

NEW PARTNERS IN PEACE

Towards a Southern African Peacekeeping Capacity

edited by Mark Malan

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PREFACE

This monograph has been commissioned by the *Training for Peace in Southern Africa* project. The project was established through an agreement reached at the end of 1995 between the three participatory organisations, namely IDP, NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) and ACCORD (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes), and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is funding the project. The purpose of the project is to contribute to the establishment of a viable regional capacity for conducting peace operations in Southern Africa. The project's immediate objective is to equip participants from the

departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs in as many SADC countries as possible, plus NGOs involved in peacekeeping operations, with the necessary knowledge and skills for engaging in their complementary and mission-specific roles within the broad ambit of peacekeeping operations.

The monograph consists of six articles on topics which range from general impressions of the regional security scenario to the specifics of disarmament and the role of civilians in peacekeeping operations. The encouragement of local scholarship and debate on peacekeeping is an integral part of capacity-building. Four of the contributions are from Southern Africans. The first contribution, by Kgomoetso Monnakgotla, expresses the concern of a young South African about the ambivalence of the international community in the face of prospects for continued regional instability, and sees the solution in closer regional security co-operation among SADC countries, including the creation of a subregional peacekeeping capacity.

Brigadier Stanford Khumalo of Zimbabwe reiterates Monnakgotla's concern for the future, and advances some more concrete proposals for a collaborative effort to deal with conflict in the region. His article is complemented by Malan's arguments in favour of addressing basic issues of military professionalism, in order to create a firm and common point of departure for the effort to muster a viable regional peacekeeping force.

Willem Steenkamp's ideas on the utilisation by South Africa of its Part-time Force capacity as a means of meeting the country's commitment to participate in future peace support operations are even more specific than those advanced by the other contributors. He addresses the fundamental problem of the availability of affordable, quality military manpower in the most powerful country in Southern Africa, but a country which is so engrossed with the post-conflict transition of its standing army that the future role of the Part-time Forces, upon which South Africa's conventional military might has traditionally relied, has largely been ignored.

The penultimate contribution is by Virginia Gamba, who was, until recently, the director of the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution project at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. Ms Gamba is presently directing the Towards Collaborative Peace project at IDP which aims at combatting the effects of the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa. She points to the fundamental issue of effective disarmament as an essential and integral part of any further regional peacekeeping efforts, emphasising lessons which must be well-learned by the new partners in peace.

The final contribution is by Eric Berman, special assistant to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. Although not specifically directed at Southern Africa, Berman provides a UN perspective on the future of civilian peacekeeping training, an essential issue in contemporary peace support operations, which will have to be addressed in the region, perhaps by projects such as *Training for Peace in Southern Africa*.

It is hoped that these insights will collectively serve to stimulate further debate, conceptual development and, finally, concerted action aimed at forging an effective Southern African peacekeeping partnership among the member states of SADC.

FROM AMBIVALENCE AND ADVERSITY TO STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Kgomotso Monnakgotla, Project Assistant, IDP

INTRODUCTION

The shortcomings in Africa's capacity to prevent, mediate, or resolve conflict situations in order to maintain peace are well-documented. Increasingly, the emphasis is placed on enhancing subregional capacity to deal with conflict in Africa. The scarcity of financial and material resources has been identified by politicians and academics alike as one of the key impediments to Southern Africa contemplating to undertake a peacekeeping operation unilaterally, as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has done in Liberia, in the event of the subregion being struck by turmoil. Despite the obvious resource constraints, Southern African states should acknowledge that a subregional peacekeeping capacity could be instrumental in alleviating some of the problems experienced by them (if not now, then in the future), and could curb the political instability which denies the continent as a whole the opportunities to attract foreign investment - the only sustainable solution to Africa's economic woes.

Besides the inability of African countries to spend millions of dollars on peacekeeping operations, the United Nations' (UN) financial crisis mitigates against the enhancement of peacekeeping capacity, as well as against further general contributions to peacekeeping missions by the international community. There is no longer a guarantee that countries contributing to future UN peacekeeping operations, by supplying manpower or in any other way, will be reimbursed speedily by the UN for their efforts. At the end of 1993, the organisation owed some \$335 million to countries that had contributed to peacekeeping operations, and by 1994, the reimbursement backlog had increased to more than \$1 billion.¹ At the beginning of 1996, the UN owed in excess of \$1 billion to more than 75 countries for their contributions to peacekeeping operations.² This is not encouraging for any country, particularly those that are cash-strapped, but willing to contribute human or material resources towards peacekeeping operations.

This article will examine the challenges confronting Africa's and Southern Africa's ability to engage in peacekeeping operations, in the light of the high potential for instability inherent in the unresolved peace process in Angola, the frail political status of the monarchy in Swaziland, the ongoing and understated political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, the civil war in Burundi, and other conflicts on the rest of the continent.

A second issue that will be discussed is the strengths and weaknesses of organisational structures that are necessary for endeavours related to subregional peacekeeping. Emphasis will be on developments within Southern Africa, with regard to strengthening institutional frameworks to address peacekeeping needs. Analysts seem to overlook the lack of structural co-ordination for peacekeeping operations, which could impair the subregion's ability to engage in operations, even if adequate financial and material resources were to become available.

THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The UN has recently been confronted by a political, and as a consequence, an extreme financial crisis related to peacekeeping, and is at present exerting greater pressure on regional and subregional organisations, and states that are able to become actively involved, to participate in peace support operations. This changed attitude will have direct implications for individual African states, and for Africa as a whole.

Recent increases in the demands for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance have drained the UN's resources. The world body is now facing the worst financial crisis in its fifty-year history. The inability or the unwillingness of the United States of America (US) to meet its

financial obligations has exposed the dependence of the UN on major western powers. Critics in the US House of Representatives are increasingly calling on the UN to show 'results' that correlate with the amount of resources contributed by the US towards peacekeeping. According to Renner, the US and Russia are by far the biggest debtors. Of the \$2,5 billion collective arrears recorded by the end of 1994, the US owed \$956 million, while Russia accounted for \$496 million of the total.³ The US figure has since increased and amounts to \$1,6 billion at present.⁴

At the political level, it is alleged that the UN-sanctioned 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia, has precipitated the world body's slide into its present disarray. The ability of the US to involve the UN in messy operations has prompted a conceptual debate about peace support operations in general and, more specifically, about the viability of peace-enforcement as a strategy to deal with complex internal strife in predominantly Third World regions. It has become increasingly popular to place a major portion of the blame for the disaster in Somalia squarely on the 'shoulders' of the UN.

After the US abandoned the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNITAF), and the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) under Resolution 814, lack of co-ordination between the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, and Somali leaders persisted. The UN mandate did not adequately clarify the mission's objectives in terms of the consolidation of the existing peace agreement between Somali leaders. Instead, a military operation took place which seemed to reflect the disproportionate confidence of the UN and the US after the annihilation of Iraqi forces in 'Operation Desert Storm'. The UN/US partnership was determined to teach 'trouble-makers' (especially in the Third World), that blocked the path towards a 'New World Order', a lesson.

Through identifying General Aideed as the villain, the US undercut the mission as a whole, and many previously uncommitted Somalis pledged their support to Aideed at the expense of the US/UN. From that moment on, the mission was doomed to fail as the vulnerability of peace keepers was exposed by a hostile population.

Somalia made the international community, led by the US, 'stand back and think' about the tactics to be employed in civil wars with ethnic undertones. The post-Cold War euphoria that characterised US policy *vis-à-vis* the UN in the early 1990s was shattered when the UN realised that conflicts of this nature would not readily be resolved through the application of traditional peacekeeping principles. Neither was brute force the answer. As Urquhart has observed, *"[t]he fighting parties in most situations with which the United Nations is now dealing are not sovereign governments, but unofficial militia or, in some cases, local thugs. They have little or no respect for Security Council decisions, international agreements, or the special status of UN peace-keeping forces, and are usually not susceptible to diplomatic or economic pressure."*⁵

The number of casualties that have characterised recent peacekeeping operations, has also left most western constituencies apprehensive. This has become an issue heatedly debated in western legislatures, with the general contention that American and European lives are worth more than conflict-ridden areas that are of little interest to industrialised countries of the West, especially areas where opposing sides are not inclined towards peace.

POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL TURBULENCE

Inadequate Democratisation

Amid these developments, there are spiralling conflict and political tension in many parts of Africa. Southern Africa remains affected by the instability that has almost become a continental 'trademark'. The fact that the recently renewed United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) is currently the largest peacekeeping operation in the world, is an indication that everything is not well in the subregion.⁶ At this stage the peace process in Angola is still fragile and if it is derailed, Southern Africa will experience the perpetuation of one of the most tragic wars in recent history. As a result of this twenty-year long civil war, Angola has the morbid distinction of having the highest percentage of limbless people, mainly due to landmine explosions. As an illustration of the continued uncertainty, reports indicate that both the Angolan government and the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) are involved in recruitment programmes for military training purposes, despite their peace agreement.⁷

In the monarchy of Swaziland, where political organisations are currently banned, calls for democratisation by trade unions will have to be closely monitored by key regional actors, as this could pose an additional threat to regional stability. Early in 1996, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, the kingdom's largest trade union grouping and a voice for political activists, brought the country to a virtual standstill with a week-long national strike intended to press for democratic reform. However, King Mswati III has given no indication that he intends to allow free political activity, and instead, has called upon the police to crush any opposition.

The kingdom of Lesotho has been shrouded in political uncertainty. The tiny enclave has experienced almost a quarter of a century of authoritarian rule, constitutional crises and military *coups*. During the first twenty years of independence (1966-1986), Lesotho was under one-party rule. In 1986, prime minister Leabua Jonathan was deposed by the military, which dissolved the national assembly and handed all executive and legislative power to King Moshoeshoe II. Four years later, a power struggle ensued between the King and the leader of the military council, Major General Justin Lekhanya, and Moshoeshoe, in turn, was deposed. The first multi-party democratic elections were held in 1993, and Ntsu Mokhehle was installed as prime minister. Expectations of Lesotho's new democracy were soon shattered when fighting broke out in January 1994, between factions in the military that were either in favour of military rule or supported the new government. In August 1994, King Letsie III dissolved Mokhehle's government. It took the combined mediation efforts of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana (and a flexing of military muscles by these countries) to reinstate Mokhehle and his government. Early the following year, Moshoeshoe II was reinstated as king. In the light of its history, and the death of the King in January 1996 (a highly respected and unifying figure), the future stability of Lesotho is clearly in jeopardy.

After fifteen years of independence, Zimbabwe is still not a 'true' democracy. It is effectively a one-party state, with President Mugabe's personal dominance of the government representing a major source of domestic tension and insecurity. In the 1996 presidential elections where Mugabe stood unopposed, it was reported that *"those who had voted had feared they would be ineligible for government seeds packs, school fee assistance and other handouts if their green 'voter registration cards' were not given a special perforation by returning officers."*⁸ The low 31 per cent poll that saw Mugabe win his third six-year term in office is an indication of people's dissatisfaction with the political dispensation. However, it seems as if they would rather engage in silent protest, for fear of reprisals, should they cast their votes against the president. The twenty per cent of the vote cast for absent candidates Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Rev Ndabaningi Sithole (who claims that he quit the presidential race due to harassment by security police), could have been higher had the democratic process allowed them the same platform to organise and campaign as that afforded to Mugabe. Muzorewa lamented that *"Mr. Mugabe*

wants to cheat the donor community into believing that there is a democratic government in Zimbabwe."⁹

Another element of concern that could be a source of insecurity at subregional level is the growth of President Mandela's influence, and international expectations of the potential leadership role South Africa could play in Southern Africa. These two factors pose a clear challenge to Mugabe and Zimbabwe. Mugabe has projected himself as Southern Africa's eminent statesman, but the relatively peaceful political transition in South Africa and its strong economic position in the subregion, coupled with Mandela's international stature and charisma, are challenging Mugabe and his country's position. If Mugabe does not get his way, it is feared that he may derail efforts to establish subregional integration and co-operation. These are but a few areas that could potentially cause instability and threaten security in Southern Africa.¹⁰

What was expected to be a decade of 'democracy' or Africa's 'second liberation' after the end of the Cold War, has so far led to bloodshed and very few perceptible changes towards democratisation and liberalisation. Many believed that the end of the ideological struggle between East and West would bring rationality that would result in an end to conflict. Sadly, autocratic elements still operate in many parts of Africa and in some cases (Nigeria, Angola, Gambia, and Burundi) have undermined and sabotaged the democratic process. In a speech to parliament on 14 February 1996, Alfred Nzo, the South African Foreign Minister, identified tyranny and dictatorship as the primary enemies of peace on the African continent.¹¹ Furthermore, *"popular participation, transparency in government operations, and accountability still remain ... insufficient in Africa, while the denial of political rights and the freedom of expression [are] still persistent on the continent."*¹² South Africa and Namibia are among the few that have made a relatively peaceful transition towards multi-party rule. But as analysts have warned, South Africa is still a fledgling democracy and the ongoing violence in KwaZulu-Natal demonstrates that it would be premature to boast of success.

Military Expenditure

The optimistic mood sweeping through the subregion stands in contrast to the relatively high levels of military expenditure that can easily lead to irresponsible adventurism. Despite pleas of bankruptcy when peace-related endeavours are mentioned, governments world-wide spend about \$50 on the military for every \$1 devoted to peace and disarmament.¹³ This lack of proportion, which smacks of the deterrence prioritisation of the past, brings into question governments' commitment to build a more secure post-Cold War world. The restriction and eventual elimination of states' war-fighting capacity and the ideal of general, co-ordinated disarmament and force rationalisation still seem far-fetched. Even though it is estimated that Southern Africa's defence expenditure has declined over the past few years (from some \$8,6 billion or three per cent of gross domestic product in 1993, to about \$8 billion or 2,6 per cent of GDP in 1994), it remains a significant cost for several countries.¹⁴ Although the international norm is estimated at two per cent of GDP,¹⁵ Angola has spent twenty per cent of its GDP on defence in 1993.¹⁶ This has been despite unfavourable economic and social indicators which would require the government rather to channel resources towards the large numbers of displaced former soldiers and other groups devastated by the civil war. The high level of expenditure in Angola could be attributed to the ongoing civil war, but the thirteen per cent of GDP (1993) that Lesotho has spent on defence,¹⁷ even though it has not been at war nor perceives an external threat, remains inexplicable. Recently, it has been estimated that Angola spends 21,57 per cent of its GDP on defence, while Mozambique spends 10,73 per cent, Namibia 3,77 per cent, South Africa 2,94 per cent, Tanzania 17 per cent and Zimbabwe 23,5 per cent.¹⁸ As in Lesotho, the potential external threat to these Southern African countries within

the foreseeable future is not commensurate with defence expenditure levels.

At the annual meeting of the Global Coalition for Africa held in Maastricht in November 1995, President Quett Masire of Botswana condemned excessive militarisation and military regimes as threats to democracy and regional security. This can only be labelled as contradictory, given his country's current weapons acquisition programme. It has been reported that *"[i]n the just-announced annual budget, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has been allocated the lion's share (68.1%) in the Office of the President's total allocation of R233,3 million. Key ministries such as Health, Agriculture, Labour and Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry and Foreign Affairs have to share R247,8 million."*¹⁹ When questioned about this figure, Lieutenant General Ian Khama, the commander of the BDF, indicated that, contrary to popular opinion, he perceived a potential threat to his country, and argued that the high spending was required to counter this unspecified threat. The figures confirm subregional suspicions that, despite efforts of countries such as South Africa to cut defence expenditure, Botswana is moving in the opposite direction. A University of Botswana academic stated that *"the government and the BDF hierarchy are now unchallengably used to the fact that the army is accustomed to getting what it asks for. In fact the BDF is to all intents and purposes treated like a private institution. This explains why it takes offence every time it is questioned about its spending habits."*²⁰

Africa's militaries still wield much power over other institutions, and if the situation is not carefully balanced, the occurrence of *coups*, such as the recent interventions in Niger and Sierra Leone, will continue to be a haunting feature of continental and regional politics. In addition, the region still harbours exiled rebel groups and a host of demobilised soldiers that further threaten stability. In Mozambique, for example, it is reported that armed renegade groups are operating in some of the provinces.

A closely linked cause for concern in Southern Africa, is the vast quantity of a variety of arms, which litter the region after decades of civil strife and destabilisation. Many of these weapons (AK-47 assault rifles, machine-guns, rocket-launchers, pistols and anti-personnel grenades) originate from supplies provided during the Cold War. According to the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), *"the largest concentration of these weapons is in Sub-Saharan Africa and especially in Southern Africa, which had become an important area of Cold War confrontation by proxy."*²¹ Furthermore, the IDP has warned that, *"failure to control arms proliferation in Africa will lead to a major growth of banditry, violent racketeering, piracy and warlordism."*²²

Inappropriate Western 'Rationality'

Even though it might be encouraging that 35 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries have held parliamentary elections over the past few years, many of these have either been flawed or have been costly in terms of human lives and political stability. Ethnic tensions, kept in check by the Cold War, have re-ignited primordial conflicts, and ill-defined boundaries set in place by the OAU in 1964 are increasingly challenged by groups eager to govern themselves, Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1993 being an example. In addition, failed transitions to democracy (as in Nigeria), and increasing competition over access to diminishing resources are now major factors fuelling instability.

Politicians and academics are beginning to question the viability of western democratic models, on a continent that is burdened by dilemmas partly caused by colonialism, and more recently brought about by the ill-conceived Structural Adjustment Programmes of the Bretton Woods structures. Professor Tandon of the University of Zimbabwe, was critical of current Western-African relations at the Maastricht GCA meeting, where he *"accused Western nations of using*

*democratic conditionalities and a host of other conditions to impose on Africa an economic market-based model of growth and a political model of governance that are foreign to African conditions and disrespectful of African indigenous traditions."*²³

Africans are being pressed to respond to many of the conflict scenarios outlined above, while simultaneously experimenting with economic models that appear to have caused more suffering and fuelled conflict, instead of having eradicated rampant poverty. Sub-Saharan Africa is still faced with economic stagnation and at present records exceedingly low economic growth figures when compared with other Third World regions. Since the 1980s the majority of African countries have experienced low per capita growth rates and many have registered negative growth.²⁴

The subregion's woes are further exacerbated by environmental degradation, drought, declining food production, increasing numbers of refugees and displaced people, and recently, floods in South Africa and Mozambique. Many people live below the poverty line and vital social services are either substandard or non-existent. War-ravaged Mozambique is currently the poorest country in the world.

It is not surprising that most Southern African countries have placed strong emphasis on internal development as a means to address poverty, disease and other threats. South Africa, in tandem with other countries in the subregion, has on many occasions indicated that, even though it intends to play a meaningful part in regional affairs, its short term priority lies at home.

DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL AMBIVALENCE

In this grim post-Cold War environment, Africa is increasingly marginalised, and pressure from the UN and other western powers for Africa to become more responsible for its plight is experienced with trepidation. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia cost the UN an estimated \$4 million per day, without much success in safeguarding the potential victims of ethnic cleansing.²⁵ Perceptions of the UN's selection process when engaging in international conflict prevention and conflict resolution, will have to be addressed urgently if the organisation wants to revive its declining credibility. Even though the UN is clearly overburdened with peacekeeping activities and consequently lacks the resources to perform some of its tasks effectively, its belated and limited action in Rwanda and the slow-paced deliberations about Burundi pose questions among Africans about the organisation's commitment to resolve conflict in Africa. In the Rwandan case, it took three months to obtain the necessary troops, to prepare them for deployment and transport them with their equipment, while the daily massacre of innocent people continued.

Africa also accounts for many aborted UN peacekeeping operations and defunct missions, such as in Somalia (UNOSOM), Liberia (UNOMIL), Angola (UNAVEM I and II), and Western Sahara (MINURSO). It is evident that the UN's patience and resolve dissipate faster with peacekeeping missions in Africa, than elsewhere. Zimbabwean ambassador Ngoni Francis Sengwe has summarised African sentiments in general: *"the application of double standards in determining conditions for the deployment or withdrawal of peacekeeping missions has clearly undermined the credibility and universality of the United Nations."*²⁶ One can only hope that the UN Secretary-General's statements about the need to strengthen mechanisms for co-ordination, consultation and co-operation between the UN and the OAU, and the possibility of building a stockpile of military equipment in Africa, for use by African contingents, are serious indications of the world organisation's desire to improve its credibility on the continent.

The UN is the pre-eminent organisation, charged by its member states to maintain global peace and ensure international security. In the past, it was unable to carry out this mandate to the extent envisaged by its founders. There was optimism after the Cold War that the Security Council would function more effectively without the vetoes that dominated proceedings prior to 1990. Increased peacekeeping activities since 1990 made the efficient functioning of the UN imperative, but unfortunately the organisation is often faced with conflicts without having the necessary capacity to resolve it. However, from 1948 to 1978, only thirteen peacekeeping and observer missions were undertaken under the auspices of the UN. During the decade between 1978 and 1988, no new peacekeeping missions were launched. *"The last ten years have witnessed a huge increase in the number and scope of peacekeeping missions. In 1987, the UN was involved in five such operations with a total deployment of 10 000 military personnel; by 1994, this had increased to seventeen operations with a deployment of over 70 000 members. This led to a growth in the UN's peacekeeping budget from US \$400 million in 1990 to more than US \$3,5 billion in 1994."*²⁷

At the qualitative level, peacekeeping operations have expanded to include, among others, election monitoring, protecting designated 'safe areas', demilitarisation of certain areas (such as in Sarajevo), and assuring the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. These new tasks have had mixed results, being both lauded and condemned by different sectors of the international community. However, the enthusiasm of the early 1990s has fizzled out, as the UN and other key international actors have acknowledged the complex nature of contemporary conflict. Recent operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda will be used (as a somewhat unfair yardstick) to judge the UN's capability to maintain international peace and security in years to come.

Africa no longer has the same strategic value for the superpowers that struggled against each other throughout the latter half of this century. However, merely focusing on the problems that confront Africa (realistic and genuine though they may be) and continually blaming the West, will not resolve the continent's problems. Western fatigue with African affairs was partly responsible for the millions of lives that were lost in Rwanda. Deliberations by the UN on whether and when to intervene in the Rwandan crisis, while CNN and other electronic media networks transmitted horrifying images into people's homes, should serve as a warning that more lives could be lost while Africans look towards outsiders to respond. 'Black Consciousness' and other Africanist ideologies could point the continent towards accepting responsibility for its own destiny, as recently suggested by South Africa's President Nelson Mandela, in a speech to Mali's national assembly.²⁸ At present, it seems as if African leaders are increasingly realising the continent's need to accept responsibility for its own affairs, albeit not through a process of introspection, but as a result of recent global developments over which there is little control.

It has been argued that *"regional organizations should realise that the need for them to take the primary ownership of their own problems, especially those relating to the issue of peace, security and stability, has never become so pressing as it is in the post-Cold War period. This is necessary because, for one thing our external partners are becoming increasingly less enthusiastic in sharing with us, our problems. For another, if we do not take care of our problems as regional entities, we will continue to shoulder such costly humanitarian undertakings relating to the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as continue to bear witness to heavy losses of human lives and property ..."*²⁹ The dynamics of conflict in a subregion such as Southern Africa, with its increasingly porous borders, can cause conflict to affect the whole region, whether such conflict is internal or not. It is thus in the best interests of all potentially affected countries to resolve crises before their effects become an internal affair.

Questions about the applicability of western-style governance and development models, point to the necessity for Africans to contribute towards the development of peacekeeping doctrine and practice for Africa. Failures, such as in Somalia, should raise questions about differences in the outcome of operations should peacekeeping mandates and concepts take the traditional structures of African socio-political systems into account, especially in cases where the 'state' itself has disintegrated. For example, who should give consent - one of the corner stones of peacekeeping operations - when national authority structures have effectively collapsed? Questions such as this one would have to be addressed if peacekeeping operations are to be effective in Africa, or any area where the state has collapsed.

In certain cases, conflict resolution should not be restricted to intergovernment negotiations between special envoys to reach a settlement. A bottom-up approach, using authority figures in rural areas to represent the population, or to provide information that would lead to a better understanding of the evolution of a conflict in order to find a solution, merits careful and serious investigation for future conflict mediation or resolution techniques. In most cases, traditional forms of authority functioning in some societies are undermined by contemporary 'western' peacekeeping doctrine, and can easily lead to the failure of a mission. Before European settlement in Africa, conflicts (in the generic sense) were resolved through traditional authority structures. Those presiding over these structures did so through some form of lineage, depending on their culture. Contrary to popular perceptions, these structures still exist and are in use. South Africa, for example, has resorted to traditional practices through the gathering of the chiefs (*imbizo*) in KwaZulu-Natal in an attempt to resolve the political violence in that province.

It is encouraging to see that the Bergen Workshop on 'The International Response To Conflict In Africa' (September 1995) has highlighted the importance of promoting indigenous conflict resolution techniques in Africa. Further research is necessary and should be tackled by Africans, who know more about their own conditions and must eventually implement these techniques. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are already placing more emphasis on traditional conflict resolution techniques in response to humanitarian crises. However, this should not imply African disengagement from international affairs, but should be seen as extending capabilities in a more challenging world environment. As Otunnu argues, *"member states from a particular region should be encouraged to spearhead international response to conflict situations within their region, but must not detract from the significance of wider international participation in these efforts."*³⁰

THE NEED FOR CO-ORDINATED ACTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A primary constraint on Southern African peacekeeping is the availability of financial resources. Many Southern African economies are in dire straits. The financial crisis that affects many international organisations is also felt by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A statement to this effect by the SADC Council of Ministers at a meeting in Johannesburg during January 1996, highlighted the serious nature of the organisation's financial problems. The delay in payments by member states has forced some SADC institutions to operate on costly bank overdrafts. However, it is not clear whether there is sufficient political will in the subregion to build a capacity for peace support operations. The process towards creating a regional framework for peacekeeping initiatives is advancing very slowly. The Association of Southern African States (ASAS), the envisaged driving force behind this process, failed to come into being, but was replaced by the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. It is fundamental that,

*"if regional organizations must take the responsibility of taking care of their own problems, especially those relating to peace and security, then the strengthening of those organizations becomes an imperative."*³¹ Even though co-operative involvement between the UN, regional, and subregional organisations is widely supported as the key to contemporary international conflict resolution, many regional and subregional organisations thus far lack the necessary institutional capacity and a real commitment from member states.

Efforts by non-government organisations (NGOs) heeding the urgent call to enhance peacekeeping capacity, are highly commendable. In South Africa, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP), collaborating with the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), have recently commenced with a programme of subregional peacekeeping training seminars in SADC countries. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the University of the Witwatersrand's Graduate School of Public and Development Management (Wits P&DM) have launched similar projects, directed mainly at Southern Africa's government officials and relevant members of defence forces. The aim of these projects is to enhance peacekeeping capacity for a more secure and stable Southern African environment, and not to undermine any efforts made at intergovernment levels. They are intended to support initiatives created by SADC. For example, a meeting of defence chiefs from Southern African countries, under the auspices of the Defence Sub-committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), has made recommendations for joint training exercises, which will introduce a measure of standardisation of procedures and build confidence and trust among the different armed forces, a prerequisite for future co-operation in peacekeeping.³²

Governments increasingly realise that some form of peacekeeping capacity is required in the subregion. Even though a permanent stand-by force may not be feasible at present, soldiers should be trained for participation in peacekeeping operations. Southern African states are already involved in regional operations, such as the preventive diplomacy venture in Lesotho in 1994, and other unilateral ventures to prevent conflict on the continent. As useful and necessary as these exercises may be, their adequacy in managing future conflicts should be questioned. For example, had the Lesotho mission failed, and conflict erupted, it would have left SADC without any recourse to action, except to wait for a response from the UN or to request South Africa to intervene. If trained peace keepers and equipment are available in the subregion, mobilisation and action can take place immediately after approval for an operation has been obtained from the UN Security Council and the OAU. The ability to respond rapidly could vastly limit the loss of life and damage to property. If soldiers in Southern Africa are trained for peacekeeping activities, national contingents could also be incorporated into the UN Stand-by Arrangement, which will allow the organisation to commit resources for peacekeeping missions at short notice.

There are further advantages in employing a subregional peacekeeping force instead of foreign troops. Article 33 of the **UN Charter** stipulates that *"[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other peaceful means of their own choice."* If such methods fail, the deployment of troops, sanctioned by the UN and the OAU, under a subregional peacekeeping force, presents an alternative in Africa. A case can be made for the utilisation of subregional forces in regional conflicts: *"For one thing, mainly due to their cultural affinity and common social and historical configuration, the people in the region normally have more intimate knowledge of the evolution and political sensitivities of the conflict in question. For another, their sense of solidarity generally, arising out of their common histories, experiences,*

geographic contiguity and cultural compatibility can play a central role in the process of consensus building, which is so crucial in times of crisis."³³ However, there are inherent dangers in missions orchestrated by subregional forces. The close origins of the forces involved might imply that peace keepers have a vested or hidden interest in the mission. If the peacekeeping force does have an interest outside of the official mandate, the resulting reduction in its impartiality is likely to make it part of the problem rather than of the solution. The limited success of ECOMOG, which has been accused of partiality, should not discourage SADC initiatives. Rather, its problems could be transformed into guidelines for other subregional organisations to strengthen their approach.

Recent developments in SADC to create a framework for peace support operations in the subregion, have taken into account that conflict management is not restricted to peacekeeping, but can include conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.³⁴ Steps are currently being taken towards creating a structure that, in all likelihood, will be empowered to make regional decisions on security and conflict matters. A recent summit meeting of the heads of state of SADC in Gaborone, Botswana, agreed to formally establish a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. It is envisaged that this Organ will allow more flexibility and timely responses at the highest level to sensitive and potentially explosive situations.³⁵ The proposal was ratified without trouble, as procedures leading to its formation were more consultative and have incorporated a wider spectrum of relevant government ministries than was the case with the ASAS initiative. The Organ will have the following as some of its objectives:

- safeguarding the region against instability from within or outside its borders;
- promoting political co-operation and common political values and institutions;
- developing a common foreign policy and a joint lobby at international level on issues of common interest;
- security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- mediation of disputes and conflicts;
- to co-operate fully in preventive diplomacy and mechanisms, with punitive measures as a last resort;
- to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices, and observance of human rights;
- promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
- promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security;
- development of a collective security capacity, conclusion of a Mutual Defence Pact, and developing a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies;
- close co-operation between police and security services in addressing cross-border crime and promoting a community-based approach to matters of security;
- monitoring the ratification of relevant international conventions and treaties;

- co-ordinating participation of members in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and
- addressing extra-regional conflicts that impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security will operate at Summit level (i.e. heads of state), as well as ministerial and technical levels, but will function separately from other SADC structures. Rather than having one country responsible for defence and security, it was decided to rotate the chairmanship on an annual basis, in order to avoid suspicion in this highly sensitive area. The Organ will operate in a flexible and informal manner, and it is proposed that the ISDSC is incorporated as one of its institutions.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the successful development and operation of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security for peacekeeping, cannot be overstated. It is encouraging to see Southern Africa's commitment to support and share the burden of monitoring and promoting peace and security with the OAU and the UN. The increased marginalisation of Africa in international circles and the crisis in the UN that has manifested itself in controversial selective peacekeeping engagements, have left African countries with limited alternatives. The question is no longer whether to develop a peacekeeping capacity or not, but rather how to achieve this and where to obtain resources for such a costly exercise. Southern African countries' defence expenditure should be used more substantially to contribute towards peace related activities. The required armed forces should be reoriented towards participation in peacekeeping operations as opposed to conventional defence activities. The existing military capacity of most African states and the vast amount of arms littering society, are partly responsible for governments and militia groups seeing the gun as a means of resolving disputes. These issues will have to be addressed if Africa is serious about establishing sustained stability. In addition, attention should be paid to the root causes of conflict and instability on the continent. Examples of the latter are the unequal international division of labour which is manifested in uneven trade policies and the prescription by international financial institutions of failed development programmes.

It should be encouraging for the continent as a whole that SADC is prepared to consider involvement in resolving conflict which occurs outside the subregion. Events such as in Burundi, could therefore be dealt with by peacekeeping forces that are in close proximity. Steps are in progress to train soldiers for peacekeeping activities, and as soon as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security swings into action, training will hopefully become more co-ordinated and standardised. European countries, such as Norway and Denmark, who have demonstrated a genuine interest in SADC's peacekeeping developments, will be more willing to support effective and well-organised structures, than to donate resources on an *ad hoc* basis. However, a wider spectrum of the international community will have to unite in helping Africans help themselves. Africans can no longer afford debates about saving lives. The time has come to build a peacekeeping capacity on the continent that will save lives. If this force is never deployed because other conflict resolution mechanisms have been successful, then so much the better. However, if a crisis arises that requires such a force, and the region or any other African subregion cannot provide it, the continent will pay a high price for its lack of preparedness.

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FORGING A REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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BACKGROUND

The United Nations (UN) often refers to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as a regional body. However, for the purposes of this article, Africa will be treated as a continent divided into regions: Southern, West, East, North and Central Africa. The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was established on 30 June 1993, also uses this division and further encourages organisations constituted by the states of these regions to develop peacekeeping capabilities.

The European partitioning of Africa followed a tradition of incursion that began in the 15th century and involved the complete colonisation of the continent. The conquest was rapid, sudden and successful, largely due to the use of superior technology against which African forces were unable to defend themselves. Only Ethiopia and Liberia survived the onslaught. However, in 1963 African leaders combined their quest for unity under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and formed the OAU. Its main mission was the liberation of Africa from the forces of colonialism, and the delivery of both political and economic emancipation to the people of Africa. This was followed by liberation wars fought throughout Africa. However, the advent of majority rule brought with it new challenges to the

continent.

Firstly, economic problems have occurred because of the adoption of inappropriate macro-economic policies at independence. The strategies were counter-productive and not designed to increase growth. Investors were in some cases treated with suspicion, as they often came from the colonial powers. Africa's economic problems were further exacerbated by some countries following Soviet-style economic management. This led to the creation of many structures that did not function, and forced governments to get involved in the daily management of the economy, instead of leaving this to the private sector or trying to operate in partnership with the private sector. Most African countries have realised that some of these economic policies have not encouraged growth and development, and have invited the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help them to design new growth-oriented economic strategies.

Secondly, Africa also finds itself engulfed by civil wars, caused mainly by the absence of democracy. Although most African countries adopted western-style constitutions that included a 'Bill of Rights' at independence, citizens have too often been denied the opportunities to fully exercise these rights. (A case in point is the recent execution of the Nigerian writer and Civil Rights leader Ken Saro-Wiwa). The absence of democracy has led to ethnic and religious conflicts with some groups claiming a right to self-determination. Rwanda has presented a vivid picture to the world of how deep some of the problems lie. Southern Africa, however, has recently entered a period of relative peace after years of warfare. Majority rule has come to South Africa. Mozambique has gone through a UN supervised election after twenty years of civil war. In Angola, after the failure of the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), parties to the conflict signed the Lusaka Agreement. This has led to the creation of UNAVEM III, and the UN has completed its deployment to supervise the cease-fire and help demobilise former combatants.

Southern Africa, like most parts of Africa, is faced with both economic and political problems, and, in an attempt to deal with these problems, has formed the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC at present comprises of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its aim is to help with the integration of the economies of the region. Within the framework of this organisation, the region should experience free movement of goods, money and people. Most importantly, the region should be able to market itself to overseas investors as a single entity. Most of these objectives will not be achieved immediately, since countries such as Angola and Mozambique have just emerged from lengthy civil wars and will not only need to balance their economies, but also to revive their social structures before embarking on regional integration.

Under the aegis of SADC, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) functions as a security organisation which aims at regional security co-operation and the sharing of information on issues related to crime and security. Recently, the ISDSC has been developing common approaches to combat poaching, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Its subcommittees on operations, intelligence, human resources and logistics have been established to provide detailed research on the possibility of regional co-operation in these areas, for the main committee. The operations subcommittee is especially interested in developing enhanced co-operation among member states in the realm of creating effective peacekeeping capacity in the region.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In the preamble to the **UN Charter** it is stated that the people of the world should practice

tolerance, must live together in peace as good neighbours and must unite to maintain international peace and security. Article I states one of the important purposes of the UN as maintaining international peace and security, and to that end, to take collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, and to settle disputes which might lead to a breach of the peace.²

Although the term 'peacekeeping' is not used in the **UN Charter**, the conditions that would warrant any form of peace operation are sufficiently covered. For example, Article 43 states that all members of the UN, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make armed forces and facilities, including rights of passage, available to the Security Council, on request. Regional peacekeeping is implied in Article 52 and the Secretary-General's **Agenda for Peace** encourages contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security by calling for initiatives to procure peaceful settlements to local disputes within regional settings. Whatever concept of regional peacekeeping Southern Africa eventually adopts, it is clear that these operations must be carried out on behalf and with the consent of the Security Council (Article 53).

THE WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

Southern Africa will not be the first region in Africa to get involved in peacekeeping operations. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been involved in a peacekeeping operation in Liberia for some time. This occurred after it became clear that the parties to the conflict were violating human rights, leading to a mass exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries. The civil war in Liberia also disrupted regional economic activities and created regional instability. ECOWAS's involvement helped to stop violations of human rights and restored regional and economic stability. Parties to the conflict have since agreed to a UN supervised cease-fire and elections should take place in the future. It would be misleading to describe the intervention as a complete success since the operation has experienced a number of problems, many of which pertain to the West African Force taking sides with one of the parties to the conflict. However, Southern Africa can still learn from this operation, especially with regard to command and control, training for peacekeeping, logistic support, information gathering for peacekeeping operations, and the support of NGOs in regional peacekeeping. The region could do well by sending officers to Liberia on short term attachments to the West African Force Headquarters to study this operation. Indeed, lessons learned from ECOMOG could help Southern Africa to develop a sound regional peacekeeping concept.

PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

At present, there is no cohesive approach to peacekeeping in the region, yet several countries have taken part in peace support operations under the auspices of the UN. However, the region has the necessary manpower to develop structures for peacekeeping. For example, Zimbabwe has taken part in peacekeeping in Angola under UNAVEM II and a battalion has been deployed to operate under the new mission, UNAVEM III. The Force Commander and a number of staff officers are also from Zimbabwe. By the end of the UN mission in Somalia, three battalions from Zimbabwe had taken part. The Deputy Force Commander at the end of the mission was from Zimbabwe, and previously served as the Chief Military Observer in Angola. Botswana has also taken part in UN missions in Somalia and Mozambique. Zambia had a contingent of observers in Angola under UNAVEM II, and also contributed an infantry battalion in Mozambique during the UN operation there. Tanzania has been taking part in the peacekeeping operation in Liberia since 1995, and, apart from its peacekeeping force, has also deployed observers. South Africa assisted in the peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, where its air crews helped with the

delivery of logistic supplies and the transport of ballot boxes to and from remote areas. While many SADC members have participated in peacekeeping operations as contributors, Angola and Mozambique have participated as hosts.

Advantages

A regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa will enable the region to solve its own problems in a rapidly changing world.

Regional forces tend to have a better understanding of the history of the region, and therefore have a better perception of the root causes of local conflicts. Parties to the conflict sometimes view forces from outside as strangers to the situation, whereas a regional force might be viewed differently.

SADC countries can combine scarce resources, and share the burden of peacekeeping operations, particularly the cost. Southern Africa can benefit especially from South Africa and Zimbabwe in matters of logistic support and training.

Training is an important asset in this partnership. In fact, countries can specialise in a particular type of training, enabling the region to respond more quickly to a situation, than at present. Training co-operation between the forces in Southern Africa will also build confidence between these forces, an important element in regional stability. Some of these forces have fought against each other during the liberation years, and a certain measure of mutual suspicion still exists between the armed forces of the region.

Armed forces that engage in joint training will also be able to co-operate more effectively with other partners, such as NGOs and other UN agencies. In Southern Africa, it is not particularly common for armed forces and other partners to work together, and yet, a shared responsibility can be to the benefit of humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. Indeed, the involvement of other partners adjacent to the armed forces in peacekeeping operations has become a central feature of contemporary peacekeeping.

Most countries in Southern Africa, except for Angola and Mozambique, use English as the official language, so communication between the forces should not be a major problem. Apart from English, there are some indigenous languages common to a number of countries in the region. For example, the Nguni people in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland speak variations of the same language and observe the same culture. Most countries in the region use West European equipment, making it possible to standardise equipment tables for the regional force.

Disadvantages

There are obviously negative aspects to regional peacekeeping. A situation may develop where conflict in the region is supported by one of the member countries for national or regional strategic reasons. If this happens, it would be difficult for a regional force to deploy and remain effective. In such cases, the UN should take over the operation completely and use should be made of outside forces.

Mozambique and Angola use Portuguese as the official language, with most of their military manuals written in Portuguese. This creates communication problems, since the region's other forces use English as the official language. However, there is a move at present to introduce

English as a second language in Angola and Mozambique. If it is successful, it will ease communication between the forces and enhance regional integration.

Regional peacekeeping tends to isolate the particular region, and may deprive Southern African forces of the knowledge and experience they could have gained by acting with forces from the rest of the world. The UN can mitigate the situation by ensuring that even in a regional operation, observer and other posts are filled by members of outside forces. This principle should be adopted for all regional peacekeeping operations. For example, the current NATO operation in Bosnia could utilise observers from Africa and other parts of the world.

ESTABLISHING A REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY

There are advantages for the region to adopt a regional force concept, but fundamental issues remain which must be addressed in pursuit of a viable peacekeeping partnership.

Regional Political Structure

The established and mandated regional structures mentioned earlier, could be sufficient to enable the region to plan and co-ordinate an operation at the strategic level. The region therefore may not need additional political structures to implement a regional peacekeeping concept. However, what is lacking is a clear link between regional leaders, the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Secretary-General of the UN. This can be improved by establishing better communication facilities, and by introducing a system of information sharing.

Command and Control

Command and control at the strategic level should not be difficult, since SADC has a rotating chairmanship between presidents of the countries in the region. The ISDSC is currently composed of the respective ministers of Defence and Security, as well as the military commanders in the region. It could assume the responsibilities of a strategic headquarters guiding the political and strategic direction of peacekeeping in the region. To link the strategic and operational levels, national commanders should continue to play their role by making sure that those contingents taking part in the regional peacekeeping force are well trained and immediately available. It is also the responsibility of the national commander to make sure that these units are appropriately and adequately equipped.

At the operational level, certain officers should be earmarked to become part of a future stand-by operational headquarters (similar to the Canadian proposal to the UN, except that they should remain in their units). These officers would be able to assemble quickly to plan an operation and should continuously train together. The group should be composed of potential force commanders and their staff. The operational level headquarters should be linked to stand-by units in different countries, since these units are expected to deploy first in the event of a problem arising. The headquarters should be able to deploy prior to or with the lead elements of the stand-by force and take command of the operation. To prepare effectively for peacekeeping operations, the commander designate should regularly engage in training his headquarters in operational staff procedures. During training, the group should be joined by civilian and NGO partners who are likely to be deployed at the operational level. This is not as effective as establishing a permanent headquarters, but is more cost-effective. It is furthermore important to have an efficient Early Warning System. This will enable the operational headquarters to assemble rapidly and plan for a specific operation, although planning in general for potential trouble spots should be undertaken in advance.

When deployed, the force commander should have operational control of the regional force, while matters related to administration and logistics can be referred to national command authorities. However, there are some operational matters that could be referred to the home country, especially critical operational issues involving national contingents. Otherwise, the force commander should be given the necessary authority and autonomy to proceed with his work.

The selection of the force commander is important and can give rise to disagreements, if it is not properly dealt with. The region should identify people who are well trained and experienced enough to hold such a critical appointment. Countries should also rotate in providing a force commander, as this will help to spread experience, as well as to reduce friction. Command at tactical level is not a problem, since units are commanded by the national commanders. This is the most important component of a peacekeeping operation, hence the need to emphasise effective command and control at this level.

Composition of the Force

The armies of the region should be trained and organised in such a way that all forces are able to take part in regional peacekeeping. National training doctrine should incorporate this new approach. However, special stand-by units could be earmarked for rapid reaction within Southern Africa. This suggested stand-by concept involves units that remain under national command engaged in their normal duties, and that only assemble when there is a problem, rather than having permanent stand-by units. The UN has called this a 'Stand-by Arrangement'.³ These units should undertake field exercises to improve their combat capabilities once a year, or as the situation demands. The stand-by headquarters previously referred to, could plan such exercises, liaise with the units and execute the exercises. This will help to foster cohesion between the units and the operational headquarters. The stand-by concept could also be co-ordinated with civilian partners such as UN agencies and NGOs, to ensure their participation. For example, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe could contribute a battalion each, while South Africa may provide a logistics battalion and air transport; Botswana could provide a signals contingent; Namibia, engineers; Swaziland might perhaps provide a field medical company; Angola could provide engineers specially trained for mine clearance; Malawi could provide Military Police; Mozambique a boat squadron; and Lesotho a contingent of observers.

Southern Africa would thus have stand-by units equal to a combat brigade of about 5 000 troops. A brigade-sized force should be able to deploy and stabilise an immediate crisis situation until further reinforcements are available. While the region can afford to deploy this force using motor or rail transport, it would take less time to airlift. In case of deployment by air, the region might have to ask the UN to help by contracting the assistance of some of the bigger nations.

Training

In order to facilitate regional peacekeeping, training must be undertaken systematically in order to foster integration and standardise staff procedures. Most armies in the region base their training on their own national security strategies and concept of operations. Training is regarded as a national responsibility, as opposed to a regional undertaking. However, training at middle and senior management levels is not as isolated as unit training. A number of officers have been sent abroad to do staff courses, and on return are usually earmarked for senior command and staff positions at operational and strategic levels. In order to enhance a regional peacekeeping partnership, staff training, currently presented at national levels, should continue. Countries in

the region should enter into agreements to accept other students into their staff colleges as part of an exchange programme. UN staff training has not yet taken shape in the region, although the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa has started a programme of training seminars in peacekeeping for senior officers.

Zimbabwe has also started a programme to train staff officers in peacekeeping at the operational level. The programme is being run at the new division of Peacekeeping Studies at the Defence Force Staff College. When fully operational, the centre is expected to run a full range of UN related short term courses. These courses will cover such subjects as operational staff procedures, the law of armed conflict, and humanitarian operations. Students in both South Africa and Zimbabwe are drawn from the defence forces, regional NGOs and UN agencies.

Since Zimbabwe and South Africa have taken the lead in establishing these centres, other countries could send their officers to these two countries for training and take advantage of what has already been established. The region could dedicate resources towards the development of these centres. The centres should be run by professionals, both officers and civilians, that have been on peacekeeping missions. Attachment of UN officers could go far in raising the level of courses offered. Officers graduating from these centres should be deployed to units as instructors and some could occupy staff and command positions. This could create the nucleus of the required manpower in order to conduct effective peacekeeping training at unit level. It follows that national training programmes on all levels should have a peacekeeping module. Apart from training staff officers at two centralised locations, all other training could take place at different national training establishments, since these are already geared for specialised training, except for the peacekeeping package, which could be brought to these centres by the new graduates.

There must also be mission-oriented training before deployment. This is aimed at refining those skills that have already been acquired during the background training phase and also at providing important basic information about the country of deployment, such as history, culture, language, geography, and politics of the country. At this stage it would be imperative to drill the unit on specific rules of engagement (ROEs), so that they are fully understood before deployment.

Southern African countries could use the established training centres in the region to train a stand-by contingent of observers that can also be made available to other UN missions outside the region.

Doctrine

Efforts have already been made by the UN to develop a peacekeeping doctrine for operations. Some people have suggested that the UN should adopt NATO doctrine, which is well established, rather than search for its own. However, it is preferable for the UN to arrive at its own doctrine, taking into account the wider problems associated with peacekeeping and which would be applicable to all countries. At any rate, whatever the UN decides on, it should be balanced enough to take into account operations under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the **UN Charter**. Southern Africa should be able to adopt this doctrine, rather than to try and develop a new doctrine which might be at variance with what the UN is trying to achieve.

Accepting a common UN doctrine for Southern Africa will enhance the region's efforts towards a standardised approach to peacekeeping. It will enable forces from Southern Africa to operate effectively outside the region, alongside other forces. The region can also benefit from UN

training teams and instructions from other countries if there is a common doctrine. Publications on UN operational procedures are already available on request from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and the region can further benefit from these, if it uses UN doctrine.

Logistics

Many countries fail to take part in UN operations because they lack logistic resources. In some cases, equipment is too old to be of use, and is difficult to maintain. Most armies in Southern Africa find themselves in this unfortunate predicament. The question of logistic resources will therefore have to be addressed vigorously, or the regional force concept will fail. This problem can be approached through the UN and through SADC member states.

The UN draws logistic support for its missions from a combination of sources. These are UN infrastructures, including other UN field missions and sometimes other UN agencies. The UN does not have functional military logistic units but depends on the support of member countries. The UN also relies on buying from local commercial sources. Therefore, the logistic contribution to a Southern African Force must be understood in the light of these limitations. However, the UN can establish a Regional Logistic Centre in Southern Africa as it has already done in other parts of the world, such as at Brindisi in Southern Italy. The centre can hold non-perishable UN equipment that can be used by forces operating in the region. Such a centre can also store equipment for other UN agencies and NGOs earmarked for humanitarian operations in the region. The centre could also serve as a distribution point for rations.

The second approach involves an understanding by SADC member states that a viable regional force depends on thorough logistic support. Countries must start by enhancing national logistics, and resources must be found to do this. The stand-by units could be equipped first, followed by the rest of those units earmarked for the regional force. It is currently difficult to convince politicians to spend money on defence, but what is often forgotten is that failure to invest in peace might lead to destabilisation and economic decline.

It is also not necessary to buy new equipment for the regional force. Most countries in Southern Africa are cutting down on the size of their armed forces, and equipment from these units can be recycled and prepared for peacekeeping. The other source for equipment could be donor countries in Europe and North America. In fact, these countries are also cutting down on equipment and, if properly approached, might be willing to make a generous donation. But there is always a price on donated equipment, as it can sometimes distort a country's procurement programme, and spare parts could be a problem. It is suggested against this background, that donations should also be linked to training programmes.

Funding

Southern Africa must find a way to fund its peace operations. It is suggested that the region set up a peace fund, to which member states could contribute. NGOs that support such operations can also make donations. The region might also come up with tax incentives for those businesses that donate to the fund. The OAU could also be asked to make a contribution, since SADC countries already contribute to the OAU fund for peacekeeping operations.

Since peacekeeping operations are basically UN operations even at regional level, it is therefore logical to expect the UN to assist in funding these operations. The present system at the UN only provides for the funding of an operation when it has been authorised by the Security

Council, and even after authorisation, the UN takes time to meet its financial obligations. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the UN has no uncommitted money, and major contributors like the US and Russia sometimes delay fulfilling their obligations.

Under these circumstances, Southern African countries should develop a capability to fund themselves if the regional peacekeeping venture is to become a reality. The fund could be used to establish training facilities and an early warning centre. It can also be used to support immediate troop deployment in new missions, pending UN reimbursement.

Civilian Partners

Although peacekeeping in the past has been mainly a job for the military, it must be understood that contemporary peacekeeping has a wider approach which is intended to achieve political, military and humanitarian goals. Civilian partners at strategic, operational and tactical levels are required to play their part effectively. For example, the political/diplomatic offensive starts before a peacekeeping operation and continues throughout the life of a mission. The humanitarian aspect of the mission also tends to start well before the operation, since NGOs may be deployed before the arrival of the military. These activities continue during and after the military operation. In Southern Africa, civilian partners, especially the UN agencies and NGOs, can be brought in at the strategic level to be part of the planning of peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. This system can be duplicated both at operational and tactical levels. The operational-level planning staff, previously referred to, should also include members of UN agencies and the NGO community.

These partners are expected to contribute planning inputs on such issues as human rights and humanitarian aid. Such organisations usually bring with them the resources they would require in a peacekeeping operation. What is even more important, is that these organisations look beyond immediate humanitarian relief by introducing programmes related to long term development. They can also help in the demobilisation of former combatants by providing civilian programmes designed to reintegrate them into civil society. The region can also benefit from information sources that are available to civilian partners. This information could be very useful, especially in identifying 'hot spots' and pending disasters. But to forge a true partnership, the regional force must plan, train and subsequently operate jointly with its civilian partners.

Early Warning System

Timely warning of potential crises, such as likely outbreaks of war or humanitarian disasters, is the key to prevention. For example, in 1992 Southern Africa was hit by drought without any prior warning whatsoever. As a result, the region could not pre-position the necessary infrastructure to deal with the crisis. Regional peacekeeping cannot be effective without an early warning capability. Southern Africa should therefore establish an early warning centre as part of the regional peacekeeping effort. The centre could be established in any of the countries in the region, provided that it has the capacity to operate such an institution effectively. There may be resistance from some member countries to this suggestion, since there is always an assumption that information gathering equals 'spying'. Countries should understand that this exercise is an important element of a regional peacekeeping framework, and that it is meant to benefit them.

The aim of the centre would be to gather information about likely crisis situations in the region, including pending natural disasters. Information about likely trouble spots is not lacking, but the will to react to them often is. However, if this information is merely raw data, without having been properly evaluated and its accuracy assessed, it would be difficult to react. In Rwanda, for

example, there was general information that the government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front might undermine the Arusha Agreement, but there was never any indication of the planned genocide by the government. A Southern African early warning centre should be able to gather information from the field and other sources. Once received, the information should be analysed, evaluated and co-ordinated before it is distributed to the client, so that preventive measures may be taken. The final product should aim at 'value added information'.

Governments could be asked to contribute information that is gathered through national means. NGOs and other agencies, especially those that work in the region, have the ability to deploy in areas that are sometimes ignored by governments. As a result of this, NGOs and UN agencies should play a leading role in any Southern African early warning system. Friendly countries in Europe or North America could also be approached to assist in providing information with regard to weather forecasting and potential environmental disasters.

Personnel working at the centre could come from different backgrounds. It is important that these operators should be well trained in the art of information gathering, evaluation and processing. International training centres, such as the Lester B Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, could be asked through the UN to send short term training teams to the region to run specialised courses for personnel earmarked for employment at the centre. Once established, such a regional early warning centre could also be linked to the planned OAU Early Warning Centre and the UN Situation Centre. It is only when Southern Africa has such a centre, that regional forces will be able to react at short notice.

Deployment Contingencies

The Southern African regional peacekeeping force could be used for missions ranging from preventive deployment, such as the one undertaken by the former UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia, to the full spectrum of Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. While this force gives the region the capability to police itself effectively, it should also be available to the UN for assignments outside the region.

CONCLUSION

The concept of a regional force for Southern Africa could be an essential step towards a more peaceful future. As the world becomes increasingly regionalised, it will be difficult to get troops from other parts of the world to undertake peacekeeping in Southern Africa. Southern African countries should therefore consider the regional concept suggested in this article. Firstly, the psychological basis for the political co-operative structures are already in place. Secondly, the operational headquarters for planning and subsequent deployment in the field has to be established and given the authority to enable it to do its job efficiently and effectively. The standby units suggested are critical to the concept of enabling the region to react at short notice. But reaction is influenced by the availability of what has been termed 'value added information', at the right time and for the right client. A regional early warning mechanism is a priority, and member states could consider establishing an early warning centre during the initial stages of adopting the regional concept. Other issues such as training, command and control, logistics and funding will also have to be addressed, since these are the fundamental pillars for the establishment of a regional peacekeeping capability.

ENDNOTES

1. The term 'peacekeeping partnership' has been used by Alex Morrison, President of the

Lester B Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, to refer to various government and non-government organisations (NGOs), including the military, the civilian police (CIVPOL), humanitarian agencies and UN organisations operating co-operatively to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a Peacekeeping Mission.

2. **UN Charter** and Statute of the International Court of Justice.
3. UN, **Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping**, 10 November 1995.

PREPARING THE NEW PARTNERS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

The termination of the Cold War at the end of the previous decade and the demise of the *apartheid* state in South Africa in 1994 have created the scope for enhanced security co-operation between Southern African countries. The 1990s have also been witness to the renewed salience of ethnic divisions in other parts of the African continent, as brutal civil wars raged in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia. The United Nations' (UN) contribution to bring peace and stability to such countries, while noble, has been far from effective. The 'messy' nature of UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola have led to an increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers and the traditional troop-contributing member states to deploy on African soil. The realisation has thus been growing that African countries and organisations will have to accept an increasing burden of responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent, and that the capability to do so could best be created through co-operation at the subregional level.

It is envisaged that Southern Africa, particularly the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), will play a leading role in this regard. The discourse on regional integration and security co-operation has included a number of proposals for the creation of a regional peacekeeping capacity within the national armies of SADC member states. However, such proposals have yet to crystallise into concrete action aimed at giving substance to the idea of regional co-operation for the purpose of actively keeping the peace. This would involve the utilisation of opportunities provided by the new partnership, which includes the eleven contiguous member states of SADC, plus the island partner, Mauritius. The lack of action is perhaps due to the complexity involved in determining the exact parameters for such action within a newly created, disparate group of states, which happens to include both old friends and former foes. Beyond the intricacies of the new drive towards integration in Southern Africa, however, there are certain basic and uncontroversial steps which can and should be initiated without further delay, in order to enhance the capacity of SADC countries to maintain the peace.

Successful economic integration requires the existence of certain objective conditions, such as complementarity, similar economic growth rates, and free movement of goods and labour. Successful security co-operation, especially that which includes third-party intervention to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts through the use of military forces, also involves the meeting of a number of basic requirements. While there are admittedly great quantitative and qualitative disparities between the armed forces of individual SADC countries, these should be far easier to address than the economic disparities of the region.

The aim of this article is to highlight some of the basic steps which must be taken by the new Southern African partners, in order to lay solid foundations for the creation of a viable subregional peacekeeping capacity.

ENHANCEMENT OF BASIC MILITARY SKILLS, DISCIPLINE AND PROFESSIONALISM

According to Roberts, *"troops involved in UN peacekeeping forces have been, and are, of extraordinarily uneven quality. Despite the UN's need for such forces, there must be a higher basic standard that forces are required to meet before they can be dispatched on a peacekeeping operation."*² Notwithstanding their special nature, peacekeeping operations (PKOs) require many of the personal qualities and training common to conventional military operations. These include professional competence, discipline, morale, sound leadership, initiative, flexibility and alertness. Forces earmarked for PKOs, therefore, require a thorough grounding in basic military skills, such as command, control and communications, navigation, weapon handling, tactical skills, deployment drills and administration.³ Although these aspects should never be taken for granted in any effective military organisation, laxity in this area will confound the effectiveness of PKOs, and elicit bad publicity for the operation within the afflicted area and abroad. In this regard, Boyd has issued the following cautionary note: *"Consideration of the media's key role in today's high visibility information environment is also important ... peace operations require disciplined, versatile forces to respond to changing circumstances while in the full glare of the media's spotlight."*⁴

The necessity for honing basic military skills may be readily grasped (if not embraced) by most military leaders. Indeed, there seems to be no critical shortage of institutions and personnel capable of imparting such skills to the armed forces of the region. However, the ethical dimensions of military professionalism are less tangible than those related to functional skills and parade-ground discipline. Those that cannot readily be observed, measured or evaluated, tend to be most easily overlooked. Unfortunately, these 'non-tangibles' normally manifest themselves in the aberrant (and abhorrent) behaviour of soldiers. As Roberts has observed, *"... the expansion of UN peacekeeping activities has highlighted a huge range of ethical and disciplinary problems [such as] the illicit sale of diesel oil, use of child prostitutes and illegal smuggling."*⁵

Many of the subregion's armies have not proven immune to such maladies.

Force preparation for peace operations, therefore, should include the inculcation and/or reinforcement of universal military values such as courage, obedience, stamina, integrity, honesty, competence, loyalty, selflessness, respect for human life, commitment and

self-discipline. If they are to be more than just words uttered by pseudo-professionals, these values have to be internalised by military leaders, and their behavioural manifestations regularly displayed to subordinates. Each value should, during the process of military education and socialisation, be articulated, analysed, debated and, ultimately, lived.

The honing of basic military skills and professionalism is the task of national militaries within the region. It is a responsibility which transcends the realm of peace operations and has a direct impact on the perceived collective and individual legitimacy of the armed forces of the region. Laxity in this area is inexcusable, for no expensive modern technology is needed. It is in the realm of humanity that the African soldier can perhaps make his or her greatest contribution to regional and international peace operations. Nor should the acquisition of relevant skills and

values be the exclusive preserve of forces dedicated to or reserved for peace operations. The type of training and socialisation required would benefit Southern African armies as a whole, and contribute to healthier relations with their host societies and governments. Moreover, the more broadly established the requisite educational and skills base for peace operations within national militaries, the greater the flexibility of the operational planner, force designer and recruiter in constituting a force capable of executing a mandated mission.

The establishment of a universally accepted peacekeeping knowledge and skills base would also drastically reduce the lead time between the acknowledgement of a political (UN/OAU sanctioned) imperative to intervene, and the deployment of the appropriate groupings or forces to the threatened area. While the advance identification of the type of unit or capability available for deployment in support of peace operations within SADC member states is useful, this should not be interpreted as advocacy of a 'standing' regional army, but a plea for earmarked forces that remain under national control with the possibility of combined exercises in order to improve regional interoperability.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Effective leadership is crucial to the success of any military operation, and fundamental to the establishment of an effective peacekeeping force. As Clapham has observed, "*[t]he choice of an individual to serve as commander is critical, since any such operation places a high level of initiative in the hands of whoever has to manage it on the spot.*"⁶ The imperative to select suitable commanders, however, is predicated upon the existence of a meaningful pool of candidates. With regard to human resources, initial development efforts to establish a peacekeeping capacity should therefore focus on those candidates most likely to occupy positions of command during peace operations, such as general duties career officers, and junior leaders in the Infantry and Engineers Corps.

The development of potential commanders of forces for deployment in peace operations cannot be isolated from national systems of officer education and development. According to Boyd, "*[l]eader development may be the single most important factor in achieving success in [peace] operations ... Leader development for peace operations takes place at all levels of the military education system.*"⁷ This implies both a sound system of officer selection and development (including general education and military training), and the inclusion of peace operations in the curricula of military staff colleges and relevant corps schools. Suitable candidates could also be nominated for UN Staff Officer and Observer courses.

Formal training and education may be fruitfully supplemented by programmes designed to familiarise officers with the concept and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. UN military observer missions have historically consisted entirely of officers. Participation in existing UN observer missions by a select mix of officers from the SADC region would familiarise such personnel with UN procedures and practices. Deployed on a meaningful mission, but freed from the burden of command, such exercises should also allow junior and middle-ranking officers to establish intra-regional contacts, and contribute to the development of mutual understanding and trust. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the OAU is in the process of establishing a hundred-person preventive observer mission which will be kept on stand-by, and OAU member states will be approached to identify suitable personnel for participation on a stand-by basis.

Once a basic pool of peacekeeping competence has been established, the best leaders may be chosen for specific missions according to appropriate selection criteria and a thorough system of evaluation. Officer candidates, for example, should be evaluated in terms of command and staff

experience, professional competence, attitudinal propensity, doctrinal knowledge, language proficiency, as well as physical and mental fitness. As Boyd has remarked, peacekeeping operations require quality soldiers, led by capable leaders armed with solid doctrine.⁸

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

Peacekeeping capacity is established through an adequate acquisition and distribution of the attitudes, skills, and resources that are essential to the successful execution of peacekeeping missions. These requisites must be encapsulated in a clear and coherent doctrine, appropriate to the most probable peacekeeping contingencies in which Southern African forces may become involved. 'Doctrine' may be loosely defined as a set of interrelated principles and beliefs. Basic military doctrine associated with war-fighting is traditionally predicated on the identification of an enemy, and is based on a number of clearly-defined principles of war in most armies. Applied wholesale to peacekeeping, such principles are bound to prejudice the fundamental peacekeeping principle of impartiality, which would dangerously destabilise an operation. Although some principles of war remain key guides to conduct, their overall ethos is largely irrelevant and inappropriate to a peacekeeping context.⁹ For this reason, war-fighting and peacekeeping cannot be guided by a common set of principles. Effective peacekeeping therefore requires the development and utilisation of a separate and appropriate doctrine. Whereas war-fighting doctrine has evolved over millennia, the concept and conduct of UN peacekeeping is a post-World War II phenomenon.

Despite the relative infancy of third party peacekeeping as practised by the UN, a large body of peacekeeping doctrine has already been generated

- at the international level (for example, the **Peacekeeper's Handbook** compiled by the UN's International Peace Academy);
- by individual countries which have become involved in peacekeeping (for example, the US Army's **FM 100-23, Peace Operations** and the British AFM Volume 5, **Operations Other than War**); as well as
- those that are subscribed to on a multinational basis (such as the **Nordic UN Tactical Manual** developed by the Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters [NORDSAMFN]).

Much of the aforementioned doctrine encapsulates the lessons learned through participation in 'new generation' (post-Cold War) operations, although there are continuing efforts to develop doctrine that would prepare contingents for the complexities of intervention in communal conflicts. There is, therefore, a considerable doctrinal pool from which SADC countries (especially those with little or no experience in UN peacekeeping) can borrow. Some work in this area has already been undertaken by individual military staff colleges in the region.

However, a direct doctrinal transplant should be avoided, given the disparities in the levels of development, sophistication and experience between the countries of Southern Africa and those which have taken the lead in developing peacekeeping doctrine. There is also the problem that existing conceptual frameworks have proven to be increasingly inadequate to address operations related to intra-state conflict, where the basic peacekeeping principle of consent cannot be upheld (commonly associated with new generation peacekeeping). There seems to be an operational drift towards 'peace enforcement' that is sometimes reflected in the contemporary doctrinal debate by the blurring of boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement is largely based on conventional war-fighting principles, and should thus remain beyond the ambit of initial efforts to establish a peacekeeping capacity (though it may be an area for informed military-academic debate within the region). Similarly, the temptation to evolve peacekeeping doctrine from existing war-fighting doctrine should be firmly resisted. Counter-insurgency doctrine and training, for example, provide an army with a repository of useful peacekeeping skills. However, even in doctrine designed for low-intensity conflict, an enemy is posited, which makes the ethos imparted by the training derived from such doctrine totally inappropriate for peacekeeping forces.

Those principles contained in the various doctrinal schools that are universally applicable to PKOs, and may be simply and unambiguously articulated and adhered to by Southern Africans, should rather be adopted as the basis of an emergent, indigenous peacekeeping doctrine. These may be adapted and refined with experience in teaching and practice. (The British concept of 'wider peacekeeping' encapsulates such a clear set of principles, and is already being propagated in the region via the National Staff College of Zimbabwe.) To avoid total confusion, there must be a concerted effort among the nations of the region, as well as any external actors assisting in the development of a peacekeeping capacity, to co-ordinate the introduction of an appropriate baseline doctrine and its evolution into a comprehensive and appropriate set of principles and beliefs that would guide Southern African peacekeeping efforts.

Ideally, initial doctrinal development should precede education and training, although there is dynamic interaction between the two spheres. Some form of training and operational experience is needed to feed the cycle of doctrinal evolution. Initial efforts to establish a regional peacekeeping capacity should concentrate on the type of background training and education that is essential and universally applicable to UN PKOs, and which may be derived from the 'non-contested' portion of the existing doctrinal pool.

BACKGROUND EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING

A comprehensive educational process is the foundation of training and preparation for peacekeeping tasks. As indicated above, all meaningful training derives from doctrine that provides an intellectual underpinning and imparts meaning to actions. A clear explanation of theory should therefore precede the practice of its application. A dedicated educational programme is thus an essential element of training, and classroom tuition and study must precede the teaching and practice of specific peacekeeping skills. Peace keepers who understand the long term purpose of their activities, including those related to training, will perform their duties more effectively than those who are ignorant of this dimension. The understanding fostered through education allows individuals at the most junior level to exercise initiative and flexibility to the full. This is a critical attribute during PKOs in complex and volatile environments.¹⁰

The primary purpose of PKOs is to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military action must complement diplomatic, economic, informative and humanitarian efforts in pursuit of the political objective of the mission. This implies a realisation among peace keepers that decisions taken at the tactical level may have immediate strategic and political implications. Therefore, they require an understanding of the overall strategic and political context of the operation, as well as an awareness of the history, culture and economy of the area of deployment.¹¹

While area-specific education and training is only possible once the decision has been made to

mount an operation and the participation of the specific contingent is agreed upon, the type of insight and understanding referred to above presupposes a particular educational basis among soldiers as a starting point for effective mission and area-specific training and education. As outlined below, such an educational basis would not be inappropriate for all African soldiers, regardless of whether or not they will be required to participate in peace operations, for it should help to reduce the level of brutality which has characterised many of the military operations in the region.

The general effect of background training and education should be to foster the attitudes and personal qualities required by members of a peacekeeping contingent. *"In the field of operations the activities of each individual should be characterised by professional, disciplined conduct seasoned with practical common-sense, a flexible outlook, patience, restraint, tact, a good sense of humour, vigilance and an objective approach."*¹²

It is difficult to measure the intensity and direction of attitudes, especially on a collective basis. However, attitudes are created through a process of socialisation, and can, at least partially, be deduced through the observation of repeated behaviour (including verbalisation of preferences). Soldiers are subjected to an intensive process of institutional socialisation, and are required to exhibit a higher degree of conformity in their behaviour than most other occupational categories. It is therefore possible to make some generalised observations on the nature and intensity of traditional military attitudes that have an impact on a peacekeeping capacity.

The socialisation and training of soldiers for combat normally leads to the development or reinforcement of salient chauvinist or anti-foreigner attitudes. The basic military attitude of being there to 'win', is also decidedly inappropriate to PKOs. Aggressive alertness is typically inculcated through military training. While alertness is a positive and essential attribute in the peace keeper, aggression contradicts the principle of 'minimum necessary force'. The aggression associated with traditional military training is partially fostered through the positing of an enemy and the engendering of hatred. In PKOs, there is no 'enemy', and the build-up of 'hate figures' is certain to endanger the mission. Related to this point is the practice of disparaging other nations' military abilities. In PKOs, this can lead to resentment by the parties to the conflict, as well as the other contingents which constitute the peacekeeping force.¹³ The bottom line is that some traditional military attitudes, often presumed to be morale-boosting for combat purposes, must be eradicated, or at least re-aligned during education and training programmes aimed at preparing for peacekeeping tasks.

Many of the accepted principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality, patience, trust, confidence and restraint, are also unique human characteristics. If these principles are to be adhered to during the conduct of PKOs, such human qualities will have to be predominant in the make-up of the individual peace keeper. Since the average human being is likely to be lacking in at least some of these qualities, they will have to be cultivated and nurtured in soldiers earmarked for participation in peace operations.

Impartiality may be regarded as both a personal quality and as a fundamental principle of peacekeeping. This principle should not be foreign to professional military leaders, for internal and external affective neutrality are fundamental and definitive attributes of any profession. Dobbie¹⁴ explains the critical importance of impartiality in the peace keeper through the analogy of a rugby referee. The latter acts as supervisor and supreme adjudicator between two opposing sides. He controls the course of the contest, even though he is outnumbered 30:1 on the field of play, and therefore cannot exert his will by force. His ability to control the contesting players depends on the perceived legitimacy of his status as referee. This legitimacy depends, in turn,

upon his impartiality. If he is perceived to favour one side above the other, his status as a legitimate authority will be lost, and he will lose control of the game. When this happens and tempers flare, the referee himself may be drawn into the ensuing conflict, where he will be vastly outnumbered by his adversaries.

The principle of impartiality should be explained in similar graphic terms during formal background education and training for peace operations. It can be further emphasised through the use of case studies, simulation, and role-playing exercises. However, the personal quality of impartiality will only be effectively internalised by prospective peace keepers if military leaders at all levels are seen to act impartially in their authoritative relationships with subordinates. This is nothing more than sound leadership.

Patience and perseverance are also character attributes which are desirable in all soldiers, and attempts are normally made to inculcate these during the course of general military training. However, there is also a contradictory tendency among military leaders to favour decisive action and 'quick fix' solutions in the resolution of problems. During background training for peace operations, personnel should learn to recognise and accept the fact that, although some peace operations might be of short duration, they may take years to achieve the desired results in other cases and will involve more than military efforts alone. Peace keepers have to balance the soldier's inherent desire for quick, decisive action with sensitivity for the long term strategic aims and restraints of the mission.¹⁵

Restraint, compassion and kindness are also desirable qualities for a peace keeper which are often sadly lacking in soldiers trained exclusively for combat operations. *"In peace operations, every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions which are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy."*¹⁶ Reflecting on Malaysian participation in UN peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hashim bin Hussein¹⁷ has observed that "... [o]ur soldiers have been exposed to dealing with civilians, especially children and the aged who make up the majority of victims in a war situation. It is a far cry from the rigours of soldiering, as one has to be full of restraint, compassion and kindness." These qualities should be present in all good military leaders, but they could be enhanced during background training through, for example, exposure to welfare work and emergency treatment centres in civil society.

Background education should also aim at imparting specific knowledge that gives meaning to the concept of peace operations, and which should be part of every peace keeper's intellectual equipment. In this regard, curriculum content for Southern African peace keepers should typically include the following:

- the **UN Charter**, organisation and role of the UN, and the pragmatic development of UN peacekeeping;
- the principles of UN peacekeeping;
- the rights and privileges of a peacekeeping force, as well as the duties, responsibilities, and obligations which result from its international legal status;
- relevant lessons learned from past and present UN peace operations;
- an overview of the operational skills and techniques of peacekeeping;
- International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict;

- civilian and humanitarian tasks during peace operations;
- the principles, purpose and content of rules of engagement;
- media relations;
- normative and behavioural bases of civil-military relations; and
- the role and structures of the OAU and SADC, specifically those pertaining to conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

As far as background skills training for peace operations is concerned, the most important training is related to communication, liaison, negotiation and mediation. The concepts of negotiation, mediation and conciliation are the precepts on which peace keepers base their initiatives for settling disputes and preventing violence. As Nhara¹⁸ has noted, "... *the weapons of the peace keeper are those of negotiation and quiet diplomacy, not the rifle.*"

Effective liaison, for example, has been identified as a major determinant of the successes achieved in peacekeeping operations. Commenting on the experiences of the British contingent participating in UNPROFOR in Central Bosnia during 1994, Williams¹⁹ has stressed the centrality of linguistic ability to the liaison task: "*Liaison could ... only be effective if sufficient high quality interpreters could be found to support it. With far too few native Serb-Croat speakers in the British armed services and training facilities for military interpreters unequal to the demands, there had to be a general reliance on locally recruited Bosnians, drawn from all ethnic communities ... [I]t was to a great extent thanks to the interpreters' skills that critical misunderstandings were avoided and an effective regime of mutual respect between formerly warring parties was established.*"

There is also a critical need for effective communication between the organisation or organisations authorising a peacekeeping mission, the peacekeeping force (including the communication between the various national contingents), and the disputing parties. The latter can be fundamental to the success or failure of the efforts of national contingents and the entire mission. Communication and linguistics should therefore form an integral part of background education and training. Multilingualism cannot be established overnight, but perhaps multilingual proficiency could become a recognised component of military leadership development. Proficiency in Swahili, English and Portuguese would probably enable personnel to communicate fairly effectively throughout Southern Africa. At a minimum, leaders should be practised in the art of communication *via* interpreters, and be well versed in the importance and conduct of sound media relations.

Training in negotiation and mediation skills should also form an essential part of background training. While these skills are particularly relevant to officers, all members of a peacekeeping force may find themselves in situations in which they will have to mediate, negotiate or liaise with members of the conflicting parties or local inhabitants. As is the case with much of the background training suggested above, these skills have a utility beyond the realm of peace operations, particularly for military leaders, as they can be fruitfully applied to the day-to-day problems of managing armed forces and dealing with disgruntled individuals or groups. They could contribute to both intra-force cohesion and improved civil-military relations at various levels of contact.

While the adoption of the attitudes, knowledge and skills outlined above is of particular

importance to peace keepers, it is also applicable to the general soldiery. Such training and education, even if conducted throughout a national army, need not detract from the professionalism and combat effectiveness of soldiers, nor in any way impair their capacity to fulfil primary missions other than peace operations. There would not necessarily be an additional budgetary burden involved, as existing resources, institutions and personnel could be oriented to cope with the task, perhaps with the assistance of outside agencies such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the various NGOs involved in the enhancement of regional peacekeeping capacity. Effective background training, however, is time consuming. Since mission-specific training derives much of its value from background education and training, the longer the delay in its initiation, the less meaningful mission-specific training will be when initiated in a crisis situation where there are severe time constraints on force preparation.

Finally, a system of inducement, selection and evaluation should be devised in order to ensure that the right calibre of people are the recipients of training and education for peacekeeping duties, particularly in the case of career soldiers. It must be accepted that even some of the best combat soldiers will never be good peace keepers. The timely identification, motivation, and pre-selection of suitable candidates can save valuable training time and resources.

CONCLUSION

Preparation for participation in peace operations fits within the framework of contemporary thinking on security, which shifts the focus away from narrow conceptions of national security, towards concepts of subregional, regional and global security. Southern African co-operation in building a peacekeeping capacity will provide a common denominator, or major vehicle, for confidence-building in the subregion, while contributing to the creation of a viable capacity for conducting peacekeeping operations. The multilateral contacts and co-operation implied by the process should also address narrower 'national' security concerns and facilitate the professional development of national defence forces. Engagement in the process may also allow otherwise insignificant armed forces to gain international prestige and respect, provide opportunities for enhancing military institutional pride, promote the concept of military professionalism, and contribute to stable civil-military relations.

This article has attempted to identify broad areas in which the process of establishing a Southern African stand-by capacity of peace keepers can be started without delay. It is by no means an exhaustive review, and leaves much room for further debate, conceptualisation and action. For example, an inventory is needed of existing peacekeeping skills, capacity and potential in the subregion. Suggestions are needed for developing this capacity on a national and regional basis. At an intergovernment level, an appropriate framework for co-operation and co-ordination has yet to be institutionalised, and some indication provided of the type of force levels and resources national governments would be willing and able to commit to peacekeeping efforts. Certain countries may favour the creation of a dedicated peacekeeping force, while others may prefer to earmark certain units or sub-units for peacekeeping training and deployment. Finally, areas of responsibility and action need to be negotiated and allocated to those countries, individuals and organisations willing to work towards the ideal of an effective regional peacekeeping capacity.

ENDNOTES

1. This contribution is an abbreviated and edited version of an article published in **African Security Review**, 5 (1), 1996, under the title *Foundations for Regional Security: Preparing*

to Keep the Peace in Southern Africa.

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BLOODING WITHOUT BLOODSHED: PART-TIME UNITS FOR UN PEACEKEEPING DUTIES

Willem Steenkamp, Citizen Force Officer

INTRODUCTION

Apart from geopolitical imperatives, and the need for South Africa to take its rightful place as a regional and continental leader, substantial SANDF participation in future peace support operations beyond its borders is, from a military point of view, not only acceptable, but also desirable.

It is an ancient military truism that no soldier can be regarded as fully trained and ready until his formal training has been leavened by actual deployment in the field in conditions of some hardship and at least an implied danger - conditions which cannot be fully simulated in training. If the 'best possible' scenario is true and South Africa escapes direct involvement in any significant conflict for the next ten years, systematic participation in peacemaking and/or peacekeeping enterprises provides the only acceptable opportunity for unblooded new generations of SANDF personnel to obtain operational experience, to replace what is lost as veterans of the former era's armed forces retire. This applies particularly to the land forces, the largest component of the country's defence machine.

With the exception of more robust interventions such as the present NATO operation in Bosnia, peace support operations differ radically from conventional military operations. However, they provide an adequate opportunity for military personnel to apply most of the procedures and techniques they have been taught, and allow for the acquisition of a considerable amount of field experience. This sharpens practical skills and instils self-confidence in all ranks, particularly among the leader group at all levels. The benefits are obvious: sufficient participation in peace support operations would allow the new-generation SANDF to accumulate a solid body of low-level occupational experience which will enable it to cope better with the first shock of battle - traditionally the stage at which most of the unnecessary casualties occur - in the event of any future 'shooting war'.

Some of the consequences of the former SADF's first intervention in Angola, Operation Savannah (1975 - 1976), substantiate the above observations. Operation Savannah remains a hot political subject, even after twenty years. But analysts will find it fruitful to look beyond the broader circumstances and ask objectively: Were there any general military management lessons to be learned from this first of the SADF's many 'external operations' into Angola? The answer is that the intervention had a startlingly beneficial effect not only on individual combat-worthiness, but also on the general efficiency of the SADF.

It is now largely forgotten that the active fighting phase of Operation Savannah, which involved less than 2 000 SADF troops, had ended by the beginning of 1976. The much larger force, mobilised and deployed from mid-January 1976 onwards, largely played a caretaker role and saw little action. The 1975 phase, conducted with an extremely small troop presence (not counting local allies), provided much food for thought. For example, the quality of SADF training - especially leader training - was confirmed, while the need for mine-protected vehicles perceived earlier in the Caprivi Strip was accentuated, and the requirement for artillery with more 'reach' became obvious.

It is the 1976 phase, however, that involved a much larger deployment of part-time troops than its predecessor, that is of relevance to this discussion. For almost all the units deployed, it was the first active service in thirty years. Few of the personnel involved in the 1976 deployment (both full-time or part-time) had ever been in the field 'for real'. They were aware of their lack of 'hands-on' experience, and consequently also lacked self-confidence.

This changed dramatically after two or three months of deployment in bad weather conditions (it was the Angolan rainy season) in a country whose physical and government infrastructure had been destroyed. Furthermore, there was a constant apprehension about mines, disease and a southward drive - which fortunately did not occur - by the Cuban expeditionary force supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). In other words, the 1976 deployment provided considerable practice in operating under severe conditions and, most importantly, enough stress to temper but not to break the soldiers involved.

Many 1976 veterans have acute memories of the sea-change that had taken place by the time the travel-stained, somewhat tattered demoralised units commenced their withdrawal. Deadwood and 'social soldiers' had been tested and either proved or found wanting; mental attitudes had been adjusted; skills had been sharpened by constant repetition; the importance of initiative and innovative thinking had been rediscovered; and most of all, both leaders and followers had cultivated that essential self-confidence which makes a soldier. It would not be going too far to say that if they had been put to the test in full-scale warfare, the part-time soldiers of 1976 would have won battles that they might well have lost in 1974.

That is the pertinent lesson of Operation Savannah, one that highlights the military importance of participation in authorised peace support operations of the future. Low-intensity operations are the finest and cheapest way (in terms of both blood and treasure) of preparing the armed forces for any sterner tests which the future may hold.

There is yet another aspect to these operations which is important. One of the greatest problems in any peace-time army is motivation. After a certain point, training - no matter how imaginative - becomes mindless repetition. A soldier (particularly a volunteer) must see an ultimate aim for what he is doing. To an unblooded youngster, operational deployment is also a rite of passage into adulthood; he has an urgent need to prove both to himself and to his father's generation that he is as good as they have been. This is why generations of young British soldiers have looked forward to deployment in Northern Ireland, and why young Americans still join the US Marines. It is also why many of the young South Africans who opposed one another between 1960 and 1990 were, quite apart from political considerations, willing to serve in the military.

Everything in life must have a purpose, no matter whether it is short, medium or long term. People volunteer for the citizen forces because they want to be soldiers, at least part of the time. This can be seen from the substantial numbers of part-timers from Britain's Territorial Army who have volunteered for six months' deployment in Bosnia. The only real questions that remain are practical ones: where the manpower for such operations is to be found, how it is to be prepared and how it is to be employed in the most cost-effective way.

A ROLE FOR THE PART-TIME FORCE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The possibility of employing Part-time Force (PTF) units in peace operations was publicly mooted by the Chief of Army Staff Personnel, Major-General J M Dippenaar, during an address to PTF leader group at 9 SA Division Headquarters. He stated that one of the future roles he could foresee for the PTF units was participation in peace support operations. Although he did not elaborate, his remark confirmed the thoughts that various forward thinkers in the part-time Army had been harbouring. Taking his remark and the declared SANDF principle of 'one force' at face value, two questions need to be asked and answered.

Firstly, can the concept of employing PTF units for the sensitive task of peace support

operations be regarded as viable?

The answer is undoubtedly 'yes'. There is considerable evidence that citizen-soldiers are often better peace keepers than long term professionals. Scandinavian servicemen performing UN duties - most of them volunteer citizen-soldiers with a small amount of special training - have traditionally proved to be excellent peace keepers in Cyprus and elsewhere. Professional combat troops, on the other hand, have often tended to be overly aggressive and at times insensitive to local feelings and customs, as has been proved in the recent Somali intervention.

Secondly, what alternative is there to the employment of PTF troops?

The answer to that question is 'very little'. It is difficult to see how the SA Army will be able to provide such extra manpower except by its traditional expedient of turning to the PTF, given the tight defence budget and a continued need for high levels of military assistance to the police, both of which are likely to be the rule in the foreseeable future. It may be ventured that if South Africa becomes involved in peacekeeping to any appreciable extent, PTF personnel on long term engagements will be a major source of manpower, seeing that the Full-time Force (FTF), after the impending rationalisation process, would probably be unable to muster more than approximately 10 000 actual combat soldiers already fully committed to police support and border control.

The Army can no longer rely on calling up (often at short notice) hordes of national service conscripts and obligated and volunteer PTF members, with little consideration for their personal circumstances or their employers' feelings. In the volunteer Army, part-time manpower assets will be available, but they will have to be treated and tasked with care and sensitivity rather than brutally excavated from the bedrock of society without thought of the morrow. The volunteer citizen-soldier is a vastly different being to the poorly paid and often neglected conscripted national serviceman and PTF soldier of the past, and the traditional way of simply dictating without involving the PTF in the planning, will not be acceptable. PTF utilisation for peacekeeping or any other task, will only work if it is done on a proper, well-conceived and 'user-friendly' basis, rather than in an *ad hoc* fashion to satisfy a short term need. Besides, all elements of the SANDF are constitutionally part of a single integrated force.

THE CONCEPT OF COMPOSITE UNITS

The long-standing 'border war' practice of mobilising existing units for three months at a time was never really cost-effective, because the deployment period was too short to take full advantage of operational training and experience. A common comment was that the units had to return home just as they were reaching their peak. Since long mobilisations for anything except national defence will not be acceptable in the new Volunteer Part-time Force, the alternative would be composite battalions manned by PTF members, who have specifically volunteered for longer service.

The composite battalion concept has seen extensive use during the past 25 years in the defence force, but it will only function properly if the hasty putting together of such units out of bits and pieces, and then dispersing them with equal haste, is avoided. The *ad hoc* grouping of unlucky individuals thereafter known as a battalion is inimical to the team spirit and cohesion of the contributing units, and might well be of doubtful flexibility under stress. Such an informal and insensitive grouping should certainly not be risked in UN peace support operations, because of the delicacy of touch required, not to mention the need for high standards of technical ability, self-discipline and innovative response to unorthodox situations. Moreover, at the end of such a

unit's existence, there is no systematic diffusion of lessons learned because few of the sub-units ever have the full picture.

There is thus a need for PTF peacekeeping battalions to be constituted, manned, trained and prepared in a systematic, well-considered way which would avoid the pitfalls mentioned above and which, in addition to assisting the UN's efforts and furthering South Africa's image and interests, would also serve an important third purpose, namely directly benefiting the PTF by stimulating interest in part-time service and ensuring a continual infusion of fresh operational experience.

UNIT STRUCTURE

A typical PTF composite infantry peacekeeping unit - called an 'Expeditionary Service Unit' (ESU) for the purposes of this discussion - should be structured in such a way that it is able to operate effectively under field conditions (bad ones), while maintaining the capability to:

- deal with and operate in various 'worst scenario' contingencies, such as
 - anti-UN hostility among the population
 - internal factional hostility
 - a land mine problem
 - a collapsed medical-care and food-distribution infrastructure
 - banditry, either organised or opportunistic
 - bad roads and blown bridges; and
 - undertake a certain amount of civic-action work, such as providing basic medical/dental care and reconstruction of essential services.

Against this background, the best type of infantry unit would be a 'light modular mechanised battle group', a modified version of the standard mechanised battle group which has been structurally adapted so that it is self-contained enough to be able to operate largely on its own if necessary. Thus it might consist of:

- a battalion headquarters;
- 3 or 4 rifle companies (ideally equipped with the less hostile looking, mine protected, Mamba than the more aggressive Ratel);
- a light armoured company (Eland armoured cars).
- a support company consisting of:
 - a quartermaster/logistic section
 - a transport platoon, including a light workshop detachment
 - catering section

- a signals platoon
- a medical platoon
- an assault pioneer platoon
- a mortar platoon, and
- town management section.

The addition of a light helicopter flight could also be considered, either attached from the South African Air Force or organic to the unit, i.e. 'owned' and flown by PTF soldiers who are former SAAF pilots, or who have been commercially trained. In at least some SAAF circles there would be considerable sympathy for such an addition.

TERMS OF SERVICE

It would probably be wise to limit a unit's continuous deployment time to no more than six to eight months, depending on the circumstances, such as climate and complexity of the task. If a unit is deployed on operations in the field for more than six months, extraneous requirements such as leave, operational fatigue and other considerations begin to take up valuable time. As a rule of thumb, therefore, the following could be considered:

- A unit's standard total deployment time would be eight months. This would include about 45 days' refresher and special task training (this is the key to successful deployment, not only to improve skills, but also to build *esprit de corps* and teamwork), a short embarkation leave (7 days) and transport time to the deployment area (say 3 days, if vehicles and other heavy equipment are despatched earlier). Another essential is at least ten days acclimatisation training in the theatre of operations. In other words, actual deployment time would be approximately six months if withdrawal time is included. Embarkation leave might be dispensed with, given the short overall period of engagement, but proper preparation as set out, remains necessary before actual operational deployment.
- Deployment of volunteer individuals in staff posts could be for twelve months at a time, including ten days' midterm leave. An individual could then volunteer for a further term.
- Individual deployment of three months for specialist purposes could apply.
- Should the operation stretch over a longer period than six months, the overlapping of units could be considered.

PERSONNEL PROFILE

In a 'consumer-friendly' operation such as peacekeeping, it would be necessary to use only the best type of soldier, since even isolated acts of stupidity, ill-discipline or dereliction of duty can destroy months of painstaking confidence-building, as was recently the case in Somalia. The right type of PTF volunteer therefore, should be one who is not there just for the sake of a job, but is intrinsically interested in soldiering and has a commitment to the concept of peacekeeping. An additional requirement that must always be in sight is that the PTF itself must benefit from the deployment of its personnel - both in terms of experience and encouragement to perform part-time service.

The only efficient way to ensure that no rotten apples slip through, is to conduct initial selection of PTF personnel, not through some remote bureaucrat at a higher formation, but through the PTF units themselves, who would be jealously guarding their reputation by sifting applicants thoroughly. Further evaluation during training of motivation, discipline, and attitudes towards peace operations, among others, will also be required. Allied to this would be a set of service requirements which would not only ensure that the right type of person was selected, but that the PTF itself would benefit in the end from his deployment. For example, it could be stipulated that the only person eligible for PTF ESU service would be one who had:

- attained a certain basic minimum level of training and/or course qualification;
- scored a required minimum in skill-at-arms and specialisation tests;
- served previously in a part-time capacity for at least six months in one of the ESU's contributing units; and
- was under contract to serve part-time for at least another twelve months in the contributing unit after returning from ESU duties.

This would eliminate most potential 'Rambos' and would-be volunteers who are only after the money. It would favour properly motivated serving part-time personnel, ensure the transfer of operational experience to the parent PTF units, and encourage short term retention of blooded members.

PERSONAL INDUCEMENTS

Specific adequate service conditions, to attract the right kind of volunteer, particularly for periods of eight months under arduous and possible life-threatening conditions, will be necessary. The key inducement is remuneration, and in this respect the Rand's poor exchange rate is an unlikely but definite trump card. The UN will pay a contributing nation up to US \$2 000 a month for each peace keeper deployed by the nation in a conflict area. Some countries, especially the poorer ones, channel these moneys into the national coffers, so that the actual peace keepers draw only their normal pay. It would be extremely short-sighted of South Africa to follow such an approach. Consider the following:

- The total UN contribution would be a paltry sum compared to the vast national requirement for development funds in South Africa.
- The primary issue is not to suck a few million gratis Rands into the national coffers, but to deploy the best possible quality peace keeper, and in the process to foster the PTF.
- Employing PTF soldiers is already cost-efficient, because it keeps long term personnel costs to a minimum.

This being the case, the most sensible course of action would be to hand each peace keeper a large portion of his full UN pay, in addition to his normal pay and operational allowance, but only as a discharge bonus on successful completion of the deployment period. In addition, he could be taxed only on his SANDF pay and allowance, thus providing an attractive proposition for providing excellent service. The exchange rate would make this a bonanza for the PTF peace keeper. Assuming each soldier has an allotment of no more than R20 a day while deployed, this will result in his returning home with a substantial nest-egg. It represents earnings beyond the dreams of any young person (the optimum age for operational infantry being late teens or early

20s), not to mention the majority of older service-people.

Combined with personal motivation such as the urge for adventure, the wish to serve, an interest in soldiering and the desire for a nest-egg with which to start a new career, pursue higher education or to buy a house, this remuneration system would foster volunteering among the right kind of candidate. Employed PTF members might be willing to take unpaid sabbaticals or resign from unsatisfactory jobs; students could delay going to university; unemployed volunteers could be some of the best material and would be strongly motivated. The best source could be volunteers who are completing or have recently completed one year voluntary military service before joining their units. The result would be a stream of volunteers for selection, both leaders and rank and file. According to the November 1995 issue of **Armed Forces Journal**, the Hungarian Army already has a similar scheme.

An adequate salary scale, as suggested above, would make it unnecessary to consider many other inducements to serve, although the following four types may also be considered:

- an on-going investment scheme for non-allocated pay, managed by a leading financial institution contracted by the government; and/or
- preference for a civil service (national/provincial) post for a former volunteer with at least six months' operational service, and twelve months' seniority for salary purposes; and/or
- twelve months' seniority for PTF promotion purposes for every six months served; and/or
- a South African peacekeeping medal (to be instituted) for operational deployment, in addition to the normal UN peacekeeping medal, with clasps for subsequent service.

In addition to these personal inducements, units should also be encouraged to participate in peace support operations. For example, to ensure enthusiastic regimental participation, the present rules on the award of battle/campaign honours could be amended, so that if one of the contributing units supplied a full company for six months' service, it would be entitled to a campaign honour, such as 'UNFOR RWANDA 1997'. Endangering life and limb in the cause of peace is at least as honourable as doing so in the cause of military victory, and surely deserves recognition.

THE ROLE OF THE FULL-TIME FORCE

A dispensation such as the one described above could meet with opposition from some elements in the FTF. Up to the 1960s, South Africa's ground forces in times of war were always manned almost completely by volunteers from the PTF. The sole exception was Korea, where personnel consisted of Permanent Force (PF) or short-service air and ground crews, plus a few seconded PF army officers. This changed during the national service era, when full-time conscript units officered by PF members took the field. These have now been partly replaced by units of short-service personnel; for practical purposes, the SANDF is nearly back to the pre-1960s situation. This has certain implications. The most important one is that few additional, trained FTF members, outside of the Rapid Deployment Force and police support units, would be available to serve in UN operations, except in selected key posts. A UN peace support operation would not be a replay of the past border war. During that conflict, large numbers of PF personnel occupied posts in border base areas such as Oshakati. In a UN operation, most control and administration would be carried out by UN personnel.

What would be important, however, would be the effect on the careers of promising junior or middle level PF members - particularly in the combat corps - if peacemaking/keeping assumes a high priority. A promising PF member's failure to perform field or at least operational-area service might well have a negative effect on his career development and might lead to demands for each ESU's leadership posts to be manned by PF members, as well as attempts to set up unnecessary field administrative structures. This might not allow a systematic transfer of operational experience at leader-group level to PTF units.

Ways of addressing the problem are outside the scope of this discussion, except for one which impinges directly on the PTF ESU concept. It would make sense for each ESU, on becoming active, to have a PF advisory cadre/training team (of platoon strength and consisting mainly of company grade or specialist officers and NCOs) plugged into it. This team would be attached to the ESU throughout the service period, taking an intimate part in all its activities. The ESU would benefit, as close support by professionals is always essential, especially during training. The PF members, on the other hand, would be able to gain operational experience, among others by commanding elements of the ESU where appropriate. A second way of addressing the need for full-time force involvement is for the first six month deployment to be done by a full-time unit and thereafter be followed by PTF ESU, which have been formed and trained during that period.

MOBILISATION OF AN EXPEDITIONARY SERVICE UNIT

The way in which ESUs are formed, could be of crucial importance. It appears to make use of what might be described as an 'extended regimental family' system. A typical 'extended family' would consist of a formal grouping or tasking on a semi-permanent basis of like-minded PTF regiments - six mechanised or motorised infantry battalions and two armoured regiments - and an ESU which would be on the permanent establishment but which would, between activation for peacekeeping operations, exist only in skeleton form. The 'extended family' could be either a nation-wide network or concentrated in one province. The pre-selected regiments would be the feeder units for the composite ESU, as follows:

- each infantry battalion would be the parent unit of one ESU rifle company;
- the armoured units would be responsible for supplying the ESU's armoured car company; and
- the various units would jointly contribute specialist platoons and sections to the ESU's support company, as required.

It is envisaged that the sequence of events during a mobilisation for peacemaking/keeping duties would be more or less as follows:

- The regimental extended family is warned three to six months ahead of time that its ESU is needed for service in a trouble spot.
- Work commences on manning the ESU:
 - A battalion headquarters staff is designated from volunteers from one unit or a number of units, and goes into part-time training immediately.
 - Three of the infantry battalions each assemble a rifle company consisting of serving members with enough time left on their contracts (or who are willing to extend their contracts), and would like to serve in the ESU; alternatively or additionally, some of

the battalions pool their manpower resources to form composite companies.

- The armoured regiments form an armoured car company by the same methods.
 - A complete support company is either supplied by one battalion or is assembled from platoons or sections contributed by various of the units.
 - The FTF platoon-size cadre or training team joins the unit.
-
- The force is assembled, issued with ESU/UN accoutrements, and launched on a 45-day refresher and special-to-task training course, the instructors being members of the FTF training/advisory team allotted to the ESU, who will accompany it on its deployment. In the meantime, heavy vehicles and equipment are sent on ahead, or - if the ESU is relieving another in the field - technical teams are despatched to ensure that the departing ESU's equipment is in good shape.
 - At the end of the training and after embarkation leave, the new ESU departs by air for the deployment area, where it temporarily marries up with the departing SANDF unit (possibly a full-time force unit originally on stand-by in the Rapid Deployment Force) for acclimatisation, familiarisation and in-theatre training.
 - By the end of the second week the arriving ESU is functional and in place.
 - At the end of six months in the field, it either prepares to withdraw or welcomes yet another ESU, which it will acclimatise and familiarise over the next fourteen days before the first ESU leaves for home.
 - By the end of the eight months, the ESU has returned to South Africa and completed all administrative outprocessing; the personnel return to their parent units and the ESU is deactivated until the next mobilisation.

Needless to say, there can be a number of variations on this theme. For example, there might be such a response to the call for volunteers among the PTF that, instead of the ESU going home, it simply stays in place and extends its operational period to allow for the end of the UN mission.

No such 'extended regimental family' currently exists, but the example of the SA Scottish Regiments' Association indicates that the concept of extended families could be a viable one. The easiest way might be to formally task and draw each ESU from a different division, in other words each of 7, 8 or 9 Division could be alerted in turn to provide one volunteer ESU out of their existing PTF units. An alternative might be to use a geographical base, for example, the Territorial Force Units (formerly Commandos or Rear Area Protection Units) of a specific Command, Commando Group or area could be grouped together to form an ESU. Groupings could also be extended to combine all the traditionally Scottish regiments, the rifle regiments or the future Transkei PTF Units. The ESU concept does not have to be confined to infantry and armoured units. Given the possibility of involving support services in reconstruction and civic-action in any peace support operation, it would make sense for support units to be ready to form extended groupings and supply engineer, signals, logistics, medical, military police and other dedicated ESUs for UN service.

CONCLUSION

In order to maintain high standards and to uphold the fine reputation previously achieved by its PTF, the SA Army needs to start preparing its PTF for peace support operations. Once clear guidelines for participation have been established, Army Headquarters could instruct the headquarters of 7 Division to undertake a feasibility study of the availability of volunteers, while Director training and the Army Battle School could compile a 45-day refresher training syllabus. At the same time, the logistics, finance, and intelligence staff at Army HQ should be engaged in similar feasibility studies in order to determine the parameters of future involvement in peace support operations. It is time for the Army to start doing its homework, as preparation for peacekeeping duties should not be reduced to a crisis planning exercise to be undertaken at short notice in the face of adversity.

The PTF have traditionally supplied South Africa both with fine fighting units and an extremely flexible and cost-effective source of military manpower acquisition. While the FTF struggles to meet the challenges of force transformation, there is no reason why elements of the PTF should not be engaged in preparation for participation in peace support operations. At the very least, the concepts proposed in this article could become the subject of serious debate in military circles, for it is through such debate that they will be refined into a workable solution to the SANDF's dilemma: the need for peacekeeping capacity has been clearly identified, but the force is unavailable. The possibilities related to meaningful PTF utilisation are almost endless, and the result would be a 'win-win' situation. At small cost to itself, South Africa could serve humanity, boost its international image and foster the growth of an enthusiastic and operationally experienced PTF, whose newer generation had been blooded without bloodshed.

ENDNOTES

1. Reference to soldiers by exclusive use of the male pronoun is purely for stylistic reasons. No exclusion of the important role of females in contemporary military organisations is intended.

DISARMAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF LIGHT WEAPONS: LESSONS FROM UN PEACE MISSIONS AND SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION SOUTHERN AFRICA

Virginia Gamba, Project Director, IDP

INTRODUCTION

The international community's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognised authority was limited. The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxation of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life, in turn, have generated pressure for international action, most notably from the UN. But there is a difference in the way the UN operated in these situations before 1991 and what is expected of it today. Before 1991, the presence of UN peace operations not only enhanced peace, but also strengthened democratic processes, promoted conciliation among population groups, encouraged respect for

human rights, and alleviated humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in the Congo, Southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Haiti. By contrast, since 1991 the UN has been engaged simultaneously in a number of larger, and more ambitious peace operations, such as those in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and the former Yugoslavia.

QUICK-FIX SOLUTIONS VERSUS LONG TERM STABILITY

In this new environment, the UN has been under increasing pressure to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence. The financial, personnel, and timing pressures on the UN to undertake these massive short term stabilising actions have seriously impaired the organisation's ability to ensure long term national and regional stability. It has been necessary for the UN to shift its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long term national and international stability, to a role which would bring about peace as quickly as possible and would ease humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined in terms of longer term goals for achieving stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain questionable. This problem has gained some recognition and has resulted in belated action by the international community. More and more organisations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political-economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. This can be seen, for example, in the Southern African region.

It is not only during peace operations that the relative importance of disarmament in the implementation of mandates is underestimated. The importance of effective and comprehensive disarmament is underestimated in most post-conflict reconstruction processes. The reason why weapons *per se* are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies, is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon, as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability.

For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using weapons and, therefore, renders them harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, the ready availability of weapons can, and does, militarise societies in general. It also destabilises regions that are affected by the unrestricted trade in light weapons across national borders. There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community is under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, and to place a higher value on peace in the short term than on development and stability in the long term. On the other hand, those who do focus on long term stability have placed a higher value on the social and economic elements of development than on the management of weapons, the primary tools of violence.

Within this context, and in the growing need to control lethal weapons, it is imperative that more is done to raise awareness among the international community with regard to the need to mandate and implement strong disarmament components in all multinational peace operations in future. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the

management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Problems within the process of controlling weapons have emerged at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations, that are necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action, are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be devalued soon, since most of the ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for careless follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilise neighbouring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

Recent experiences in UN peacekeeping highlight a number of recurring problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of co-ordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were sufficiently understood. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control, early in the mission, would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The problem with co-ordination applies both to international interaction, and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and co-ordination between the international effort and the nations with immediate borders with the stricken country. But co-ordination must not simply be present at the international level: it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be co-ordinated among and within the civilian, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of co-ordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organisations working in the field. These components must co-operate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission co-ordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, of unity of effort, and of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Although an identification of problems which cause ineffective disarmament is a useful exercise, the international community must ultimately recognise that the combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons poses a whole range of new challenges, and the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long term national

and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

For this reason, the best way to implement peace, defined in terms of long term stability, is to focus not just on sources of violence (such as social and political development issues), but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled will invariably flow over into neighbouring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects are included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution:

- the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set up;
- the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and
- the encouragement of close co-operation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is implemented.

Unfortunately, these three aspects have been sadly neglected in recent UN peace operations in African countries, such as Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, Liberia and Angola.

BY-PRODUCTS OF 'PEACE' : SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa is adjusting to the process of transition to democracy. In South Africa the transition is still incomplete, both at the state level and at the level of civil society. Elsewhere, Angola is haltingly emerging from its long-standing civil war; Mozambique is coming to terms with the devastation wreaked by almost a quarter of a century of war; in Malawi and Zambia the transition from a *de facto* system of life presidency to a system of elected parliamentary rule is incomplete; in Lesotho there is a security threat to the elected government. There is therefore no common, institutionalised political value system in Southern Africa. While the region is increasingly economically interdependent, it is not yet interdependent with regard to matters of security and defence.

During the Cold War, superpower proxies on the African continent were flooded with weapons meant to defend the interests of their allies in Europe and elsewhere. The largest concentration of these weapons was in sub-Saharan Africa and more especially in Southern Africa, which was an important area of Cold War confrontation. Following the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of most conflicts in the area, the abundance of these weapons and their proliferation became a major threat to stability. The end of the Cold War has not served to diffuse conflict or eliminate threats to security in sub-Saharan Africa. In the last four decades, the sub-continent has seen thirty-five major conflicts and almost ten million deaths. More recently, in Rwanda alone, the intensity and speed of genocide and epidemics claimed nearly one million lives.

The end of the Cold War has managed to reduce ideologically motivated conflict, although conflicts over democratisation, ethnicity and access to economic empowerment have often led to the outbreak of civil wars, lawlessness, anarchy and misery. Widespread political and socio-economic problems have helped to plunge the sub-continent into unprecedented instability and conflict - motivated neither by the drive for independence nor the end of colonial rule. The quest

for democratisation and economic empowerment was essentially an internally-driven process supported by external forces such as former metropolitan powers, donor agencies, and international financial institutions. Ethnic confrontations, on the other hand, are attributable to a number of factors which may vary from country to country as a result of historical settings and varying geopolitical constellations.

Small arms currently spreading throughout the region include pistols, machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-personnel grenades, and the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle. The proliferation of these weapons poses a serious threat to security in Southern Africa and the horn of Africa. In Southern Africa, weapons are smuggled from Angola, Mozambique and other former zones of military combat to South Africa, the country in the region most affected by armed crime.

An understanding of the present proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa requires a focus on three different issues. The first is the initial influx of weapons due to the massive arming of sub-Saharan Africa by external powers during the Cold War and the linkages of these arms policies to ongoing national struggles for political determination. Another issue requiring examination is the second influx of weapons (most of them light weapons) which has been characterised by the legal and illegal trading of weapons in the lax environment following the end of both the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Finally, a third issue of focus should be the fluid movement of these weapons across borders due to the impact of UN-brokered peace settlements in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, where the establishment of short term peace took priority at the expense of disarmament.

CONCLUSION

A host of case studies on disarmament during peacekeeping operations in recent years points to multinational peacekeeping as one of the three sources for massive flows of light weapons into the Southern Africa region. In this respect, it is enticing to think that if part of the problem of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa is due to ineffective disarmament efforts during multinational peacekeeping operations, part of the solution might lie in a more effective use of regional peacekeeping forces to ensure border controls aimed at reducing this flow. At a minimum, the issue of disarmament within peacekeeping operations should feature prominently in any efforts to create or enhance regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa.

TOWARDS A FUTURE FOR CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING: THE UN PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING FACE OF UN OPERATIONS

Five years ago, there was a general feeling that the United Nations could do no wrong. The Cold War had ended peacefully and there was talk of a 'New World Order' in which the UN was centre stage. The advent of the 'failed state', the extent to which dormant ethnic tensions would come to the fore, and the rise in isolationist and xenophobic tendencies had not been fully appreciated. Today, the pendulum has swung back toward the other extreme. There is an increasingly pervasive (and misplaced) tendency to view the UN as being incapable of doing anything right.

A tangible change has indeed occurred in the past five years. The UN must come to terms with

several new realities. In short, learning how to delegate responsibility effectively will assume an ever greater importance. Burden-sharing should not be seen as an admission of failure or as simply 'passing the buck'. Rather, the UN must take advantage of other's abilities and form symbiotic relationships so that everyone concerned wins. In this period of financial belt-tightening, the UN must re-evaluate its goals and the resources available to achieve them. Co-operation, rather than competition, must be the order of the day if the UN is to continue to make a meaningful difference.

When Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali invited member states and the international community to establish training centres for personnel serving in UN operations some years back, he did so with the understanding that the UN could not meet the demand in this important area on its own. Since then, there has been a growing appreciation that the same is true of peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations themselves. The result has been an increasing reliance on Chapter VIII of the **UN Charter**. This is an important development and should be encouraged. The UN does not have a monopoly on the promotion of peace. It is everyone's business.

Furthermore, non-government organisations (NGOs) and other members of civil society are also assuming greater responsibilities in the furthering of peace. The number of international civilian personnel participating in these endeavours continues to grow. The financial and budgetary crises facing the UN indicate that regional and other organisations will play an increasingly integral role in promoting peace and security, and that staff from outside the UN system will continue to comprise a greater percentage of the total.

Given this decentralised approach, there will be greater opportunities - and a greater need - to train these organisations and their staff in the necessary skills to fulfil their objectives. As the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are experiencing while they work toward implementing the Dayton Peace Accords, such an undertaking is extremely complicated and requires people with specialised skills. The need to train civilian personnel serving in UN and similar field missions becomes ever more apparent.

INCREASING DEMANDS FOR THE SKILLS OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The Increasing Reliance on Chapter VIII

Initially, training for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) had been geared toward military personnel. This was understandable given the needs of the day. These soldier-diplomats needed to learn techniques such as conflict resolution and restraint in the lethal use of force. Nordic countries and organisations such as the International Peace Academy have provided indispensable training and have gained a good deal of expertise in these matters over the years.

In 1989, with the end of the Cold War fast approaching, the UN began to undertake PKOs that were considerably more complex and demanding. Civilian personnel and non-military expertise became more integral to fulfilling the mandates entrusted to the UN.

In an operation such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), civilians were needed to perform a myriad of duties. For example, the Civil Administration Component was given a mandate to supervise and control the existing administrative structures of the four parties to the Paris Peace Agreement on which the PKO was based. More than 200 international civilian personnel were recruited to oversee five broad areas of control: defence;

finance; foreign affairs; information; and public security. They performed a crucial role in helping to ensure that a neutral political environment was secured so that free and fair elections could be held.

Civilian personnel also headed that mission's human rights, electoral and repatriation efforts. They were instrumental in promoting a climate in which the respect for human rights was protected, and in preventing a return to the policies and practices of the past. They also played a major role in conducting elections in which both voters and candidates first had to be registered and educated with regard to their rights and responsibilities' and in repatriating hundreds of thousands of refugees. These very broad examples clearly illustrate that the tasks civilians are asked to perform are extremely demanding. The ability to meet these challenges is critical to a mission's success.

Furthermore, civilian staff are increasingly taking responsibility for overseeing tasks previously considered to be within the realm of the military. For example, in the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), a civilian-staffed 'Technical Unit' ran the programme to demobilise armed combatants. Obversely, military personnel are now involved in supporting 'civilian' tasks and humanitarian operations to a greater extent than ever before. The need to take account of the different approaches and organisational cultures, and to address the antagonism seemingly inherent in civil-military relations, has been recognised. The UN has begun to develop training modules and materials for both UN civilian staff and blue helmets.

The operations during the post-Cold War period may be described in general terms as second-generation PKOs: whether established under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN was the central player in the international community's efforts to meet its goals. Today, there is a move toward establishing what one might call 'third generation' PKOs, which differ in that other regional or subregional organisations assume the lead role. As these entities undertake new tasks, they will require qualified people with experiences and skills that their staff do not currently possess.

An Increase in Other Types of Peace Operations

Besides PKOs, the UN has also recently undertaken numerous civilian missions that receive less publicity than their blue-helmeted counterparts, but are no less significant in meeting the UN's goal of promoting international peace and security. These missions can be broadly categorised as follows: election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; and human rights supervision. (The distinctions among them, however, are becoming increasingly blurred). They too have expanded in number and scope in recent years.

For example, whereas there were not any UN Human Rights Field Offices before 1992, today there are seven (in Burundi, Cambodia, Guatemala, Malawi, Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia, and Zaire). Externally-recruited civilian personnel are needed to staff these missions, not to mention other non-PKOs with significant human rights components, such as the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH); and the demand for their services is going to grow. Currently, there are plans for three more offices to be established (in Colombia, Georgia/Abkhazia, and Indonesia). Additional staff will be needed not only for new offices, but for existing missions as well. (The Government of Rwanda has requested the UN to double its office there to 300 staff). The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is in close contact with, and supports the efforts of institutions training personnel. It benefits tremendously from their initiatives in these matters.

THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF TRAINING

Despite much progress having been made in recent years, the UN recognises the need to improve substantially the level of training it now offers personnel serving in its missions. The Training Service of the Office for Human Resource Management (OHRM) is working closely with several departments within the Secretariat and others to prepare staff more thoroughly for field assignments. The UN General Assembly has requested its member states to provide detailed information on their national training programmes so that others might benefit. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has established a Training Unit and has compiled and integrated information submitted to create useful training syllabi and curricula, and written material. It has also produced a number of helpful videos.

While briefings for specific and time-limited tasks such as the monitoring of elections are structured and comprehensive, the training of civilian personnel generally has received comparatively little attention. Those efforts that have been undertaken have tended to concern the improvement of the performance of the civilian police (CIVPOL) monitors. Initially, 'training' for civilian personnel was substantially passive in nature. For many, it consisted of a manual that was distributed along with the plane ticket to be read *en route*. Material covered included such issues as the country's wattage, and the availability (or lack thereof) of medicines and foodstuffs. Nowadays, these manuals include substantially more information and cover such subjects as sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and how to avoid them, and the country's cultural *mores* and the need to respect them. Much more attention is being paid to the provision of improved background material about the mandates and the history of the conflict and its resolution.

Building upon previous efforts, the UN Centre for Human Rights has developed formal human rights training for CIVPOL (which was first instituted formally with ONUMOZ). Recently, with the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the UN has significantly supplemented its training for CIVPOL. IPTF is administering tests to determine that monitors possess basic driving and English communication skills. Offered in Zagheb, only those who pass the tests can deploy to their posts in the field. Those who fail are repatriated at their government's expense. This measure will ensure that a proper level of capabilities exists within the Force, and will serve as a disincentive for member states to offer CIVPOL who cannot meet basic requirements. For example, whereas the IPTF had been forced to repatriate many CIVPOL in the early stages (as of 15 March 1996, fifty monitors had failed to meet the language criteria and seventeen had failed their driving tests) subsequent arrivals have fared better.

While this development is important, the dynamics of peacekeeping and other operations are such that it is not feasible to train people *after* deployment. These operations require staff to 'hit the ground running'. Post-deployment briefings on topics such as mine awareness and language classes are none the less valuable and should be expanded upon. There are many responsibilities, however, for which no lecture or course given upon arrival will be sufficient to prepare an individual.

For example, civilian staff must often work in extremely hazardous conditions and deploy in groups as small as two people in 'deep field'. While the military who take part in operations as military observers are expected to have the necessary mental and physical fortitude to withstand isolation and stress as part of their years of training, and as those in formed units benefit from being deployed with peers who share similar cultural, linguistic and dietary habits and traits, the same is not true for civilian staff. Furthermore, no matter their position, civilian staff are often seen as high representatives of the UN. As such, they command respect, but are also

sometimes expected to bestow favours and make good on 'promises' (that they may be unaware they have made), for which they often do not possess the authority or ability to satisfy others' expectations. Proficiency in conflict resolution techniques, therefore, can be critically important. The difference between possessing these skills and attributes and lacking them can quite literally be a matter of life and death. This underscores the need to teach people the necessary skills and to prepare them mentally and emotionally beforehand.

The importance that the UN attributes to the training of civilian personnel for these missions is exemplified in part by its decision to institutionalise such training. The recently-created UN Staff College at the International Labour Organisation's Centre in Turin (founded in January 1996), will contribute significantly toward meeting the growing need for civilian training. The Secretary-General has repeatedly stressed the need for such an undertaking, and has called the founding of the Staff College an *"excellent example of ... universal mobilisation in the service of the great ideals of the Charter of the United Nations"*.

CO-ORDINATION AND COLLABORATION AMONG TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

Another recent development of note is the creation of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) as an informal forum for the exchange of peacekeeping information. Founded in July 1995, the IAPTC has already undertaken several important initiatives. The framework for future co-operation and collaboration among its members and the international community exists and is secure.

Members of an association such as the IAPTC might undertake or address the following possible projects and areas of concern. First, just as DPKO and the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) at Brown University's Watson Institute have compiled very useful syllabi for military peacekeeping training and academic courses on international organisations, respectively, IAPTC could work toward creating a comprehensive account of teaching techniques and manuals of current efforts to train civilian staff. This will allow new and future centres to benefit in a most efficient and cost-effective manner.

Second, effective training consists of a mixture of pre-deployment and on-site courses and briefings. For lengthy missions, it is valuable to seek feedback on what has worked, what has not, and what is lacking. This will permit subsequent arrivals in the field the best chance to integrate effectively into the mission. Furthermore, detailed debriefings for staff prior to departure will provide valuable insights into designing better programmes for future undertakings. The creation of the Lessons-Learned Unit of DPKO in April 1995 is an important development. At present, however, it cannot handle the massive amount of information that can and should be accumulated, analysed, and acted upon by itself. Providing for a training unit as part of future operations may prove helpful.

And third, there is the question of how best to employ this pool of talent. Presently, IAPTC member institutions are establishing links with various UN entities to learn of their staffing needs and to appraise them of personnel they have trained who desire to be deployed in the field. In some instances, such as with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the co-ordination is quite good. Ties with non-UN organisations such as the OSCE are also being strengthened. The database that DPKO has created for 'Stand-by Arrangements' that seek to match member states' military contributions with UN peacekeeping operations' needs, offers a potential tool for civilian personnel as well. Such a master file of names, skills and experiences, languages spoken, and availability could prove to be an invaluable resource to international and regional organisations as well as NGOs seeking to recruit qualified people.

CONCLUSION

The demand for the diverse skills civilians are expected to possess is certain to grow for the reasons outlined above. The UN and the international community stand to benefit from the work being undertaken by a variety of existing peacekeeping training centres and projects, for training plays an increasingly pivotal role in the efficacy of the civilian component of contemporary peacekeeping operations. The effectiveness of this training, in turn, can be enhanced through greater co-ordination and collaboration among existing peacekeeping training centres and projects, and the UN. It is in our mutual interest to take advantage of one another's expertise and experience in reaching our shared goal of a peaceful world. Additional initiatives in this regard are most welcome.

ENDNOTES

1. This is an edited version of a speech delivered at the second Annual Meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S Anna, Pisa, Italy, 2 April 1996.