

DEMOBILISATION AND ITS AFTERMATH I

A PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISED MILITARY PERSONNEL

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PREFACE

The SANDF, like all other armed forces in the Southern African region has undergone, and anticipates that it will be undergoing substantial reductions in its force levels. Initially, it was anticipated that some 138 000 personnel would be integrated into the SANDF in 1994. This consisted of some 90 000 former SADF members, 32 000 former Umkhonto we Sizwe members, 6 000 former Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army members and 11 000 members of the former homeland armies. At its height, however, only some 101 000 persons were finally integrated.

However, the force levels of the SANDF in 2001 stand at approximately 78 000. Various reasons account for the shortfall from the initial figure of 138 000. Firstly, only 15 000 members of the liberation forces were finally attested for service within the new national defence force. Most opted for employment elsewhere - either in the private or the merging public sector - while some 6 000 were demobilised due to ill health, age or aptitude.

Secondly, the number of former SADF members declined as a result of either having opted for voluntary severance, or termination of service on expiry of their contracts. In addition to these force reductions, the Department of Defence's policy further anticipates that the force levels of the SANDF will have to be reduced from the present levels of 78 000 to possibly even 65 000 to ensure that the envisaged force design will be aligned with both future national defence requirements (particular the capital-intensive equipment items which the procurement package intends acquiring) and defence budgetary realities (which have witnessed a 59% decline in real terms since 1990).

While persons who are about to leave the armed forces have to be catered for, a profile of those who have already left is also necessary. An attempt must be made to determine the status of their personal circumstances. South Africa possesses numbers of former military personnel, which far exceed the numbers referred to above. Generations of white boys were conscripted into the former SADF, saw service in Namibia, Angola and elsewhere on the continent.

Thousands of people saw service in the liberation movements, and a substantial number of them do not appear in the Certified Personnel Register. This is not even to speak of those who rendered military service in the former SADF Citizen Force or Namibian nationals conscripted into the service of the former South West Africa Territorial Force.

Indeed, the major problems of demobilisation do not come back to haunt governments in the immediate aftermath of a conflict but, more often than not, in the following decades. Although the recent invasions in Zimbabwe are mainly about land issues, an equally importantly component is that it is a product of the government's failure to deal with its own demobilisation process - a process that dates back to the creation of the Zimbabwe National Army in 1980.

This monograph explores some of these issues by examining the challenges confronting the reinsertion of former SANDF personnel into the South African economy and society. It is hoped that it will make a contribution to the emerging policies, strategies and literature on the challenges of South African demobilisation. Regardless on whose side they fought, South African soldiers, both serving and demobilised, are people to whom there is a responsibility to ensure that they live a life of dignity in an environment of security.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The broad experience of demobilisation in developing countries, South Africa included, indicates severe difficulties when economically integrating veterans into civilian life. Long-term reintegration is directly dependent upon the former soldier obtaining stable and gainful employment. However, most veterans suffer from a shortage of capital and have no marketable skills that can easily be translated into full employment in a highly competitive civilian economy.

The results of the survey outlined in this monograph suggest that the vast majority of South Africa's demobilised soldiers remain unemployed and are struggling to support themselves and their families. Many former combatants are clearly unhappy about their demobilisation from the SANDF, yet, a large number indicated an interest in rejoining the military if offered the opportunity. Some former soldiers have returned to their communities, have settled down, found jobs and have managed to put the past behind them. However, the picture as a whole suggests that former combatants still require significant assistance if they are to be fully reintegrated back into civil society. The results of this survey would thus tend to support the conclusions reached by Motumi, McKenzie and Cock in earlier studies, that demobilisation did not effectively provide for the effective reintegration of former combatants into society.

The survey results in this monograph suggest that the typical profile of the demobilised soldier is a black male in the age group between 26 and 35 years; unmarried, but perhaps living with a partner; with children to support; formerly served in MK for a period of approximately four to ten years; served in the SANDF for approximately one to four years in the infantry; was not demobilised by choice; has been demobilised for more than two years; completed schooling to the level of grade nine to eleven, but presently has no other non-military technical, or tertiary level education; completed only infantry-related training in the SANDF; has not completed any training or educational programme since leaving the SANDF; is presently unemployed, or is undergoing training in preparation for employment; and finally, has a very strong interest in

further training, or skills enhancement.

Given that the demobilisation process affected only a limited number of individuals and that the next phase of demobilisation, or rationalisation, is likely to be much bigger, urgent attention needs to be given to:

- resolving outstanding issues relating to past demobilisation; and
- planning for future rationalisation by giving consideration to the experiences of the past, as well as lessons learned from other countries.

Any support programme should be designed on the basis of the needs and aspirations of former combatants, their families and communities. Reintegration programmes thus need to be adjusted in response to a continuing dialogue with former combatants. Moreover, past experiences show that the process is more successful if it is demilitarised. But there is no guaranteed blueprint for success. The appropriateness of assistance interventions depends on a case-by-case basis. For both the former combatant and the reintegration programme administrator, the process is an ongoing and joint learning exercise. Given the need for continuing dialogue, the actual implementation of programmes is best handled in a decentralised way. However, effective communication with the central administration remains important for overall success.

The lessons to be learned from demobilisation in the developing world, as well as from South Africa's first post-1994 demobilisation process suggest that the future rationalisation of the SANDF will require a very strong political commitment, an inclusive approach to planning, the availability and co-ordination of adequate funding, along with the required administrative capacity, comprehensive and targeted assistance packages and the determination to adopt a long-term perspective with regard to economic reintegration. Despite the obvious difficulties for former combatants to find employment outside the military, former defence personnel have a range of skills, which would be suitable for civilian application with some adaptation. These skills include administration, information technology, management, logistics, electronics, mechanics, civil engineering, vehicle maintenance, public health, cooking, printing and surveying. These skills form an excellent foundation for human resource conversion to gainful long-term employment.

The recommendations derived from the survey and comparative studies of demobilisation in the developing world are divided into recommendations with regard to previously demobilised soldiers and those with a bearing on proposed future rationalisation. Recommendations concerning those previously demobilised include the following:

- the establishment of a suitable mechanism for former combatants to communicate their concerns and problems;
- the mobilisation of non-governmental organisations, churches, unions and other elements in civil society to assist former combatants with both social and economic reintegration; and
- the effective long-term monitoring of the problems and concerns of demobilised soldiers with the view to provide ongoing support and assistance.

Recommendations with regard to possible future demobilisation, or rationalisation include:

- the collection of current, high quality socio-economic data on soldiers earmarked for demobilisation;
- the preparation of appropriate and targeted safety net packages and reintegration initiatives;
- the mobilisation of donor support for specific assistance programmes; and
- strong political commitment and support, along with the timely delivery of promised resources.

INTRODUCTION

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOBILISATION

The backdrop

Of all the challenges facing post-conflict societies, few are more challenging and enduring than that of demobilisation. While forces may be downsized over time, weapons inventories disposed of effectively, and the legacy of conflicts gradually fade from public memory, demobilised soldiers continue to remain with a society in political, psychological and practical terms.

Demobilisation is rarely an easy process to manage. It involves the intersection of many factors - the socio-economic status of those being demobilised, the capacity of the economy to absorb former combatants, their acceptance into the broader community and, always, the psychological needs of those being reinserted into the community.

To ensure that the post-conflict reintegration process is successful, the active involvement of many actors is required. Decisive political commitment and high levels of political will are imperative to ensure that a country accepts the importance of demobilisation and the need for resources to be allocated to this process. It demands a high level of understanding and commitment from the government to ensure that, across all its policy sectors, it can contribute to the creation of an enabling environment within which an orderly demobilisation strategy can occur. It should expect that the private sector (macro, medium or micro-enterprises) harness its energies in support of the demobilisation process not only because of the skills that former military personnel have to offer, but also to mitigate against the potentially disruptive effects of political and social instability that can be occasioned by frustrated war veterans.

A critical role must be played by civil society because it is ultimately within civil society's terrain that demobilised soldiers need to re-establish themselves and create livelihoods characterised by dignity, productivity and cultural and spiritual acceptance. It is ultimately on the farm and in villages, suburbs and towns, the churches and beer halls that former combatants need to make their homes in such a manner that they play a constructive part in the ongoing development of these communities.

In essence, a successful demobilisation strategy includes of necessity a wide range of roleplayers within its orbit, demands the involvement of many different public and private institutions and should be characterised by high levels of public awareness and sympathy for persons about to be demobilised. It is equally important, however, to acknowledge that demobilisation cannot be successful unless certain broader political and strategic conditions are

in place, if not entirely then at least partially. These are analysed below.

Defence conversion and demobilisation: Two sides of the same coin

Demobilisation is an inseparable component of a broader process of what is increasingly referred to as 'defence conversion'. Defence conversion can best be identified as the purposeful conversion of existing, surplus or redundant defence capabilities towards human security and development ends. Six areas of conversion have been identified in international disarmament and demilitarisation processes. These include the reallocation of financial resources, reorientation of research and development (R&D) functions, restructuring of defence industry, demobilisation, military base closure and redevelopment, and the disposal of surplus weapons. Some analysts include another element in this list - *normative conversion* - and assert that, without a significant mind-shift in people's attitudes towards both conflict and war, the areas of conversion indicated above will continue to emerge in one form or another in the future.

Six major areas of conversion have been identified in the current South African demilitarisation process, which correlate to the processes identified above (with the exception of the reallocation of financial resources that has not occurred in a systematic and planned manner). These include defence industry conversion, demobilisation, surplus arms disposal, base closure, land redistribution (this being of particular political significance in the South African transition) and R&D reorientation. These processes all relate directly to attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to reorient military resources primarily for non-military uses.

The progress with the conversion of these capabilities towards civilian-centred development goals has been uneven and asymmetrical — itself a product of the different institutional responsibilities for such conversion within the state, the relative inexperience of the new government and, as stated above, the absence of a unifying, integrated and practical strategy capable of operationalising the new thinking in security, which underpins much of South African policy. These processes, their strengths and weaknesses, existing and suggested strategies for the future, are therefore critical to the ultimate success of any demobilisation process.

Political and strategic conditions for a successful demobilisation strategy

A demobilisation process is unlikely to be successful unless the following broad conditions are present:

- A stable and resilient political culture should exist with robust and legitimate political and civil institutions in the country concerned. Without this precondition, the ability for demobilisation to take place in an ordered and stable environment will be greatly reduced.
- Stable civil-military relations with a high level of trust must exist between the civil authorities and the military élite. The preparedness of the armed forces to accept cuts in their budget and their willingness to support demobilisation initiatives will be bedevilled, unless a mutual recognition of the importance of demobilisation within the broader security equation exists between both parties.
- A relatively high level of interaction should exist between the state, political society and civil society over the formulation and implementation of defence policy. Without these internal confidence and security-building measures, the ability of the state to ensure effective 'buy in' and legitimacy for its endeavours will be severely limited.

- The prospects for regional stability, peace and development must be reasonably good. Where such short-term prospects are ill-defined or non-existent, the long-term prospects for a stable demobilisation strategy will be short-lived. The successful demobilisation programmes conducted in Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia during the early 1990s were rendered redundant with the remobilisation of these forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Eritrean conflicts, respectively.
- A relatively high level of political and institutional will should be evident in both the state and political society to ensure that demobilisation, and not simply the severance of military personnel is implemented.
- The extent to which a coherent and integrated human security policy exists within a government which proves capable of integrating the diverse elements of security (political, economic, social, military and technological) of which demobilisation is a key component, is crucial to the success of demobilisation programmes.
- A degree of policy and strategic coherence must exist regarding demobilisation among donor agencies, international financial institutions and international organisations.

If these conditions are largely, or even partially present, then it is vital that an appropriate demobilisation strategy, with the requisite levels of political and institutional support, is formulated and implemented.

Demobilisation phases

To be successful, most demobilisation strategies need to follow a generic series of phases. These phases are not inviolable and are strongly influenced by the political, social and psychological profiles of the country concerned. Key elements in any process should include at least most, if not all, of a number of steps.

Firstly, it requires a clear acknowledgement that the time for demobilisation has arrived. This recognition is, however, not always as self-evident as it seems. Many post-conflict societies do not automatically engage in demobilisation processes. Armed forces continue to retain bloated force levels for a variety of reasons. Some of these are pragmatic and relate to the belief that members of the armed forces can be used for different non-conflict roles - reconstruction and development tasks for instance. These types of strategy, while viable in the short to medium term, fail to address the appropriateness of the armed forces for these tasks and, indeed, the cost-effectiveness of such strategies.

Governments are sometimes simply scared or reluctant to demobilise former combatants and, accordingly, lack the political will to ensure that a sustainable demobilisation strategy is developed. Legions are the examples of bloated armed forces that persisted well into peaceful post-conflict scenarios in both the developed and the developing world alike. Many argue that the armed forces in the United States have still not managed to adjust their force levels to those appropriate to post-Cold War tasks. Tanzania still possesses the legacy of force levels that can be traced, at least partially, to its invasion of Uganda in 1979. The inflated level of the current officer corps in the South African armed forces is a twin product of its integration process and the substantial force levels of the pre-1990 South African Defence Force (SADF).

Secondly, it remains important to ensure that a durable cease-fire is in place. Without this guarantee, demobilisation processes that are hastily initiated may terminate with equal rapidity.

Thirdly, it is important to identify persons eligible for demobilisation. This is a difficult process for politicians and force commanders alike and exposes them to the risk of unpopularity and, in more extreme cases, accusations of treachery. Such a process needs to take place, not on the basis of patronage, but on the basis of a scientific assessment of the roles and tasks envisaged for the force in future, the force levels required for such a force, and the functional levels of competency demanded by those persons in the different posts within the proposed force structure.

In the fourth place, it is vital that an assessment of the profiles of persons nominated for demobilisation should be compiled. This will include an assessment of their socio-economic background and status, skills base, aptitudes and psychological status. This will contribute to the more effective placement of such individuals in society.

Furthermore, appropriate programmes should be instituted within the armed forces to prepare persons for demobilisation. To a certain extent, an attempt to rectify this situation has been made with the creation of the Service Corps. Its mission is to assist with the reintegration of former service members into civil society by uplifting their standard of education, helping them to find employment, career guidance and assistance with reintegration, where possible.

However, the Service Corps has been stymied by a number of interrelated factors. The first is the fact that, to date, it has largely concentrated on rationalised and demobilised personnel from the lower end of the military hierarchy. As such, its focus on skills provision lies predominantly in the private and junior non-commissioned officer range. Secondly, the perception exists, and this is partially confirmed by the membership of the Service Corps, that it has become a 'dumping ground' for former liberation force members. The legitimacy of the Corps to a broader range of demobilised personnel and, indeed, its capacity to provide conversion and accreditation skills for both the officer and non-commissioned officer corps are therefore limited at present.

While the services of the Service Corps need to be retained, and its focus should continue to be on the reintegration of more junior members of the armed forces into civil society, a more ambitious programme needs to be instituted within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) that will extend beyond the cash payments and basic skills-training provided by the Service Corps.

The armed forces of the US and the United Kingdom have developed some innovative military career transition programmes. In particular, the armed forces need to focus on conversion strategies such as alternative certification programmes whereby the substantial organisational, managerial and technical skills of service members can be converted for use in the civil sector. Alternative certification is defined as follows:

"Simply put, alternative certification refers to programs designed to facilitate the entry of college graduates with appropriate subject matter expertise into classroom teaching or administrative positions in the schools ... Alternative certification programs allow arts and sciences graduates to participate in intensified programs which do not require the typical accumulation of credit hours, to demonstrate competency requirements, and or to gain the necessary expertise through field-based experiences while holding a teaching position."¹

While the focus of alternative certification in countries such as the US, Germany and the UK has exclusively been on converting the skills and capabilities of former officers and senior non-

commissioned officers (NCOs) into classroom-based competencies, the concept is used in a wider sense here. It refers to the possible conversion of the skills and capabilities of all former service members into a wide range of competencies including managerial and administrative capabilities within both the private and public sector, possible conversion into teaching and instructor-based competencies, as well as the conversion of technically-related skills into similar areas.

Alternative certification programmes in the US, for instance, take place within the broader context of defence downsizing. Downsizing has had profound effects on force levels within all US arms of service. To prepare military personnel for a second career upon severance, a variety of military career transition programmes have been instituted. Although many former military officers and NCOs find direct employment within the private sector upon severance from the organisation, a large number want to go to university or college, while others desire retraining in a new skill.

Skills that could be developed and converted through such alternative programmes could include leadership and management skills, effective written and oral communication skills, team-building, strategic capabilities, and an ability to work with large groups of people. Most senior and middle-ranking officers from all integrating forces possess graduate qualifications from civilian tertiary institutions, and have completed a variety of staff courses at defence force staff colleges (the latter providing extensive background in managerial, strategic, financial and administrative techniques). Junior officers and senior NCOs, for their part, have completed a range of military courses in areas of functional specialisation, leadership and basic management skills.

The advantages are evident of alternative career certification programmes as the dominant human resource conversion strategy in South Africa. It can contribute to the creation of a national skills base, which can be used in various areas of national reconstruction and development. It can also ensure that demobilised soldiers are peacefully reintegrated into the community and are not tempted to use their 'not inconsiderable' skills towards other, more violent ends. Indeed, the real and alleged involvement of former soldiers from throughout Southern Africa in ongoing crime, even during the early stages of demobilisation, should provide South African defence planners with food for thought.

Reintegration is the sixth major phase and consists of many different components. The first is undoubtedly an attempt to ensure that appropriate opportunities exist outside the employment of the armed forces that would enable former combatants to find meaningful — not degrading — employment. This does not necessarily entail reinsertion into the formal economy but, at least, requires an appreciation of the elasticity of both the formal and informal boundaries of a country's economy. The second, as stated above, is to mobilise as wide a range of stakeholders behind this process as possible - whether public, private or community-based. The third is the ongoing monitoring of this process for decades to come, for it is ultimately only when veterans pass away that the responsibility of both the state and society towards them ceases.

Obviously, none of this can be accomplished unless adequate resources are available and an integrated national demobilisation strategy is in place. Resources are critical, but do not need to be abundant - indeed, in many countries resources are simply not available. A creative utilisation of resources that avoids undue expenditure on bureaucracy, aims at developing the long-term capacity of individuals as opposed to the invariable short-term nature of cash 'hand-outs', and relies on the collaboration of a range of funding agencies, can generate immensely creative solutions.

The formulation of an appropriate national demobilisation strategy should reflect two factors. The first is the fact that demobilisation is not simply a military challenge — indeed, it is not even primarily a military challenge. Demobilised persons, once they leave the employ of the armed forces, become citizens and their travails and needs are articulated within this broader civil infrastructure. The military does not possess the capacity to address these concerns. However, there are a plethora of organisations which do and that, in the normal course of events, attempt to assist all civilians grappling with similar problems.

The second is the fact that, without a national focus and an appropriate national level of co-ordination, demobilisation programmes run the risk of becoming lost in a welter of bureaucracy and/or organisational dissipation. In the opinion of respondents involved in this survey, this is where one of the key challenges lies that will face the demobilisation process in South Africa in future.

The future?

The SANDF has undertaken and anticipates substantial further reductions in its force levels. People about to leave the armed forces have to be catered for, but those who have already left should not be neglected. It is crucial to determine the status of their personal circumstances. Indeed, issues around demobilisation do not arise in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, but often in the following decades. Although the conflict in Zimbabwe is mainly about land issues, an equally importantly component of the problems in this country is the government's failure to deal with its own demobilisation process, dating back to the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army in 1980.

This monograph explores some of these issues by examining the challenges confronting the reinsertion of former SANDF personnel into the South African economy and society. It also considers demobilisation processes in other countries in the developing world, and draws lessons from their experiences. It is hoped that the insights provided here will make a contribution to the emerging policies, strategies and literature on the challenges of South African demobilisation.

Chapter 1

POST-COLD WAR DEMOBILISATION

"The long-term costs for society are even larger if former combatants are not able to reintegrate into civilian life. Failure to support the reintegration process effectively may lead to increasing unemployment and social depravation, which could lead to increasing crime rates and political instability."²

Over five million military personnel have been demobilised since the termination of the Cold War in 1990. The end of the Cold War has led to significant cuts in military spending in almost all regions of the world, as a result of reduced military threats and a significant decrease in the need to maintain large standing armies. Moreover, the elimination of Cold War divisions in Europe has introduced the possibility of a radical demilitarisation process that could have profound consequences for interstate relations. Demilitarisation and the reduction of military forces has been significant in Europe and less dramatic in the United States mainly because of powerful defence industry lobbies, but has had global implications in general. Post-Cold War influences, the elimination of superpower rivalry, as well as the new commitment to democratic forms of governance have promoted demobilisation on the African continent. At the same time, it

has become clear that a successful demobilisation process can have a very positive impact on post-conflict peacebuilding and social stability. Demobilisation can facilitate a reduction in defence expenditure and free scarce resources for economic development and social upliftment. However, a demobilisation process which fails to integrate former combatants successfully into civilian life can pose new and dangerous threats to social stability. Unemployed former combatants often fall back on their military skills to make a living, which could lead to crime and other forms of banditry.

Demobilisation, or the separation of personnel from military units, is followed by the more challenging process of reintegration. The reintegration of military personnel back into civilian life is in many cases an extremely difficult task requiring state assistance in the form of demobilisation packages (primarily financial assistance) along with other interventions such as educational assistance, counselling, skills training, career counselling and employment placement. Effective demobilisation packages are widely regarded as extremely important to ensure the reintegration of former combatants. The risks of failing to integrate highly trained military personnel successfully back into civilian life are self-evident. An effective demobilisation programme reduces the security risk that disaffected former combatants may pose. Successful reintegration requires that demobilised soldiers are able to find sustainable and meaningful civilian employment, sufficient to provide for themselves and their families in the long term. The process thus requires a skills conversion procedure which will turn a trained soldier into a skilled individual able to contribute to the civilian economy over the long term in a productive and meaningful way.

This monograph is the first in a two part study intended to identify the specific problems of demobilised soldiers in South Africa and thus to provide a foundation for planning the next phase of demobilisation, or what the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) terms 'rationalisation'. This study falls into two parts. Chapters 1 to 9 examine demobilisation in developing countries with a view to provide insights, lessons and ideas for South Africa. The process of demobilisation in South Africa, which was initiated in 1995, is also examined. It remains a key item on the defence agenda. Chapters 10 to 14 deal with the results of a detailed survey conducted among demobilised former SANDF personnel. This socio-economic analysis provides a useful foundation for future planning of demobilisation strategies and reintegration programmes in South Africa. The specific objective of this study is to assist in the successful reintegration of demobilised soldiers into civil society. It is hoped that the research will promote remedies to assist soldiers already demobilised, as well as those who are expected to be demobilised in the future.

Chapter 2

AN OVERVIEW OF DEMOBILISATION IN AFRICA

Demobilisation processes

Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of countries in sub-Saharan African have conducted demobilisation processes with different degrees of success. However, these efforts have been broadly welcomed as important contributions in building sustainable peace and human development. Events in a number of African countries indicate that the positive outcome of the demobilisation process depends to a large extent on whether soldiers are able to reintegrate successfully into society. The record suggests that many demobilised combatants experience enormous difficulties in the transition from military to civilian life. Unhappy, frustrated and unemployed former soldiers may jeopardise social stability and post-conflict peacebuilding. Past experiences confirm that demobilisation is a complex and risky process, which demands

that a number of conditions are met if the exercise is to be a long-term success. However, at the workshop on demobilisation organised by the International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa (IRG) during December 1994, participants agreed that relevant African demobilisation experiences exist, and that the wheel was not in need of reinvention.³

While the conditions under which demobilisation has taken place in a number of African countries are not identical to those of South Africa, these experiences provide numerous useful insights and experiences of relevance. During 1989, Namibia initiated a major downsizing programme, demobilising all of the approximately 30 000 troops who had served under the South African administration, as well as 13 000 combatants of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). A much smaller national force of less than 10 000 was afterwards established in the country. In Mozambique, 70 000 government forces and 20 000 Renamo combatants were demobilised between 1992 and 1994, to allow for a new much smaller national military force of approximately 30 000 soldiers. Between 1992 and 1995, the Ugandan government demobilised 36 000 soldiers in a three-phased process. Following the collapse of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia, Africa's largest armed force was reduced by almost 500 000, while almost 50 000 soldiers in the newly independent Eritrea were demobilised along with 22 000 combatants of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Besides post-conflict demobilisation, a number of African military forces have been reduced as a consequence of budgetary pressure, or altered government priorities. For example, during the mid-1990s Zimbabwe reduced the size of its armed forces from 55 000 to 43 000 due to financial constraints.

Since the initiation of large African demobilisation programmes, governments, international development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have increasingly paid attention to and provided support for an activity considered extremely important for peacebuilding and sustainable development. Recognising the importance of military demobilisation, the United Nations has increasingly highlighted the issue. The UN's 1994 *Agenda for Development* declared that "the reintegration of combatants is difficult, but is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period ... effective reintegration of combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace."⁴

The general problems encountered by African demobilisation efforts include the following:

- Former combatants have enormous difficulties in finding employment, or establishing small enterprises.
- Demobilised soldiers usually have very poor prospects for successful integration because of a lack of skills, education, or as a result of serious health problems.
- Psychological adjustment for former soldiers is usually a critical challenge, forcing major changes in attitudes and expectations.
- The resulting availability of 'uncontrolled' light weapons, which are often linked to smuggling and banditry, pose serious risks.
- The propensity of demobilised soldiers to join private armies is an issue of concern.

According to Kingma's study of demobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, a number of factors are crucial for success. These include a clear political will, a credible central authority to guide and secure the process, a broad process of national reconciliation to undergird demobilisation, a comprehensive management process and sufficient skilled resources to support the process as

a whole. However, reintegration support remains the critical element in the entire process. Without comprehensive support for the reintegration of soldiers into civil society, the entire process is threatened. Kingma suggests that this

"support is costly, but the long-term costs for society could be even more if former combatants are unable to find livelihoods outside the armed forces ... It could lead to increasing unemployment and social depravation, that could again lead to increasing crime rates and political instability."⁵

The tools to facilitate successful reintegration include counselling, technical and managerial training, provision of equipment, credit facilities, construction of houses, improvement of social infrastructure and the creation of new employment opportunities. A positive outcome for demobilisation and reintegration requires detailed planning, extensive support and a clear linkage between all phases of the process.

Table 1: Demobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa (1985-1994)

Country	Number of demobilised soldiers	Total size of armed forces before demobilisation	Period
Angola	Demobilisation 1992 failed	55 000 UNITA (estimates of current sizes)	-
Chad	15 000	47 000	1992 - 1994
Eritrea	26 000	95 000	June 1993 - 1994
Ethiopia	Almost 500 000 plus 22 200 (OLF)	Mengistu army of almost 500 000 totally demobilised	June-December 1991, mid-1992-1994 (OLF)
Mozambique	69 352 plus 20 034 Renamo	79 507 plus 24 546 Renamo	1992-1994
Namibia	32 000 (SAF) plus 13 000 PLAN	32 000 (SAF) plus 20 000 PLAN	1989
Uganda	21 197	80 000	December 1992-July 1994
Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), < www.bicc.de/demibil/brief4/summ.html >.			

A brief overview of African demobilisation efforts in several countries provides insight into the process and suggests lessons for South Africa.

Ethiopia

Following almost 30 years of conflict and prolonged insurgency warfare that severely undermined Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed power in May 1991 and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The TGE established the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans to prepare and implement a demobilisation and reintegration programme for the defeated Derg army. The main objective of the commission was to restore security and stability by confining the movement of soldiers to designated assembly areas. The long-term goal was to

facilitate the reintegration of former combatants into society. The commission was also tasked with the demobilisation and reintegration of the members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) captured by the EPRDF.

Socio-economic data collected in the assembly camps enabled the categorisation of the 455 000 Derg soldiers into four groups: rural, urban, those who had served for fewer than 18 months and disabled former soldiers. Categorisation enabled the commission to provide specific assistance to former combatants in accordance with their stated needs. A high percentage of Derg and OLF combatants received an identification card, which included a photograph and the official seal of the commission. The identification card was the main instrument used by former combatants to apply for specific benefits. Ethiopia's demobilisation programme showed some early successes but, regrettably the outbreak of war with Eritrea undermined the prospects for long-term reintegration.

Namibia

The demobilisation of forces in Namibia took place in terms of a United Nations supervised transitional period prior to March 1990. The demobilisation of former combatants commenced during the establishment of an independent Namibia. However, neither the UN nor the new Namibian government planned a reintegration programme. Following demobilisation, many former soldiers failed to reintegrate back into civil society. Consequently, and in response to growing protests, the government set up a number of ad hoc programmes. Observers thus described Namibian demobilisation and reintegration as 'a patchwork of well-intended programmes', rather than a well-planned and carefully conceived strategy. Six years after independence, the Namibian government began to redraft reintegration strategies to assist former combatants who were still unemployed. Approximately 32 000 combatants from the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and 25 000 combatants from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), including the paramilitary units of the SWATF, were demobilised in 1989. Of this total, 7 500 were able to join the Namibian defence and police forces. The other 49 500 former combatants required assistance with reintegration. The group was divided into the unemployed, the disabled, and the San (Bushmen) fighters. At the time of demobilisation, there was no collection of socio-economic data from combatants, but later surveys suggested that many individuals joined the army in their twenties and stayed in the military for approximately ten years. Most were married with an average of four children. Their health was not different to that of the average citizen. However, the overall educational qualification of former combatants, especially PLAN members, was not significant. Based on socio-economic data, a number of specific targeting mechanisms were applied to PLAN and SWATF former combatants. The long-term impact of these strategies remain difficult to determine accurately given the lack of available data.

Uganda

After a 15-year period of civil war and prolonged insurgency warfare in Uganda, the National Resistance movement came to power in 1986. Low-level conflict and banditry continued in different parts of the country until 1991. Between 1986 and 1991, capital expenditure on defence increased. However, once the military opposition was finally defeated in 1991, the government decided to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from the military to the promotion of social and economic development. This shift in government expenditure required a phased demobilisation process and the subsequent reintegration into civilian life of 36 400 (accompanied by 135 250 dependants) of the estimated 90 000 soldiers in the National Resistance Army (NRA) between 1992 and 1995. Three key factors motivated Uganda's

demobilisation process. Firstly, the government's desire to ensure a 'peace dividend' demanded a reduction in the defence budget and a resulting demobilisation process. Secondly, there were strong social pressures to resettle former combatants with their families in their original home districts. Lastly, military leaders demanded a smaller, more professional and better trained armed force.⁶

An important step in the design and preparation of the programme was the completion of three studies. These studies included;

- a socio-economic profile of soldiers to identify their capabilities, needs, and expectations;
- an analysis of the opportunities for veterans in the job market; and
- an examination of institutional requirements to facilitate programme implementation.

A profile study of military personnel was undertaken in order to gather data on demography, education, employment, land ownership, marketable skills and asset ownership in order to identify areas where intervention would be the most beneficial. The study indicated that the majority of army personnel (66.5%) were below 30 years of age; few soldiers had any other skills besides military training (43.7% had only infantry skills) and the average family size was 3.17 members. Led by the World Bank, the donor community worked with the Ugandan government to implement the demobilisation programme. A Veterans Assistance Programme was developed to resettle former soldiers into civilian communities. The statutory autonomous agency, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), under the direct control of the prime minister's office, was set up to manage the assistance programme. The programme had two elements. Firstly, a 'settling-in-kit' was designed to cover the first six months after discharge. The package consisted of the provision of shelter, food, clothing, transport, medical care and education for veterans' children. The second element, the 'long-term package' included reintegration measures such as vocational training and credit facilities. The UVAB worked with the military leadership to decide who was to be demobilised and to manage the entire process. Soldiers were demobilised under a number of categories: age, medical, voluntary, services no longer required (competence) and reduction in establishment (rationalisation).

Soldiers and their dependents went through pre-discharge orientation briefings, intended to provide them with information on how to open a bank account, how to start income-generating activities, environmental and legal issues, basic health and child immunisation, civic duties, legal rights of women in civil society, along with family planning and AIDS prevention. A 'transitory safety net package', in cash and/or kind, was provided to assist former soldiers in the initial stages of resettlement. These packages included food, civilian clothing, household utensils, building materials, seeds and agricultural implements. The package also included funds for the payment of school fees for children for a period of 12 months. The UVAB developed a discharge certificate, a non-transferable, non-corruptible identification mechanism. It included general information about the bearer, an entitlement section, and a statement of the rights of inheritance vis-à-vis the next of kin if the veteran passed away before the six-month programme of entitlement terminated. The discharge certificate proved to be a highly effective instrument in preventing leakages, facilitating administrative procedures and reducing costs.

Demobilisation was extremely traumatic for soldiers in Uganda, most of whom expected rewards from the government and the community for their participation in past military conflict. They did not expect to be "pushed to obscurity, while the rest of the country enjoyed the peace and fruits of their sweat."⁷ Political disputes regarding the wisdom of those who did participate in the conflict led after a time to veteran disaffiliation of civil society. The vast majority of demobilised soldiers lacked the ability to help themselves, as well as the necessary civic awareness and

self-reliance to meet the new challenges in civilian life. In many cases, the total lack of readily marketable skills to facilitate quick entry into a competitive labour market was a major problem. The provision of marketable skills was made via training in micro-business management and apprenticeship in collaboration with a number of NGOs. Training for micro-business management included recordkeeping, group dynamics, bookkeeping, writing a project proposal, loans management and gender issues. Training was usually conducted on location in villages by NGO fieldworkers and Veterans Assistance Programme representatives. On occasion, specific training was provided at the beneficiaries' workplace. Training was provided with the objective of enhancing the self-employment potential of veterans by providing new skills or upgrading existing skills.

The Ugandan demobilisation process suggested that economic integration was the most difficult part of the transition to civilian life. A lack of marketable skills and little or no access to capital severely hampered economic integration. The problem was partly addressed by foreign donors. The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) provided assistance in the medical rehabilitation of veterans, while USAID supported the reintegration of veterans with agricultural technology and credit programmes. The German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) provided limited direct credit to a number of veterans and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in upgrading skills.⁸

Studies of the Ugandan experience suggest a number of lessons:

- Both veterans and the civilian community need to be thoroughly prepared before the commencement of the demobilisation programme.
- Former soldiers and their spouses need to be advised on how to adapt to civilian life.
- Specific programmes are required to target the special needs of veterans for an extended period after demobilisation.
- Economic reintegration efforts should be linked to existing development activities.⁹
- The education of veterans is an essential part of the reintegration programme.
- Effective participation of all parties is necessary for success.
- Demobilisation and reintegration need to be seen as part of a continuum. There "can be no artificial separation between demobilisation and reintegration."¹⁰
- Demobilisation and reintegration cannot be addressed with a purely military approach. The issues of vocational training and education are a vital element of 'human reconversion'.
- Training for a specific job in civilian life is only relevant in an environment where employment opportunities are available.

Mozambique

A key element in the Mozambican peace process was the demobilisation in 1994 of 92 881 soldiers from both the government and opposing Renamo forces. Demobilised soldiers and their families were transported to their chosen destination and provided with a range of benefits to assist both their social and economic reintegration into civilian life. Assistance packages

included civilian clothing, food for three months, vegetable seeds and a tool kit, cash payments for two years, and specific programmes to support reintegration such as occupational skills training and small grants for projects. The total cost of the reintegration programme over the period 1993 to 1997 was US \$94.9 million, of which the Mozambican government contributed US \$10.35 million with the balance provided by foreign donations.

During the assembly area registration of military forces in 1994, a socio-economic survey was conducted to determine the key characteristics of each soldier about to be demobilised. The survey covered age, marital status, district of origin, level of education, military rank and years of military service. The resulting database was used to assist in planning and monitoring reintegration programmes. In addition, surveys were carried out at different times during the reintegration programme to determine progress and the levels of success.

Rwanda

In 1998, Rwanda initiated a four-year demobilisation programme with the objective of reducing the size of its armed forces by 50%. During September 1997, 5 000 soldiers were demobilised and sent back to their villages to begin a process of reintegration into civilian life. In terms of the programme, each demobilised soldier was given a piece of land on which to settle and build a house, along with US \$1 000 as a 'departure allowance'. The government promised demobilised soldiers a bank loan if they were able to come up with a 'viable' project. Former soldiers were encouraged to acquire new skills suitable for employment in a civilian environment. The setting up of a Veterans Vocational Training Centre in Butare where former soldiers were able to develop new skills in masonry, carpentry, welding and tailoring was considered particularly helpful to many. The approximately 3 000 former child soldiers, or Kadogos as they are known in Rwanda, were either sent back to school, or back to their families. The Rwandan government provided 60% of the funding for demobilisation, while the rest was covered by donations from the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain, Switzerland, Austria and the UNDP.¹¹

Sierra Leone

The 1996 Abidjan accord made provision for a comprehensive demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation programme in Sierra Leone. However, the programme was put on hold due to Revolutionary United Front (RUF) scepticism over UN involvement in mediating the conflict. Factors preventing a comprehensive demobilisation programme included a lack of political will among all parties; bureaucratic and financial problems; failure to reduce available weapons; difficulties surrounding the resettlement of chiefdom-based militias (possibility of victimisation); as well as an inadequate sensitisation and reconciliation programme. An escalation in the conflict indefinitely delayed the implementation of a demobilisation initiative.¹² In July 1999, it was estimated that it would cost approximately US \$35 million to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the RUF, the Civil Defence Force (CDF), other paramilitary groups and the regular Sierra Leone Army (SLA). However, the Sierra Leone government disputed this figure, claiming that at least US \$100 million was required to complete the process.¹³

Chapter 3

CASE STUDY OF DEMOBILISATION IN UGANDA

Motivation for demobilisation

In the case of Uganda, the primary goal for demobilisation was to decrease defence and security expenditures and increase public expenditure on social and economic development.

The defeat of the military opposition in 1991 by the National Resistance Army (NRA) brought stability to the country. There was therefore no need for a large army in this new Uganda, something which had been crucial during the earlier insurgency period. After the war, the large numbers of soldiers were no longer required and had become a severe burden on the national budget, as well as the management capacity of the NRA itself.¹⁴ Additionally, the bloated military was consuming a significant proportion of the national budget at the expense of other sectors of the economy, though this was previously viewed as a necessary expenditure meant to ensure permanent peace and security. Of particular concern was that the level of remuneration and the material conditions of service had to be substantially improved at all levels of the NRA. This was very difficult to implement on a sustained basis, given the large number of personnel. In order to take Uganda forward, the army council took a bold step and decided to reduce the number of military personnel in the NRA. The demobilisation process and subsequent reintegration process took place between 1992 and 1995 and involved approximately 40 000 soldiers.

The first step undertaken by the Ugandan government was to gather personal socio-economic data about combatants in order to identify target groups and to design effective reintegration programmes.¹⁵ Three studies were completed. The first study compiled a socio-economic profile of soldiers to identify the capabilities, needs, and expectations of the target group. This included gathering data on demography, education, employment, land ownership and other characteristics of the army in order to identify the areas where policy intervention would be most supportive. The second study analysed the opportunities for veterans in product and factor markets in order to design a settling-in kit and long-term reintegration programme. The last study examined institutional requirements to determine the programme's implementation structure.

The study revealed three principal categories of combatants to be affected by the reduction-in-force (RIF) plan:

- the aged and the sick, whose children would require educational assistance;
- the healthy and mature, who just wanted to go home and settle, and of whom the majority wanted to farm while the others wished to engage in various trades or skills, with some vocational training; and
- the young, who did not have much to go back to and who wished either to continue formal education or to develop their skills and become artisans.

The donor community, with the World Bank as the lead donor, worked closely with the government to organise and mobilise resources for the demobilisation exercise. The Veterans Assistance Programme was established to assist the process. Its aims were to resettle veterans and to facilitate their smooth integration into civilian communities. A statutory autonomous body, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), in the office of the prime minister, was constituted to manage the veterans' programme (for example, carrying out demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of veterans throughout the country). The programme included two packages: the settling-in kit, which covered the first six months after discharge, and the long-term package, which involved assistance that would be extended to veterans for a further period of at the most 30 months. The settling-in kit consisted of shelter, food, clothing, transport, medical care and education for veterans' children. The long-term package constituted reintegration measures including vocational training, credit for income-generating activities to facilitate veterans' reintegrating into civilian society.

The demobilisation process

The demobilisation process was managed and carried out by the UVAB as mandated, which worked in close co-operation with the army. The army decided who was to be demobilised - 38% were discharged because their services were no longer required, 25% of soldiers left the army voluntarily and 26% were discharged on medical grounds. There was an appeal committee, however, to which soldiers could apply if they felt they were not fairly treated. Demobilisation was implemented in three phases during which all 36 358 soldiers, accompanied by over 100 000 dependants were demobilised and helped to resettle in their home districts and among their communities.¹⁶ The UVAB, in collaboration with the army, developed a discharge certificate as the principal non-transferable, non-corruptible identification mechanism. It included general information about the bearer, an entitlement section on and a statement of the rights of inheritance vis-à-vis the next of kin, should the veteran pass away before the sixth month of the programme of entitlement ended. Its major security features was a photograph, its bound format, and the unambiguous identification of the bearer. Due to these features, the discharge certificate proved to be a highly effective tool in preventing leakages, facilitating administrative procedures and reducing costs.

The army decided to discharge the identified soldiers as quickly as possible to avoid potential disruptions, difficulties, and costs to sustain large numbers of soldiers and their dependants at the assembly points for any prolonged period. Therefore, soldiers were often given no more than one to two days' prior notice of demobilisation. Many veterans resented the shortness of the demobilisation notice. To facilitate the veterans' return to civilian life, a predischarge orientation programme was offered to them and their dependants in discharge centres. This provided the veterans and their spouses with details on civic duties and the community, family-planning and immunisation, information on how to start income-generating activities, environment protection, how to open a bank account, legal rights of women in civil society, AIDS awareness and protection, the district veterans' programme office and district veterans' councils and, finally, on the package itself. These briefings helped the veterans psychologically by explaining how to take initiatives towards self-reliance, and how to behave in civil society.

Transport was provided for each veteran and his or her family and belongings from the discharge centre to the district of destination. From district headquarters to their final destination, veterans had to arrange transport individually and pay for it with part of their transition allowance. The UVAB entered into contractual agreements and arrangements with private and public transport providers at rates that were fixed during each phase. In the final phase of the programme, post-discharge orientation meetings for information and counselling were organised in district capitals and were attended by veterans and their spouses. District administration representatives, especially those from agriculture, health and education departments participated.

The UVABs transitional safety net package was designed to address the immediate basic needs of demobilised former combatants. It included:

- cash payments to assist veterans for a period of six months;
- health care support in cases of severe need;
- financial contributions for veterans' children primary education; and
- shelter for families to meet the most pressing short-term survival needs as they sought to

secure a sustainable future.

The cash benefits were calculated to finance a package of basic needs and were designed to cover the veterans' expenses for clothing, food, medical care and drugs, agricultural tools and the materials necessary for the construction of a simple building. The payments were effected in instalments, partly in cash and partly through bank transfers.

In the Ugandan case, the objective of reintegration was seen as permitting former combatants and their families to become productive, self-sustaining citizens who contribute to the community. This is a gradual process, which goes far beyond the process of resettling veterans into civilian life. At the planning level, the reintegration goal is to bring the majority of veterans to a socio-economic level on a par with civilians. Three types of integration emerged: economic, social and political. For successful reintegration of veterans into a civilian environment, it became imperative to create measures in support, for instance, of education, training, counselling, employment and self-employment. A pilot education and training support component was introduced in phase two. The fund enabled veterans to continue with formal education, attend a vocational training institution, or participate in a scheme that provided on-the-job-training advised by master craftsmen.¹⁷

During the second phase, the UVAB set up a directory of NGOs to advise veterans on non-UVAB financial reintegration support. To counter various incidences of discrimination, the UVAB sensitised project promoters, as well as local and central authorities to allow veterans to apply for loans on an equal basis with civilians. Counselling mainly addressed issues of health, programme procedures and local administration. Despite its extension to several reintegration initiatives, direct employment support to veterans and their spouses was beyond the scope of the UVAB. Hence, several parallel activities financed by government, multilateral and bilateral donors alike were initiated or extended to cater for veterans' income-earning needs.

Programme managers designed and implemented several measures to facilitate social reintegration. Those who failed to achieve social reintegration were said to include some from dubious backgrounds, thieves and those who exhibited habitual anti-social behaviour.¹⁸ With social capital progressively weakened over years of civil strife, the Ugandan government clearly understood the potential problems of distrust and fear that could derail even a well-planned demobilisation exercise. Consequently, government officials and UVAB staff undertook community sensitisation tours at the initiation of each programme. Community awareness towards reintegration was also a central focus in phase three through a mass media campaign, which made use of radio and social drama or puppet theatre as alternatives to normal teaching methods. The UVAB conducted seminars after the first phase of discharge to educate community leaders not to view veterans as negative elements in society, but to help veterans by advising them on how to integrate themselves productively into civilian life.

Initially, in the earlier phases of demobilisation, political reintegration was weak. The veterans had not felt confident enough to join local council systems. They preferred to take their problems to the veterans' programme office, instead of to local council officials. In some cases, the officials refused to handle veterans' issues and, as a result, veterans lacked confidence in the local system. In subsequent phases, however, the participation of veterans in local politics improved substantially and some veterans were already holding leadership positions in local councils, school management committees and local development associations. In some areas, veterans joined local defence units and became involved in political education programmes. Two veterans were elected to parliament, while some have been elected as mayors in some districts. Community stability and the good discipline displayed by most veterans were positive

contributing factors to their integration into local political systems.

The capacity of veterans to reintegrate socially and economically is determined by several factors. Among the characteristics that have eased reintegration are the following: having been stationed in settled military units rather than mobile combat units, having joined the army as a mature person with access to land, and having a family to return to. Many veterans lost their entire families, and had no homes to return to. For these effectively displaced veterans, as well as for child soldiers, reintegration was a major challenge. The Ugandan experience showed that access to land was a major factor facilitating economic reintegration.

Wives of former combatants faced particular problems where they did not belong to the same ethnic group as the husband, but followed him to his home after discharge. They were often rejected by the community and/or abandoned by their husbands bowing to community or family pressures. Many decided to leave (divorce or separation) their husbands and returned to their own place of origin at their own initiative. A significant divorce rate among returning veteran families (over 50% in phase one) bears testimony to this high level of social stress. At the same time, the Ugandan experience shows that communities often erect visible and invisible barriers to veteran reintegration especially in the early stages of the process. Both political leaders and community members had misconceptions regarding the returning veterans. As only very few veterans actually committed a crime or behaved unsociably, distrust slowly receded and often turned into advice and assistance.

Successes

The budgetary returns as a result of demobilisation were impressive. There was a decrease in defence spending and annual budget savings of 10% of recurrent expenditure.

To facilitate the administration of veterans' affairs, the UVAB appointed district veterans' programme officers in each district to handle veterans' issues. These officers were very effective in assisting veterans, for example, to open bank accounts.

As part of the government's preparations at local level, district veterans' advisory committees assisted the district officer as and when required. Its main role was to oversee the implementation of the programme at the district level. This provision made the demobilisation process even smoother.

An external auditor scrutinised the UVAB's monthly accounts for the first two phases and certified the final statements of accounts on completion of each phase. This prevented the misuse of funds.

The UVAB's staff training activities to improve the skills and knowledge of staff and other concerned officials to enable them to contribute to the programme's implementation proved to be of great importance.

Failures

Seminars and workshops often lacked adequate preparation and proper orientation.

Reporting by district staff was infrequent and incomplete in the first phase of the programme.

Cultural differences between veterans' wives resulted in tensions and, for some, subsequently,

in divorce or separation.

The reception of veterans by the community during the first phase was negative, characterised by a mixture of apprehension, fear, prejudice and suspicion.

The Ugandan government did not take into account contingency factors like the drought, which resulted in food scarcity, and each arriving veteran was seen by the community as an additional mouth to feed.

There are still cases of veterans renting or residing in houses which belong to relatives.

Many veterans and their families suffered from a shortage of capital and had no marketable skills. Only between 10 and 20% of veterans were reintegrated economically over a short period and were able to support themselves with little help from the community.

Constraints

The majority of veterans had not been educated beyond the level of primary school. They possessed military skills, which did not have much relevance outside the army.

Some of the veterans were physically handicapped and therefore had difficulties earning a living on their own.

The absence of sufficient funds allocated to reintegration programmes by both the Ugandan government and the donor community adversely affected veterans' economic reintegration.

The implementation schedule of the programme depended on the availability of funds from donors (delayed disbursement of funds by major donors).

Lessons for South Africa

The Ugandan demobilisation experience suggests some lessons for South Africa:

- Demobilisation programmes must have clear but realistic objectives.
- The gathering of precise socio-economic data to identify target groups and prepare suitable support programmes is crucial.
- Soldiers clearly need time to adjust to the reality of demobilisation, and at least a month's notice should be given.
- Predischarge and post-discharge transitional safety net packages are important for immediate support.
- Education and training support would be useful in the South African context, especially in the form of funding for formal education, vocational training and direct employment support.
- Social and political reintegration need to be considered as separate issues and addressed differently.

- Mass media campaigns to create public awareness about demobilisation and reintegration processes proved effective in Uganda and would be useful in informing the civilian population.
- Small-scale business management and funding for business plans could be effective in supporting economic reintegration.

Chapter 4

CASE STUDIES OF DEMOBILISATION IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR

Demobilisation in Central America

While there have been demilitarisation programmes in most Central American countries, including Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, those in Nicaragua and El Salvador are regarded as the two best examples. The change in the international climate after the end of the Cold War played a key role in promoting demobilisation, while other factors such as internal civil groups, businesses and NGOs were seeking constructive ends to conflict.

This chapter will examine how demobilisation took place and discuss in more detail the reintegration of the demobilised forces. Factors that will be considered include the role of the military after demobilisation and the issues aiding and hindering the reintegration of the armed forces and their families as constructive members back into civil society. This discussion will note both unforeseen and uncontrollable factors that need to be considered before compiling a list of the important lessons that can be learned from this by South Africa. The importance of a well-planned demobilisation plan is arguably the main lesson learned from these two case studies and the list of lessons will highlight those factors that need to be carefully considered in the planning of a demobilisation process.

Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing trend towards demilitarisation in Central America. This development followed the termination of the Cold War, shifts in ideologies and a subsequent decrease in military assistance to the countries of the region.¹⁹ The capacity of the militaries in the area had been historically powerful, but began to wane as the idea of a civilian controlled society was promoted by social institutions and business leaders.

These efforts and changes became clearly visible in the establishment of the Central American peace process, which began in the early 1980s and helped to establish the framework for change in the military forces of the region. This led to the establishment of a commission to oversee demilitarisation that, in turn, increased the transparency of the military and weapons stockpiles of the various armed groups. The Central American peace process also encouraged the international community to make a new commitment to the region and facilitated a more defined role for its participation. This allowed the various national, regional and international peace processes that were operating at the time to complement one another to better effect.

Regional commitment and shared circumstances played important parts in the demilitarisation of the individual countries, by calling international attention to the problems in the region as a whole and offering regional support between governments and NGOs. The shared reasons for a move to demobilisation in Central America included one or more of the following:

- multilateral, bilateral or national peace accords;
- defeat of one of the fighting parties;
- perceived improvements in the security situation;

- shortage of adequate funding;
- perceived economic and development impact of conversion; and
- changing military technologies and/or strategies.²⁰

The Central American peace process commenced with a meeting on the island of Contadora in Panama in early 1983 that was initiated by the Mexican government.²¹ The peace process experienced several initiatives and processes before a consolidated plan could begin to take shape. The reaction of both Nicaragua and El Salvador - although both were stimulated and coached by the Central American peace process - followed different paths according to their own unique circumstances and problems.

This section will look at three different aspects of demobilisation first in Nicaragua and then in El Salvador. Practical aspects of the demobilisation of the various forces and the disarming of the various forces and groups will be discussed, as well as the role of the army and changes in its structure.

Nicaragua

Following the victory of Violeta Chamorro in the February 1991 elections, the Contras stated that there was no longer a need for conflict. A demobilisation programme was initiated, although its implementation suffered several delays. Renegotiation took place among all parties in the 'security zones' and their role and permanence (the general view was that these areas would be temporary and would only function during for the demobilisation process, whereas the Contras felt that the zones should be established as more permanent areas).

Based on this negotiation, the Sandinista forces would withdraw and members of the resistance were to disarm upon entering these zones.²² There would be no military presence in these areas except for the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (UNUCA). Due to several factors, the process was initially slow, most importantly the holding back of anticipated funds (totalling US \$128.8 million) for tools, medicine and training.²³ Added to this was the realisation that more Contras needed assistance than had previously been anticipated. The fact that demobilisation was also voluntary meant that the process could not be implemented with haste. An additional hindrance was the decision by the Chamorro government to keep General Humberto Ortega (who was the brother of the former Sandinista president) as head of the army, causing doubts over the safety of members of the resistance movement once they had disarmed.

The process formally ended in July 1990 with a total of 23 000 Contras demobilised and 17 000 weapons destroyed. By 1993, the 80 000-strong Sandinista Peoples' Army (EPS) was reduced to 15 000 and by 1997 was further reduced to 12 000.²⁴ Subsequently, several small groups resurfaced that attempted to rearm themselves. These groups — known as the Recontras, Recompas and Revueltos - were initially motivated by anger at the government for failing to provide adequate reintegration assistance.

As part of the disarmament process, members of the resistance turned their weapons in upon entering the security zones. These weapons were smashed, or cut into pieces. While the destruction of weapons went smoothly, the general disarmament process experienced some problems. Many of the weapons that were turned in were unserviceable or old and rusty and, as the Contras had been militarily supported by the US for a number of years, it appeared that newer weapons had been hidden by the Contras for future protection, or for future arms-trafficking as a source of income. The Special Disarmament Brigade later started a gun buy-

back scheme among the groups that had resurfaced with some success. For instance, 300 Recompas members participated in a gun buy-back in exchange for cash and promises of homes and land.²⁵ By the end of 1993, the Special Disarmament Brigade had confiscated or collected 142 000 weapons.²⁶

Before president Chamorro assumed power, the new structure and role of the army were not specified. Once inaugurated, she also assumed the position of defence minister and ended the military draft, called for the army to be reduced by half and limited the terms in office of armed forces chiefs to five years. In an effort to change the image of the security forces, Chamorro also called for a restructured police force under civilian rule. She amended the law that gave most of the military power to the military chief, and brought the forces under her command. This limited the role of the military to defence of security on the country's borders and to dealing with internal disturbances. Despite these changes, there were still some problems with the control of officers and a perception by most people that the army was just another political party and not an institution that protects the country. People found it difficult, in general, to separate the army and the Sandinistas in their minds.

El Salvador

In El Salvador, a country with a historically powerful military, the improvement of civil-military relations and a transition to democracy were vital. Under the Chapultepec peace agreement, the security and armed forces were dissolved. The agreement also called for the dissolution of the military structure of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its transformation into a legitimate political party in the country.

Under the agreement, the demobilisation of the FMLN and the armed forces of El Salvador (FAES) was constructed in such a way that FMLN combatants would be concentrated in 50 designated points and the FAES in 100 designated points.²⁷ Over the next weeks, the forces would be further concentrated into fewer verification centres in the areas they would normally occupy in peacetime.

There was a delay in the process because the FMLN refused to demobilise claiming that the government had not honoured its commitments towards, among others, humanitarian aid and infrastructure. Some of the main obstacles were land and land reforms such as the land on which the demobilised troops were kept and the transferral of land after demobilisation. Prior to the disarmament process, both parties were required to submit information of their troop strengths and weapons to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL). The verification of stocks and weapons, and the transparency of the process were important precursors to actual disarmament.

All the arms that were turned in during demobilisation were to be, reported and securely stored in lockers. These lockers were furnished with two locks of which the keys were kept by an UNOSAL and a FMLN commander. Combatants were allowed to keep personal weapons until they left their designated areas. Despite the inventories supplied before the disarmament process, a large arms cache belonging to a group of the FMLN was found in Nicaragua in 1993. They were then pressured to hand over other arms caches in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras and these were quickly destroyed. Following the demobilisation of the Contras in Nicaragua, arms were widely available in El Salvador and an abundance of arms is still visible.²⁸

Unlike Nicaragua, the structure of the army was discussed and negotiated fully before the signing of the Chapultepec peace agreement. The most noteworthy change was a clear distinction

between security and defence. Structural changes and reductions were made in terms of troops, branches, equipment and spending. The change in budgetary allocation was vital as El Salvador had a highly disproportionate expenditure on military needs, as opposed to education and health care.

The military has had to justify its existence through participation in non-military operations such as conservation and deforestation, but have also been involved in activities involving oil, mining, publishing, resort hotels and other economic activities.²⁹ They have also assisted in policing activities because the newly formed police force has insufficient manpower and experience to handle particularly organised crime in El Salvador.

The reintegration of former combatants in Nicaragua began with a serious disadvantage due to the unstable economic situation in the country. This meant that demobilised soldiers were dissatisfied from the beginning with the contribution by the government which had insufficient available resources. An important aspect of the demobilisation programme in Nicaragua was that over 60% of the former soldiers were under the age of 25 and had been fighting for an average of five to ten years. They clearly had not learned any other skills, other than those required for combat.³⁰

The core problem with reintegration was the land issue. Land has been historically disputed in Nicaragua and remained unresolved after demilitarisation. Many demilitarised soldiers were promised land that they never received and, at the same time, citizens who had not participated in the conflict felt that the soldiers were being overcompensated at their expense. Another serious problem in land resettlement in rural areas was the presence of landmines. Over 100 000 landmines were planted in Nicaragua and are still disabling many people today. Without a record of where the mines were planted, it is difficult for the government to provide safe new land. The delays in handing over land also meant that all follow-up programmes have been delayed, and thus the first planting season was missed resulting in a longer period of economic hardship.

Demobilised troops were promised two years of medical, housing and credit assistance by the government, but its inability to provide this increased their frustration with the process. This was compounded by the fact that approximately half of the entire population lived below the poverty line. These are some of the issues that prompted some groups to pressurise the government, while some resorted to banditry.

The biggest inhibiting factor behind the funding of demilitarisation, disarming and reintegration processes was the lack of national funding. This meant that the majority of efforts have been paid for with donor contributions. Although large amounts of foreign funding were pledged in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the actual payments were often very late, or were not actually made. In some cases, the international aid was slow in coming due to prerequisites that were attached to aid, such as the development of a free market system. Consequently, the government had to juggle the immediate economic needs of the soldiers and the stipulations of the limited donor funding. It was also of major concern that the reintegration process should ensure both short-term satisfaction and long-term sustainability.

In terms of social reintegration into society, the best results were achieved by smaller local and international NGOs that ran training workshops and undertook projects focused on skills-training, counselling, legal advice, community-building and reconciliation. In a society where the lack of employment and financial security cause social instability, it is also important to teach skills such as peaceful conflict resolution and tolerance.³¹ Included in the work of these NGOs

was a project to train trainers so that new local leaders could be equipped with the necessary skills to enable them to fulfil their duties.

Problems arose among local and international NGOs due to the perception that some of these organisations had stronger sympathies with a particular faction. This impacted on both their community support and government assistance. Despite this, however, the role of NGOs was extremely important in the demobilisation process.

As was the case in Nicaragua, El Salvador also suffered from a lack of funding, even though external promises were made to this effect. Appeals for funding were also not met with much enthusiasm due to the shift in the focus of international aid away from Central America. There was a scepticism on the part of donor nations because financial aid had to be directed to the government that would allocate it to various projects. Land was also a key aspect of the reintegration of soldiers in this predominantly agricultural country. The delays and problems around the issue of land slowed the implementation of other parts of the reintegration process.

Impediments to successful reintegration

One of the major funding problems with reintegration in El Salvador was the fact that there were many more participants in the reintegration process than had originally been expected. Moreover, in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the situation of women added to the complexity of reintegration. In El Salvador, an estimated 11% of the demobilised combatants were women. In a male-dominated society, women had faced many hardships before the conflict and, while their roles changed during the conflict, tradition expected them to return to their previous status. As a result, women in both countries were holding jobs in societies experiencing high unemployment rates and this caused tension among unemployed males. After the conflict, a feminist movement developed and several women's groups were established to offer support to those facing discrimination. In Nicaragua, mothers often held very important positions in conflict resolution with as members of the same family in many cases fighting on different sides. Their role in the reconciliation process was therefore vital.³²

The long years of conflict left many of combatants with physical disabilities. Extra provisions and considerations were thus needed for their reintegration into society, as well as to fulfil in their specific medical needs. Employment for the disabled was even more rare than for able-bodied former combatants. Several unions were formed, often across previous allegiances to ensure that they received sufficient consideration.

The biggest threat to the success of demilitarisation in El Salvador was crime and extensive arms-trafficking. The inability of the police force and the judiciary to control crime made an already fragile process even more precarious. The wide availability of arms in Central America has helped to fuel the problem. In El Salvador, as in Nicaragua, training in social skills and conflict resolution was undertaken mostly by local and international NGOs and community organisations.

Perhaps the biggest failure of both demilitarisation efforts was the inability to secure the necessary foreign funding. The second major failure was the lack of clear planning in the case of the new role of the military and the actual events after initial demobilisation. The third most important failure of both efforts was the still large numbers of available arms. The instability that the presence of these arms and munitions created could nullify many of the positive successes.

The successes in both countries include the complementary linkages and co-operation between

government, NGOs and local programmes. While government efforts were focused more on the practical aspects, NGOs have attempted to address social and personal issues. This was seen particularly in the clearer framework of El Salvador than that of Nicaragua. Calculating the accumulated arms and munitions stocks of all the parties was a success because it gave a clearer indication of the collected arms. Following up with 'guns for cash' programmes afterwards was also successful, as was the double lock system that promoted fairness in the collection and destruction of weapons.

Accepting that reintegration programmes that were only focused on business skills would be defunct and cause frustration in a society with very few available job opportunities was important. Agricultural and social skills were identified as being far more valuable.

Lessons for South Africa

Perhaps the most important lesson for any country wishing to engage in demilitarisation is the need to secure the necessary funding for the operation before commencement, to avoid dissatisfaction midway through the process. Without the necessary funding to complete reintegration, former combatants with fighting skills may resort to their previous lives or banditry rather than to accept the conditions of halting reintegration.

While South Africa is not as economically unstable as El Salvador and Nicaragua, using funds originally allocated to other areas causes dissatisfaction among those not involved in reintegration. Part of ensuring that this funding is available lies in balancing needs with the expectations of donor countries, NGOs and former combatants.

Correct and thorough planning is essential to ensure that the initial success of short-term efforts is not lost in the longer term. The practical aspects, as well as the definition and perception of forces after demilitarisation need to be assured.

This includes having a clear understanding of the profiles of former combatants and knowledge that is as accurate as possible of available arms supplies.

Remembering that those involved in reintegration are not only male necessitates an understanding of the gender dynamics that is part of the situation and inclusion of all in reintegration training.

The disabled — whether still in action at the time of demobilisation or those who have been out of action for a while - form an important part of former combatants, and often constitute a large percentage of the total group. Their specific needs also have to be taken into account.

Much effort needs to be directed to the destruction of arms. At first, large-scale voluntary action should be undertaken, followed by direct interaction with reluctant groups, and the use of 'guns for bread' tactics.

Regional stability and support are important factors. These help to define the role and size of the military to a level that addresses past suspicions and fears. This also prevents unnecessary regional instability, as is the case with the large-scale arms-trafficking in Central America.

Finally, the teaching of vital social skills goes beyond training in basic business skills. Education and business skills need to be developed alongside social skills such as conflict resolution, tolerance and community-building. This is an ongoing process and sufficient funding and

manpower have to be earmarked for such training, It should be undertaken through the involvement of a variety of NGOs and government institutions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are several lessons that can be learned from demilitarisation in El Salvador and Nicaragua. There are many factors to consider for a successful campaign, including economic stability, total disarmament and the training in a variety of social and business skills. Most importantly, for all these factors to be successful, there needs to be careful and detailed planning of the entire process.

Chapter 5

CASE STUDY OF DEMOBILISATION IN CAMBODIA

Background

Following the Cold War, the international system entered an era where many of the Cold War conflicts have lost their international relevance and, in some cases, have fundamentally changed. In cases where conflict has been replaced by peace, large numbers of combatants and traumatised communities have found themselves in an unfamiliar situation. The lessons of the past ten years have taught that, in a conflict environment where peace is made, one of the major priorities must be the demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration of combatants. Should this not be achieved, the prospects of a lasting peace are substantially reduced, and it is likely that former combatants will eventually return to conflict or banditry.

In no country has this lesson been more effectively illustrated than in Cambodia. Cambodia's modern history reflects a situation of extraordinary violence, crisis, trauma and conflict. Starting with the aerial bombing by the US during the Vietnam War, Cambodia then fell prey to the Khmer Rouge in 1975, beginning one of the most brutal and traumatic periods of civil conflict in modern history. In 1978, Cambodia was rescued from the Khmer Rouge by its historic enemy, Vietnam, and a period began of the effective colonisation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese government, in which groups of combatants fought one another and the Vietnamese army for influence, power and control of the resources of the country. It was only with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s that Cambodia was relieved from the victimisation of foreign powers. A civil war for control of the country ensued and lasted until October 1991 when the four main competing parties signed the Paris peace agreement. This ushered in an era of peace, stability, economic growth, foreign investment and general optimism. However, the failure of a suitable initiative to separate armed groups from political parties and substantially disarm and demobilise conflicting parties led to the re-emergence of civil conflict and a coup in July 1997, which effectively erased the gains of the previous six years of relative peace. With the formation of a stable coalition government in 2000, the lessons of the past are obvious: proceed with urgency and purpose towards the effective demilitarisation of Cambodia in order to create a sustainable state of stability in which development and economic empowerment of the people can occur.

Unlike the other case studies in this monograph, Cambodia is only beginning its process of demilitarisation, and the contents of this chapter will therefore be far more forward-looking and advisory than the other case studies. However, it will be structured in a similar way to make comparison easier. For this purpose, it will evaluate the current situation in Cambodia and point to reasons why demilitarisation is a national priority. In doing this, demilitarisation is seen not as a military or even a social imperative, but rather as an economic imperative. It will look at the obstacles and challenges to demilitarisation in Cambodia, and from this perspective, hope to

make the process in South Africa more informed and effective.

Economic pressures

The key issue relating to demobilisation in Cambodia is economic. Cambodia is a relatively small country with a population in excess of 50 million people. The land area of Cambodia is mainly low-lying with bodies of water accounting for 10% of its surface area during the dry season, and much more than this during the rainy season. The population is mostly rural (80%) and dispersed in about 7 000 villages, many of which do not have access to basic services, utilities and infrastructure. Another example of the poverty in the country is that, out of 100 pregnancies, nine deaths occur — a rate twice as high as that of India and much of Africa. The terrible legacy of international and civil conflict is reflected in the fact that Cambodia has the highest proportion of physically disabled people in the world (one out of every 238 people is an amputee), there are more than 200 000 child orphans, and 35% of women over the age of 18 are heads of households.³³

Economic statistics for Cambodia show a country ill-equipped to meet the development and social challenges that confronts it. In order to meet its development priorities, Cambodia must effectively follow an urgent path of demilitarisation to reduce the drain of the military on the government budget, remove the military's involvement in business activities, curb inefficient and corrupt practices in the military, and introduce capital into the largely rural districts where veterans will be based.

The most obvious development challenge for the military in the process of Cambodia's economic recovery is its sheer size relative to the security requirements and the unnecessary drain that this causes on the government budget. In 2000, estimates of the size of Cambodia's armed forces were a total of 160 000 personnel. In addition to the armed forces, there were an additional 60 000 police and 10 000 *gendarmes* (paramilitary police).³⁴ This represented an estimated total of 230 000 security force members. This is clearly a military swollen well beyond the size reasonably needed to counter potential threats to national security. Military analysts suggest that, while a 100 000-member force is not unreasonable for a military that relies largely on personnel, based on real threats to Cambodia, a figure close to 50 000 would be more realistic.³⁵

Currently, Cambodia spends between 30 and 40% of its annual budget on the military sector,³⁶ of which the Ministry of Defence alone received 23.7% of the budget in 1999, or equal to the total of funds allocated to health, education and rural development.³⁷ In fact, the funding for education declined in 1999, while health was only increased by 1% to 5.3%.³⁸ The World Bank notes that other ministries are not always able to make full use of their resources, while defence regularly utilises more than 100% of its budget.³⁹ The challenges of this bloated military to the development of Cambodia and the economic empowerment of its people are obvious.

In order to counter this considerable drain on national funds, the government has committed itself to a process of demilitarisation over the next few years with the aim of reducing the number of people employed in the military by approximately 31 500 soldiers by 2004. This is combined with a programme of identifying 'ghost soldiers' and removing them from the payroll.

The demobilisation plan

As a first step, in what the World Bank calls 'personnel data management and information

system development', Cambodia has made an effort to establish a reliable military personnel data system, which enabled the government to conduct the first effective census of a military that had been recently swollen by the inflow of a considerable number of Khmer Rouge soldiers (see table 2). This census revealed that there were over 20 000 'ghost soldiers' employed in the military - personnel who are either dead or have left the military and have never been reported as absent without leave. In many cases, these persons simply do not exist, and military officials pocket their salaries in a "notoriously widespread form of corruption."⁴⁰ By removing these individuals from the payroll, Cambodia has already 'demobilised' 20 000 forces. Some observers estimate that the savings from this project can be up to US \$2.3 million.⁴¹

The second step is the demobilisation of forces, comprising two basic subcomponents: assembly and disarmament, and discharge operations. Neither of these subcomponents represents a short-term saving, but in fact represents a considerable cost, as discharge involves preparing soldiers for civilian life. It is widely anticipated that, upon discharge, veterans will receive US \$250 (about a year's salary), a three-month supply of rice and fish for a family, and certain household utensils from the World Bank, GTZ and the Carere and Seila programmes (funded by the UNDP).⁴² The success of the second and subsequent steps depends upon the ability of the government, NGO and donor community to manage the process effectively, as well as adequate funding. In addition, the savings on demobilising these soldiers is only expected to be in the region of US \$7 million - not a substantial amount.⁴³ Instead of focusing on the least costly areas in the military, it may be more prudent for the government and donor community to study how they can demobilise and reduce costs in the more expensive areas of the military.

For this reason, it is unlikely that there will be any considerable cost-saving to the country in the short term. If handled correctly, the process will not only save the country money in the future, but will also assist in the development of the economy by assisting veterans to find legitimate means of personal gain. The market will thus be expanded in the longer term.

As a starting point, it is useful to identify the major structural challenge to veterans' successful reintegration into society: economic opportunity. Cambodia has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, and while the general trend during the 1990s has been positive, there has been little work created outside of the service and industrial sectors - services and industry account for 57% of gross domestic product (GDP), but only employs around 25% of the workforce. In addition to this, these industries are concentrated in urban areas and the productive base does not spread much further than the central urban areas.⁴⁴ Even where work is to be found, wages are often so low that it cannot be viably considered to be economic empowerment.

In this context, it is difficult to imagine a situation where soldiers are able to move into productive civilian life. However, with the right approach, the demobilisation process can serve as the major impetus behind rejuvenating the most vital sector of Cambodia's economy: agriculture. While ambiguous land control legislation has hampered foreign investment in this sector, local communities are in a good position to take advantage of the opportunities offered by Cambodia's climate, generally fertile land, and central location to other emerging markets. In addition, the government is in the process of introducing a new land law that is expected to make foreign investment in agriculture and agro-industry easier and more transparent.⁴⁵

In a pilot project completed in 2000, it was found that, out of 1 500 soldiers, 85% have become farmers.⁴⁶ In addition, one of the largest concerns in a demobilisation project is that veterans will turn to banditry and crime to make a living. However, a study by the World Bank in Uganda

revealed that soldiers dismissed without land were 100 times more likely to commit crimes than soldiers who were dismissed with land.⁴⁷

Table 2: World Bank demilitarisation project description

Phase	Description	Objectives
Personnel data management and information systems	Establish a reliable military personnel data base and develop a computerised payroll system, including identification and verification of identity	Undertake an accurate census, thereby allowing the government to know who is entitled to payment and who not
Demobilisation	1 Assembly and disarmament 2 Discharge	Remove troops from the field and place them in a controlled environment. Allow troops to be prepared for discharge: predischarge orientation, health-screening, discharge procedures, and transportation to the communities
Reinsertion	Intended to cover the immediate needs of veterans, and to help them in the initial phases of their return to full civilian life	Consists of food and essential household kits, planning for shelter assistance, provision of essential agricultural; tools and inputs such as seeds, and the formulation of skills/vocational training programmes; also includes counselling after arrival, and sensitisation of host communities
	Assist the	Design and implementation of

Reintegration support	Assist the veterans in their assimilation into the mainstream of productive civilian life	shelter assistance, skills development, vocational training, community development, and assistance to special target groups. Donor support of communities where veterans live.
Source: Cambodia - Demobilization Project, World Bank, 2 October 2000.		

Prospects

While there remain many obstacles to the process's success (principally the lack of rural infrastructure, such as roads for the transport of fresh produce), this at least shows that agriculture has the capacity and potential to absorb often unskilled veterans, allowing them a source of income and serving to develop the rural areas of Cambodia. In looking forward to the implementation of the Cambodian demilitarisation process, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the project. However, it is possible to identify some of the imperatives required for the process to be a success in the future stability and development of the country.

Dissociation of politics and the military

Due to the fact that the ruling party draws most of its support from the military, it becomes very difficult to enforce a programme of demilitarisation.

Demilitarisation requires a substantial degree of political will. If military officers (who have a vested interest in keeping the military budget as high as possible) have too much political influence, it will be extremely difficult for political leaders to institute an effective programme of demobilisation.

Creating a professional military

It is vital that the demobilisation process should be accompanied by a wider process of military reform. In a military where soldiers are not paid a living wage, they are forced to abuse their power and become involved in business and corrupt activities. Individuals employed in the military must not be allowed to benefit from their privileged positions as armed and authoritative members of society. Should they be allowed to abuse their positions, it will become very difficult to convince soldiers to take the opportunities offered to them by demobilisation, as they are able to benefit even more by remaining in the military.

Disarmament

The process of demobilisation must be accompanied by an effective process of disarmament. The temptation for veterans to use their skills as combatants in order to follow a life in banditry is a very real concern, and access to small arms will only serve to increase this temptation and the violence associated with crime.

Remuneration

Being discharged into a difficult economic environment where jobs are not being created is extremely traumatic for veterans. Rather than giving mainly financial remuneration, more focus must be given to supply veterans with skills and tools that will allow them at least to subsist and, if possible, become productive members of society. Agriculture holds considerable potential as it will enable veterans to feed themselves and their families, and possibly develop this primary sector of the economy. Associated with this must be programmes of land reform, the provision of implements and infrastructure development (especially transport).

Economic empowerment

The discharge of soldiers does not remove the potential threat that they can pose to the future stability of a country or region. Should they become dissatisfied with the process or with the opportunities afforded to them as civilians, the potential for them to turn to crime or become militarised once more is very real and daunting. All efforts must be made to ensure that they and the communities they are a part of are able to benefit from their peace status. This may involve development projects in the communities and regions where they are settled. *Economic skills* In a traumatised environment where education and skills levels are very low, former professional soldiers can be very valuable members of society. It is likely that they possess discipline, training and unique leadership qualities that other members of society may not have. This can be especially valuable in rural areas and efforts have to be made to ensure that the 'comparative advantage' of soldiers can be fully utilised.

Sensitisation of communities

The need for veterans to undergo counselling in life skills and crisis management is obvious. However, what is less obvious is the need for communities to be sensitised to veterans. In countries with diverse and differing political opinions, people may not be pleased with the prospect of veterans settling in their communities, due to various stigmas, differing political opinions, and the fact that certain communities may have suffered considerable hardship from the war, in general, and at the hands of soldiers, in particular. For this reason, it is important that communities also receive counselling and advice on how to allow veterans to become part of the community once again.

Chapter 6

DEMOBILISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Key lessons for South Africa

The analysis of demobilisation in a number of developing countries presented above suggests a number of key lessons applicable to all countries, including South Africa, which are contemplating demobilisation programmes. These lessons include:

- The transition from soldier to civilian is divided into three distinct phases: demobilisation (separation from the armed forces), reinsertion (return to the civilian community) and reintegration (securing long-term employment). During each of the different phases, the needs of former combatants are different and a variety of support interventions are required.
- The success of demobilisation is contingent upon effective rehabilitation and consistent follow-up.

- Significant financial support for demobilisation and reintegration programmes is vital for success. The necessary financial resources should be ensured well in advance of the start of demobilisation. A rapid donor response can substantially contribute to the success of demobilisation and reintegration. The co-ordination of donor support is also important for success.
- Any reintegration programme should be compatible with the national development process.
- The key elements of a demobilisation programme are provision of an assistance package, simplicity of delivery, a decentralised programme for implementation, and building on existing social capital.
- Socio-economic surveys are important to identify the needs, aspirations and capabilities of former combatants. Quality information is essential for the design of demobilisation programmes. Surveys should be conducted during programme preparation. Studies of the reintegration of former combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda clearly indicated that the establishment of a socio-economic profile of soldiers that identifies their capabilities, needs and expectations is crucial.⁴⁸
- Former combatants should be classified into different target groups based on their specific needs, requirements and aspirations. This facilitates the development of specific, relevant and cost-effective interventions. Once again, sound socio-economic data is essential for effective classification.
- Vocational, technical and management training for former combatants is important for the reintegration process.
- Demobilised soldiers should be given a package to assist them in the early stages of resettlement. The package should also include assistance in developing specific plans for long-term employment. Flexible credit schemes should be available to fund specific small business proposals. Possible components of a reintegration support programme include:
 - cash payments
 - transport to the resettlement area
 - orientation on the resettlement area
 - food (for a specific period)
 - access to health care
 - health care advice
 - family planning advice
 - support for children's school fees
 - civilian clothing
 - basic household utensils
 - building materials
 - tools, seeds and agricultural implements
 - counselling
 - stress and conflict management training
 - information packages
 - legal advice
 - banking advice
 - business advice

- credit facilities
- job placement advice
- housing support
- assistance to find accommodation
- wage subsidies
- skills enhancement training
- educational training support.⁴⁹

Reintegration support programmes usually last between several months and two years. Programmes may have to be specifically designed for physically handicapped veterans. The German Agency for Technical Co-operation [GTZ] supported a number of micro-business activities among former soldiers in Ethiopia through a financing mechanism managed as an 'open fund'. The fund provided support to 44 000 former combatants with agricultural equipment, labour intensive construction schemes, training for self-employment and small low-cost housing projects. In this case, the keys to success were flexibility, a high degree of autonomy along with continuous dialogue regarding the progress on projects and small business activities. GTZ's philosophy was to support a large number of small projects, despite the obvious risks of failure, to maximise former combatants' involvement, rather than to concentrate on a few larger projects.

- HIV/Aids should be a key concern for reintegration management. Awareness campaigns should specifically include former combatants and their families.
- Major consideration must be given to psycho-social problems of former combatants.
- Civic education, designed to give former combatants a knowledge of civil society, has proven useful in some cases.
- An information and sensitisation programme is useful for both former combatants and the communities into which they are to be reintegrated.
- A transitional safety net (mainly adequate financial support) should be provided to bridge the gap between demobilisation and reintegration.
- Communities play an important role in problem-solving through community advisory committees. Such communities can also provide guidance to former combatants. Every effort should be made to maximise community support.
- Demand-driven training should be prioritised and linked to specific job placement programmes.
- Urban reintegration has proven to be more difficult and requires a more diversified approach with comprehensive planning. Key components for success are counselling, job placement and referral, vocational and apprenticeship training, along with employment subsidy schemes.
- The regular provision of useful information to former soldiers about skills enhancement and educational and job opportunities can significantly enhance economic reintegration.
- The potential impact on the communities into which former combatants settle needs to be carefully assessed with the aim of providing a corrective intervention if necessary.

- Detailed co-ordination within government and between government and other relevant actors (NGOs) is important to maximise the effectiveness of reintegration programmes. The best administrative model appears to be central co-ordination complemented by decentralised implementation. At the same time, transaction costs should be minimised in order to maximise benefits for demobilised personnel.
- The entire demobilisation and reintegration programme needs to be monitored in order to redesign, or redirect interventions where necessary, and to ensure transparency, public confidence and accountability.
- From the outset, strong political commitment and support, along with a delivery of promised resources, are essential for the success of any demobilisation and reintegration programme. Several case studies suggested that it is counterproductive for a government to promise more than it can deliver.


The demobilisation model

Based on numerous case studies of demobilisation in the developing world, it is suggested that, if no other option exists, former combatants may use their military skills to make a living through crime. Demobilised soldiers in El Salvador and Nicaragua became extensively involved in robbery, kidnapping and drug-trafficking during the late 1990s.⁵⁰ The use of former soldiers as mercenaries is also a common phenomenon in developing countries. As the World Bank's demobilisation model shows, there are three distinct phases in any demobilisation programme, with other analysts suggesting a fourth phase:

- preparation: planning and mobilising support;
- demobilisation: the actual separation of combatants from the military;
- some observers suggest an additional phase — relocation: the suggested additional phase, when former combatants are relocated to chosen civilian accommodation; and
- reintegration into civil society (a process which may take a number of years).

During the final phase, temporary relief aid (usually for a few months to two years) should lead to the provision of formal employment, or assistance in establishing a micro-business. According to the World Bank, failure to find suitable employment may result in long-term unemployment and poverty for former combatants, or the resort to banditry to ensure survival. The provision of employment for former combatants is thus regarded as crucial to avoid social instability and increased poverty.

Figure 1: Demobilisation model



Chapter 7

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISATION PART 1?

"South Africa's demobilisation process, which was aimed solely at soldiers from the liberation armies, has not effectively provided for the reintegration of former combatants into society. In view of the relatively small numbers of people demobilised, it is unlikely that there will be any major social, or political ramifications, but if the problems with demobilisation are repeated in the rationalisation process, which may involve ten times the number of people, the consequences may be dire. Demobilisation has been poorly planned, badly executed and wholly inadequate in meeting the needs of ex-combatants."⁵¹

Background

South Africa's Department of Defence, consisting of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the Secretariat of Defence, was established by the Interim Constitution of 1993. A process followed to integrate seven former military forces (including the KwaZulu Self-Protection Force) into a single SANDF. The integration process was designed by the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) of the subcouncil on defence of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). The TEC agreed that the six armed forces in South Africa - the South African Defence Force (SADF), the four 'bantustan' armies (TBVC states) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - were to be integrated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) originally stayed out of the negotiations, but the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) later joined the integration process after a cabinet decision and an amendment to the Interim Constitution. The original plan envisaged a termination of the integration process by the end of 1994, but the timeframe was later extended to three years.

The JMCC decided that the statutory forces (SADF and TBVC states) had completed the necessary training and had the qualifications for inclusion in the new defence force, but the non-statutory forces (MK and APLA) would have to undergo a training and selection process. All armed forces submitted a personnel list to the Certified Personnel Register (CPR), which formed the foundation of the integration process. Non-statutory forces were assembled at the military bases of Wallmansthal and De Brug to begin their integration into the SANDF. The application process was controlled by a placement board consisting of representatives from all the integrating forces, as well as members of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). Combatants who did not have formal military training, or adequate military qualifications were not integrated. Depending on training and qualifications, other combatants were accepted at different ranks. The application and placement process was followed by bridging training for former MK and APLA forces to prepare them for full participation in a conventional military force. Following bridging training, soldiers were sent to specific military units. There were a number of problems with the integration process, mainly because only former MK and APLA forces were required to undergo tests before acceptance into the SANDF. The general perception created by the application and placement process suggested that MK and APLA members were joining the SADF, rather than a newly created defence force as envisaged in the 1993 Constitution.⁵² BMATT indicated satisfaction with the integration process, but admitted that there had been problems which led to dissatisfaction among former MK and APLA members.

Sixteen months into the integration process, the Department of Defence initiated a demobilisation programme, described by the minister at the time, Joe Modise, as "the voluntary release of former non-statutory members, who are constitutionally part of the SANDF, but who do not wish to serve in the full-time force, or who are unable to do so."⁵³ The demobilisation process announced in August 1995, was not intended specifically to reduce force numbers, but was rather designed to provide a mechanism to facilitate a way out of the military for former MK or APLA members. Demobilisation was applied to three categories of soldier: those not eligible for service in the SANDF based on age, education or health; those refusing integration into the SANDF; and those dissatisfied with rank or salary after acceptance into the SANDF. The demobilisation programme consisted of three key elements:

- once-off gratuities;
- two-week counselling on personal issues, career prospects, social services and finances; and
- an opportunity to join the Service Corps for an eighteen-month training course on life skills and adult literacy.

Assessment of demobilisation

No comprehensive counselling, training, or job placement programme was offered to demobilised personnel. By the end of February 1997, 3 770 former MK and APLA soldiers had been demobilised. Gratuities received included the following:

- 0-4 years' service: R12 734;
- 5-11 years' service: R20 201;
- 12-17 years' service: R28 721;
- 18-21 years' service: R34 276;
- 22-23 years' service: R40 657.

The demobilisation process cost approximately R69 million, compared to the original estimate of R250 million. Initially, average integration costs were estimated at R50 000 per soldier, almost R10 000 more than the highest gratuity paid to any demobilised combatant.

The demobilisation process resulted in 3 770 soldiers leaving the SANDF and returning to civil society. However, demobilisation was widely regarded as flawed and having failed to provide adequately for former combatants.

Jacklyn Cock, an independent researcher, found that the demobilisation process did not adequately address the psychological, educational or employment needs of demobilised personnel. In a survey of 180 former combatants, Cock found that the majority were unemployed, living in poverty and relying on their families for food and accommodation. Many of the respondents had emotional problems and suffered from depression. Cock suggested that many were suffering from post-traumatic stress disease and had not received adequate counselling. Only 11% indicated that they had received assistance for psycho-social problems. A number of former combatants indicated that they had been unable to find employment because of poor education and no skills or work experience outside the military.⁵⁴

According to Tsepe Motumi and Penny McKenzie, the demobilisation of former non-MK and APLA forces carried out during 1996 had a number of weaknesses:

- *Lack of planning:* The demobilisation process was not adequately planned and the process was conceived through a top-down approach with minimal involvement of former combatants. Only a limited effort was made to gain political support and civil society was also largely excluded from the process.
- *Lack of research:* The limited planning that was undertaken was not informed by detailed research, such as a socio-economic profile of former combatants, education and training levels, skills requirements and career aspirations. Information was also lacking with regard to the families of former combatants, areas where individuals would live after discharge, reintegration possibilities and employment opportunities.⁵⁵ Adequate research would have enabled sound planning and would have significantly enhanced the possibilities of successful reintegration into society. Employment opportunities in both the formal and informal sector were not investigated to match possible retraining with market demand.
- *Demobilisation packages:* Demobilisation packages consisted of once-off cash payments, limited counselling and an offer to join the Service Corps. The packages provided immediate short-term relief, but were clearly not adequate to ensure successful reintegration into civil society. Clearly, the gratuities should have been accompanied by a range of reintegration programmes, involving skills enhancement and job search training.
- *Implementation:* The actual implementation of the demobilisation programme was characterised by bureaucratic delays and legal problems.
- *Service Corps:* The Service Corps was launched on 31 January 1995 to assist former combatants to integrate into civil society, via career-profiling and skills conversion for civilian employment. The Corps was intended to provide 18 months of training, consisting of three months literacy and adult lifeskills training, three months of vocational training and 12 months of practical experience. The Corps also established a vocational training centre to provide practical training. However, only a limited number of demobilised former combatants chose to complete courses offered by the Service Corps.

By all accounts, the first part of the demobilisation process in South Africa did not meet the needs and expectations of former combatants.⁵⁶ Moreover, the process was not particularly successful in the economic reintegration of former military personnel. Arguably, the key failure was a lack of planning, compounded by poor communication and a lack of adequate political support.⁵⁷

Predictions that former combatants would turn to crime once their severance packages ran out appeared to become a reality when, in January 1998, government officials indicated that they had 'declared war' on former MK soldiers who were perpetrating violent crimes. Sydney Mufamadi, Safety and Security minister at the time, said the government had no 'sentimental attachment' to former cadres who made use of military training to carry out cash-in-transit heists and bank robberies.⁵⁸ In March 1998, a former MK member admitted to the media that he had helped to plan and execute several cash-in-transit robberies in which over R100 million was stolen and 12 people murdered. He claimed that former MK members along with criminal gangs were masterminding the heists.⁵⁹ The editorial in the *Saturday Star* of 7 March 1998 suggested that demobilised soldiers were a 'time bomb' which could not be ignored. At the same time, the government was criticised for not making a 'special effort' to ensure that demobilised soldiers were integrated back into society as productive citizens. Former APLA and MK cadres told the media that their reason for turning to crime is simply that they have no alternative means of earning an income.⁶⁰ In April 1998, Bob Tucker, the chairperson of the Council of South African Banks (Cosab), stressed that new measures to curb increasing bank robberies, including electronic surveillance and armed guards, were having little impact on a wave of military-style heists never seen before in South Africa.⁶¹ Former MK members have complained that, without marketable skills and adequate education, they have been forced to rely on military training to carry out robberies simply in order to survive.⁶²

The frustration expressed by former combatants suggested that previous demobilisation efforts had not done enough to assist in economic reintegration. Transfer from uniform to civilian life has proved to be extremely difficult for many individuals. Successful economic reintegration obviously requires a comprehensive effort on the part of a wide range of stakeholders.

Chapter 8

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISATION PART II: RATIONALISATION

Background

The integration process in South Africa of former combatants coincided with a series of significant defence budget reductions and the approval of a programme to purchase new defence platforms for the air force and the navy. Consequently, the budget allocation for personnel expenditure became a key issue of contention. Following the 1997 Defence Review, it was decided to reallocate the defence budget according to the following formula: 40% for personnel (requiring a significant decrease from 57%), 30% for capital expenditure and 30% for operating costs. The 17% reduction on personnel costs, envisaged in the Defence Review, thus required a significant reduction in personnel.

The Defence Review emphasised that the newly integrated armed forces far exceeded the numbers required for the envisaged tasks in the region and in the post-Cold War low threat environment. It was also emphasised that the Department of Defence of the future had to be affordable as government spending priorities would shift to reconstruction and development from the past traditional high prioritisation of defence and security concerns. The original downsizing

proposal contained in the Defence Review proposed a reduction of personnel from 98 806 (15 February 1997) to 70 700 over a three to four-year period.

The mechanisms for personnel reduction were identified as voluntary severance, contract expiration and employer initiated retrenchment. The voluntary severance initiative is based on severance packages depending on years of pensionable service and is thus not attractive to personnel who have only served for a short time. The Department of Defence also declined to re-enlist many short-term members whose contracts had expired. The employer initiated retrenchment programme was outlined in the Interim Constitution (1993), and intended to ensure the long-term rightsizing of the defence force in response to new budgetary and security considerations. The Defence Review emphasised that the retrenchment process would be done in a:

"fair and equitable manner which will satisfy the goals of representativeness, affirmative action and equal opportunities and ensure that the SANDF is seen to be legitimate and representative of the total South African population."

It was also emphasised that efficiency considerations, such as the assessment of potential, rank and age, would be taken into account.

During the annual defence budget Vote in parliament during March 1999, Minister Joe Modise indicated that approximately 37 000 members had left the SANDF since 1994. Of this total, 6 000 were former APLA, 1 700 former MK, 4 270 former TBVC and over 28 000 former SANDF members. However, the reduction in personnel through voluntary severance and contract expiration has been insufficient to meet the target of a smaller defence force. Consequently, an employer initiated retrenchment process was proposed by the SANDF personnel division aimed at reducing the overall size of the force by a further approximately 20 000. The long-term objective was to reduce personnel expenditure to 40% and operating costs to 30%.

The rationalisation process would be managed by three main roleplayers, the personnel division, the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) and the Service Corps. The personnel division would be responsible for identifying persons to be retrenched, providing notification and determining severance packages. SAMHS would take care of the transition support process and provide psycho-social support for those retrenched. Commanding officers would be advised by SAMHS on how to handle rationalisation with sensitivity. SAMHS is currently preparing to provide counselling for a large number of retrenched personnel. The Service Corps is intended to assist with providing a resettlement service through career guidance briefings, skills enhancement, job search assistance and marketing. The Service Corps was originally intended to provide extensive training for retrenched personnel, but due to the withdrawal of external funding, the Corps is presently only tasked with organising training and has limited ability to find suitable employment for former soldiers. Plans have been made to mobilise national and regional training institutes to assist in skills enhancement and vocational training.

The rationalisation strategy

The *Personnel Rationalisation Strategy for the Department of Defence*, officially approved early in 1999, details a comprehensive plan for the reduction of personnel to a strength of approximately 65 000-70 000, a reduction of 25 000-30 000 personnel. A significant reduction in personnel costs is the primary objective of the rationalisation strategy. The second objective is to assist former members to find suitable employment once they leave the military. According to the Department's plan, rationalisation will be undertaken with the view to promote equal

opportunities, affirmative action and gender equality. Moreover, constitutional and legal provisions aimed at transforming the public service into a representative, democratic institution providing effective and efficient services will guide the process. The conclusion of rationalisation is intended to produce a force broadly representative of South Africa's population. The process is also intended to be gender sensitive, but the rationalisation of male and female members will be conducted according to the same criteria. Retrenchments in the Department will be carried out under the guidance and supervision of the Rationalisation Strategy Committee (DoDRSC) comprising representatives from the Department of Defence, other government departments, parliament, trade unions and interested NGOs. The committee reports to the Minister of Defence. Any member may appeal to the Minister of Defence or the Secretary for Defence if there is any dispute over rationalisation decisions.

Cabinet approved the following guidelines for rationalisation on 23 November 1995 in response to Cabinet Memorandum 23 of 1995:

- As a point of departure, the future force design should constitute the first principle of rationalisation.
- "Rationalisation would be effected through natural attrition, non-renewal of expired contracts and retrenchment."
- "The process would call for volunteers which [sic] the SANDF could afford to release, where after the remaining supernumerary members would have to be rationalised, considering a number of factors such as, inter alia, operational readiness, the budget, Government policy with regard to representivity and legitimacy, successfully concluding integration, maintenance of morale and transparency. Criteria applicable to individuals would include aspects such as inter alia, expertise, past performance or potential, disciplinary records and domestic circumstances."
- "Appropriate identification and appeal systems were envisaged, with involvement of the affected individual and British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in a monitoring and advisory role. PSAP would in the main be rationalised according to the provisions applicable to the broader Public Service. Some form of support for those being rationalised, was considered very important and their re-introduction into civilian life should be conducted in the same way as persons being demobilised i.e. be managed by the Service Corps."

In an address by Mosiuoa Lekota, the Minister of Defence, on the occasion of the defence budget vote in the National Assembly on 7 April 2000, he pointed out that the integration intake process of statutory and non-statutory forces was drawing to a close. Minister Lekota indicated that the process took much longer than was originally anticipated and confirmed that the rationalisation of SANDF personnel would be guided by the employer initiated retrenchment scheme. At the same time, the minister indicated that the composition of the SANDF had to be demographically representative. This also applied to the composition of the officer corps. This implied that training had to be shaped to ensure representivity and a balanced force for the future. The termination of the integration intake of statutory and non-statutory forces led to the Termination of Integration Intake Bill along with an amendment to the Demobilisation Bill.

At a parliamentary media briefing in Cape Town on 18 September 2000, Minister Lekota suggested that the South African Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the South African Defence Review demanded a "smaller, professional representative defence force,

capable of performing its primary and secondary functions efficiently and effectively."⁶³ The Minister emphasised that the scope of transformation covered the following areas:

- integration and representivity;
- civil control over the military;
- civilianising the Department of Defence, defence policy and posture;
- civic education;
- efficiency; and
- international and regional defence co-operation.

The rationalisation dilemma

With regard to integration and representivity, Minister Lekota reported a significant improvement of the racial mix in the SANDF. (In order to promote harmony within the force, the Department of Defence has identified the establishment of a shared value system as a key issue based on the institutionalisation of a code of conduct.) In 1994, the percentage ratio of whites to Africans, Asians and coloureds in the Department of Defence, was 45:55. By October 2000, this had changed to 26:74. The Defence Review guidelines set the ratio at 24.5:75.5. In an interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly* in December 1999, Minister Lekota highlighted the key problem for future rightsizing when he posed the following questions: "Where do we slice off? Top, middle, bottom? In what proportions?" Lekota partly answered his own questions by pointing out that, if the SANDF cuts mainly at the bottom, former MK and APLA members will be mostly affected, creating the impression that the department is simply retaining former SADF personnel. Moreover, it would result in releasing a large number of individuals with insufficient economic skills back into society, in effect, transferring the problem without actually solving it.⁶⁴ Given the present composition of the SANDF (see table 3), middle to upper management is predominantly white and former SADF, while the lower ranks, the most likely to be rationalised, are predominantly former MK and APLA. Any rightsizing will thus have to address this problem and take into account targets set in the Defence Review to ensure representivity (see figures 2-4). The challenge is to create upward mobility for black members of the SANDF while, at the same time, ensuring that the force retains the necessary skills and experience. Some observers suggest that the SANDF is top-heavy, largely for historical reasons, and requires a significant downsizing of senior ranks.⁶⁵ Simultaneously, the restructuring of salary scales is suggested to improve remuneration without the necessity of promotion, as is the case in most military forces. The US, for example, has an 'up-or-out system' which requires that officers are promoted on merit into an available post within a limited period of time, or accept early retirement. This ensures that the best, most motivated individuals are promoted to the higher ranks, but prevents the military from becoming top-heavy and placing an inordinate burden on the defence budget.

Table 3 Racial composition of the SANDF, 2000

Rank	Coloured	Asian	Black	White
	percentage			
General			100	
Lieutenant-general			62.5	37.5
Major-general		2.9	29.4	67.6
Brigadier-general	1.3	1.3	27.1	70.2
Colonel	0.8	0.3	12	86.8

Lieutenant-colonel	2.9	0.4	16.7	80.1
Major	6.1	1	26.8	66.1
Captain	5.5	1.1	33.3	60.1
Lieutenant	8.9	0.7	40.9	49.5
Second lieutenant	9.8	2.8	24.4	63
Chaplain	7.9	0.9	39.8	51.3
Warrant officer 1	8.7	1.2	5.9	84.2
Warrant officer 2	14.8	2.7	13.3	69.2
Staff sergeant	16.7	3.4	20	59.8
Sergeant	16.5	2.5	39.8	41.2
Corporal	14.9	1.9	64.4	18.6
Lance corporal	10.3	1.8	78.9	8.9
Private	5.8	0.2	91.3	4.6
Total	10.1	1.3	61.2	27.3
<i>Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2001.</i>				

Figure 2: Racial distribution in the Department of Defence, 1997




Figure 3: Proposed strength after final integration based on transformation strength of 70 000, 1997





Figure 4: Proposed strength including possible future MK/APLA integration and KZSPF incorporation, 1997



Minister Lekota has confirmed the government's intention to proceed with the purchase of strategic defence packages. According to the minister, the reason for acquiring defence equipment originated from constitutional obligations embodied in the White Paper and the Defence Review. Confirming the government's intention to purchase new weapons signalled the requirement to reduce expenditure on personnel and, consequently, the need to rationalise the force. The significant defence budget increase of 28% announced in 2000 is intended to be allocated largely for the equipment modernisation programme and is not expected to alter the longer term objective of personnel rightsizing (see table 4).⁶⁶ In the context of rationalisation, or rightsizing, the department has suggested that the Defence Review, financial limitations and

parliamentary approval will determine the final force design and the shape of the department with regard to personnel requirements. At the same time, the department is expected to be guided by the need to improve the ratio of combat troops to support troops.⁶⁷

Table 4: Budget allocation (rand billion), 2001-2002

Table 4: Budget allocation (rand billion), 2001-2002

Department	Rand billion
Department of Defence administration (including Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretariat and Defence Headquarters)	0.403
Landward defence	3.65
Air defence	1.95
Maritime defence	0.945
Military health	1.09
Defence intelligence	0.184
Joint support (including communications and information systems, logistics support, military police and personnel administration)	1.63
Command and control (including Joint Operations headquarters, the five Regional Joint Task Forces and the Special Forces Brigade)	0.201
Special defence account	5.81
<i>Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2001.</i>	

According to the department's 1999/2000 annual report, the integration of the armed forces since 1994 increased the size of the full-time establishment from 84 052 members in 1993/4 to a high of 102 600 in 1995/6.⁶⁸ This resulted in the defence expenditure ratio with respect to personnel, operating and capital costs to change, respectively, from 32%, 40%, 28% in 1994, to 57%, 35%, 8%, in 1998. In order to re-establish the targeted budgetary balance, the department has allowed its personnel component to fall below 84 000 by making use of selective appointments, natural attrition, including the voluntary termination of short-term contracts and voluntary severance packages. Planning allows the department to continue reducing personnel numbers through natural attrition and voluntary severance mechanisms. Longer term planning assumes that an employer initiated retrenchment package will become available and that, with political approval for rationalisation, the department will reduce its personnel strength to 70 000 through this kind of retrenchments and natural attrition. The department estimates that the reduction in force levels will result in a decreased personnel cost from 52% of the total budget in 1999/2000, to 47% in 2002/03, excluding the effect of improvements in conditions of service. The costs and details of the employer initiated retrenchment programme fall within the ambit of Department of Public Service and Administration. The Department of Defence has established the Directorate of Separation to promote the efficient reintegration of military personnel back into civil society. Moreover, it has prepared a comprehensive plan for rationalisation and reintegration.

The future SANDF rationalisation programme is expected to use the following criteria to identify personnel for retrenchment:

- *Military readiness*: poor health is likely to be important in this context.
- *Representivity*: targets set in the Defence Review are expected to act as guide.
- *Level of expertise*: this will count against the lower ranks.
- *Disciplinary record*: soldiers with poor records will face retrenchment.
- *Gender distribution*: this implies that only a small number of women, if any, will be retrenched.
- *Performance in the specific post*: a poor record of performance will be a negative factor and may lead to retrenchment.

South Africa's first demobilisation exercise was financed by the Department of Defence. However, the much larger rationalisation programme that is expected will require additional external funding to ensure its success. The department has indicated that it will identify and mobilise potential donors to this end.

Chapter 9

PEACE STUDIES GROUP PILOT STUDY

Background

During 1999, the Peace Studies Group of the University of the Witwatersrand, with the assistance of the Directorate of Separation of the Department of Defence, completed a pilot study on the potential demobilisation of defence personnel.⁶⁹ The purpose of this pilot study was to establish a 'snap-shot' of the socio-economic profile of soldiers likely to be retrenched in order to formulate a comprehensive reintegration programme and thus to assist former combatants to find suitable employment in civil society. The study was motivated by the proposed retrenchment of SANDF soldiers.

Methodology

A random sample of 2 000 from a list of 20 000 'most likely to be retrenched soldiers' was selected for this survey.⁷⁰ All data was provided by the Personnel Division of the Department of Defence by means of accessing electronic personnel files. In order to avoid unnecessary anxiety among personnel, no face-to-face interviews were conducted. It was suggested that such interviews to complete the socio-economic survey would be conducted at a later stage, once soldiers had been informed of their imminent retrenchment.

The data that was extracted from the department's files included rank, military unit, military specialisation, population group, age, gender, marital status, number of dependants, home language, home address, length of service with statutory/non-statutory forces before joining the department, level of education and education/training programmes completed in the Department of Defence.

Survey results

Of the soldiers 'most likely to be retrenched', 92.3% were male and 7.7% were female. The result is consistent with the objective of increasing the number of women serving in both combat and non-combat roles.

Surprisingly, only 3% of those earmarked for retrenchment were white, while 92% were African. This appeared to be inconsistent with the Defence Review's express aim to ensure that, over the long term, the Department of Defence becomes broadly representative of South Africa's population composition.

There was a large variation in the ages of soldiers most likely to be retrenched. However, a significant number fell within the group aged 25-33 years.

The home language of soldiers who would potentially be retrenched varied considerably with significant numbers speaking IsiZulu, SeSotho and IsiXhosa. It was suggested that any training, or skills enhancement programmes should ideally provide courses in the various home languages to ensure maximum impact.

The survey indicated that 71.6% of soldiers to be retrenched were unmarried. This could allow for greater flexibility in seeking employment after retrenchment.

The vast majority (76%), had no dependants, suggesting that the impact on families and extended families would be limited.

The majority of respondents (50.8%), had completed grade 10 or 12, which suggested a reasonable educational foundation for enhanced skills development and job-specific training.

The home addresses of respondents varied widely and were dispersed throughout the country. Retrenched soldiers were not expected to be concentrated in any city or subregion.

Nearly three-quarters of the proposed retrenchments were expected to occur at the rank of private (72.9%), while the remaining retrenchments were nearly evenly divided between lance corporals (13.8%) and corporals (13.4%).

Just under half (48.6%) of the specialisations of the potential retrenchments were in the area of infantry non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The next largest specialisation was in the area of material supplies clerks (20.1%), personnel officers (8.9%), military intelligence NCOs (6.6%), vehicle fitters (6.2%), caterers (3.8%) and service trainers (1.2%). All other specialisations were under 1%.

A quarter of the target group surveyed were found to be in the Kruger Park Unit (KPU) (26.3%), while the other significant unit was the department's Main Ordnance Division (4.9%). All the rest were less than 4%.

The average length of service in the Department of Defence among the target group was five years (with the bulk of soldiers joining from around 1993-1995).

Among the target group, the majority were once part of the MK non-statutory forces (42.5%), the next largest group originally part of the SADF (32.5%), followed by a smaller segment of APLA non-statutory forces (12.8%) and the rest a combination of the various homeland militaries (less than 5%).

The majority of respondents (65.6%) did not list their terms of service with the statutory or non-statutory forces.

The majority of personnel had not participated in any training programmes (60%). Of those who had, 17.6% took driving and maintenance training programmes, followed by 8% who indicated that they received some computer training.

A cross-tabulation of population groups with rank among personnel indicated that 92% of all potentially retrenched soldiers were of African origin, with the rest of the target population group consisting of percentages of less than 5%. Of the African soldiers, 69.4% were privates, 13.1% were corporals and 9.5% were lance corporals.

Survey conclusions

From the data, it became clear that the profile of the prospective retrenched soldier was that of a 29-year old male of African origin. He would be unmarried and without dependants, and was a former MK or SANDF soldier serving as an infantry NCO in the military for five years. The findings of the survey regarding the skills and training of potentially retrenched soldiers indicated that, while half had been educated up to grade 10 or 12, the majority (60%) had no further training since joining the SANDF. Of those who had, less than 20% participated in driving and maintenance training programmes and only 8% in some form of computer training.

As most soldiers identified in this study had only five years of service in the SANDF, the value of retrenchment packages would be relatively low. According to the findings of the study, the overwhelming number of potentially retrenched soldiers are unmarried (71.6%) and without dependants (76%) and will thus not have additional financial burdens to consider. This would presumably mean that the pension payout per soldier would last longer. Conversely, it could be argued that spouses and dependants are more than just an additional source of income and social stability that a single former soldier would not have.

The pilot survey included an estimate of HIV/Aids infection among SANDF personnel based on the Metropolitan-Doyle model, developed by Metropolitan Life. The model suggested an infection rate of approximately 11% in the country's working population, with an increase to 18% by 2005.⁷¹ It was therefore assumed that approximately 11% of retrenched soldiers would be HIV-positive and would require special assistance. However, a *Mail & Guardian* report of March 2000, suggested that the rate of HIV/Aids infection in the SANDF may be higher. Figures were apparently based on a leaked report taken from preliminary HIV-testing conducted by the SANDF.⁷² Metropolitan Life Aids researcher, Dr Thomas Muhr, has suggested that over 20% of personnel of the SANDF may be HIV-positive. Muhr based his estimate on statistics from other African states where soldiers were twice as likely as the civilian population to contract HIV/Aids.⁷³ Whatever the exact figure, demobilisation planning will have to prepare for targeted assistance to those in need of special medical assistance.

The pilot study provided a brief overview of the labour market with the view to propose possible post-retrenchment employment for soldiers. The overview concluded that trends in the South African labour market indicated that, with the exception of the financial and public sectors, the current oversupply of labour will continue, thus militating against the easy absorption of retrenched soldiers into the formal economy. The conclusion of the pilot study was that, given the existing skill levels of the target group, coupled with trends in health and the labour market, the prospects for gainful employment (and thus integration into the economy and society at

large) for retrenched soldiers were low. Furthermore, as the average length of service in the SANDF was five years, the retrenchment package (calculated in terms of the number of years served in the military) will be relatively low and not sufficient to provide for retrenched soldiers' needs beyond four or five months.

Recommendations

- Building upon the findings of the pilot study, a broader socio-economic study of the target group should be conducted to establish the particular social, economic and psychological needs and requirements of soldiers to be retrenched. In this way, a more comprehensive picture will be developed of the target group that will capture and integrate a variety of concerns, including provisions for counselling, facing retrenched soldiers.
- On the basis of these findings (and enhanced by the details of a more thorough socio-economic study), a specialist skills and training enhancement programme should be developed to facilitate the integration of retrenched soldiers into the economy and society. Such a programme should take into account trends in the labour market to ensure that retrenched soldiers are trained or provided with skills enhancement that corresponds with the requirements of South Africa's contemporary economy.

Chapter 10

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In this chapter, the following key aspects of and steps taken during the execution of the study will be discussed:

- origin and objectives of the study;
- theoretical framework;
- research strategy;
- unit of analysis;
- selection of respondents;
- data collection
- data analysis;
- selection and training of fieldworkers; and
- scientific status.

Objectives of the study

The primary objective of the study is to explore and describe the social reality of South African demobilised SANDF personnel, while the secondary objective is to provide policy relevant recommendations using available opportunities to minimise, if not remove, the key obstacles currently experienced by these former SANDF staff members in their attempts to reintegrate themselves into the South African society and make their contribution to its economy. A further objective is to provide policy advice in preparation for a possible future SANDF demobilisation exercise.

Theoretical framework

Since the social situation of the former combatants needed to be described, a suitable

theoretical perspective was required that would guide the study to illuminate the world of this group of people. Symbolic interactionism was chosen as its conceptual assumptions provide the ideal framework for explorative research into the social world of these former combatants of which very little, if any knowledge exists in South Africa. Moreover, it allows the utilisation of a multi-methodological approach to decipher and describe this world.

Research strategy

For the greater part, the exploration of the social world of South African former combatants was conducted within a quantitative methodological framework supplemented by a qualitative approach. These two well-known and recognised approaches to research differ vastly from each other. In the ensuing discussion the key differences between the two approaches - as summarised by Schurink and Schurink - are outlined.⁷⁴ The quantitative paradigm is based on positivism, which takes scientific explanation to be nomothetic (based on universal laws). Its main aims are to measure the social world objectively, to test hypotheses, and to predict and control human behaviour. In contrast, the qualitative paradigm stems from an anti-positivistic, interpretive approach, is idiographic, thus holistic in nature, and the main aim is to understand social life and the meaning that people attach to everyday life.

Unit of analysis

The present study's unit of analysis could be specified as the study of a group of South African former combatants:

- during the first quarter of 2001 (a specific point in time);
- of key characteristics (gender, age, race, occupational level, income and other demographic features);
- interests (like receiving further training);
- career chosen if given the opportunity;
- assistance to find a job;
- opinions/perceptions regarding a number of matters such as the extent of training received before leaving the SANDF, help to find employment after leaving it, whether the SANDF did enough to assist after leaving it;
- feelings towards the Citizen Force, the commandos, and the Service Corps of the SANDF; and
- actions like deciding to resign or demobilise, study further after leaving the SANDF, or seeking employment.

Selecting respondents from the population of interest

In social research, the focal group about whom scholars want to learn something is known as the population. This concept is used in the statistical rather than geographical sense. It is often used interchangeably with 'universe'. While a population of interest or universe includes all elements or cases of human beings, collectives of individuals or groups, organisations, or social

artefacts of a particular study, the population of interest in social research is normally composed of individuals. As already indicated, these individuals are considered as the unit of analysis.⁷⁵

Since the universe of former combatants in South Africa since 1994 cannot be established, a random sample of representative cases could not be drawn for inclusion in the present study. Cases needed to be selected non-randomly. In order to ensure that some typical characteristics of former combatants are included in the sample, non-probability sampling was utilised. Quota sampling was first used to establish the following three sets of categories and areas from which the former combatants were selected:

- key segments of demobilised SANDF personnel, i.e. the various military mustering from both statutory and non-statutory forces: MK, APLA and AZANLA;
- key socio-demographic characteristics: age, gender, race and language; and
- geographical areas: the South African provinces, as well as rural and urban areas.

Utilising purposive or judgmental sampling, subjective information was then obtained from veterans' organisations and the South African Service Corps. A number of community organisations were used to identify potential respondents from the target group.

Finally, snowballing was also used, since potential respondents were identified by asking former combatants to name a few former combatants from their friendship networks as possible candidates for the study. They were also asked to assist the researchers in explaining the objectives and nature of the study to their friends and to ensure them that participating in the research would not harm them and would in fact be in the long-term advantage of all South African former combatants.

With the assistance of veterans' organisations, the Service Corps, former combatants, interested family members, as well as community organisations in the provinces, 309 former combatants were finally included in the study. While the research results obtained from this sample of cases can not be generalised to apply to all South African former combatants, the researchers were convinced that sufficient respondents were recruited from the most typical categories of the former combatant population. It was felt that the sample would enable the exploration and description of the social world of local former combatants, as well as the construction of key profiles from those demobilised SADF staff, which would give rise to policy relevant recommendations. It must be pointed out, however, that the particular sampling techniques used in this study do not allow any of its research findings to be generalised to all former combatants in South Africa.

Data collection

Two well-known and recognised approaches to research were used in the study. While a quantitative method, the social survey, was principally employed to explore and describe the social world of South African former combatants, unstructured or qualitative methods in the form of open-ended questions included in the survey schedule, as well as fieldnotes and reports written by the fieldworkers were also utilised, albeit to a limited extent, to gather information.

The social survey

For the purpose of this study, the following definition of the social survey was used:

"The survey may be defined as a methodological technique that requires the systematic collection of data from populations or samples through the use of the interview or the self-administered questionnaire. The investigator approaches a sample of persons who have been exposed to a set of events or experiences and interviews them with respect to these experiences ... [A] group of persons are observed at one point in time and questioned about their behaviours, attitudes, and beliefs with respect to a series of issues."⁷⁶

In the present study, the following two types of surveys were used:

- *The individual interview:* The fieldworkers visited the respondents at the places where they were found (for example, residences, work or other places) and completed former SANDF staff's answers to previously constructed questions in a schedule.
- *The completion of individual questionnaires in a group context.* On a number of occasions, it was decided that it was necessary to gather former SADF staff in groups at specific venues where they completed questionnaires in the presence of fieldworkers who explained certain questions and, when necessary, assisted those respondents who were illiterate.

Aspects of the social situation of former combatants (fields of interests, attitudes, perceptions, actions, background demographic information, among others) on which data was required, were carefully studied and converted into specific questions/items that formed part of a schedule. Since the goal in survey research is that every respondent should interpret both the questions and answers similarly, special attention was given both to the wording of the questions and their possible responses, as well as to their placement in the schedule. Finally, in outlining the items/questions, the two types of surveys were borne in mind.

Three strategies that proved to be very valuable to achieve this end, were:

- discussions with informants (personnel of the SANDF), members of veterans' organisations, and other people who were knowledgeable about former combatants;
- reviews of previous research undertaken on the topic; and
- a reality check and pre-testing.

The initial draft of the interview schedule was checked by conducting a focus group with a few of the former combatants who were willing to discuss the items or concepts that the researchers planned to include in the study. This focus group pointed out a number of ambiguities, hidden assumptions, or conceptual complexities that the researchers had overlooked. After these revisions were made, and the interviewers trained, a pilot test of the interview schedule was undertaken.

Qualitative methods

Bogdan and Biklen provide the following important views on qualitative data:

"The term data refers to the rough materials researchers collect from the world they are studying; they are the particulars that form the basis of analysis. Data include materials the people doing the study actively record, such as interview transcripts

and participant observation fieldnotes. Data include what others have created and the researcher finds, such as diaries, photographs, official documents, and newspaper articles."²²

For the purposes of this study, qualitative data is defined as:

- rough material that the fieldworkers have gathered from particular aspects of former SANDF staff's worlds;
- material which the fieldworkers themselves have actively recorded;
- any information that was gathered during the course of the study that was not expressed in numbers;
- any human creation and production of former SANDF staff including, for example, words, letters, drawings, photographs, household garbage, and others;
- descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions and observed behaviours;
- direct quotations and excerpts from self-accounts made by former SANDF staff about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs and thoughts;
- entire passages from fieldnotes; and
- the meaning of the world to former SANDF staff expressed in their own words.

Four qualitative methods were employed in the study: participant observation, fieldnotes, fieldworker reports and, finally, open-ended questions included in the quantitative schedule.

- *Participant observation*: Collecting data from research participants in their natural settings was especially helpful in obtaining some understanding of the social situations where former SANDF personnel lived and worked. This first-hand information also facilitated the interpretation of the qualitative data gathered by means of the schedule.
- *Fieldnotes*: The mainstay of qualitative research is the written account of what researchers (fieldworkers) hear, see, experience, and think in the course of collecting and reflecting on the data in their studies.
- *Fieldworker reports*: Since research, like all human behaviour, is subjective - the process of executing the study is in the hands of the fieldworkers and researchers - it is necessary to acknowledge and describe attempts made to minimise the effects of this subjectivity. In the present study, the fieldworkers were requested to compile their reports by, among others, speculating about what they learned - the themes that emerged, patterns that were present, additional ideas, and thoughts that came to mind. They were also requested to reflect on the study's methods - information about the methods employed in the study, comments on fieldworker's rapport with the research participants as well as the ups and downs encountered in the study. They were also asked to report on anything else that was regarded to be important to the study.
- *Open-ended questions included in the schedule*: Literature on the techniques of face-to-face interviewing treats the interview as a pipeline for extracting and transmitting

information from the respondent to the interviewer. In this way, the face-to-face interview helps in understanding the closed worlds of individuals, families, organisations, institutions and communities. Strictly speaking, the open-ended questions included in the schedule cannot be regarded as truly open-ended and qualitative, because only the answers are open-ended. In other words, a set of pre-formulated questions are generally carefully arranged and put to all the respondents in a fairly similar sequence. Nevertheless, this method was used in the present study. It generated valuable data from the perspective of former SANDF staff on their views and attitudes, as well as on how they cope with and make sense of their situation. The main advantage of these open-ended questions for the current study was that it ensured data that was obtained relatively systematically which, in turn, facilitated the comparison of the data.

Data storage

In the present study, researchers sorted and analysed the data manually. The main steps applied in the current study were:

- A set of codes were developed that referred to the open-ended items, the guidelines for the fieldnotes included in the schedule, as well as to themes used in the fieldwork reports.
- The verbatim answers in the schedule, fieldnotes and reports were studied and codes were provided according to the specific open-ended question asked during the interview, the particular guideline for the fieldnotes, and the specific heading used in the reports.
- Quotable passages were marked.
- Topics were taken one by one and the coded items in materials were studied to establish whether there were relationships or patterns between the various topics or codes.

Data analysis

The following definition of qualitative data analysis, provided by Bogdan and Biklen, portrays the key features of the process of making sense of the data in the current study:

"Data analysis is the process of systematically searching and arranging the interview transcripts, fieldnotes, and other materials that you accumulate to increase your own understanding of them and to enable you to present what you have discovered to others. Analysis involves working with data, organizing them, breaking them into manageable units, synthesising them, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others. For most projects, the end products of research are dissertations, books, papers, presentations, or, in the case of applied research, plans for action. Data analysis moves you from the rambling pages of description to those products."⁷⁸

Selection and training of fieldworkers

Fieldworkers or interviewers are the 'foot soldiers' in any research project, regardless of whether structured scheduled interviews or qualitative interviews are conducted. Consequently, it is crucial that they are selected carefully and trained properly. Careful attention to the selection and training of interviewers is time well spent. While anyone's interview skills can be improved in a well-designed training programme, not everyone has the same ability to establish rapport

quickly or has the social skills that accompany successful interviewing. Since the scientific interview is different from normal, everyday conversation, interviewers have to be taught how to read questions exactly as worded with no improvising. Promising young researchers who satisfactorily conducted interviews on previous occasions or were keen to be trained to conduct interviews, were approached with the view of using them to assist with collecting information from former combatants. Willem Schurink of the Social Sciences Consultancy (SSC) presented a three-day training course on various dimensions of social research, including the 'general' and 'study-specific' phases of interviewer training, discussed above, and other aspects of particular interest to the present study.

Data analysis

The inferential methods, or instruments used in the present study to make sense of the former combatant phenomenon are in accordance with the positivistic model used in the study that was already outlined. The data analysis is underpinned by the belief that quantitative data (survey research) enables the making of inferences about the population or sample surveyed. However, generalising the study's research results to the larger group of demobilised SANDF personnel, as has already been pointed out, is not possible, since the sample on which these inferences are based is not representative of all demobilised SANDF personnel in South Africa. Such representivity was not possible, since information on demobilised soldiers is limited in the country. This is partly due to a lack of capacity and resources to build the necessary data base and partly because information on SANDF personnel is classified. This, of course, implies that, in any discussion of the current study's findings, the analyses can at best be regarded as tentative and subject to further study.

Quality of data

In the light of the fact that social research, because it investigates human beings, is bound to include errors, it goes without saying that its main goal is to minimise observer effects or nuisance variables as far as possible. In order to minimise these effects or variables, it is necessary to maximise validity during each and every decision taken during the design and execution of the research. One way in which social researchers have attempted to improve the validity of their data sources is data triangulation, that is, when different types of data are used within one study to improve the data validity. As has already been pointed out, different methods were used in the study of South African former combatants, which enabled triangulation and thus gave rise to data with a high level of validity.

Conclusion

All attempts were made to minimise nuisance variables in the present study, and it is believed that these attempts were successful and the research findings can be regarded as valid. It must be emphasised, however, that because of the explorative nature of the study, these results, although valuable and insightful, should at best be regarded as tentative. Because of the current study's scope, there are undoubtedly many aspects of the world of South African former combatants that still need to be unravelled. It is hoped that future researchers will undertake large-scale research of the circumstances of these former military personnel that will unpack the difficulties experienced by this group in their day-to-day living.

Chapter 11

SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Background

Figure 5: Age groups of respondents




Table 5: Age category of respondents

Table 5: Age category of respondents

Age category	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
21-30	109	35.28	35.62
31-40	109	35.28	35.62
41-50	45	14.56	14.71
51-60	23	7.44	7.52
61-70	20	6.47	6.54
n/a	3	0.97	
Total	309	100	100

The ages of the 309 individuals surveyed varied from 19 to 74 years. The majority of respondents fell within the 26 to 35 year-old category.

The majority of respondents were below 40 years of age. The vast majority of those interviewed were males.

Table 6: Gender distribution of respondents

Table 6: Gender distribution of respondents

Gender	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Male	264	85.44	86.56

Female	41	13.27	13.44
n/a	4	1.29	
Total	309	100	100

Table 7: Marital status of respondents

Table 7: Marital status of respondents

Marital status	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Married	61	19.74	19.93
Divorced	33	10.68	10.78
Unmarried/living together	31	10.03	10.13
Unmarried/single	136	44.02	44.44
Separated	6	1.94	1.96
Traditional	39	12.62	12.75
Unknown	3	0.97	
Total	309	100	

Table 8: Dependants forming part of respondents' households

- | Children | Base number | Percentage | Percentage valid |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Yes | 249 | 80.58 | 81.37 |
| No | 57 | 18.45 | 18.63 |
| Unknown | 3 | 0.97 | |
| Total | 309 | 100 | 100 |

A high proportion of respondents were unmarried, with less than 20% indicating that they were married.

Over 80% indicated that they had children — this would obviously place a major burden on families if the demobilised soldier was unemployed.

Table 9: Language distribution of respondents

- Table 9: Language distribution of**

Language	Base number	Percentage
isiZulu	42	13.59
Sepedi	53	17.15

English	1	0.32
Afrikaans	4	1.29
isiXhosa	65	21.04
Xitsonga	10	3.24
Tshivenda	3	0.97
Setswana	68	22.01
Sesotho	42	13.59
siSwati	8	2.59
isiNdebele	12	3.88
Other	1	0.32
Total	309	100

The results of the survey indicate a wide spread of different home languages among respondents. This would suggest that, for any education or skills enhancement programme, attention should be given to courses presented in the home languages of demobilised soldiers.

The majority of respondents (49.84%) were MK members before joining the SANDF. Less than 15% indicated that they had formally been a member of the SANDF.

Years served with the non-statutory forces varied considerably from less than two years to over 20 years. However, the results indicate that a significant proportion of respondents spent fairly long periods of time (6-20 years) with the non-statutory forces.

Table 10: Military experience prior to joining the SANDF

statutory forces			
Duration in years	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
>2	27	9	11
4-Feb	32	10	13
6-Apr	43	14	17
10-Jun	66	21	26
20-Oct	51	17	20
<20	31	10	13
Unknown	59	19	
Total	309	100	100

A significant proportion of respondents spent between three and five years in the SANDF.

A significant proportion of respondents (37%) served in the infantry. This finding tends to support the general perception that foot soldiers bore the brunt of demobilisation.

The majority of respondents (60%) indicated that they had not received any training in the SANDF, over and above normal military instruction.

Table 12: Employment duration in the SANDF

Duration in years	Base number	Percentage valid
>1	36	19
2-Jan	38	20
3-Feb	36	19
3-4.5	43	22
5-<5	39	20
Total	192	100

Table 13: Mustering served in the SANDF

Table 13: Mustering served in the SANDF

Mustering	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Infantry	115	37	56
Artillery	6	2	3
Signal	9	3	4
Medical	3	1	1
Engineering	17	6	8
Personnel	6	2	3
Administration	5	2	3
SA Air Force	2	1	1
SA Navy	5	2	2
Special Forces	3	1	1
TDK mustering	10	3	5
Motor mechanic	1	0	0
Military police	4	1	2
Service	2	1	1
Ordinance	1	0	0
Integration	4	1	2
Special defence unit	10	3	5
Other	2	1	1
Unknown	104	33	
Total	309	100	100


Table 14: Training participation while serving in the SANDF

Tabng in the SANDF

Training	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Yes	25	8	12
No	185	60	88
Do not know	1	0	0
Unknown	98	32	
Total	309	100	100

Separation from the SANDF

Figure 6: Reason for leaving the service of the SANDF



Survey results indicate that the majority of respondents (60%) left the SANDF because they were demobilised. At the same time, almost 30% either resigned or were dismissed.

A total of 37% of respondents indicated that they were forced to accept demobilisation, while 18% indicated that demobilisation has been a choice.

Most respondents had not attained significant education levels on leaving the SANDF.

Figure 7: Manner in which respondents left the SANDF




Table 15: Educational level of respondents at the time of departure who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

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Educational level	Demobilised	Resigned	Dismissed	Total
Percentage				
None-grade 5	16	2	2	12
Grade 6-8	11	12	19	12
Grade 9-11	34	28	52	36
Grade 12	26	40	19	27
Grade 12+	14	19	7	14

The figures in this table were rounded off, and the total therefore does not equal 100.

Most respondents were in the age group between 26 and 35 years when they were separated from the SANDF.

Most of the individuals separated from the SANDF were male.

The vast majority of demobilised soldiers had children to support when they left the SANDF.

Of those who responded to the question, 39% did not choose to leave the SANDF.

Table 16: Age of respondents at the time of departure who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

• missed, or who resigned from the SANDF

Age groups	Demobilised	Resigned	Dismissed	Total
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	Percentage			
<25	5	0	10	5
26-30	28	49	24	31
31-35	21	28	40	25
36-45	24	16	19	22
46-60	14	7	2	11
61>	7	0	5	6

Table 17: Gender of respondents who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

- Table 17: Gender of respondents who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

Gender	Demobilised	Resigned	Dismissed
Male	90	86	98
Female	10	14	2

Table 18: Dependants of respondents who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

Table 18: Dependants of respondents who were demobilised or dismissed, or who resigned from the SANDF

Dependants	Demobilised	Resigned	Dismissed
Yes	80	86	83
No	20	14	17

Table 19: Respondents who left the SANDF by choice

- Table 19: Respondents who left the SANDF by choice

Left voluntarily	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Yes	91	29	43
No	122	39	57
Unknown	96	31	
Total	309	100	100

Table 20: How long respondents were demobilised

Table 20: How long respondents were demobilised

Time	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
<6 months	3	1	2
6 months-1 year	10	3	6
1-2 years	6	2	3

>2 years	154	50	88
Not retrenched	2	1	1
Unknown	134	43	
Total	309	100	100

Almost 90% of the respondents were separated from the SANDF for more than two years.

Educational level of respondents


Table 21: Educational levels of respondents

• **Table 21: Educational levels of respondents**

Education	Base number	Percentage
No schooling	9	2.91
Grade 1 to 5	25	8.09
Grade 6 to 8	42	13.59
Grade 9 to 11	99	32.04
Grade 12	83	26.86
Grade 10/11 and apprenticeship	7	2.27
Grade 12 and 3 years training	28	9.06
Grade 12 and >3 years training	16	5.18
Total	309	100

Clearly, one of the most important socio-economic factors in successful demobilisation programmes is the level of education achieved by demobilised soldiers. A higher education level will obviously be a major advantage in finding suitable employment, while a lower education level, conversely, would be a significant disadvantage. The survey suggests that the vast majority of demobilised soldiers are not well enough qualified to find suitable employment easily in commercial enterprises.

Figure 8: Educational levels of respondents, by age group



Linking age and educational levels, the survey shows that a high proportion of those under 35 years of age would require further study, or skills enhancement to prepare them for employment.

Table 22: Educational level of respondents prior to joining the military

• **Table 22: Educational level of respondents prior to joining the military**

Training/educational levels	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
School	276	89	91
University/Technikon/College	13	4	4
Practical training no certificate	4	2	1
Practical training with certificate	9	3	3
Unknown	7	2	
Total	309	100	100

Some respondents indicated that they had undertaken further studies since leaving the SANDF. However, studies were not undertaken at a very advanced level, thus limiting prospects for employment.

Almost 90% of respondents had completed various levels of schooling, but less than 10% had participated in any kind of further training.

Figure 9: Education/training received while in military service




Table 23: Further educational pursuits of respondents after leaving the SANDF

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
Study after leaving SANDF	Base number	Percentage	Percentage valid
Yes	55	18	22
No	195	63	78
Unknown	59	19	
Total	309	100	100

Respondents reported a range of training programmes that had been completed while in the SANDF. With some additional assistance, these skills could be put to good use in civilian enterprises.

The majority of respondents (63%) indicated that they had not completed any studies after leaving the SANDF, while 18% confirmed that they had.

Employment

Figure 10: Current employment status of respondents



Only 23% of respondents reported being in full-time employment, indicating that a very high percentage of demobilised soldiers have yet to find gainful employment. Only 10% indicated that they were employed full-time.


Proportionally, males are more affected by a lack of employment than females.

Table 24: Current employment status of respondents, by gender

• **Table 24: Current employment status of respondents, by gender**

Status	Male	Female	Total
Work/study	87	13	100
Unemployed	86	14	100

Figure 11: Current employment status of respondents, by age group



Interest in further training

Figure 12: Level of interest in further training expressed by respondents




Table 25: Interest expressed by respondents for training in specific fields

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	Base number	Percentage
Unknown/none	33	10.68
Administration	10	3.24
Any training	20	6.47
Army	7	2.27
Building	9	2.91
Business management	25	8.09
Carpentry	6	1.94
Catering	7	2.27
Construction	2	0.64
Development	6	1.94
Dressmaking	5	1.62
Electricity	10	3.24
Farming	10	3.24
Financial management	4	1.29
Information technology	25	8.09
Marketing	7	2.27
Mechanics	21	6.8
Nursing	4	1.29
Other	17	5.5

Panelbeating	5	1.62
Police	10	3.24
Security	31	10.03
Study	5	1.62
Technology	8	2.59
Tourism	11	3.56
Traffic control	6	1.94
Transport	3	0.96
Welding	2	0.65
Total	309	100

The vast majority (86%) of demobilised soldiers expressed a strong interest in further training.

Areas of interest varied widely, but there is clearly significant potential for human resource conversion of demobilised soldiers. The institution of specifically focused short-term training programmes would be extremely useful for former combatants.

Conclusion

The survey results suggest that the typical profile of the demobilised soldier is:

- a black male in the age group 26-35 years;
- unmarried, but perhaps living with a partner;
- a number of children to support;
- formerly served in MK for a period of approximately four to ten years;
- served in the infantry of the SANDF for approximately one to four years;
- was not demobilised by choice;
- has been demobilised for more than two years;
- has completed schooling to the level of grade nine to eleven, but presently has no other non-military technical, or tertiary level education;
- completed only infantry-related training in the SANDF;
- has not completed any training or education programme since leaving the SANDF;
- is presently unemployed, or is undergoing training in preparation for employment; and
- has a very strong interest in further training in a wide variety of areas.

Chapter 12

COMMENTS BY RESPONDENTS AND INTERVIEWERS

Some comments from the open-ended questions, and from notes made by interviewers, provide further insights into the views, feelings and concerns of demobilised soldiers which may be useful in assisting those already demobilised as well as in preparing future demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Comments by respondents

- *I would like to see more change in the SANDF ... please speed up transformation.*
- *I feel displaced in our community - I lost my family because I could no longer support them.*

- *We have nowhere to grieve.*
- *Most are sent back home without getting employment ... this is one way of encouraging crime, because no-one can allow himself to sleep with an empty stomach. More especially after spending years fighting for liberation.*
- *Discrimination is everywhere, not only in the SANDF.*
- *I would like to go back [to the SANDF], if I get my rank back.*
- *Maybe this [survey] will ultimately help us, as some people are so stressed about what happened.*
- *I am seriously interested in furthering my studies ... I need viable financial support.*
- *There is no place to send our grievances.*
- *I would like to be employed, but there are no opportunities.*
- *I can barely support myself.*
- *They must make jobs ... they must help us.*
- *I feel that the government should do more for the freedom fighters and for those who lost breadwinners in the struggle.*
- *I'm feeling disillusioned because there is no strong proof that I will be able to find work with the skills I have.*
- *If I finish training at the Service Corps, I would like to thank all the generals, Chief of the Military and also the Minister of Defence.*
- *I cannot manage without a job.*
- *I need more training.*
- *We were not properly trained to be able to get employment somewhere after demobilisation.*
- *It took years to find alternative employment.*
- *Is it possible to be reinstated in the SANDF?*
- *I would like the SANDF to give further training skills before, or after contracts expire.*
- *I am very interested in improving my skills.*
- *I am worried about my children's education.*
- *We are suffering.*

- *I would like to return to the defence force.*
- *We need more skills development training.*
- *If everybody can be trained, we won't have so much crime.*
- *Our government is not doing enough for the people, like getting them jobs, houses and amenities.*
- *The idea of the SANDF Service Corps is a very good thing.*
- *I have moved on now and I never go back and I am happy where I am.*
- *People need jobs.*
- *Nobody is doing anything about our problems.*
- *The Service Corps was good for me, but nobody cares about our complaints.*
- *Unfortunately I am not fit for work, my health gets worse every day.*
- *I wish we could start integration again.*
- *In exile we could live even if we didn't have any money.*
- *Something must be done to change the unemployment rate.*
- *I have not received my course qualification certificates from the SANDF ... If I had received all of my certificates, I think I would be employed.*
- *I am not happy with the way life is for me. I cannot support my family and I am finding it very difficult. I am desperately looking for a job.*
- *I still want the SANDF to re-employ me, because what they taught me is not a skill that I can use in civilian life. As a paratrooper there is nothing I can do here in civilian life.*
- *I am worried about what I am going to live on ... I need work.*
- *We are job hungry ... try your best [to help us].*
- *I am now looking forward to working at one of the big firms in South Africa. I hope that what I have learned will contribute something to all my fellow South Africans.*

Comments by interviewers

- *People look down on him for being rejected by the military.*
- *Since I have been working with these people, it is hurting to hear what they have to say about their lives.*

- *My respondent used to love the army, but because of past bad experiences, he now would settle to join the traffic department.*
- *Something has to be done to address their problems.*
- *Nobody thinks about the veterans.*
- *He has lost hope in the search for employment, but I discouraged him from turning to crime.*
- *They have no platform to discuss their ideas.*
- *He would go back to the army if given a second chance.*
- *He wishes the government could offer some bursaries for his children to be educated, or at least provide them with some skills.*
- *The government should provide social security for unemployed soldiers.*
- *He is willing to go back to the army as he believes he was a good officer.*
- *They have a lot of regret and disappointment.*
- *Nobody looked after them after they left the SANDF.*
- *She is interested in a number of projects, but is still looking for funding.*
- *More people need to be provided with marketable skills.*
- *He has no skills that can make him employable.*
- *He has lost hope — he still has an interest in the army, but will settle for anything.*
- *He hopes that one day he will find a job.*
- *She is frustrated and hopes for change.*
- *They need a platform to express their frustrations.*
- *He is eager to continue with his studies, but has no funds.*
- *He is worried about what the future holds for him.*
- *He needs an opportunity to realise his potential.*
- *He feels that because he served the country he should be looked after, or compensated.*
- *He was only trained to be a soldier.*
- *SANDF courses were inadequate to prepare soldiers for jobs outside the military.*

General comments

Comments made both by respondents and interviewers suggest that some former soldiers have moved on with their lives, have settled down, found a job, or are studying. However, a large number of demobilised soldiers are clearly unhappy, are unemployed and finding it extremely difficult to support themselves and their families. The constant plea is for jobs, so that they can ensure their economic survival. Other themes which emerged from the open-ended responses are:

- the need for a forum in which demobilised soldiers can express themselves; and
- a desperate need for skills enhancement and training to prepare former combatants for employment in civilian life.

Chapter 13 CONCLUSION

The broad experience with demobilisation in developing countries, South Africa included, is characterised by the severe difficulty experienced in economically integrating veterans into civilian life. Long-term reintegration is directly dependent upon the former soldier obtaining stable and gainful employment. However, most veterans suffer from a shortage of capital and have no marketable skills that can easily translate into full employment within a highly competitive economy. As Nicole Ball of the Overseas Development Council in Washington has observed:

"African ex-combatants constitute a specially disadvantaged group. The typical veteran is semi-literate, is unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land and frequently has many dependents. Some veterans are also physically and psychologically handicapped by wartime experiences. Many find it difficult to take independent initiatives and to cope with the ordinary demands of civilian life. Even when they possess a marketable skill, such as a mechanic or driver, former combatants tend to have little or no experience in the labour market, having taken up arms at an early stage."⁷⁹

Consequently, the reintegration process poses significant challenges for reintegration. In this context, successful reintegration implies that the demobilised former combatant "settles in the community of his choice and generates an income."⁸⁰ The key to a successful reintegration programme is appropriate post-demobilisation training. As Rocky Williams has emphasised, "fundamental to the success of any demobilisation programme, is the effective preparation of former military personnel."⁸¹ The results of the survey outlined in chapters 11 and 12 suggest that South Africa's first phase of demobilisation did not adequately prepare soldiers for employment in the general economy.

The results of the survey outlined in this monograph suggest that the vast majority of South Africa's demobilised soldiers remain unemployed and are struggling to support themselves and their families. Many former combatants are clearly unhappy about their demobilisation from the SANDF, even though a large number indicated an interest in rejoining the military if offered the opportunity. Some former soldiers have returned to their communities, have settled down, found jobs and have managed to put the past behind them. However, the picture as a whole suggests that former combatants still require significant assistance if they are to be fully reintegrated back into civil society. The results of this survey would thus tend to support the conclusions reached

by Motumi, McKenzie and Cock, that demobilisation did not effectively provide for the effective reintegration of former combatants into society. Given that the demobilisation process affected only a limited number of individuals and that the next phase of demobilisation, or rationalisation, is likely to be much bigger, urgent attention needs to be given to the resolution of outstanding issues relating to past demobilisation and plans for future rationalisation by giving consideration to the experiences of the past, as well as lessons learned from other countries.

Any support programme must be designed on the basis of the needs and aspirations of former combatants, their families and communities. Reintegration programmes thus need to be adjusted in response to a continuing dialogue with former combatants. Moreover, past experiences show that the process is more successful if it is demilitarised. But there is no guaranteed blueprint for success. The appropriateness of assistance interventions depends on a case-by-case basis. For both the former combatant and the reintegration programme administrator, the process is an ongoing and joint learning exercise. Given the need for continuing dialogue, the actual implementation of programmes is best handled in a decentralised way. However, effective communication with the central administration remains important for overall success.

The lessons to be learned from demobilisation in the developing world, as well as South Africa's first post-1994 demobilisation process, suggest that the future rationalisation of the SANDF will require a very strong political commitment, an inclusive approach to planning, the availability and co-ordination of adequate funding, along with the required administrative capacity, comprehensive and targeted assistance packages and the determination to adopt a long-term perspective with regard to economic reintegration.⁸² Despite the obvious difficulties for former combatants to find employment outside the military, former defence personnel have a range of skills, which would be suitable for civilian application with some adaptation. These skills include administration, information technology, management, logistics, electronics, mechanics, civil engineering, vehicle maintenance, public health, cooking, printing and surveying. These skills form an excellent foundation for human resource conversion to gainful long-term employment.

Chapter 14

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations below are divided into recommendations with regard to previously demobilised soldiers and recommendations for the proposed future rationalisation.

Recommendations with regard to previously demobilised personnel

The survey results indicated that demobilised soldiers are experiencing a range of problems which need to be urgently addressed. Specific recommendations for assisting former combatants are:

- establishing a suitable mechanism for former combatants to communicate their concerns and problems;
- mobilising NGOs, churches, unions and other elements in civil society to assist former combatants with both social and economic reintegration;
- mobilising the international donor community's interest in the issue, possibly by means of a major conference;

- providing information to demobilised soldiers (possibly in the form of a monthly newsletter) on issues such as skills enhancement programmes, bursaries and employment opportunities;
- alerting commercial enterprises and the public, in general, to the plight of demobilised soldiers with the aim of mobilising support for appropriate job creation;
- organising regional workshops where demobilised soldiers along with local and provincial leaders and business forums can address employment and training issues (this will help to identify demand-driven training initiatives);
- encouraging former combatants to undertake further training in the Service Corps;
- providing bursaries in the form of vouchers that could be used at various tertiary technical training/educational institutions (coupled with encouraging these institutions to establish short courses specifically designed to facilitate the skills conversion of demobilised soldiers); and
- the effective and long-term monitoring of the problems and concerns of demobilised soldiers with the aim of providing ongoing support and assistance.

Many of the recommendations may be considered costly and outside the mandate of the Department of Defence. However, implementation could be outsourced with the administrative, financial and technical support of relevant NGOs.

Recommendations with regard to future rationalisation

Given that past demobilisation efforts did not meet expectations, it is recommended that any future rationalisation programme should consider the following issues.

It cannot be overemphasised that planning for successful demobilisation and reintegration requires quality and current socio-economic data on soldiers to be retrenched. It is thus strongly recommended that, once the Department of Defence has identified individuals to be retrenched, they should participate in a comprehensive socio-economic survey designed specifically to determine:

- precise socio-economic profiles;
- relocation preferences;
- capabilities, specific needs and expectations;
- employment potential; and
- skills enhancement, education or vocational training requirements.

In Uganda and Mozambique, workshops with small groups of former combatants proved particularly useful in identifying needs and aspirations.

The Personnel Rationalisation Strategy of the Department of Defence should be reviewed in the light of South Africa's past demobilisation experience, as well as the experiences of demobilisation in other parts of the developing world. The review should be driven by an inclusive approach, involving a broad base of stakeholders, including relevant government departments, potential donors, unions (especially the South African National Defence Union), churches, NGOs, business forums and civil society. The specific focus of review would be to:

- finetune the predischarge orientation programme (legal advice, civic education, and others);
- develop transitional safety net packages;
- design specific reintegration initiatives;
- differentiate assistance packages;
- facilitate targeted programme interventions; and
- facilitate active assistance with job placements.

A sustainable reintegration programme should be compatible with the national economic development programme (GEAR).

Rationalised military personnel should be given appropriate and sufficient demobilisation packages to assist them in the initial stages of resettlement.

Donors should be mobilised as early as possible to contribute to the process. The careful co-ordination of donor activity is also essential to avoid duplication. In addition, potential donors need to be kept informed of relevant developments — this could be done via regular newsletters and other forms of information exchange. Donor support should be mobilised for the following:

- employment support;
- vocational training (this proved especially effective in Mozambique and Uganda);
- on-the-job training;
- both formal and informal education;
- general skills enhancement; and
- micro-enterprise development.

Former combatants should be given assistance in developing specific plans for long-term economic activities.

Extensive career counselling should be provided for demobilised individuals. Counselling should be guided by aptitude tests to determine employment potential and career aspirations. These could include:

- general aptitude tests;
- special aptitude tests;
- vocational interests tests;
- situational tests; and
- personality tests (such as the Bernreuter Personality Inventory).

The design and management of the reintegration programme should take into account the social and cultural values of former combatants.

Individuals to be demobilised should be afforded the opportunity to make inputs into the planning process and programme formulation to avoid a top-down approach.

Given the contribution that former combatants have made to their country, the government should treat them as a special group for support programmes and employment opportunities. Project proposals submitted by former combatants should receive preferential treatment.

Planning should pay special attention to the specific needs of women. In Ethiopia, for example, a special gender unit was established to identify and protect the interests of female former combatants. Funding was made available to the unit to respond to specific needs.

Special attention should also be paid to the needs of disabled veterans. Detailed and targeted surveys designed for disabled military personnel are useful in identifying the specific needs of this group. In most cases, this group will require long-term access to appropriate healthcare facilities.

Given that soldiers constitute a HIV/Aids high-risk group, specific counselling and support, along with advice and awareness programmes, should be included in the demobilisation process.

Technical, vocational and managerial training for former SANDF personnel is critical for a successful reintegration process. It is thus important that demobilisation should be planned with this in mind.

Reintegration should be thought of as a long-term process, requiring a major commitment from all stakeholders.

Consideration should be given to outsource some of the technical/administrative procedures linked to demobilisation and reintegration.

Express consideration should be given to the psycho-social problems of those demobilised. This would include support for post-traumatic stress disorder and other related conditions.

Adequate financial support for demobilisation and reintegration is essential. NGO support to supplement state-funding could be decisive. In Uganda, the World Bank's contribution to and co-ordination of donor support were decisive in ensuring the success of the programme.

The government should create an environment that facilitates reintegration and provides specific support in a responsive and flexible way. Continuous dialogue with all stakeholders is required. Government initiatives could include:

- State enterprises should be encouraged to employ former soldiers.
- Colleges and universities should be encouraged to make special programmes available to former combatants.
- The state should encourage the formation of agricultural co-operatives of former soldiers.
- Specific targeted vocational training programmes should be established.

Information and sensitisation programmes are useful for both former combatants and the communities into which they are to be reintegrated.

A comprehensive monitoring system needs to be established to provide both early warnings of problems and ongoing dialogue and feedback. Feedback will allow for the redesign, or redirection of interventions where necessary.

Demobilisation processes should be transparent in order to ensure public confidence and accountability.

Strong political commitment and support, along with the timely delivery of promised resources, are essential for the success of any demobilisation and reintegration programme.

It is hoped that this monograph will contribute in some way in addressing the plight of demobilised soldiers and will help to assist those who may face demobilisation and an uncertain future. As an anonymous respondent said: "Maybe this will ultimately help us, as some people are so stressed about what happened."

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