

Diplomats and Defenders:

South Africa and the Utility of Naval Power

Monograph No 9

February 1997

Preface

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies

The Renewal of the South African Navy Fleet: Issues in the Current Debate

Rusty Evans, Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs

Defence and Security in the 21st Century

Dr Martin Edmonds, Professorial Fellow and Director; Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

Annual Policy Review of the South African Navy, 1996

Vice Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, Chief of the South African Navy

South African-Latin American Maritime Co-operation: Towards a South Atlantic Rim Community?

Dr Greg Mills, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg

Security and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Rim

PJ Botha, Head: Asia Pacific Business, ABSA Bank

Southern African Marine Exclusive Zones: Burdens and Opportunities

Mafaniso Hara, Research Fellow, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape

This publication is sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation

PREFACE

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies

The contents of this monograph is a selection of papers from the annual navy conference, co-hosted by the Institute for Security Studies, the South African Navy and the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Cape Town on 17 October 1996, with the exception of the paper by Mafaniso Hara on Exclusive Economic Zones. The theme for the 1996 conference was **The Utility of Naval Power**, and it was held at the BMW Pavilion at the Waterfront. The annual navy conference has become a regular and prestigious event on the calendar of the Department of Defence and once again maintained the traditional high standard set by previous conferences.

In his opening address to the conference, the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Rusty Evans, comments on the debate dealing with the renewal and updating of the fleet and argues that it is the right of the SA Navy to present its case. However, it is ultimately

"... the task of the South African Navy to convince the public that a strong navy will contribute to the prosperity of South Africa in particular, and Southern Africa in general." This is true, but providing for the defence of the country is a primary function of Government, which must ultimately decide how much it wishes to spend on its insurance policies. Evans states bluntly that "[t]he South African Navy is at present reaping the result of past policies. These directed much of the defence budget towards the other branches of the former South African Defence Force. Clearly, outdated and obsolete equipment is preventing the Navy from effectively exercising its maritime function to defend South Africa's coastline of 3 000 km and its interests within the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The Navy's usefulness as a foreign policy tool is severely curtailed and needs to be addressed urgently."

In his article Professor Martin Edmonds discusses defence and security in the 21st century with his analysis strongly rooted in the realpolitik. He is salient in his remark that, in a world that is becoming increasingly fragmented, volatile and unpredictable, *"... national survival is no longer immediately at risk. Instead, widely defined national and international interests have become vulnerable, with no clear indication of how these can best be protected. The post-1989 world might arguably be characterised as one in which the question of 'against' what military force is designed to be, has been replaced with one which asks 'for' what military force is designed to be."* Yet, Edmonds is at pains to point out that, contrary to the thinking of most post-modernists and scholars focusing on security *"... the nation-state remains, and is likely to continue to remain for the foreseeable future, the principal actor on the international stage."* Equally sobering is his warning that *"[s]tates will resort to military force when they perceive their core interests to be in jeopardy."* The nature of the armed forces of developed countries, in particular, has changed – becoming leaner, better equipped and more mobile, while market interdependence and alliance politics have become strong inhibitors of inter-state conflict. Edmonds discusses a host of changes in the nature of any future war, including changes in civil-military relations, the armed forces and the like. In his analysis, he distinguishes between so-called first, second and third wave armed forces, arguing that there is an immutable relationship between the manner in which societies create wealth and the way in which they fight their wars. Agrarian (first wave), industrial (second wave) and information/service (third wave) societies therefore have different characteristics, strengths and weaknesses.

Edmonds is a strong believer that *"[n]avies are ... ubiquitous. Their value lies in their flexibility and their relevance to the kinds of future world security scenarios that are being projected among leading decision-makers ... Furthermore, navies are accepted as a benign form of power, operating in international space (unlike airspace or land), a diplomatic high value asset in a world where the emphasis is on avoiding the coercive use of military force."* This excellent article provides a sound backdrop against which the remainder of the articles in this monograph are projected.

In his paper, the Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, presents the annual policy review of the SA Navy. Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson uses the policy framework provided in the 1996 **White Paper on Defence** as the point of departure to define and describe the maritime and naval contingencies that have been used as a basis by the SA Navy in formulating its various strategies and its force design. The essence of the Navy concept of operations is the defence of Durban and Richard's Bay on the east coast and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon's Town on the west coast. These two areas are *"... defended by means of a horizontal layered approach where harbour patrol boats patrol the waters of the harbours and mine hunters and minesweepers keep the harbour approaches clear of potential mines. Strike craft patrol the inshore waters, harbour approaches and the intermediate area. Corvettes patrol the balance of the maritime defence area out to 200 nautical miles (370 km)."*

Submarines would patrol underwater through the entire maritime defence area. Combat support ships help to ensure that this force can conduct operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support." This requires a total core combat force of six strike craft, four corvettes, four conventional submarines, four mine hunters, four minesweepers, 39 harbour patrol boats, plus combat support ships, and diving and hydrographic services.

Despite having presented and argued its case both in private and public for more than a year, the procurement programme of the SA Navy that would enable it to meet its defence obligations, has apparently now been held hostage, first by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of Parliament and lately by Cabinet for several months. The irony of the situation is that there appears to be consensus that the long delayed procurement of corvettes will proceed – the only remaining question is 'when'. This is an untenable situation with cost implications that has already possibly cost the South African tax payer several million dollars. It has also been a source of intense frustration and substantial additional costs (that will inevitably be passed on to the South African Government) for the various shipbuilding consortia, that will again have to bid for a deal that is moderate by international standards. In addition to other urgent acquisition decisions that need to be made – ranging from replacement helicopters to combat vehicles – the South African National Defence Force is increasingly faced with block obsolescence of many of its major weapon systems, while the defence budget continues to be tapped to fund budget increases by other departments. Recent media reports have warned of a collapse of morale in the SA Navy, after having been starved of funding for several decades. The morale problems are in no small way due to fact that the Navy is becoming hollow and is in serious danger of being figuratively sunk. It is within this context that the clear and concise 'Annual Policy Review' of the Chief of the SA Navy should be read. There is an urgent requirement for politicians, the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet to buckle down and translate rhetoric into action.

The future commitments of the SA Navy, demanded by government policy, particularly foreign policy, are aptly supported by the papers by Dr Greg Mills on *South African- Latin American Maritime Co-operation* and Mr P J Botha on *Security and Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Rim*. Looking to our potential commitments across the vast expanse of ocean to the west, Mills argues that the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) with its four 'windows' of action, places a number of obligations on South Africa. He says, "*It is not enough for politicians simply to commit South Africa to participation in an expanded ZPCSA or to the Valdivia Group [the grouping of South Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, Chile, Australia and Uruguay which was established with the intention of focusing attention on issues of mutual environmental concern], without taking into account all the 'normal' functions and tasks expected of the naval forces ... if South Africa wants to expand its links with Latin America in the maritime domain, and if it wants to take up its rightful place and play a meaningful role in world affairs by accepting the responsibilities that go with the image of a responsible power, it will have to possess the necessary capabilities to enforce these political ideals. To this end, the SAN will have to be provided with the tools necessary to carry out all these expanded roles.*" He argues that the present reality is one in which "... *South Africa's naval complement is little better than that of Uruguay, a country that has a coastline of 1 000 kilometres (South Africa's is 3 000 kilometres), and a population of 3,1 million (42 million in South Africa). Yet, if an attempt is made to find a model for South Africa's naval responsibilities, Argentina or Chile would probably be the closest fits: medium powers with populations of 33 and 14 million respectively, and with interests in Antarctica.*"

Looking towards the east, Botha addresses the way forward in dealing with security issues among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Thus far the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace has proven to be ineffectual in this and other fields, and he suggests that a separate Indian Ocean

Regional Forum may be the appropriate structure within which "... *[i]ssues such as maritime search and rescue, law of the sea, resource management and security, marine scientific research, the safety of sea lines of communication, as well as the concerns about drug trafficking, piracy, the illegal movement of people, and natural disasters, could ... form part of a comprehensive security agenda.*" Although the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IOR) has been making steady progress, among others adopting a charter in 1996, this does not include security-related aspects that could avoid potentially divisive security issues among its member states, as these could detract from its primary focus on trade and economic development. Despite strong Australian pressure, the feeling among the remaining IOR members is that security issues should be dealt with bilaterally or in a forum created for that purpose. Such an Indian Ocean Regional Forum or comparable body will place additional demands upon the SA Navy, apart from those already evident from SADC member states, many of whom have made repeated appeals to South Africa to police their waters.

The final article in the monograph is by Mafaniso Hara and deals directly with the role, tasks and obligations of the SA Navy. South Africa has declared a 200 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone and has ratified the **Geneva Convention on The Continental Shelf**. In this sense, South Africa sees the continental shelf as part of the Republic. Hara discusses the obligations that the **Geneva Convention**, the **United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea** (UNCLOS III), and related conventions and treaties place upon developing countries to enforce their jurisdiction. In many cases, the potential costs of the maintenance of an Exclusive Economic Zone through policing, law enforcement and conservation measures, outweigh the potential benefits that countries could gain from it, with the result that marine resources may be under threat from exploitation. In the case of countries such as Angola, foreign vessels take an estimated eighty per cent of the total fishing catch. Others such as Namibia and Mozambique, lack the means to police their waters. He argues that, "*[w]hile South Africa has generally been successful in imposing its jurisdiction over its waters since it declared a 200 nm Exclusive Fishing Zone on 1 November 1977, there are still reports of infringements from time to time ...*" and that "*... the emotional and irrational public outcry against 'foreigners' pillaging the country's resources has no basis apart from the occasional incursions ... in Angola, Mozambique and also in South Africa in the future, two approaches are likely to be appropriate for regulating marine fisheries: community based approaches for the inshore artisanal fishery, and [monitoring, control and surveillance] MCS systems based on sea and air patrols for the offshore industrial fishery.*" Against this background, co-operation will be required in two areas, namely research, and in monitoring, control and surveillance activities. In the latter, collaboration may extend to the policing of EEZs – already included bilaterally in a treaty signed between Namibia and South Africa during 1991. The conclusion of a regional monitoring, control and surveillance system would be hampered by inequalities and the value that countries attach to securing their marine resources.

During 1997, the South African Navy will celebrate its 75th anniversary. The highlight of the celebrations will take place in Cape Town during the weekend of 5-6 April with an International Fleet Review in Table Bay. About 35 warships from South Africa and foreign navies are expected to participate in the Fleet Review. Approximately 3 500 to 4 000 foreign sailors are expected to attend the celebrations. If there is no sense of urgency within the Ministry of Defence, Parliament and Cabinet with regard to the procurement programme of the SA Navy, it may be a hollow event, signifying the extent of the decline of the Navy, rather than a celebration of its vibrancy.

INTRODUCTION

History abounds with examples of countries that became great and powerful based on the might of their naval forces. From Grecian times, to the British empire at its mighty zenith in the nineteenth century as a result of its naval supremacy, nations were able to exert their national aspirations by naval force.

In modern times, more particularly since the end of the Second World War, the role of navies has changed somewhat. However, no one would dispute that the naval might of the two superpowers during the Cold War had a definite deterrent effect.

In global terms, the world is in a relatively peaceful period. The question could be asked what the role of the Navy is in peacetime.

The Navy still has an essential role to play today. It has the task to protect the country from hostile activity along its coastline. Furthermore, its functions have been expanded to include a variety of peacetime activities, such as the protection of maritime resources and support for meteorological research.

From a South African perspective, the South African Navy, has recently received extensive media coverage, among others on the proposed renewal and updating of its fleet. The reaction of the general public has been to question, perhaps rightly so, proposed procurements in the light of current challenges facing the South African Government to meet the basic needs of its people with regard to health, housing, education and employment. However, it is equally the right of the South African Navy to state its case in an environment conducive to rational debate on this very sensitive issue.

Ultimately, it is the task of the South African Navy to convince the public that a strong navy will contribute to the prosperity of South Africa in particular, and Southern Africa in general.

Since 1990, while South Africa was in a transitional period that led to its first democratic elections, the world also underwent its own process of transition. The 'bipolar world' of the Cold War era made way for a 'multipolar world'. New economic and regional groupings were formed, ranging from an expanded European Union (EU) to the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a 'new' Southern African Development Community (SADC). Security issues were changing fundamentally and peacekeeping, peacemaking and other areas, such as arms control, required revision and redefinition.

South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, described this process in the following terms, in September 1995: *"Our operational environment has changed dramatically. The end of the Cold War has created a new global situation in which our young democracy must find its feet. The new world order, if it exists at all, is fraught with uncertainties and insecurities. Ideological conflict has to a large extent been replaced by economic competition, the rules for which have not yet been fully agreed upon. The ground beneath our feet is not firm: It is volatile and unpredictable. Yet it is our primary task to secure and promote the sovereign integrity of the South African State, as well as the security and welfare of its citizens. These are the considerations which ultimately determine everything we do in the conduct of our foreign relations."*

Security issues fall within the domain of foreign policy and international relations, as they affect relations between states and influence the promotion of the national interests of countries in the international sphere. They extend much further than defence matters. In recent years, new dimensions

have become increasingly important in international security. These include regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping, drug trafficking, illegal arms trading, non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, migration and refugees. These important international trends affect, in a very direct sense, the formulation of foreign policy and the promotion of sound international relations.

THE SA NAVY'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent, and neither can escape the impact of the new world order. In the formulation and implementation of South Africa's foreign policy on the continent, particular attention will have to be focused on

- measures to prevent conflict;
- the monitoring of events;
- involvement in concerted preventive diplomacy; and
- ways to influence the emergence of a constructive new order on the continent in a positive and significant manner.

South Africa's first foreign policy priority is the Southern African region, with the country having assumed the role of chairperson of SADC. While this regional grouping has concentrated solely on economic and development issues in the past, the co ordination of political and security interests in the region has recently become an additional and important focus point.

During the last two years, the management of conflict as a prerequisite for economic development has dominated the discussion on regionalism. It has led to the realisation that there is a need to establish a mechanism to manage, resolve and prevent conflict in the region. With the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in June 1996, SADC has assumed the responsibility for conflict prevention in the region and has become an example to other regional organisations on the African continent.

Conflict management through preventive diplomacy is not only applicable to most known forms of political conflict, but also applies to conflict arising from a lack of security in other fields, such as employment, lack of water or other scarce resources, environmental and drought-related issues common to the Southern African region. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is not merely a mechanism for crisis management, but should also give attention to issues such as human rights and migration trends. By analysing and addressing those factors responsible for possible conflict, a proactive role in addition to preventive diplomacy, can possibly be played. Although the modalities of the Organ have not yet been finalised, it becomes clear against this background why the Organ was described at its launch as the foremost institution of SADC. It is also becoming obvious that a transfer of technology will be needed to empower officials to perform the necessary functions of peacekeeping, conflict management and preventive diplomacy.

The new SADC, focusing on both socio-economic and political issues, can now consider the needs of the region holistically. It has become possible, therefore, to address political and socio-economic issues simultaneously throughout the region.

The South African Navy is at present reaping the result of past policies. These directed much of the defence budget towards the other branches of the former South African Defence Force. Clearly, outdated and obsolete equipment is preventing the Navy from effectively exercising its maritime function to defend South Africa's coastline of 3 000 km and its interests within the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The Navy's usefulness as a foreign policy tool is severely curtailed and needs to be addressed urgently.

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

With regard to South Africa's foreign policy objectives, naval power can be utilised in various ways. In peacetime, the Navy can play a role in naval diplomacy, it can contribute to South Africa's commitment to help to maintain international peace and security, to safeguard the environment, and it can assist in preventing the proliferation of arms.

Naval diplomacy is related to those official visits by naval ships that fly the national ensign within the territorial waters of another state, without actually invading or intruding its land or air space. This is an important symbolic sign and projection of bilateral or multilateral friendship. These symbolic gestures should not be underestimated in their value to strengthen ties between countries. Since 1994, South Africa has welcomed a host of foreign naval vessels in its harbours on courtesy visits to the country. Similarly, the oceans of the world have opened to the South African Navy, which has already participated in exercises with foreign navies, attended commemorative celebrations, apart from courtesy visits being paid to many foreign ports.

South Africa's commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security will be facilitated, among others, through the ability of the South African Navy to assist in humanitarian relief operations and, when South Africa is able to do so, peacekeeping missions. In this regard, the Navy's combat support ships can assist with the transport of humanitarian disaster relief provisions and equipment, and the transport of necessities for peacekeeping missions. It could be required to act as a deterrent to warring factions when South Africa is involved in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.

THE SA NAVY'S ROLE IN PROTECTING THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

During the last several years, the coastal zones of the world have leapt to the forefront of global environmental attention. Already, more than sixty per cent of the world's population is found along a narrow strip of about sixty kilometres wide at the edges of the continents. By the year 2025, this number will increase to 75 per cent.

The shoreline of Eastern Africa, including the island states, extends over a distance of 11 000 linear kilometres and is inhabited by 30 to 35 million people. Perceived economic opportunities act as magnets for large numbers of people who migrate to the coast. In some countries, at least eighty per cent of the population are considered to be coastal. Consequent environmental degradation as human activity and presence increase, forecloses the future sustainability of development.

Against this background, the Navy will play a more important role in assuring the sustainability of South Africa's, and on request, Southern Africa's valuable marine resources. In this regard, the Navy was recently unfortunately unable to assist with the monitoring of illegal fishing activities in South Africa's territorial waters, due to the absence of key naval ships.

CONCLUSION

The South African Navy is not just important for the defence of the country's maritime and territorial interests, but is also essential for other priorities, such as the protection of marine resources and the enhancement of regional security. Contrary to the predictions of many doomsayers, there are at present signs of growing hope and increasing optimism in the future throughout Africa.

In many African countries and in the Southern African region, significant progress has been made over recent years in building stronger economies and in meeting the needs of the people in critical sectors such as education, health and the provision of basic social services.

At the same time, the challenge to achieve meaningful people-centred and sustainable development remains a daunting one for much of Africa. South Africa cannot escape having to rise to this challenge and the South African Navy has its role to play in this process.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Dr Martin Edmonds, Professorial Fellow and Director; Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

PREAMBLE

Among defence and strategic analysts, 1989 is seen as a watershed. It was the year that effectively marked the end of the Cold War and the bipolar military confrontation that dominated defence and strategic planning, not merely among the superpowers, but equally among their allies and non-aligned states throughout the world. But 1989 did more than mark the end of one era. It has heralded a new problem, one which remains with defence planners today and is far from being satisfactorily resolved. This problem combines the questions around the nature of future defence and security, and the utility of military force in the present world that is permeated by the rapid development of 'information technology'.

To some extent, defence planners and analysts are not equipped to address these problems. The premise of their past work – an imminent threat of a major conventional attack, possibly escalating to limited nuclear exchange between two heavily equipped and standing military alliances – no longer holds true. Indeed, when Gorbachev, the former Soviet leader, remarked in 1985, that he was going to cause confusion within the ranks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) because he would remove the threat, he could never have anticipated how prescient he was.

The year 1989 marks the beginning of a new approach to defence and security planning in a way that has been recognised by the South African Defence Review Working Group. The classical threat-based approach to defence and security planning no longer exclusively applies.¹ New approaches have had to be developed.

The certainties of the Cold War enabled previous planners to focus their strategic and defence attention and to calculate, with some degree of confidence, the risks involved and the outcomes of different courses of action. Force postures and structures could be assembled and the personnel, equipment and infrastructures acquired, trained and exercised. Today, the calculation of risk has been substituted by uncertainty, with the prospects of major military confrontation and potential nuclear annihilation receding and the world moving inexorably to one that is more fragmented, volatile and unpredictable. The stakes, in other words, have changed: national survival is no longer immediately at risk. Instead, widely defined national and international interests have become vulnerable, with no clear indication of how these can best be protected.

The post-1989 world might arguably be characterised as one in which the question of 'against' what military force is designed to be, has been replaced with one which asks 'for' what military force is designed to be. In accepting this change in the approach to defence planning, governments have had to recognise that the concept of national security itself has been transmogrified: the paramountcy of territorial integrity and military protection of land boundaries, territorial waters and air space has been overtaken by the recognition of the extent of international interdependence and the concept of security's wider economic, social and political dimensions.² Perhaps one of the most potent reflections of this

change, and one that contrasts with the Cold War era, has been a restoration of a belief in the utility of the United Nations (UN) and the 'internationalisation' of world security issues.

CHANGING APPROACHES TO SECURITY

It is one thing to recognise that the world has changed and that past assumptions about national and international security no longer apply. It is another to project what states, governments, and defence planners might, or should do in the face of a world that is difficult to predict and where different trends point in different directions. Indeed, it would be both fair and accurate to argue that the only thing about which any prediction could safely be made, is that the world is an unpredictable place. To plan national defence forces on the premise that some future event or scenario will happen, or that the probabilities of it happening are high, would neither be a prudent course of action, nor a cost-effective one.

To accommodate this problem, it is argued in this monograph that it would be helpful to return to basic principles and in so doing to try and shed the ontological constraints of earlier strategic thinking and the military accoutrements of Cold War defence establishments. To some extent, all states have been engaged in this essentially cerebral activity since 1989 and there is much evidence of some innovative thinking in this respect. The United States, for example, after an initial response to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, embarked on a national defence review which substantially altered its approach to where, when and why US military forces might be used.³ More recently, the Department of Defense has thoroughly considered the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the light of new information technologies, and has begun to draw interesting conclusions on how the US military force will be employed in the future. Likewise, the United Kingdom reassessed its position within the framework of its 'Options for Change' exercise, and made several assumptions about where and when British forces might be employed and the kinds of force structures needed to meet those objectives.⁴ Similar reassessments were made elsewhere, especially among the aligned states within the bipolar divide.

These reappraisals focused on military priorities and, in their own way, were quite radical – at least as far as their impact on their defence establishments was concerned. However, they have tended to build on the past, and adjust what they already have, rather than to go back to fundamentals. Thus, the US sees the protection of its national interests in terms of promoting international regional stability through the use of conventional interventionary forces and precision weapons, probably in alliance with other states and under international or UN auspices. Britain, France and, to some degree, the Russian Federation have adopted a similar posture. Still unclear, however, is what constitutes international regional stability and what is seen as a threat.

The high cost of defence during the Cold War, and undoubtedly the underlying reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union, have brought home the realisation that military security at the cost of economic stability, if not growth, hardly meets the security criteria. The impressive performance of economies, such as those of Japan, Germany and more recently the states in the Asia-Pacific region, have been closely linked to the absence of a major defence burden in these countries. Although the jury is still out on the extent to which high defence spending is, or has been, an impediment to economic growth, it is certainly the perception among large numbers of people that this is not only the case, but also that persistently high levels of defence spending have carried an unacceptable opportunity cost in terms of social welfare, educational standards, lack of investment, inadequate infrastructure, health provision, and so on. When the opportunity cost is believed to be too great, domestic stability and therefore national security comes under threat, with the consequence that the definition of security has to be widened and made more responsive to threats other than purely military ones.

This argument has been taken a stage further inasmuch as states, in their international relations and foreign policies, should pay greater attention to economic, political and social threats than to strictly

military ones. At one level, it is suggested that foreign international aid might be a more fruitful source of future security in the longer term than, for instance, the transfer of military equipment. At another, inward investment and building interdependent economic links with other states might help towards deterring future conflict, as all parties would stand collectively to lose more than they would gain, in line with the logic first advocated by Ivan Bloch in the earlier part of the Century.

There are a number of issues with the potential to threaten the security of states and their peoples that transcend national boundaries. Foremost among these, is the international environment that, according to scientists, is progressively degraded and destroyed. Predictions are that solutions, if there are any, would require widespread international co-operation and a pooling of resources, not confrontation. Furthermore, the implications of these environmental problems and their knock-on effects for particular states, can well be a cause of conflict, leading to full-scale war. It is therefore in the interests of all states to pre-empt that eventuality and to act in concert, sooner rather than later.

The rapid growth of information technology and the further extension of what McLuhan referred to as the "*Global Village*" has meant that relatively little that happens throughout the world can be shielded from the gaze of the international audience any longer. More significantly, developments anywhere in the world can be witnessed in real time, as a result of the increased power and reach of the international media. Indeed, political leaders and governments now use the media as a major source of intelligence in addition to their dedicated intelligence services. The global media has managed to highlight and expose the infringements on human liberties throughout the world, from East Timor to Bosnia and Rwanda, to Palestine and Columbia. Humanitarian concerns and issues of social justice have become a cause of deep concern among peoples and states. Such treatment of human beings is not new, but it is only recently that it has received such wide exposure. **The UN Charter on Human Rights** alone places a moral obligation on signatories not to stand idly by, even though interference in the domestic affairs of other states is a precarious path to follow.

Other considerations that transcend purely national interests and require international responses, include the wider issue of population growth and immigration, disease, international crime and illegal narcotic dealings, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – chemical, nuclear and biological plus their delivery systems – and depleted natural resources. Each brings its own set of attendant problems, most of which have the potential to destabilise states and regions. None is more threatening than another; each brings its unique set of problems. Some can be confined on a national basis, others, less so. It is the opinion of some analysts that these and other global 'threats' require a 'new thinking' on security, premised on greater mutual trust between states and peoples. Others go further, recognising that their prescriptions may well bring populations into direct confrontation with their governments. They argue that the initiative for future security should be seized by the people – "*détente from below*" – reaching out to co-operate with one another across political divides, and resisting the encroachments of their military establishments.⁵

RETURN TO BASICS

It is manifestly clear that the world is a changed place since the days of the Cold War. It is equally clear that the focus of attention, as far as security is concerned, has turned away from the dominant question of the deterrence of and defence against a massive and sophisticated attack from an ideologically committed opponent to a multifaceted array of global problems. The likelihood that any or all of these will have an impact on the national interests of any one state, or of assessing how that impact may manifest itself, is difficult to gauge. Equally difficult is the kind of scenario within which these security threats might develop or the most appropriate ways of dealing with them. Unlike in the past, the appropriate response to these multidimensional threats is not necessarily a military one.

To provide some guidelines for a solution for future defence and security needs, it is necessary to go back to basics. Firstly, it is necessary to establish who the principal actors are who have the responsibility, ability or motivation to address these security issues. Secondly, the question of possible options to be entertained by these actors in exercising their responsibilities needs to be addressed. Thirdly, the question of whether they can, in fact, pursue those options in the light of other constraints should also be considered. Finally, the probability that particular security threats may surface and the scenarios that might provide a prediction of what the principal actors are likely to do, are salient issues.

THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS

There is a need to depart from traditional thinking, and to formulate a clearer idea of security in the future, and the contribution 'defence' can make to it. The first basic principle that has to be established is the level of analysis. Who are the salient actors in the security world – international organisations, nation-states, subnational groups, or individuals? As the world as a whole becomes increasingly interdependent, a fact that is reflected in the formation of international regional groupings, the nation-state diminishes in importance. After 1989, the UN witnessed a resurgence in its utility and importance. Within two years, it was involved in more peacekeeping missions than in the previous forty-five years, even though its limitations in terms of performance and outcome, and its dependence on regional groupings and particular states, were quickly exposed.

Regional groupings of states, as the principal security actors, would appear to become more influential as they take on more responsibility for their own stability. Thus, NATO took the initiative to impose some control over the Bosnian crisis that threatened to destabilise Southern Europe and possibly beyond, when both the European Union (EU) and the UN failed in reaching their objectives. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was established after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, was initially a loose federation of independent states, many of which retained independent defence capabilities. As their economic and domestic situations have deteriorated, many have elected to reintegrate their defence and security interests with that of the Russian Federation and the CIS, again in the interests of promoting regional stability.

Other regional economic organisations, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Union (EU), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the South American MERCOSUR have the potential, and in some cases have already taken the first step, to incorporate military security within their terms of reference. The focus here is as much to promote stability and security within the region through mutual economic development and military co-operation, as the protection from external threat.⁶ The trend would suggest that the 'regionalisation' of future international security is more likely, and that regional actors will assume a more prominent role in defence and security issues in the next century.

Strong though these trends towards regionalism are, and notwithstanding the neo functionalists' logic that economic integration will lead inexorably to political and therefore security integration,⁷ the nation-state remains, and is likely to continue to remain the principal actor on the international stage for the foreseeable future. The fundamental reason is that they are the principal components of the more important international global or regional organisations, whether of an intergovernment political nature (such as the UN), economic (such as the EU), military (such as NATO), commodity (such as the Organisation of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC)), religious, or functional, (such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO)). Without the co operation of and contributions to these international intergovernment organisations by states, these organisations would collapse or fall into virtual abeyance, as the UN did for decades.

Non-government organisations (NGOs) abound and outnumber international intergovernment organisations. Many have wide international – even global – membership and can exercise significant influence. Their influence, however, is mainly on national governments. They act as global interest groups to put pressure on governments to conform to some desirable international norm or code of conduct, or to adopt policies that promote their limited or functional interests. Thus NGOs, such as the International Air Transport Association, the World Council of Churches and Amnesty International, of which many have recognised status in the UN, are able to exercise influence on states and within the global arena from their limited or partial perspectives. The essential point is that the focus of their activities is the governments of nation-states.

The question of whether the state-centric view of the world or that of commercial interdependency better reflects the way the world is, is largely irrelevant and should rather be confined to abstract academic debate.⁸ The fundamental point is that these organisations require resources, since they have none of their own. They can only function if states, the only effective mechanism to raise funding, are prepared to pay. Correspondingly, governments will only part with funds if there is a reasonable chance that the benefits to the state and its citizenry outweigh the cost. Some organisations cost less than others: international political organisations are useful for exchanges of opinions and to reach consensus, and cost relatively little. International military organisations, however, are not only expensive but also, by their nature, infringe on the national sovereignty of states. No international organisation has yet assumed a supranational position of authority over the military forces of its members. Though there is evidence that many states in the EU are committed to political union and would like to see a supranational or single European defence force, it is still a long way off.

When considering future defence and security into the 21st century, the nation-state remains the principal actor, particularly when it comes to the raising and employment of military force. Governments can and do come under domestic and international pressure from a wide range of sources and its responsibility is to judge those pressures in the light of national interests and the particular interests of sections of its population. This fact alone has direct consequences for the wider question of what military force is for, and when and how it should be used.

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

The Clausewitzian dictum that war "*is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means*", is an appropriate point to start any discussion of the use of military force.⁹ In essence, Clausewitz argues that military force is a resort open to governments when less costly and potentially harmful options have been exhausted. Indeed, as he also observed, "*no-one starts a war – or rather no-one in his senses should do so – without being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.*" The dilemma in exercising the military option is that there has to be a better than average chance of success, that the act of engaging in military conflict should bring about a resolution of the conflict rather than add to it, and that it should not lead to an attenuated war with a diminished ability to withdraw.

Furthermore, the act of going to war has to be supported by the population, or at least a substantial proportion of it, and that support has to be sustained throughout its duration. As political and military leaders are aware, setbacks in war have a deleterious impact on the commitment of the population to back the policy, and drastic action is often required to restore confidence.¹⁰ During the Falklands War, for example, the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher demanded some operational success to offset the impact on public morale and support for the war of the loss of HMS Sheffield to an Argentinean Exocet missile, against better military judgement. It is in the nature of war, a fact supported by experiences during this century, to inflict pain and cost without necessarily resolving an issue permanently.

Why then resort to military coercion to resolve conflict of interest, if it is such an unpredictable, risky and costly business? There is no one answer, any more than there is a single explanation for the causes of war in general. However, on Clausewitz's premise that "*state policy is the womb in which war develops*", some appreciation of why the use of coercive force is chosen can be derived from an understanding of the concept national 'stakes'. As with disputes between individuals and groups within society, there are some matters upon which compromise or accommodation is impossible. These issues require definition.

During the Cold War, the confrontation between the two principal sides was driven by ideological differences that allowed virtually no room for compromise. Compounding the problem was the totalitarian nature of one of the parties, and a high level of secrecy and suspicion on both their parts. Since both were eventually armed with weapons that could assuredly destroy the other and, subsequently both of them, they were both vulnerable. The failure to deter would mean either being absorbed into the other's system, or facing total destruction. There was little room for manoeuvre, other than to keep open lines of communication, avoid misunderstanding, promote arms control measures, and, yet, maintain a high level of military vigilance and military capability. The stakes were high, since defeat in a confrontation would be total. Strategies of 'reassurance' to the population were as important as military strategies, to persuade them that this was the best, if expensive, and most effective way of protecting their 'core values'. The stability and predictability of the years after the equally sobering experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, lent credence to this strategy.

The critical consideration is a population's 'core values'. It is axiomatic that core values are those about which people are not prepared to compromise, or sacrifice. These values are relatively easy to identify in religious fundamentalism and in particular in the fanatics who adhere to it. Cultural and racial identity – what Huntington refers to as 'civilisation' – tends to be something about which people feel strongly. Both have been the principal motive behind separatist guerrilla movements, and on a larger scale, clashes of whole civilisations that transcend national boundaries have been predicted.¹¹

One core value that is more difficult to evaluate is that of economic well-being. Violence and riots in the US during the 1960s generated many attempts at an explanation, one being the theory of relative and absolute deprivation. People tend to resort to violence either when their economic expectations are unfulfilled or when, having enjoyed a given standard of living, their lifestyle takes a downward turn. When applied to states, the presence of poverty, declining standards of living, or gross inequalities within the population create the potential for domestic violence. One option for governments is to seek solutions elsewhere by coercive means.

Poor countries with annual birth rates in excess of 2,3 per cent per annum – in other words, they will double their population within twenty years and correspondingly more than sixty per cent of the total population will be teenaged or below – face an acute problem. Most of their populations will be unemployed or unemployable, there will be inadequate food or resources, and standards of education, health and welfare will be desperately low. It is unlikely that such states will have the resources or the will to embark on any external adventures, but the prospects for mass migration to areas where there are resources to eke out a subsistence existence are high. There are already signs of this trend in North Africa, the Middle East, Central America and Eastern Europe.

Food for survival is clearly a major factor in forcing states to take action, since there is no alternative but to let populations starve. However, food is only one factor in survival: natural resources, such as water, and the technology and education to know how to use these to generate the wealth that could maintain an acceptable level of existence, are also important. For this, the poorer states rely on advanced nations for help, even though, more often than not, the real beneficiaries are the advanced nations themselves, a fact which has been a source of some objection in recent years.

In the 1990-91 Gulf War, oil has already been shown to be a primary motivating factor in the Allies' military intervention. If prognoses of future armed conflict in the South China Seas prove correct, oil will again be a primary motivating factor. Water, however, has the potential to become the major critical issue, not merely because of the demands of population growth rates and industrialisation, but because climatic change and environmental pollution have reduced the number of sources. There are some who anticipate that water access would be one of the more volatile issues in the future, and one that has the potential to lead to armed conflict.

States will resort to military force when they perceive their core interests to be in jeopardy. Such considerations as 'rogue' leadership, national pride, breaches of international law, and 'special' economic interests are secondary, contributory factors. When projecting defence and security into the next century, these 'core values' will have to be weighed, their vulnerability to change will have to be established or their possibility to form the basis of a threat, carefully assessed in respect of each country. They will give an indication of the likelihood that disputing parties would resort to armed conflict, or that scope for compromise and accommodation could be found.

MILITARY FORCE AS AN OPTION

Threats to core values may be the root causes of a state being prepared to use military force for their protection. However, this is not the same as a state either having the capability or the will to do so. In reality, there are many constraints that mitigate against the use of military force. As governments have to weigh the costs of such adventures in the short and long term, war and military force have declined appreciably as options, even when the core values of states are threatened. This is more acute among the richer, advanced nations, than among the poorer ones, largely because of the extent to which issues, such as the defence of territorial integrity, maintenance of standards of living, protection of cultural identity, and the prospect of a physical invasion, have receded significantly. More at risk are their particular and sectional economic and political interests, their investments, and the protection of their citizens abroad.

A further factor among the more advanced states that mitigates against their using military force against one another, is the degree to which their respective political and economic interests are bound together. It is not simply a matter of common markets and trade, but one of cross-investment, industrial rationalisation and mergers, and collaboration in science, research and development. Issues such as common currencies are secondary to the reality that most industrial states in Europe and North America have created an interdependency in terms of industry and commerce that puts constraints on what national governments in extremis can entertain. In a manner of speaking, when states share intellectual property rights, they all have to agree.

The richer nations that continue to get proportionally richer in comparison with poor nations, display a further characteristic that will help inhibit the option of using military force. In addition, the reasons for doing so are receding. Since 1989, most of the richer nations have substantially reduced the size of their armed forces, their annual defence budgets and, correspondingly, their military capabilities to engage in a major military conflict and sustain it for any length of time. The more advanced countries, such as the US, France and the UK, have argued that, although fewer resources are now devoted to defence, this has not appreciably reduced military capability because of enhanced efficiency, the substitution of personnel with high technology weapons, and greater flexibility and mobility. The lumbering conventional armies and the formations of the Cold War have been replaced by leaner, better equipped and more mobile formations with highly trained personnel.

A concomitant of this change in the force postures of the advanced states is the tacit assumption that none of them will commit themselves to the use of military force without the support and participation of

allies. This fact alone has tended to limit the number and type of intervention force that can be entertained, since the prerequisites of an effective command and control infrastructure and procedures can only effectively be met either through NATO or with the direct assistance of the US. The establishment of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJFT) by the European states – to enable them to engage in operations without the US, but with their C3 assistance – is an acknowledgement of this reality.

Except in relatively minor conflicts on the American continent, this assumption also applies to the US, arguably the largest and most technically advanced professional military force in the world. If this is indeed the case, and on the assumption that there has to be both consensus between allies and a critical mass to embark on an operation, constraints will immediately surface regarding the political and military objectives, duration, cost, command, and termination of the engagement. The entire Bosnian experience has served to demonstrate the problems encountered through the joint use of military force, and those that will likely have to be addressed in future.

The replacement of men with highly sophisticated weapons and equipment may well enhance the destructive capability of the individual soldier, sailor or airman, but there is also a significant opportunity cost. Most seriously, redundancy, the capacity to absorb losses, and to reinforce units in the field, have virtually been eliminated. For reasons of economy, reserve forces in their specialist capacities have now become as much part of the line of battle as the full-time professionals, and are no longer, in the strictest sense, reserves. They have restricted terms of engagement that place a limit on the duration of any military operation or engagement. Furthermore, modern weaponry is expensive and, again for reasons of economy, training with new equipment has to be limited or resorted to simulation. Nor is it possible to keep adequate stockpiles of modern weapons, since they would tie up too many scarce resources. Both in the 1990/91 Gulf War and the 1982 Falklands War, supplies of munitions ran out and in the former case, forced a change of strategic timing by bringing the land battle forward as the air bombardment could no longer be waged.

There are other hindrances to the exercise of military force which have either emerged or intensified in the last decade. These have to do with the degree to which they generate public support. There is a substantial difference between public acceptance of high military spending and levels of readiness when there is an acceptance of a significant and potentially imminent threat to the security of the state, compared to a situation where threats are believed to be remote or non-existent. There is also a difference in public perceptions of the defence of state borders and the use of military force in pursuit of other national interests. UN peacekeeping operations and military intervention for humanitarian reasons can and have commanded public support, but this has proved vulnerable when the costs of these operations have mounted, the engagement became extended over long periods, or there has been loss of life. The US withdrew very rapidly from operations in Somalia when the situation degenerated into armed conflict.

In establishing the readiness, or ability, of states to deploy military force, the changes within the armed forces of those states able to use force have to be taken into consideration. As societies have changed their attitudes towards military force for political purposes, so have armed forces also changed. They no longer consist of the same kind of people as in the past, and their terms of engagement have also changed. International law governing rules of engagement and crimes against humanity have strengthened, as have laws that govern the use and discipline of states' military forces. The old assumptions that the military is separated from society and government by martial law and therefore have a right to be different no longer apply. Cases have proliferated where servicemen and women have resorted to the law to seek redress against their employers in efforts to exercise their right to refuse service in a conflict with which they have political or moral scruples. In peacekeeping operations, where war has not been declared formally, service personnel or their dependents have taken to the courts to sue

for compensation for injury. Currently, the most publicised case for compensation is that of Gulf War service personnel who have allegedly suffered from a debilitating illness directly attributed to either pesticides or anti-biological and chemical warfare inoculation.

These considerations should not be dismissed as minor inconveniences. Governments faced with legal challenges arising from their policies to use military force in pursuit of national interests, must first think carefully. The armed services are no longer a compliant institution of the state, and those who serve in them, rather than as people, separate from society, who have joined up, perhaps for vocational reasons, and have accepted an 'unlimited liability', are encouraged to think of themselves as citizens in uniform. In a manner of speaking, the changes in the composition of the armed services and in the relationship between armed services and society, have introduced a form of structural disarmament in which the use of military force is less likely to be the first resort in the prosecution of the defence and security of the state.¹² In countries such as South Africa, where constitutional change has introduced sets of legal civil-military arrangements that prescribe and proscribe what can and cannot be done with and by the armed forces, these constraints on the utility of military force are even more evident.

THE TOFFLERS' DILEMMA

The above discussion is directed, for the most part, at the richer, more advanced states, those that more or less come within Alvin and Heidi Tofflers' **Third Wave** category of warfighting ability. Essentially, they argue that there is an immutable relationship between the manner in which societies create wealth and the way in which they fight wars. Thus, the first wave of war was fought between nations, groups or states, whose productive capacity was essentially agrarian, and whose weapons of war were handcrafted, personally owned and used. Payment for military service was irregular, poor and invariably in kind. This changed dramatically with the industrial revolution that introduced the mass production assembly line and correspondingly mass armies equipped with mass-produced weapons.¹³ Generally speaking, the First and Second World Wars were of this type, with corresponding massive loss of life in front-line combat. The Tofflers also attribute the creation of huge overseas empires, such as those of Britain and France, to the simple fact that they, as second wave states, expanded at the expense of first wave nations, who had neither the wealth nor the military capability to resist. The conflict was therefore grossly uneven, with the result that overseas expansion and colonialism were both relatively easy to achieve and the resultant empires, for a while, moderately easy to control.¹⁴

It is the Tofflers' contention that some states, principally the US, have moved beyond the second wave of warfare, largely as a consequence of the fact that their wealth is no longer generated by mass industrial production, but out of the revolution in information technology. Huge industrial enterprises have been replaced by smaller, more dynamic companies that are able to adapt to changing market situations with new products and services. Correspondingly, the weapons and the way these states prepare for military conflict have also changed.¹⁵ These include the increased use of the sophisticated and precision weapons referred to above, an essential element in the debate over the Revolution in Military Affairs that has occupied strategists and military analysts over the past six or so years.¹⁶

The US is clearly in the vanguard, at least as far as 'smart' military weapons and strategic and tactical thinking are concerned, although the Russian Federation, an onlooker during the Gulf War, has given long and serious thought on the implications for the Federation's future policy in terms of weapons, doctrine and strategy. Britain and France, buying into US weapons technology, have also engaged in a longer term doctrinal debate on their implications in the changed international environment.¹⁷ The rapidly expanding economies of the Asia Pacific states, in particular those of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, with China rapidly making progress in information technology areas as much as the more traditional industrial ones, will have the capacity to develop the 'smart' weapons that characterise the third wave of military conflict by the first quarter of the 21st Century. These developments must give the

richer states of Europe and North American food for thought.¹⁸

Change, however, takes time to accommodate. Even though the US possesses many of these third wave/information technology weapons and is increasingly aware of their implications on strategic thinking, the rate at which these changes have been absorbed by the US armed services in their staff college teaching and in organisational reform is considerably slower. A full transformation is unlikely until well into the next century, and many of the vestiges of the 'second wave' industrial, as opposed to 'technological', wave of war will remain.¹⁹

However, as the Tofflers noted the disparity in conflict between first and second wave armies during the 18th and 19th centuries, the question arose of what would happen if conflict developed between second wave and third wave armed forces. This question is considerably more critical than might appear at first sight: firstly, many emergent, developing or third world states, some that do not yet possess the productive capacities characteristic of second wave states, have acquired second wave military weapons in recent years, as the leading industrial states have dispensed their military arsenals at relatively low cost following the end of the Cold War and in line with recent arms control agreements. No one state is above this practice in the international arms market. The states of the former Soviet Union, whose arsenals of conventional weapons were overbearing and where economic circumstances dictated an imperative to earn foreign currency, were major contributors to this wide distribution of weapons. Some of the more complex of these weapons have proved beyond the level of development and therefore the competence of the recipient states. Others have not, and more disturbingly, have given a military capability to some states and leaders, particularly in missiles and CBW warheads, that can at least pose a threat to Europe, if not yet to the US.²⁰

The second reason why the problem is critical, is because third wave states are likely to intervene in concert in regional security situations with particular types of weapons and force structures. These have the potential to pit them against forces that are equipped with less sophisticated weapons. They are massed in considerably greater numbers, and their governments and peoples have the determination and will to sustain conflict for long periods. Alternatively, third wave forces may well find themselves facing unconventional terrorist or guerrilla forces that have weapons, doctrines and tactics that have already ensured success against conventional second wave forces and tactics in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. They are likely to prove equally difficult to defeat and again should give cause for thought. In other words, the old maxim applies that there is no substitute for the soldier who is on the spot to take and hold ground, if the political objectives for the use of military force are to be achieved.

Globally, there is an emerging dichotomy in the array of states at different levels of development and wealth creation that increasingly display marked differences in military capability. Mix this complex hierarchy of armed forces and states with a break down in the old Cold War bipolar system and the emergence of disputes and conflicts that have either been suppressed or lain dormant for the past half-century, and a scenario emerges which is both potentially volatile and uncontrollable. It is little wonder that analysts are reluctant to predict future defence and security, beyond the caution that it is uncertain and that regional security arrangements are one of the most likely ways forward.

Some have ventured into the minefield of prediction, with varying degrees of success, but their focus seems to lie more in general trends than in specifics. The Tofflers themselves foresee a rather pessimistic future in which global revolutionary changes have created a high-risk environment. 'Small wars', they believe, can snowball into gigantic confrontation, because of the world's 'Prigogine' dissipated structures: all parts of the global system are in constant fluctuation and extremely vulnerable to external influences, ranging from religious fanaticism, environmental problems, and oil price changes, to changes in the balance of weapons, the population explosion and ethnic vendettas. Military force is but one way of preventing these from escalating, though it can also be a contributory factor in that escalation. According

to them, the solution is a change in attitude, and an understanding of how the world has recently changed and of the link between knowledge, wealth and war.²¹

Paul Kennedy, following his major study of the rise and fall of the great powers, in which he recognised both the connection between economic and military strength and counselled against committing too much of a state's resources on military matters, turned his attention to defence and security in the next century in his book, **Preparing for the Twenty-First Century**. Like the Tofflers, his prognosis is pessimistic, focusing on the simple projection that there are environmental and technological changes that will put pressures on human society. Furthermore, with too many people and not enough resources, the world will spin out of control. More seriously, the mechanisms that enabled some degree of control over these two developments would no longer be available, and worse still, the move towards liberalism and free markets could not be relied upon to solve these problems. If anything, the information revolution has served to exacerbate the situation by encouraging high expectations among poorer countries and stimulating ethnic, racial and religious animosities between states. He sees the state as having to assume greater responsibility, because people will increasingly see it as the only foundation of their security, irrespective of transnational trends.²²

The third major contributor to the debate on future defence and security is Martin van Creveld. His forecast is likewise somewhat doom-laden, inasmuch as he foresees, that "*[w]e are entering an era, not of peaceful economic competition between trading blocks but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. Even as familiar forms of armed conflict are sinking into the dustbin of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place ... Unless societies are willing to adjust both thought and action to the rapidly changing new realities, they are likely to reach a point there they will no longer be capable of employing organised violence at all.*"²³

He anticipates that conventional warfare is in its final stages as an instrument of state policy, and 'organised violence' is coming to an end. It will be replaced by low intensity conflict, national sovereignty will be undermined, and today's armed forces will be replaced by "*police forces and bands of ruffians.*" Although his argument is not dissimilar to others' who have seen the increase in irregular warfare replacing conventional confrontation throughout the world,²⁴ it is debatable whether the world has reached that stage, as emergent states such as India, Pakistan, China, and most states in Africa, Central and South America and central Asia expand their conventional military capabilities.

On a less abstract level, the question of who will fight future wars and why, has been addressed by Trevor Dupuy. His approach was the application of quantitative historical analyses through the use of a computer combat simulation model of future conflict to areas throughout the world where there were unresolved differences both between states and ethnic groups. The means of combat were conventional between states and unconventional where conflict was civil or internal, in each case examined. Interestingly, none of the ten wars examined out of the more than twenty candidates he identified in the model, involved any intervention by the UN or alliances, despite predictions of significant knock-on effects for international and regional stability.²⁵

Finally, there has been the work of the US National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies Advanced Concepts, Technologies and Information Strategies. Such as the strategic importance to the US that much of their work is now prevented from being disseminated in the public domain, though some has been accessible – for example, the Joint Operations Symposium held in Washington in August 1996. In a paper presented to the symposium, entitled *Threats to Security Other than War: The Never-ending Story*, the authors recognised, among others, that threats to international security manifested the following characteristics: "*Actors are multiplying, diversifying, miniaturising and becoming more mobile; threats to security are becoming increasingly ambiguous; the means of attack and access to these have also multiplied; avenues of attack are proliferating and becoming more*

*interdependent; [and] threats to security are enormously complex with important side-effects."*²⁶

Their conclusion was that states – including the US – could not meet these threats to world stability or security independently: the ramifications were too great. Intelligence gathering would therefore take on a new dimension and significance, markedly different from the 'dominant battlespace awareness', characteristic of conventional operations. They concluded that the US military had accomplished its mission of deterring traditional warfare so well, that "*its force structure had become irrelevant to most prevalent current and foreseeable military missions.*"²⁷ Operations other than war to promote security required either substantial changes to force structures, strategies and doctrines, or the creation of other organisations more suited to the task.

FUTURE DEFENCE AND SECURITY AND THE UTILITY OF NAVAL FORCE

There is clearly little consensus on future defence and security in the world, apart from an acceptance that there is rapid change. Such is the extent and variation of change that the future stability of the world is judged to be under threat, although there is little agreement from where, when and by whom it will first come. Such is the nature of the challenge and the lack of any clear projection on what the future has in store, that considerable time and resources have been devoted in recent years to address the problem. This has not been so much a matter of addressing the question of how to identify the probable or likely causes of future instability and conflict in the next twenty to thirty years for planning purposes, but the intellectual challenge of finding a satisfactory methodology that will enable analysts and forecasters to arrive at plausible and convincing answers.²⁸

Decision-makers charged with the immediate responsibility for the defence and security of the state, and indirectly with contributing to the promotion of collective security under the terms of the **UN Charter**, are well aware that difficult choices will have to be made in times of change and uncertainty, regarding future force structures, weapons systems, equipment and military doctrine. Without the certainties that have focused their task in the past, the conclusions of forecasting exercises of future international security are guides that can assist them in their task. However, these prognoses come without guarantee and, at best, merely offer degrees of probability. Any unforeseen, unanticipated or misunderstood development can blow any forecast off course, with huge potential consequences.

Nevertheless, some world developments can be forecast with some certainty and these can be used as a baseline from which to make forecasts and upon which to base defence and security choices. These include

- increases in the population and the corresponding shift in the demography of most states: poorer states will increase their populations and become younger on average, and the richer will remain static or decline and grow proportionately older;
- increases in the world's population that live within 25 miles of the sea coast is forecasted to rise from today's fifty per cent to 75 per cent by the year 2025;
- water becoming a strategic resource that will diminish in supply as population and industrial demands increase exponentially;
- food will likewise be under pressure, as demand increases and cultivable land and sustainable fish stocks diminish;
- the extent of urbanisation will continue to increase rapidly as populations migrate from the rural areas;

- without international controls, pollution will continue to rise with all its attendant implications for the weather and the habitable environment; and
- the gap between rich states and poor states will widen, as will the height of stratification within states.

These factors determine the context within which human society will have to operate or adapt. States have different capacities to adjust, either for cultural or geostrategic reasons. They all have a range of alternative strategies for survival, from international integration at one extreme, to belligerence and aggression at the other. To many, the world's future is on something of a knife-edge, and it can go one way or the other. In a somewhat Manichean way, some have attempted to see the future in terms of different scenarios, based on these probabilities, and to plan their future defence and security forces around these projections. Others have focused their attention on building suboptimal flexible military capabilities that can serve the interests of the state or the international community, should the occasion arise.

Whatever the underlying approach that state decision-makers choose to adopt, a number of developments are emerging on which there seems to be a degree of consensus. The first is that the kind of large scale interstate war that has been anticipated on the plains of northern Europe during the Cold War – with or without the use of tactical or nuclear weapons – is judged to be very unlikely. The second is that belief in the utility of military force has changed from territorial defence and conventional deterrence against an aggressor, to one of intervention in situations short of armed conflict elsewhere in the world. A third is that the use of armed forces, when intervening in a situation abroad, requires international endorsement if it is to be considered legitimate. It is for this reason, aside from the sheer expense involved, that states no longer anticipate deploying their armed forces independent of a coalition or alliance. Fourthly, the international arms control regimes, constraining the possession and use of weapons of mass destruction, have made significant progress in recent years, thereby changing the nature of military operations, should armed force be used. Armed conflict is also as likely, if not more so, to be against non-statutory forces, such as terrorist organisations, international crime syndicates and pirates, as against the statutory forces of other states. In this scenario, highly sophisticated and heavy weaponry would not be the most suitable equipment for the state forces involved. Finally, the use of armed forces in a range of operations short of war, including peacekeeping, maintaining peace, humanitarian aid, infrastructural support for vulnerable societies, supervising democratic processes, etc., require professional skills beyond the traditional military ones of the constrained management of violence.

There is a real danger that – as with the enthusiastic espousal of strategic theories and doctrines during the Cold War that served the interests of states with armed services – defining future international security scenarios will serve other purposes than those with which they ostensibly are expected to cope. Shifts in populations' attitudes towards military expenditure, and their greater awareness of other threats to their security, well-being and values, have already led to an extreme sensitivity to loss of life during military engagements, opposition to high levels of military expenditure, disapproval of practices within armed forces to impose and maintain discipline, and expectations of military conduct that mirrors civilian, rather than military employment. These considerations have hastened the restructuring of tomorrow's armed forces, changes in recruitment and terms of employment, and adjustments to the balance between personnel and equipment. If trends continue, future weapons will be capital intensive, smart, hands-off and long range: the automated battlefield has not yet arrived, but the time is not far off when this will be the case in combat scenarios. Personnel matters most in operations short of war.

If these future scenarios convince decision-makers, and the trends that have been identified, continue – and ontologically they will continue as identified, since state decision-making has the effect of turning

them into self-fulfilling prophecies – a number of projections can be made regarding the composition of future force structures and their probable equipment. It is within this framework that prognoses can be made about the role and function of future navies and the utility of naval, as distinct from military, force. Within these prognoses, some assumptions have to be made about maritime power, naval doctrine, combined operations, joint forces, as well as the purpose and goal of using coercive force.

The change in the international environment, from one of major military risk to one of multivariate uncertainty, plays significantly to the strength of maritime power. The former demanded forces with a high degree of readiness to react to military threats to the home territory with relatively little advance warning. The latter multivariate scenario does not require instant response – the substance of air power and mobile armoured forces. The lead time for action is considerably longer, the risks much less, and the response, involving political, social and economic, as well as military considerations, is more sensitive to public resistance at home and abroad. In his book, **Gunboat Diplomacy**, Sir James Cable observed that *"[i]f instances of gunboat diplomacy towards the end of this era prove comparable with those at the beginning, it becomes arguable that this technique has already been successfully adapted to changes in the international environment and is capable of further evolution in the future."*²⁹

The remarkable aspect of Cable's observation was that it was made in 1971 at the height of the Cold War. His confidence in the flexibility of the use of naval power for diplomatic, humanitarian, commercial, and peacetime operations, as well as always having a purely military function in reserve, was such that he believed that navies would always have a future, even when dominant military hostilities subsided.

Navies are more or less ubiquitous. Their value lies in their flexibility and their relevance to the kinds of future world security scenarios that are being projected among leading decision-makers. This is not to reject the utility of land or air forces, or their importance in certain categories of operations short of war. Air forces can and have been used to deny airspace to governments and states that have used airpower to coerce or intimidate both other states and their own populations. Without adequate air cover, the rapid movement of aid and logistics support with freight aircraft in emergencies would be both dangerous and vulnerable. Peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and even peace enforcement are, and will always be tasks for land forces. But, by way of generalisation, the deployment of land and air forces – both of which a well structured navy should also possess – is a remedial or restorative action. It is not preventive to the degree that the deployment, presence and use of naval power can be. Furthermore, navies are accepted as a benign form of power, operating in international space (unlike airspace or land), a diplomatic high value asset in a world where the emphasis is on avoiding the coercive use of military force.

Conventional naval capabilities are generally characteristic of second wave military technology, inasmuch as they are complex systems produced from industrial, rather than information technologies. Apart from those of the US and, in the near future, the UK, most of the world's navies are not equipped with long-range, stand-off, precision guided weapons that enable intervention in conflict situations, without the forces concerned necessarily being directly involved in front-line conflict. Naval vessels can provide the platform for such weapons, but for the most part, they operate around the world within close distance of other states. It is both their potential power and their vulnerability that make them such valuable diplomatic and military tools. As far as the future is concerned, the question of how and where navies will be used, will depend on which states are involved, what the postures of their navies are, and what decision-makers hope to gain by their use.

The immediate advantage of second wave navies is that they can be used on the high seas as a political statement of a state of affairs, without either infringing upon other states' rights or putting their own servicemen and women in immediate danger. The deployment of naval surface ships is, in effect, a potent military move, but one far short of war and essentially non-provocative. A ship is also a manifestation of the state, a symbolic statement of its political position in a crisis. There is another

advantage in ships that, in alliance or in coalition with other states' navies, have the ability to operate alongside others – a basic feature of navigation at sea – without the elaborate command and control measures that are needed when forces operate on land or are involved in joint land/air operations. Submarines are different: not only do they place states in a different international league, but they also provide a psychological dimension to international conflict that can serve as a constraint or deterrent against adventurism or outright aggression.

As the world edges towards a period of increasingly greater uncertainty, the relative slowness of naval reaction to political crises around the world becomes an asset rather than a liability. The deliberate nature of their use and the symbolic significance of dispatching a national capital asset to regions of conflict, provide tools of national and international diplomacy that no other action can match. To that extent, either as an action by the state or in support of an international initiative, navies can and do make a wider contribution to international security. With the international legal obligations that states are expected to honour, following from their signing of the **United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea** (UNCLOS III) that provides for a 200 nautical mile Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), navies have also become a front-line source of national economic, commercial, political and industrial defence.

While the world becomes more uncertain, and decision-makers are confronted by a range of future scenarios, each with the potential to predict instability in the world, efforts are made to develop and acquire the means to counteract their effects. Naval forces are emerging as one of the more valuable tools for the promotion of international stability.

With international trade an important ingredient in increasing world interdependence and the promotion of domestic growth, the protection of shipping and of sea lines of communication, has become increasingly important. This has been recognised among a growing number of states, not merely those with access to the sea. As land-locked states experience their legitimate trade being interrupted by territorial disputes, relations with states with access to the sea become an important lifeline.

The evidence is that huge capital investments are made in maritime assets, both merchant and naval. From the perspective of future international security, this must be a welcome development and one which, in spite of the projected uncertainties and difficulties as the world moves into the second millennium, must be taken as an encouraging sign.

ENDNOTES

1. Defence Review Working Group, **Defining Defence Interests and Responsibilities: Explanatory Notes on the Model adopted by the DRWG**, DS/DEFREV/521/2/1/56, Department of Defence, Pretoria, 27 May 1996.
2. B Buzan, *Is International Security Possible?*, in K Booth (ed.), **New Thinking about Strategy and International Security**, Harper Collins, London, 1991, pp. 31-55.
3. United States Department of Defense, **Bottom-up Review**, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1992.
4. R Mottram, *Options for Change*, **RUSI**, Spring 1991, pp. 22-27.
5. M Hugh, *New Visions, New Voices*, in Booth, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-10.
6. R Hormats, *The Regional Way to Global Order*, in C Kegley and E Wittkopf (eds.), **The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives**, McGraw Hill, New York, 1995, pp. 289- 297.

7. E Haas, **International Political Communities**, Doubleday, New York, 1966, pp. 93-130.
8. R Rosecrance, **The Rise of the Trading State**, Basic Books, New York, 1986; also R Keohane, **Neo-Realism and its Critics**, Columbia, New York, 1986.
9. Cited in R T Collins, **Dictionary of Military Quotations**, Harper Collins, London, 1990, p. 14.
10. R Beaumont, **Military Elites**, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1974.
11. S Huntington, *Clash of Civilisations*, **Foreign Affairs**, Summer 1993.
12. For a discussion of these changes and their impact on the *British Armed Services*, see M Edmonds, British Army 2000, **CSCI Occasional Paper**, 23, CSCI, Camberley, July 1996, p. 76.
13. See for example, J Ellis's excellent and enlightening study of the 'industrialisation of war' in **Social History of the Machine Gun**, Croom Helm, New York, 1975.
14. A & H Toffler, **War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century**, Warner Books, London, 1993, pp. 33-50 and 104-110.
15. A & H Toffler, *ibid.*, pp 69-103.
16. M C Fitzgerald, *The New Revolution in Russian Military Affairs*, **RUSI Whitehall Paper Series**, RUSI, London, 1994, pp. 21-52.
17. For example, Britain has purchased the Tomahawk sea launched precision guided cruise missile and France has bought the advanced AWACS airborne command system from the US.
18. M Edmonds, *Military Technology and South East Asian Security*, in Z HJ Ahman (ed.), **Asia Defence Review**, October 1996 (forthcoming).
19. For a perceptive discussion of the extent to which strategic thinking bounds ahead of organisational reform, see P Bracken, *The Military after Next*, **Washington Quarterly**, 16(4), Autumn 1993, pp. 163-174.
20. See for example, D Bosdet, H Crum Ewing & R Ranger, *Ballistic Missiles the Impending Threat*, **Bairrigg Memorandum**, 11, CDISS, Lancaster, 1995.
21. A & H Toffler, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-3.
22. P Kennedy, **Preparing for the Twenty-First Century**, Harper Collins, London, 1993, pp. 133-134.
23. M van Creveld, **Future War**, Brassey's, London, 1991, p. ix.
24. For example, see F Kitson, **Low Intensity Operations**, Faber, London, 1971.
25. T Dupuy, **Future Wars**, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1992, pp. xiii-xvii
26. R Hayes, *Threats to Security other than War: The Never-ending Story*, paper presented to the 1996

27. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

28. See, for example, the **Insight** programme, conducted by the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, Chatham House, 1995-1996.

29. J Cable, **Gunboat Diplomacy**, Chatto & Windus, London, 1971, p. 12.

ANNUAL POLICY REVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY, 1996

Vice Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, Chief of the South African Navy

EMERGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT

In May 1996 the Minister of Defence presented the **White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa** to Parliament, which Parliament approved with the strong support of all political parties.

The overarching theme of the **White Paper on Defence** is the transformation of defence policy and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the light of momentous political and strategic developments within and outside South Africa. The **White Paper on Defence** addresses issues at the level of broad policy and establishes a policy framework and the main principles of defence.

The next step forward is to translate these policy formulations into practical implementation plans through a Defence Review process that is informed by consultation and consensus.

Although South Africa as a nation faces no foreseeable conventional military threats at present, we live in unpredictable times, with history having illustrated again and again how quickly a situation can deteriorate. In their latest book, **Suid-Afrika en die Nuwe Wêreldorde**, Leopold and Ingrid Scholtz quote Air Commodore N B Singh, the Deputy Director of the United Service Institution of India, who warns of the problems in predicting threats in the post-Cold War environment: "*The new world order at the global, regional and sub-regional level is in the process of transformation due to interaction of newly emerging forces after the end of the Cold War. Challenges and threats to our vital interests in the [Indian Ocean] Region during the next 15-20 years may not be clearly identifiable and also cannot be accurately assessed in their degree and dimension. During this period of uncertainty, it would be wise for nations to be prepared to defend their vital interests by military means, if necessary, as a last resort.*"¹

During a recent Defence Review regional conference, Professor Renfrew Christie presented a thought provoking paper entitled *Strategic Alliances are the Deepest Defence*, especially in the Nuclear Age. In this paper Christie provides reasons why the time is ripe for South Africa to right-size its Army, Navy and Air Force, to develop strong strategic alliances and to build an intelligent strategic defence force.²

The Defence Review is presently elaborating, in considerable detail, on the framework provided in the **White Paper on Defence**. Matters receiving particular attention are roles, functions, tasks, doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.

The logic behind the Defence Review's deliberations on the force design of the SANDF depends on the

tasks foreseen for the Defence Force.

IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS

The identification of SANDF tasks is based on those constitutional provisions for defence policy that is contained in the **White Paper on Defence**, as well as an analysis of the internal and external security environment.

The new Constitution states that "[t]he primary object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force." It further states that "[t]he defence force may be employed in co-operation with the police service, in defence of the Republic or in fulfilment of an international obligation, (only under the authority of the President)."³

The **White Paper on Defence** states that "*the SANDF may be employed in the following functions:*

- *for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;*
- *for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;*
- *for service in the preservation of life, health or property;*
- *for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;*
- *for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and*
- *for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment."*⁴

The **White Paper on Defence** further states that all these functions do not carry equal weight and that "*the primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression*", with the other functions being secondary. Therefore, the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will be determined mainly by its primary function.

The analysis of the internal and external security environment entails identifying defence contingencies (situations in which the SANDF will or may have to be employed), assessing the probability of such situations arising and assessing the likely consequences for South Africa if the SANDF does not or cannot take the necessary steps to address such a situation.

UNDERPINNING FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE POSTURE

The determination of the manner in which the SANDF will fulfil its tasks is based on foreign policy pronouncements by the Government and provisions in the **White Paper on Defence** regarding posture.

According to Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister, Aziz Pahad, a leadership role is being thrust upon South Africa⁵ and South Africa cannot sit on the sidelines.

During the National Maritime Strategic Conference on **Navies in Peace and War** held in October 1995,

the Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils stated that the demands for South Africa to become more involved in the area of regional security have become greater. South Africa – one of the few regional states with a naval capability – is called upon urgently to curb the pillaging and compromising of Africa's maritime resources. Kasrils stated that this concern for the maritime environment was not only limited to coastal states, and that a recommendation to landlocked states to become involved through service by some of their military staff on South African ships was enthusiastically endorsed.⁶

Similarly, the South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, in an interview with Helmoed-Römer Heitman of **Jane's Defence Weekly**, stated that South Africa's neighbouring states need help in protecting their coasts. *"They come openly to us to request South African support and assistance. They complain that the marine life in their waters is being plundered by foreign ships. They are not even talking about security problems or some future military threat. The region wants and needs our support, particularly Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia."*⁷

The defence posture for the SANDF is defined in the **White Paper on Defence** as being *"primarily defensive."*⁸ This pronounced strategic intent is consistent with the new emerging common security environment that exists in the Southern African region at present and is entirely appropriate.⁹ However, what is posture? Posture is defined as the combined (maritime) strategic intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities of a country, including the strength, disposition and readiness of its armed (maritime) forces.¹⁰

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The **White Paper on Defence** asserts that South Africa will employ the following principal strategies to protect the State and its people against external military threats in this order:

- political, economic and military co-operation with other states;
- the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means; and
- the deployment of the Defence Force. The threat or use of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.

During his opening address on the occasion of the **Second Consultative Conference of the Defence Review** in Parliament on 12 August 1996, the Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki stated that *"[t]he United Nations Charter, and our new Constitution empower us with the right to defend our sovereignty and impart to us the responsibility of deterring aggression ... The primary function of this National Defence Force, must therefore, be to act as a credible deterrent to would-be aggressors, to provide for a secure future ... Just as we are striving to promote the human potential of the SANDF, so too we must address the material needs in terms of equipment ... It is for the Defence Review process ... to provide us with concrete guidelines on the acquisition of essential main equipment ... This is necessary to avoid the serious problem of all our equipment needs peaking at the same time, and thereby imposing a severe financial burden on the next generation ... Your task is therefore challenging and carries with it a sense of urgency."*

That the Government is serious about its defence capability and maintaining adequate main equipment is quite clear.

CONTINGENCIES

The focus in the formulation of strategy and the composition of the force design for the entire SANDF is

based on a continuum of possible broad defence contingencies, ranging from invasions to threats to South Africa's off-shore assets. It is from these overall defence contingencies that the maritime and naval contingencies are derived.

The following contingencies have been identified and analysed in order to formulate various strategies and plan joint force designs.

- **Invasion:** Invasion is defined as a major attack aimed at occupying South Africa, or part thereof, replacing the Government by force and conquering its people. At present the probability of an invasion is considered extremely small. However, given the catastrophic impact of a successful invasion, it cannot be ignored as a contingency. A seaward invasion will require substantial resources and will only be possible with the involvement of a superpower or a coalition of major powers. Factors favouring South African defences would be natural obstacles to the attacker, including the effects of the merging of the Indian and Atlantic oceans on the underwater environment. These are considerable as the mixture of warm and cold currents produces different thermal layers at various water depths, a fact that is tactically and operationally to the advantage of submarines.
- **Limited neutralising attacks:** In this scenario a third party, such as a major power, seeks to neutralise South Africa from interfering militarily in the designs of that third party in Southern Africa. South Africa's approach to common security in Southern Africa implies that it opposes any major military aggression within Southern Africa. Such a scenario could also emanate from a peacekeeping operation that escalates. In such a scenario, the aggressor will have to neutralise the country's capability to project military power. Targets for such an attack would include air and naval transport capabilities, air and naval attack capabilities and mobile ground forces. If the scenario occurs as an escalation of a peacekeeping operation, South African ground forces may already be deployed in vulnerable positions away from their home territory.
- **Raids:** Raids of lesser intensity may occur against South Africa for the purposes of coercion or castigation. Coercion would aim to force the country to change behaviour that conflicts with another state's interests or goals, and castigation would be retaliation for South Africa's actions considered offensive by such a state. Such raids could be launched by a major or a smaller power and may take the form of attacks from surface vessels, amphibious assault or invasion by clandestine forces. Since such actions may also be launched by non-government, radical organisations, the probability of such invasions must be considered as real.
- **Blockades:** Blockades may be used by major powers or powers similar in size to South Africa to coerce the country to change behaviour that is in conflict with the interests and goals of that state. Blockades are particularly popular courses of action in low level conflicts to coerce opponents. Blockades may consist of interference in South Africa's sea lines of communications (SLOCS) through mining of harbours or attacks on shipping along the country's maritime trade routes.
- **Captured embassies, ships and aircraft:** South Africa has a responsibility to protect its embassies, ships and aircraft outside its national borders. The threat against these assets is mainly one of international terrorism. Protection by host states may not necessarily be forthcoming or effective. Although the impact of such contingencies is relatively low, the probability of their occurrence is higher than most other contingencies.
- **Marine resources and maritime zone law enforcement:** Maritime law enforcement is not a primary defence task. The specific contingency here would be of another state using military force to support its exploitation of South African resources.

- Threat to islands: The level of the threat against the South African Islands – the Prince Edward Island group – and the impact if such a threat materialises, are of such a nature that no special or additional defence capabilities will be provided in the core defence capability at present. However, it should be noted that the South African sea areas around these islands are rich in potential food sources that can be utilised in the country.

It is impossible to design a defence force to cater for all possible contingencies within the present budgetary constraints. It is therefore necessary to make some difficult political decisions. The country's elected civil authorities will have to decide which contingencies will be funded and by so doing, will also have to accept the risk created by the consequent strategic gaps for which funding will not be made available.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

South Africa protects its maritime interests by securing access to the sea for international markets through its ports of entry, by guaranteeing its maritime sovereignty, through patrolling its sea lanes and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), by guarding its harbours, fish stocks and natural resources under the sea bed, and by ensuring the safety of international maritime traffic around its coasts.

South Africa has six major commercial ports and two naval bases – in Simon's Town and Durban. It is of vital importance that these ports should be kept open to shipping during times of war or tension. The present lack of funding for defence has determined that only two critical areas can be defended – Durban and Richard's Bay on the east coast, and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon's Town on the west coast.

To this end and based on these areas, two maritime defence areas have been planned. They are defended by means of a horizontal layered approach where harbour patrol boats patrol the waters of the harbours and mine hunters and minesweepers keep the harbour approaches clear of potential mines. Strike craft patrol the inshore waters, harbour approaches and the intermediate area. Corvettes patrol the balance of the maritime defence area out to 200 nautical miles (370 km). Submarines would patrol underwater through the entire maritime defence area. Combat support ships help to ensure that this force can conduct operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support.

South Africa's Peacetime Naval Force

The proposed Peacetime Naval Force has been designed to provide a core defence capability. This force allows for two patrol Corvettes, two patrol submarines, three strike craft, two mine hunters and two minesweepers for each of the two maritime defence areas. These vessels can be regrouped into other formations to respond to other contingencies as required.

Surface Combat Vessels

Corvettes are multipurpose maritime helicopter carrying combat ships with modest capabilities in many disciplines, including anti-submarine and anti-air and surface warfare. They are capable of conducting sustained operations in sea conditions, such as those off the South African coast. Their capabilities allow them to be used in a wide range of military, constabulary or other peacetime tasks. They are of particular value in maintaining a South African 'presence' when naval forces are used in deployments, port visits, exercises and routine naval operations in areas of national interest. This serves to remind local inhabitants and sea users of the effectiveness of the particular navy and the intent of the State that owns it. When a stronger message is required, these vessels could be used as part of a carefully tailored force with an offensive capability that could act as a signal of will and strategic intent of greater concern or to

encourage a friend or ally.

The SA Navy has no vessels of this nature, having lost its destroyers and frigates between the mid-1970s and late 1980s because of obsolescence. It is awaiting political approval to procure four Corvettes, necessary for the core defence capability of the Peacetime Force.

The core defence capability requires a total of six strike craft that, together with the Corvettes, will provide a surface and anti-air warfare capability necessary to defend the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy presently has nine strike craft, on average seventeen years old.

Submarines

The essence of any navy rests in its surface combatants. However, there is a unique relationship between surface combatants and sub-surface combatants. The number and level of sophistication of surface combatants are determined to a large extent by the number and capabilities of the submarines. Without submarines, a navy would have to have a considerably larger number of surface combatants of greater sophistication and higher cost considerations to provide the same deterrent and defence value.

Submarines render small navies, such as the SA Navy, credible and, according to Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills in their recent book, **Uncharted Waters**, submarine ownership puts South Africa in a "*different league*."¹¹

The SA Navy places a particularly high value on submarines primarily as a result of their ability to deter. This was clearly illustrated in the Falklands or Malvinas War of 1982 when a very modest submarine capability on the part of the Argentines struck terror into the hearts of the British Royal Navy surface forces, to the extent that the latter were called to action stations a total of 1 500 times during the conflict when they thought they had made sonar contact with a hostile submarine. On the other hand, the presence of Royal Navy submarines kept the Argentine fleet within the 12 nautical mile limit throughout the most critical period of the war.

It is for this reason that a number of South East Asian countries have recently acquired, or are in the process of acquiring submarine capabilities.

It is also for this reason and resulting from lessons learned in the recent Gulf War – where the crucial reality of having a stealth ability to ensure a survivable deterrence in a technologically sophisticated battlefield has been accentuated – that the Iranian Navy has recently acquired and is presently expanding a submarine capability.

Submarines have excellent anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. Their inherent stealth, mobility, firepower, endurance, ability to control their visibility and survivability allow them to dominate many battle spaces. The potential aggressor has no idea that he is the subject of this continuous surveillance and preparation and, as such, is not provoked into retaliatory action.

The SA Navy presently operates three Daphne-class submarines built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These submarines are coming to the end of their economical service lives and serious consideration is being given to their life extension or to cost effective replacements. The SA Navy requires a total of four conventional submarines in order to protect the two maritime defence areas.

Combat Support Ships

The combat support ships in service are modern ships capable of providing replenishment to submarines and surface combatants at sea. These ships are capable of performing multiple tasks and are vital in

peace support operations because of their inherent cargo and personnel carrying capacity.

Mine Countermeasure Forces

The core defence capability requires four mine hunters and four minesweepers for use in clearing mines from the approaches to ports within the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy has adequate numbers of these vessels that are used for other tasks, including sea fishery patrols, in times of peace.

Harbour Patrol

The core defence capability requires a total of 39 ski-boat-sized harbour patrol boats to carry out patrols in the harbours of the maritime defence areas. The SA Navy has 27 such boats at present.

Diving Services

The SA Navy has diving services for military purposes, including mine clearance diving and submarine rescue operations. The collateral utility of this service has proven invaluable both locally and regionally – such as during the retrieval of some 300 corpses from the Tanzanian ferry that capsized on Lake Victoria a few months ago.

Hydrographic Services

The SA Navy surveys the coast and surrounding seas using the survey ship SAS Protea, as well as providing charts and other hydrographic services for military purposes. Using the collateral utility of this service, the SA Navy provides hydrographic services to the local and international maritime communities in compliance with international obligations.

PEACETIME TASKS

The SA Navy is designed to fulfil its primary mission of defence against external aggression. Nevertheless, it has vessels, command and control facilities, personnel, skills and resources that can be used in the performance of other, non-military tasks as and when required. This is referred to as the collateral utility of the SA Navy. These tasks are regarded as secondary functions. The SANDF does not budget for collateral utility, nor are collateral tasks primary factors in force design and force levels. All naval vessels have an inherent capability to provide for peacetime tasks, such as search and rescue, humanitarian and disaster relief, and the patrolling of maritime zones.

Maritime Services

The SA Navy provides surveillance and enforcement support to relevant authorities for the protection of marine resources against illegal plundering, and of the marine environment against pollution, and maritime law enforcement with respect to piracy, drugs and weapons smuggling. Marine resources are steadily gaining importance and the marine environment is under growing pressure. The scope of the protection task can therefore be expected to increase. Naval vessels conduct extensive regular patrols as part of their normal employment. The Department of Defence currently allocates 1 500 hours of sea patrols and 750 hours of air patrols to the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism free of charge each year.

Disaster Relief

The SA Navy provides support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations that exceed the capacity of the civil authorities.

Search and Rescue

The SA Navy provides search and rescue support to the relevant authorities and in terms of South Africa's international obligations. It is an essential participant in the national search and rescue structure, SASAR, that is activated when required and co ordinated by the Department of Transport.

Antarctic Transport Support

The SA Navy and Air Force provide the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism with transport support to the Prince Edward Island group and the Antarctic as and when asked to do so.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not South Africa should have a defence force is no longer an issue. It has been accepted by Parliament that the country should have a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force that includes the need for a navy. This is derived from both the **Constitution** and the **White Paper on Defence**.

The Defence Review is presently elaborating on the framework provided in the **White Paper on Defence**, concentrating on such matters as roles, functions, tasks, doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, equipment, human resources and funding.

South Africa, with its island economy, cannot run the risk of an inadequate investment in its Navy. The concept of defending the coast is out of the question. There are only plans to keep two portals, the Maritime Defence Areas, open to secure access to the sea to international markets. The SA Navy plans modest surface forces in each of the maritime defence areas, based on a credible submarine deterrent.

Investing in its Navy transmits a message of seriousness about the protection of the country's economy and the protection of foreign investments.

Investing in a Navy is investing not in a war fighting capability only, but also in the fight against seaborne crime, disasters, pollution and the dangers of the sea. In respect of the peacetime tasks, the SA Navy recognises that it is not necessarily the chief role player, but it wishes to co-operate in a structured way with other state departments involved in the maritime environment where it has built up a wealth of knowledge and experience. This is in keeping with the way it is done in many countries, including ones much wealthier than South Africa. Such co-operation will, furthermore, see the SA Navy helping to ensure the safety and prosperity not only of the people of South Africa, but also the people of the Southern African region.

ENDNOTES

1. L Scholtz and I Scholtz, **Suid-Afrika en die Nuwe Wêreldorde**, Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1996, p. 107.
2. R Christie, *Strategic Alliances are the Deepest Defence*, especially in the Nuclear Age, unpublished paper presented at the **Defence Review Regional Conference**, Cape Town, 12 July 1996.
3. South Africa, **The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa**, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1996, p. 86.

4. Department of Defence, **South African White Paper on Defence**, Department of Defence, Pretoria, p. 26.
5. **The Star**, 19 September 1996.
6. R Kasrils, *We Live in a Tough Neighbourhood – Extracts of an Address by Mr Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defence on the occasion of the 1995 National Maritime Strategic Conference, at Simon's Town on 26 October 1995*, **Salut**, March 1996, p. 14
7. H-R Heitman, *Interview with Minister Joe Modise*, **Jane's Defence Weekly**, 3 January 1996, p. 32.
8. **White Paper on Defence**, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
9. L Nathan, **Changing of the Guard**, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1994, p. 48.
10. J M Collins, **Grand Strategy – Principles and Practices**, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1973.
11. M Edmonds and G Mills (eds.), **Uncharted Waters – A Review of South Africa's Naval Options**, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1996, p. 74

SOUTH AFRICAN-LATIN AMERICAN MARITIME CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A SOUTH ATLANTIC RIM COMMUNITY?

Dr Greg Mills, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg

INTRODUCTION

For many South Africans, most of Latin America has been epitomised by instability and, thus, by unreliability. This image was formed by the decades of economic and political upheaval – where telephone number hyper-inflation figures and military interventions combined to produce a volatile and unattractive cocktail for outside partners.

But this situation has altered radically and fundamentally. Democracy has been installed and is maintained, and the installation of democracy has gone hand-in-hand with economic reform. This has given the continent a totally different image to that of ten years ago. Brazil, for example, considered by many to be the regional hegemon, producing some forty per cent of Latin America's GDP, has successfully left behind 31 years of military junta (1954-85), and has implemented the the so-called 'Washington Consensus' or 'neo-liberal project', a by now common package of macro-economic structural adjustment programmes. These include liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation – a package with which the South African Government is also familiar.

Broadly speaking, the thrust towards regional co-operation and, in its purest form, regional integration, falls into three distinct categories, notably, political, economic, and security. Each of these will be considered in turn in the course of assessing the potential for naval co-operation across the South Atlantic.

POLITICAL REFORM: THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL DEMOCRACY

The significance of the virtually simultaneous democratic transformation in Latin America and in South

Africa should not be underestimated when considering the possibilities of regional co-operation. Although the process of contemporary regional co-operation and integration is often characterised by detailed and sometimes tedious high-level meetings and negotiations on economic matters, such as trade quotas and tariff reduction strategies, "*behind that process lies a sense of values – whether it be to promote peace, or defend socialism, or overcome poverty or further democracy.*"²

Given that regional integration and co-operation is also mostly a 'top-down' process (driven by the leadership *élite*), governments have to perceive that their best interests are served by integration, as they view the process through the prism of their own interests. In other words, governments will not be inspired to co-operate and, ultimately, share sovereign interests, unless integration and co-operation will promote both their "*sense of values*", which tend to be long term, and their interests, which may be short or long term.³

The democratic symbiosis between Southern Africa and Latin America goes beyond just the advent of democracy, however important and crucial that has been for both regions. Just as the end of civil conflict in Angola and Mozambique and the metamorphosis of South Africa's regional military involvement from the negative (destabilisation) to the positive has facilitated Southern African co-operation, the steady improvement in Argentine-British relations after the Falklands/Malvinas campaign of 1982 has also defused tensions in Latin America.

To put it simply, successful regional co-operation and integration requires, as James Barber has put it, "*a sufficient recognition of shared values and common aims, alongside individual interests.*"⁴ South Africa, like Latin American nations, will inevitably be drawn to co-operate with states that mirror its own political values and are consistent with its own political and economic status.

While the advent of a new 'globalised' age has paradoxically standardised expectations about national political and economic systems, it has at the same time brought with it inevitable demands to alter the manner in which states interact and in which international organisations are structured. Countries with similar political values (and with similar problems) could lobby together, for example, over reform of the United Nations system. Regional leaders in Southern Africa and Latin America, in particular South Africa and Brazil, have potential stakes in an expanded UN Security Council – though both will have to manage regional sensitivities over their role carefully. The notion of south-south linkages also creates a certain political solidarity with the nations of the nascent South Atlantic Rim – however misplaced the concept of a 'south identity' is in an era where the ideal of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) is *passé*.

GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM: A FOREIGN POLICY LINK?

In this new 'globalised' age, South Africa's foreign policy is essentially underpinned by economic factors. The foreign policy and diplomacy of a democratic South Africa will have to be based on an understanding about its self-interests in this global village. Self-interest will remain in existence for as long as the nation-state is still around, and despite the globalisation of economics and politics. South Africa's national interest, like that of other states, may be said to be underscored by the values enshrined in the **Constitution**, and encompasses the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of their social and economic well-being, as well as the encouragement of global peace, regional stability and development.

In this, Pretoria will thus have to take into account the needs of its citizens in a continually evolving global order and define its foreign policy objectives accordingly.

Following the end of the Cold War, the most notable global trend is towards political and economic

liberalisation in which a body of ideas around free trade and democratic governance is emerging. States are now expected to conform to standards of democratically accountable and transparent governance and macro-economic management. International support and investment are increasingly conditional on compliance with these standards. Indeed, in this regard foreign policy needs a significant economic product to sell, which government has to provide to the Department of Foreign Affairs and other diplomatic assets abroad, including the South African Navy (SAN).

Compliance with these globalising trends can only foster co-operation and trade. It should be noted in this regard that South Africa's trade with Latin American states has steadily improved:

- for the Mercosur group countries (Southern Cone Market: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and now also Chile), the trade volume has more than doubled from 1993 to 1995 (R1,75 billion to R3,8 billion); and
- for the Andean Group (comprising Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia, where South Africa still does not have any diplomatic missions), it has risen by 156 per cent (R157 million to R403 million) over the same period.⁵

THE SECURITY DIMENSION

As noted above, the states of Southern Africa and Latin America face many common problems, in part derived from similarities in their colonial past. Both regions have emerged from decades of authoritarian rule, and are suffering high crime rates, violence, corruption and economic instability. Both are concerned with the need to uplift poor communities, and with the effect that liberal economic reforms will have on these groups – hence, for example, the continued demand in South Africa for the effective implementation of its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and in Latin America for spending on its 'social agenda'.

Essentially, states will be brought together by both institutional and functional security concerns. While there is undoubtedly a degree of overlap between these areas, the institutional structures are not necessarily solely driven by practical concerns and often perform politically sentimental roles.

In this new age, too, it is also not realistic to speak of naval or military threats. Rather, the new mantra should be that of assessing functional security issues in terms of vulnerabilities, despite the fact that some Latin American countries still use each other as measuring sticks of force structures and capabilities.

What are the vulnerabilities that draw the states of Southern Africa and Latin America closer?

The need to establish effective regional security regimes

Given the past history of Southern Africa, there is clearly a need to institute an effective regional security regime to show, at least, that the region is grappling with its myriad of security challenges. This will also serve to give confidence to investors and help to offset the endemic bout of Afro-pessimism.

Here the importance and symbolism of transregional linkages, such as that between Mercosur and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), should also be noted.

Combating drug-trafficking

The fourth ministerial meeting of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) held in Somerset West in April 1996, noted with concern the threat posed by drug-trafficking, and urged

member states to accede to the three main United Nations drug conventions as soon as possible. Drug-trafficking is a problem that obviously demands international solutions, and there is a peculiar Southern African Nigerian-Brazilian nexus that demands policing. According to the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Gelbard, Brazil is a "*cocaine source country for Nigerian traffickers*" who ply their trade, among others, to the Cape Verde, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. "*Brazil*", he noted, "*is the primary staging area for Nigerian cocaine shipments because of its close historic ties to Africa and its large ethnic African population [while i]n 1993, Nigerians were responsible for more than half the cocaine that was seized in South Africa, and that percentage may be rising.*" The Brazilian Federal Police claims that 80 85 per cent of drugs enter and leave Brazil by sea today.⁶

Although this trend presents a global threat, it is one where regional co-operation may reap immediate dividends. This is most important for young, vulnerable democracies. Along with the careful management and policing of fish stocks in the maritime domain, it is clear that the spread of drugs is an area where functional needs could encourage greater regional co-operation.

Effective protection and management of marine resources and the environment

This involves co-operation by institutional structures, but also demands that the regions share information to ensure that the maximum benefit is derived from the limited resources of both regions. The areas of potential co-operation include, for example:

- joint exercises;
- officer exchanges,
- the sharing of information about ship-building and ship-modernisation;
- joint Antarctic exploration;
- pollution control; and
- the sharing of intelligence.

It should be noted that the **United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea** (UNCLOS III) allows South Africa to extend its marine resources jurisdiction along the circumpolar Antarctic convergence belt through its sovereignty over the Prince Edward Island group. South Africa has declared a 200 nautical mile limit fishing zone around these islands. It has also constructed a new base, SANAE IV, in Queen Maud Land on Antarctica, and is involved in a number of collaborative international projects in the area. These include the Southern Hemisphere Radar Project to monitor physical changes in the southern hemisphere and oceans. Antarctica is "*a laboratory for global change and developments*", which is connected to land only by the sea.

South Africa is also a member of the Valdivia Group, alongside Argentina, New Zealand, Chile, Australia and Uruguay. The group was established with the specific intention of focusing attention on issues of mutual environmental concern.

Navigation and Hydrography

This includes the need to ensure safe passage and general safety at sea, as well as to undertake hydrographic mapping under the terms of UNCLOS III. In South Africa's case, these tasks assume a regional responsibility given the de facto absence of naval capabilities elsewhere in Southern Africa. As

with co-operation, for example, over Antarctic missions, a sharing of logistics demands would apparently carry some benefit.

Disarmament and Arms Control

This would include, for example, collaboration over the establishment of a southern hemispheric nuclear free zone.

MARITIME CO-OPERATION: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES?

Multilateral Co-operation

The most notable Southern African-Latin American institution that sets out tasks and responsibilities is the aforementioned Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic. Created in 1986 as a result of a Brazilian initiative and partly as a counter to the mooted South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO), the Zone is based on four 'windows' of action:

- the environmental window which is concerned with the protection of marine resources in the South Atlantic;
- a window for the denuclearisation of the area;
- a window for interpersonal contact (known as the 'sports window'); and
- a window that focuses on economics and commercial initiatives.

The goal to establish a 'Community' or 'Commonwealth' of Portuguese-speaking countries is seen to be complementary to the Zone's broader aims.

The South Atlantic Maritime Area Co-ordination (CAMAS), founded in 1966 in terms of the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR,) is today well-established. This is a merchant shipping control organisation in which Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina exchange data on a daily basis on shipping passing through a designated South Atlantic maritime area. South Africa has observer status on CAMAS. These states also stage the biannual combined naval operations known as ATLASUR (Atlantic South). The first was held off Uruguay and Argentina in 1993, and the second from 19-24 May 1995 in South African waters. The next exercise is again scheduled for South Africa in 1997.

The mooted linkage between SADC and Mercosur could potentially include defence naval obligations which could further strengthen these ties. In this regard, there is a need for South Africa to draw the Southern African region into ATLASUR or other joint forms of involvement given the total lack of naval capacity in SADC states. This could also be extended to training and, potentially, also to the sale/lease/donation of equipment from South to Southern Africa. There are some interesting possibilities with regard to what might happen with the old Minister-class strike-craft, should the proposed corvettes be procured by South Africa.

Peacekeeping is another area of potential multilateral co-operation. In this regard, South Africa could share experiences with Brazil which has sent around 1 200 troops to UNAVEM in Angola (including 250 Marines), and has previously participated in UNOMOZ in Mozambique. Chile contributed forces to the UN operation in Cambodia. In another area, Argentina also possesses unusual southern hemisphere combat experience, having sent a naval force to take part in the UN Gulf mission in 1990-91.

Embryonic regional co-operation could also be assisted by a number of recent developments. South Africa took part in the annual US-Latin American naval exercises, known as UNITAS, for the first time in 1996. SAS Drakensberg participated in Phase Zero out of Puerto Rico in July.

Secondly, both Brazil and South Africa have been involved in supporting Namibia's fishing rights: Brazil through assistance in the training of naval personnel and in harbour construction; South Africa through policing initiatives. Clearly, there is some degree of complementarity, but there are also some realistic competitive tensions around regional involvement.

Thirdly, personnel exchanges and technological co-operation between Brazil and South Africa (two SAN officers were on secondment with the Brazilian Navy in 1996), and South Africa and Chile (where technical assistance continues today, albeit at a lower level than in the 1980s), may also act as a catalyst for greater regional contact.

Bilateral Co-operation

This could include, for example, the combat of drug-trafficking, joint naval technology exchange, and ship-building and repair.

There are a number of areas in the exchange of technology where South Africa could stand to gain from increased co-operation with Brazil. For one, Brazil possesses an impressive ship-repair and building capacity. In addition to Brazil's ten civilian yards, the facility at the Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (commonly known as 'the Arsenal') has been building ships since as far back as 1789. The first armoured frigate was constructed in 1874. Possessing three dry-docks (including the largest in Latin America capable of accommodating vessels up to 224 metres in length) as well as a locally-built floating dry-dock (Almirante Schieck) that is large enough to accommodate vessels of up to 3 500 tonnes, the Arsenal has constructed 127 warships since 1935. Recent examples include:

- two Type-209 (known locally as the Tupi-class) submarines (with a third under construction);
- four Niteroi-class frigates (based on the Vosper-Thornycroft Mk10 design);
- the training ship Brasil (based on the Niteroi-class);
- four Inhauma-class corvettes (with a fifth now laid down); and
- two Vosper (Singapore) 46 metre, 200 tonne patrol boats (with two constructed by a civilian yard, and two more on order locally).

In addition, the major surface combatants, including the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, have all received regular repair and upgrading at the Arsenal. The Instituto de Pesquisas da Marinha (IPqM) – the naval Research and Development centre based on the Ilha do Governador in Rio de Janeiro – has maintained its usefulness in updating equipment and substituting local for imported items since 1959. Interestingly, while on the backburner, plans to construct nuclear submarines are still under way.²

At another level, it should also be noted that Brazil possesses the largest government-controlled tanker and combined commercial fleet (in terms of dead weight tonnes (dwt)), ahead of Russia, the Pacific Rim Countries, India and Iran, with the US only in sixth place.

Chile, too, has repair-yards within easy reach of Antarctica. The facility at Talcahuano is still operational, with three floating docks and two dry-docks. The extensive refits, among others, of their

County-class destroyers were carried out at Chilean facilities. There are currently plans afoot (in addition to the acquisition of the Upholder-class submarines from the UK) to construct patrol craft, landing craft (LSMs and LSTs), a 4 700 tonne transport vessel, and service ships locally. Asmar Shipbuilding in Chile has recently delivered a 75 metre, 1 300 tonne Guardian-class offshore patrol vessel to Mauritius which will be operated there by the Indian Navy.

There is also the possibility of bilateral exercises, such as those held annually between Argentina and Brazil, known as AREX (Armada Republica de Argentina Exercise). They commenced in 1994, and were in part motivated by the unserviceability of the Argentine aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, and the need for carrier pilot training. The Chilean Navy is also keen to be involved in joint exercises, as well as in training and technology exchanges, picking up again on the close relationship enjoyed by the two countries, albeit under different regimes, in the 1970s and 1980s.

Lessons

South Africa can also learn lessons from Latin American navies. The Chilean Navy, for example, has managed through a combination of shrewd political posturing, an eye for the right purchase opportunities and modernisation programmes, to maintain a relatively up-to-date naval force. Between 1900-90, this was achieved at around 25 per cent of the resources spent by Argentina (and despite the international arms embargo against Chile). For example, the four County-class destroyers purchased second-hand from the Royal Navy in the 1980s for US \$15 million each, were modernised at a cost of around US \$35 million each. These vessels are expected to serve well into the next century.⁸ South Africa could also perhaps draw on the Chilean experience with the operation of the 'marinised' Super Puma helicopter, known locally as the Cougar.

As can be noted from the above, Brazil has managed, with a combination of cheap purchases from abroad – the four Type-22 class frigates were recently acquired from the Royal Navy at a cost of only US \$40 million each and are expected to continue to serve for another twenty years – to update elderly equipment and construct new vessels to maintain a force level commensurate with its maritime responsibilities. Even though Brazilian naval officers complain that they do not have the assets to patrol their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) effectively and to fulfil other expected tasks, the continued revitalisation of its force structure at least narrows the gap between roles and means to bridgeable dimensions and signals the seriousness of Brazilian intentions. This is something that South Africa's politicians will have to consider.

The ability to procure vessels at considerably lower cost and to keep them serviceable, raises some interesting possibilities should South Africa's corvette purchase, for whatever reasons, not go ahead.

PROBLEM AREAS

There are manifest problems in the approach of simply listing areas where South Africa would like to form links and institutional relationships. These wishes, unless they are to be nothing more than unrealistic ambitions, need to be rooted in the realities of the financial, material and personnel resources available.

At the 1996 ZPCSA meeting, South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad argued: *"South Africa would recommend that at this meeting we focus on matters such as environmental protection, managing the resources of the ocean, prevention of pollution, surveillance and sea rescue and general monitoring of the ocean ... South Africa accepts the obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment as set out in the various conventions adopted internationally for this purpose in the past decade and more. We look forward to also pursue these principles within the Zone of Peace and Co-*

operation in the South Atlantic. We must protect this great body of water which divides us, but at the same time serves as the link between all of us."

The allocation of such tasks would be fine in an ideal world, but not in the one in which we live. A critical point should be stressed with regard to South Africa's participation in such forums or missions. It is not enough for politicians simply to commit South Africa to participation in an expanded ZPCSA or to the Valdivia Group (whatever form that body might take in the future), without taking into account all the 'normal' functions and tasks expected of the naval forces. These include:

- its primary task – the defence of South Africa's sovereign interests;
- upholding international maritime law and responsibilities;
- the safeguarding of South Africa's own maritime interests, including the safety of life at sea;
- the monitoring of shipping;
- the preservation of maritime resources;
- the rendering of humanitarian aid;
- diplomatic visits; as well as
- the control of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and piracy.

However, if South Africa wants to expand its links with Latin America in the maritime domain, and if it wants to take up its rightful place and play a meaningful role in world affairs by accepting the responsibilities that go with the image of a responsible power, it will have to possess the necessary capabilities to enforce these political ideals. To this end, the SAN will have to be provided with the tools necessary to carry out all these expanded roles. Without these, it will be necessary to make some difficult choices.

Consider, briefly, in this regard, the naval forces available to some of South Africa's potential South Atlantic Rim partners:²

- Argentina: 20 500 personnel (including 3 000 naval aviation officers and 4 000 marines); four submarines; six destroyers; seven frigates; two Fast Attack Crafts (FACs); one combat support ship; two oceanographic research vessels; and one icebreaker;
- Brazil: 50 000 personnel (including 1 250 naval aviation officers and 15 000 marines); one aircraft carrier; six submarines; one destroyer; eleven frigates; thirty plus patrol and coastal vessels; four amphibious craft; 26 support craft; and thirty plus armed helicopters;
- Chile: 27 500 personnel; nine destroyers and frigates; four submarines; six FACs; twenty helicopters and 31 fixed-wing naval aircraft; and
- Uruguay: 5 000 personnel (including 280 naval aviation officers and 430 naval infantry), three frigates, four mine-sweepers, three support ships, and one oceanographic support vessel.

In other words, South Africa's naval complement is little better than that of Uruguay, a country that has a coastline of 1 000 kilometres (South Africa's is 3 000 kilometres), and a population of 3,1 million (42

million in South Africa). Yet, if an attempt is made to find a model for South African naval responsibilities, Argentina or Chile would probably be the closest fits: medium powers with populations of 33 and 14 million respectively, and with interests in Antarctica.¹⁰ Unlike South Africa, however, both possess considerably greater naval forces, at least on paper, and most certainly are not the only maritime powers in Latin America with the regional responsibilities this implies.

CONCLUSIONS

The nations of Southern Africa and Latin America share many of the same problems. Both regions are attempting to cope with domestic inequalities and to integrate their economies into a new globalised age. The sentiment expressed by the Chilean Under-Secretary for the Navy, Pablo Cabrera, in an interview during October 1996, is probably shared by many across the South Atlantic: *"We feel that our borders are no longer land borders; in this globalised age we are bordered by oceans. Environmental problems cross these borders with impunity. Through the oceans we feel we are close to many countries and can face common problems together with other nations with similar policies. South Africa is one of these countries. Our experiences, particularly with transition and governance issues, can be used to create a better understanding between both countries. UNCLOS is another field. As middle-sized countries, we play key regional roles. We have to work together with imagination and creativity in order to get together in trade and in the sharing of technology. There are many things we can do together through the fragile environment which is the oceans."*

There is clearly a need, however, for a long term approach to South Africa's co operation with Latin America. Some questions need to be answered in this regard:

- Should this occur through SADC?
- What should the role of ZPCSA be?
- How would co-operation in environmental and other maritime issues be attained?

At the moment, the approach is *ad hoc* and unco-ordinated, and this could place an intolerable premium on the participation of the SAN in co-operative ventures. It would be 'intolerable', because, although the SAN would apparently like to encourage co operation across the South Atlantic (and with good reason, given the potential for synergy), it does not have the means to do so properly at present when compared to the navies of Latin America. Should South Africa be a junior partner in this relationship, particularly as the country will be representing the maritime interests and sum capability of Southern Africa, whether it wants to or not?

There is the prospect, as the Brazilian Vice-President, Marco Maciel put it recently, of setting up partnerships across the South Atlantic based on common interests and goals. In each region there are countries at similar levels of economic development, there is a need to consolidate democracy, and there is a common call for hemispheric denuclearisation. These emerging nations are all grappling with the (sometimes) conflicting strains of nationalism, regionalism, and globalism. In the naval realm, the big challenge for the countries of the South Atlantic rim is *"how to conceive a navy for the next century."* There is thus considerable scope to improve trade, investment and security ties, and also to form links that will enable each of these countries to learn from the experiences of each other. The sea, which separates the two regions, could also serve to bring them closer together.

ENDNOTES

1. Much of the information was gathered during a trip to Brazil and Chile in September October

1996. Meetings were held with academics, government and military personnel, and a conference on **Brasil-Africa du Sol**, organised by the Instituto de Pesquisa de Relacoes Internacionais (International Relations Research Institute), Rio de Janeiro, 24-25 September 1996 was attended. The author expresses his gratitude to those who assisted him on his trip. The views expressed here are, however, his sole responsibility.
2. See J Barber, *Regional Co-operation and Integration: South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur)*, paper presented at the conference on **Brasil-Africa du Sol**, *ibid.*; for related views, see also G Mills, *A Comparative Perspective on South Africa's and Brazil's Foreign Policies*, *ibid.*; and D Venter, *South Africa, Brazil and South Atlantic Security: Towards a Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic*, *ibid.*
 3. Barber, *ibid.*
 4. *Ibid.*
 5. SAIIA, **South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1996**, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, 1996, pp. 335-343.
 6. See R Gelbard, *Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa*, paper presented at a conference on **War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Armies, Drugs and Trade**, SAIIA, the World Peace Foundation and the Institute for Security Studies, Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 4-5 August 1996.
 7. Employing 300 civilian and 160 military personnel, IPqM has successfully developed a number of items for the Brazilian Navy since its creation under the military junta in 1959, including: sonar transducers; chaff rockets; sonar software; sea and limpet mines; gyroscopes; computerised integrated command, communication, control and intelligence (C3I) systems (allegedly at one-quarter of the price of the nearest commercially-available equivalent); and, for the Inhauma-class corvettes, Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) systems.
 8. See E Meneses, *Maintaining a Regional Navy with Very Limited Resources: The Chilean Case, 1900-1990*, **Defense Analysis**, 7(4), 1991, pp. 345-362; C Marambio, *La Armada de Chile*, **Technologie Militar** (Tecmil), 6/91, pp. 26-33. It is important to note one point when examining the respective military budgets of Brazil and Chile and comparing them with South Africa. In Chile's case, the military budget is 1,6 per cent of GNP, divided between the Army (42 per cent), Navy (35 per cent) and Air Force (23 per cent). This figure does not include the amount allocated for pensions nor, importantly, for capital expenditure. The latter figure annually amounts to ten per cent of the turnover of the country's copper mines, normally about US\$400 million. This figure has steadily increased with the improvements in the copper production capability and the world price. The amount is divided equally between the three service arms. The Brazilian defence budget has reduced to the present 0,5 per cent of GNP (of which the Navy receives fifty per cent and the other two arms 25 per cent each), though it is 'topped up' in a number of ways. Firstly, the Navy receives one per cent of the royalties of the oil industry (Petrobras) to enable it to fulfil its patrol capability. Brazil produced 8,9 billion barrels of oil in 1995. In addition, according to Vice Admiral Mario Jorge Ferreira Braga, the Executive Secretary of the Science and Technology Section of the Brazilian Navy (SECONCITEM), much of the naval equipment Rand D costs are met by other ministries, such as those for the Environment, Science and Technology, and Energy. The exact military budget is therefore difficult to ascertain.

9. For a thorough appraisal of Latin American naval issues, see M Morris, *The Challenges for Latin America*, in G Mills (ed.), **Maritime Policy for Developing Nations**, SAIIA and CDISS, Johannesburg, 1995; J C da Silva, *Brazilian Naval Power*, *ibid.*; J I de Abelleira, *Argentina*, *ibid.*
10. Chile has substantial base interests in the Antarctic. The largest of these is run by the Air Force, which includes facilities for 150 personnel, a school, and an air base, operating helicopters and Twin-Otter aircraft.

SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RIM

PJ Botha, Head: Asia Pacific Business, ABSA Bank

THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY

There is a need to manage security to prevent conflict. However, if not dealt with in the correct manner and in the right forum, it can be counter-productive. It can restrain countries and regions economically, and can lead to heightened tension.

The world is experiencing an economic and political renaissance. Conventional wisdom is no longer what it has purported to be, and traditional ways of dealing with the interaction between states are being reassessed. The main catalyst for this new environment has been the end of the Cold War. Was the Cold War still being waged, the approach to security in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) might well have been quite different. Although it may be said that the diminished superpower interest in the Indian Ocean has made dealing with regional security issues more difficult (because of the lack of a 'big stick' to beat states into submission), it has also created unlimited opportunities to deal with the intractable issues of the past and has opened the way for the establishment of mechanisms to ensure a measure of regional stability and growth. A change in mindset and innovation on the part of those dealing with security issues is required. It is necessary to learn from the mistakes of the past and vigorously pursue the success formulas that have been tested with time.

It is crucial that the correct mechanism(s) and structure(s) are used, if there is to be any hope of successfully managing security in the IOR. The question arises whether there are existing structures capable of achieving this objective, either in their current or in a restructured form.

In the past, security in the IOR was addressed by the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP). Is the IOZP a successful mechanism to address security issues, and does it have any relevance in today's changed environment? To answer this question, it may be necessary to reassess the way the world – particularly the western world – deals with global and regional challenges, especially in view of the recent successes in Asia in dealing with divisive regional issues. This was investigated in a paper by Major General D Banerjee, Deputy Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, that was presented at a conference on **International Relations in the Indian Ocean**, in Reunion in 1992.

General Banerjee comes to the conclusion that the IOZP is totally inadequate to meet present challenges: *"The end of the Cold War has removed any necessity to attempt to prevent the negative consequence of superpower rivalry. Simultaneously, the second Gulf War shattered the illusions of regional security. Both these conditions have undermined the basic assumptions behind the concept of the IOZP. Its premises stand discredited and there is no means that will effectively resuscitate the proposal ... Some scholars have argued that a Conference by itself may be a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) and, therefore an IOZP Conference has the potential to generate greater understanding and reduce tensions. However, in this particular case the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee have shown that they more often add to the problems than they resolve them and they do not contribute to an effective dialogue. It is suggested that a better option may be to bury the dead and start anew."*

In the fifties and sixties, various Asian heads of state promoted the idea of a zone of peace, with Sri Lanka taking the lead. The idea of an IOZP was first proposed at the meeting of the Non-Aligned Heads of State in Cairo in 1964 and was prompted by Mrs Sirivmo Bandarnaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. As Banerjee pointed out, these initiatives should be seen in the context of an era where the world experienced a proliferation of ideas and approaches to arms control and peace: *"this created an environment where ideas of peace and disarmament received a certain acceptability no matter how unrealistic or difficult these were in practice, or what little preparation had gone into their formulation."*

In his book, **The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Zone of Peace**, Dieter Braun stated that the *raison d'être* for the establishment of the IOZP was the awareness of the Indian Ocean Littoral States of the increased military and strategic activities of both the superpowers in the second half of the 1960s.

The basic elements of the IOZP were formulated at the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in 1970, with the proposal shifting thereafter to the United Nations. In 1971, the resolution on a Zone of Peace was voted on and it was declared *"that the Indian Ocean within limits to be determined together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto is hereby designated for all time as a Zone of Peace."* The thrust of the resolution was the elimination of the military infrastructure of superpowers and the halting of the escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean.

It was clear that the IOZP was the product of the geo-political environment of its time and focused on superpower rivalry. It dealt almost exclusively with conventional security issues and threats. Any prospect of progress was further bedevilled by the introduction of nuclear issues into the region. It is therefore not surprising that, even with expanded international support over the years, it has not achieved anything of consequence. It might be said that the only reason that the IOZP initiative continued to exist, was because it was easier to keep going through the motions than to face reality and admit defeat. As in other parts of the world, the superpowers remained omnipotent. There was no way of forcing them to comply with resolutions or initiatives that did not meet their own agendas. In fact Britain, France and the United States withdrew from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1989.

From the outset, it was also not suited to deal with the intractable issues it tackled. The approach was institutionally aligned and rigid. Issues could not be resolved because of the absence of a consensual, non-confrontational process. Had the approach been different and minor, with more soluble issues taken on, it might have ensured some advancement. It would have allowed progress and created an environment of trust where those involved did not feel they were being confronted by a zero sum situation.

It is now also apparent that a UN initiative is unlikely to gain the confidence of the Littoral States of the Indian Ocean, nor will be allowed to take the lead in tackling the security issues in the Indian Ocean. The present Ad Hoc Committee hopes that, with a change in approach, it can breathe new life and vitality into the Zone of Peace. Resolution 49/82 of 15 December 1995 requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean *"to continue its elaboration of new alternative approaches, including those discussed during the session held in 1994, with a view to giving new impetus to the process of strengthening co-operation and ensuring peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region."*

In 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee held five formal meetings and two informal meetings. At the 439th meeting, the chairperson stated that *"the newly emerging international climate of confidence following the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tension consequent on the termination of superpower rivalry, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the commencement of the Middle East peace process, all ... augured well for peace in the Indian Ocean area, presenting new opportunities for regional and global co-operation in the Indian*

Ocean."

A revitalised Zone of Peace may have a complementary role to play in dealing with security issues, providing that expectations are realistic. It should furthermore be accepted that the driving force will have to be a localised initiative without the political baggage of the UN. It could convince the international community to support consensual decisions made in an Indian Ocean forum. The endorsement of decisions by the UN will add force to those that are decided by the Indian Ocean Rim community.

Barry Buzan supports this view: *"In terms of the general character of the international system, the assumption is that the next few decades will be dominated by a move towards a considerably more decentralised form of international relations than that which prevailed during the Cold War, or come to that during the several centuries of European world domination that preceded 1945. There are two main reasons for this assumption. First is that the sources of power have become much more widely diffused throughout the system. The West achieved its extraordinary global control because it possessed assets not possessed by the other actors in the system: the political form of the national state, the knowledge and productive power of the scientific and industrial revolutions, and the mobilising power of nationalism and ideology. These assets are now thoroughly, if unevenly, spread throughout the international system. No longer can great powers easily occupy and rule large swaths of foreign territory and population. Second, is that all of the major centres of power in the international system – the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan – are notably introverted. None of them is willing to take on a strong leadership role in international society, and all of them are preoccupied with their own domestic affairs. The operation of the international system will be less marked by intervention (especially military intervention) more localised (especially in terms of military and political relations), and less focused at the global level (in terms of large scale ideological rivalries shaping behaviour all through the system)."*

THE CONSEQUENCE OF INCORRECT POLICIES AND NEGLECT

Notwithstanding considerable cynicism, the IOR initiative has made steady progress, and with the approval of a charter at the last intergovernment meeting in September 1996 in Mauritius, and its forthcoming adoption at a Council of Ministers meeting in Mauritius in March 1997, it will become a reality. If it is argued that, at the very most, the Zone of Peace UN Committee can be the supporter and not the initiator of the security agenda, then the question arises whether the security agenda can be accommodated in the IOR.

The Australians in particular have pushed very hard to have security included in the agenda of the IOR, notably through their former Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. This has surprised the other countries that have formed the original Mauritius Seven group (M7) and launched the initiative – Mauritius, India, Australia, Singapore, Kenya, Oman and South Africa – because of the leading role Australia played in launching the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC).

Central to APEC's success is the shunning of divisive issues, and its concentration on those issues that can bring members closer and add benefit. In this way, for example, APEC has managed to deal with the intractable China/Taiwan issue, with both being members of APEC. As a rule, the most divisive issues tend to be security-related. For this reason, APEC has no security agenda. Even the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that came into being to counter the security threat resulting from the Vietnam conflict, discarded security issues in favour of more digestible economic and trade-related issues. Against this backdrop and in the light of the failure of initiatives such as the Zone of Peace, it is not surprising that most of those involved in the IOR initiative have been adamant that security issues would not be raised in the context of the IOR. It would be difficult enough to make a success of the IOR,

given existing regional tensions and the different levels of economic development among the Littoral States.

In a paper delivered to the Transitional Executive Council's (TEC) Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1994, the following point was emphasised: *"It is essential that the process eventually be inclusive rather than exclusive. Politics must be neutralised as a factor in deciding on the aims of the grouping. This has been effectively recognised by APEC and is one of the reasons for its success. Regional political issues must be subjugated to the economic goals of the group. As with APEC, it should be a purely economic and trade initiative. It must not have a political or security agenda."*

Professors Mukul Asher, V V Bhanoji Rao and Ramkishan Rajan made the same point in a discussion document in May 1994: *"Furthermore, unlike past alliances which dealt with wide-ranging issues encompassing politics, security and economics, there seems to be an awareness and acceptance that in the present post-Cold War era, the formation of economic alliances is crucial for sustained economic growth which, in turn, is essential for the retention of policy autonomy and the maintenance of overall national security. Regional alliances now focus primarily on economic-related issues."*

South Africa has been consistent and insistent on this point, and is supported by the other five M7 members. Because of South Africa's firm conviction, it came as no surprise when progress was held back in the first year, and the initiative almost scuttled by two issues unrelated to trade and economics, namely membership and security. The disagreement came to a head when Australia launched its Track II International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) conference in Perth in June 1995. The conference insisted on ignoring the concerns of the other initiators of the process and included a workgroup session on security. This resulted in the only adverse publicity for IFIOR during the conference and acrimonious exchanges between the key players. South Africa made its position known to Australia in various meetings preceding IFIOR (as did the other M7 states). In a paper presented on 29 May 1995 to the SAFTO Indian Ocean Rim Conference, the South African position was stated clearly: *"South Africa regarded this first second track meeting as exploitative in nature and accepted that it was the prerogative of the host country to decide who to invite. We went to Mauritius to listen and learn but we were adamant that there could be no compromise on two key principles. The first being that the process should be inclusive and not exclusive, particularly in view of our SADC commitments, we were not prepared to belong to an exclusive club. Secondly, we firmly believed that we should concentrate on that which binds us and avoid divisive issues. As with APEC, IOR should concentrate on trade and economic related matters. Issues such as security should be avoided and if there is a need to deal with security matters in an IOR context, they should be dealt with bilaterally or in a forum created for this purpose. This has been our position in Mauritius and this will be our position in Perth. We have informed the Australians of our concerns regarding security matters on the Perth Agenda and are consulting with other countries on how to deal with this contentious issue. I believe that we should have nothing to do with this part of the agenda."*

South Africa has never been opposed to the discussion of security issues. In fact, it is considered to be extremely important to address a host of security-related concerns that confront the Rim, but not in the context of the IOR initiative. In discussions between the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and the South African Navy in 1995 this point was emphasised, as it was in discussions with Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and officials in Perth during the IFIOR conference. During these discussions it was suggested that security issues should first be dealt with bilaterally and that the recently established Asian Regional Forum (ARF) might be a model worth considering when dealing with these issues in a multilateral context.

The logic behind South Africa's reasoning was simply that it did not want the progress of the IOR initiative to be restrained by more complex security issues. If the forums were separated, they could each

move at their own pace on the assumption that progress and the resulting benefits would sooner be attained if issues that only held benefit for those involved were dealt with.

At an ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on **New Directions for ASEAN** (September 1994), Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Deputy Director-General of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, put it succinctly: *"Bilateral security issues, whose cumulative effect could be quite injurious to good neighbourly relations, are in many instances not fed into multilateral processes for management. A good example is the countries forming ASEAN, which do not even discuss these issues at ASEAN meetings, much less seek to manage them directly at this level. In practical terms South East Asian security is built more on the bilateral level through various bilateral mechanisms and processes than at the multilateral level. It is this belief that has lead to the creation of the Asia Regional Forum (ARF)."*

Japan's **Yoshida Doctrine** is an excellent example of the benefits in separating economic and security issues. In this regard, Dr Garth Shelton writes: *"If Japan had become involved in the politics of the Cold War and allowed itself to be dragged into regional conflicts it would certainly not have been able to achieve such impressive economic growth. The Yoshida Doctrine provided the necessary foundation for Japan's economic miracle. The magic formula used by Yoshida to produce the most successful Cold War foreign policy was simply to accurately identify and pursue with dedication, Japan's national interests. Japan's 'survival interests' (defence of Japan) were taken care of by a military alliance with the USA and the regional balance of power which prevailed in Asia. Japan was thus able to concentrate on 'vital interests' (economic development). Yoshida wisely prevented other 'major' (ideological issues) or 'peripheral' interests from undermining the pursuit of Japan's key foreign policy goal."*

THE RECOMMENDED APPROACH

How should security issues be accommodated in the Indian Ocean Rim?

If the submission is correct that economic growth in the Rim could be an important catalyst in defusing potential regional conflicts and would make it easier to deal with security issues on the back of the trust already established, then it is important that security is dealt with in a way that does not inhibit economic growth. In this regard, the process is almost as important as the structure.

Dr Noordin Sopiee, the Malaysian member of APEC's Eminent Persons Group, contrasts the Western and Asian approach to the development of the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) and argues that the Asian approach is more suited to deal with diverse cultures, levels of economic development and remote geographic regions. He refers to the Western approach as the Cartesian way: *"The Cartesian way emphasises legalistic forms, agreements, contracts, institutions and structures. If we wish to build APEC along such lines, we should adopt charters and constitutions, negotiate one agreement after another, sign as many contracts as possible, and build the broadest range of institutions, committees and structures. The Asian approach relies more on the meeting of minds and hearts, on consensus building, peer pressure, and on unilaterally sound and proper behaviour. To many Westerners, this appears mushy and soft-headed, cumbersome, not 'transparent', unpredictable, ponderous – and plain silly. It calls for enormous patience. It is frustratingly slow. By the same token, there is a great deal that is wrong with the Asian approach. Its only merit often seems to be the fact that it works. Yet, in the building of a community of such diversity, the Asian way is the only approach. The Cartesian method will mean the destruction of APEC."*

Given the extent of the Pacific Rim, the complexity of security issues and the existing cultural diversity, the Asian approach seems more suited to the challenges facing Asia.

Just as certain experiences have been borrowed from the APEC and ASEAN initiatives in developing the

IOR, it is worth exploring the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) as a possible model for an Indian Ocean Regional Security Forum. In view of the South East Asian success in this field and the fact that the region forms a significant part of the Indian Ocean, the development of the ARF may be relevant.

THE ASIAN REGIONAL FORUM AS A MODEL?

The ARF was launched at a dinner attended by eighteen foreign ministers in Singapore in July 1994. It resulted from a wish to address security issues outside the established and successful ASEAN association, in order to avoid putting it at risk. An interesting feature of the ARF is that it consists of the seven ASEAN states, the association's seven dialogue partners (the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the European Union), two countries with observer status at annual meetings of Asian foreign ministers (Papua New Guinea and Laos), and China and Russia. Its reach is therefore much greater than that of ASEAN.

Prof Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics and Political Science said the following about the ARF at the time of its formation: *"Asia has addressed regional security in a more piecemeal manner by deliberately avoiding the problem of power which is at the centre of all international relations. Fundamental to this aversion is the absence of a common strategic perspective or a shared sense of security priorities among member states. In place of defence co-operation ASEAN has concentrated on avoiding and managing conflict through informal procedures of consultation and co operation."*

The traditional approach in dealing with regional threats has been a policy of balance of power. This is not possible in ASEAN because of the lack of common purpose in member countries' projection of military power. The alternative to the balance of power, is the extension of ASEAN's model of regional security through confidence-building, to East Asia. Leifer believes that *"underlying the initiative for the ARF is the prospects of employing the nexus of economic advantages as a basis for constraint on declared territorial revisionism by China."*

The sensitivities and concerns that face ASEAN in dealing with matters of security are very similar to those faced by the countries of the Indian Ocean Rim. It is suggested that little progress will be made if the traditional western approach is used in dealing with these issues. A case in point is the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Some may argue that Europe has been successful with the Organisation on Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE - formerly Conference), and that this could serve as a model for dealing with security arrangements in the Indian Ocean, or in Asia, for that matter. Eiichi Furukawa, executive director of the Japan Centre for International Strategies, challenges this view and points out that the situation in East Asia (and one could add the IOR) is quite different. He writes that, *"after the Cold War, the [O]SCE's main tasks are creating an institution, extinguishing the fires of local and ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and former soviet Republics, and assisting democratisation and free elections. What the Westerners are interested in is institutionalisation."* The countries in the Indian Ocean and in Asia no longer require supervision by the west and believe they are mature enough to enter into dialogue with a view to establish co operation.

Unlike the OSCE, which is dominated by the US, the European Union and Russia, Furukawa points out that an important characteristic of the ARF is that it is *"small country orientated rather than big country orientated."* The subject matter dealt with by the ARF will be limited to security and political matters related to security issues. These will be tackled step-by-step, one of ASEAN's hallmarks. The ARF may not be interested or in a hurry to introduce the military-oriented confidence-building measures of OSCE, as western observers desire it to. Furukawa comes to the conclusion that the main purpose of the forum is to *"remove future uncertainties and provide mutual assurances to countries in the region."*

The objectives of an Indian Ocean Regional Forum (IORF) will also have a much broader focus than that

of the OSCE and possibly that of the ARF. The issue to be addressed in the Indian Ocean is comprehensive security and not only the more conventional kinds of security issues. It would appear that an ARF structure would be better able to cope with this challenge.

It is surmised that there will be general consensus among the IOR states that both maritime co-operation and comprehensive security issues need to be addressed. The point of departure has always been where and how they should be addressed. Issues such as maritime search and rescue, law of the sea, resource management and security, marine scientific research, the safety of sea lines of communication, as well as the concerns about drug trafficking, piracy, the illegal movement of people, and natural disasters, could also form part of a comprehensive security agenda. All these issues can be addressed in an Indian Ocean Regional Forum.

Lastly, in anticipation of the possible formation of IORF, the format and functions of such a forum will have to be considered and debated. A point of guidance may again be the ARF, which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests should comprise of three kinds of forums:

- a venue for ministers, defence analysts and other parties to meet each other (Type I);
- a forum for the exchange of information and where possible for developing common strategies on the issues confronted by the countries in the region. This forum will require a secretariat such as APEC's (Type II); and
- a full-fledged forum, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – (Type III).

This will only be required in time, should the first two be successful in fulfilling their objectives.

CONCLUSION

In addressing the changing global circumstances that confront countries of the Indian Ocean Rim, it is imperative to deal with comprehensive security issues in an innovative and proactive way. Security issues cannot be dealt with in an *ad hoc* fashion, if and when the need arises. They need to be managed in a forum designed to meet their specific needs. Furthermore, security should be dealt with both on a bilateral and a multilateral level. The best multilateral vehicle will be an initiative, similar to the ASEAN Regional Forum, and based on the ASEAN-styled approach, which is slow, steady, consensual and less legalistic.

As with the IOR initiative, we may already be in the process of experiencing the establishment of an Indian Ocean Regional Forum.

REFERENCES

M G Asher, V V Bhanoji Rao and R S Rajan, *Towards an Association for Indian Ocean Economic Co-operation (AIOEC): An Exploratory Paper*, unpublished discussion document, National University of Singapore, May 1994.

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Minute: Indian Ocean*, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia, 1995.

P J Botha, *The Indian Ocean Rim, Practicalities and Opportunities for South Africa*, unpublished paper, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, March 1994.

P J Botha, *The Indian Ocean Rim Within the Context of South Africa's Foreign Policy*, paper presented to the SAFTO Indian Ocean Rim Conference, Johannesburg, 29 May 1995.

D Braun, **The Indian Ocean: Regional of Conflict or "Zone of Peace"**, Part III and IV, C Hurst and Company, London, 1983.

B Buzan, *International Security in East Asia in the 21st century, Options for Japan*, **Working Paper Series**, East Asia Project, Johannesburg, 1995.

E Furukawa, *Regional Analysis: West Wants East Asia to March to a Different Beat*, **Business Times** (Singapore), 20 July 1994.

M J Hassan, paper presented at a colloquium on **New Directions for ASEAN: Regional Security Beyond ASEAN**, ASEAN-ISIS, 1994.

M Leifer, *Will the ARF work?*, **Business Times** (Singapore), July 1994.

M Pierre and O Gohin, *International Relations in the Indian Ocean*, in D Banerjee, *Indian Ocean, Zone of Peace: Need for a New Approach*, Publications de l'Université de la Réunion, Saint-Denis, 1994, pp. 201-218.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, General Assembly Official Records, Fiftieth Session Supplement No 29 (A/50/29), United Nations, New York, 1995.

G L Shelton, *The Yoshida Doctrine: A Foreign Policy Model for South Africa*, **Working Paper Series**, East Asian Project, Johannesburg, 1995.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MARINE EXCLUSIVE ZONES: BURDENS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Mafaniso Hara, Research Fellow, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of independence in March 1990, Sam Nujoma, president-elect of a soon to be independent Namibia, asked all foreign fishing vessels to leave Namibian waters (the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone). Those fishermen who did not heed the warning were arrested, prosecuted and, in some instances, their vessels were confiscated.¹ This ended the plundering of Namibian fish resources by foreign, mainly European, distant-water fleets that had been going on since the 1960s. It was said at the time that the expulsions and installation of a strict management regime had come just in time. Scientists pointed out that another two years would have resulted in the Hake fishery (the most valuable) being fished down to stock levels that would have been irretrievably beyond recovery. In taking such action, Namibia was doing no more than exercising its sovereign rights over resources in its declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the 1982 **United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)**.

In this article, some issues of marine EEZs are addressed, as defined under UNCLOS III, in the context of four Southern African coastal states, namely Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. The potential opportunities that can be derived by the individual countries for economic and social advancement from exploitation of resources in their EEZs are discussed, as well as the problems of asserting these rights in practice.

BACKGROUND

The 'freedom of the sea' has been a historic principle of customary international law from the time of Grotius's '*Mare liberum*' in 1608. Grotius proclaimed that "*the sea was limitless and could not become the possession of anyone but was, by nature, suitable to the use of all.*" This notion persisted until the signing of UNCLOS III in 1982. Under this Convention, which came into force in November 1994, coastal states can claim and establish jurisdiction in the form of 'sovereign rights' in the area 200 nautical miles (nm) out seaward from the baseline (the lowest line to which the water of the sea recedes during periods of ordinary spring tide) as an Exclusive Economic Zone. In this zone, the coastal state has 'sovereign rights' for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non living, of the water above to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.

MARITIME ZONES

Under international law, four categories of maritime zones can be distinguished: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and the EEZ/continental shelf.

Internal waters

Internal waters are those which are landward of the baseline. These include estuaries, river mouths, points and bays, where these have been closed off. Internal waters are assimilated into national territory and are subject to the control of the coastal state.

Territorial waters

Under UNCLOS I of 1958, it became accepted that coastal states could claim a territorial zone of 12 nm. In this zone the coastal state can exercise complete sovereignty just as on its land area. The laws of the state in question are fully applicable in this zone. The only exception to the rule is that foreign vessels have a right of 'innocent passage' through the territorial sea.

Contiguous zone

International law provides for coastal countries to declare an additional 12 kilometres immediately seaward of the 12 nm territorial zone to a total of 24 nm. This is the zone called the contiguous zone. While a coastal state cannot make laws in this zone, it can enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration and health laws in the zone. But the contiguous zone does not constitute part of the coastal state's territory.

Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf

Using the UNCLOS III Convention, coastal states can declare the area covering 200 nm from its baseline out seaward, as an EEZ. In this zone the coastal state exercises sovereign rights over all resources. It also has jurisdiction over the construction of offshore structures and scientific research, and has a right to protect and preserve the environment. Allied to the concept of the EEZ is the doctrine of the 'continental shelf', reaffirmed in UNCLOS I of 1958. The continental shelf is the shallow platform adjacent to the land mass to the 200 m isobath (depth line). The doctrine originated with the 1945 Truman declaration. Under this declaration, the United States proclaimed its continental shelf, which in the case of the eastern seaboard extended to as far as 250 nm, exclusive for its exploration and exploitation and subject to its jurisdiction and control. Apart from the depth line, the concept also includes the criterion of exploitability, leaving the extent of the legal continental shelf open-ended. The concept of the continental shelf grants coastal states sovereignty over natural resources in the shelf or as far out as they have the ability to exploit the resources. Because the physical shelf does not always coincide in size with


the 200 nm boundary, this doctrine has resulted in an overlap in the two regimes. What is important to note is that the UNCLOS III EEZ regime does not supersede the continental shelf doctrine, but merely complements it. In practice, countries choose to ratify the regime that would best serve their interests. For example, South Africa has not declared an EEZ (although it declared a 200 nm exclusive fishing zone). Instead, it has ratified the Geneva Convention on The Continental Shelf (see Map elsewhere). In this sense, South Africa's Territorial Waters Act deems the continental shelf to be part of the Republic and provides that, in so far as exploitation of natural resources is concerned, South African law will apply in this area. For example, mining legislation that applies to the part of the country immediately adjacent to the continental shelf, will also apply to the continental shelf. It deems the continental shelf to be unalienated state land for this purpose.²

CONCEPT OF EEZS

Larson³ points out that the primary impetus for the development of the concept of EEZs can be traced to President Truman's presidential proclamations (No 2667 and No 2668 of 1945). These asserted US jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the territorial seas for reasons of oil and gas explorations and exploitation (2667) and fisheries conservation (2668). Other countries followed these initiatives, and it led to the eventual codification of a 200 nm EEZ in the **Informal Composite Negotiating Text** (ICNT) of UNCLOS III. The actual UNCLOS III Convention of 1982 moved beyond mere codification, as was the case under the previous customary international law, and legislated new international law for seventy per cent of the earth's surface, the seabed and airspace in a single comprehensive convention. For fisheries economists at the time, establishment of EEZs was a very welcome development, as they felt that international fisheries were afflicted with a particularly virulent problem concerning common property, in which there were not just many fishermen, but also many states competing for the same resource.⁴ It was felt that enclosure of these global commons by individual coastal states would improve both the management and economic efficiency of fisheries exploitation.

INNOCENT PASSAGE

The historical maritime powers, such as the US, USSR and Britain, were determined during the negotiations of the Convention that freedom of navigation on the seas should be maintained. Larson⁵ points out that this insistence was partly for strategic and ideological reasons: the US and USSR had the biggest navies and therefore desired some flexibility of action in all the maritime zones apart from the high seas. Thus one of the obligations of the coastal state is that it should allow the 'innocent passage' of merchant ships, warships and submarines (if they navigate on the surface) through all these zones. Passage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.



The Waters Surrounding South Africa and Oceanographic Information Related to the South African Marine Resource₆

Furthermore, the coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not 'innocent'. The problem with all these requirements for innocent passage is that the determination of what is 'innocent', is left to the coastal state. Such determinations may therefore become subjective, arbitrary and discriminatory.

RESOURCES IN THE ZONES OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES

Fish is probably the most valuable resource currently being exploited from the seas by the Southern African coastal states. Estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN of potential production (see Table elsewhere) show that not all the countries of the region are fully exploiting their marine fish resources. Apart from fish resources, EEZs of all the coastal countries in Southern Africa contain other forms of resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals. In the 1980s, the Cabinda oil fields accounted for ninety per cent of exports, fifty per cent of state revenue, and thirty per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of Angola. In Namibia, a major area of potential expansion, apart from fisheries, is the off-shore Kudu gas fields. In Mozambique, off-shore gas has been found in Pande, Temane and Buzi in the south and centre of the country. In Pande, confirmed reserves have been put at 40 billion m³.⁷ South Africa has gas, oil and minerals in its continental shelf. Of the countries in the region, only South Africa and Namibia are currently involved in offshore diamond mining on any large scale.⁸ Namibia has probably the richer and larger deposits although both have significant amounts.

BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF EEZS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

On the economic front, the coastal state enclosure revolution of the 1970s and 1980s was viewed as being in line with the New International Economic Order that developing countries were demanding. More so in the sense that UNCLOS III put heavy emphasis on 'permanent sovereignty' over natural resources.⁹ The convention had given developing coastal states a powerful legal weapon with which to resist what they regarded as manifestations of neo-colonialism by developed countries through their

'distant-water' activities (such as fishing, navigation and scientific research off the coasts of other states). Under UNCLOS III such activities would now be subordinated to the coastal state's jurisdiction. In practical terms the new order on the seas presented developing countries with an opportunity to conserve fish stocks off their coasts which were increasingly threatened with over-exploitation through the activities of distant-water fishing fleets, mostly belonging to developed nations. Possibilities to explore and exploit other resources which could be found in the zones, had also suddenly become a reality.

TABLE: SOME FEATURES OF COASTAL STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA¹⁰

Feature	Angola	Mozambique	Namibia	South Africa
Coastline length (km)	1 650	2 500	1 500	2 880
Marine shelf area (km ²)	66 900	104 300	111 000	143 400
EEZ area (km ²)	605 700	562 000	504 000	1 050 000
Year declared EEZ	1975	1978	1991	1977
Fish production (m tons) - 1993	80 773	19 195	798 209	596 069
Potential fish production (m tons)	643 000	425 000	1 000 000	800 000
Other resources available or potentially available in EEZ	oil	gas (at Pande)	diamonds, gas at Kudu	diamonds, oil and gas

Despite the expected benefits from claiming jurisdiction over the various maritime zones up to a 200 nm EEZ, such jurisdiction usually places an extreme burden on the capabilities of developing nations to enforce it. Niekerk¹¹ points out that the maintenance of such an Exclusive Economic Zone – as defined in international law – through policing, law enforcement and conservation measures, can impose a financial burden that the claimants might consider not to be commensurate with the benefits to be derived. Niekerk further points out that, while few nations would ignore their rights, developing nations are unlikely to attach high priority to maritime policing, unless the resources endowed to them under the terms of UNCLOS III, are being plundered to the detriment of domestic income. Even then it would not be worthwhile to attempt to protect those resources from exploitation by foreigners if the cost of doing so exceeds the perceived benefits. Mills¹² points out that in a maritime sense, the importance of resources and their exploitation is linked to the safeguarding of the EEZ created under UNCLOS III. Problems in fisheries clearly manifest this point.

FISHERIES AND THE CONVENTION

The coming into force of UNCLOS III in November 1994 reaffirmed the benefits of the Convention, while at the same time raising the profile of the obligations of coastal states. While Article 56 of the Convention establishes the foundation of the rights of the coastal state, Articles 61 to 68 provide the framework for the management of fisheries in the zone. The rights of the coastal state are balanced with two obligations: conservation of the resource, including its habitat, and ensuring the optimal utilisation of the resource by allocating the surplus to national needs to third parties. At the same time, Article 73 gives the coastal state wide-ranging powers, stating that "*in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resource in the zone, the coastal state may take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this convention.*"

Although the Convention was careful not to give coastal nations sovereignty over these EEZs in order to guard against short term national interests or advantages as opposed to long term international interests

in resource conservation, the trend among coastal nations has been to assert jurisdiction and proprietary rights over the EEZ in their legislations.¹³ Such practice has implied that in these countries' view, the content of the concept of 'sovereign rights' includes full or absolute authority. Thus in the zone, coastal states usually exercise virtual sovereignty because they have primary jurisdiction over the resources to be found there, albeit oil, gas, minerals, or fish. This is done under the aegis of protecting and conserving their resources in their national economic interests. Furthermore, Article 62 of the Convention endows the coastal state with broad powers in imposing terms and conditions. It is up to the coastal state to determine the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and to determine its own capacity to harvest. There are no compulsory dispute settlement provisions in relation to the coastal state's powers and abilities to determine the TAC or its ability to harvest. Where the coastal state has 'created' a surplus, it is not obliged to provide access to it free of charge. Indeed, the normal practice of coastal states has been to sell fishing rights to foreign vessels. For example, Namibia charges quota fees that are graduated according to the size of share ownership between foreigners and Namibians, and based on whether the fish is landed fresh or frozen.¹⁴ The higher the Namibian share ownership in a vessel or company, the lower the quota fees (100 per cent of the quota levy if you are 100 per cent foreign, 50 per cent if the company or vessel is half Namibian owned, and only up to 25 per cent if the company is purely Namibian owned). Fresh fish quotas attract lower fees than frozen fish quotas, as this helps to create employment opportunities on land in the processing sector.

South Africa's draft **National Marine Fisheries Policy** expresses a commitment that research and management of marine resources shall be in accordance with the specifications of the **Convention on Law of the Sea** (A1.10.1), and also includes provisions for the allocation of access rights to foreign vessels (2.10):

- Unauthorised fishing by foreign vessels within South Africa's EEZ will be prohibited (2.10.1).
- No marine resources or part thereof will be made available for utilisation by any foreign interest (2.10.2).
- Notwithstanding the above, and in cases where inadequate local capacity exists, joint ventures with foreign companies, where the majority beneficial interest is SA, will be allowed providing that the fish are landed and processed (unless specific exemption is granted) in South Africa and that not less than 80% of employees are South African nationals (2.10.3).

Straddling and highly migratory fish stocks

Under the 1995 draft agreement on straddling and highly migratory fish stock, states will be legally bound to conserve and sustainably manage high seas fisheries.¹⁵ The agreement includes provisions to ensure compatible conservation and management measures between high seas areas and coastal zones under national jurisdiction. Other provisions of the agreement establish detailed international standards for conservation and management of fish stocks. It also includes effective measures for compliance to these provisions and their enforcement on the high seas.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES AND MARINE FISHERIES

Unlike other resources, such as oil and minerals, fish is a fugitive resource. Articles 63 (transboundary stocks) and 64 (highly migratory stocks) specify that, as long as fish are within the 200 nm zone, the coastal state has full authority over their capture and disposition. Once they leave the zone, either of their own volition or having been captured, the rights of the coastal state would come to an end. The Convention requires therefore, that an offender is caught in the act or with fish within the zone for the coastal state to take legal action. The 1995 agreement gives coastal states a legal flexibility to make

arrests on the high seas if someone commits an offence, whether it is inside the zone or on the high seas. Canada's unilateral action in arresting Spanish trawlers outside its 200 nm EEZ in 1994,¹⁶ might have set a precedent for future action by states under this Convention. The necessity for a coastal state's heavy and continued presence within the zone, both as a deterrent and also to effect arrests that could be sustained in a court of law, will not be diminished by this latest agreement. In general, the efficient maintenance of an EEZ entails a sound monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) system.

A SURVEY OF THE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the 1980s, Angola has had licensing and joint venture agreements of varying complexities with foreign fishing vessels from Russia, Cuba, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Nigeria operating in its waters.¹⁷ These foreign vessels take an estimated eighty per cent of the catch. Under some of the agreements, foreign vessels are supposed to land thirty per cent of their catch in Angola. But only a very small portion of this agreed percentage is actually landed, as Angola has been unable to regulate the activities of fishing vessels in its waters, especially during the years of civil conflict.

Namibia had similar problems prior to its independence. In the 1970s, the International Commission for the South Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF) attempted to regulate the exploitation of hake and other species off the Namibian coast. The Commission was only partially successful, mainly because of insufficient surveillance.¹⁸ Another part of the problem was that South Africa was ruling Namibia (then South-West Africa) against the UN mandate. Although South Africa attempted to restrict fishing off the Namibian coast by declaring a 200 nm exclusive fishing zone on 1 April 1981, it could not enforce its jurisdiction, because the nations whose vessels were operating in Namibian waters refused to recognise the South African backed administration in Windhoek. This poker game continued until Namibia's independence. It was only after independence on 10 July 1990, that Namibia was able to impose a 200 nm EEZ and assert its authority over exploitation of fish resources in its waters.

In Mozambique, internal conflict had hampered the country's ability to control the activities of fishing vessels in its waters. Enforcement of regulations and control over the activities of foreign vessels have mainly been through sea-going observers on board these vessels and land-based observers. This kind of monitoring system is usually not very effective, as the observers onboard these vessels can be bribed. Foreign vessels may also transfer their catch to sister vessels at sea to carry it back to their home country ports without first landing the catch in Mozambique. This system seemed to have been determined largely by what Mozambique could afford at the time in terms of financial, technical and human resources.

While South Africa has generally been successful in imposing its jurisdiction over its waters since it declared a 200 nm Exclusive Fishing Zone on 1 November 1977, there are still reports of infringements from time to time. Walker¹⁹ reported that fishing by foreign trawlers in South African waters, particularly Taiwanese and Korean vessels, was reaching crisis proportions and that fishermen were becoming disillusioned with the inability of the authorities to police South African territorial waters. In August 1992, Walker reported again about Taiwanese boats caught with gill nets onboard during a routine inspection while they were berthed in Cape Town harbour. The most recent case is that of a potential fishery for Patagonian tooth fish said to be found around Prince Edward and Marion Islands, eight days steaming away from Cape Town. Fishing companies have been pressuring fisheries administrators for licenses to start exploiting the fishery, arguing that foreign vessels are already illegally exploiting the resource, since South Africa has no air or sea patrols in the 200 nm fishing zone surrounding the island.²⁰ While these reports might, to an extent, be driven by commercial self-interest, they at least point to the fact that even South Africa is still not completely rid of problems concerning illegal exploitation of resources in its waters.

MONITORING, CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

Where fisheries are concerned, the whole area of an EEZ will not be productive. It is usually the continental shelf or small pockets of areas, where there is a high nutrient circulation, that will have high fish productivity. For example, of the 560 000 km² area of Namibia's EEZ, only 230 000 km² is the productive shelf. For Mozambique, only ten per cent (100 000 km²) of the total 1 000 000 km² of its EEZ is productive. Due to the ocean current systems, the west coast of South Africa is much more productive than the east coast. Thus, when setting up MCS systems, the individual countries have to mark out the geographical priority areas.

The main guiding principle in setting up an MCS system is that the cost of the system should be lower than the value of the resource.²¹ Fisheries administrators therefore have to be aware of this principle when selecting a regulatory measure or set of measures for a fishery.

Namibia

The case of Namibia is a good example of this principle. When the country had to set up a new MCS soon after independence in 1990, the cost and benefits had to be considered.²² The country has a large and valuable fishery resource, because the sea off Namibia has exceptional biological productivity due to the upwelling of nutrients resulting from the Benguela current. The state could therefore derive a sizeable amount of revenue from the fishery. This justified the establishment of a sound MCS system. In the financial year 1993/94, revenue from the fishery was in the order of N\$90 million. At the same time, expenditure for the fisheries administration was approximately N\$35 million, giving a comfortable margin.²³ A large amount of the expenditure is for surveillance activities (sea and air patrols). Hersoug and Paulsen caution that the rosy picture of Namibia's MCS system is partly due to the fact that grant and development aid money is not taken into consideration in the present equation and that the system is still in its development stage with more staff needed to make it fully functional. If all these factors are taken into consideration, the positive expenditure margin would be greatly reduced, pointing to the fact that MCS systems are expensive to establish and run.

Angola

The civil war has been the most destabilising factor in the economy of Angola. Fisheries development has been similarly affected by the years of conflict. The FAO²⁴ estimated the potential unrealised production from Angolan waters to be in the order of 650 000 tons. Of this, eighty per cent is pelagics, while shrimp resources are estimated at 15 000 tons. It has been cautioned that the pelagic resource might not be that valuable and its exploitation would require a sizeable investment in infrastructure. As the fisheries administrators try to get things in order so that the country can start to derive benefits from its fisheries resources, setting up an MCS system will be one of the priorities. Lessons learned from Namibia and a precautionary approach will be essential in this regard.

Mozambique

Fisheries is an important component of the economy of Mozambique. Crustacean catches mainly exported to Spain, Japan and South Africa, contribute 55 per cent (US \$70 million) to the country's export value. These are mainly caught by foreign industrial vessels. Very little data exist on the amount and value of the catches from the artisanal fishery, which is spread along the coast covering 2 500 km. The contribution of the artisanal sector to the economy is therefore not well appreciated. The fish potential of its known productive areas – Sofala and Boa-Paz banks, the small continental shelf and the narrow coastal zone – is estimated to be in the region of 200 000 tons. As the country tries to restructure its economy after twenty years of civil strife under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund and

the World Bank (since 1995), it has opted for a minimum fisheries administration strategy.²⁵ Under this strategy, Mozambique concentrates its MCS activities on the industrial and semi-industrial sectors which, in economic terms, are seen to be the most important. The artisanal fisheries have been left largely unattended.

South Africa

South Africa has an MCS system that combines sea and air patrols and onshore monitoring. It has been quite successful after South Africa's declaration of a 200 nm Exclusive Fishing Zone in 1977. It resulted, among others, in the recovery of the Hake fishery which had been decimated by foreign vessels in the 1960s and 1970s. Fuggie and Rabie²⁶ point out that the emotional and irrational public outcry against 'foreigners' pillaging the country's resources has no basis apart from the occasional incursions.

Successful MCS systems

One of the reasons for the success so far of the MCS systems in Namibia and South Africa, is that their fishing industries are mainly industrial, dominated by few fishing units, and operating mainly offshore. It has thus been relatively easy to control these activities. What is common in both countries is the conspicuous absence of an artisanal fishing sector. In the case of Namibia, there has been no communities that historically lived along the sea coast. Namibians do not seem to be seafarers. In South Africa, local coastal communities were systematically kept out of the industry through apartheid policies. While the situation is not expected to change in Namibia, the increasing pressure on the South African Government to award greater interest in the fishery to formerly deprived coastal communities under the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), will result in the creation of a small scale fishing sector. Depending on its form and the way in which the sector comes into being, its emergence might result in increasing the workload and the cost of the MCS system. Hersoug²⁷ warns that, if the resistance to re-distribution from big fishing companies and their organised labour is allowed to prevail, 'illegal' fishing will flourish. In other words, if the unorganised fishermen and the coastal communities in general feel that nothing has been done to redress the former injustices regarding the contentious issues of access rights and re-distribution, they will consider the whole process of developing a new fisheries policy to be illegitimate. The dashing of the high expectations they had for change and redress will result in increased 'poaching'. This would drastically increase the cost of MCS activities.

Angola and Mozambique have artisanal sectors. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, the increasing calls from formerly disadvantaged racial groups in coastal regions for broader participation in the fishery is likely to result in a flourishing artisanal sector in South Africa. Because of the main characteristics of artisanal fisheries (among others, multiple units which are geographically spread out), they are usually very difficult to regulate by direct administration from fisheries authorities. These difficulties are multiplied if the fisheries administration loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the fishermen. As a result, community-based approaches are advocated as offering more hope. This is increasingly becoming a common phenomenon around the world. Thus in Angola, Mozambique and also in South Africa in the future, two approaches are likely to be appropriate in regulating marine fisheries: community-based approaches for the inshore artisanal fishery, and MCS systems based on sea and air patrols for the offshore industrial fishery.

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

In the 1950s and 1960s, attempts were made at international management of fisheries through the establishment of international commissions. In Southern Africa, such a commission was the International Commission for the South East Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF). Its area of jurisdiction was the sea off South Africa, Namibia and Angola. But the work of such organisations was generally deemed to be

unsatisfactory by most coastal states, because they failed to regulate the activities of distant-water fleets. For example, management responsibility for the resources and the regulation of fisheries in Namibia, until independence, was divided between the South African administration for inshore fisheries and ICSEAF for offshore fisheries. Since the functioning of the ICSEAF regime was based on voluntary co-operation, the reality of the situation was that fishing was unregulated for distant-water fleets.²⁸ The result was that by the time of Namibia's independence in 1990, the resources were effectively fished down. Comparable stock depletions under the management regimes of similar international commissions for other regions had also occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. It is said²⁹ that this was one of the major factors that precipitated coastal states to extend their fisheries jurisdictions to 200 nm years before the 1982 UNCLOS III Convention. With Namibia finally declaring sovereignty over resources in its 200 nm zone (Angola and South Africa had declared theirs in 1975 and 1977, respectively), the work of ICSEAF became redundant.

Article 197 of UNCLOS III stipulates that there shall be co-operation, global or regional, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account the characteristics and regional features. In the context of Southern Africa, such co-operation is envisaged in two areas: research and MCS activities.

Research and scientific collaboration

On the west coast, South Africa and Namibia have similar kinds of fish stock, due to the influence of the Benguela current, while on the east coast, the stocks in Mozambican and South African waters tend to be similar, due to the influence of the Agulhas current. Namibia and Angola will also have similar stock in the waters along their boundaries. In the maritime boundaries (the 'grey areas') of neighbouring states, stocks will usually be common to the neighbours, as fish do not know or respect political borders. A typical example, with enormous economic implications, was the 1994 Pilchard stock migration from Namibian waters north into Angolan waters. This followed adverse environmental conditions in Namibia's waters (low oxygen, upwellings of sulphur from the seabed and unusually warm water), that led to huge shoals of Pilchard migrating north. Namibia had to reduce the Pilchard Total Allowable Catch (TAC) from 125 000 tons to 35 000 tons for 1995.³⁰

Logic would thus call for joint research programmes and management strategies, information exchanges, and general scientific collaboration. In cases such as the Pilchard migration, agreements on joint exploitation could be appropriate.

MCS activities

Another area of possible collaboration is in the area of MCS activities. This might be in pooling information, or might extend further to the policing of the EEZs. Namibia and South Africa have an agreement, concluded on 22 March 1991, for mutual assistance in enforcement activities against violators of the fishing laws of either country.³¹ The thrust of the agreement is that the government of one country could be called upon to assist in apprehending or escorting offending vessels in the fishing waters of the other, or in its own fishing waters for that matter. The agreement further states that neither government will render any assistance whatsoever to any vessels that are or have been involved in catching fish illegally in the waters of either state, and that each government, upon notification through the normal diplomatic channels, will grant to the other the right to pursue and apprehend these vessels if and when they escape into its fishing waters. The agreement arose from the need for co-operation following the arrest of three Spanish vessels allegedly found illegally fishing in Namibian waters in March 1991. South Africa helped in effecting the arrest of the offenders. Clearly, there is scope for collaboration between other neighbouring countries: Angola /Namibia and South Africa/Mozambique could sign similar agreements. Such bilateral agreements seem more plausible at this juncture, than a regional MCS system,

as has been suggested by an official of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the signing of the agreement with Namibia.

Regional MCS system

The decision to establish regional MCS systems beyond a country's national system would depend on several factors. Flewwelling³² suggests that these factors could include:

- the political will of the states involved;
- common interests which mean that the individual countries would benefit from such a liaison;
- common language and cultural ties;
- differences in economic situations of the different countries; and
- cost-sharing arrangements.

Based on these factors, each country has to balance its own advantages and disadvantages prior to making a commitment to regional co-operation. Each country will have to be aware that such international co-operation will not abrogate it from its responsibility to establish appropriate internal structures to address its own fisheries MCS needs. In the context of Southern Africa, one can envisage problems stemming from differences in economic status, differences in the value countries attach to fisheries, unequal interests and different priorities of the individual states in a possible proposal to establish a regional MCS system. Angola and Mozambique are just emerging from years of bitter and economically destructive civil wars. Their priorities are to get their houses in order. This might hamper their ability and willingness to participate in such larger schemes.

The 200 nm Convention brought tremendous optimism in many countries that acquired large fishing zones. Along with the potential for enhanced economic benefits, the Convention also brought with it responsibilities for coastal states in the utilisation of resources in the EEZs. Experience in many developed countries shows that the optimism has been misplaced, as fisheries management systems have not utilised the opportunities created by the new 200 nm regimes. As tension subsides and attention turns to issues of economic development, the coastal states of Southern Africa would do well to take the lessons learned by other countries and regional groupings in this regard, seriously.

ENDNOTES

1. **Fishing News International**, May 1991.
2. R F Fuggie and M A Rabie, **Environmental Management in South Africa**, Juta, Cape Town, 1992.
3. D L Larson, Security, *Disarmament and the Law of the Sea*, **Marine Policy**, 3(1), Butterworth, Oxford, 1979.
4. D McRae and G Munro, *Coastal State 'Rights' within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone*, in P A Neher, R Arnason and N Mollett (eds), **Rights Based Fishing**, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989.
5. Larson, *op. cit.*

6. **SA Commercial Marine Magazine**, August 1996.
7. African Development Bank, **Economic Integration in Southern Africa**, 3, Biddles, Oxford, 1993.
8. G Mills, *Insecurity and the Developing World: The Maritime Dimension*, in G Mills (ed.), **Marine Policy for Developing Nations**, SAIIA, Braamfontein, 1995.
9. C Ogley, *The Law of the Sea Draft Convention and the New International Economic Order*, **Marine Policy**, 5(3), Butterworth, Oxford, 1981.
10. Note that Mozambique and South Africa declared 200 nm exclusive fishing zone rather than an EEZ; to cover the other resources offshore they use the **Geneva Convention on The Continental Shelf**. Estimates of potential production are from J P van den Bossche and G M Bernacsek, **Source Book for Inland Fishery Resources of Africa**, 1, Rome, FAO, 1990.
11. H Niekerk, *The Implications of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 1982*, in Mills *op. cit.*
12. Mills, *op. cit.*
13. McRae and Munro, *op. cit.*
14. T Minney, *Fishing for Namibia*, **Namibia Foundation: Namibia Brief**, 18, 1994.
15. M Gill, *UN Straddling Fish Stocks as in Agreement*, **World Fishing**, September 1995.
16. FNI, *Legal Arrest on the High Seas*, **Fishing News International**, 33(6), June 1994.
17. W A Wilkinson, *Country Profile: Angola*, **World Fishing**, 38(13), February 1989.
18. M Stuttaford, *Recovering from the Near Collapse of a Rich Resource*, **Namibia Foundation: Namibia Brief**, 18, 1994.
19. T Walker, **SA Commercial Marine**, 2(3), 1990.
20. T Walker, **SA Commercial Marine**, 5(2), 1996.
21. B Hersoug and O Paulsen, **Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Fisheries Management**, University of Namibia, Windhoek, 1996; P Flewwelling, *An Introduction to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Systems for Capture Fisheries*, **FAO Technical Paper**, 338, FAO, Rome, 1994.
22. Hersoug and Paulsen, *op. cit.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Van den Bossche and Bernacsek, *op. cit.*
25. Hersoug and Paulsen, *op. cit.*
26. Fuggie and Rabie, *op. cit.*

27. B Hersoug, *Fishing in a Sea of Sharks – Affirmative Action in the South African Fishing Industry*, unpublished manuscript, Centre For Southern African Studies, Cape Town, 1996.
28. Hersoug and Paulsen, *op. cit.*
29. G Munro and G Pontecorvo, *The Taking of Living Things: Expectations and Reality*, in **The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea**, Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1984.
30. **Fishing News International**, *op. cit.*
31. T Walker, *Halt Illegal Fishing in 'Grey' Areas – Call*, **SA Commercial Marine**, 2(2), June-August 1993.
32. Flewwelling, *op. cit.*