of unemployment in countries where the economy is destroyed, or to strengthen the rule of law (as required for contracting purposes) in a society where neither coherent rule nor well-codified law has existed for several decades, if ever.

Circumstances also differ from country to country. In a country such as Burundi, some argue that ethnic power sharing as a form of governance is central to the painful peacebuilding success that has been achieved there. Over time, peacebuilding in Burundi has become statebuilding. Curtis thus argues that ‘despite talk of liberal peace, local participation, bottom-up peacebuilding, and inclusive governance, in practice peacebuilding has been expressed as stability, containment, and control’. Ultimately, this is an issue of sequencing, also known as a stabilisation-first approach, tracking the historical sequence of security, capacity and inclusion outlined earlier.

Building on the work done at Carleton University, Carment and Samy argue that ‘successful transitions from fragility can be understood as a process of improvement in the proper sequence of authority, legitimacy and capacity, through among other things, compliance with the law and incorporation of peoples into a functioning economy’. For countries stuck in a fragility trap, ‘increasing fragility appears to begin with deterioration in authority structures that are negatively reinforced by internal and external forces’.

One could thus argue that the sequencing of positive changes in such countries would be one that focuses on addressing security structures and
then legitimacy to buttress that authority and, finally, capacity. 35 Additionally, Carment and Samy argue that shifts out of fragility are not obtained by economic transformation alone, especially if economic gains do not lead to positive changes in authority and legitimacy. 36 An alternative approach would be one based on social justice, with its focus on the empowerment of previously marginalised groups, and hence its focus on the structural drivers of violence. Efforts at a stabilisation-first approach necessarily accentuate predominant power relations and complicate subsequent efforts to deal with some of the core drivers of instability, but an approach rooted in social justice is often defeated by the need to balance elite interests. This tension between stability and justice is inherent to all statebuilding processes.

For many African countries (and, indeed, also elsewhere in the world) the three processes toward the consolidation of state security, state capacity and inclusion now proceed much more simultaneously, and in mixed and various patterns, complicated by the fact that ‘statebuilding is inevitably a historical process that is open ended and continually subject to contestation’. 37

The summary impact is a compressed process, but even so, one that takes time. Historically, such transformations have taken more than a generation, according to historical analyses of pathways from fragility in contemporary middle-income countries. 38 In addition to this view of the simultaneous and compressed process of statebuilding in much of Africa, this study favours a holistic and integrated view of statebuilding, based on an understanding of national power dynamics, elite agreements, and the constant bargaining and accommodation that characterise politics in fragile countries, perhaps erring on the side of realpolitik. Against this background, classifying conflict as ‘development in reverse’ is misleading, since conflict is often part of development. For example, the extent to which violence in Africa has accompanied elections often reflects the degree to which elections have become the main area of contestation (i.e. participating violently in the broad political process) rather than armed confrontation that seeks to entirely replace the current government or system. In many instances, therefore, violence around elections reflects the advance of democratisation rather than the reverse.

Pathways to state legitimacy in the context of compressed, simultaneous historical processes thus appear to start with strengthening governance across the security, including its capacity and inclusion dimensions. In fragile states there is typically a legacy of mistrust and animosity towards state institutions
such as the police and judiciary, and little confidence in the state’s ability to deliver essential services. Thus, the pathway from fragility is found in transforming institutions to regain confidence in governance as being capable of delivering security, providing justice or creating jobs as part and parcel of the actual delivery of these services.\(^{39}\)

**Governance in fragile states**

There is good reason to focus on poor or weak governance as an initial or critical factor in understanding state fragility for policy intervention purposes. There is, for example, ample evidence that good governance improves economic growth rates, but equally that economic growth is required to improve government capacity, security and inclusion. Hyden et al found that variation and positive gains in governance in a country across six principal domains – civil society, ‘political society’, government, bureaucracy, economic society and the judiciary – best explained development progress over time.\(^{40}\) Governance is critical to development, even as debate continues over whether democracy as such leads to development, particularly in the early stages.

International development partners have promoted post-conflict governance practices in a number of different ways, including electoral assistance and democracy promotion, technical support, constitutional advice, capacity-building programmes and training, and – increasingly – ‘the promotion of power-sharing or national unity governments’.\(^{41}\) The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, has developed in its 2012 publication by the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery entitled *Governance for peace: renewing the social contract* an approach that emphasises the restoration or recovery of state responsiveness or service delivery functions, resilience through improvement in state–society relations and conflict prevention, and inclusive political processes that go beyond narrow political settlements; for UNDP, addressing fragility starts with renewing the social contract.

‘After civil war, establishing a framework for deciding on who governs and under what authority is not easy, since political contestation is at the heart of the civil conflict in the first place.’\(^{42}\) Often subsequent political peace agreements are fragile and weak; in the long term, statebuilding is about institution building and creating the systemic and organisational capacities for a professional public administration.
Statebuilding, in the view of this study, is first a political process that largely deals with internal changes in relationships along many fronts – political, economic and social/cultural. Neopatrimonial structures of governance are particularly difficult to change from the outside. While external actors and global politics necessarily impact on statebuilding, this is essentially about defining and redefining the relationships between citizens and government (vertically) and establishing power relationships among groups in society (horizontally).

Figure 2 loosely represents in a more useful and dynamic way the relationships among violence and war, poverty, inequality/exclusion, and poor/weak governance earlier presented in Figure 1. This reflects the preceding discussion that politics and governance, in whatever manifestation, lie at the heart of the challenge of rebuilding fragile states, and are necessarily key to the associated policy responses of external agencies.

**Figure 2:** Stylised representation of key relationships

Today, governments are expected to accumulate and distribute resources (taxes, public expenditure, etc.) according to the priorities set by (an elected) leadership and can operate at different levels, such as local, provincial and national. To achieve these ends, governments generally include a professional public administration and a military and criminal justice system to defend and regulate public order in terms of common standards known as the rule of law. Governments are only able to build sufficient capacity for these systems if they gather sufficient resources through taxes, donations or trade.
Instead of state capacity as the basis of legitimacy, in fragile states such legitimacy is often found more in the political agreements that serve as the basis for stability and the extent to which these agreements and elite pacts provide access to resources that in turn are required to build and maintain political support. This relationship is represented in Figure 3. That this is not restricted only to extreme instances was, for example, particularly evident in Kenya in recent years, where a deeply ingrained culture of corruption and abuse pervaded literally every aspect of politics. This is also characteristic of many poorer countries globally.

In the context of more fragile states, every aspect of the governmental relationship is directly (and often personally) political. Separate institutions do not exist, the policy framework is uncertain, and the summary result is often far removed from the rational-legal processes and systems taught in courses dealing with political sociology. Many functions of governance are performed in ethnic or clan networks and through other informal faith-based institutions.

**Figure 3: Key relationships in the fragile state context**

In some instances the strength of the state also has to be defined in terms of its capacity to command loyalty – the right to rule. Once the ‘idea’ of a single Somalia lost saliency, it took several decades and more than twenty peace processes to rebuild confidence in that notion. And even then it took years of
extremely brutal oppression by al-Shabaab and its affiliates before disaggregation and clan control lost its initial appeal – a process that is still incomplete.

If in more fragile states everything that relates to the state and government is political, and progress is largely dependent on the keystone political pact or agreement, the associated political settlement(s), not the ballot, lie(s) at the heart of stability and development. For example, in South Sudan the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-led government initially championed a process of promoting political integration rather than tolerance for political opposition as its preferred political model. Most recently, the government has effectively imploded as the divisions within the governing party burst into the open. In the DRC, the absence of a national political framework, despite successive attempts, continues to stymie progress in a context where insider/outsider politics of patronage dominate. In both countries the ruling elite appear to follow the example of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola, where governing parties use state resources to purchase stability by buying in competing elites at the cost of state capacity and the delivery of services – although Nigeria is much further advanced on the road to competitive politics than any of the others.

Following a war or crisis in an already fractious and weak country, the rules of the game may be established at the negotiating table, but continue to be played out in key domains well before and long after formal negotiations have ended. In the process these rules may be changed, including the basis on which power is distributed – which may affect the political process through which state and society are connected.45 ‘States are consolidated less by legal process than by a layering of agreements, and a process of “political sedimentation”’.46

This brings us to a major challenge, i.e. the tension between internal or local ownership (the elite pact or elite stalemate) and normative calls from outside and within from civil society for social justice, the advancement of gender equality and other issues that seek to embed a system that, over time, will represent a structural break with a violent past that resulted in state fragility in the first place. The accepted understanding is that such agreements need to be domestically owned and internationally supported; as Castillejo observes: ‘in practice, international actors have little influence over who shapes the political settlement.’47 Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the international community invested unparalleled resources, have clearly demonstrated the limits of such efforts and the resilience of local networks, systems of patronage and power over external efforts at statebuilding almost irrespective of the
amounts of resources devoted to the exogenous project. Aid in these contexts has sometimes had deleterious effects on the process of statebuilding, although it has often and substantially reduced suffering and destitution. And in these conditions elections are potentially disruptive and violent; hotly disputed; and, if they threaten elite agreements/pacts, often subverted.

**Conflict and fragility**

The recent paper by Cilliers and Schünemann referred to in the Introduction explored the key structural causal relationships driving intra-state violence, the most significant of which are depicted in Figure 4. As reflected in the figure and in the sections that follow, the propensity to intra-state violence overlaps with the four previously mentioned dimensions of poverty, inequality/exclusion, conflict/war and poor governance. At the risk of confusing the reader, this is used as an example of how, in the domain of high levels of violence/war, various deep, proximate, internal, and external drivers overlap and reinforce one another as part of a complex system of fragility.

**Figure 4: Seven drivers of intra-state conflict in Africa**

In sum, Cilliers and Schünemann found that observers – scholars, international organisation professionals, development specialists and local practitioners – tend to characterise interactions among specific causal drivers in local conditions that include factors such as scarcity, socioeconomic inequality, migration, or...
conflict over land or urban spaces. At the same time scholars often explore deeper drivers such as climate change, demographic instability, global terms of trade, and the absence of external and internal agencies of constraint that can prevent corruption, rent seeking and state capture.

The paper discussed seven drivers that increase the propensity for intra-state violence:

- The first, and most important, is the broad relationship between poverty and instability. Internal armed violence is significantly more frequent in low-income and lower-middle-income countries than in upper-middle-income or wealthy countries. These issues are discussed further below.  

- Two subsequent drivers relate to governance and were touched on earlier in the two sections immediately preceding this one:
  - Periods of change are inevitably disruptive and the evidence shows that rapid transitions from autocracy or civil war to democracy or adverse regime changes are often unstable and prone to violence.
  - A large democratic deficit (lack of democracy relative to levels of development) has the potential to trigger instability. Shortly before the Arab Spring, an ISS study noted the danger in the large democratic deficit (the level of experienced vs the expected level of democracy, given levels of GDP per capita and education) evident in North Africa.

- Another frequent characteristic of poor countries is that countries with a relatively large youthful population that is largely excluded from the economy tend to be more prone to violence. This becomes particularly acute if education levels, rates of urbanisation and unemployment are comparatively high.

- Once a country has experienced large-scale violence, the tendency towards recurring violence is strong.

- Similarly, there is the bad-neighbourhood effect of being close to or bordering on other countries experiencing conflict in which there are spillovers or contagions across borders.

- Finally, many of these factors are associated with the provision of poor governance, self-serving leadership and the rent-seeking impact of excessive dependence on commodity exports.

Criminal and interpersonal violence, political violence, and armed conflict have deep and lasting negative effects on a country’s ability to make progress on
health, education, environmental management, and women’s empowerment goals, among others. Similarly, the absence of development opportunities – particularly employment or livelihoods – in turn creates the conditions through which a country, city or community may be vulnerable to mobilisation for conflict. Thus, countries that experience conflict often see stagnant or declining gains in development and in turn experience follow-on effects, including an increased likelihood that governance will be weak and unable to deliver basic services to reverse the vicious, self-reinforcing cycle of conflict and underdevelopment. The problem of the recurrence of conflict in those countries that have experienced civil wars in recent years is evident and has driven the international agenda to ensure a long-term engagement to consolidate peace in war’s wake through various agencies, including the Peacebuilding Commission. Writing an analysis on conflict in 2010, Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr find that most new onsets of conflict in the last decade have been cases of conflict relapse.\(^55\)

Two recent papers, the first from a US-based research team and the second from a Norwegian-based group, drawing on different datasets and using different models provide a complementary basis on which one can build to forecast political instability and/or the associated probability of intra-state violence.\(^56\)

The analysis presented by the US-based Goldstone et al identifies a combination of just four independent variables able to forecast the onset of violent conflict or an adverse regime change with a two-year advance warning for a country that has been stable for at least three years.\(^57\) The variables are regime type, infant mortality, neighbouring countries in conflict (bad neighbourhood), and state-led discrimination against at least one minority group. Using a four-fold classification of regime type that reinterprets some aspects from the Polity IV data\(^58\) (on regime type), the authors identify partial democracies with factionalism (defined as a pattern of sharply polarised and uncompromising competition between blocs pursuing parochial interests at the national level) as exceptionally unstable types of regime – with a risk of instability 30 times greater than for full autocracies.\(^59\) In their analysis this situation of partial democracies with factionalism ‘polarizes politics of exclusive identity or ideologies, in conjunction with partially democratic institutions … [and] most powerfully presages instability’.\(^60\)

Goldstone et al find that the odds of future instability in countries at the 75th percentile in global infant mortality levels were nearly seven times higher than in countries at the 25th percentile.\(^61\) Using these four variables, they claim over
‘80% accuracy in distinguishing country-years followed by instability from ones where stability continues’ when testing the model against historical (actual) even occurrence. Running the model only for sub-Saharan Africa, it averaged 85 per cent success in forecasting the onset of instability – a figure that would be impossible to replicate in real life, given the time lag between the availability of statistics and the ability to forecast in time.

The summary view of Goldstone et al is that government security capacity, not resources or the means to prosecute war by opponents, is the most important factor in determining the probability of violent political instability. Their view is that in most instances governments have far greater military resources than potential insurgents or armed criminal gangs, and that a united and administratively competent regime can defeat most challenges to its authority.

The 2012 paper in International Studies Quarterly by Hegre et al (the Norwegian group) looks at deeper or more structural drivers of conflict with the intention of forecasting global and regional incidence of armed conflict. For their analysis, Hegre et al rely on the conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset and forecasts from the UN and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. The analysis posits that countries experiencing fragility fall into a ‘conflict trap’ over a period of two to three decades, and the model is less able to forecast a change in stability (which is the purported strength of Goldstone et al’s model) in the expected incidence of armed conflict. The Hegre et al analysis also points to a continuation of the general decline in conflict over time, but with the lowest reductions in sub-Saharan Africa. In Southern Africa the authors expect ‘a clear increase in the incidence of conflict up to 2025’. The risk of conflict is expected to increase in a number of countries without a recent history of conflict, e.g. Mozambique, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and Cameroon. Reflective of the work of many other authors, the risk of conflict recurrence is around 40 per cent and only one-sixth of post-conflict countries manage to transition to what have been called ‘successful developers’. Hegre et al’s findings reaffirm the importance of assistance to post-conflict countries to avoid a recurrence of conflict.

Other findings are that countries with larger populations (such as Nigeria) evidence a larger conflict risk (although the per capita risk of conflict does not increase proportionately to the size of the population). Hegre et al quote earlier findings by Thyne that ‘higher levels of primary enrolment, secondary male enrolment, greater education expenditure, and higher literacy levels are associated
with lower conflict risk’.71 Their findings also underscore the importance of high rates of infant mortality (reflected in the work of Goldstone et al) as a predictor of conflict onset. The size of a youth bulge appears to intensify conflict rather than trigger instability, whereas countries that are heavily dependent on oil may have a higher risk of the onset of major conflict than non-oil-dependent countries.72 Other relationships include a strong correlation between trade openness and a reduced tendency for intra-state conflict.

Cilliers and Schünemann also note the increase in local conflict over sources of livelihood such as land, water and grazing, and the expectation that this trend may intensify in the years that lie ahead as climate-change impacts intensify.73 Currently, it is generally accepted that climate change may manifest itself in sudden ‘extreme’ events (such as storms, droughts or floods – all of which are increasing as weather patterns become less predictable) or gradually by increasing competition over grazing or access to water as rainfall patterns change. Countries with long, low coastlines are particularly vulnerable to the impact of increased storms and, eventually, changes in sea levels. Climate change acts as a multiplier that interacts with other risks in fragile countries. It exacerbates existing weaknesses in governance and other vulnerabilities such as poverty, which is evident in how cycles of drought and subsequent food insecurity in Darfur, Mali, Chad and Somalia have exacerbated tensions among tribal or ethnic groups, including through the movement of refugees. In response, external partners have invested in building resilience and helped communities to mitigate and withstand the associated shocks and disturbances.

As population numbers and pressures on limited resources increase, these developments present the potential for inter-state conflict when the stakes are high enough. For example, had it not been for the Arab Spring and the impact that this has had on Egypt, it may have been possible to conceive of an armed confrontation over the decision by the Federal Government of Ethiopia to build the Grand Renaissance Dam on the upper reaches of the Blue Nile.

The issue of resource competition, particularly the nexus among food, water, energy and population, presents another example of the interrelationships among structural drivers of conflict. During the 1970s an extensive global debate on the ‘limits to growth’ brought together concerns about global population growth and anxieties over intensifying resource interdependence, magnified by the oil crises and Western concerns about Soviet power.74 Forecasts of the availability of oil, water, and food and Malthusian fears about population growth continue
to circulate, basing their arguments less on the physical scarcity of resources (which are asymmetrically distributed around the globe) and focusing more on the economic, political, environmental and distributive dimensions of scarcity, which are all associated in some way with aspects of governance.

**Poverty and fragility**

As reflected in Figures 2 and 3, poverty is a deep and indirect driver of fragility. The correlation between high levels of poverty and fragile countries (also countries experiencing high levels of both armed conflict and armed violence, and poor governance) is strong and clear. Studies of civil wars typically relate low per capita income to both the risk of civil war outbreak and the duration of such a conflict.75

Conflict and poverty act in a recursive or self-reinforcing way: at the macro and micro levels, poverty is associated with conflict, and indeed conflict has a role in furthering and deepening poverty. Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini find the relationship between conflict and chronic poverty to be rather direct: ‘since the end of World War II developed countries have overwhelmingly been spared the ravages of war and violent conflict. Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, 80 per cent of the world’s poorest countries have suffered violent conflict. This view suggests a clear link between low levels of development and high risks of violent conflict.’76

Less clear is the nature and direction of causality, and the stated relationship is often very controversial. Extreme or chronic poverty is related to the micro-foundations of conflict as individuals are recruited into and continue to participate in conflict groups. While no context is the same, there is an understanding that poverty provides a deep back-ground condition that creates low opportunity costs for fighting, large group-based grievances and vulnerability to radicalised ideologies.77 Youth unemployment is strongly associated with the increased risk of political instability, especially when combined with factors such as perceptions of corruption and socioeconomic inequalities.78

Chronic, unending poverty and stagnant or falling incomes are the cause of deeply held grievances when paired with discrimination and exclusion, especially along ethnic or religious lines.79 Also, poverty reverberates back to state capacity in that poor states lack the capacity to prevent, manage, or integrate criminal or armed political groups – an issue referred to earlier in
pointing to Goldstone et al’s findings about the importance of state capacity in resisting or suppressing revolt. Yet a third set of approaches focuses on poverty and unmanaged growth in Africa’s burgeoning informal settlements. At the heart of most theories that link poverty to violence are the vulnerability of the poor to mobilisation and organisation into illicit or informal institutions such as militias, gangs, insurgent groups or political party enforcers. Often, as is the case in North and South Kivu in the eastern DRC, tribal groupings establish militias for self-defence to protect themselves from the marauding of criminal gangs, government soldiers and foreign invaders intent on benefitting from abundant natural resources. The motivating factor of grievance, however, continues to be frustration, which is often informed by a deep appreciation of injustice and inequality and horizontal distribution along identity-group lines (see the section below).

Still widely prevalent at a time of unprecedented human development and prosperity, chronic and widespread poverty in regions such as Africa and elsewhere have prompted repeated efforts at humanitarian relief and development assistance. Approaches have oscillated between the direct provision of food, shelter and education to impoverished communities, on the one hand, and the provision of budgetary assistance to governments, on the other. The former approach bypassed government and undermined its legitimacy and duty to provide services, while the latter approach served as unearned rentier income that undercut the social contract between citizen and ruler. The results have been gratifying in terms of the alleviation of human suffering and destitution, but less satisfying in building sustainable government capacity and development. The dilemma of how best to support fragile and weak states is also central to modelling the forecasts presented in this monograph.

**Inequality/economic exclusion and fragility**

Earlier it was noted that what distinguishes many extremely fragile countries from others is the existence of high levels of income inequality, a skewed allocation of benefits to particular ethnic/tribal groupings, a pugnacious urban/rural allocation of resources (as is often seen in the use of tax revenues for education systems that benefit urban elites), etc. Inequality is often driven (and enabled) by large resource flows from commodity exports if expressed in the ratio of exports to GDP. Such exports tend to leave these countries vulnerable
to short-term fluctuations in global prices and conditions, which can lead to sharply falling incomes. Primary commodity dependency may create conditions for local elites to compete over the export bounty and to capture and manipulate the state to divert resources along patronage and clientelistic lines. Indeed, much of the ‘political economy’ analysis of fragile states starts from the premise that economic factors that leave countries vulnerable to rent-seeking politics are a deep and persistent driver of fragility in Africa, and that mobilisation by mid-level ‘entrepreneurs’ is a strong and persistent feature of mobilised armed groups.81

The most recent UNDP Human development report notes: ‘Rising inequality, especially between groups, can lead to social instability, undermining long-term human development progress. Persistence of inequality often results in a lack of inter-generational social mobility, which can also lead to social unrest.’82 Inequity and exclusion endure when the excluded and those at the lower ends of the distribution chain lack the political voice to seek redress. More equal and just societies are essential for satisfactory and sustainable human progress, and thus greater voice and political participation and more-accountable governments are required.83 In particular, Stewart et al have shown that in countries with patterns of inequality in which income and opportunity overlap with identity – what are termed ‘horizontal inequalities’ – violent encounters are more likely. Such horizontal inequality can also occur together with so-called vertical inequality. When such group-based inequalities are present and mobilised there are adverse consequences for both conflict and development.84

A recent article by Diamond and Mosbacher summarises the impact as follows:

The surge of easy money fuels inflation, fan waste and massive corruption, distorts exchange rates, undermines the competitiveness of traditional export sectors such as agriculture, and pre-empts the growth of manufacturing. Moreover, as oil prices fluctuate on world markets, oil-rich countries can suddenly become cash poor when booms go bust. ... Oil booms are also bad news for democracy and the rule of law. In fact, not a single developing country that derives the bulk of its export earnings from oil and gas is a democracy. Rather than fostering an entrepreneurial middle class, oil wealth, when controlled by the government, stifles the emergence of an independent business class and swells the power of the state vis-á-vis civil society.85
Research on the ‘resource curse’ argues that too heavy a dependence on natural resources impedes rather than accelerates economic growth and investment, and may hinder the broadening of the economic base and the development of the various institutions of government.86

Of course, most of today’s industrialised countries such as the UK, France and previously Spain were founded on mineral extraction, either their own or, through colonial control, the exploitation of minerals in other countries. This is a path that many countries, including China, the United States, Australia, Brazil, South Africa and Canada, have trodden.87 Objectively, mining should translate into higher tax revenues, result in improved services, increase employment for local communities, increase demand for goods and services (including foodstuffs from the agricultural sector), and eventually help in the establishment of supporting manufacturing and services sectors. Yet according to Gylfason and Zoega, in many other countries ‘it may reduce saving, investment and growth’,88 thereby lowering the level of consumption and output per capita in the long run.

Price volatility, the risk of the so-called ‘Dutch disease’, an increased likelihood of undemocratic government, the prevalence of a rentier state (where the state is not accountable to citizens), pressures to spend within a short-term horizon to maintain support, and a greater likelihood of low-quality institutions are often highlighted as severe risks facing single-commodity exporters. The result is an ‘observable correlation between resource abundance and political corruption’89 in a general sea of poverty and destitution with few forward and backward linkages with the broader economy. As will be discussed elsewhere, the most extreme example in Africa of the resource curse and its tragic implications is found in Equatorial Guinea and to a slightly lesser degree in Angola.

A wave of oil and gas discoveries in the East African Rift Valley and further west in the Gulf of Guinea have the potential to transform many fragile African economies – for better or worse. In East Africa the list likely includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda. In West Africa it probably includes Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, and possibly also Niger.90

Few African governments have proved able to withstand competition for contracts, pressure from foreign corporations and arm-twisting by powerful countries to shape contractual relationships to particular external advantage. In extreme cases commercial interests have even resulted in changes in government or efforts in that direction. Many African elites have compromised the
development of their countries by entering into complex and often fraudulent deals to benefit from the income from oil, gas or other commodities, of which the post-colonial histories of Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are probably the best documented, but also the DRC, Uganda and others. Some (most prominently Botswana) have been able to walk the path of sustained high growth rates and transform their societies and economies, although wealth and influence remain concentrated in relatively few hands.

Recent experience has shown that poor countries that are relatively well endowed with natural resources – in particular, rents from oil and natural gas exports – are also vulnerable to the fragility trap; indeed, even middle-income countries have shown themselves to be fragile during turbulent transitions in which political violence may accompany transitional processes. The association of natural resources and conflict is highly context specific; however, natural resource endowments may be factors both in conflict onset and in the duration and intensity of war. We observe conflicts that are related to distributive inequality especially as being particularly vulnerable to violence: in these cases, such as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, local communities may be excluded from the natural resource bounty, but may suffer the direct environmental consequences. Elsewhere, in Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, revenues from oil have undermined other sectors in the economy and, through massive corruption, weakened state structures and legitimacy.

Research has shown that countries that lack accountability systems – both horizontal (between provinces or states) and vertical (between the central state and the people) – are more vulnerable to resource-related conflict. Ross argues that natural resources contribute to conflict vulnerability in three ways: when there is the potential for the looting of resources, when war appears financially profitable and when wealth is concentrated in specific regions, to the exclusion of others.

Natural resources drivers are especially critical to any evaluation of whether rents are more broadly distributed in a way that addresses the need for livelihoods and essential water and sanitation, nutrition, health care, and housing. Increasingly, it seems important to address the linkages between natural resource endowments and conflict vulnerability in terms of three principal approaches, which will be returned to in the conclusion: the first is a wealth-sharing agreement that creates and provides accountability institutions that oversee a logical demographic and geographic distribution of commodity rents.
The second is a focus on land and natural resource management. (Most effective are direct cash transfers to the poor.) Finally, the economic integration of marginalised groups and political inclusion go hand in hand; this includes marginalised citizen groups, but in many fragile states also migrants and refugees. For this reason some leaders and a number of donors have turned to methods of promoting social cohesion and integration through a combined approach to both economic exclusion and inequality, and political integration.93

Difficult issues: democratisation and the role of the private sector

As we move to a conclusion in this theoretical section, two particularly difficult trade-offs present themselves in terms of external support to more fragile countries. The first relates to the relationship between democracy and development, and the second to the role of the private sector.

At the levels of destitution experienced in many ‘more fragile’ countries, democracy and development make for uneasy bedfellows. Despite vast amounts of research by democracy advocacy groups, Western governments and the academic community in free societies, there is no established relationship between the two, although there are clear correlations between transparency and government effectiveness, etc. Clearly, democracy is a deep driver of development, and causality is complex and difficult to prove empirically. This does not make democracy less important, but the question remains one of at what pace democratic evolution with all its trappings, imperfections and complexities should be pursued in the absence of development. On the one hand, human rights are indivisible and apply equally to all. On the other, the provision of the most basic of human needs – food, shelter and protection – responds to basic human rights in the most practical of ways. In the provision of support and the development of an appropriate development path for these countries, partners need to discuss the speed at which political, social and economic emancipation can proceed, ensuring appropriate balance at all times, and be prepared to follow the lead of the host country within certain boundaries, difficult as that may be.

At an early stage of development the state is inordinately important for every aspect of life. There is little separation between the government and governing elites, and control of the state/government directly translates into economic opportunity. Over time this relationship changes and eventually, as economic
development occurs, the role of the state declines. First there is separation between politics and government, and eventually between the economy and the state. Whereas the state is very important in economic development and hugely influential in poverty alleviation, education, service provision, jobs, etc. at the early and even mid-stages of development, this role changes over time. Eventually in advanced democracies the role of the state is supplanted in most economic aspects – and rightly so – by the private sector, which has much greater potential for wealth creation.

Similar to the state, if unaccountable, the private sector is a huge source of corruption if unchecked by due process, clarity on the rule of law and effective oversight – which is the situation in most of Africa's more fragile countries. Eventually it is the private and not the public sector that drives development, but the role of foreign multi-nationals in particular requires careful consideration in a fragile context.

Conclusion

The purpose of this section was to make explicit the approach to fragility for the purposes, in the next section but one, of using the IFs forecasting system as an aid to look to the long-term future. ‘Fragility’, it has been argued, can be fruitfully understood and studied as a system and a syndrome, and a simple distinction between ‘fragile’ and ‘not fragile’ is not persuasive.

Before embarking on this process, we create our own list of ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ countries in the following section for the purposes of forecasting. Many countries that seem stable could well see moments of fragility emanating from natural disasters or localised conflict (e.g. even local urban rioting in Western countries has called forth the fragility concept in seemingly consolidated, developed countries); indeed, recent local-level urban rioting can be noted in countries that typically contend for the top spots on global rankings of state capacities (e.g. more recently in Sweden).

Figure 5 presents a simplified diagram of the statebuilding process for the purposes of this monograph, reflecting the extent to which government institutions, policies, and implementation are limited and weak in fragile states, versus an idealised status where effective and accountable governance is delivered through stable institutions. Much of the analysis and subsequent recommendations speaks to the importance of support to the endogenous
Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries

process of state formation and the necessarily limited contribution of external statebuilding efforts.

**Figure 5: Idealised presentation of statebuilding**

![Diagram showing the relationship between chronic poverty and statebuilding]

- Declining levels of chronic poverty
- Violence and war
- Inequality and exclusion
- Government institutions, policies and implementation
- Elite pact or peace agreement
- Progress to less fragility
- Stability and security
- Effective, accountable governance through stable institutions
- Sustainable development
This section draws up a list of ‘more fragile’ countries in Africa. In doing so it is recognised that the associated dividing lines are subject to judgement and perspective.

In recent years the AfDB and World Bank have increased their collaboration, including in their identification of and response to fragile and conflict-affected countries in Africa, as well as expanding their associated efforts. In July 2013 the World Bank published its most recent ‘harmonised list of fragile situations’ (reflecting the harmonisation of the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment – CPIA – score with that of the African and Asian Development Banks) for the 2014 financial year.94

The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (1) economic management; (2) structural policies; (3) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (4) public sector management and institutions. For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (very weak performance) to 6 (very strong performance). A country is classified as ‘fragile and conflict-affected’ if it has a CPIA score of 3,2 or less, or has had a UN or regional peacekeeping or peace-building mission in the previous three years. Countries that are weak performers on the CPIA are considered to be fragile in terms of two important dimensions:
(1) state polices and institutions are weak, making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, control corruption, or provide for sufficient voice and accountability; and (2) they face risks of conflict and political instability.95

As a working list the present study adopted the World Bank/AfDB harmonised list of conflict-affected and fragile countries for FY2014. It does so given the importance of the CPIA ranking/judgement in decisions by banks and lending agencies in determining the conditions under which these countries can access financing on the international market.

In 2014 the two banks included 19 countries in their harmonised list: Burundi, the CAR, Chad, Comoros, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe. Guinea and Niger are to be confirmed after a qualitative assessment, bringing the list to 21. Libya and Angola are listed as countries in a special category, although both are considered as middle-income countries. Libya also has a UN political mission in-country. Angola only recently migrated from the World Bank’s fragility list as it continues to benefit from its oil income, although it suffers massive corruption and a legacy of marginalisation, war and disposition that will haunt it for years to come. We removed Libya and Angola from our list of ‘more fragile’ countries and eventually added Niger, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, Cameroon, Uganda and Rwanda. These are all countries that appear among the top 20 countries categories in three or more of the various other groups/lists and studies of fragility that were examined (see Annex C), namely from the various endogenous indices developed and computed within the IFs system, the UNDP Human Development Index, the Ibrahim Governance Index, Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index, and the Center for Systemic Peace.

It is recognised that Ethiopia and Rwanda have made remarkable progress in many aspects that relate to the achievement of the MDGs (for example). Both remain very poor, are located in a turbulent region, have a long history of internal war and face numerous internal challenges, however.

Nigeria qualifies for inclusion based on the fact that three separate organisations include it in their lists of fragile states. Neither the World Bank nor the AfDB classified Nigeria as fragile, despite its legacy of poor governance, high levels of corruption, and historically high levels of internal violence and even
war. With a population that greatly exceeds that of any other country in Africa, the inclusion of Nigeria will additionally skew the present forecast and Nigeria was not included as a member of the ‘more fragile’ grouping.

If these countries are added to the harmonised AfDB working list, the final list of ‘more fragile’ states in Africa consists of the following 26 countries: Burundi, the CAR, Chad, Cameroon, Comoros, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. As noted in the executive summary, the IFs forecasting model currently includes data on Sudan with its pre-division borders: the present study will refer to Sudan/South Sudan where appropriate, indicating the inclusion of data for both countries.

By default, in this approach the remainder of countries in Africa are considered to be ‘more resilient’.

Many countries that face long-term problems are not on this list. The two countries with the highest democratic deficit in Africa – Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland – are not included, although it is certain that trouble lie ahead for both, with the latter one of the remaining absolute monarchies in the world. Swaziland has some of the highest levels of HIV/AIDS globally, tolerates no opposition, and squanders money on luxuries on its king and his numerous wives, while grinding poverty expands. It is currently in negotiations with South Africa for a large loan, since it is unable to access sufficient funds on the international market at reasonable rates.

Equatorial Guinea has a distortive effect in any comparison group, due especially to the large democratic deficit, its very high levels of GDP per capita as a result of its oil rents, massive corruption, state capture by the Obiang family and the small size of the population: three out of every four citizens of Equatorial Guinea live on less than $2 per day. In the present analysis both remain part of the ‘more resilient’ grouping, although from a country-context perspective they should be approached with a great deal of unique analysis and assessment.

Large countries with substantial subregional fragility are also not on the list: Nigeria and Kenya, for example. Other countries with substate fragility that are included in the group of ‘more fragile’ countries above include the DRC, Mali, Madagascar, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

A number of countries, such as Zimbabwe and Uganda, that are included on the list have been governed by strong presidencies for decades and a democratic
transition will likely be associated with widespread instability and potentially high levels of political violence.

Many of the countries in North Africa, including Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, face numerous challenges in the short to medium term, but only Libya may experience conditions of fragility lasting for several decades. Its crisis of governance (given the absence of governance institutions during the regime of Muammar Gadaffi) is expected to continue much longer than that elsewhere in the region, despite its relative wealth in comparison to other countries on the continent.

For these 26 ‘more fragile’ countries we next turn to a forecast using the IFs model in the following section.
Figure 6: Map of Africa’s ‘more fragile’ countries
This section uses the IFs tool (version 6.7) to provide a base-case forecast for the 26 ‘more fragile’ states in Africa. The forecast horizon is 2050, but 2030 is used as a useful milestone. In using IFs a range of variables were considered (and tested) for each of the four dimensions of fragility, i.e. (1) poverty, (2) inequality and exclusion, (3) conflict/violence, and (4) poor/weak governance, while the impact of external developments such as a bad neighbourhood was also looked at. In the end a set of composite variables were chosen with a careful eye toward ensuring that insofar as possible there is no substantive overlap in the subindex indicators.

The analysis employed these variables in IFs (additional detail is provided in Annexure B):

- **For governance** two variables of governance developed by Hughes et al were used, i.e. capacity (GOVINDCAP in IFs) and inclusion (GOVINDINCL in IFs). These provide for government revenues as a percentage of GDP, government corruption, democratic deficit and gender empowerment.
- **For war/violence** the inverse of the composite index developed by Hughes et al was used (SFINTLWARALL in IFs), which was also included in the paper by
Cilliers and Schünemann. This includes a moving (but declining) average of a society’s past experience of such conflict, as well as internal war probability, infant mortality, trade openness, democratic deficit, youth bulge and GDP growth rate.

- For **poverty** the Human Development Index (HDINEW in IFs) was used. The HDI provides for life expectancy, education and income.
- For **inequality** the inverse of the Gini coefficient (GINIDOM in IFs) was used. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the statistical dispersion of inequality.

Absent from these variables are direct measures of armed violence and organised crime. The IFs tool includes a module on environmental change and impact, with the result that the impact of climate change is accommodated, as well as a module on international relations that provides some measure of global impact.

Each of these variables and indices is composite and individually complex. Their use results in considerable loss of explanatory value and country context. All suffer from substantial country data gaps. We acknowledge these issues, while still being confident in the forecast, given the underlying datasets and the reliability of data and compensatory mechanisms for when data is unavailable.

The first subsection presents a brief picture of Africa’s current trajectory and, where appropriate, that of the two subgroups: ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ countries. A second subsection explores the future of the ‘more fragile’ grouping as part of the ‘base-case’ forecast.

A third subsection explores the future from a reasonable best and worst forecast for the category of ‘more fragile’ countries. Here the results from the two scenarios are presented as probability limits of future options rather than each being presented as a separate storyline. It is hoped that the integrated representation of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts reflects back on the presentation of fragility as a self-reinforcing syndrome.

All figures in this section are in 2005 US dollars.

**Africa’s expected future: comparing ‘more resilient’ with ‘more fragile’ groups of countries**

**Key aspects of Africa’s expected future**

The changes in the global demographic balance is evident from Figure 7, which
presents the changes in the size of the working age population from 2010, pointing to the substantial demographic dividend that could accrue to Africa if the continent is able to provide opportunities for its teeming young population. The total African labour force will more than double to over 1 billion between 2013 and 2030. Hundreds of millions of youngsters will need to be educated, provided with health care, and found jobs, many of whom live in the group of ‘more fragile’ countries where prospects for such opportunities are limited or currently non-existent.

Africa’s total population will increase from slightly more than 1 billion people in 2010, such that by 2050, 23 per cent of the global population will be living in Africa. By 2025 more people will be born in African countries collectively than in China and India. This is because from 1960 to 2013 life expectancy improved by 15.7 years and fertility rates declined by 20 per cent, leading to strong population growth in Africa.

**Figure 7:** Population of working age (15–65 years) as a percentage of total

The IFs base-case forecast is that the African economy as a whole will grow at an average rate of around 5.6 per cent between 2010 and 2050, which will be significantly faster than the global growth average of slightly below 3 per cent (see Figure 8). This forecast of generally higher rates of growth in Africa has recently received considerable public attention and associated analysis. An
earlier monograph from the African Futures Project at the ISS (in partnership with the Pardee Centre) set out the authors’ views on the reasons for these improvements, ranging from the population dividend referred to, evidence of more responsible macroeconomic management and reform, improved agricultural output and industrial management, more stable political frameworks, more effective aid, targeted debt relief and increased domestic revenues, growth in remittances and foreign direct investment, the rise of the South (China in particular), and the extent to which Africa has been able to benefit from the commodities boom.98

Except for Angola and, eventually, Ethiopia, growth will be faster in smaller economies and countries with smaller populations.99 The fastest growth is also not expected to occur in large natural-resource exporters (with the exception of Angola and Equatorial Guinea). This bears out much research that countries rich in oil, minerals and other natural resources experience slower economic growth in the longer term than countries that are less well endowed – although there are always exceptions, such as Botswana.

**Figure 8: GDP growth rates: Africa and the world (including Africa) (five-year moving average)**

![GDP growth rates chart](source: IFs v 6.7)
During this period the size of the African economy will increase almost ninefold in market exchange rate terms (from around $1 241 billion in 2010 to $3 498 billion by 2030 and $11 126 billion by 2050). Much as there is well-deserved excitement about the rise of Africa, it is important that future growth prospects needs to be placed in context, for the continent’s relative size as part of the global economy will continue to remain modest throughout. It currently constitutes around 2,5 per cent of the global economy, and this figure will have increased to roughly 3,8 per cent by 2030 and 6,5 per cent by 2050. GDP per capita grows steadily from $2 718 in 2010 to $4 141 in 2030 and almost $7 588 by 2050 – a growth rate slower than that of the global average, but steady and pronounced over time.

**Characteristics of the ‘more fragile’ vs ‘more resilient’ groupings**

The size of the populations of Ethiopia and the DRC dominates in the ‘more fragile’ group of countries, followed by that of Uganda. These three countries have populations that by 2030 will consist of 83 million, 66 million and 33,5 million people, respectively. The remaining countries in the ‘more fragile’ group all have substantially smaller populations, ranging from Madagascar at 21 million people by 2030 to the Comoros, with less than a million people by 2030.

The median age of ‘more fragile’ countries can be expected to increase from around 18 years currently to 21 by 2030 and 25 years by 2050. More resilient country median age averages are around 3 years higher and population growth rates around 0,5 per cent lower.

On a per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) basis the average citizens in both groups (‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’) would see their incomes rise (although slightly slower in the case of ‘more fragile’ countries) to levels of $1 857 in 2030 and $3 771 in 2050, at which point the GDP per capita in ‘more resilient’ countries is forecast to be substantially higher at $10 960 (see Figure 9). This will occur despite the fact that the group of ‘more fragile’ countries will expectedly average growth rates of up to 1 per cent higher than the group of ‘more resilient’ countries. As a result the ‘more fragile’ group of countries will increase from constituting around 13 per cent of the total African economy in 2010 to 16 per cent in 2050.
Development assistance has been important in Africa, particularly for its poorer countries, although its relative importance is declining as tax income and remittance flows have increased. As expected, the ‘more fragile’ countries have received substantially more aid in historical terms than the ‘more resilient’ countries.

Figure 10 presents a trend line to 2050 on expected foreign aid receipts. The forecast is that although development assistance levels remain high, its contribution to GDP declines as African economies (and associated tax revenues) grow. Recently at G8 and G20 meetings there has also been a welcome focus on the importance of curbing tax evasion and illicit financial flows at the national and international levels.
If we look at the number of people affected by extreme poverty, using the $2 per day measurement and the percentages of the population for each grouping, the summary result are presented in tabular form in Table 1 and graphically in Figure 11.

**Table 1: Persons affected by extreme poverty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>‘More fragile’ (no. of people/% population)</th>
<th>‘More resilient’ (no. of people/% population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>302 million (70%)</td>
<td>317 million (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>365 million (53%)</td>
<td>282 million (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>394 million (39%)</td>
<td>198 million (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two groups start with roughly the same number of absolute poor people (although percentages of population obviously differ). Absolute poverty in both

**Figure 10: Foreign aid (net) as percentage of GDP: history and forecast (five-year moving average)**

![Graph showing foreign aid (net) as percentage of GDP history and forecast](image-url)
groups decline as a percentage of their total population, but much more rapidly in the ‘more resilient’ group, despite the fact that this group had around 162 million more people than the ‘more fragile’ group in 2010. Thus the gap between ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ states is expected to widen in terms of people in chronic poverty. At the same time, absolute numbers of people living in extreme poverty increase in the ‘more fragile’ states, while significant decreases are expected in ‘more resilient’ states. These trends are key to reducing extreme poverty, which was earlier identified as a deep driver of fragility, and are presented in a line graph in Figure 11.

In interpreting these figures it is important to bear in mind that the population numbers in both groupings increase significantly in the future, eventually totalling 1 billion people living in ‘more fragile’ and 1.14 billion living in ‘more resilient’ countries by 2050.

**Figure 11:** Poverty at less than $2 per day (millions of people)

Sources: Historical Data: World Development Indicators. Forecast: IFs v6.7

These trends point to the additional need for wealth-sharing agreements and the development of social welfare systems, possibly through cash transfers that avoid the capacity constraints evident in many governments.
All African countries are expected to make steady progress in moving to improved scores on the HDI. ‘More fragile’ countries will improve from an average figure of 0.373 in 2010 to 0.47 in 2030 and 0.564 in 2050, while the gap between the two groups does not change meaningfully. Similarly, the percentage of malnourished children declines more sharply in ‘more fragile’ countries, because it is always easier to make large inroads at an earlier stage. Based on a forecast of domestic Gini coefficients, inequality improves, but the gap between ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ countries is expected to remain relatively constant.

Under the current agricultural growth scenario, Africa’s dependence on imported food continues to deepen. When measuring imports as a net percentage of total demand for all of Africa, this number currently stands at 13 per cent. By 2030 and without an agricultural Green Revolution, this number is expected to increase to around 30 per cent, and to 35 per cent by 2050, with ‘more fragile’ countries more dependent on food imports than ‘more resilient’ countries across all three main categories, i.e. crop, meat and fish imports. In continuation of recent historical trends, the average African agricultural yields per hectare will mostly improve steadily, despite the impact of climate change. Of course, Africa has significant untapped agricultural potential that can be unlocked with the right investment and policies, and much larger improvements in production are possible. In fact, all the measures to affect unemployment and improve on human capital, the potential impact of a true African Green Revolution is unparalleled.

Figure 12 presents a picture of the average years of education for males and females in the ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ groupings at average age of 25 years and above, and reflects expected ongoing disparities and the challenges facing female advancement. In advanced economies there is little distinction between men and women in this group, but in the ‘more fragile’ grouping men generally have one year more education than women at age 25 and above. Although the gap between the two is expected to narrow, only a marginal improvement is expected under current conditions.

Figures 13 and 14 provide two summary graphs that presents a representation of the youthful population structure of the ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ groups, as well as the expected delivery of primary, secondary and tertiary education levels, by comparing 2010 data with a forecast for 2050. Clear progress is evident across both groups. The average number of years of formal education
attained by Africa’s adult population (at age 15) grew from 1.3 in 1960 to 5 today, a miserly improvement by any standard. This number should reach 5.8 years in 2030, a similar level to Bangladesh today, reflecting the long educational road ahead, with the years of education of the ‘more fragile’ group of countries trailing more than 2 years behind those of ‘more resilient’ countries, and, as indicated earlier, with females worse off than males.

Currently, fewer than 75 per cent of children are enrolled in primary education across the continent. The IFs base-case forecast is that Africa will achieve 85 per cent enrolment in primary education by 2030. This means that by 2030, 38 million children will not go to primary school (as indicated by the purple pattern in the centre of each population pyramid in Figure 13). Gross secondary school enrolment currently stands at 55 per cent and is expected to reach 70 per cent by 2030.

**Figure 12:** Education years, average at age 25+ for ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ groups, male and female

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**Sources:** Historical data: UNESCO. Forecast: IFs v6.7
Figure 13: Educational achievements by age and sex, 2010 and 2050, for ‘more resilient’ countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>No education or incomplete primary education only</th>
<th>Completed primary education only</th>
<th>Completed through secondary education</th>
<th>Completed through tertiary education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–9</td>
<td>110+</td>
<td>105–109</td>
<td>100–104</td>
<td>95–99</td>
<td>90–94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>80–84</td>
<td>75–79</td>
<td>70–74</td>
<td>65–69</td>
<td>60–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>35–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>10–14</td>
<td>5–9</td>
<td>0–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Male 2010
- Female 2010
- Male 2050
- Female 2050
Figure 14: Educational achievements by age and sex, 2010 and 2050, for ‘more fragile’ countries

Sources: Historical Data: UNESCO and UNDP. Forecast: IFs v6.7
Figure 15 presents a summary of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘democratic surplus’. The democratic deficit is an indicator of the level of democracy that one could expect for a country, given its GDP per capita and education levels (in global comparison) versus the actual level of democracy for countries at similar levels of development, using the Polity IV data. The formula for the deficit/surplus calculates the level of expected democracy against the global average for that level of income and education. Although there are some minor issues with the Polity dataset, it remains the most comprehensive global measure of democracy over time. The ‘more fragile’ countries start with a slight democratic surplus that reduces over time. In other words, the level of democracy in the ‘more fragile’ group of countries, currently higher than the global norm, will over time come closer to the average for countries elsewhere in the world with similar levels of development.

The reasons for this counterintuitive finding are, the authors believe, twofold. The first would be the high levels of development assistance and associated conditionality relating to good governance, democracy and individual rights that the ‘more fragile’ group of countries have received. The second reason is the impact of the diffusion of global ideas and values, and the inability of many poor African governments to effectively control a media environment dominated by the free expression of ideas and an orientation to a Western concept of freedom of speech and political association.

Figure 15: Democratic deficit and surplus using polity data

Source: Historical: Policy IV. Forecast: IFs v6.7
Given the challenges in measuring governance and democracy, two other sources of analysis are used to understand governance and democracy, namely the Ibrahim Governance Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. Neither measure is used in the present forecast, but both are included here to complement the contextual analysis.

The Ibrahim Governance Index\textsuperscript{102} measures government performance in Africa from the perspective of citizens, i.e. the delivery of public goods and services, and policy outcomes. It measures governance outputs and outcomes in four broad categories: safety and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Using data from the Ibrahim Index, Figure 16 presents the ‘governance gap’ between the ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ groups of countries. A higher score for the ‘more resilient’ group indicates the experience by citizens in this group of the delivery of ‘more’ governance when compared to the ‘more fragile’ grouping. This forecast in the delivery of governance between ‘more fragile’ and ‘more resilient’ countries provides strong empirical support to the view given above that ‘more fragile’ countries suffer from insufficient governance – in fact, substantially less than that experienced in the rest of Africa.

**Figure 16:** The ‘governance gap’ in Africa using data from the Ibrahim Governance Index

![Diagram showing the 'governance gap' between 'more fragile' and 'more resilient' countries in Africa over time.](source)

Sources: Historical: Recomputed from Ibrahim Index. Forecast: IFs v6.7
The deficit between ‘more’ and ‘less fragile’ countries aside, it can be said that Africa generally experiences a ‘governance gap’ – it has less capacity than one would expect from countries at similar levels of development, given historical patterns, and certainly less government than required to meet the challenges of poverty alleviation and development generally. This is an analysis shared across the developmental sector, with numerous efforts to build the capacity of African governments. As explained above, there are deep historical reasons for this situation, which is a result of the African experience of interrupted state formation.

For several years the Economist Intelligence Unit has been computing and publishing its Democracy Index. The most recent index (for 2012)\textsuperscript{103} points to what it refers to as a ‘global backsliding in democracy’ that has strengthened in the wake of the 2008–09 global economic crisis. Mauritius scores highest in the 2012 ranking among African countries, followed by Cape Verde, Botswana and South Africa. Guinea-Bissau scores the lowest of all African countries (Somalia is not included), only slightly better than Chad. Of the ‘more fragile’ grouping, Malawi scores the highest, but in general the ‘more fragile’ countries score lower than the ‘more resilient’ countries. In summary, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, levels of democracy in the grouping of ‘more fragile’ countries are lower than in the ‘more resilient’ group of countries, if slightly higher than could be expected based on the democracy surplus/deficit presentation given in Figure 15. These findings make intuitive sense.

Similar to the findings of Hegre et al (discussed above), there appears to be a slight increase in the probability of state failure for ‘more fragile’ countries through abrupt regime changes in the years ahead.

If we look at violence\textsuperscript{104} while also going back historically, it is evident that the ‘more fragile’ countries have experienced much higher levels of internal war and violence than the ‘more resilient’ countries, and that we can expect this trend to continue, even as we expect that the levels of future war/violence decline in both. In fact, violence is the defining feature of most ‘more fragile’ countries and the modelling done by Hughes et al indicates that past conflict is the largest contributor (and hence the most important indicator) of future conflict. The results are presented in Figure 17, with a five-year moving average to smooth out the trend lines. The graph accurately depicts the sharp rise in (proxy) wars leading up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent tapering off thereafter. It also presents the opportunity for further sharp reductions in conflict (equivalent to the sharp rise in the years before 1989) reflected in the optimistic scenario.
Figure 17: State failure resulting from an internal event: history and forecast

*Sources: Historical: Political Instability Task Force. Forecast: IFs v6.7*

From fragility to resilience

In summary, the forecast would indicate the following (see Figure 18):

- Twelve countries could exit fragility on a path towards greater resilience by or before 2030: Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
- Four countries could exit fragility on a path to greater resilience by or before 2050: Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
- Ten countries are at risk of remaining in a fragility trap beyond 2050: Comoros, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and Togo.

This forecast is based on the base-case forecast and would change substantially should either the pessimistic or optimistic scenarios be realised.

These findings are based on (1) the measure of progress that a country could make compared to others in the ‘more fragile’ group; (2) the starting point (since a number of countries start at a low point on the index and others are close to
saturation scores); and (3) a comparison of the results at the subindex level and the aggregate index.

**Figure 18:** Continued fragility versus more resilience

In addition, Mauritania faces a challenge from environmental stress in the decades that lie ahead if a solution to its impending water challenges are not found. Mauritania is already depleting its groundwater resources at an alarming rate, and it will be impacted more severely by reductions in agricultural yield than any other country in the group of 26 ‘more fragile’ countries as a result of the impact of global warming, with reductions of around 5 per cent from 2010 levels by 2030 and 10 per cent by 2050.

Whereas by 2050 slightly more than 1 billion Africans (about half of all Africans) would be living in ‘more fragile’ countries, this number could be reduced to 372 million people by 2050 (around 16 per cent of all Africans) if the improvements towards greater reliance materialise. The key dimension that will affect the trajectory of these countries is inevitably the quality of their leadership and the commitment of the governing elite to inclusive growth and developmental policies.
Using the HDI, all countries in the ‘more fragile’ group are expected to improve their scores, with the Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe consistently scoring the best across the study’s time horizon. Unsurprisingly, the country that makes the most progress is Somalia (coming from a very low base) and the one that does the worst (makes the least progress) is Madagascar.

Domestic inequality as measured using the Gini coefficient does not change rapidly over time. A forecast or Gini coefficient indicates that the CAR is expected to stay the most unequal country in the group of ‘more fragile’ countries, followed by Somalia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, the Republic of Congo and Chad. The least unequal countries are Guinea, Togo, Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Niger. Countries that are expected to see larger-than-average increases in inequality are the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Uganda, Mali, Liberia and Togo.

**Scenarios for the future: hope versus despair**

This section compares an optimistic with a pessimistic forecast for the 26 ‘more fragile’ countries. These two scenarios can be viewed as two reasonable outer boundaries within which the future could occur. The futures forecasting that follows assumes that there are no historically unprecedented tragic events. Again, forecasting is looked at through the experience of the past, ‘smoothing over’ shocks or disruptions in terms of human and environmental systems. The specific adjustments to the base-case scenario that lead to the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios described here are detailed in Annexure B. This section presents how these scenarios could unfold.

An optimistic scenario would envision better-than-expected gains in governance, conflict prevention and development. In such a scenario one could envision a combination of advances in technology, or better regional and global governance, or more effective approaches to capacity development at the national and local levels, or breakthroughs in inclusive growth (perhaps related to better-than-expected global growth and the integration of Africa more fully into the international trade and financial system). At the heart of an optimistic scenario, one could argue, are a benign or facilitative international environment, improvements in governance through greater mechanisms for accountability, and inclusive growth with more equitable and transparent sharing of natural resource rents.

Gains in governance through systematic and long-term investments in public administration, the expansion of service delivery, and more inclusive governance
processes would be essential for the realisation of a more optimistic scenario. Essential as well are new ways to realise government revenue that are based on appropriate taxation as an essential element in state–society relations and in improving accountability. Many countries will see continued and often-turbulent political transitions, and a more optimistic scenario would require better-than-expected regional and global assistance to help facilitate such transitions through a renewed commitment to facilitating political settlements (as described below).

There could be many origins for a pessimistic or worst-case scenario such as an increase in local-level conflict over livelihoods such as land, water and grazing, and an increase in conflict in crowded urban settings. Many of these developments may be driven by the impact of ever higher levels of greenhouse gases and associated climate change or a resumption of global competition and conflict to the detriment of Africa.

There are good reasons to be concerned that future global shifts such as the effects of climate change will lead to new climate-induced conflicts prompted by migration, localised scarcity conflicts, rapid urbanisation, and group-based inequalities, and that many of these conflicts will occur in Africa’s burgeoning urban areas and in the rural areas most affected by climate-related stresses. How these risks may unfold over time is uncertain, and as suggested at the outset of this monograph, the underlying drivers of fragility may be quite country specific. Nonetheless, these potentially worsening drivers of conflict in Africa in the coming years do provide the basis of a more pessimistic scenario that sees accelerated or enhanced risks beyond a ‘base-case’ forecast.

**The risk of expanding extreme poverty**

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the range of possible futures that Africa’s 26 ‘more fragile’ countries can experience is reflected in Figure 19. This is a potential future that could see 75 million more or fewer people living in extreme poverty by 2030 and 142 million more or fewer by 2050. Or, put differently, between 11 and 14 per cent more or fewer people will experience these dire circumstances, depending on the policy choices and social processes that unfold in the years that lie ahead.

Ethiopia and the DRC necessarily dominated the picture presented here, because they have substantially larger populations than the rest, followed by Sudan/South Sudan and Uganda. Inequality in key countries – Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the DRC and Uganda in particular – could vary greatly, depending on
Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries

the development path that is followed (all could see increases in excess of 0,1 in their domestic Gini coefficients).

**Figure 19**: Million people living on less than $2 per day, log normal formulation

![Figure 19: Million people living on less than $2 per day, log normal formulation](image)

**Sources:** Historical: World Development Indicators. Forecast: IFs v6.7

**The risk of increased inequality and exclusion**

The average Gini and HDI scores of ‘more fragile’ countries are presented in Figure 20 with an optimistic and pessimistic forecast.

The 2030 and 2050 values are forecast as follows:

- **Pessimistic:** the Gini for 2030 is 0,457 and for 2050 it is 0,467; the difference is 0,072.
- **Optimistic:** the Gini for 2030 is 0,385 and for 2050 it is 0,404; the difference is 0,063.
- **Pessimistic:** the HDI for 2030 is 0,466 and for 2050 it is 0,549; the difference is 0,008.
- **Optimistic:** the HDI for 2030 is 0,474 and for 2050 it is 0,579; the difference is 0,03.
The risk of deepening democratic deficits

A previous section discussed the notion of a democratic deficit or surplus. An ‘appropriate’ level of democracy is important (i.e. a level of democracy commensurate with levels of education and wealth) and the present analysis is that the grouping of ‘more fragile’ countries would remain firmly within the anocracy category – i.e. neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic – with all the associated risks of greater instability. Cilliers and Schünemann quote various studies that point out the following:

- Anocracies (partial democratic regimes) are about six times more likely than democracies and 2.5 times more likely than autocracies to experience new outbreaks of intra-state war.
- States that experience stalled transitions from autocracy to democracy or adverse regime changes tend to be more prone to conflict and instability.
- Anocracies are generally highly unstable, with over 50 per cent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over 70 per cent experiencing one within ten years.
- Partial democracies with factionalism are exceptionally unstable.\textsuperscript{106}
This risk suggests the need for a focus on assistance to statebuilding, or expanding state capacity development, as a critical priority to avert the pessimistic scenario. Improvements in governance across the domains of authority, legitimacy and capacity will be critical, but, as is pointed out elsewhere, need to occur in tandem.

The development of state capacity in fragile state contexts has been disappointing, in part because aid has at times had unintended negative effects on local conditions, and poorly delivered aid can in the worst instances exacerbate conflict dynamics. At the same time, progress on improving the state’s legitimacy through improved electoral practices, or its authority in terms of progress in security sector reform, or its capacity in terms of public administration reform has seen progress in some of Africa’s most conflict-affected states. Beyond the critical role of the political settlement and for enlightened leadership (see above), the ingredients for progress in state capacity lie in a long-term vision that sees the state develop in its ability to promote the rule of law and to make improvements in the accountability institutions of the state.

The risk of increasing conflict

Given the importance this study attaches to a democratic deficit as a driver of conflict and instability, the reduction in the gap between actual levels of democracy (the supply) and expected levels (the demand) when compared to other countries with similar levels of education and GDP per capita could dramatically reduce the propensity for internal violence and upheaval. Figure 21 provides a summary forecast between a pessimistic, base-case and optimistic forecast of intra-state violence.

Unsurprisingly, Sudan/South Sudan, Somalia and the DRC experience the lowest reductions in intra-state violence under an optimistic forecast and the largest increases in violence under a pessimistic forecast. The combined impact of an unstable neighbourhood, a history of conflict, a large youth bulge and various associated factors creates a conflict trap from which it will be very difficult to escape in these instances. Indeed, in the pessimistic forecast one could expect levels of intra-state conflict to increase in the next decade or so before a gradual decline into the mid-21st century.

The size of the economy and GDP per person could vary greatly among these countries and for each scenario. Table 2 sets out the difference in the size of the economy and in GDP per capita between the optimistic and pessimistic forecasts.
The economies of key countries – Ethiopia and Uganda in particular, according to the forecasts – will increase dramatically in size on the back of large increases in their populations. But these increases will only slowly translate into improvements in income on a per capita basis, and in some instances the potential differences are quite low.

Given the relatively small size of most of the economies in the ‘more fragile’ group, increases in energy demand will not be significant, but could vary greatly. For example, the largest economy, Ethiopia, could see its energy demand vary by 21 million barrels of oil equivalent by 2030 and by 309 million barrels of oil equivalent by 2050.
Table 2: Alternative economic performance for the ‘more fragile’ states: GDP and GDP per person scenarios in 2030

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Difference in size of the 2030 economy (market exchange rate)</th>
<th>Difference in GDP per person by 2030 (purchasing power parity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>$571 million</td>
<td>$99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>$7,6 billion</td>
<td>$340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>$767 million</td>
<td>$174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>$3,2 billion</td>
<td>$272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>$96 million</td>
<td>$115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>$5,6 billion</td>
<td>$219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>$2,7 billion</td>
<td>$42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>$376 million</td>
<td>$77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>$14,1 billion</td>
<td>$207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>$2,1 billion</td>
<td>$236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>$195 million</td>
<td>$151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>$1,2 billion</td>
<td>$229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>$1,6 billion</td>
<td>$120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>$2,7 billion</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>$4,5 billion</td>
<td>$234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>$947 million</td>
<td>$283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>$1,7 billion</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>$4,9 billion</td>
<td>$887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>$3,8 billion</td>
<td>$357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>$1,9 billion</td>
<td>$280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>$1,2 billion</td>
<td>$125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South Sudan</td>
<td>$9,2 billion</td>
<td>$203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>$166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>$12,8 billion</td>
<td>$316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$1,3 billion</td>
<td>$166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IFs v6.7
Conclusion

Statistics, graphs and associated analysis can be mind-numbing, obscuring the direct and debilitating consequence of poverty, inequality, violence and the absence of governance.

IRIN, the humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, reports on an almost daily basis on the impact of the incapacity, or virtual absence, of state institutions and endemic corruption in places such as the eastern DRC, part of a country that seems to be trapped in long-term fragility.109 Two-thirds of children in North and South Kivu provinces do not have a birth certificate, although such a document is ostensibly required to be enrolled in school, IRIN recently reported. Most health and education services in eastern DRC are funded or controlled by aid agencies, not the government, and in rural areas customary chiefs exert their own authority, dispense justice and allocate land. The police often do not provide any crime prevention or investigation services, since the government does not pay them; tax collection essentially consists of the extortion of irregular payments for non-existent services, permits and passage. Colonial-era infrastructure has crumbled after decades of neglect; people are poor, destitute and often desperate. Were it not for the bounty from an extremely fertile nature, many would starve.
Corruption in the DRC is endemic and pervasive. Despite elections, ‘the country has an undemocratic, authoritarian and opaque governance system that supports patronage networks based on the exchange of favours and murky resource transfers.’ It is easy to fall into this trap, as is evident by the example of close neighbour Zimbabwe that today has a GDP per capita not much higher than that of the DRC, having spiralled downward for more than a decade until very recently.

The international community, largely through the UN system, has spent billions of dollars on trying to ‘fix’ the DRC since the early 1960s. Yet in 2013 progress toward statebuilding and even stabilisation remains incomplete, such that the UN now finds itself engaged in ‘peace enforcement’ to protect civilians in the volatile eastern third of the vast country. It is unlikely that the recent deployment of the Rapid Deployment Brigade in the east will change this dynamic without much more comprehensive political engagements for the future that can set the country on a new trajectory. Domestic leadership, long in short supply in this beleaguered country, is key, as is regional support.

Analysis would indicate that the tragedy in the DRC (as well as in Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan, and probably the CAR) will continue for at least a generation, if not longer, while ‘government’, to the extent that it exists more than 2 000 km to the west in Kinshasa, continues with the pretence of sovereignty and is accorded the privileges and respect of others who are elected and govern in the interests of their citizens, not their personal benefit, and without the capacity, institutions and systems to affect change.

Realistically the DRC and the larger Central African and Great Lakes regions, whose neighbours’ development it generally retards, has three options that could unlock this most tragic of situations. The first is the establishment of some type of international or regional trusteeship for the country, which is an unlikely prospect. The second, equally unpalatable outcome, is the temporary or permanent dismemberment of the country, allowing neighbours such as Rwanda in particular de jure control over territories that have been theirs in practice for decades. At least this will provide some semblance of governance in parts long abandoned by Kinshasa. The third pathway ahead is the development of a national development and stability accord by which the government and other key stakeholders in Kinshasa will enter into a pact with their people and with neighbours and the international community to commence with a new pathway.
This third option, clearly the most desirable from any perspective, has proven as unlikely as agreement on any of the preceding options, although the recent initiative towards the creation of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC is an important component of such an approach.111 International partners wield considerable influence in the DRC and its meddling neighbour, Rwanda, to the east, disbursing roughly 40 per cent of their annual budgets. The DRC is a self-anointed member of the g7+ grouping of the world’s most fragile countries that have come together in a mantle of self-examination and ownership that, in turn, will ensure continued donor support. This is a recipe that is working elsewhere (such as in Liberia), but the quality and orientation of domestic political leadership are key, while the size of the challenge in the DRC is enormous. President Joseph Kabila rules through a complex system of patronage, factionalism and violence that is stoked by at least 30 different armed groups in the eastern DRC alone. Similar to the situation in the much more stable Kenya, where this occurred on a smaller scale during the 2007/8 elections, local or national politicians use these groups ‘to rally popular support, intimidate rivals, and bolster their importance’.112

Eventually, progress in a long-term ‘more fragile’ country such as the DRC will require domestic ownership beyond the ruling elites and enlightened leadership, a solid regional pact (such as the emerging Regional Oversight Mechanism), and concerted international support, for the forecast in this section has concluded that in ten extreme cases (Comoros, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and Togo), these countries could be expected to remain fragile for at least the next generation.113 Beyond the domestic challenge, regional and international support is important. Responding to these challenges will also require continued close interactions among development and humanitarian assistance partners to reconcile emergency and crisis response initiatives with longer-term strategies for governance, development and conflict prevention. In these instances no amount of ‘surge’ aid or technical assistance beyond some type of trusteeship presents an option to somehow manage these countries out of fragility. External agencies and local populations will have to respond to ongoing setbacks, numerous crises and a barrage of criticism in terms of whatever support they embark on.
6

Recommendations

This monograph has presented a model of fragility drawn from the contemporary scholarly and practice-oriented literature, provided a long-term, ‘structural’ forecast on the future of Africa’s more fragile countries, and developed various alternative scenarios. The recommendations that follow are of a strategic, ‘big picture’ nature, in tandem with the broad brush strokes with which the forecasts were undertaken.

The recommendations are designed to highlight those interventions that hold the greatest potential for minimising the risks of the pessimistic scenario and realising the more positive potential outcomes associated with the optimistic scenario – in essence seeking to highlight ways in which the balance can be tipped toward greater security and development over the long term.

While the urgency for immediate operational recommendations (such as on the commitment of resources to alleviating hunger and suffering, supplying water and sanitation, and providing basic health care and security from direct threat) is recognised, these are left aside in what follows.

The recommendations are grouped in accordance with the dimensions of fragility that were identified as part of the study, as follows:
1. Thinking long term by planning for long-term fragility and data innovation
2. Preventing and managing conflict by responding to a bad neighbourhood and the security dilemma, as well as establishing an enhanced partnership with the UN
3. Reducing poverty and inequality by reform of the extractive sector and securing future oil/gas income as cash transfers
4. Improving governance by building the foundations of the state and balancing security demands with other requirements

**Thinking long-term**

**Planning for long-term fragility**

Africa faces a potential multigenerational challenge in at least ten long-term ‘more fragile’ countries, and the need for continued, decades-long commitment to the 16 ‘more fragile’ – but forecast to improve – countries in the analysis. While gains can be made in all these countries, the forecast suggests that due the persistence of deep, structural drivers of fragility, security will not emerge readily and the state is unlikely to accrue the legality and authority to drive development or be able to facilitate and regulate the private sector. Poor people in these countries will continue to suffer, because chronic poverty will likely be increasingly concentrated in these countries, and for the international community good money will be thrown after bad as traditional approaches to aid remain ineffective in overcoming the effects of deep drivers of fragility.

It is recommended that external partners (the AfDB, organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the AU’s newly established African Solidarity Initiative (ASI)114 and neighbouring countries) collectively engage with each of these ten countries to facilitate the development of individual long-term national development plans. In some countries, such as Liberia, this has been a key component of galvanising long-term commitments, drawing up a sober plan for building state capacity, and rallying the public around a new vision for the future. As in Liberia, ownership of forward-looking development planning must lie with domestic stakeholders, while recognising that the associated process will be difficult and suffer inevitable delays and setbacks. Widespread domestic engagement with the national development plan – and the involvement of society in ensuring accountability by the state and development partners – is a critical component of implementing such plans, and any
long-term planning should be buttressed by ongoing in-country community- or city-level outreach that features participatory methodologies. The principal difference between this initial recommendation and similar approaches, such as poverty reduction strategy papers or UN Development Assistance Frameworks, is firstly the need to foster an integrated approach to conflict-sensitive development, thus reducing inequality, and the need to think holistically about the strengthening of state capacity as a critical goal; and, secondly, to extend the time horizon of such planning over at least twenty to thirty years.

A long-term financial facility will be required that is dedicated to supporting the implementation of these plans, supported by commitments from traditional donors, new partners such as China and African countries. Access to the facility should be contingent on the accountability of domestic leadership and clear benchmarks of progress that is also locally monitored. An amended version of the APRM process, based on domestic ownership and self-reporting, should serve as the key engagement mechanism for the fragility partnership. Self-reporting and assessment should be supported by regular independent political-economic and forward-looking reviews and oversight delegated to a single integrated team.

Partners could individually invest in country-level integrated analysis to understand the structural drivers of fragility in each country, how they inter-relate and what the potential trade-offs of different policy interventions are, but must act in concert. Neighbouring countries to these ten long-term ‘more fragile’ states, the AU and international partners will have to commit to clear conditionality and agree to act in concert if external support is to make any impression on domestic considerations. This additionally requires that new partners, including countries such as South Africa, India and China, become part of the process and that engagement with the long-term fragile countries be effectively ‘ring-fenced’ to discourage external engagement that detracts from the stated development objectives.

Many authors have pointed to the importance of consolidating a national developmental coalition before the exploitation of resources begins that also builds government capacity while creating social safety nets for the chronically poor. The key to managing non-renewable resources successfully is generally presented as requiring a coherent long-term national strategy embracing all stakeholders that can convert temporary natural-resource wealth into permanent human capital and expand opportunities across generations. This strategy should set out the terms and conditions under which natural resources will be
developed, including fiscal policies, contractual arrangements, corporate social responsibility obligations and tax regimes. Strategies such as these must be developed through wide consultation and identify extractive projects that can generate jobs by linking effectively with the local economy through forward linkages that address poverty reduction with inclusive growth and social transformation.\textsuperscript{117}

\textit{Innovation in data collection and analysis}

Data from many African countries is poor, because statistical service agencies are weak – a consideration that necessarily casts doubts on analysis, including that contained in these pages.\textsuperscript{118} Even the most basic data, such as population numbers, total fertility rates, and economic size and growth rates extrapolations, may come from field research that is often several decades old. For example, Ghana recently rebased its economy (and Nigeria will shortly release its own update) that saw the country catapulted from a low-income to a lower-middle status, increased the size of the economy by 60 per cent, and removed its eligibility for concessional lending from the World Bank.

Despite the efforts of organisations such as UNDP and the establishment of a forum where the director-generals of the statistic departments of African countries now regularly meet, the development of accurate statistics as a basis for planning and forecasting will take several decades, delivering only incremental results along the way.

The potential of ‘big data’ – the massive amount of data that is now available and our ability to use or interpret that data in novel ways on the back of the rise of mobile telephony in Africa – may provide an alternative avenue that can be explored with potential fruitful results. Already innovative approaches have been used in improving conflict-prevention strategies through the use of crowdsourcing data gathering in countries such as Kenya around the two most recent presidential elections.\textsuperscript{119} Recently, Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger made a strong case to the effect that ‘we can learn from this large body of information things that we could not comprehend when we used only small amounts’. The rise of big data will, according to this view, undermine our quest ‘to discover the cause of things, in return for accepting correlations ... Big data helps answer what, not why, and often that is good enough.’\textsuperscript{120}

Instead of using smaller amounts of very exact data (the historical quest of many social scientists when seeking to undertake forecasts), the modern
response of corporations such as Google, Facebook and Twitter, and election campaigns such as that of Barack Obama is to throw computing power at the huge amounts of data now available through social media, looking for correlations and associations that may have little obvious causal relationship. Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger argue that this is an approach that may imply that much of life ‘is probabilistic, rather than certain’. Their view is that large amounts of messy data will steadily trump small amounts of cleaner data.

There are two potential implications regarding big data that flow from the analysis presented in this monograph. Firstly it could present an alternative to trying to understand deeper drivers and causes in favour of associations and correlations, and moving on from there. In the process, ‘prediction becomes probabilities’. Secondly, the exploration of the opportunities presented by big data provides an opportunity for partners to explore and benefit from innovative new approaches to social analysis in Africa. Already the World Bank has established a unit located in Nairobi and Washington, DC to analyse and review engagement in fragile countries. It is recommended that international partners explore the use of big data that could complement the more traditional efforts of the World Bank and short-circuit some of Africa’s traditional data constraints. Such data can help provide greater knowledge about the conditions of substate fragility and development challenges, which are often obscured in the more typical country-level datasets.

Additionally, country-specific platforms for social media and integrated approaches to link up development-, conflict- and governance-related social media interfaces have great development and oversight potential. Also recommended are investments in mobile technologies and projects to extend awareness of service delivery, new forms of communication and information sharing, and ways for citizens to monitor and report on the implementation of development initiatives undertaken by the World Bank and others.

Preventing and managing conflict

Bad neighbourhoods and the security dilemma

The analysis of the drivers of instability indicates that two factors predominate in perpetuating instability – past experience of instability (such as in countries like the CAR, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia) and bad-neighbourhood effects (particularly in Central, West and the Horn of Africa, where regional conflicts
have been the order of the day for decades). Most of Africa’s conflicts have a regional dimension and the existence of overlapping regional security complexes in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Central and West Africa is the subject of a considerable body of academic literature. Many ‘more fragile’ countries are trapped in a classic security dilemma, with unjustifiably large defence establishments to provide protection against meddling neighbours, retaliate by direct or indirect encouragement of factions opposed to the government next door, and, of course, protect against competing domestic factions.

Africans should build on the example of the Ad-hoc Investigation Mechanism that was established by the Mbeki Panel to investigate the ongoing claims and counterclaims by Sudan and South Sudan about support to armed groups in their territory aimed at destabilising the other. Credible findings that are made public on the extent of cross-border interference in the domestic affairs of others would go a long way to shining the light on these situations and should trigger remedial censure and action under the auspices of the AU and the UN Security Council. Once this security paradox is addressed, it opens the way for domestic efforts to undertake comprehensive security review processes that can identify the appropriate levels of expenditure on defence, internal security and intelligence – often hidden from scrutiny and uninformed by a needs analysis.

Efforts are also recommended to build non-formal local-level institutions for resilience and conflict prevention that can bridge the gap between formal state institutions and authority, on the one hand, and traditional and informal institutions, on the other. Recent work by UNDP on community security and ‘infrastructures for peace’ emphasises ways to innovatively balance the need for expanding state authority and the local, often informal, networks that are de facto security providers. This approach also seeks to balance local initiatives to create resilient communities up to national level and regional initiatives for conflict prevention.124

The focus on conflict prevention is shifting to two key areas: dealing with land- and other natural-resource-related disputes in rural areas, and reducing urban conflict often along identity lines in informal settlements and underserved and marginalised areas that are often seen as the result of unmanaged urbanisation. Both deserve attention in the future.

An enhanced partnership with the UN

More than any other region, Africa looks towards the UN and, with the support
of organisations such as the European Union, has sought to actively build its capacity to prevent and respond to conflict, particularly through the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture. In the absence of UN Security Council reform to push the international body to greater accountability and responsiveness, much more can be done, particularly within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that deals with regional organisations. These efforts include greater integration between AU and UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions, including the use of assessed contributions for AU peacekeeping missions; consultations prior to decision making; the division of labour and the sharing of responsibilities; the effective use of the comparative advantages of the AU and its regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution; the full operationalisation of the African Standby Force; and the provision of greater financial support by African members states to African peace efforts.125

Reducing poverty and inequality

Reform of the extractive sector and company tax

The extractive sector will remain particularly important in the development trajectory of Africa’s ‘more fragile’ countries, despite the importance of a Green Revolution, the dominance of the informal sector and the need for the development of other sectors such as services and, eventually, manufacturing. Yet ensuring that the extractive sector contributes to wider developmental through revenue generation and the establishment of processing operations requires an activist and capable state126 – which is clearly not the situation of the ‘more fragile’ grouping. Even in the developed world, with all the checks and balances available to well-resourced and capable governments, graft and corruption in this and other sectors have been able to steadily outwit the most sophisticated regulatory regime.

A recent report from the Africa Progress Panel127 has identified five components as key to managing non-renewable resources successfully:

- Firstly, an enduring contract between governments and citizens sustaining the highest standards of transparency and accountability.
- Secondly, ensuring that the benefits are distributed sustainably across society, both by spending on basic services, but also by putting in place the
infrastructure and skills needed to foster inclusive growth (see the recommendation on cash grants elsewhere).

- Thirdly, progressively strengthening the linkages between the extractives sector and local markets by maximising value added.
- Fourthly, developing resources in a way that protects and benefits host communities, and safeguards the natural environment.
- Fifthly, providing civil society groups with the political space to monitor what is going on, including in terms of contracts, concessions and licensing agreements.

Social pressure on producer states/governments to exercise greater financial, regulatory and sometimes operational control over extractive activities will increase, especially given the apparent disconnect between ordinary livelihoods in new resource producers and the expectation of improved social and economic conditions. Historically, company tax rates in Africa have been relative low compared to developed countries, though rising. African leaders need to insist that mining companies pay appropriate tax and not divert attention to corporate social investment projects as a cheap alternative, while development partners should consider the provision of expertise at national level in this regard.

The global financial crisis has already led to important innovations with potentially positive results in many ‘more fragile’ states in terms of corporate practices. Thus the Africa Progress Panel was able to call for a crackdown on the international tax rules that allow multinationals to shift profits from one country to another with impunity. The UK’s G8 presidency has called for a global agreement to compel fiscal disclosure by companies, especially of tax payments, and beneficial ownership of companies (seen as key instruments to address transfer pricing and other sharp practices that especially affect resource-rich fragile states). Additional measures deserving of support include an end to the trade in conflict minerals, resulting from transparency on the supply chain (through due diligence, traceability and certification) and the identification and securing of strategic mines; governance reform; and support for the livelihoods and economic opportunity of miners.128

Also, further integration into global networks such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and other similarly regimes must allow for a stronger role by the private sector in future African development. International partners, the AU, and others should demand increased transparency for
multi-lateral aid, and strong support for and participation in global efforts such as Publish What You Pay, and should encourage new partners such as China to fully participate.129

**Securing future oil/gas income as cash transfers to address deep-seated poverty**

Earlier it was noted that a commodities boom generally poisons the prospects for development in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Yet a number of countries in East and West Africa stand to benefit handsomely from future oil and gas income streams, even as the discovery of other minerals accelerates. The list includes six ‘more fragile’ countries, namely Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and possibly also Niger.130

It is recommended that organisations such as the AfDB, the Peacebuilding Commission and others, including the World Bank, should work towards a radical policy approach (as advocated by Diamond and Mosbacher), namely, handing a large share of new oil and gas revenues directly to the people as taxable income.131 Diamond and Mosbacher argue, and the present authors concur, that if properly managed and extended over a sufficiently long period, the income from new oil and mineral discoveries in ‘more fragile’ countries could contribute significantly to alleviating deep-seated poverty. The approach has many obvious advantages, including the establishment of an expanded tax base as a source of state revenue and in fostering a ‘tax-mediated social contract’ between the people and the custodians of the state.

Numerous studies, such as that released in 2009 by the Pardee Center on forecasting global poverty, have reviewed the policy levers through which poverty can effectively be reduced over time. Almost without exception they come to the same conclusion: direct transfer payments to the poor ‘are among the most effective single measures, and perhaps the only one that makes a significant contribution’.132 Cash transfers may even be effective as an instrument of inclusive growth. Such programmes are expected to see immediate gains in food security, health, and nutritional and educational gains, with the potential of other effects such as reducing HIV risk or in new small-enterprise development.

The authors tend towards a view that discussions on making cash-transfer payments conditional on ‘desirable’ activities (e.g. school enrolment of children) are an unnecessary diversion. Cash grants should be unconditional
and poor people should be allowed the dignity to determine their own most pressing priorities.

Equally, two areas should be carefully addressed in any cash transfer programme: ways to limit long-term dependency on cash transfers, and ways to ensure the accountability and transparency of the state in carrying out the programme. In regard to the latter, recent technological advances enable even poor and fragile countries to embark on direct cash transfers to poor people. These include the spread in mobile phones and associated software systems that allow for mobile banking, as well as affordable and reliable personal-identification technologies using biometric identification such as fingerprint and retina recognition. Many of the same tools can also make the management of these grants transparent.

There are few practical obstacles to this recommendation. Resistance to such an approach will largely come from politicians and bureaucrats who would suffer the potential loss of control over important streams of income and patronage.

**Improving governance**

*Building the foundations of the state*

This monograph’s understanding of the nature of governance in more fragile states was set out earlier, and the personalised and delicate nature of the elite agreements that are often foundational to stability in these countries is recognised. Progress in these circumstances is largely dependent on successive political pacts and agreements rather than the ballot; thus statebuilding in fragile states is a process of political sedimentation that builds the rules of the game (and institutions) over time. The limited role and influence of external actors and the resilience of local networks of patronage and power was also pointed to.

For statebuilding to proceed, a political settlement has to take account of elites and their interests. But to advance social cohesion and stability, settlements have to simultaneously advance the influence of marginalised groups, women in particular, whose influence could, over time, be transformational at a time when there is acknowledgement that external actors have a limited role (and impact) and that associated threats of punishment (or conditionality) are seldom effective.

This study’s general approach to this challenge is to emphasise the importance of building the social compact between citizens and the state. The most
fundamental aspect of this relationship is through national tax systems and the need to practically connect the state. In exchange for registering and paying tax, citizens should, of course, expect the provision of basic services, where the priority should be to connect the country, in the physical sense of the word. Historically, many of Europe's nation states were the product, not only of war and conquest, but also of the practical extension of central authority over the hinterland. In the originally disparate conglomeration of tribes that became France, this was greatly facilitated by building a viable network of roads that connected all provinces/counties to the capital and to one another. In this way the backbone of the state is established along which additional projects and activities can be undertaken and through which the capital can extend its influence nationally.

Rather than respond to short-term crisis, the strategic statebuilding challenge is to start a virtuous circle that replaces the fragility syndrome with a sustainable developmental trajectory. This statement is made with full recognition that ‘more fragile’ states generally are faced with numerous special challenges when establishing systems of taxation, including poverty, a large informal sector and economic inequality, as well as competing demands on a small purse such as education, food security and security.

External support from international partners and organisations such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission, UN Economic Council for Africa, AU, World Bank, OECD and AfDB should assist ‘more fragile’ countries to establish taxation systems, border controls, agricultural extension services and systems for the management of trade. Dedicated in-country training teams should provide substantive courses and funding to allow the development of the associated policies and systems. In addition, national projects should include priority investment in strategic infrastructure in order to build the key transport and communications systems that allow travel and commerce to reach key towns, cities, and regions, thus bringing the country together.

Already the area of public administrative reform has received considerable attention by UN development partners, resulting in a well-considered and wide-ranging set of standards and principles for engaging in long-term public administrative reform in fragile- and conflict-affected countries. The 2010 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs World public sector report focused on reconstructing public administration after conflict: it emphasised the need for public administrators to foster trust in government institutions through
accountability and integrity, the importance of effective leadership, a focus on institution building, and the need for a long-term approach to capacity development at the systemic, organisational, and individual levels. Similarly, the UN has also devoted considerable resources and attention to addressing the deficit of judicial and legal institutions that can provide access to justice for all (not just those with means to afford often-lengthy and tedious legal processes) and the sanctity of contract and secure property rights (a critical element of creating an ‘enabling environment’ for domestic and international investment). A critical component of rule of law institutions is the advancement of women’s security and rights of inheritance, which is a strategic area of social transformation that can also contribute to a state that is more responsive to the needs of the chronically poor.

**The question of balance and security first**

In earlier section we presented our view of the sequencing debate, and a discussion on the up-front investment that should be made in security in particular as a prerequisite for investment in other sectors such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure or governance. Analysis would indicate that engagement in four broad areas (governance, poverty, inequality, and efforts to reduce conflict/violence) should proceed in unison. Although development is not possible without security, the quest for security first is often a search for the Holy Grail, and the exact nature of ‘sufficient’ security is unclear. Current international practice is at odds with this view, particularly when reviewing the amounts earmarked and spent on peacekeeping (the UN’s approved budget for 2013/4 is $7,54 billion, with 8 of the 15 peacekeeping missions in Africa). These amounts are in stark contrast to the amounts available to the Peacebuilding Fund and other sources of support in so-called post-conflict situations. The Peacebuilding Fund works in 17 African countries with a total budget equivalent to that of a modest peacekeeping mission. Politics is essentially about the allocation of scarce resources, and in ‘more fragile’ countries a proportionate amount needs to be spent on security, but no more.

**Conclusion**

Different to various indicators and measures of state failure, fragility and the like, this study has adopted a deeply structural approach to what it terms the
fragility syndrome. Thinking about fragility in Africa over the long term is aided by the findings that emerge from efforts to forecast trends. Futures analysis that presents the costs of conflict in the long term and highlights the potential gains made if conflict is reduced can help inform present decisions about the urgency of conflict prevention; the reduction of poverty, inequality and exclusion; and gains in governance effectiveness and degree of democratic inclusion.

This study only touched on the potential role of regional organisations such as the AU, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States and the East African Community. Despite considerable progress, particularly in conflict management and prevention at the continental level, none of these organisations has been able to develop a sufficient set of shared values and the ability for common action to forge an effective security or development community. All remain hostage to very limited levels of national support and capacity, although the current model of infrastructure-led development presents a realistic future pathway. Regional integration is inevitably a slow process and the study recognises the important role that these organisations play in normative congruence, even if this is currently limited in practical implementation. The weakness of regional organisations should not, however, detract from the importance of adopting a regional approach in efforts to alleviate the symptoms or causes of fragility.

Increasingly, there is appreciation of the need for the greater integration of local, national and regional or transborder structures in Africa for promoting security. For example, gains have been made in contexts such as the Mano River Union in efforts to take a more holistic approach.

Futures forecasting with tools such as IFs is best suitable for country- and regional-level data analysis and as a result there is a loss of granularity at subsidiary levels. For this reason this study has not substantively looked at substate or city-level fragility, and the recommendations presented earlier are the poorer for that. In this regard the 2012 report of the Crisis States Research Centre entitled *Meeting the challenges of crisis states* is recommended as an important complementary study that goes beyond the present analysis. An increased number of African countries are additionally adopting federal and decentralised models of governance, including greater financial autonomy provided to subnational regions, larger metropolitan areas and cities, which offer new opportunities for engagement by organisations such as the World Bank, the AfDB and others.

There is increased evidence that inequality in many ‘more resilient’ African
countries is growing, including in many of the continents larger and more stable countries such as South Africa and Kenya. Nigeria, Africa's most populace country, was not included as part of the more fragile grouping, despite the debilitating poor governance, substate fragility and violence that it is experiencing at present, particularly in its northern regions. While such countries are characterised as ‘more resilient’, realistically they too are vulnerable to subnational fragility in the years ahead and are not impervious to national-level crises. The potential that this has for the future is worrying, and the resort to populism in Zimbabwe at the cost of economic growth is a warning of the toxic impact that unsustainable policies can have on the livelihoods of ordinary people. These are challenges that appear to be building up in South Africa, a state that impacts more widely on the region than any other due to its trade links into southern and eastern Africa, while the recent escalation of terrorism in Nigeria and Kenya bodes ill for the future for these two regional powers.

Helping fragile and conflict-affected states is difficult, often suffers setbacks, and is necessarily a long-term enterprise. According to the AfDB's research, average income levels in Africa's fragile states (based on the bank’s list of these countries) rose by only $33 per person from 2005 to 2011, and all evidence points to multiple and complex challenges to exiting the fragility trap. The present study's forecast would reaffirm the view that much of Africa is witnessing a long process of state formation and statebuilding, together more recently with rapid economic growth that could simultaneously address many of the deep drivers of fragility (such as poverty) while accentuating others (such as inequality). Thus the 2013 *Africa progress report* finds that ‘economic growth is driving an increasingly unequal pattern of wealth distribution and weakening the link between growth and poverty reduction’. Economic growth and the broader concept of ‘development’ are not a panacea for reducing fragility, but they are essential prerequisites.

Policy measures necessarily have limited ability to respond to deeper or root-cause drivers due to the longer time horizons and systemic nature of interrelated problems. These relationships only change gradually over time and provide limited ‘policy leverage’. This rather obvious statement points to the need to think innovatively about how future-related analysis can help inform the priorities and interventions of external partners in the coming years, and how country-specific futures modelling can also be especially helpful in working with national stakeholders on long-term development planning.
Current World Bank engagements relating to state fragility

The World Bank’s work in ‘fragile and eligible conflict-affected countries’ is undertaken through the International Development Association (IDA) fund. In addition to concessional loans and grants, The IDA provides significant levels of debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Eligibility for IDA support depends firstly on gross national income (GNI) per capita being below an annual threshold (in fiscal year 2013: $1,195) and lack of creditworthiness to borrow on market terms. The IDA ‘currently places emphasis on four thematic areas: gender, climate change, fragile and conflict-affected countries, and crisis response’. Starting in the 1980s, the bank’s structural adjustment policies came under severe criticism. The use of performance-based allocations effectively rewarded countries with greater institutional capacity (and penalised those with less capacity). The deleterious impact of this on poverty and state capacity forced a rethink and today the bank has a much less risk-averse approach to supporting fragile states.
The World Bank Low-Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) programme grew out of a 2002 report that sought to address the special cash needs (for quick, high-impact projects) of low-income countries with unstable government and economic structures. In 2004 the LICUS strategic programme established a $25 million trust fund scheduled to operate through 2007 by focusing on basic health care and essential social services like education in small, realistic projects. LICUS countries were expected to draft individual country strategies to strengthen vital domestic institutions and governance. LICUS-qualifying standards were not exact and the criteria for eligibility included:

- weak institutions and institutional performance, as measured by the World Bank’s CPIA ratings – see below
- severe internal conflict
- a deteriorating socioeconomic climate that is not conducive to the receipt and successful use of traditional development assistance
- the risk of being abandoned by the international community for past poor performance

A 2007 review set the foundations for revised World Bank policies as the bank sought to create a faster and simplified results-based framework. The funding available to fragile states was increased. A more recent push by the bank saw the publication of the *World development report 2011: conflict, security, and development* and the subsequent establishment of its Centre on Conflict, Security and Development in February 2012 working from Nairobi and Washington, DC. The centre helps the bank to develop its engagement strategies for fragile and conflict-affected countries.

In June 2013 the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the political risk insurance arm of the World Bank Group, launched its Conflict-Affected and Fragile Economies Facility. This facility will use donor partner contributions together with the MIGA’s guarantees to assume higher risk and insure more investment projects in conflict-affected and fragile economies. It targets ‘high-development impact projects that support economic growth and poverty reduction through job creation, infrastructure services, and access to financial markets’.

Funded by Canada and Sweden, as well as from internal World Bank resources, the MIGA expects the facility to provide aggregate risk
mitigation of $400 million in conflict-affected and fragile economies over the next four to five years.\textsuperscript{147}

**Current AfDB engagements relating to state fragility**

The AfDB is active in around 40 least-developed African countries, investing around $6 billion annually through concessional funding for projects and programmes, as well as technical assistance for studies and capacity-building activities.\textsuperscript{148}

Beyond its five operational priorities (infrastructure, regional integration, private sector development, governance and accountability, and skills and technology), the AfDB has three areas of 'special emphasis' that include a special focus on fragile states. In January 2008 the bank developed a strategy for enhanced engagement in fragile states that set out a framework for operational engagement in these countries based on what it termed a ‘continuum approach’. It created a flexible Fragile States Facility to channel additional resources to these countries, to which it allocates 7.5 per cent of AfDB resources, which are available to fragile states over and above their regular allocation. A key part of the bank’s revised business model has been operationalised through the Fragile States Unit, and the bank is advancing its work on justice and security sector reform in fragile and post-conflict contexts.

In its engagement in fragile states, the bank focuses particularly on governance and capacity building, accountability, and economic management, while projects are supported via country programmes. In 2012 it published a report on evaluating its assistance to fragile states and subsequently committed to the implementation of the New Deal that built on a 2011 lessons-learnt exercise. The bank has also undertaken a range of research and analysis on the impact of natural resource revenue flows on conflict and fragility. As a result the AfDB has beefed up its support for the EITI and helped Liberia become the first country in Africa to comply with the EITI. Other projects include support to the Mano River Union and the demobilisation of former combatants.\textsuperscript{149}

Based on its experience with its Fragile States Facility, the AfDB is intent on ensuring that fragile states can also benefit from ‘resources in the Bank’s non-sovereign window, taking into consideration its risk management framework’.\textsuperscript{150} The bank has 11 of its 34 field offices in fragile states and has two regional
resource centres. Today it refers to a ‘continuum approach’ that goes beyond a
list of fragile countries and believes that this approach will make it easier to
support fragile situations rather than fragile states alone. The AfDB Strategy
for 2013–2022 notes the following:

In dealing with fragile states and fragile situations, the Bank will stay
closely engaged in the field and be quicker to exploit windows of oppor-
tunity for change. It will be more sensitive to the dynamics of political
economy and conflict and share more cross-country experiences. It will
take a hands-on approach to strengthening weak institutional capacity.
Key priorities will include security, capacity building, employment creation
and the provision of basic infrastructure. The Bank will pay special
attention to donor coordination in order to facilitate its work with fragile
states. It will also review procedures to ensure that fragile states benefit
most from support, while it maintains the best possible risk management.

Reflected in the AfDB’s release of its Private Sector Development Strategy, 2013-
2017, the private sector will be key to Africa’s future and bank lending is steadily
moving ‘from public to private investment, and from making investment itself
toward encouraging others to do so’. The AfDB notes that the private sector
already generates ‘two-thirds of Africa’s investment, three-quarters of its eco-
nomic output, and nine-tenths of its formal and informal employment’.

The strategy aims to improve Africa’s investment and business climate by
supporting governments’ efforts to strengthen the laws, policies, tax
systems, rights, regulations and procedures that govern business. ...
Second, it aims to expand business access to social and economic infra-
structure. ... Third, it aims to promote enterprise development by helping
business gain access to finance, building its skills, and helping to add value
to its activities.

The strategy notes activities to support fragile states as much as strong states –
‘with a commitment to take risks for them when necessary and to be both
flexible and versatile to achieve quick and tangible results’.

The AfDB’s Private Sector Development Strategy, 2013–2017 includes the
following statement on the bank’s engagement in fragile situations:
For both sovereign and non-sovereign operations, supporting PSD [private sector development] in fragile states presents significant operational challenges, which require adjustments by the Bank Group of its generic approach to fragile countries. In practical terms, this will involve more informed risk taking, nimbler operational responses including the development of innovative instruments by the Bank Group, more hands-on implementation support, and new approaches to measure results in fragile and conflict-affected states – all based on the accumulated experience of the Bank.157

The strategy further lists various strategies, including greater innovative risk mitigation instruments, the proposed establishment of new financial instruments to stretch risk capital in more risky countries, the greater use of multi-donor trust funds, etc.
ANNEXURE B

Methodological notes

The International Futures forecasting system

The IFs tool models relationships across variables from a wide range of key global systems for 186 countries and allows forecasts to be generated to 2100. Relationships are structured in the model in two interconnected ways: firstly, by leveraging a very large set of historical data series (nearly 2,500 series in the most recent version of the model) and, secondly, by evaluating extant academic literature. The data series are drawn from the most authoritative sources available, such as international organisations and scholarly projects that have been subject to peer review. IFs does not include proprietary data such as may be available for a fee from private sectors sources; all data sources are derived from publicly available time-series data by country.

The tool has been developed over nearly three decades of work by the pioneering application of modelling and data-analysis techniques developed to assess how historical trends and patterns may be projected into future horizons through algorithmic procedures. IFs has been developed under the leadership of Professor Barry Hughes of the University of Denver and it is now used for a variety of research applications ranging from education to health, the
environment, conflict and governance. It has recently led to a series of publications on global futures – entitled Patterns of Human Progress – that include national-, regional-, and global-level analysis and forecasts in poverty reduction, education, health, and infrastructure. A volume that provides a futures assessment of governance is also forthcoming. IFs is available for public use and is available in a web-based form or can be downloaded.

Behind the tool is the principal assumption that progress in understanding human systems and ever-better data-gathering techniques may allow for more informed goal setting and progress monitoring in human development and human security over the long term. Each model that presents the assumptions behind the futures analysis is based on representations of agent classes such as citizens, governments, firms or households that interact with demographic, economic, social and environmental structures. Models generated in IFs and the forecasts and scenarios they yield allow researchers, leaders and policymakers to shape reasonable expectations about global, regional, and/or country-specific change and continuity, and to formulate reasonable, but aggressive policy choices for long-term strategic planning initiatives. It is important to bear in mind that IFs forecasts are highly contingent scenarios, not predictions.

IFs is an integrated assessment model that is built on a foundation of dynamically interacting subsystems. These subsystems include population, economic, health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, energy, environmental, governance and international political modules. The software allows users to perform three types of analysis. Firstly, historical trends and relationships can be analysed to understand how a country has developed over time. Secondly, these relationships are formalised in the model to produce base-case forecasts. These initial forecasts – integrated across all systems covered in IFs – are useful indicators of where a country seems to be heading under current circumstances and policies, and in the absence of major shocks to the system (wars, pandemics, etc.). Thirdly, scenario analysis augments the base-case analysis by exploring the leverage that policymakers have to push systems to more desirable outcomes.

The IFs base case is a dynamic and integrated collection of central tendency forecasts that represents a scenario of how the future may unfold. The base case assumes no major paradigm shifts, policy changes or ‘black swans’ (very low-probability, high-impact events such as a global pandemic or nuclear war). Although the base case generally demonstrates continuity with historical patterns, it provides a structure that can also generate a wide range of non-linear,
dynamic, and endogenous forecasts rather than the more common simple linear extrapolations of historical trajectories and current trends.\textsuperscript{158} Given that the base case is built from the initial conditions of all historical variables and is periodically analysed and assessed in comparison to many other forecasts, it can be a good starting point for carrying out scenario analysis and constructing alternative future scenarios. Users can build their own alternative scenarios to the IFs base case or other forecasts by altering parameters within the system.\textsuperscript{159}

In IFs, a pre-processor plays a large role in creating a consistent and complete dataset for the 186 countries and 2,500 data series within the model, filling holes caused by missing data of many countries using various computational rules developed over several decades of work by the IFs team. The absence of reliable data in Africa necessarily results in various anomalies and underlines the extent to which IFs, similar to other tools of this nature, is an aid to understanding the future and not a prediction generator. The results thus need to be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism and tempered by fieldwork, the use of other tools, and individual and comparative country knowledge.

### Summary of variables used in IFs

The most recent of the volumes in the series on Patterns on Human Progress, forthcoming in 2014, is on forecasting global governance.\textsuperscript{160} The analysis presented in this monograph draws heavily on the work undertaken by Barry B. Hughes and José R. Solórzano entitled ‘IFs governance model documentation’, which is a working paper of the Pardee Center and accompanies the forthcoming volume.\textsuperscript{161} The presentation given here is a brief extract from the much greater detail available from the Pardee Center.

For the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios on ‘less’ and ‘more resilient’ countries, the present study used the following variables in IFs (the names are as used in IFs):

- for governance: GOVINDCAPAC and GOVINDINCLUS
- for war/violence: SFINTLWAR (also called SFINTLWARALL in the model)
- for inequality: GINIDOM
- for poverty: HDINEW
GOVINDCAPAC is one of three composite indicators developed, the other two being GOVINDINCLUS and GOVINDSECUR. The analysis uses GOVINDCAP and GOVINDINCLUS. The third composite indicator, GOVINDSECUR, overlaps with SFINTLWAR, which the study uses to forecast violence/intra-state war, so the security aspects of governance must not be included in this variable cluster.

The ability to raise government revenues (GOVREV as a share of GDP) is one of the dimensions of capacity in governance. Its basic calculation is a very simple ratio. The governance capacity index (GOVINDCAP) is an unweighted average of government revenue (GOVREV) net of aid recipients (AID) as a portion of GDP and government corruption.

Although the IFs base-case forecast is that the capacity, inclusion and security capacity of African governments will steadily improve in the decades ahead, although it does see a rapid drop-off in the capacity for the more fragile group of countries in the period until 2025. The reason for this is that government expenditure for these countries exceeds their revenues, resulting in a fiscal imbalance, higher debt, etc. This negative impact necessarily cascades through the remainder of the forecast, the most important aspect of which is a reduction in government capacity. This may be a data issue, since government revenue data in IFs, to the extent that it is available for Africa, is compiled and calculated from different data series.
**SFINTLWAR is defined as follows:**

Vulnerability to intrastate conflict is a function of past intrastate conflict, energy trade dependence (as a proxy for broader natural resource dependence), economic growth rate (inverse), youth bulge, urbanization rate, poverty level, infant mortality, life expectancy (inverse) undernutrition, HIV prevalence, primary net enrollment (inverse), adult education levels (inverse), corruption, democracy (inverse), gender empowerment (inverse), governance effectiveness (inverse), freedom (inverse), inequality, and water stress.

Internal or intra-state war (SFINTLWAR) is heavily determined by a moving average of a society’s past experience of such conflict (SFINTLWARMA) in what is a positive feedback system. The probability of such conflict will, however, typically converge with that determined by more basic underlying drivers, and the user can control the speed of such convergence by specifying the years to convergence (sfconv). The formulation for the index is as follows:

\[
SFINTLWAR_i = ((0.1420 + 0.0012 \times INFMOR_i - 0.0006 \times TRADEOPEN_i) + F(POLITYDEMOC_i, YTHBULGE_i, GDPRMA_i, SFINTLWARMA_i))
\]

where

\[
TRADEOPEN_i = \frac{X_i + M_i}{GDP_i}
\]

- **SFINTLWAR** = probability of internal war or state failure
- **INFMOR** = infant mortality, normed globally
- **TRADEOPEN** = trade openness ratio
- **X** = exports in billions of dollars
- **M** = imports in billion dollars
- **GDP** = gross domestic product in billion dollars
- **POLITYDEMOC** = Polity’s 21-point scale of democracy; asymmetrical curvilinear relationship with a peak at 9 and a sharper fall than rise
- **YTHBULGE** = population aged 15–29 as a proportion of all adults; algorithmic adjustment with GDP/capita explained in text
- **GDPRMA** = gross domestic product growth rate, algorithmic moving average carrying forward 60 per cent past year’s value; algorithm-
mic adjustment with GDP/capita explained in the text; inverse relationship

\[ SFINTLWARMA = \text{moving average of past internal war probability (i.e. carrying forward past forecast values, not past data values)} \]

\[ \text{sfintlwarm} = \text{an exogenous multiplier for scenario analysis} \]

Algorithm on regional contagion explained in the text

\[ R\text{-squared} = 0.22 \text{ in a 50-year historical simulation without annual correction (see text for elaboration)} \]

The major driving variables in a statistical estimation are the level of infant mortality (INFMORT) as a proxy for quality of government performance and trade openness or exports (X) plus imports (M) as a share of GDP. In addition, democracy level (DEMOCPOLITY) enters in a non-linear and algorithmic way, as do youth bulge (YTHBULGE) and a moving average of economic growth rate (GDPRMA). Although less often used and turned off in the base-case scenario, external interventions (wpextinterv) and mass repression (sfmassrep) can cause or at least temporarily dampen internal war, respectively.
HDINEW and GINIDOM. These indices are based on the HDI (2010 reformulation) and domestic Gini as defined by UNDP, but calculated endogenously in IFs.\textsuperscript{162}

The optimistic/best-case scenario for the ‘more fragile’ group would see this group increase its levels of governance capacity and inclusion, reduce poverty, and reduce violence/war to the average level of those African countries that are ‘more resilient’ by 2020, and maintain that improvement thereafter. To achieve this the following optimistic scenario was created:

- For the governance dimension govcorrupm was changed to +1.8 and govrevm to +1.5.
- For the violence/war dimension, sfintlwaradd was adjusted to -0.3. Note that the stability of other countries also improves marginally and this creates something of a virtuous effect.
- For the poverty/inequality dimension, there is no easy solution to long-term forecasting. In 2009 the Pardee Center published its first volume in the Patterns of Human Progress series on forecasting global poverty. The volume included a review of the policy levers through which poverty can effectively be reduced over time. After exhaustive modelling, the researchers found that a complex array of interventions each makes a modest contribution, but that direct transfer payments to the poor (or some equivalent thereof) ‘are among the most effective single measures, and perhaps the only one that makes a significant contribution’\textsuperscript{163} in the short to medium term. Over an extended period of around thirty to forty years ‘other interventions are as important or more so, especially fertility reduction’\textsuperscript{164}. Although this is a very blunt axe to use, transfers were raised to the maximum allowable in IFs over a period until 2020 and were then maintained out to 2050 (the variable in IFs is govhhtrwelm for unskilled persons and is set at 5). In practice, this would only be possible through substantial levels of additional external aid or substantial income from oil/gas that is maintained for at least two decades, since the ‘more fragile’ countries under discussion in this monograph would not have the resources to make such use of their current revenues without substantial reductions in equally essential needs such as education and infrastructure.

To set an appropriate benchmark for the development of a pessimistic/worst-case scenario, the gap between the ‘more fragile’ countries and the ‘more
resilient’ countries was doubled out to 2020 and then maintained at that reduction thereafter.

- For the governance dimension, this was done by adjusting two multipliers in IFs. Corruption was first increased (by reducing govcorrupm from 1 to 0.4) and government revenues reduced (govrevm was reduced from 1 to 0.6).
- For the violence/war dimension, sfintlwarradd was adjusted to +0.14. The impact is slightly less than the doubling of instability and also marginally lowers the score for the more stable grouping of countries.
- For the poverty/inequality dimension, reduced government-to-household transmissions were reduced to the minimum allowable in IFs (govhhtrwelm for unskilled persons was therefore set to 0.01, with interpolation until 2020, and maintained at this level to 2050).
ANNEXURE C

Country list of ‘more fragile’ category

Table C.1 sets out in alphabetical order the 20 lowest-ranked countries on the various lists to which the present study compared the AfDB and World Bank 2014 harmonised list of fragile and conflict-affected states.

- Column (b) consist of the World Bank/AfDB list of conflict-affected and fragile countries for the 2014 financial year. This serves as the basis for the compilation of the present study’s list of ‘more fragile’ countries.
- Columns (b) and (c) consist of the 20 countries in Africa that score the lowest on the 2012 HDI (2010 reformulation), which is also calculated endogenously in IFs (HDINEW). Both results are presented.
- Columns (d) and (e) do the same in terms of the Ibrahim Index of Governance. Column (g) contains the 20 countries in Africa that do worst on governance risk (GOVRISK) in IFs.
- Column (h) consists of the 20 lowest-ranked countries on the summary indicator of governance capacity (GOVINDTOTAL) in IFs.
- The 20 countries that have appeared in the published version of the CIFP more fragile lists in Africa from 2009 to 2011 are given in column (i).
- Column (j) contains the 20 countries in Africa that scored the lowest in the
Column (k) contains the 20 countries in Africa that scored worst on the State Fragility Index and Matrix for 2010 (fragile states list created by the Center for Systemic Peace).

Angola was removed from the CPIA list in 2014, while Guinea, Madagascar and Mali were added. The comparison above allows us to review which countries could be added to this studies working list of ‘more fragile’ countries.

- from the HDI lists: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger and Rwanda
- from the Ibrahim Index lists: Cameroon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Swaziland
- from the IFs Government Risk Index (GOVRISK): Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda
- from the IFs combined Governance Index (GOVINDTOTAL): Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda
- from the CIFP: Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger and Uganda
- from the Failed State Index: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger and Uganda
- from the Center for Systemic Peace: Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Rwanda and Angola

Based on this analysis the following countries were added to the 19 African countries on the harmonised CPIA list: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda and Uganda.
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<td>CAR</td>
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### Table C.1: Fragile countries in Africa from different lists (continued)

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<th>Serial no.</th>
<th>CPIA (2014 fy)</th>
<th>HDI for 2012 (from UNDP)</th>
<th>Ibrahim Index for 2012 (from IFs)</th>
<th>GOVRISK 2013 from IFs</th>
<th>GOVINC-TOTAL from IFs</th>
<th>CIFP countries on fragility lists, 2009–2011</th>
<th>Fund for Peace Failed State Index 2013</th>
<th>Center for Systemic Peace 2010</th>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</table>
Endnotes

1. The Fund for Peace is a Washington, DC-based non-profit organisation with the mission of advancing international peace and security. See the 2013 Fund for Peace Failed State Index rankings at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable.


5. http://www.ifs.du.ed. The IFs team is located at the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures, Joseph S Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, with whom the ISS has been collaborating in the framework of the African Futures Project for several years.


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14 See endnote 15.


16 The five core functions of a state that are salient in the relevant literature resonate well with this conceptualisation, i.e. (1) the provision of security, (2) the establishment of the rule of law and access to justice, (3) the ability to raise revenue, especially through taxation, (4) the management of economic development, and (5) the delivery of essential services.

17 Armed conflict is typically defined as involving an organised group that seeks to challenge the state in terms of control of state power or secession; armed violence references to interpersonal, community-level, or subnational conflict that does not have an explicitly political objective.


19 A recent United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report also lists other examples such as that drug money has supported the election of members of parliament in Ghana, weakening their accountability and undermining democratic institutions. In Mozambique, USAID argues, the business community has complained of unfair competition from drug traffickers, whom it accuses of evading customs excises and container inspections. In Kenya, increasing drug use is linked to robbery, HIV/AIDS and broken families (BS Lawson and P Dininio, *The development response to drug trafficking in Africa: a programming guide*, Washington, DC: USAID, 2013, 8).


31 Zaum, *Corruption and statebuilding*, 17.


35 Ibid.


41 Curtis, *The international peacebuilding paradox*, 72.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid, 76.


46 Ibid, 48–49.


49 Cilliers and Schünemann, The future of intra-state violence in Africa. The diagram in Figure 1 was not in the original paper: source J Cilliers.

50 In the section entitled ‘Inequality/economic exclusion and fragility’. 

For example, for each percentage point increase in the youth bulge (defined as the age group 15–24 years), the risk of conflict increases by more than 4 per cent. Furthermore, when youth make up more than 35 per cent of the adult population, the risk of armed conflict is 150 per cent higher than in countries with an age structure similar to most developed countries. The relationship between marginalised young men and crime has been well established in the academic literature, while the correlation between age structure transition (i.e. size of youthful populations or ‘youth bulge’) and civil conflict has also been recently explored (see Cilliers and Schünemann, *The future of intra-state violence in Africa*).

Subsequent modelling would indicate that this is the largest indicator of future conflict; see Hughes et al, *Strengthening governance globally*.


The US-based paper draws heavily on the massive investments that the US government (and others) have made over many years in the work of the Political Instability Task Force that was established under the Clinton administration as the State Failure Task Force and managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The public analysis is published as the Polity Project (currently in version IV). In addition, see the ‘correlates of war’ and ‘minorities at risk’ work done by Goldstone et al over several decades; see JA Goldstone, RH Bates, DL Epstein et al, *A global model for forecasting political instability*, *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1) (January 2010), 190–208.

Ibid, 194.


The material in this paragraph draws on Goldstone et al, *A global model for forecasting political instability*.

Ibid, 198.

Ibid, 197.

Ibid, 191.

Ibid, 204.

‘It is where regimes are paralysed or undermined by elite divisions and state-elite conflicts that revolutionary wars can be sustained and states lose out to insurgencies’ (ibid, 191).


Ibid, 1 and 11.

Ibid, 14.

Ibid, 15.

Ibid, 4.

Ibid, 5.

Ibid.
73 Cilliers and Schünemann, The future of intra-state violence in Africa.


80 J Fearon and D Laitin, Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war, American Political Science Review 97(1) (2003), 75–90.


83 Ibid, 37.


88 Gylfason and Zoega, Natural resources and economic growth, 1091.
Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 ‘more fragile’ countries


90 Diamond and Mosbacher, Petroleum to the people, 87–88.


94 The CPIA system has been important in its analysis of fragility and is an assessment tool ‘to determine how well countries implement policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction’. CPIAs have been done since 1978, although the results have only been published since 2005. The World Bank does not release the scores of middle-income countries (such as Libya) that can borrow on the open market and whose ability to do so may be impacted by publicly available CPIA scores. Incremental changes have been made to the CPIA and previous scores are apparently not comparable with those since 2005 (and are not publicly available) (see http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida/fund-for-the-poorest.pdf). Intermediate scores (such as 3.5) may also be given. The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is based on the results of the annual CPIA exercise that covers the IDA-eligible countries, but additionally includes a project performance risk (PPR) value. Thus IRAI = CPIA + PPR.


96 IFs calculates HDI and Gini scores endogenously. As a result these scores in IFs may differ from those published annually by UNDP; see Table C.1 in Annex C.

97 The 2005 figures can be converted to 2013 US dollars by multiplying by 1.2.

98 Cilliers, Hughes and Moyer, African futures 2050.

99 In declining order, Africa’s largest economies in 2013 are South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Angola and Tunisia. The African countries with the largest populations in declining order in 2013 are Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, the DRC, South Africa and Tanzania.


101 The forecast is done in IFs based on the 2010 results from the Ibrahim Governance Index.

102 http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/ (accessed 3 September 2013).


104 Using the same indicator used in the forecast in IFs, i.e. SFINTLWAR.


107 OECD-DAC, *Do no harm*.


110 Ibid.


113 The analysis of Sudan and South Sudan is necessarily limited by the fact that they are still represented as a single country in IFs.

114 The ASI was launched at the 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 2012, in the context of the implementation of the AU Policy on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development that was adopted in Banjul in June 2006.

115 Di John, Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states. The present authors are not the only ones recommending such an approach premised on ‘tough love’. In a recent article entitled ‘Helping Congo help itself’, Stearns speaks to the important of ‘forging a pact between donors and the Congolese recipients of their aid that would lead to a cutting of development aid if key benchmarks were not met’.


120 K Cukier and V Mayer-Schoenberger, The rise of big data – how it’s changing the way we think about the world, *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2013), 29.

121 Ibid, 30.


123 Ibid, 33.


Africa Progress Panel, Equity in extractives, 6 and 29.


Publish What You Pay is a movement aimed at getting extractive industries to declare all the money they pay to governments for the rights to natural resources. The EITI is a public–private partnership that sets global standards for transparency and accountability in resource-rich countries.

Thus Lisk, Besada and Martin note that ‘Rather than provide for broad-based and sustainable economic growth, resource revenues often end up benefiting only a small number of local elites and foreign investors due to corruption, undervaluation of mineral assets, revenue mismanagement, and various forms of taxation manipulation and evasion’ (F Lisk, H Besada and P Martin, Regulating extraction in the Global South: towards a framework for accountability, May 2013, 4, http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Lisk-Besada-Martin_Regulating-Extraction-in-the-Global-South-Towards-a-Framework-for-Accountability-_FINALFINAL.pdf (accessed 11 June 2013)).

Ibid, 88.

The authors note that over an extended period of around thirty to forty years, ‘other interventions are as important or more so, especially fertility reduction’ (BB Hughes, MT Irfan, H Khan et al, Patterns of potential human progress, vol 1: reducing global poverty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 101; also see B Davis et al, ‘Evaluating the impact of cash transfer payments in Sub-Saharan Africa, Journal of Development Effectiveness 4(1) (2012), 1–8).


http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (accessed 24 September 2013). Additionally, the Peacebuilding Commission should be working in closer partnership with the AfDB, the World Bank and others, particularly in terms of its ability to focus international attention on fragile states and mobilise additional resources. The commission needs to demonstrate accelerated progress and better cohesion in New York, and add value in the field.

http://www.unpbf.org/countries/ and http://www.unpbf.org/donors/key-figures/ (accessed 25 September 2013). Six ‘more fragile’ countries (Burundi, the CAR, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone) are on the commission’s agenda.


140 Established in 1960, the IDA provides loans (at little or no interest) and grants (to countries at risk of debt distress) to boost economic growth, reduce inequalities and improve living conditions. Largely funded by donor contributions (as opposed to accessing financial support through the market), the IDA complements the World Bank’s lending arm, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Currently the IDA has an active portfolio of 190 projects in fragile and conflict-affected states and recent annual commitments average around $15 billion, about 50 per cent of which goes to Africa; see http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html and http://www.worldbank.org/ida/borrowing-countries.html (accessed 11 July 2013).

141 Ibid.


144 Ibid, 3.


147 Ibid.

148 According to the AfDB website, ‘No interest is charged on [African Development Fund] loans; however, the loans carry a service charge of 0.75 per cent per annum on outstanding balances, and a commitment fee of 0.50 per cent per annum on undisbursed commitments. Project loans have a 50-year repayment period, including a 10-year grace period. Lines of credit have a 20-year repayment period with a five-year grace period’; see http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/african-development-fund-adf/ (accessed 14 July 2013).


151 AfDB, *At the center of Africa’s transformation*, 19.

152 Ibid, 20.

153 AfDB, *Supporting the transformation of the private sector in Africa*, i.

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid, ii.

156 Ibid.

157 AfDB, At the center of Africa’s transformation, 19.


159 For further information on scenario analysis in IFs, see the IFs Help System, http://www.du.edu/ifs/help/use/scenario/index.html.

160 Hughes et al, Strengthening governance globally.

161 BB Hughes and JR Solórzano, IFs governance model documentation, Working Paper 2013.06.01, Pardee Center for Futures Research, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, June 2013 (draft).

162 The HDINEW and GINIDOM data in IFs originates from the UNDP Human Development Indicators (http://hdrstats.undp.org).

163 Hughes et al, Patterns of potential human progress, vol 1, 101.

164 Ibid.

165 IFs calculates HDI from its component elements in every year, with the result that if the input variables differ from those used by UNDP, the values will differ. The most current HDI table for African countries from the 2013 UNDP Human development report (i.e. for 2012) is reflected in column (d).

166 UNDP, Human development report 2013. The 2010 revision of the HDI now combines three dimensions: a long and healthy life (through life expectancy at birth); education (mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling); and a decent standard of living (GNI per capita).

167 The Ibrahim Index does not yet include Sudan/South Sudan or South Sudan/South Sudan in its rankings, countries that we can confidently expect to fall in the worst-performing category. This would remove Ethiopia from the list as the country with the highest governance score from the 20 countries listed in the table. Two countries that the Ibrahim Index scores much higher and that are on the original list are Malawi and Mali.

168 A summary index within IFs as a measure for overall governance/society performance value across all variables.


Despite sterling growth in some countries, a number of African countries are caught in a vicious cycle of violence, chronic poverty, inequality and exclusion. These ‘more fragile’ states are on a slow trajectory to long-term peace and development. Using the International Futures system (IFS) data analysis and forecasting tool, the monograph provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. The forecasts suggest that in the long-term ten countries on the continent will continue to remain fragile into the mid-21st century. Others, however, have a good chance of embarking on a pathway from fragility to middle-income conditions by 2030 or possibly 2050. The monograph concludes with a list of recommendations.