

MULTI-FUNCTIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

Evolution and Challenges

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Monograph No 8
January 1997

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This publication is sponsored by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

PREFACE

On 10 September 1996, the South African National Defence Force, in conjunction with the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, undertook a two week long peacekeeping training exercise in Pretoria, entitled 'Morning Star'. This monograph must be seen as a continuation of discussions which occurred as a consequence of exercise 'Morning Star'.

Part I of this monograph relates to a highly complex concept, one dealt with repeatedly by speakers and the public during the above-mentioned exercise: that of the differences between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement operations undertaken by the UN in the past. As a result of this debate, a need has emerged to reach clarity on the evolution of the various peacekeeping concepts, as accepted by the international community, as well as on the different tasks that peacekeepers undertake in the field. This part attempts to assist in the understanding of how prevalent concepts and doctrines related to multifunctional peace support operations have evolved into their present form.

Part II, a revised version of the paper presented by the authors at the peacekeeping training exercise, refers to the challenges and difficulties experienced today in the implementation of multifunctional peace support operations. As Part I deals with the context in which the multifunctional peace support operation debate occurs, so Part II deals with the challenges and difficulties that emerge in the deployment of contemporary multifunctional peace support operations.

This monograph is the first in a series and forms part of an intellectual contribution that the ISS is making to the discussion of regional peacekeeping in Africa. It will be followed by a book which will specify the challenges to multifunctional peace operations, the training required for undertaking such operations, and a possible African peacekeeping structure for the immediate future. Discussions on regional peacekeeping, nevertheless, require an understanding of the evolution of international concepts, and of the difficulties associated with multifunctional peace support operations today. This is the purpose of the present monograph.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CMF Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 1978-1979

MFO Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai

MPSO Multifunctional Peace Support Operations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America, from 1989 to 1992

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique, from 1992 to 1994

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, from 1991 to 1994

UN United Nations

UNITAF Unified Task Force in Somalia, from 1992 to 1993 (US led)

UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti, from 1993 to present

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force, from 1992 to 1995

UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, from 1993 to present

UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I, from 1992 to 1993

UNOSOM II United Nations Operations in Somalia II, from 1993 to 1994

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, from 1992 to 1993

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, from 1989 to 1990

UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, from 1989 to 1991

UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, from 1991 to 1995

UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, from 1995 to present

WEU Western European Union

I THE EVOLUTION OF MULTIFUNCTIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: PERCEPTIONS, MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND REALITIES

INTRODUCTION

In world transition from a past order to a future one, attention is riveted on the containment of potentially explosive intra-state conflicts. Thus, efforts of military collaboration in pursuance of peace and stability have come to the forefront of discussion. These efforts are basically seen in the contexts of (1) a novel use of force within, (2) a restructured UN. Unfortunately, both of these issues have yet to be realised.

And yet, military collaboration efforts are not only tied to the context of novel use of force within the UN, but also to the debate related to the type of tasks in which these peace forces should be

employed. The terms most frequently used in the ongoing debate are: peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and enforcement. A further lexicon of words includes: allied, collaborative, regional, collective, or multinational use of force under the UN, or its auspices. Paradoxically, the wide range of word usage that prevails does not prove the enrichment of the discussion, rather it demonstrates the confusion in both the theory and the practice of peace support operations in the 1990s. To add to this, many of these confusing concepts are often coupled with that of the usefulness, or not, of collective military intervention in the internal affairs of other states for humanitarian reasons. But what are we really talking about? Do all of these issues refer to the same process? In an attempt to reach clarity on these confusing elements, the approach to be taken is one of the deconstruction of superficial parameters so that needs, influences, interests, and contexts can be separated from the amalgam that today goes by the name of a Multifunctional Peace Support Operation (MPSO).

New wordings, seemingly creating new roles during peace support operations, started to appear between 1987 and 1991. But, as we shall see below, there were, in fact, no new additions to the classical list of *ad hoc* tasks that peace support operations had executed in the past. Yet, although the UN has not shown a marked change in its tasking of a peace support operation since 1990, these have differed from those in the past in three respects: size and complexity; objectives to be pursued; and preconditions for UN troop deployment. They have also deviated from the norm according to the type of troop contributor and the civilian-military mix of the mission.

All of these elements conform to what has come to be known as 'MPSOs' under international or regional organisational umbrellas. But, in order to understand the realities of the present situation and to assess its perils and its benefits, one must compare and contrast past traditional peacekeeping operations with present ones. In this way, realities can be disassociated from myth and, in so doing, the leverage points for discussion can be found and analysed.

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND THE 'NEW' TASKS OF MULTI-FUNCTIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS, TASKS AND MODALITIES

To distinguish between peace operations now and in the past, several factors must be addressed. These alone can explain the changes in the way operations are run and perceived today. The factors are:

- the linking of old UN peacekeeping practices to new needs;
- the building of a role for multinational forces in the control of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War world; and
- the tasking of Cold War powers in this new control role, and the accrued experience of the UN peacekeeping component and other multinational military operations since 1990 in dealing with intra-state and not international conflict.

Linking old UN peacekeeping practices to new international peace and security needs

The UN traditional peacekeeping missions have always been ill-defined, if for no other reason than that the UN peacekeeping operations are not mentioned in the **Charter** of the United Nations. The concept of peacekeeping has been an evolving one, based on *ad hoc* practice. Therefore, these types of operations are seen as belonging somewhere between the peaceful

means for resolving international conflict, as mentioned in Chapter VI of the **UN Charter**, and multinational military operations, possibly according to Chapter VII of the **UN Charter**. In reality, the only articles that can be used for the employment of military force under UN auspices are Article 40 and Article 42 – both of which can be read under Article 39 of the **UN Charter**. All of these fall under Chapter VII of the **Charter**.¹ Chapter VI refers only to peaceful settlement of disputes; it contains no mention of, or proviso for, the employment of a military force or any component of such a force.

Through the practice of subsequent *ad hoc* peacekeeping missions, some guidelines, explicit and implicit, for the conduct of traditional peacekeeping operations have emerged. There is no consensus, however, as to their number or their fundamental qualities. Thus, Wallenstein emphasises that there are six 'rules' for traditional peacekeeping, these being:

- a political agreement must exist between the warring parties, on pertinent aspects of the operation;
- the peacekeeping operation is neutral to the situation (i.e., the status quo does not change on arrival of the peacekeepers);
- the parties involved are basically states and governments, normally members of the UN, and the sovereignty of the state is always respected;
- the rules for the engagement of peacekeeping troops include the use of force for, and only in, self-defence.
- the troops are to be recruited from countries other than superpowers; and
- the operations are of a temporary duration, in place only to allow time for diplomatic efforts to provide for permanent solutions to the conflict.²

In a different definition, Cox ascertains that peacekeeping rests on a triad: the consent of the parties, the impartiality of the UN and of the peacekeeping force; and the use of force only in self-defence.³ By and large, consent, impartiality, and self-defence have become the standard principles according to which peacekeeping missions are defined. These sets of rules, nevertheless, were never designed as rigid norms, but rather as indicators of the international environment. The reality is that since peacekeeping practices first developed in the 1950s, they have done so only as an item of necessity, due to superpower confrontation that blocked the decision-making mechanisms for enforcement of international peace and security at Security Council level. Because peacekeeping practices came to the fore as an *ad hoc*, interim solution to a conflict situation, none of the categories applied to its limits for action are rigid.

For this reason, and taking into account the record of peacekeeping practices since the 1950s, distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcing tasks in peace support operations are not clear. The complexities of the UN peace support operation in the Congo are well known, as is the expansion of the definition of self-defence to permit UN military operations to ensure that the mission objectives are fulfilled. In practice, therefore, the limited use of force and involvement in the internal affairs of host states have been part and parcel of UN peacekeeping practices since the 1950s.

If the purpose of the UN traditional peacekeeping missions has been understood as that of interpositioning, with the consent of the belligerent parties, between two hostile forces after a

truce or cease-fire has been agreed to, to discourage a resumption of hostilities and thus allow the belligerents to continue negotiations at diplomatic level, leading ultimately to lasting peace, the actual operations have usually gone beyond this role.

From 1956 (the Suez crisis) to the watershed year of 1990 (UNTAG, ONUCA and ONUSAL) each individual peacekeeping mission has had its own peculiar character. The mandates of operations such as those of Suez, the Congo, Cyprus, Southern Lebanon, Namibia and Central America have all varied in needs, objectives, and interpretation of mandates.

If in an attempt to see whether a peacekeeping mission could be considered traditional, one applied Wallenstein's six rules, namely: political agreement of warring parties, neutrality of peacekeepers, state- and government-centred operations, self-defence, peacekeepers coming from countries outside the power equation of the Cold War, and the temporary duration of a peace operation, one would be hard put to it to find all six elements present in each one of the cases where peacekeeping had been mandated since 1956.

Interpretations have differed, for example, those relating to self-defence. Sometimes these have included the right to defend positions that peacekeepers had occupied previously (Congo); sometimes, restoration of law and order (Cyprus). The same is true regarding the neutrality of peacekeepers and the maintenance of the *status quo* at the time of peacekeepers' moving into an area. Here again, the interpretations vary and we have cases where central governments and states have attempted to use peacekeeping forces as a force to assist them to overcome domestic opposition (the Congo and Southern Lebanon).⁵ The temporary duration of peacekeeping operations has also varied, Cyprus lasting for twenty years.

Ultimately, the only two constant rules in peacekeeping operations between 1956 and 1990 have been a reflection of the international environment prevailing at the time. The first is the neutrality of the peacekeepers (who, up to 1990 belonged to countries other than the superpowers); the second, the state-centred authority which ruled the agenda of the mission (again, until 1990 peacekeeping operations were mandated for the resolution of international, and not intra-state, conflict). And yet it is in these two constant and fundamental rules for the definition of a peacekeeping operation that the greatest changes have occurred since 1990, as will be explained below.

The build-up of an innovative role for multinational forces

Many countries – for different motives – are now seeking new missions for their own armed forces so that these can effectively contribute to their restructuring and demobilising processes.

The need to restructure, demobilise, and reduce military budgets is a global trend originating from different motives in different regions of the world. Thus, industrialised and developed nations who had invested in a diverse over-insurance military capability in tune with their Cold War commitments and considerations, found themselves under the same pressure to demobilise and downsize as that registered at the end of hot military conflicts. On the other hand, underdeveloped nations in different regions found themselves under pressure to ensure that democratic processes prevailed over the unbridled power of national military forces. This trend is in tune with universal pressure to secure democracy, the protection of the individual, and the reassignment of scarce resources to serve direct developmental purposes in the South.

At the same time as this global search for new roles for a restructured military, national entities world-wide are attempting to concentrate on non-aggressive/non-threatening missions for their

military. In the context of increased military actions led by the UN for the control and appeasement of intra-state conflict since 1989, most of the national restructuring processes in both North and South are attempting to hold discussions concerning military action under UN agreement or authority. The discussion of UN military operations is thus seen as part of the national internal processes in discussing military restructuring. This also happens in the reverse mode, where the discussions at the UN are impinging on discussions at home.

One of the biggest problems of doing this, however, is that – from sheer need – the discussions relating to the links between UN multinational military operations and new roles for the military at home have been connected to the only military component in the UN experience: the tasking of peacekeeping forces. But building new roles for the military on the basis of traditional peacekeeping operations at UN level has considerably confused and constrained the potential for multinational peace operations in a changing world. It has also tainted, regrettably, the reputation and the understanding of traditional peacekeeping initiatives.

Intra-state conflict: the tasking of Cold War powers for international control roles and the accrued experience of the UN peacekeeping component and other multinational military operations since 1990

One of the major reasons that UN peacekeeping operations are seen today as such a novelty is that many of the critical situations identified for peacekeeping missions since 1990 have changed. Peace support operations in the last six years have been mandated as a means for resolving intra- and not inter-state conflict. Moreover, in mandating these operations, a formal truce or cease-fire has not always been a *sine qua non* precondition for deployment of troops.

Aside from these two fundamental differences, others that are impinging on the evolution of the concept relate to the emergence of the old superpowers and of the permanent members of the Security Council as major providers of peacekeeping operations. Finally, the last six years have also shown an expansion of the concepts related to the tasks involved in UN peace support operations. Thus, three new phrases – aside from that of peacekeeping – have become prevalent in the peace process: 'peacemaking', 'peacebuilding', and 'peace enforcement'.

Although these terms have become embedded in UN documents such as **An Agenda for Peace** and the **Supplement to An Agenda for Peace**, they have served to create more confusion than clarity in the discussion of the new roles for UN peace forces. Each additional verbalisation has generated the impression that the UN is talking of new tasks for new forces. In reality, this is not the case: these are merely further clarification of what *ad hoc* traditional peacekeeping operations have always been about. The UN would have done better simply to indicate that – after thirty years of peace support operations which have never even figured in the **Charter** – they were now in a position to quantify, qualify and institutionalise these under the title of 'UN Multi-functional Peace Support Operations'. Which is, in fact, what all peace operations have been, from the time of their inception: a chameleon of possibilities restrained only by the political context of troop contributors and by regional imperatives. Thus, every mission that has – up to now – passed for a peacekeeping operation, has, in reality, been a mix of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement tasks. The real challenge is to know how to apply each task pertaining to each operational and tactical level, at just the right moment of a peace support operation.

To prove this point about MPSOs, let us consider each new term individually. The word 'peacemaking' was first used during the Namibia and Central American operations of 1987-1990. It was quickly superseded by the concept of 'peacebuilding', which is broader and

favoured for explaining the expanded role of a peacekeeping operation which has been mandated to include elements over and above those of the maintenance of peace between warring parties that have agreed to a truce.⁶

But, peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks have been present in various missions since 1956. The same is true of peace support operations in situations of intra-state conflict. Missions which included this aspect arose as a necessity in order that original objectives might be reached. They dealt with issues such as preventing renewal of internal armed conflict (Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia), strengthening the infrastructure of a country (Congo and Cambodia), improving local security (Southern Lebanon and El Salvador), and facilitating an electoral process⁷ (Namibia and Mozambique).

The reality is that the UN could, simply by its presence, alter the conditions in which authorities met their responsibilities. Thus it was only one step further for UN peace support operations to engage in a more active participation to secure conditions that would permit stability.⁸ Another element that underscored the need for a more active role for peacekeeping missions was that of securing the safety of UN officials and relief workers. Thus UN officials, more often than not, had to attempt to secure contact with, and acquiescence of, armed groups that did not necessarily involve a central command or government force⁹ (i.e., El Salvador, Angola, Liberia, Somalia). Peacekeeping is inextricably tied to peacemaking, a fact acknowledged in **An Agenda for Peace**: *"Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all the activities dealt with in the present report, so there may not be a dividing line between peace-making and peacekeeping. Peace-making is often a prelude to peacekeeping, just as the deployment of UN presence in the field may expand possibilities for the prevention of a conflict, facilitate the work of peace-making and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace building."*

Thus, the concept of a peacemaking task in UN peace support operations, in situations that were largely a reflection of intra-state conflict, has always been present, finally being recognised as a concept where the peacekeeping mission could actively engage in creating the atmosphere in which its objectives could be accomplished.

The UN Central American peace support operations and the Namibia operation were the watershed: there the old style of *ad hoc* traditional peacekeeping operations (with their multitude of tasks) started to redefine and recognise the independent value of each aggregate task. Thus, although peacekeeping tasks were needed, unless simultaneous peacemaking tasks were included in the mission, the peacekeeping tasks would be hampered. Similarly, if there were no peacebuilding tasks, the maintenance of peace would be imperilled, since peacebuilding strengthens the durability of a stable peace by actually engaging in the reduction of those social tensions that might have given rise to the conflict in the first place. And, if cease-fires, agreements or truces were broken at the tactical level during the development of the mission, then peace enforcement units would have to restore order so that the peacekeeping tasks could continue.

Although ONUCA (Nicaragua, 1987) was the first mission where all the tasks of a traditional peacekeeping mission finally came into their own, it was not until UNTAG (Namibia, 1989) and ONUSAL (El Salvador, 1991) that the missions received official broadly defined mandates, including all the tasks that a 'peacekeeping mission' normally undertook. For example, there was a mandate in ONUSAL for the supervision of the implementation of peace accords (traditional peacekeeping task), but the mission often acted as a mediator or enforcer of differences¹⁰ (peacemaking task). In addition, ONUSAL (like later UNTAC in Cambodia) was mandated to monitor human rights, assist in the structural overhaul of the government apparatus, disarm,

dismantle public security forces, establish a new national civil police, help create and administer a land reform programme, investigate past human rights abuses and supervise elections¹¹ (peacebuilding and peace enforcement tasks).

Yet, all of these differences have been largely obscured by the periodic use of non UN multinational forces in specific situations, concurrently with UN peace operations. Since 1991 this has been the situation in the Gulf War (the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991), the initial WEU operation in the former Yugoslavia (prior to UNPROFOR) and the successive NATO operation IFOR, and the running of UNITAF in between UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in Somalia.

The fact that certain member states of the international community as well as some regional military organisations decided to apply force for the solution of humanitarian crises in different regions, precisely at the same time as the UN was involved in different phases of conflict resolution in the same crises, did much to confuse the issue on the differences between three quite distinct concepts: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcing.

Regardless of the justification for the use of unilateral or multilateral force, enforcement action has permanently damaged two facets of peacekeeping and the terms denoting them which were, in the past, part of the UN lexicon: peace-enforcing and enforcement. The confusion has been fed by two distinct inputs into the debate: first, the entrance of the major global military powers into the multinational peace operations arena as from the end of the Cold War; and secondly, the confusion between the usage of the word 'enforcement' in the **UN Charter** and the emergence of the term 'peace enforcement' in **An Agenda for Peace** in 1992.

The input of the powers in the discussion of enforcement and peace enforcement during multinational and UN peace support operations has had a decided impact on the way the UN looks at traditional 'peacekeeping operations'. Since peacekeepers traditionally had to act on an *ad hoc* basis, the existence of a military doctrine for peace operations was largely non-existent, consisting of a set of rules and patterns of behaviour that some countries' military volunteers could adhere to if called upon to serve in these types of UN missions. With the ending of the Cold War and the revaluation of the Security Council as an instrument for the effective resolution of regional and intra-state conflict, the military organisations of developed countries rushed to adapt their military doctrines and force structures to meet the 'conflict of the future' in co-operation with other countries.

In reality, the opposite took place. Due first to the political inability of major powers to conform to UN standards and practices as seen in the past and, secondly, to a sincere wish to ensure platforms for the prevention of humanitarian crises, pressure was exerted to create a doctrine that would give teeth to UN peace operation structures. Unfortunately, the different powers submitted different doctrines to that effect, each seeking to advance its own national contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace abroad. In a very manifest way, the rivalries of the Cold War on the political and military front gave way to a competition between potential allies for the best usage and control of a multinational force.

Here, the topics around which the silent battle is still being waged, concern the notions of unity of command, doctrine, force structure, rules of engagement, exit strategies, and the notion that forces can be deployed without the consent of the parties at intra-state conflict level and for largely humanitarian reasons. The powers, albeit offering their intellectual support to the reform of the capabilities of UN peace operations, also contributed some negative aspects to the discussion. Thus the size and budget of UN peace support operations increased, the Security Council was more ready to mandate elephantine operations in situations where the conflict

resolution mechanisms were still not in place, and the budgetary requirements for peace operations at the UN level increased so as to give more leverage power to those contributing countries who had the resources. Since this process of pressure and influence in the UN was concurrent with large force restructuring and military downsizing in all developed nations in the 1990s, the confusion prevailing in the usage of terms and strategies spilled over into national doctrines as well.

MULTI-TASKING AND THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING, PEACE-ENFORCING, AND ENFORCEMENT

The elements of confusion in the discussion of peace enforcement at the UN level stem from a problem in distinguishing the difference between peace-enforcement tasks during normal peace support operations, on the one hand; and outright military intervention (enforcement), on the other.

Strangely enough, the oft-quoted difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcing is not the real problem for the UN. First, because peacekeeping operations were not included in the original **UN Charter**, while both peace enforcement and enforcement were. It was the impossibility of using collective force during the Cold War which generated a different, more neutral type of operation. This, eventually, came to be called 'peacekeeping'.

Where the collective use of force today is concerned, international actors are seen to be preoccupied with the search for the original justification for the use of force as indicated in the **Charter**; with the Cold War employment of force (in limited military interventions carried out by powers outside the framework of the UN); and with national pressures for military restructuring in the post-Cold War era. In the latter, particularly, the problem is compounded by the unlimited theoretical possibilities related to the use of military force; possibilities that differ only in degree. Thus, at the upper end is war: an extensive and general resort to systematic violence. At the lower end is intimidation: the threat to use force to induce compliance so that a war need not be fought. Verbal threats, displays of military power, exemplary resort to violence – all are instruments of intimidation. Just the other side of intimidation lies a limited coercive campaign: a recurring but time-restricted, tightly-controlled use of focused violence to compel compliance from an especially resistant party. The relevance of the above categories and their variants becomes obvious when seen against the backdrop of UN member states' postulated options to implement UN resolutions.

In 1946, the primary element in the concept of collective security expressed in the **UN Charter** was based on the fact that military force would, if necessary, be used to maintain peace and international security.¹² The types of threat to international security and the intended reactions, on the one hand, and the implementation of these reactions, on the other, were specifically mentioned in Articles 40, 42 and 43 of the **UN Charter**.

Since its creation, the UN has afforded the Security Council the authority to:

- maintain or restore international peace and security; and
- enforce the will of the Council on a state that has broken the peace.

The **UN Charter**, under Articles VI and VII, clearly provides a sliding rule of action in the case of international disputes: first it focuses on peaceful means of dispute settlement, then on sanctions and, finally, on military action.¹⁴ In essence, the ability of the Security Council to use

collective force was marred by two problems:

- the divisions in the Security Council – an effect of the Cold War; and
- the inability to reach agreements on the military implementation of Article 43 as witnessed by the failed attempts to give teeth to the **UN Charter**, on the part of the Military Staff Committee in 1947, the Collective Measures Committee in the 1950s, and the Committee of 33 in the 1960s¹⁵.

These problems are still on the table now, particularly the second.

At this point we turn to the types of military action possible within the UN. There are only two types, better differentiated if referred to as Article 40-type action and Article 42-type action.

Article 40-type action

Article 40-type action refers to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, because it is used:

- to stabilise a post-conflict situation (i.e., a traditional international peacekeeping operation);
- to stabilise a pre-conflict situation (i.e., a deterrent peace support operation, such as the one in Macedonia);¹⁶ and
- to assist in the final settlement of ongoing internal or international conflict, if the warring parties, at the strategic level, sign an agreement to that effect.

Under the older mandate of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, the Security Council puts together a unified force which has different tasks according to each situation. These tasks vary – as mentioned above – from peacemaking and peacekeeping through peacebuilding to peace enforcement. But this principle, which was never fleshed out in an institutionalised manner within the UN structure, is now complicated by the change in the nature of the conflict for which MPSOs are mandated.

From the late 1980s and early 1990s, conflicts have become increasingly intra-state in nature. Therefore, it has become clear that in order to maintain or restore peace, the UN needs the potential to take action across the full spectrum of possibilities, as demonstrated in the *ad hoc* peace support operations of the past: namely, action that will restore, maintain, and keep peace and security within countries rather than defeat a single aggressor. This shift has emerged for a variety of reasons, most notably because, as cease-fires were reached, sometimes repeatedly, they were broken by the parties at operational and tactical levels. This happened in Croatia and in Bosnia Herzegovina, as well as in Somalia. The need to identify more fully what the peace enforcing tasks of peace operations were, became manifest. Unfortunately, these tasks also became confused with the simultaneous trend to employ multinational forces, authorised by the Security Council, in enforcement actions to defeat an enemy, as seen in the Gulf War of 1991. Thus the enforcement and peace-enforcement needs of a MPSO became confused, an issue reflected in the doctrines referred to by military personnel in these situations.

For example, the British, Nordic, and American approaches define peace enforcement in terms of military compellence. In the Nordic formulation, there is no difference between the use of

military force to compel behaviour and war. While the British doctrine on this question is still being formulated, the Americans make a clear distinction between peace enforcement and war. The dividing line for the Americans is that peace enforcement, as a sub-category of 'operations other than war', does not involve the defeat of an enemy force. In peace enforcement, offensive use of force may be employed, but it must be restrained and directed towards causing the warring factions to make peace. The French concept of the restoration of peace is thus closer to the American notion of peace enforcement, since there is no politically identified enemy. Yet, the French notion of peace enforcement is, essentially, war.

The French notion of peacekeeping is, ironically, the doctrine closest in meaning to that originally intended for peace enforcement as the enforcing of 'compliance with any agreement reached between the principal military leaders'.¹⁷ In James Sutterlin's formulation, peace enforcement is "*a provisional measure taken without prejudice to the position of any of the parties*" and is therefore a mission other than going to war to defeat an enemy.¹⁸

Article 42-type actions

Article 42-type actions refer to operations where the Security Council does not act as a neutral agent to bring about an end to conflict between two warring parties, but rather as a party in itself, to defeat a country or countries whose guilt has been established by Council decision. This type of use of force can best be identified as Article 42-type Enforcement Action, since it is that Article which authorises the Council to take such an action.

Thus, both peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations possible under Article 40 type operations are provisional measures, being without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned. In peacekeeping operations, the UN does not act as one party against another, as it does under Article 42-type operations, but rather as a force between parties, and without taking sides. No UN peacekeeping operation has been used to compel an invading army to withdraw.¹⁹

In the first years of the UN, even though the Military Staff Committee was already in existence, the differences that existed between the US and the USSR on the structure and mission of the forces to be made available to the Security Council, as well as the Cold War atmosphere, made it impossible for an agreement to be reached whereby troops could be used by the Council as originally envisaged in the **Charter**.²⁰ Therefore, in the only two instances in which Article 42-type action (enforcement) has been taken, the Security Council has called for, or authorised, the use of national forces to enforce the Council's decision. These were the Korean War of 1950 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991.²¹

With the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, resort to force in accordance with the principle of collective security was once again possible. This was the situation when Saddam Hussein initiated the action against Kuwait. Though the atmosphere at the time was different from that of the Korean War, the similarity rested in the fact that no armed forces were available to the Security Council to put into the field under the terms of Article 43 of the **Charter**. No agreements had been completed with member states on the provision of such troops at the time of the invasion of Kuwait.

As in the earlier enforcement action in Korea, the Council again turned to member states to act on its behalf by means of such measures as might be necessary. But this time no unified command was established, nor was the use of the UN flag authorised. Though the Security Council operated with the full collaboration of its permanent members, fundamental questions

on the use of force and the control of that force by member states arose. "*As the massively destructive campaign advanced, increasing unease became apparent among Council Members on the proportionality of the means being used by US forces in comparison with the objectives.*"²² Had the US decided to pursue the battle to Baghdad in order to eliminate Saddam Hussein, which might have been justified under a liberal interpretation of Resolution 678 of the Council, serious differences would have developed at the UN. If measures taken cease to have the endorsement of the majority of the Council, can they still be considered collective measures taken on the Council's behalf? If support within the Organisation becomes fragmented, all the disadvantages that emerged from the Korean operation begin to manifest themselves.²³

Thus, at the end of the Persian Gulf War the questions that remained unanswered were: first, whether the approach taken in the Gulf War constituted a desirable model for enforcing the Council's decisions under Article 42 of the **Charter** and, second, whether other options existed.²⁴

These issues, as debated in the context of Article 42-type action and that of the prevalent confusion between enforcement – as seen in Article 42 – and peacekeeping and peace enforcement – as seen in Article 40 – are at the core of the international debate on MPSOs today.

The essential concept represented by Article 42 of the **Charter** is that troops and support will be available from member states for use by the Security Council – a truly UN force. The procedure for calling on individual states to take the necessary enforcement action, without specified restrictions or limitations, represents a necessary improvisation. It gave the Council, both in Korea and in the Gulf, no means of controlling when, how, or to what degree the enforcement measures were applied. States were only requested to keep the Council regularly informed.²⁵

Yet, although it is important to understand the problems of providing the Security Council with available military force in times of need, it is even more crucial to comprehend that the forces to be applied in Article 42-type enforcement operations are not the same as those required for Article 40-type peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, simply because the objectives and the framework for both types of operations are not the same. In reality, since enforcement operations mandated or authorised by the UN are infrequent, it is not so important to specify the active use of force within the UN structure since – according to past experience – it will suffice to attend to this need in Korean or Persian Gulf fashion, which entails that member states individually take the lead under the sanction of the Security Council.

What is of major importance is to determine how countries will deal with peacekeeping and peace-enforcing situations (Article 40-type action), and whether or not it would make sense to earmark units for these missions early on, as well as how to go about the questions of unified command and strategic directions.²⁶ Here it is interesting to note that what must be debated is the way in which Article 40-type operations will be tied to Article 43 procedures (i.e. the creation of a truly UN military force). So far, the international debate has tied itself to a different type of linkage: attempting to discuss Article 42-type (enforcement) with Article 43 (procedures), a situation which is a political minefield and is not brought under discussion here.

Leaving aside enforcement action then, it is obvious that what is needed today is a clear understanding of all that a peace support operation entails, taking into consideration all its tasks. Such a peace support operation, which is a force provided by member states to be deployed by authorisation of the Security Council, but under the direction of the Secretary-General of the UN – a truly UN force – should have clearly understood, prescribed tasks, which include

peacekeeping and peace enforcing. Thus, with these needs in mind, Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended in his **An Agenda for Peace** that the Council "*consider utilisation of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance.*"²⁷ The units would be available on call from member states and would consist of troops that had volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need extensive preparatory training within their national forces.²⁸ Therefore the issue involved earmarking and training troops for this function, as well as stockpiling equipment for such tasks.

In theory, peace enforcement units could be the same troops already earmarked nationally for the tasks of a MPSO, which comprised traditional peacekeeping. "*Both peacekeeping and peace-enforcing units fall within the definition of provisional measures in terms of Article 40 of the UN Charter; neither is intended to resolve the basic problems underlying a conflict; for both, deployment is decided by the Security Council, troops are provided on a voluntary basis by member states and operations are carried out under the management of the Secretary-General. Peace enforcement units, however, must be more heavily armed than peacekeeping troops and they must be mandated to take offensive action as necessary to restore peace. The Secretary General has suggested that peace-enforcement troops be made up of volunteers. Obviously, different kinds of training are required in the two cases (although they could be made compatible) and governments, in earmarking peace enforcement units, would understand the more dangerous nature of their potential duty. Thus members will have to decide whether or not they will earmark and train the same units for dual purposes – or possibly triple purposes – if Article 43 agreements are signed; whether they will maintain separate peacekeeping and peace enforcement units [for the same mission]; or whether they will earmark and train units, if at all, only for peacekeeping [tasks of a mission].*"²⁹

As has been discussed above, defining the terms of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and enforcement is no easy task. Standard practice in most dilemmas is to define the problem, so that it can be understood and solved within a certain frame of reference. The peace support operation does not differ in this respect. The United Nations, NATO and various troop-contributing countries have all tried at one stage or another to define peacekeeping. The examples quoted below illustrate how differently the term is viewed, and how considerable is the effort made to try to fit it into set patterns of thinking. The scars of political consensus debates on simple clearcut issues are evident in the definitions of the UN and NATO. The UN defines peacekeeping as: "*the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.*"³⁰

Delightfully vague in that "*hitherto with the consent of member states*" normally means – and as frequently does not – a technique that expands the possibilities of conflict resolution and peace. NATO, on the other hand, tries to incorporate all the possibilities of peacekeeping – none of which is of importance – in one definition, while failing to address the real issues that constitute the fundamental differences between its member states. For NATO peacekeeping is "*the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between and or within states, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organised and directed internationally, using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace.*"³¹

This definition can be applied to operations such as the MFO in the Sinai, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, and that of Desert Storm; all of which could, accordingly, pass as 'peacekeeping

missions'.

Troop-contributing countries have a more realistic perception of what peacekeeping entails. The British Army defines peacekeeping as: "*Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.*"³²

This definition focuses on the fact that it is a military operation, undertaken with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace. The United States Armed Forces, on the other hand, define peacekeeping as: "*Military Operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.*"³³

Here emphasis is on the fact that it is a military operation, undertaken with the consent of the belligerent parties to implement an agreement, in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting settlement. This definition implies that peace must be achieved before it can be maintained. This condition is more evident in the French definition for peacekeeping as "*the control of a conflict settlement process, once the hostilities between belligerents [have] ceased, by military forces and political officers, that are responsible for overseeing adherence to the peace agreement by observation, reporting, supervision or intervening.*"³⁴

Peacekeeping, according to this definition, can thus only begin once peace has been made.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT: PEACE AGREEMENT, MANDATE SPECIFICITY, AND THE GRANTING OF AUTHORITY TO THE UN MISSION

As is the case in all operations, in MPSOs, unless objectives are clear, it will be difficult to find and apply strategies. If strategy implies adapting means to ends, no operation will ever be efficient without carefully formulated objectives. Although the foremost diplomatic effort at the time of a peace agreement is based on finding the right non-threatening language to ensure a stop to the conflict at hand, the objective of an MPSO should not fall prey to such grey language or to the process of gathering consensus for lasting peace. The objective of an MPSO must be clear from the start, even if those pursued by the warring parties are purposely left unclear. This distinction would further assist the international community in judging which situations they ought to get involved in and when. It would also assist in determining what authority was needed by the MPSO to make a difference in the conflict resolution at hand.

But objectives include not only the political and strategic objectives. Lesser objectives must be co-ordinated to go with, not against, the principal political objective of the mission at large. This co-ordination of secondary objectives must be undertaken to ensure that all actions and strategies reinforce the one single, final political objective, which does not serve the warring parties but the international community in its decision to take the risk of instituting an MPSO.

In a failed state or in an internal conflict still hot within a state, an MPSO can be perceived either as another warring faction or as the overall authority hovering over the warring parties and the peace process. This difference is crucial to the evolution of the mission. At the same time, it is one related not to mandates, but to practice.

A failed state, or an internal crisis of such proportions as to merit consideration of deployment of an MPSO, is a product of a variety of factors such as change, instability, insecurity,

dissatisfaction and violence. Political, economic, and social concerns dominate the failed state environment and these make for non-traditional demands on the use of military power and resources. The success of an MPSO, therefore, would seem to depend on its ability to provide political dominance (authority), unity of effort (co-ordination), adaptability, legitimacy, and patience (time).

Thus, an MPSO has at its disposal a combination of means, employing political, relief, economic, informational and military instruments, all of which have at centre the protection and well-being of the population. In fact, an MPSO should be deployed to ensure that the population at large benefits in real terms from the efforts of the international community, not remaining a victim of warring parties' tactics and tantrums. By winning the people over and empowering them, the seeds for national consolidation and democracy can be sown, eventually leading to the establishment of a process whereby the warring parties are made accountable to the people which is, ultimately, the objective of sustainable development, democracy and peace.

It has been the repeated failure of peace support operations in the past to engage in the field without clear guidelines as to the role they play *vis-à-vis* the population, and as to the authority they will command *vis-à-vis* the warring parties. Neither of these two functions necessarily endangers strategic neutrality or impartiality of peace operators. Perhaps because the operators have been unclear concerning both of these factors, their efforts to establish a secure environment for the MPSO early on have been marred and put to the test in the past.

The timorous approach of deployed personnel in the first crucial month of an MPSO, more often than not, has damaged the credibility, evolution and future of the whole operation. This was clearly seen in UNOSOM I, UNPROFOR, UNAVEM II, ONUMOZ, and UNOMIL. At times, the failure to establish authority and to provide a secure environment has also led to the institution of parallel enforcement missions in the middle of a process, such as that presented by UNITAF. Non-UN peace support operations, such as those of the CMF in Rhodesia and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, were successful, in that they did manage to establish both authority and a secure environment before handing over the effort to multinational forces and the UN itself to consolidate the peace that had been gained.

In the process of signing a peace agreement that will allow for UN participation and monitoring, warring parties frequently offer structures and guidelines that are very fragile. If these agreements were made to guarantee the relationship between the parties, greater clarity would be assured in the guidelines and rules of engagement of peace operations. By the same token, if UN or other multinational mandates were clearer on the objectives and conduct of the operation, authority would be much more easily established on arrival in the field. None of this demands that MPSOs should revert to pre-1989 formats; rather they should take into account the changed circumstances, risks, and difficulties involved in setting an MPSO in action. If one recognises that perhaps a major failure in the present context is that of demanding less of warring parties and of the UN Security Council than was originally required for setting up an MPSO, while, at the same time, accepting the reality that forces will be deployed in more volatile and risky environments, it then makes sense to demand more (rather than less) from the strategic levels.

The psychological aspect of a multinational peace force entering the field is such: for the first few weeks of deployment both the population and the warring parties tend to analyse and explore the weaknesses of the new arrivals to see whether they can slip through the loopholes created by the strategic decisions and expectations of the peace force. Thus the clarity, unity and determination of an MPSO during the first few weeks is crucial to their establishing and

consolidating the rules of the game with both the warring factions and the population. Since this process is cemented by consent promoting techniques, keeping information and communication lines open, and providing security for the mission and the population, it follows that each of these tasks should be given priority on arrival.

The importance of establishing a secure environment immediately cannot be underestimated. At the same time, the ability of a mission to secure such an environment is very much dependent on the authority that the warring parties and the population award the mission through the peace agreement, the mandate, and trust on the part of the population. A case in point is that of the UN mission to Cambodia in 1992 (UNTAC).

UNTAC had its origins in the 1989 Paris Conference on Cambodia, which developed a broad framework for a peace process. As Cox³⁵ indicated, the framework was "*haltingly espoused by the four Cambodian parties, but fell short of achieving agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.*" Australia sought to break the deadlock by proposing that the UN supervise the administration of Cambodia during a transitional period, at the end of which a new government based on internationally supervised elections would take over. This proposal took two years to be accepted by the parties and the international community. The texts, signed in 1991, included the **Final Act** and three **Instruments** dealing with a comprehensive political settlement, the independence and neutrality of Cambodia, and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.³⁶

The most comprehensive of all the agreements was that related to a political settlement. In this agreement the following issues were present: the establishment of a transitional period to begin with the signing of the **Final Act**; the creation of UNTAC; the establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) as the legitimate body enshrining the national sovereignty of Cambodia during the transition period; ordering the withdrawal of foreign forces and equipment; proclamation of a cease-fire and cessation of outside military assistance; and announcing a general election for a constituent assembly which would draft a new constitution and transform itself into a legislative assembly.³⁷

UNTAC was designed to play a commanding role in the transition period since, in Article 6 of the **Comprehensive Political Settlement**, the SNC was called upon to delegate to UNTAC all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement. Specifically, Article 6 declared: "*[I]n order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct UN supervision or control.*"³⁸

UNTAC was granted extraordinary powers to determine government policies during the transition period in fields such as foreign affairs, defence, public security and public information.

Had UNTAC not secured authority over the warring parties at the time of the Peace Agreements, it is highly debatable whether it would have enjoyed the relative success that it demonstrated in the field. It is also important to note that UNTAC not only enjoyed a wide-sweeping authority granted by the warring parties, but was also given a UN mandate much more specific and detailed than those provided for many of the more contemporary UN peace operations world-wide.

The granting of authority to the UN missions in Namibia, Cambodia and Central America contrasts with the failure to obtain peace agreements in accordance with the same terms of reference in other major peace operations, such as those of Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

In fact, in Somalia no such peace agreement was achieved and in the former Yugoslavia there was no consensus among warring parties on the role or authority for UNPROFOR. All of these latter missions did carry references to peace agreements in the text of the UN mandates, but they were relative and not consensual or characteristic of the attitudes of the warring factions prior to the deployment of the missions.

For these reasons it is important to note that of thirteen peace operations³⁹ mandated by the UN from 1989 to 1995, twelve were undertaken to resolve internal conflicts, but only three of the first five missions had the potential to establish authority over the warring parties as indicated in the peace agreement and through the specificity of the mandates: ONUCA, ONUSAL, and UNTAC.⁴⁰ The same was true of a past operation in Namibia, UNTAG. But, as of 1992, none of the other missions mandated by the Security Council bore these characteristics, rather the opposite was the case, and yet the mission did proceed. It is not surprising that the results of these new missions have never equated the successes of UNTAG, ONUCA, ONUSAL and UNTAC. By the same token, these four missions enjoyed the support of the regions where they operated, much as the CMF, led by the UK government, had demonstrated in resolving the transition process in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1978/9.

The peace agreements in all of the more successful UN peace support operations took years to negotiate and to implement, but the willingness of negotiators to secure the most advantageous terms for the deployment and success of the mission, their caution in getting the UN involved in the solution of internal conflict, and the planning of the missions, all paid off. The question here is, given such a record over a period of four years, why did the UN begin to deviate from its procedures, format, timings, and planning of missions in the 1990s? The record of resounding failures as represented by UNOSOM, UNPROFOR, UNOMIL, and UNAVEM should have demonstrated that the winning formula is not one of size or speed, but of caution and initial leg-work to ensure that both authority and specificity are well understood before embarking on such missions. Of these initial needs, none is more important than securing a firm peace agreement that acknowledges the authority of the UN mission and establishes it as a point of reference for all parties to a dispute. The paradox is that, in some cases where even Chapter VII operations rather than Chapter VI were mandated, the UN mission lacked the willingness or strength to establish itself over the factions to the dispute. This occurred manifestly in the case of Somalia. In one case where political success was achieved, ONUMOZ, it came at a cost to the original terms of reference of the mandate. In this specific case all the disarmament and demobilisation goals of the operation were changed due to the inability of the mission to position itself above the parties once the mission was under way. The outcome is to be seen in the flood of weapons that has engulfed Southern Africa as a result of peace in Mozambique.

Concurrent with the indications produced by the peace agreement regarding the authority to be granted to UN missions and the specificity of the mandates on this point, the ability of the mission itself to establish a secure environment on deployment helps assure it of the best working environment for a successful operation. This again was true in UNTAG, ONUCA, ONUSAL and UNTAC. No other operation of this type enjoyed the same level of preparation and/or chance for success. At the same time, these were the four operations where the UN acknowledged the fact that a peace support operation is not only a sphere where peacekeeping tasks are carried out, but where peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcing tasks necessarily overlap with one another to form a structured whole. It can be argued that in the last of these missions, UNTAC, it was precisely the wish of the military components of the mission to have the power to enforce peace at tactical levels that led to a certain disruption of the operation halfway through due to two opposing ideas, namely those of the Australian and French contingents concerning what precisely was permissible and required to keep the

mandate and authority of the mission on track. Failure to comprehend the peace enforcement tasks intrinsic to large, contemporary peace operations was manifest here.

As Cox⁴¹ indicates: *"Faced with a recalcitrant party in the Khmer Rouge, the debate within UNTAC and the concerned international parties centred on the use of force to coerce the Khmer Rouge into compliance with the disarmament process ... However, the debate about coercive disarmament may also have obscured a more systematic approach to inducement and persuasion. In his assessment of the operation, General Sanderson has emphasised the original compliance of the Khmer Rouge with the disarmament process as well as their subsequent non-compliance. Between voluntary and coercive disarmament, there may be many opportunities and means to sustain a continuing dialogue with non-complying parties ... [but] while the Secretary-General is entitled to take credit for 'a significant degree of success' in UNTAC, in the outcome the new government of Cambodia was faced with the task of bringing order and stability to a country which remained awash in arms. It was precisely this situation which the disarmament process was intended to avert."*⁴²

UNTAC is therefore a clear case of the lack of a unified doctrine on what a peace support operation can, cannot, and must do, to secure the objectives of the mission in accordance with the mandate received, the rules of engagement employed, and the authority vested in the process by the peace agreement between the parties to the conflict. In this case, the Australian military advisor to the Special Representative ruled against the French peace operator's belief that: *"In actively upholding the mandate, the peacekeeping force may have to use force. Citing the United Nations peacekeeping manual, the French believe that force should be used not only in self-defence, but to stop parties who seek to hinder a peace-making operation from carrying out its mission ... While the French believe that if negotiations fail, then force should be used ... one of the crucial qualities of the new peacekeeper [being] the 'controlled and mastered use of force' ... France holds that the use of arms has no effect on the transformation of peacekeeping into peace-enforcement."*⁴³

Clearly the Australian peacekeepers did not share in this view. Believing that peace enforcement tasks at the tactical level would impinge on the consensual strategic decision taken by the parties and reflected in the UNTAC mandate and might, consequently, provoke the end of the mission, they did not enforce the mandate, the result being that they assisted in aborting the disarmament objective of the operation. A universally accepted doctrine of what constitutes the four tasks of a peace support operation and how they interact would have prevented these disputes and ensured more stability and security in the post-conflict reconstruction process of Cambodia.

THE SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF AN MPSO: THE CIVIL MILITARY INTERACTIONS

One of the most difficult things to understand and accept today is the fact that most contemporary multifunctional peace operations are, above all, civilian operations with military and humanitarian components working closely together. This was not the case previously, at least not in extent, size and proportionality.⁴⁴ Peacekeeping operations before 1989 were generally military in task and composition. Most of the time, the head of the mission was a military officer. As of 1989, however, a transition to the practice of appointing a civil affairs officer as head of mission became the norm. The change in both number and proportionality of military *vis-à-vis* civilians occurred when operations became more complex, multi-task, multi-component conglomerates, working in specific contexts which made humanitarian organisations work side by side with military and civilian peacekeepers. Civilians appointed as heads of missions are normally appointed for their political ability and stature, rather than their expertise

in the field, where they work with multi-component organisations. Having limited to no experience of working with military commanders, they struggle to understand, and sometimes to relate, to the military frame of mind. Military commanders, on the other hand, like to know the parameters of their freedom of action, and will keep pushing the edge until they have established these. This can, indeed has, led to a total breakdown of communications between the two most important actors in any peace support operation. When one looks at the current operation in Angola, one cannot but wonder if it is, in fact, not two different operations taking place in the same country, one civilian and one military. What is needed in the field are civilian and military heads of missions that are trained to work with the different components of a mission, and have been exposed to each other's milieu. It would, therefore, be commendable to have joint pre deployment training exercises to this effect, as well as joint mission planning sessions before deployment.

The new relationship that MPSOs have imposed on both civilian and military components of a peace support operation has not been an easy one. On the one hand, one can argue that the frequent interaction between civilian and military in the field might assist in a change of the military mind-set *vis-à-vis* these types of interactions. On the other, it can also create an impact on the normal course of action for humanitarian organisations. Thus, in contemporary conflict situations, where MPSOs are concerned, the humanitarian objectives of different agencies and NGOs cannot be separated from military and political objectives. Humanitarian aid has become an aspect of military objectives. Ultimately the problem of the differences in approach of both civilian and military peacekeepers, which can inhibit the efficiency of international action in areas of conflict and thus impact negatively on the mission itself, does exist.⁴⁵

In a recent survey conducted by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva⁴⁶ respondents to a specialised questionnaire reflected on civil-military interactions in the field. Under the question: "*Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organisations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate or inadequate*", 23% of respondents agreed that it was very good, 42% that it was adequate, and 35% that it was inadequate. Nevertheless, these responses correspond to a total of ten peace support operations, some of which have been successful and some not. When the answers are matched with the missions themselves, it is striking to note the difference in civil-military interaction *vis-à-vis* the success or failure of an operation. Thus, for example, in Cambodia (UNTAC) the percentage of adequate interactions was 85% *versus* 15% for inadequate interactions. Almost the same percentage applies to the CMF in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (75% adequate *versus* 25% inadequate interactions). In contrast, questionnaire responses for the Somalia operations clearly showed that only 16% of people surveyed considered civil-military interactions good or adequate, whereas 84% of respondents found them to be inadequate.

At this stage, it is possible to say without doubt that the two principal problems that have emerged in the context of civilian-military interactions in an MPSO are those related to: a) the lack of co-ordination between these components, and b) the extent to which each is able to accommodate the other, before and during an MPSO. As Slim⁴⁷ indicates, the terms 'military' and 'humanitarian' encompass a range of different organisations, making operational planning and standardised practice more complicated than most generalisations on the subject recognise. Thus there is some overlap in today's emergencies which create two types of special civil-military relationships that can give rise to either consensus or tension. These are security relationships and technical ones. This is complicated by the fact that each military or civilian component in an MPSO is also following different mandates and procedures. On the civilian side, for example, UN agencies differ from wider international agencies, such as the

International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Cross movement, and both differ from the structures, goals and procedures of international and national non government agencies which also operate in the field in an independent manner. Thus, tensions between civilian-civilian components and between civil-military components may arise in the field because of different management styles: to the military used to working in hierarchical command structures the independent and consultative style of NGO management, for example, may appear muddled and indecisive.

On the issue of perceptions, international humanitarian organisations tend to be made up of people who have deep reservations about militarism. This makes it a fact that, at a profound moral level, the humanitarian has more problems with the military than the military with the humanitarian. The result is that a reticence and ambivalence in the civil-military interaction extends on the part of the humanitarian that reaches beyond questions of operational procedure to matters of ethics and identity. With respect to the military component *per se*, it is important to remember that the military forces differ in force size, structure, capability and posture;⁴⁸ that not all national militaries are the same; and that there are differences in competence, professionalism and democratic outlook. This is particularly true of the MPSO environment made up of military contingents of many nationalities, cultures and levels of professionalism.

Some troop-contributing countries to MPSOs see a benefit in the frequent interaction of their military in peace operations, which include a large component of civilian operators. It is argued that the interaction serves to demonstrate to the military the advantages of working closely with civilians and, in more extreme cases, might serve to democratise or humanise military from countries which have had totalitarian or military regimes in the past, but who are now democratic. And yet, experience in the field serves to demonstrate that many times the opposite occurs. The structured military contingents of many countries have difficulty in interacting with the civilians, not because they are civilians, but because they are unstructured.

A more positive and constructive debate here would be to recognise that the type of task to which military contingents of an MPSO are exposed, fall under humanitarian policy and humanitarian affairs thus creating a new type of military profile. The role of 'humanitarian' military as seen in an MPSO can be divided between three main tasks: relief assistance, protection, and peacebuilding. All of these are tasks which can afterwards be applied internally in the context of their own countries. The paradox is that, more often than not, countries with a history of military intervention in the affairs of a population do not wish their own military to get involved in internal affairs, security or stability on their return, so the peace operators cannot pursue their new-found skills at home.

This argument aside, it is interesting to note that civil-military relationships in the field will be affected by the type of humanitarian role adopted by the military. Sometimes the military are asked to operate like a relief agency becoming directly involved in emergency provision of water, food, medical care and logistics support. Sometimes they are only involved in protection, and the like. Civil-military relations then depend on which role the military is playing at any one time, which provides the framework for characterising a relationship as being one of technical assistance or security provision.

One aspect of the continued interaction between civilian and military components in an MPSO is that consensus has emerged whereby both sides recognise the limits of humanitarianism and the need for long term political and developmental solutions for the achievement of lasting peace. Yet, although there might be consensus on this recognition, the civilian and military approaches differ from each other. For example, the military operational approach is not geared

to implement development activities. The military aim to do something for, rather than with, people and tend not to think much about the long term management implications of what they construct or repair; whereas the civilian components – particularly NGOs – are very much aware of the differences. This can, at times, also create tension between the different components.

Another factor resulting in tension is the sense of competition felt by civil agencies regarding the perception that the military is increasingly becoming the organisation of choice for the international community in complex emergencies. They accuse Western armies of jumping on the humanitarian bandwagon in order to find a new role and so defer cuts to their budgets.⁴⁹

At this point it is important to note that there are some issues in an MPSO that affect both civilian and military components equally but which can also, in time, become sources of tension between the two. Of these, the most important concerns the degree of consent the MPSO has from local populations. When levels of consent run low and the MPSO becomes unwelcome and unpopular, civil-military relationships (which have a different profile locally) become strained and the civil humanitarians try to distance themselves from both the civil affairs officers of the mission and from the international military force (who, themselves, bear the brunt of the symbol of a mission in the field).

To sum up, the civil-military interaction, whether at civil affairs and military levels in the mission, or between humanitarian and relief organisations and the mission, is characterised by civilian presence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the operation. Sometimes it is difficult for military peacekeepers to understand that even at the most tactical of levels, they will have to cope not only with restraining belligerent parties but also with assisting the action of humanitarian and civilian components of the mission. Even if they achieve this goal, the military will not always be welcomed or seen as successful *vis-à-vis* the humanitarian components who will, at worst, be defensive (because the military are taking on their own traditional roles) or derisive (because they do not understand the military operational structures).

MULTI-TASKING: OLD PRINCIPLES, NEW REALITIES

Troop-contributing countries engaged in peacekeeping in the 1990s proffered troops in the belief that they would operate according to their vision of a peace operation. They were unaware of the slippery rope that all such missions cling to from their very inception. In some cases, new peacekeepers with extensive conventional training and their own ideas of what a peace support operation is all about also rushed into the fray, bringing with them their own ideas, doctrines and structures. This was particularly true of troops contributed by certain of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The unusual pattern of peace operations mandated by the UN in the last six years, their complexity and size, their high visibility and exposure, and time and budgetary constraints have done much to lower expectations on the future of MPSOs in the international community. International public opinion is now convinced that an MPSO should revert to low visibility, limited and very specific tasks for it to be effective. This blocks the real issue of what makes for an effective MPSO and how the international community could employ these operations. In other words, we are now risking throwing out the baby with the bath water because of an inability to comprehend the realities and needs of an effective and feasible MPSO.

The principles of impartiality, neutrality, consent, and self-defence have been cited repeatedly as providing the guidelines for a peacekeeping operation. In reality, these same principles apply not only to the tasking of a peacekeeping mission, but also to the tasks normally associated with

peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement.

This can be demonstrated more clearly if it is understood that the three principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and self-defence) depend on the environment and context at the time of implementation. Thus, during the 1990s, none of the standards related to consent, impartiality, and self-defence have proved to be straightforward. Each will be examined here in turn.

Consent

Consent has proven to be strong or weak, durable or transitory; indeed, in intra-state wars it may be unclear as to whose consent is necessary.⁵⁰ In Cambodia, Angola, and Rwanda, the UN deployed troops and administrators to help implement peace accords, only to have one or more of the parties subsequently withdraw their consent. Consent at theatre level has not always coincided with consent at operational level, as UN forces meet local commanders who drag their heels in fulfilling their supposed obligations.⁵¹ Consent in the larger sense of mission acceptance has not necessarily translated into consent in carrying out the individual components of a peace accord, especially in the sensitive area of disarmament. Finally, in cases like Bosnia⁵² and Somalia, where consent at theatre level was lacking, UN units on the ground were sometimes able to gain sporadic consent among local authorities, often to the detriment of the unity of the mission.

Consent simply means giving assent. It can be implied or expressed. The former is evidenced by offering no resistance to what others are doing or by acting in a manner consistent with what is being demanded. In peace support operations the latter usually obtains when political or military leaders sign a negotiated agreement presumably binding the entities they represent to follow its terms. Leaders possess what can be referred to as the power of strategic consent because of the presumed broad impact of their decisions while the rank-and-file are capable only of what can be termed local or tactical consent. When the leaders do indeed commit all or most of the rank-and-file, then the situation is one of widespread or general consent, but if they do not – if many of the rank-and-file resist on their own or with the covert sanction of their leaders – then we have varying or ineffectual consent.

Peace support operations usually aim at helping parties implement cease-fires or more comprehensive agreements. These broadly constitute prior consent for the peace support forces to act, as opposed to recurring follow-on consent, necessary to implement specific features of an agreement.

While consent in general seems to be an all-or-nothing phenomenon – i.e., either one consents or one does not – in reality it is more complicated. In crises where opposing parties mutually agree to cease operations, pull back forces, eschew interference with elections, disarm, or the like, it would be quite surprising if consent were not provisional or conditional, as opposed to firm. At the least, each side would watch carefully for cheating by its rivals and make its continued adherence to the agreement dependent upon the adherence of all others. No party would risk disarming unilaterally, for instance. A variant of provisional consent is decaying consent,⁵³ i.e., a pulling back from willingness to abide by an agreement because circumstances are not working out as hoped or envisioned. Its obverse is grudging consent, acceptance of what a mandate or prior agreement requires because that acceptance is the least unsatisfactory of the alternatives available.

In short, numerous possibilities must be considered and, except where consent is expressed,

firm and widespread, there is always ambiguity as to how much consent actually obtains. The degree can significantly impact on what peace support forces should be expected to do.

Impartiality

To be impartial means acting without prejudice or bias, yet it is necessary to distinguish intent from effect. Concern for intent leads to an emphasis on blind impartiality or impartiality toward a mandate, including one which calls on UN forces to facilitate implementation of an agreement to which parties gave their prior consent. It involves a good faith effort to fulfil the provisions of the mandate or referenced agreement, irrespective of the negative consequences to any party called to task for not abiding by those provisions. Determining what the provisions require would be the product of a neutral process *versus* accepting one party's unilateral interpretation or desires. Each party would be treated equally, but the impacts would not necessarily be equal. In other words, UN forces acting without prejudice could nevertheless prejudice the interest of one or the other of the parties.

Conversely, UN forces could focus on not prejudicing the interest of any party in order to guarantee that they retain each party's consent and co-operation. Because UN elements represent international community interests *versus* those of any of the parties, their role initially in the face of resistance is to negotiate, insist, plead, or cajole. Yet unless they are capable of forcing co-operation, their ultimate choices are to cease their activities or to work within the limits of what the parties allow. Thus, one can speak of impartiality toward the parties or symbiotic impartiality because of the link with consent.

Of the two general varieties, blind impartiality seems to have risen in salience over the last few years. As one study puts it, *"the notion of impartiality had to be reconceived as no longer pertaining to the parties, whose lack of clear consent would frustrate an operation thus reliant, but as a reference to the integrity with which a mandate would be implemented."*⁵⁴

Self-defence

The starting point here is the breadth of 'self' in the term 'self-defence'. As will be developed further below, the historical record indicates that this 'self' can consist of more than individual self-defence; it can extend to defence of UN military units, equipment, an area of responsibility, and/or civilians. The latter can be limited to officials of international or humanitarian organisations or can include innocent bystanders caught up in the midst of a conflict. Finally, there is also the possibility of mandate defence, described this way by a UN official, Shashi Tharoor: *"[I]t was always theoretically permissible ... for UN troops to use armed force if others were attempting to use [force] to obstruct them while they were trying to fulfil the mandate entrusted to them."*⁵⁵ Thus, there is in 'self-defence' a wide range of 'selves'.

Alongside the breadth dimension is a time dimension. Self-defence is usually thought of as an *ex post facto* phenomenon, but there are also two types of anticipatory self defence, preventive and pre-emptive. The first refers to military action taken to contend with hostile intent, i.e., with the prospect of an immediately impending attack which leaves the defender with no choice other than the resort to force to avoid grievous harm. There is no such immediacy in pre-emptive defence. This term refers to action taken to forestall the possibility that a party might militarily oppose the efforts of a peace support force to implement a mandate or agreement. For example, pre-emptive defence could involve air strikes against tanks to ensure that they do not harass a humanitarian convoy scheduled to go through the same area one or two days later. Such an example highlights, however, the near impossibility of distinguishing between pre-emptive self-

defence and offensive military operations.

Thus, it is understandable but still a tragedy of the system of existing MPSOs that the first arrival of deployed operators commences its activities at the lowest possible level of action. Usually few people are deployed in the beginning, with new arrivals beefing up an operation sometimes months later. The first arrivals, consequently, only deploy in peacekeeping tasks and reserve the peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks as chores for the future. Peace enforcement tasks, if considered at all, are used as a potential threat of escalation rather than as the base rule for the beginning of an engagement. The consequences of this *modus operandi* are obvious: a small, timorous force with strict guidelines and tasks related to observing and peacekeeping soon loses credibility in the field, forcing the hand of negotiators to step up peacemaking and peacebuilding. The only possible incentive to throw at the warring parties at the strategic level is the threat of abandoning the mission altogether or of engaging in peace-enforcing operations, both of which have no credibility if stated in those terms. In time, missions then become bloated as more forces with uncertain mandates are deployed in the field, generating negative pressure in the public opinion of contributing countries, who see added deployment as something unusual, unexpected, and sinister.

Things would be very different if instead of engaging on a sliding rule of operations from less to more, the tasking of a mission were in the opposite direction. Escalation from the lower to the higher always smacks of lack of control, whereas the opposite brings with it the perception of winning the peace. In the context of present generation operations, it would be best to ensure that the warring parties understood, from the outset of the mission, that a peace agreement would result in a mandate for a peace enforcement task. The way in which the parties uphold the guidelines agreed upon and the way they contain and manage their operational and tactical forces in the field would carry a set number of rewards, one of which would be to lower the threshold from peace-enforcing to peacekeeping as the ultimate objective prior to final withdrawal of the MPSO. Peace would then have to be won.

Thus, the first elements of an MPSO put in place would be those appropriate for military peace enforcement. Shortly after the establishment of a secure environment, other elements of the mission, including the relief and civilian support elements could also be installed. The co-ordinated whole between civilian, military and relief operators would then actively engage in two elements: peacemaking and peacebuilding to ensure that the peace process prospers, as well as the population being won over to the cause of peace. Peacemaking and peacebuilding would then act as incentives and as support to the warring parties in consolidating the 'wish list' that had prompted the signature of the peace agreement in the first place. The penultimate reward would be a re-tasking of forces de-emphasising peace enforcement and focusing on peacekeeping tasks, in support of the final settlement of the dispute and in preparation for the democratic process to begin.

By implementing the tasking in a way other than what is normally held desirable, problems within the process would be differently negotiated. For example, if an MPSO must engage in peacekeeping, it can only rely on the threats of peace enforcement or withdrawal to attract the consideration of strategic levels of warring parties, but it does not have control over tactical or rogue elements, nor is it able to protect the population or the civilian components of the mission. The idea here is one of escalation by threat. If, on the other hand, peace enforcement was the base line at the start, the situation can only improve. This acts as an incentive to the warring parties, the population, and the peace process.

If halfway through the peacebuilding task of the mission promises are not kept, the mission can

revert to the peace-enforcing originally undertaken without this necessarily being interpreted as escalation. It would also serve to reinforce the authority vested in the MPSO by the warring parties during the peace agreements, and would assure the population of the MPSO's continued protection while more peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks are being pursued.

From the logistics point of view, it makes more sense to commence the deployment with an emphasis on the peace-enforcing tasks of the MPSO. Only the most advanced troop-contributing countries would be able to offer units with full equipment for deterrence and force protection, and with the possibility of immediate transport to the region. This would give more time for mustering the numbers needed from other troop-contributing countries to provide support and forces that might take up some of the other tasks of an MPSO. It would also ensure conveyance of a forceful message to the warring parties and the population upon entry onto the scene, as well as providing incentives to all parties to de-escalate tensions and allow for gradual diminution of numbers and types of forces in the field as peace becomes consolidated. Moreover, it would mean, on the budgeting side of an MPSO, that the biggest expense would occur early in the mission, ensuring that a mission became a diminishing obligation rather than an escalating one, which would make it more attractive to funders. The initial peace-enforcing task would also indicate that the major initial effort and the finances would be on the military component gradually being taken over in proportion and balance by the relief and development aspects of the mission. Thus, as the military decline in numbers with the consolidation of peace, the relief and development needs of the mission would assume the lion's share of the exercise, ensuring continued support by the people for the consolidation of development initiatives.

The last benefit of this tasking order is that the peace enforcers can eventually become the peacekeepers with a change in numbers, equipment, and attitude only. This is much easier to effect when a mission is set from maximum force to minimum, rather than the other way around, if for no other reason than that all military forces have experience in demobilisation and gradual change from war to peace duties.

The rearrangement of normal tasking duties in an MPSO would make much more sense in the present context in which MPSOs are deployed. If we are not to wait for lasting peace for the deployment of a peace support operation, then we must ensure that all the conditions for furthering the establishment of peace in the shortest possible time, are met. In the 1990s the UN Secretary-General has indicated clearly that it is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for peace have been fulfilled before mandating a mission. What this implies is that the MPSO itself can create the conditions for peace. If this is proven to be true, then the tactics by which the UN and MPSOs might have created conditions for peace have been seriously lacking. Yet, a reversal of these same tactics, could yield positive results.

An examination of the tactics which could prove successful, reaffirms that, of the entire process, the single most important ingredient for peace is a peace-enforcing task at the tactical level of an MPSO. While assuring security in rural communities and enforcing the will of the MPSO (as per the peace agreements signed by the warring parties at the strategic level) at tactical levels is the single most important stratagem for promoting peace at the operational level. This will, furthermore, enhance the chances of strategic peace between the parties. Thus, the three most important issues to pursue from day one of an MPSO are: winning over the people to the peace process by providing them with assurances, help, information and protection; establishing a secure environment by peace-enforcing on a tactical level; and effectively controlling the rural regions.

MEANS AND ENDS

As stated above – and we repeat – a failed state, or an internal crisis of such proportions as to merit consideration of deployment of an MPSO, is a product of a variety of factors such as change, instability, insecurity, dissatisfaction and violence. Political, economic, and social concerns dominate the failed state environment and these make for non-traditional demands on the use of military power and resources. The success of an MPSO, therefore, would seem to depend on its ability to provide a secure environment, political dominance (authority), unity of effort (co-ordination), adaptability, legitimacy, and patience (time).

A suitable doctrine for MPSOs should make reference to each and every one of these needs.

Secure Environment

As mentioned above, concurrent with the indications produced by the peace agreement as to the authority to be granted to the UN missions and the specificity of the mandates on these, the ability of the mission itself to establish a secure environment on deployment helps to assure the mission of the best working environment for a successful operation.

In all MPSOs the establishment of a secure environment must come first to ensure stability. This requires clear political authority and guidelines. These will, in turn, impact on the following: the provision of reasonable security to the belligerent parties and their willingness to comply with the peace agreement; the relationship between their willingness to disarm and the different stages of the peace process; and the importance of unity of command and international co-operation in supporting the whole peace process.

Authority

This implies that the warring factions must accept that, once they sign a peace agreement and invite the presence of an MPSO into their country, the MPSO will act as an impartial defender of the agreement itself and of the spirit in which the agreement was conceived. The establishment of authority over the warring factions does not imply that the MPSO assumes authority on the political level or over the evolution of the peace process, as would be the case in an enforcement operation (Article 42-type action); it does imply that the MPSO will exert authority to keep to the spirit of the agreement and to the objectives and terms expressed by the warring factions in the original peace agreement. All the parties to the agreement would abide by the authority of the MPSO in keeping the peace they wish to establish in the area. The control and responsibility attached to keeping demilitarised zones, demobilisation and disarmament agreements, and protecting the population at large from rogue violence would be clearly that of the MPSO over the warring parties. In so doing, the authority of the MPSO would be underwritten by peace-enforcing capabilities to ensure that no cease-fires are broken and that violence is contained at tactical and operational levels as per the strategic consent expressed by the warring parties in the peace agreement and in the mandates.

Clearly, the MPSO would also take initiatives of its own in implementing peacemaking and peacebuilding techniques between the parties as the mission progresses.

Unity of Effort

The MPSO would also take charge of the co-ordination of the civilian and military components, and co-ordinate with the relief and aid components of the operation. What this implies is that both in pre-deployment and on-site planning and implementation of the operation, co-ordination with regard to the phases and components of the mission would be arranged to ensure the

adequate focus, as well as adequate support for all components thereof.

Co-ordination must not only be looked for in the three human elements of the mission (civil-military relief), but also in the guarantee that the conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction processes are co-ordinated from the very beginning so as not to undermine each other as the process advances.

Final co-ordination must be ensured between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the operation and between the mission and the neighbouring countries and/or regional organisations operating in the stricken country.

Unity of effort also demands a concerted and organised approach to the population concerned in an attempt to win it over to the aims of the MPSO.

Adaptability

This element of the MPSO is of crucial importance as it will provide the sliding scale between the four tasks of the conflict-resolution phase of the operation and those which will have to be faced in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The four tasks of the MPSO are: peace-enforcing, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. Those of the conflict reconstruction process are: development, demobilisation, and disarmament – although for these the MPSO acts in support of the established government or the transitional government rather than as the main authority.

Adapting the human and material resources of an MPSO so that they bridge the gaps between the different tasks of current peace support operations is the single most important challenge to the success of the whole. This will require a series of structures and controls which will ensure joint strategy, doctrine, planning, command and control, information management, and civil-military interactions, flexible and clear enough to provide guidelines and instruction for each task, as needed.

Legitimacy


Legitimacy not only requires the acceptance of the warring factions and the mandate of the international community. It must be won by the active pursuit of three elements to the mission: capturing the will, consent and support of the population to the mission; ensuring regional support to the MPSO; and structuring a transparent and quick information flow *vis-à-vis* local, regional and international media.

Obviously, the constant pursuit of legitimacy also places a burden on the performance of MPSO operators, whether civilian or military. Credibility of the operators is crucial and the uniform application of rules of conduct and engagement must be monitored at all times. Disciplinary action is a must in those cases where the credibility of the operators has been brought into question by unco-ordinated, dangerous, irrational or immoral acts.

Time

The time limits of a mission have, in the past, conditioned the operators in many ways. Frequent rotation, lack of integrated strategies and objectives, lack of training, and lack of debriefing have caused loss of memory and degeneration of peace processes. Aside from these problems related to the timing of field personnel, there are those more operational problems of having a

mission mandated with a specific time frame, regardless of the evolution of the peace process itself. Although no open-ended MPSO, such as the one in Cyprus, could feasibly be mandated today, there are nevertheless mechanisms to ensure that a time constraint initiated at the outset of an MPSO does not turn against it by eating away at the credibility of the whole in the minds of both the warring parties and the population.



CONCLUSION

After seeing how both the concept and the application of operations traditionally entitled as 'peacekeeping' have chopped and changed, it is possible to state that the manner in which peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1956 suggests a theme that has run throughout the history of peace support operations: the story of a hesitant and reluctant participation by troop-contributing countries, attempting to cope with concepts and organisations of an unconventional nature in order to maintain, restore and enforce international peace.

Loopholes for collective action involving multinational peace forces were created, as we saw, in the invention of the peacekeeping concept itself. Techniques for a peace force to operate under certain conditions were also formulated, with certain troop contributing countries, such as Canada and the Scandinavian nations leading the way in this respect, particularly in concepts related to the military observer mission. Despite this facilitation of *ad hoc* missions, however, what has been lacking is the taking into account of the multidimensional qualities and multifunctional needs of such operations in order to structure a workable and unified doctrine of use.

Peace support operations should be seen in a holistic way, including peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks. All functions overlap in time so that the actual deployment of a multifunctional peace support operation will have, in varying degrees, tasks that represent support for peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peacebuilding. The peace

process is thus a continuum, permitting sliding rules for action so that each phase of the process as might be reinforced. The representation (p. 40) is an attempt to visualise what the whole would look like.

The 'sacred' *ad hoc* rules that have given colour to traditional peacekeeping operations, namely those of impartiality, neutrality, consent, and self-defence have, by and large, constrained rather than guided discussions. At times these principles have also confused the underlying issues and hampered the flexibility and adaptability of the multinational force to engage in the tasks intrinsic to its mandate. As long as the context for these operations remained in the realm of the Cold War and referred to international peacekeeping in the wake of a recognised and accepted peace process, the problems associated with such missions were kept under cover. *Ad hoc* problems which emerged in the tasking were solved in an *ad hoc* manner and on a case-by-case basis. And yet, the inability of the system to appreciate what was specific to a particular mission, as opposed to what was inherent in all missions, prevented the UN from applying uniform rules for action. This, coupled with political uncertainty and lack of co-operation from the permanent members of the Security Council in engaging their forces for the support of MPSOs during the Cold War, sustained the belief that MPSOs could only happen on an unstructured basis, if they were going to happen at all.

With the end of the Cold War and the re-examination of the potential of MPSOs as a practical means of assisting in the resolution of localised conflicts, the international community soon realised that their new-found enthusiasm for multinational co-operative and peace support actions had to be channelled through outdated, non-structured mechanisms. As the complexity and frequency of the operations increased, the flaws in the system became more apparent. And yet, contrary to international public opinion, the flaws evidenced in operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Liberia, were not evidence of the inability of the international community to engage in large scale peace operations, but rather confirmation that all peace operations are complex and demand multi-tasking.

Since 1989, MPSOs have started to operate in a different context, according to a different format, and with different objectives and schedules from those employed in the past. Above all, the relationship between the civilian and military component of a mission has changed. MPSOs today are found in different contexts because they have been increasingly mandated and deployed in situations of:

- internal conflict; and
- in the context of failed states.

They operate according to a different format because:

- they are oversized;
- they tend to cover entire national geographic spreads rather than just borders or hot areas;
- they have a large civil-military mix in their constitution;
- they are often concomitant with large humanitarian relief operations by international agencies and NGOs; and

- they are mostly manned by personnel from non-traditional troop-contributing countries.

MPSOs operate with different objectives because:

- they do not demand the settlement of a conflict as a prerequisite for deployment;
- they deploy in increasingly premature and volatile situations – more with the intention of peace pre-emption and peacemaking than of peacekeeping – which generates enormous pressure on their human resources;
- they seldom carry mandates for population protection and yet the way they will be judged in the field depends on the way they can protect populations; and
- they engage in peacebuilding activities concomitant with their peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcing tasks.

The timing of MPSOs is different because, due to their size and objectives:

- they have more time constraints than in the past;
- they must operate under an exit deadline, a fact well-known to warring parties prior to deployment; and
- they depend on financial and personnel contributions which are strictly conditional upon types of task and periods of time in the field.

Finally, civil-military interactions during an MPSO have become more complex, calling now for greater co-ordination between the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian operators in the field. Lack of co-ordination, perceptions and suspicions, as well as the belief from the humanitarian side that the military are now impinging on their traditional roles might jeopardise the success of a mission itself. A transparent code of conduct to guide civil-military relations in peace operations, and clearer planning and organisational structures could improve the present situation.

There are a number of issues which cloud the debate on what a UN multifunctional peace support operation should look like, taking into account the needs of the global context today and the precedents for UN military action in the past. All of these issues reflect the fact that the UN is comprised of member states who contribute ideas, policies and forces for multifunctional operations. Thus, the debate is as broad and diverse as the membership of the Organisation itself. The issues which stand out are the following:

- The potential for the UN to act with military force for the protection of peace and security has existed from the inception of the **UN Charter**. Although the way in which they are institutionalised in the **UN Charter** refers to the international context rather than the national one, there is the potential for adapting the principle to act for humanitarian reasons in defence of populations subject to intra-state and failed state conflict situations. This has been done for the last six years.
- The paralysis which, in the past, affected the use of UN forces was due to Cold War confrontation among Security Council members and an unwillingness to earmark troops for UN use at the time. This forced the UN to find innovative *ad hoc* ways to mandate and

implement peace operations in a number of cases. The term 'peacekeeping' was coined as a result, although it did not reflect the multitude of tasks that such an operation came to entail. With the ending of the Cold War and the potential for acting in international and national situations for the maintenance and restoration of peace, the UN faced two problems: that of institutionalising peace support operations; and that of indicating that these operations would carry out a multitude of tasks, including that of peace-enforcing. Nevertheless, the mandates for these operations were different from those relating to enforcement actions, in that they did not seek to defeat an opponent in battle.

- Efforts at institutionalising the concept demanded a broad exploration of ideas and views from member states. This debate occurred at a time of the realignment, restructuring and redefining of military forces, security threats, and national interests in the global community. It coincided, moreover, with a major enforcement action in the case of the Gulf War of 1991, which confused member states as to the meaning of peace enforcement actions *versus* enforcement operations.
- Consequently, this confusion led member states to shy away from earmarking troops and giving teeth to the Article 43 military procedures, as originally envisaged in the **Charter**. Furthermore, countries which had traditionally contributed to peacekeeping tasks in the past, did not wish to acknowledge that many of these tasks included peace-enforcing at either tactical or operational levels. It was the wish of these countries to institutionalise only peacekeeping tasks and only within the parameters in which they had become accustomed to contribute troops. But this ignored the reality of the multifunctional needs of any peace operation, past or future.

Today frank and open debate on a number of issues is required:

- acknowledging that peace operations are multifunctional missions which have a very broad spectrum of types of action and of forces and equipment to be applied, but that their objective, by and large, is not one of defeating an enemy in combat;
- acknowledging the wisdom of earmarking national troops for carrying out these activities and putting them under UN command on a regular basis, thus permitting the standardisation of equipment and training; and
- abandoning the enforcement actions of the UN, as past experience and the few precedents which have occurred would seem to indicate. The latter point to the independent ability of member states to team up with the intention of confronting a declared enemy and defeating him in battle. For this no specific earmarking or UN command structure is needed or wanted.

It is evident that not enough effort has been made to improve interaction between different mission components and NGOs in the field. More importantly, the lack of unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels of a mission, and the lack of co-ordination between conflict resolution actors and post-conflict reconstruction actors in the field seriously impinges on the effectiveness and smoothness of the missions.

Interaction between the military and civil components of UN missions is not on a healthy footing. To improve the chances for success of any future mission in the volatile environment of current conflicts, this issue must be addressed and resolved. The joint planning body must find the 'centre of gravity' of an operation, i.e., what is the single most important event or condition that

will stabilise the situation or reverse the destruction and strife. The organisation and the mission headquarters must then direct all their efforts and resources towards that one identified centre.

If these issues are understood and pursued in earnest by the international community, the possibilities of using MPSOs to prevent and resolve conflict, and/or to restore peace will be enhanced. It is better to open discussions on these elements than sit idly by, while regional tension mounts as a result of unresolved humanitarian crises.

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52. See, for example, B Ekwall-Uebelhart and A Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia*, 1996, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996, p. 31.
53. See Ratner, *op. cit.*
54. J Chopra, J Mackinlay and L Minear, *Report on the Cambodian Peace Process*, **Research Report**, 165, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, February 1993, p. 93; also A Roberts, *The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping*, **Survival**, 36 (3), Autumn 1994, p. 115: "[I]mpartiality is no longer interpreted to mean, in every case, impartiality towards the parties ... In some cases, the UN may ... be tougher on one party than another ... [That is,] impartiality may have come to mean ... impartiality in carrying out UN Security Council decisions."
55. S Tharoor, *Peace-Keeping Principles, Problems, and Prospects*, **Strategic Research Department Report**, 9-93, Centre for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, 1993, pp. 10-11.

II THE CHALLENGES OF MULTIFUNCTIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

At the January 1992 Security Council Summit meeting, world leaders expressed optimism about the future role of the UN in international relations. This indicated to most observers that the paralysing influence of the Cold War would no longer impair the effectiveness of the UN Security Council as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Underlying this optimism was the view that established principles, procedures and practices of peacekeeping would increasingly serve as an effective instrument to reduce the level of violent conflict internationally.

By mid-1993 the dream had vanished. The brutality and senseless ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, the relapse of the civil war in Angola and the failure of the UN to achieve lasting peace in the failed state of Somalia had changed the situation dramatically. It was time to take stock and to face the realities. The UN machinery, however, is slow to appreciate these realities and even slower in reacting to them. An analysis of the last eleven UN and Multifunctional Peace Support Operations (MPSOs)¹ indicates that failure to adapt to changing circumstances; inability to find new solutions to new problems; and the taking on of more complex roles with old scripts is seriously hampering the effectiveness of the UN and affecting the attitude of member states and belligerent parties towards UN peace operations. Yet, it is comfortable to stick to the ways we know and to ignore the fact that the nature of conflict in which the UN is expected to broker peace has changed.

Although one may argue that stability and the defusing of conflict in any given state are more likely to be the product of democracy, human rights, social and economic justice and development rather than anything a peacekeeping force can do, one cannot ignore the fact that such operations are usually undertaken in situations where the crossroads to better society lie far back in the past. Degeneration of the security environment in which conflicts take place is usually far advanced and, as a direct result, the region is awash with arms and dominated by various armed factions fighting each other, and harassing the population. The classic chicken and egg situation arises: there is no stability without security; no lasting security without stability. It seems therefore inevitable that any given peace operation will have to address both issues simultaneously.

International violence today occurs primarily at sub-state or intra-state level, the availability of light weapons and ammunition is greater than ever before, and every faction involved claims moral justification and a democratic basis for justifying its role in the dispute. To deal with this environment, peace operations have evolved from classical peacekeeping operations to the MPSOs we have today. The problem is, however, that this evolution has taken place under the table, and is still struggling for recognition today.

The lack of international consensus in approaching the problems posed by these new types of missions, as well as the lack of universally accepted solutions, is an open challenge that must be faced to make these missions with their inherent problems conceivable and operative. It is therefore of importance to look at the many components of the issue, all of which contribute to the operational problems faced by multifunctional peace operations. Some of the key problems will be examined here and corrective measures recommended. Among these are the problems

of terminology, common challenges of multifunctional peace operations, specific challenges, and possible areas for the immediate enhancement of such operations.

TERMINOLOGY

Officially there are only two types of Peace Operations, Peacekeeping Operations (Chapter VI of the **UN Charter**) and Enforcement Operations (Chapter VII of the **UN Charter**). But as explained above, the situation has changed dramatically since 1989, and the official view is not necessarily the correct one. The middle ground between these two operations, peace enforcement, needs to be institutionalised and recognised by the UN and its member states. Comparing arguments and texts in this area of discourse reveals a confusing *melange* of concepts, views, and idea groupings, with different people using the same terminology with slightly to radically different meanings and different words with the same or closely related meanings.

Peacekeeping

'Peacekeeping' used to refer to the employment of an international military contingent under UN control in order to help belligerents maintain a cease-fire. With the upsurge in peace support missions since 1988, the underlying purposes of peacekeeping have been broadened to encompass additional functions, many of which, such as supporting the conduct of national elections, flow from comprehensive peace agreements. As a result, a mission limited to supporting a cease-fire facilitation is now referred to as 'classical' or 'traditional peacekeeping,' and missions which go beyond it as 'multifunctional' or 'wider peacekeeping'.² It is now generally agreed that this widening of the functions of a peacekeeping force does not, nor should it, signify any change in the underlying characteristics of the mission.

Peacekeeping is premised, first of all, on the consent of the parties. As Dag Hammarskjöld put it, a peacekeeping force is "*para-military in nature, not a Force with military objectives*."³ Its military functions would be restricted to those "*necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance*" with UN resolutions. Strategic consent is evidenced in the initial cease-fire or peace agreement, as well as the follow-on agreements about when and how the UN force will arrive, where it will garrison, and the like. The consent of each belligerent or faction must be broad-based with any non-consent being sporadic and local only. If they are to succeed, the peacekeepers must keep consent from decaying or becoming ineffectual. This is accomplished more through reciprocal impartiality rather than blind impartiality, and entails, as well, eschewing the use of force, except in self-defence.

When he was formulating the principles for peacekeeping, Dag Hammarskjöld insisted that a UN contingent must not become party to a crisis. He directed that, consistent with blind impartiality, it does not take sides; consistent with impartiality toward the parties, it does nothing that would affect the political and military balances governing the voluntary resolution of the crisis. He was well aware of the tension between blind and reciprocal impartiality and of the fact that consensual peacekeeping, while aspiring to the former is ultimately driven either to emphasise the latter or to cease operations when confronting a recalcitrant party. Over time and in varying operations, peacekeeping rules of engagement have allowed preventive self-defence, as well as defence of the unit, equipment, area of responsibility (such as a voting site), and the mandate itself.⁵ In practice, however, peacekeeping forces have generally been very conservative, tending toward narrow interpretation of the right to self-defence and setting up strict rules about resort to force when exercising that right. This weakness also underlies the

problem of expecting mandate defence from a peacekeeping force operating among military adversaries: mandate defence by definition requires blind impartiality, but a force commander cannot blindly implement a mandate if intrinsic military weakness means that he is incapable of success without each party's co operation.⁶ Any thought of enforcement is out of the question.

Enforcement

In one way this is the simplest of the options to explain since it is the antipole to peacekeeping: it assumes non-consent on the part of the parties, consistent blind impartiality on the part of the UN elements and, going beyond self-defence, compels compliance at the strategic level *versus* simply dealing defensively with sporadic local opposition. Nevertheless, there is no uniform agreement as to what should be included in the enforcement option. Some (including proponents of a middle option) have a narrower perspective. They see the enforcement option as consisting essentially of "*all-out warfare*" or "*large-scale collective enforcement ... like that in Korea in 1950 or ... in Kuwait in 1991*" against an identified aggressor. Others (including many critics of the middle option) have a broader view, adding intimidation and coercive campaign activities, which many see as being at the heart of the middle option. Thus, this second group effectively incorporates Peace enforcement and enforcement into one category labelled 'enforcement'.

Peace Enforcement

"The peace enforcement concept arose out of a perceived need for an option midway between peacekeeping, as described above, and UN-sanctioned warfare against an identified aggressor. The present Secretary-General himself suggested consideration of an option which aimed to guarantee adherence to a cease-fire agreement by all its parties, regardless of who they might be. His concept went beyond peacekeeping since the operation would be deployed without the express [strategic] consent of the two parties (though its basis would be a cease-fire agreement previously reached by them). UN troops would be authorised to use force to ensure respect for the cease fire."

Others expanded on the purposes guiding the use of peace enforcement units. These included the implementation of peace agreements; the protection of humanitarian relief activities; control of the possession, movement, or use of weapons (especially if highly lethal) by the parties; the prevention of atrocities; and the re-establishment of basic social services and government structures in war-torn states.

Peace enforcement assumes, at best, that there is only provisional strategic consent and that the parties will probably want to test the limits of the UN's willingness to insist on adherence to a mandate or agreement. The UN force is to respond with blind impartiality. Its action may affect the positions of the parties, but there is no identification of a malefactor or aggressor and no intent to become a party to the crisis.⁷ Rather, the aim is to shape strategic and tactical consent on the premise that even grudging co-operation limits inhumane or destabilising behaviour, buying time for those working towards long term improvement.

Shaping consent requires acting as much like a peacekeeper as possible by working with the parties, reasoning with them, keeping them informed, and constantly seeking their co-operation. It can also involve pressuring the parties, intimidating them, if necessary, by subjecting them to exemplary pre-emptive self-defence or to a limited coercive campaign against carefully selected military targets. Thus, military credibility is to peace enforcement what intrinsic military weakness is to peacekeeping. This means fielding a force ready for war or at least capable of deterring

any party that would resist by harming the UN troops or other international personnel.⁸

Proponents of a middle option accept that achieving the proper balance between speaking softly and wielding a big stick can be extremely difficult. Unlike their counterparts in consensual peacekeeping, peace enforcement contingents must assume some resistance which is either centrally co-ordinated or, even worse, sporadic – such as roadblocks manned by drunken irregulars – with no clear indication of whether it is the rule or an exception. Unlike their counterparts in fully-fledged enforcement, moreover, peace enforcement contingents cannot assume that theirs' is a combat task intended to break all resistance once and for all. Rather, the very personnel expected to demonstrate resolve and augment consent are expected to do so with the lightest possible touch in the hope of the parties' finally assenting to the UN's will. They have to avoid taking sides and yet alleviate the suffering of innocents being subjected to unspeakable cruelties. They may have to deal with leaders whom they might arrest as thugs or war criminals in other circumstances. Hence, it would not be surprising if the soldiers involved regarded the means as contradictory to the ends.⁹

Peace enforcement is much akin to what Alexander George has called "*forceful persuasion*" or "*coercive diplomacy*". He describes it as a "*beguiling strategy*" because of the possibility it offers of achieving objectives with minimal bloodshed, but he also cautions against bluffing.¹⁰ As far as this applies to the UN, it means that if it is to avoid humiliation, it must not only prepare for, but indeed initiate, violent military action should intimidation fail. This reality is the one reason that some criticise middle ground thinking.

Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement and enforcement seem to be the terms most frequently used when referring to contemporary peace operations. Thus, in the absence of universally accepted definitions, the following are used throughout this discussion.¹¹

Peacekeeping Operations

Operations carried out with the consent of opposing parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict are referred to as 'peacekeeping'. The general aim of a traditional peacekeeping operation is to control the conflict settlement process once the fighting has stopped between the opposing parties. UN military units that are responsible for ensuring the parties' compliance with the various clauses of the signed agreement, normally carry out their mandate by observing, reporting, intervening and following up. In this type of operation the use of force or coercive measures is not normally needed to enforce the agreement. It may, however, be necessary to employ coercive measures on the tactical level, such as convoy escort, protection of security zones, movement control, cordon and search operations, etc., to ensure safety and compliance with the agreements.¹²

Peace Enforcement Operations¹³

Operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties, but in an environment that may be highly volatile and which are, by default, of a multifunctional nature are termed 'peace enforcement'. In other words, peace enforcement missions are established to restore security in a country where state power no longer exists or is very weak. Any operation designed to place a devastated country back on the road to security and stability cannot be compared to a normal peacekeeping operation aimed at "*peacefully bringing an end to a conflict.*" With this kind of operation, notably in cases where law and order must be restored, there is no notion of consent at the tactical level. On the contrary, it is often necessary to use coercive measures to

stop actions that threaten the safety of the population, security and the like; and that prevent peace forces from executing their mandate. Political and military personnel in charge of this type of operation must have real freedom of action within their mandates to take the necessary steps to restore law and order.

Enforcement Operations¹⁴

Operations carried out to impose peace on belligerent parties, who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities, are enforcement operations. This type of operation can only be seen as a reaction to an act of aggression, identified and qualified as such by the UNSC. Peace forces are then authorised to identify and use force against an aggressor party (Operation Dessert Storm), or to prevent a state from exercising acts of repression or violence against certain groups of its population. Enforcement is executed with fully equipped conventional forces, according to the principles of war and within the constraints of International Humanitarian Law.

NEW AND CHALLENGING TASKS WITH OLD RESTRAINTS

The role of the classic peacekeeper – to monitor the implementation of an honourable agreement between two or more parties to a conflict, to do so usually unarmed, and to man a distinctly marked observation post or patrol a de-militarised cease-fire line – has become the exception rather than the rule. Since 1988, the number of UN peace operations has increased dramatically. Civil wars, fuelled by deep-rooted hatred and involving countless armed factions, each pursuing its own agenda, as well as the abundance and availability of weapons and ammunition, confront peace forces with a highly constrained operational environment. These operational environments are a serious challenge to the traditional principles of peacekeeping. The impartiality of peace forces is never recognised by all parties to the conflict. The extent to which consent, as an absolute requirement, can be assumed and adhered to, becomes increasingly problematic. Freedom of movement, traditionally seen as a key principle for effective peacekeeping, is constantly denied to peace forces and/or military observers. Cease-fire agreements are violated as soon as they are agreed upon. No distinct front lines exist. In the worst-case scenarios no accountable or legitimate political authority exists in operational areas. And last, but not least, forces serving under the UN flag have become the target for warring factions, which has increased the risk to their physical safety. The changes that have occurred in the operational environment have added an array of new and challenging tasks to the mission of any peace operation, current or future. These include:

- ensuring uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance to isolated populations;
- guaranteeing the safety and security of civilian and administrative personnel, national aid workers and NGO personnel;
- protecting the local population;
- undertaking de-mining operations;
- human rights monitoring;
- disarming, cantonment and demobilising of armed factions;
- executing police functions;

- undertaking preventive deployment; and
- elections monitoring and providing security for election points and workers.

Like an automaton, the UN has based its activities, despite these changes, on traditional concepts of peacekeeping operations. Normally the *modus operandi* developed on the basis of a Security Council resolution evolves into an operational concept that is static in nature: using a network of positions to be able to observe, report and react. Exploring the possibilities and advantages of a more mobile approach never arises. Research in this respect has shown that the customary principles and practices of peacekeeping are sometimes inadequate as a basis for initiating and sustaining large scale multifunctional missions, undertaken in the context of the current operational environments within which the UN operates. Self-imposed operational restraints, which characterise UN peacekeeping, are now seriously undermining the ability of peace forces to carry out their assigned missions. These self-imposed operational restraints include:

- unclear and/or insufficient mandates;
- the lack of an integrated strategy operating between the different components of a mission, and the consequent inability to work toward one common goal;
- the absence of, or incomplete, planning prior to deployment;
- restrictions on information gathering and intelligence operations;
- restrictions on the use of coercive measures and force within the ROEs (Rules of Engagement);
- the absence of a universal doctrine for UN peace operations;
- the absence of a universal training curriculum for UN operations;
- the reluctance to subject contributed manpower to adequate screening mechanisms before acceptance;
- difficult and slow logistical support systems; and
- the effects of the geographical spread of military contingents and administrative personnel.

All the constraints mentioned here, some not new to the historical experience of peacekeeping, point to weaknesses accentuated by the necessity for operating in the context of a changed operational environment. From these flaws emerge the new challenges to be met by the UN before its success in all spheres of a peace operation may be guaranteed. It is no longer good enough simply to feed the hungry, care for the sick, or hold elections regardless of the consequences. It is time to seek lasting resolutions to conflict situations.

GENERAL CHALLENGES TO MPSOs

This category of challenges was identified in the analysis of the eleven case studies undertaken in 1995,¹⁵ and in the interpretation of responses to the **Practitioners' Questionnaire on**

Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilisation during Peacekeeping Operations.

Included are:

- the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment;
- the lack of co-ordination of efforts among:

1) the regional and international communities; and

2) the various groups involved in the mission.

(Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were better understood.)

Challenges associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment
An analysis of the case studies, mentioned above, permits comparison of challenges associated with the establishment of a secure environment between UN peace operations and those conducted by other multinational efforts. Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe¹⁷ and Namibia-Angola¹⁸ are good examples for demonstrating this point.¹⁹

The case of Somalia (UNOSOM I and II)

The establishment of a secure environment was essential to the success of each of the peace processes in Somalia, and yet it was never the centre of gravity of the missions. There seems to have been a constant subordination of the security objective to that of food distribution and humanitarian assistance. Aid here came before security.

In UNOSOM I and II, the international community was unwilling to exercise an independent political authority which would have positioned it above the warlords. The UN thus became just another faction in the conflict.

The international community did not commit itself to decisive action because it insisted on securing maximum consent from dubious warlords, since there was no central authority. This inability to engage in more decisive action occurred despite the fact that two of the Somalia operations were authorised or mandated as Chapter VII operations. The warlords benefited from this situation by exploiting the status awarded to them by the international community. This, in turn, led to the freezing of large components of the operations.

The case of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Unlike Somalia, Rhodesia was not a failed state. The government of the day exercised power as far as normal government functions were concerned. Rhodesia had a well developed bureaucratic infrastructure, well-trained and disciplined armed forces, and an effective, well-positioned police force.

When the Lancaster House agreements were signed, the system was effectively handed over to the appointed governor, who had full control of services. Thus, law and order inside the country were maintained. The only gamble in the peace process was the possibility that the different parties to the agreement would lose control over their armed forces. Such a loss of control would have erupted into a full-scale civil war, the consequence of which might have been a failed state. Fortunately, this did not happen, for many reasons, the most important of which,

from a military point of view, were the following:

- The Rhodesian Security Forces were well disciplined and had a good command and control structure. The force was therefore able to be controlled and held accountable for its actions.
- Although the distrust and inherent insecurity of the guerrillas were evidenced in the way in which they assembled (partly, and only with young fighters, while veterans were kept in Mozambique) and in the fact that they kept their weapons, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force went a long way towards winning back the guerrillas' trust. Again, a reasonable amount of control was established which, in turn, led to the maintenance of an environment secure enough for demobilisation.
- Proper control, direction and monitoring of the existing police force ensured sufficient maintenance of law and order during the transitional period. This, in turn, created a feeling of security within the country and kept the different parties from resorting to violence based on their perceptions of insecurity.

The case of Namibia (UNTAG) and Angola (UNAVEM I and II)

Further contrasts in the issue of maintaining a secure environment can be seen in the Namibia *versus* Angola situation. In the case of UNTAG in Namibia, a secure enough environment was established to allow the political process to take its course. The system of control established by UNTAG in Namibia left the local government with enough power to sustain the normal government functions within the region and to maintain daily government on a sound, effective basis. This provided effective administration, the rule of law, and the rendering of services, which enhanced the security of the environment. By establishing effective authority, UNTAG curbed the local government enough to permit the functioning of the mission and the achievement of the mandate in a credible manner.

By contrast, even at the start of the second mission in Angola, UNAVEM II, the danger of the self-implementing nature of the peace accords became evident when both sides failed to place all their troops in the established cantonment areas by the agreed deadline. No system of political control or accountability was established by UNAVEM in Angola, and it left the local government with all the power it needed to run the demobilisation and political process as it saw fit. The disarmament and demobilisation of both forces, and their integration into an all-new Angolan Defence Force – to be completed before the start of the elections – never took place as was intended. Not surprisingly, the security environment inside the country was very volatile. No proper system of law and order existed, nor did the government of Angola possess the resources or the ability to establish a secure environment in which the different belligerent parties could feel confident enough to demobilise.

In analysing these four cases, it is possible to say that the focus of the operations in Somalia, Angola, etc., should not have been on a level with the factions, but above them, like in Namibia, Cambodia and Rhodesia. In international conflicts, the primary objective of peace efforts in the past was to achieve a cessation of hostilities. It has proven to be the case consistently that the UN, rather than supporting a standard or concept of authority to facilitate a local transition, adopts the nature of authority locally. It tends to manoeuvre in the direction of maximum consent and even accepts restrictions placed on it by the parties. This means that the UN is not willing to exercise independent political authority.

Recommendations are clear: the establishment of a secure environment could render the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. A concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was under way.

CHALLENGES CONCERNING LACK OF CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORTS

This challenge applies both to: 1) international interactions between the mission and the neighbouring countries, and to: 2) the internal components of the peace operation itself. In order to explore these problem further, the cases of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Somalia, Namibia and Angola will be examined once again.

International interactions between the peace operation and neighbouring countries

The case of Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe

Here the international community exerted its political authority and co-ordinated its efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Although the transition of Rhodesia to a fully democratic state was essentially a Commonwealth responsibility, the diplomatic and political actions of different Commonwealth and other states in assisting the process sharply contrasts with the international community's actions in the Somalian case.

- From the start, the different Commonwealth states stood firmly behind the mandate that they had given to the British Government. At the same time, the United States and the 'front-line' states remained committed and supportive throughout the transition process, providing the British Government with the diplomatic and political authority to see it through.
- During both the initial negotiations and the transitional arrangement time frame, regional government actors offered support to the peace process at decisive times. On at least three occasions, the willingness of member states to support the British initiatives resolved stalemates in the process.

The case of Somalia

Unlike Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, neighbouring states were in no position to assist crisis prevention or resolution in Somalia. Nor were they in a position to interact effectively with the peace operation once it had been mandated.

- Somalia's immediate neighbours, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, were each engrossed with some of the most difficult problems of nationbuilding in Africa. Indeed, in 1991, Kenya, the strongest of these states, was threatened by economic collapse and increased political instability. Ethiopia was on the verge of collapse as a result of the military successes of the separatist movement in Eritrea.²⁰
- It was therefore left to the OAU and the League of Arab States (LAS) to assume the responsibility for mediating the crisis and, if necessary, intervene to re-establish some form of order. After a first attempt by the OAU to mediate in 1991, the LAS took up the Somali problem in 1992. In both cases, lack of funds and of necessary expertise meant

that the situation could not be controlled.²¹

- Other external actors and international organisations which might have stepped in earlier were daunted by the absolute state of famine, violence and anarchy in Somalia, and the sheer cost of doing anything to salvage the situation. International attention was finally achieved through the wrenching media reports which were coming out of the country.

Of the situation in Somalia, Adibe remarks, "*the timidity of early efforts by the OAU and LAS to arrest, or at least to contain, the Somali conflict arose from their institutional weaknesses, especially in the area of collective security.*"²²

This weakness, in turn, led to the establishment of an *ad hoc* and confusing communication pattern between these regional organisations and the UN.²³ The contacts were only possible when multinational forces were about to be assembled or deployed, but these efforts could not be sustained throughout the course of the UN Somalia missions.

Moreover, by the time external actors got involved in the Somalia tragedy, the international community was already suffering from 'crisis fatigue', a situation which slowed down the level of support needed and which explains much concerning the shifts between the UNOSOM, UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions.

The case of Namibia and Angola

Here again the issue of international support and co-ordination comes to the fore and demonstrates a contrast, similar to that found between the cases of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Somalia. During UNTAG, unity of effort existed within the international community to resolve the Namibian question. This generated the political will to press the issue to its conclusion and provided the support for sustaining the effort. The breakdown of the Cold War ended the power game in the region and provided the opportunity for both South Africa and Cuba to withdraw military forces. By contrast, the initial peace accords for the settlement of the internal conflict in Angola were largely negotiated and drawn up by the two warring parties. The international impetus was used to ensure successful completion of UNTAG. Nevertheless, and by contrast with Namibia, political clout from the superpowers and international organisations to force the parties to adhere to the agreements they themselves had drawn up was lacking. UNAVEM II was given only a limited role in the peace plan, while the MPLA and UNITA were largely responsible for the greater part of the implementation of the accords.

The difference between international support for UNTAG and that which was lent to the implementation of the Angolan peace accords (UNAVEM II) stemmed from the fact that the world was no longer concerned with events in that region. Events in Eastern Europe, Asia and Somalia, as well as the large ongoing peace operations in Cambodia and elsewhere, had created enough diversion for the monitoring operation to go awry without being noticed.

Lack of co-ordination between the internal components of the peace operation itself

In the case of Somalia, the co-ordination problems were more internal than international. They involved the lack of co-ordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the missions: the inter- and intra-state mission commands, the civil and military components, and the humanitarian aid organisations.

- There were often conflicting national and international interests among the contributors to

these peace processes. These impacted negatively on the disarmament component of all three operations.

- The large number of participating countries in UNOSOM II also led to fragile command and control structures, national micro-management of contingents, and the imposition of limitations on the use of manpower. Command and control channels were indirect, slow and vague.
- The three peace processes – but in particular UNOSOM II – suffered from the lack of a joint doctrine, defined structures, and clear procedures. Directing and co-ordinating all civilian and military field operations towards one common goal thus became difficult, if not impossible.
- As in most international operations with these characteristics, there was no joint management system fusing the military, civilian and humanitarian relief components of the missions. This lack of joint management was exacerbated by the absence of effective systems for gathering information, which would have helped to avoid open confrontation. The lack of management was also aggravated by the growing need to protect civilian components engaged in humanitarian missions. This need put a strain on scant military manpower which, compounded with media pressure and the lack of effective information gathering systems, created resentment and distrust, thus undermining the missions' unity of effort.

In Somalia, the need for a joint doctrine/procedure within the UN system to unite the civilian and military missions, aims, objectives and the sharing of the responsibility for reaching these, was evident. The liaison between the UN's military and civilian components and NGOs also needed some kind of formalisation. A common goal shared by NGOs and the military did exist in Somalia, but it resulted from the force of circumstances. Even this forced co-operation had become strained by the time the transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II took place. The arrival of international bureaucracies restricted goodwill. The whole process demonstrated the need for a well-defined structure and procedure to direct and co-ordinate field operations towards one common goal.²⁴

The Commonwealth Mission in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Once again, this was the exception to the rule. The CMF was in essence a British force with a unitary command and control system, and under direct orders of the governor (and therefore the British Government). This meant that a uniform 'value system' existed throughout Rhodesia as far as monitoring operations and assembly were concerned. Only one commander controlled operations in the whole of the territory. The fact that the appointed governor was effectively in charge of all operations in Rhodesia, as well as the agencies of the government of the day, implied a close working relationship between the political, military, police and relief components of the mission. This translated into formalised co-operation and a working relationship directed towards a common goal with one set of norms.

The cases of Namibia and Angola

These demonstrate the same problems related to the lack of:

- integrated strategies between the different components of the mission;

- integrated command and control structures;
- joint planning mechanisms; and
- proper communication and reporting systems.

These deficiencies were painfully evident, for example, in Namibia. The Force Commander reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) only with regard to the political aspects of his mandate. As far as technical matters were concerned, he answered directly to the office of Special Political Affairs in New York. This dual axis of command made it uncertain as to whether the Force Commander's position was totally subordinate to, or somewhat on a par with that of the SRSG. Strained relations between the force commander and the SRSG led to the appointment of a civilian Deputy Special Representative whose main role was to restore the breach in the command set-up by co-ordinating the military and civilian components of UNTAG.²⁵ His appointment further reduced face-to-face interaction between the Force Commander and the SRSG. UNAVEM II suffered a similar fate.

PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS

Challenges concerning the establishment of a secure environment and those related to the lack of co-ordination between and within missions severely impinge on the processes which are often required within the mandates of these missions. For example, those peace operations which have registered the worst problems with weapons' management programmes are also those that had the greatest difficulties in establishing security and co-ordination of efforts. For this reason, it is possible to reach the following conclusions.

The establishment of a secure environment must come first to ensure stability – this requires clear political authority and policy guidelines. Missions where this was not the case were Somalia, Angola, the former Yugoslavia, and Liberia. The operation where this was more clearly developed was Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In this case, the secure environment and effective co-ordination mechanisms served to balance some of the problems which undoubtedly threatened the process from the start. Repetition of this model might, however, be difficult in future cases, as the international and national contexts of the time were very different from those prevalent today. It is clear that in the case of Rhodesia, the following features stand out, calling for further research:

- the impact of the provision of reasonable security to belligerent parties on their willingness to demobilise;
- the relationship between a willingness to disarm and the different stages of a demobilisation process; and
- the importance of unity of command and international co-operation in supporting peace processes.

Relations between and within the groups involved in a peacekeeping effort must be well co-ordinated. No case reviewed was totally satisfactory in this respect, with the possible exception of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (CMF) operation and perhaps the Central American UN missions: ONUCA and ONUSAL. Although Namibia, Mozambique, Haiti and Cambodia showed an interest in co-ordination from their earliest phases, they all experienced, to a greater or lesser extent, problems in this regard. The worst cases here were those of Angola, Somalia, the former

Yugoslavia, and Liberia.

Sometimes the mix between the lack of effective security and the lack of effective co ordination – a characteristic of missions which occur in failed states – can destroy a mission almost at its outset. This was particularly true in Angola: UNAVEM II was very difficult to execute due to the vastness of the country, its devastated infrastructure, and the lack of equipment and means to overcome these problems on the part of the mission. As was the case in UNTAG, the interaction between the military and civilian components of the mission was badly flawed. The way in which the two components interacted was poor and damaged the overall performance of the mission. The political decisions made by UNAVEM II reflect the fact that the HQ in Luanda lost touch with the situation on the ground, even though the observers indicated that the evidence of a resumption in hostilities was clear from early on in the mission.

If this category of challenges were differently understood and implemented, MPSOs would have the potential for success. Thus, it is possible to say that:

- a peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and co ordination between the international effort and the nations that immediately neighbour the stricken country;
- the co-ordination must not simply be present at the international level, it must permeate the entire peace operation as well;
- to obtain maximum effect, relations must be co-ordinated between and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of co-ordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organisations working in the field; these components must co-operate with each other if the mission is to realise its desired outcome; and
- once problems with mission co-ordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties can be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms, all of which were present in one form or another in Bosnia/Croatia (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), Angola (UNAVEM I and II), and Liberia.

SPECIFIC CHALLENGES TO MULTIFUNCTIONAL MISSIONS

Important as they are, the problems associated with the maintenance of a secure environment and those of maintaining healthy interaction are in themselves a product of several related factors. Taken together, these impinge on the success of a mission and its goals. The most important of these are the issues arising from mandate specificity, consent and doctrine; and those related to rules of engagement and consensual *versus* coercive measures applied in the field.

Mandate specificity, consensus, and doctrine

"Security Council procedures when mandating a peace operation are important in that, together, they [constitute] clear and feasible mandates for these operations. But it is also necessary that [with the resolution] they jointly interact to govern and administer the missions, once these are deployed. In addition, when the time comes, [procedures and mandates] should both work

together in [closing it] down.²⁶ Although the political environment of Security Council decisions does not allow for excessive clarification on procedures and objectives, there are some points on which specificity might be improved:

- *The various members of the Security Council, the membership of the UN, the troop contributing countries and the Secretariat need to seek consensus on the political utilisation and management of peacekeeping operations. A continued dialogue between all participants to this process is needed.*
- *A new consensus must be reached on the manner in which the financial costs are to be distributed among the members. This involves not only the UN's need to rationalise existing resources but the recognition by member states that it is in their interests to finance a UN peacekeeping operation rather than acting alone in unilateral interventions or in a coalition of member states. The latter are far more costly than peacekeeping operations.*
- *A better effort at transparency and information exchange is needed. It is important that member states, and also the Secretariat, significantly increase their efforts to explain, on a continuous basis, the nature, potentiality and evolution of peacekeeping operations. This fact is particularly relevant to troop-contributing countries that require an active support of their respective public opinions.*
- *The Security Council, unrestricted at last at the end of the Cold War, should seek increasing efficiency in its work and should search for a growing transparency and accountability. In the end, these factors will strengthen the legitimacy of its actions. In this sense, there is an increasing convergence of views between permanent and non-permanent members, as well as a significant rise in opinions to this effect emerging from the General Assembly."²⁷*

To improve the mechanisms that have led to error in the interpretation of mandates dealing with peace support operations, a few suggestions are put forward here. These relate, above all, to the question of mandate specificity. The elements of a mandate²⁸ appear in three different documents: the peace agreements between warring parties, the Secretary-General's Reports and the Security Council resolutions. In all three, certain modifications might be made:

- *"The peace agreement offers the ideal framework for bringing specificity to mandates, since consensus is expected during its implementation, making it imperative to have the explicit consent of the parties to the goals and modalities of the mission.*
- *The Secretary General's reports inform the Security Council of the concept of the operation which it plans to implement and the different possibilities related to it. It is therefore imperative that the reports contain enough technical precision and information, as well as making reference to the lessons learnt in past operations at the UN. Such precision might prove fundamental in choosing operating guidelines to add to the body of a Security Council resolution for the mandate of a peace operation.*
- *The Security Council Resolutions constitute the legal basis for the establishment of a peace mission. They also channel a clear message to warring parties, international communities and public opinions, and to the Secretariat which is in charge of implementation. As such, although for political reasons resolutions need not detail the concept of an operation, they must provide clear overall objectives and stress aspects*

*relevant to each case. Through this mechanism much can be done to ensure adequate recognition of disarmament and arms control needs. For example, the Council could evaluate the possibility of establishing preventive measures related to the trade of weapons in the establishment and enforcement of an arms embargo; it could also provide guarantees to warring parties to facilitate their consent to light and heavy weapons disarmament tasks, and thus build confidence between the factions."*²⁹

These suggestions might reinforce the capability of member states in their decision to react to a specific international problem while ensuring that the options of the mission commander are better evaluated and interpreted in the implementation of peace missions.

Since the mission mandates in many UN peace operations have not been as efficient or useful for disarmament purposes as originally envisaged, the issue of mandate specificity is of prime importance. Nevertheless, although a need exists for modalities and means of facilitating missions to be spelled out clearly at the outset, the lack of precision and specificity in Security Council mandates is often quite intentional. Agreement at Security Council level does not always signify agreement on the underlying cause of the conflict, as has been the case in the former Yugoslavia.³⁰ Thus, when the Security Council chooses to act, the Secretariat is left with the task of implementing policy which, if implementable at all, often contains the seeds of long term difficulties.

On the other hand, there were those cases where the specifics were present, but were not implemented, as was the case in the demobilisation and disarmament component of the ONUMOZ mission in Mozambique.³¹

Ideally, the elements required to avoid these problems are:

- mandates which include clearly expressed long term political and administrative objectives. To achieve this, Security Council members must have a framework of analysis to assist them in their decision-making prior to involvement in a conflict. This would allow the members to decide whether they really wanted to order a mission in cases where the UN presence itself might not reinforce the political processes needed to resolve the conflict in the first place;
- a mechanism for adapting or adjusting mandates in a pre-emptive rather than reactive manner, as well as a system of budgeting and approval procedures which would assist rather than delay the implementation of mandated operations; and
- the inclusion of an independent operational guideline for each mission which would then be attached to the mandate. Often interpretation of obscure mandates leads to excessive or insufficient action. Clear and rigid guidelines must be given.

Once a resolution from the Security Council mandates a peace operation, a further source for interpretation problems lies with member states of troop-contributing countries. Each country has a different doctrine that oversees the use of its armed forces for peacekeeping purposes. For some analysts, consent, neutrality, impartiality and minimal force used only in self-defence have long been the defining aspects of peacekeeping. Since 1989, however, peacekeeping has fundamentally changed. *"The proliferation of challenges to which peacekeepers must respond and the introduction of new peacekeeping participants has led to the creation of various, new national peacekeeping doctrines. When different armies speak of consent, neutrality, and impartiality, they now mean different things."*³²

It is possible to say that, operationally, in the 1990s consent, neutrality, and impartiality have proven anything but straightforward. Take consent, for example. We see that it has proven to be strong or weak, lasting or transitory; indeed, in civil wars it may be unclear as to whose consent is necessary. In Cambodia, Angola, and Rwanda, the UN deployed troops and administrators to help implement peace accords, only to have one or more of the parties subsequently withdraw their consent. Consent at theatre level has not always coincided with consent at operational level, as UN forces meet local commanders who drag their heels at meeting their apparent obligations. Consent in the larger sense of acceptance of a mission has not necessarily translated into consent in carrying out all the components of a peace accord, especially in the sensitive area of disarmament. Finally, in cases like Bosnia and Somalia, where consent at theatre level was lacking, UN units on the ground were sometimes able to gain sporadic consent from local authorities.³³

It is important to indicate here that *"the prospects for success for an operation where the UN is in the direct chain-of-command seem to be generally limited only to consensual peacekeeping, whether traditional or multi-functional."*³⁴

If this is the case – as almost all case studies of UN peace operations indicate – one of the key questions is whether *"a consensual peacekeeping operation must necessarily accept limitations on the implementation of mandated missions ..."*³⁵

While this point is arguable, *"its consideration is triggered by the analysis of the questionnaires on Somalia ... Rather than manoeuvring in the direction of maximum consent, accepting restrictions imposed by the parties, it might have been better ... if the UN force had retained a position above the parties."*³⁶

This comment reflects on the way the process of disarmament in Somalia *"was derailed as soon as one or more of the factions were no longer in agreement with the process."*³⁷ Even though, particularly at the end of the UNPROFOR experience, the UN is *"disenchanted with anything which smacks of enforcement,"*³⁸ there is still much to say for the potential that consensual peacekeeping has for achieving disarmament missions: *"Peacekeepers may not be able to play a coercive military card, but the case studies illustrate that they can have other sources of leverage."*³⁹ These include:

- a reputation for objectivity in monitoring and implementing agreements;
- a willingness to expose cheating, should it be uncovered;
- the co-operation of a local populace weary of war and of rule by gun;
- the support of outside powers, such as in the UNTAC, ONUCA, and UNPROFOR cases; and
- the 'CNN card', whereby peacekeepers can threaten to expose ill-will or inhumane behaviour on the Central News Network, not only to the other parties, but to the court of international public opinion.⁴⁰

A set of four rules for improving the chances of a peacekeeping force in undertaking mandates might be contemplated to correct problems and help towards the achievement of mission goals:

- *"Peacekeepers must have the resources and determination to do the job and must insure that the parties understand this. Resources include people, material (such as trucks, aeroplanes, sensors), and access to sources of information the peacekeepers cannot provide for themselves. This rule is so basic as to cause one to wonder why it needs to be mentioned at all, but the fact is that the UN has too often not had enough capability to do a proper job of weapons control in consensual peacekeeping."*⁴¹
- *"UN forces should absolutely minimize the amount of time it takes to deploy an effective monitoring and reporting capability. The speed and effectiveness of the UN's response seems to correlate with the respect the parties will accord the UN, and their willingness to cooperate and firm up their provisional consent."*⁴²
- *"Peacekeepers must act decisively immediately upon arrival and respond firmly to challenges. The start of a UN operation seems to be a period when the parties are somewhat hesitant or uncertain as to what to expect and how far they can challenge the UN. That they will challenge is certain, if for no other reason than to probe how far they can go. Such probing occurs not only at the start of a mission but also when new contingents arrive to replace those going on to other duties. Once peacekeepers make a concession or back off, it is difficult for them to return to the status quo ante and it encourages further challenges."*
- *"Peacekeepers must act uniformly and respond uniformly to challenges. Both the case studies and questionnaire responses reveal that a lack of uniformity can entirely vitiate a force's effectiveness. Those seeking to cheat will find the weak spots and those desiring peace will become disillusioned. In addition, the UN force may split internally as those who see themselves as holding the line come to believe they are being undercut by their own colleagues."*

Rules of Engagement and consensual versus coercive disarmament

These sets of problems lead directly to an exploration of the problems associated with rules of engagement and consensual disarmament operations. *"The rules of engagement, their use and their effect can be a critical factor in the success or failure of disarmament operations in UN missions. Since rules of engagement relate to the use of force they also touch on some of the most sensitive and politically difficult aspects of the operation."*⁴⁵

It is not surprising then that *"UNIDIR questionnaire respondents pointed out that one of the disadvantages in operating multi-nationally was the inconsistent implementation of the rules of engagement by national contingents. Although the RoE for the operations in question were clear for all members of the mission, they were interpreted and implemented differently by different national contingents."*⁴⁶

One general recommendation proposed on this issue centres on ensuring greater dissemination of the rules of engagement *"to the international media and providing explanations of how they might be used or applied in practice."*⁴⁷ This effort should be made at the *"beginning of an operation and then reiterated if incidents arise which raise questions about the rules of engagement."*⁴⁸ Even if they are classified, this should *"not prevent broad discussion of the objectives and purpose of the rules of engagement with the media."*⁴⁹ This might help towards gaining overall clarity in the objectives of the operation and the way people engage in it.

Differences or misinterpretation related to rules of engagement have grave consequences for a

peace operation. They impact directly on three vital issues: establishment of secure environments, readiness, and the fragility of consensual disarmament. These are:

- *"The Importance of a Secure Environment: Although UNOSOM II inherited a 'secure' environment from UNITAF, and although it used the same basic RoE, it was unable to maintain that secure environment. This was certainly a contributing factor to the mission's problems. This raises the question of the sequence of the tasks. Would the situation have been different if UNITAF had used its Chapter VII authority to undertake a serious disarmament mission as a way of establishing a secure environment, rather than simply establishing a secure environment through the presence of overwhelming force? Had disarmament occurred first, resulting in a secure environment, would that have paved the way for the Chapter VI goals of the UNOSOM mandate to be pursued without being hindered by the task of forcefully disarming key factions?"⁵⁰*
- *"The Role of Perceptions and Overwhelming Force: The failure of the peace process in Angola, and the experience in Somalia, raise difficult questions ... When parties to a conflict sign a peace agreement and ask for UN support in its implementation, and when the disarmament elements of the process are critical to the success of the peace agreement, should the UN go to the mission prepared and equipped to enforce the implementation if necessary? That is, even in missions based [on] Chapter VI, where disarmament formed a critical part of the process, the UN would send troops equipped to enforce the agreement (under Chapter VII) if the parties began to violate the agreement or the process faltered. The shift would require a change in mandate, but when that occurred those on the ground would already be prepared for the shift. The advantage in working this way would be that, in tenuous situations where agreement exists but is fragile, and where UN assistance has been requested, the demonstration effect of such a commitment on the part of the international community might keep the process on track. This approach is similar to the original idea of peace enforcement units outlined by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace. While this is ... a decidedly more costly way of operating [in the near term], over the long term it is always less expensive to prevent a deterioration of the process than to deal with the effects of further conflict ..." ⁵¹*
- *"'Consensual versus Coercive'. Both the UNPROFOR and the UNOSOM II operations had mandates which were based on Chapter VI of the Charter but invoked Chapter VII. Both operations also occurred in situations where fighting was ongoing" and where the level of consent varied. These experiences suggest that: a) "consent in situations of ongoing conflict should not be expected. Even if consent is achieved, as long as the conflict continues, the odds are that the consent of one of the parties will be withdrawn at a later point"; b) "operations without consent [means] effectively a combat situation"; and, c) "a situation of ongoing conflict should not be attempted without giving the operation enforcement rules of engagement and troops and equipment adequate to the task."⁵² "As regards enforcement or coercive measures, the UN never took a clear-cut position."⁵³*
- *After an exhaustive exploration of the characteristics of both consensual and coercive measures, it is possible to make certain observations.*

In peacekeeping operations, neither consensual nor coercive measures are an end in themselves. They are instruments of a military adjustment process that is carried out with the help of peacekeeping forces. Nor are consensual and coercive measures mutually exclusive: mandated operations can be carried out voluntarily under Chapter VII or coerced under Chapter VI. Compellence can act as a substitute for actual force in Chapter VI operations. It is a second

best solution for countering decaying consent, while at the same time holding on to the principle of impartiality. The key to success appears to lie with those UN Sector Commanders who can walk the invisible tightrope separating co-operation from coercion.⁵⁴

PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS

One of the principal conclusions reached at this point is that, at the tactical level, it is possible to achieve the enforcement of mandated operations during operations where there is strategic and operational consent. To implement their mandated tasks, peacekeeping and multifunctional missions – unlike enforcement operations – rely on having the consent of the belligerent parties, at least at the strategic and operational levels. For this reason, such missions depend for their success on consent-promoting techniques.

This is the case because consent is likely to be anything but absolute. In theory, depending on the volatility of the general environment, it is unlikely to be more than partial and could amount to nothing more than a tolerance of presence. Consent is something that peacekeepers can expect to have bits of: from certain people, in certain places, for certain things, and certain periods of time. *"Consent at the tactical level will derive from local events and prevailing popular opinion. It will be subject to frequent change and its boundary will, therefore, be mobile and poorly defined."*⁵⁵

The identification of the critical consent divide⁵⁶ allows the use of force to be addressed in a way that takes full account of its wider connotations. This is particularly the case when consensual disarmament operations are enforced.⁵⁷ If a strong consensual framework reduces the status of armed opposition to that of maverick banditry, a demonstrably reasonable and proportionate force may be employed against it without fear of fracturing the consent divide. For this reason, the enforcement measures may represent a valid consensual peacekeeping technique. Consent can facilitate, rather than hinder, enforcement measures. On other occasions, it may be that coercive measures must be used in a way that breaches the tactical edge of the consent divide, but stability can be retained if the operational boundary of consent remains intact.⁵⁸

Different countries interpret the needs and realities of MPSOs in different ways. The ensuing confusion is not helped by the lack of clear guidelines or mandates from the strategic level of an operation (the UN Secretariat and the Security Council). Finally, confusion also occurs at the operational level of the mission, where rules of engagement are often not translated adequately enough to ensure that peacekeepers at the tactical level are properly aware of what they can and must do to implement the mandate they have received.

CHALLENGES THAT COULD ENHANCE MISSION PERFORMANCE

The third category of challenges to MPSOs includes those that emerge from the study of the two prior sets, but at more operative levels. These issues represent a set of needs that have not been addressed so far in peace processes. First and foremost of these, for the successful maintenance of a secure environment and for effective action during peace operations, is information gathering. A second issue relates to the role and influence of the media during peace operations. A third concerns the training of peacekeepers for multifunctional missions. A fourth refers to the status of civil-military interactions during a mission.

Information gathering

In order to execute his mandate, a military commander needs to be able to detect the movement

of belligerent forces, determine the location of hidden arms caches, and anticipate the plans and tactics of those who intend to violate agreements and threaten the execution of the mission mandate. It is evident, therefore, that an effective information gathering system is needed early on in the peace mission. *"For a contingent not to be given the resources to undertake such basic tasks only encourages the parties to lose confidence in the whole process. A party wishing to abide by the rules can never feel confident that it will know whether or not the other side is abiding as well."*⁵⁹

What this boils down to is a need for a sound information gathering, assessment and distribution system in the theatre of operations. Nearly all respondents to the UNIDIR questionnaire, for example, mention the need for a proper intelligence system during peace operations. The importance of this capability cannot be over-emphasised. Related to good intelligence is the need to be a step ahead of the opposition and to anticipate their moves. When confronted with periodic violations, deliberate breaches of agreements and even sporadic attacks, it is important to have information which enables one to anticipate and prepare in a pre-emptive manner to counter or lessen the effect of these outbreaks on the overall success of the mission. Accurate warning will allow for more effective counter measures and provide an opportunity to disrupt threatening behaviour before it is launched. This requires good intelligence, the ability to evaluate and disseminate information, and the ability to react rapidly.⁶⁰

Despite the importance of this element in many aspects of the successful implementation of a peace operation, information gathering in the field has been neglected at best; shunned at worst. This may be due to several factors, among which the following stand out:

- Misperceptions regarding information gathering: belligerent parties may perceive information gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust that the parties may have in the peacekeeping force. However, it is reasonable to assume that the parties will pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping force. They may also attempt to deceive it from time to time. Circumstances may place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious problem, but whatever the circumstances, the peacekeepers need information and must have the ability to collect it. The way in which it is gathered is important, since it should, as far as possible, not create stones for the belligerent parties to throw back at the peacekeeping force.
- Confusion in determining the information requirements needed: threat capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining information requirements. It is difficult for a commander to make a decision when the situation is not reasonably clear. There may also be a requirement for economic, political, sociological, medical and other information. It is therefore unthinkable that an operation can be successful without proper, shared information gathering capabilities.⁶¹

Thus, to create the desired result in the field, peace support missions need to do the following:

- develop and implement an information gathering system to provide the mission HQ with political and military intelligence. This system must provide for tactical and strategic intelligence to change the concept of the operation from a reactive to a pre-emptive posture on both the political and military fronts;
- develop an early warning capability and system of analysis that provides the information

for making decisions for intervention based on facts rather than emotions;

- promote transparency by sharing the information with all parties concerned, when and if required;
- define information gathering parameters. The intelligence community must define information gathering requirements for supporting the military commitment as early as possible. This is crucial because the re-deployment and planning phases of the operation require optimum support. Once deployed, a unit or formation should develop its own requirements and information gathering plan in conjunction with the operational plan, and submit it, through the proper channels of command, for approval;
- focus on operational planning considerations;
- ensure force security. To ensure the safety of assigned forces, the commander must have the capability to disseminate critical indications and warnings to all echelons quickly. A robust theatre architecture must be in place to provide accurate and timely all-source information. This information must be formatted clearly and be at the disposal of the whole force deployed; and
- improve the observation skills of the peacekeepers. Mission success and the security of the force depend almost entirely on the observation skills of the personnel and the leadership of the small unit. In the absence of other systems, human intelligence may be the primary source of timely information. This is also the first line of defence against any threat and is a critical factor in determining mission success. It must be developed to its full potential during every military peace operation.

The interaction between the peace mission and the media

Peacekeeping operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. By using satellites and other modern communications technology, the press is able to distribute reports and pictures faster than ever before. Incidents, sometimes embellished or slanted toward a partisan viewpoint, are screened on television the same day and the next morning are in the press to excite audiences in those countries that are parties to the dispute, as well as their allies. The role of the press during delicate negotiations is indeed of incalculable importance. When information is withheld, journalists fall back on speculation. Such speculation, although usually inaccurate, is often close enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large sections of public opinion, and even by governments. Belligerents may sometimes find it advantageous to leak part of a story to the press to build public support for their own position. On occasion, such activities can grow into fully orchestrated press campaigns.

Certain of the warring parties in Somalia understood this 'media weapon' extremely well, staging events to get to the soft underbelly of the democratic world – public opinion. In such circumstances, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the UN mission in Somalia to set the record straight without destroying its neutrality. An opposition tactic was to stage a demonstration and attempt to provoke peacekeepers. Women and children would be deliberately mixed into organised crowds to complicate the problem of control. An example was the demonstration staged on 13 June 1993 in front of a Pakistani strong point. (Not by accident, the site selected was next to the only press centre in the city.) As the crowd was nearing the Pakistani position, shots were fired at the soldiers from the top of nearby buildings and from the crowd. The Pakistanis returned fire, wounding some of the civilians. The organisers reached

their goal: to present to the press an image of a UN out of control, beamed across the world within minutes after the event had taken place. It would have been far preferable to have been able to disperse this organised crowd with non-lethal means, thus preventing a contrived demonstration from becoming damaging in terms of world opinion.⁶²

The issue of the relationship between the media and the peace operation is of considerable importance. This was clearly the case in both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, to give but two examples. UN missions must accept the fact that the media will be present in any theatre of operations, and that it plays a major role in keeping families informed and in determining, to a great extent, how the world public will perceive the operation. The approach of the headquarters of a mission to the media can either enhance greatly, or sink a mission. The challenge posed to the mission headquarters is to deal with the needs of the media, to implement effective information/briefing sessions, and to build a trustworthy relationship with the journalists.

Training

The primary mission of military forces is to protect the national interests of their respective countries through deterrence and to engage in war should that deterrence fail. Recently, however, the international environment has evolved so that peace operations are a more common event for armed forces than ever before. Most of the growing number of armed forces that have served in peace operations have realised that these operations are different from combat. Our research, however, has established the indisputable fact that professional armed forces, commanded by professional officers, properly trained for their primary mission, properly equipped and well-disciplined are the only forces to deploy in peace operations. And further that some specialised training is needed for successful participation in peace operations. Unfortunately, only a few countries have developed specialised means to prepare troops for peace operations. Specialised training must not replace traditional military training, which should, in fact, be modified to include the unique tasks of peace operations.

Initial reading and interpretation of the responses referred to in the Table (p. 78), showed a number of contradictions related to the training of military peacekeepers deployed in over eleven multilateral missions since 1979.

Questions 11.2 and 11.4 clearly show that a majority of peacekeepers believed that arms control and disarmament could have been conducted in the sectors they controlled and that these tasks could have been accomplished more efficiently. These answers prompted an intense study of the specific training responses. As indicated in questions 14.1, 14.3 and 14.4 through 14.8, the most extensive training undertaken was in the area of classical peacekeeping observer tasks. In every other category, less than half of the respondents had been trained for the specific task they had to undertake. Of these categories, the greatest lack of training emerged in arms control and cantonment and in demobilisation techniques.

Another interesting issue emerged when analysing the answers to questions 14.10 and 14.11. Clearly, the peacekeepers felt that lessons had been learned at the end of the mission and that they were properly debriefed afterwards in their home countries. A contradiction emerges at this point: if lessons were learned and the peacekeepers debriefed, the percentages of training given should have been higher. This contradiction might show that the training programmes were not dynamic enough to take into account the lessons learned in the field in readiness for the next mission.

Finally, answers to question 16.4 indicate that less than half of all peacekeepers understood

clearly the relationship between disarmament and post-conflict reconstruction. Of those that did, however, a majority felt that their disarmament task had had a positive effect on the national reconstruction processes in the field.

On the interactions between civilian and military forces, the project asked very few questions. The answer, for example, to question 15.4, which focused on co-operation between these elements and local ones showed that much interaction does occur in the field. Yet, although co-operation and interaction exist at all levels of a peacekeeping mission, there are few training courses for civilian peacekeepers, or for joint training of civilian and military peacekeepers. Most of the contact between these groups is brought about during on-site training; almost none occurs at the pre deployment level.

**UNIDIR QUESTIONNAIRE:
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED QUESTIONS**

QUESTION NO	QUESTION	YES	NO	BLANK	YES %	NO %	BLANK %	TOTAL
Q11.2	Did security situation in the mission area allow arms control and disarmament?	96	42	26	58.5	25.6	17.6	164
Q11.4	Could weapons control and disarmament have been more efficient?	79	52	41	45.9	30.2	23.8	172
Q14.1	Was any pre-deployment training given?	56	87	28	32.75	50.88	16.37	171
Q14.3	Were you trained in arms collection and cantonment?	32	98	41	18.71	57.31	23.98	171
Q14.4	Did you receive training on inspection and observation techniques?	70	67	34	40.94	39.18	19.88	171
Q14.5	Were you trained in verification?	44	89	38	25.73	52.05	22.22	171
Q14.6	Were you trained in weapons control and disarmament?	63	74	34	36.84	43.27	19.88	171
Q14.7	Were you trained in demobilisation?	31	100	34	18.7	60.6	20.6	165
Q14.8	Were you trained in demining?	44	92	35	25.73	53.8	20.47	171
Q14.10	Were any 'lessons learned' compiled at the end of the mission?	104	31	40	59.4	17.7	22.8	175
Q14.11	Were you debriefed in your home country?	103	36	39	57.08	20.2	21.9	178
	Did you think the disarmament tasks which							

Q16.4	you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes?	34	14	120	20.2	8.3	71.4	168
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EXAMPLE OF MILITARY TASKS DURING MULTIFUNCTIONAL MISSIONS	
NEW TASKS	
Control crowds Administer humanitarian relief Validate compliance of accords	Negotiate Prevent refugee flows Establish/administer justice code
TASKS WHICH NEED GREATER EMPHASIS	
Interact with civilians Use of high technology equipment Apply rules of engagement Guard duty	Liaison with foreign forces Counter mine operations Application of International Humanitarian Law Convoy security
Use of force Seize and control buildings Static defences	Marksmanship Interactions with NGOs Disarming belligerents and civilians

Following these answers, the analysis identified needs regarding training, namely:

- to upgrade general pre-deployment training packages in existence at national levels;
- to create courses on specific arms control and disarmament techniques and add them to pre-deployment training packages; and
- to implement more integrated civil-military peacekeeping training in view of the greater interaction between civilians and military operators in a mission.

By the same token, the analysis also highlighted that very little training or debriefing is actually conducted by the UN itself. Most of it is undertaken by the home countries. The experiences of these countries have not been fed back immediately to the training field. In addition, and more importantly, they have not been collected by the UN or other institutions to ensure that the lessons learned are made available to other participating countries or on a more general level.

There are, consequently, three principal items that must be understood in relation to training:

- most military peacekeepers were not trained for specific tasks, since most national contingents believed that basic military training was all that was required to undertake these tasks;
- most military peacekeepers would benefit from an updated pre-deployment curriculum which would take into account the changing nature of peace operations and the increase

in civil-military interactions during these operations; and

- most contemporary peace operations had a strong civilian component at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and yet little training for civilian peacekeepers was being offered by the UN, the nations, or the relief organisations.

A last recommendation that emerged from the analysis of training for peacekeeping missions is that military peacekeepers must at times act as negotiators and diplomats in the field, brokering partial peace and disarmament agreements at the tactical level. There is no reason, however, why this specific tasks should not be undertaken by trained diplomats to facilitate and to improve interaction and communication between the warring parties and the mission, not only at the strategic and operational levels, but also at the more localised ones.

To sum up, training for a task remains the ultimate responsibility of the organisation employing and deploying personnel. In the case of UN mission, it is the responsibility of the organisation to ensure that the personnel it deploys, are trained. With few financial implications, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can contribute to ensure that mission personnel are properly trained. To achieve this, the UN needs to:

- develop and implement a mandatory national pre-deployment training package for all military and civilian personnel assigned to UN peace operations;
- structure and co-ordinate the proper utilisation of the vast amount of training experience and knowledge available within the system to support missions; and
- develop and implement an easily accessible computerised information system that can provide analysed data on lessons learned, hints on training, etc., and can be accessed from the contributing country.

Civil-military interactions

One of the most difficult things to understand and accept today is the fact that most contemporary multifunctional peace operations are, in fact, civilian operations with military and humanitarian components working closely together. The civil-military affairs in the missions, or between humanitarian and relief organisations and the mission, is characterised by civilian presence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the operation. Analysis of case studies has shown that sometimes it is difficult for military peacekeepers to understand that, even at the most tactical of levels, they will have to cope not only with restraining belligerent parties, but also with assisting the action of humanitarian and civilian components of the mission.

From research undertaken, it is evident that not enough effort has been made towards improving interaction between different mission components and other NGOs in the field. More importantly, the lack of unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels of a mission, and the lack of co-ordination between conflict resolution actors and post conflict reconstruction actors in the field seriously impinges on the effectiveness and smoothness of the missions.

Interaction between the military and civil components of UN missions is not on a healthy footing. To improve the chances for the success of any future mission in the volatile environment of current conflicts, this issue must be addressed and resolved. The joint planning body must find the 'centre of gravity' of an operation, i.e., the single most important event or condition that will

stabilise the situation or reverse the destruction and strife. The organisation and the mission headquarters must then direct all their efforts and resources towards the one identified centre. This will only be possible when:

- the interaction between the military and civilian components of a mission are formalised to such an extent that they can operate in accordance with one integrated strategy towards one common goal;
- the relationship between the military and civilian components of a mission are developed around a formal liaison structure with an integrated joint procedure for planning, information exchange and mutual support;
- overall command and control is reinforced by a joint planning mechanism and procedure for UN missions;
- proper communication and reporting systems are established between UN New York and the mission HQ in the field, and between the mission HQ and the different components deployed in their area of responsibility;
- an effective joint command and control system is created; and
- a joint UN doctrine and Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for civil-military co operation is developed so that daily operations are streamlined.

CONCLUSIONS

Three basic conclusions arise from the set of problems examined above relating to MPSOs, and from the challenges facing such missions.

The first refers to the need to understand peace processes in a holistic manner. The implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society, and the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution:

- the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set up;
- the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and
- the encouragement of close co-operation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

The second conclusion refers to the enforcement of consensual arrangements. In peace operations, particularly in peacekeeping and multifunctional missions, the need to preserve overall consent does not foreclose the use of coercive measures when and if necessary. Nevertheless, at times the peacekeepers do not seem to comprehend the need for the enforcing of these arrangements, even if this was what was agreed at the strategic and operational levels by the warring parties. Thus provision must be made for some leverage, both military and non-

military, to enforce agreements on the tactical level of any peace operation. Such leverage, however, can only benefit the mission if personnel have the right training, sufficient resources, effective information gathering mechanisms, and the willingness to act decisively, uniformly and consistently to meet all challenges.

The final conclusion refers to the environment in which contemporary peace missions must operate. In theory, the possibility of enforcing a mandate does exist. The mechanisms and resources to undertake this are also available. But the environment in which MPSOs are now flourishing makes this task difficult and unattractive. The reasons for this seem to indicate a number of elements:

- an international unwillingness to act for humanitarian reasons, while the internal conflict is still hot and the warring factions are not yet prepared for peace;
- the changing role of military forces world-wide in the wake of the Cold War, and their attempts to attach old needs to new roles, as demonstrated in differing national peacekeeping and peace-enforcing doctrines;
- the desire of member states to use the mechanisms in place at the UN without a comparable desire to secure resources, combined planning and implementation or unity of command; and
- the general insecurity related to new threats to regional and international stability and peace.

In this way, countries offer peacekeepers for multinational efforts without clearly understood objectives, without appropriate training, and without a clear picture of how long their effort should be maintained in the field. Likewise, agencies undertake enormous relief operations without prior co-ordination of objectives, planning or communication mechanisms which are fundamental to the interactions needed in the field for conflict resolution and for the smooth transition between peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction processes in the stricken country.

To sum up, in a context of dwindling resources, horrendously violent internal conflicts, and uncontrolled proliferation of all types of weapons, nations would do well to ensure that the MPSOs they are involved in are as efficient as possible. If they neglect this duty, there will be no lasting peace and the loop of deprivation, violence and war will spiral endlessly.

ENDNOTES

1. UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, Switzerland, 1994 1996. This project, entitled the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project (DCR project), was directed by Virginia Gamba with Jakkie Potgieter as the senior military expert on the project.
2. See, for example, **Army Field Manual**, Vol 5, **Wider Peacekeeping** (Interim draft, 1994), HMSO, London; UN, **Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations**, A/50/60, S/1195/1, 25 January 1995, para. 8-25. Sutterlin and US Army doctrine usefully remind us that even operations viewed as traditional peacekeeping often involved the (temporary) performance of tasks now generally regarded as falling under wider

- peacekeeping. See J Sutterlin, **The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met**, Praeger, Westport, 1995, pp. 24-45; and Department of the Army Headquarters, **Peace Operations Field Manual 100-23**, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 30 December 1994, pp. 5-6.
3. UN Secretary-General, *Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International UN Force requested in Resolution 998 (ES-1), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956*, in R C R Siekman (ed.), **Basic Documents on UN and Related Peace-Keeping Forces**, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 5.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
 5. See United Nations, **The Blue Helmets**, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1990, p. 7.
 6. J Boulden, *Rules of Engagement and Force Structure and Composition in United Nations' Disarmament Operations*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996.
 7. One of the best treatments of this issue is by the French General Staff. See for example, *Etat-Major des Armées, Reflexion sur la conception, la préparation, la planification, le commandement et l'emploi des forces dans les opérations militaires fondées sur une resolution du conseil de sécurité de l'ONU*, paper read at **UNIDIR Conference on Doctrine**, Finland, July 1995.
 8. See D C F Daniel, *Is there a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations? Implications for Crisis Containment and Disarmament*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996, p. 36.
 9. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
 10. A George, **Forceful Persuasion**, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1991, p. 6; also S W Lewis, *Foreword*, in George, *Ibid.*, p. xv.
 11. Although these definition might assist in understanding the differences in the type of mission and the role peace operators must play, labels are, ultimately, not so important as long as all participating forces understand that i) they refer to the same issues even while using different terms; and ii) the political thresholds that can place a mission on the slippery slope between keeping peace and imposing peace are the same for all. This is often not the case.
 12. Potgieter and Gamba, *op. cit.*
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. See DCR project, *op. cit.*
 16. See C Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, in Potgieter and Gamba, *op. cit.*

17. See J Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, in *Ibid.*
18. See V Gamba, J Potgieter and J Ukabiala, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Angola and Namibia*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, (in process), 1997.
19. In view of the extent of the case studies undertaken by the DCR project and the use that authors of policy papers have made of the cases in this volume, only four specific examples will be provided at this time. By choosing these cases, an attempt is made to contrast UN peace operations (Somalia) with other Multinational peace operations (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), and to contrast successful UN peace operations (Namibia) with less successful ones (Angola).
20. Adibe, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Potgieter and Gamba, *op. cit.*; see also J Potgieter, *Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations: Somalia*, in Adibe, *op. cit.*
25. See Gamba, et. al., *op. cit.*
26. S Zawels, *Specificity in Peacekeeping Operation Mandates: The Evolution of Security Council Methods of Work*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996, p. 30.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
30. See B Ekwall-Uebelhart and A Raevsky, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996.
31. See E Berman, *Managing Arms In Peace Processes: Mozambique*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996.
32. S J Stedman, *Consent, Neutrality, and Impartiality in the Tower of Babel and on the Frontlines: United Nations Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, **Managing Arms during Peace Processes Series**, UNIDIR, Geneva, (unpublished draft), p. 1.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
37. Potgieter, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
38. Daniel, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
45. Boulden, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
55. This definition – from **Wider Peacekeeping**, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-7 – continues: "*At operational level, consent will devolve largely from formal agreements and its boundary will consequently be relatively clear cut and easier to discern.*"
56. *Ibid.*
57. See J Potgieter, **Training to Manage Arms during Peace Processes: Training Techniques**, UNIDIR, Geneva, (forthcoming 1997).
58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

60. See Potgieter, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

62. In Somalia, women and children were repeatedly mixed in with gunmen and used as shields. On one occasion, for example, they were used to close a Moroccan column to hand grenade range, resulting in serious casualties to the soldiers. Women and children were often used to construct roadblocks and were mingled with ambush groups. In one incident, a combination of US engineers and Pakistani escorts trying to remove a roadblock on a main route were ambushed by several hundred Somalis. With women mixed into their group, the gunmen attacked from behind walls and buildings. The resulting defence by tanks and helicopters, in an effort to extract the soldiers from the ambush, resulted in heavy casualties amongst the Somali gunmen and civilians alike.