

PEOPLE POVERTY AND PEACE:

Human Security in Southern Africa

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Monograph No 4
May 1996

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This publication is sponsored by The Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Foundation for Global Dialogue

PEOPLE, POVERTY AND PEACE: HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Hussein Solomon and Jakkie Cilliers

Traditionally, security has been concerned with understanding the causes of war and, conversely, the conditions for peace. In part, fixation on the security of the state and military strength reflected the concerns of the protagonists of the Cold War - the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. Confined to the straitjacket of bipolarity, security was seen in such staid concepts as the balance of power, deterrence, massive retaliation and flexible response. However, in a post-Cold War environment, this Clausewitzian view of security is increasingly attacked by new security thinking.

Ken Booth¹ has argued that redefining security requires broadening the concept both 'horizontally and vertically'. Expanding the concept horizontally involves creating an agenda that recognises security as being as dependent on factors such as political democracy, human rights, social and economic development, and environmental sustainability, as it is on military stability. To expand the concept vertically involves recognising that people should be the primary referent of security. In this way, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security that emerge at sub-national, national and transnational levels.

Southern Africa, in the post-Cold War, post-apartheid era, has also been plagued by a variety of traditional and more contemporary human security concerns. These range from mass migrations to disease; from poverty to small-arms proliferation; from a lack of democracy to the emergence of virulent ethnic nationalism; and from environmental degradation to drug trafficking. In order to understand regional security better and to foster more harmonious forms of interaction between the states of Southern Africa, the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) has recently launched its Human Security Project (HSP). The project aims to serve the following purposes:

- to conduct research and publish its results in Southern Africa on the status of regional insecurity with a particular focus on the movement of peoples and its associated effects as a source of regional insecurity;
- to analyse the impact of such movement at local, national and especially at the regional level;
- to liaise with researchers, government and non-government agencies in Southern Africa to exchange information, interpretation and results of field work;
- to analyse the international comparative dimensions of population movements, insecurity and regional integration, and to draw lessons for Southern Africa;
- to provide policy options and propose practical measures to deal with the problem of population movement and the associated regional insecurity in Southern Africa;
- to enhance the local research capacity within the region through an internship mechanism; and
- to liaise internationally to share the information with other regions and with specific researchers, institutes and non-government actors with an interest in population movement, regional insecurity and integration in Southern Africa.

The objective of the study would be to provide verifiable facts and policy options to the national, regional and international communities on the issue of population movement and the associated status of insecurity and regional integration in Southern Africa, and on the socio-economic, security, political and environmental consequences of such movements. By doing so, the project in itself becomes a confidence-building measure between countries in the region. By sharing in the research and interacting with each other, participating Southern African scholars and practitioners will be in a position to disseminate information and influence policy formulation. Furthermore, the project will generate collaborative mechanisms between the countries in the region and with different sectors in each country.

This initial monograph aims to provide an overview of some of the areas which will be investigated under the auspices of the Human Security Project.

In the first article, Solomon and Cilliers identifies the various sources of insecurity in Southern Africa - population growth, mass migrations, lack of food security, disease, ethnocentric nationalism, small-arms proliferation, the poor record of political pluralism and civil-military relations, and a lack of economic growth. Each of these sources of regional insecurity is, in turn, discussed and the question is posed whether regional integration is the best way to solve these transnational security threats.

The issue of regional co-operation is once more raised in Swatuk's penetrating analysis of

environmental security in Southern Africa. He argues that many of the region's problems stem in large part from the nature of uneven and inconsistent capitalist development. Swatuk also notes that, if the region is to move towards a sustainable and prosperous future, it must move together, for eco-systems do not respect any political boundaries. Questions of resource use and sustainability must be approached within a regional framework.

The final article by Solomon investigates population movement as a source of insecurity. Solomon looks at South Africa's perceived debt towards the region and expounds upon the ambiguity of international law with regard to migration. He questions the efficacy of existing control measures and concludes with proposed strategic responses to the problem. In this, he argues for an interventionist approach based on comprehensive bilateral agreements between South Africa and its various neighbours.

Endnote

1. K Booth, *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations*, **Southern African Perspectives**, 30, 1994, p. 3.

SOURCES OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN INSECURITY AND THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Hussein Solomon and Jakkie Cilliers

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese curse, "*May you live in interesting times*", seems to have specific relevance to the latter half of the twentieth century. The relative security of the Cold War days has been shattered: the straitjacket imposed by bipolarity in which the lay person, academic and policy-maker have derived such comfort, has disappeared. There is an almost chaotic 'New World Order' in place. Some instances seem to support the thesis of a human rights culture rapidly becoming a universal phenomenon; other instances, like the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, seem to contradict this. On one level, a global culture and a global identity seem to be developing. CNN broadcasts reaching 200 million people in ninety different countries are testimony to this.¹ However, the growth of virulent ethnic nationalisms may lead to a revision of your opinion of a global identity. On one level the fall of authoritarian socialism in Eastern Europe seems to have spurred on the winds of liberal multiparty democracy throughout South America, Africa, the Middle East and the Eastern bloc itself, but recent events from Angola to Algeria and from Kenya to Kazakhstan once more undermine perceptions of progressive global democratisation. In short, the end of the Cold War has brought new challenges to the practitioners and scholars of international relations, as well as to the person on the street, while traditional challenges have retained their saliency. Southern Africa has proved to be no exception to this world-wide trend.

For almost a quarter of a century, South Africa's apartheid state constituted the main source of insecurity in Southern Africa. The democratic elections in South Africa on 27 April 1994 raised hopes that the region would soon enter a new period of peace and prosperity. Despite high expectations, the reality appears more complicated and regional peace, security and development are not guaranteed, nor will they be attained easily. Indeed, new threats to security have emerged. These include a range of non-military and transnational threats such as droughts, mass migrations and drug trafficking. As a consequence, shifts in the conceptualisation of security, as well as an overhaul of existing security institutions are a

prerequisite to deal effectively with the source of regional insecurity.

This article therefore seeks to contextualise regional security within the new theoretical paradigms of security; secondly, it seeks to identify and briefly discuss a selection of the more important sources of insecurity in Southern Africa; and finally it aims to assess the utility of regional integration as a mechanism to deal with these issues.

NEW PARADIGMS OF SECURITY₂

The contention that theory is of no use to 'practical' people needs to be disposed of at the outset. The evolution of theories and concepts are more than mere intellectual or academic indulgences. Theories both inform the manner in which policy-makers understand their world and shape their responses to pressing global, regional and national issues. In this way, theory contributes to the creation and re-creation of the world and is, therefore, a matter of intense practical importance.³

These insights are vital in developing an understanding of the concept 'security' and how it may be enhanced in Southern Africa. The manner in which the sources of Southern Africa's security is understood, will partially determine the success or failure of policies that attempt to reverse the region's downward spiral. In many respects, therefore, one key to the region's future lies in transforming the parameters and nature of the regional security debate along more collaborative, emancipatory and peaceful lines. As these processes are still embryonic in the Southern African context, intellectual debate constitutes a critical terrain of struggle.

Traditionally, security has been concerned with understanding the causes of war and, conversely, the conditions for peace. In the period following World War II, however, a rather narrow definition came to dominate mainstream thinking in security studies.⁴ In this view, security was deemed to be based primarily on the military capacity of states to defend their sovereignty and integrity from the predatory ambitions of others.

From the 1970s onwards, this state-centric and military conception was increasingly contested. In the first place, the logical consequence of the traditional conception of security is the so-called 'security dilemma', where the enhancement of the security of one state through military build-up is likely to effect a corresponding decrease in the security of others. This establishes the psychological preconditions for escalating arms races and exacerbates general insecurities and anxieties. However, the criticisms levelled against the traditional definition go much deeper.

On one level, such a definition of security ignores the underlying reasons for conflict, as well as the dangers that emanate from non-military sources, such as environmental degradation or economic stagnation. Moreover, fixation on the state and military strength reflects the narrow concerns of the dominant 'knowledge-producing' centres of the world during the Cold War - the United States and its Western allies - and tends to overlook the threats to the lives and security of the vast majority of the world's people who live in the developing world. It is in these regions that some of the more severe contemporary conflicts (military and otherwise) are being played out.

It is in the light of such considerations that the idea of security is being recast, both to deal with the wide range of threats to international peace and to incorporate the security concerns of people, and not merely states, around the world. In attempting to chart a course through the maze of threats to peace and security in Southern Africa, it is useful to concentrate on two deceptively simple questions: whose security is being addressed, and security from which

threats?

In answer to these questions, Ken Booth⁵ has argued that a redefinition of security requires broadening the concept both 'horizontally and vertically'. Expanding the definition horizontally involves creating an agenda that recognises that security is as dependent on such factors as political democracy, human rights, social and economic development, and environmental sustainability, as it is on military stability. To expand the concept vertically involves recognising that people should be the primary referent of security. In this way, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security that emerge at sub-national, national and transnational levels.

In Southern Africa, the debate on security, among others, has considered issues of common security, disarmament and the peaceful resolution of conflict.⁶ Common security is premised on the interdependence of nation-states and, since many problems transcend national borders, states are no longer capable of protecting their citizens unilaterally. In such a context, states share an interest in joint survival. States need to organise their security policies co-operatively and such arrangements are most effective when they are formalised.

While informal arrangements grant the political flexibility that is often necessary for effective diplomacy, it can work against the interests of less powerful states. Moreover, informal arrangements do not regulate inter-state behaviour in an agreed and predictable fashion and, as they are not binding, they tend to break down in times of crisis. Ultimately, the issue of informal arrangements should not be seen as mutually exclusive and it should be possible to incorporate an adequate measure of flexibility into formal conflict resolution procedures.⁷

Regional security will also be enhanced through disarmament. While arms build-up inevitably deepens insecurity and anxiety (the security dilemma), it also increases the potential that conflicts which may potentially be resolved peacefully, deteriorate into armed conflict. Disarmament may reduce the likelihood of such outcomes. Moreover, in contexts of underdevelopment (as in Southern Africa), resources may be redirected towards alleviating poverty which, in many instances, is the underlying cause of conflict.

Wider, more nuanced conceptions of security constitute a more adequate conceptual 'fit' with the realities that confront Southern Africa. At the same time, such conceptions encourage the development of a more appropriate regional security agenda. Nevertheless, the expanded security concept needs to be complemented with additional considerations. Firstly, attempts to uncover the region's security dynamics must recognise Southern Africa's position of economic dependence and political marginality within the global stratification system.⁸ Secondly, regional insecurity should also be explained as the product of the dynamic and historical interplay of domestic, global, political, economic, social and environmental factors. As these are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing, distinguishing between cause and effect is often an exercise shrouded in obscurity, as the following section on the sources of regional insecurity demonstrates.

SOURCES OF REGIONAL INSECURITY

Population Growth

Africa is generally characterised by very high rates of national population and urban growth. Population density varies from arid to well-watered areas. At present, Africa's population is growing at an average rate of 2,8 per cent per year (about 20 million persons). In Southern Africa, the population growth rate is expected to average 2,7 per cent over the next five years

(see Table 1). The long term major implication of population growth is that it tends to deplete and overstress the continent's natural resources base. This results in the emergence of problems related to the scarcity of water and lack of space in urban areas. It is no coincidence that the murderous events that have scarred Rwanda and Burundi occurred in the two most densely populated countries on the continent.

Uncontrolled population growth on the continent is primarily a reflection of the level of modernisation in Africa. Yet, it can also be attributed to inadequate educational facilities that would change public perceptions of optimal family size in favour of small families. It is further exacerbated by the confining to urban areas of service points at which family planning advice is provided, when these should be spread out to reach rural areas, and a general lack of enthusiasm for the use of modern birth control methods. Religious and traditional beliefs are often advanced in communities against the use of modern birth control measures. Fast, uncontrolled population growth seems to be on the increase in poorer countries in Southern Africa, such as Malawi and Swaziland. Even more affluent countries, like South Africa, will soon find themselves in serious difficulties if they do not embark on radical measures that will contain population growth as Table 1 indicates.

Table 1: Population Statistics (1995)⁹

Country	Population Density	Total Population	Average Annual Growth Rate (1995 - 2000)
Angola	9	11 500 000	3.1
Tanzania	30	28 500 000	3.1
Malawi	84	10 000 000	3.3
Zambia	13	9 500 000	2.9
Zimbabwe	29	11 200 000	2.1
Mozambique	22	18 000 000	3.1
Namibia	2	1 600 000	2.8
Botswana	2	1 550 000	3.1
Lesotho	66	2 000 000	2.5
Swaziland	55	950 000	3.3
South Africa	36	43 500 000	2.3
Mauritius	554	1 130 000	0.9

Africa is the least urbanised of the world's continents, but its urban populations are growing faster than anywhere else. In Southern Africa, this is particularly acute. In large part, it reflects the rural-urban imbalance, especially the traditional bias of African governments to spend more resources on urban areas. With thousands of rural dwellers streaming into already overcrowded cities, the battle for political power and resources is often most intense in urban areas where the battle lines between urban 'insider' and rural 'outsider' are starkly drawn.

Another consequence of population growth is that it fuels mass migrations in the region.

Mass Migrations

Southern Africa has one of the highest numbers of displaced people in the world. In South Africa alone, there are an estimated eight million illegal people from the region taking refuge within its

borders.¹⁰ The end of apartheid, South Africa's re-entry into the world community, and its relatively developed economy and infrastructure have made it a magnet for those fleeing famine, drought, economic deprivation, environmental degradation, conflict, persecution and human rights abuses in Southern Africa and, indeed Africa. For many, South Africa is a tempting 'oasis of opportunity' and Johannesburg is the main destination.

The economic implications to the host state of a large illegal immigrant population are potentially disastrous. In 1994, it was estimated that five million illegal immigrants cost the South African state R1 985 million.¹¹ In addition, there seems to be some truth in the statement that illegal immigrants are 'stealing' employment opportunities from South African citizens, in a context where a third of South Africa's adult population is unemployed! Various reports have illustrated the presence of illegal aliens in the agricultural, hotel and restaurant, construction and domestic sectors of the economy.¹²

The problem of illegal immigration is not only economic, but also social. The rising rates in crime and violence - prostitution, small arms and drug trafficking, car theft and armed robbery - are increasingly linked to the rising number of illegal immigrants. Police have estimated that fourteen per cent of crime in South Africa involves illegal immigrants.¹³ At the same time, there are severe health risks associated with illegal immigrants. The detection and control of such diseases as AIDS, cholera and malaria among this sector of the population are almost impossible.¹⁴

In order to deal with the problem of illegal immigration, the governments of Namibia, Botswana and South Africa have signified a 'get-tough' approach. In South Africa, the South African National Defence Force has stationed troops along the country's borders and coastline to curb the influx of illegal aliens. Police have arrested thousands of illegal traders and handed them over to immigration officials for deportation. Government figures show that 96 600 illegal aliens were deported to 39 countries in 1993. Some 81 000 of these came from Mozambique and nearly 11 000 from Zimbabwe.¹⁵

These efforts have nevertheless been *ad hoc* and ineffective. The responsible government departments are simply unable to deal with the sheer numbers of illegal immigrants entering the country daily. Indeed, some reports indicate that illegal immigrants are entering the country at the rate of one every ten minutes.¹⁶ Perhaps, in recognition of their own failure, cabinet has decided that illegal immigrants who have been resident in the country for five years, who are economically active, or who have a South African spouse should be allowed to settle in the country. According to Home Affairs Minister, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, this could result in a further six million instant South African citizens, with an attendant cost running into billions of rands.¹⁷

However, neither of these approaches are actually addressing the problem of population displacements. Short term, 'problem-solving' approaches in themselves, are futile. While stricter border controls and enforced repatriation have proved to be ineffective, it could also be argued that transforming South Africa into a refuge for all of Southern Africa's displaced does not solve the problem of why people move. Should South Africa transform itself into a haven for the poverty-stricken, oppressed peoples of Africa, it would not only be against the interests of its citizens, but would also adversely affect the region. After all, Southern Africa cannot benefit from an impoverished South Africa (as a result of hosting millions of migrants).

An effective strategy needs to be informed by wider, more inclusive definitions of security, as was briefly indicated above. This would seek to address the root causes that give rise to

population movements. In the Southern African context this would entail, among others, regional economic development, a respect for human rights, and the creation of an environmental regime. All these would invariably imply a long term project. But, it is equally obvious that, if this is not done, the haemorrhage will continue. After all, South Africa will continue to be a Canaan for illegal immigrants, as long as it is a relative oasis of plenty in a sea of poverty. South Africa will still serve as a haven for illegal immigrants as long as civil strife, violence, ethnic chauvinism and a general lack of respect for human rights continue to be the order of the day in the region.

Lack of Food Security

The comparatively low population density in Africa as a whole conceals a great disparity in various parts of the continent. Likewise, there is a significant variation in climatic conditions and the availability of arable land as Table 2 indicates. As a proportion of the total land area, Africa's arable land area is the smallest of all continents (except Oceania).

Table 2: Percentage of Arable Land ¹⁸

Country	Percentage of Arable Land (1991)
Mauritius	52
Angola	3
Tanzania	4
Malawi	18
Zambia	7
Zimbabwe	7
Mozambique	4
Namibia	1
Botswana	2
Lesotho	11
Swaziland	12
South Africa	11

Overall food production in Africa has increased by thirty per cent over the last decade, but *per capita* it declined by nine per cent or nearly one per cent per year. Few African countries produce enough food to meet their own needs. Lack of food security in the past has fomented riots and public disorder in many parts of the continent. Short-falls in the production of staple foods and other agricultural products have contributed to aggravate food insecurity. The lack of foreign exchange in the region and in Africa, generally, to redress these short-falls through commercial imports of grain is also a cause of major concern. Other major factors that continue to aggravate food shortages are erratic or insufficient rainfall; civil wars; price collapse of export commodities; prioritisation of export commodities at the expense of food production; population growth; inflow of food aid and the liberalisation of food imports which, in turn, has led to the reduction of food prices in the international markets.

To remedy the situation, the excessive production of agricultural products that are less in demand, has to be curtailed, and government mismanagement and inefficiencies with regard to food production sectors have to be corrected. Furthermore, investment policy also has to be biased in favour of creating the necessary infrastructure that would allow food production to prosper.

Disease

The region's stability is also hindered by the high incidence of diseases whose spread could be controlled through the provision of primary health care. Alongside the commonly known diseases on the continent, such as malaria, tuberculosis and water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, the prevalence of AIDS and its consequences are yet other major causes of concern.

Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infected adults in the world. In 1993, while it was estimated that thirteen million adults were infected by HIV world-wide, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for an astonishing eight million. A recent report by the Panos Institute in London shows that one in five of Zimbabwe's sexually active population will die prematurely, and four out of ten of their offspring will die in childhood as a result of the disease.¹⁹ In South Africa, estimates suggest that 27 per cent of the total population between the ages of fifteen and sixty will be HIV positive by the year 2000.²⁰ Besides the human loss, this implies devastating consequences for the regional economy in terms of decreased productivity and increased demands on the health infrastructure.

What accounts for these high statistics? Judith Head, in a breakthrough study, argues that the rapid spread of the virus in Southern Africa is intimately related to poverty, and not to sexual behaviour: *"Poverty is ubiquitous in Southern Africa. In many countries of the region large numbers of people regularly do not get enough food to eat. In addition to malnutrition; tuberculosis; bilharzia; malaria and measles are all common. All these diseases weaken the immune system and leave the individual more vulnerable to subsequent infection. It is plausible that if two people are exposed to HIV infection, the person with a compromised immune system will be more vulnerable than the person who is well-fed and healthy ... it follows that many more people will contract the virus in Africa, including South Africa, than the better-fed and healthy North Americans and Europeans."*²¹

The suggested conclusion is clear. If the spread of HIV is to be slowed down, poverty needs to be alleviated, implying the need for real economic growth.

Ethno-centric nationalism

A key feature of the post-Cold War era is the rampant resurgence of a chauvinistic ethnic nationalism in far corners of the world, as events in the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Rwanda have shown. Southern Africa has also not been spared the scourge of inter-ethnic violence. Although more muted, there are indications that ethnic rivalries may erupt in various areas of Southern Africa.

For many years the Angolan conflict was seen through the prism of a Cold War proxy conflict between the Marxist oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) being pro-West. Released from the straitjacket imposed by global bipolarity, the conflict has taken on increasingly ethnic and racial dimensions. Savimbi portrays himself as the leader of the Umbundu people, Angola's largest ethnic group, whom he claims are being marginalised by the MPLA. UNITA claims that the Kimbundu people and *mesticoes* (those of mixed Portuguese/Angolan descent) are the enemy, as they support the MPLA government.²² Although this is a simplistic ethnic dichotomy disproved in the recent elections in Angola when large sections of the Umbundu voted for the MPLA, ethnic tensions are sometimes easily exacerbated by leaders who exploit those differences for political gain.

This phenomenon is not confined to Angola. Since its inception in 1974, Inkatha under the leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has portrayed itself as a moderate, pro-Western alternative to the 'radical Communism' of the ANC. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unbanning of the ANC, however, Inkatha has pursued a narrower Zulu nationalist agenda, that has resulted in an upsurge in violent conflict with thousands of lives being lost in the troubled province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Unscrupulous political leadership is not the only reason for the resurgence of ethnocentric nationalism. In many cases, there are legitimate grievances held by specific sectors of the population who believe their needs are neglected by government. This is the case in Botswana. With a population of only 700 000, Botswana is divided into more than twenty different ethnic groups. One group - the Bakalanga - are demanding greater socio-economic and political recognition, as well as a recognition of language rights from the dominant Tswana.²³

In Mozambique, unscrupulous leadership and legitimate grievances have combined with devastating consequences. Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) largely draws its support from the Ndau ethnic group who inhabits parts of central Mozambique. Renamo's war against the government of the Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frelimo) was often portrayed as a struggle against a government dominated by Southerners. Frelimo supporters in the South are markedly better off socio-economically and in terms of education than their Ndau counterparts. While it is widely acknowledged that Renamo has been the creation of specific interested parties in South Africa and the former Rhodesia, it has recently been successful in using real grievances of the Ndau to carve out a constituency in the Mozambican political arena.

The advent of multiparty democracy in Southern Africa has at times exacerbated ethnic and regional tensions, as the Malawian experience indicates. The former Malawi Congress Party (MCP) derives its support largely from the Chewa tribe in the central region. Prior to the election in 1994, new political parties appeared to have organised themselves mainly along regional and ethnic lines. The Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) received most of its votes from the North, and the United Democratic Front (UDF) led the polling in the southern region.²⁴

The dilemma facing many countries in the region centres around the securing of the rights of particular ethnic groups in a democracy, while preventing narrow, ethnically motivated conflict. The dilemma is further complicated by the fact that African states have never been as integrated as their European counterparts. As is well known, nation-states across Africa were artificially created during the colonial era. Divergent ethnic groups were thrown together without due regard to historical conflicts, and the colonial policy of 'divide and rule' served to antagonise inter-ethnic rivalries. This legacy continues to have an impact on current developments.

In addition, arbitrary colonial borders sometimes cut through territories inhabited by a single ethnic group. Consider the larger numbers of Basotho people living in South Africa than in Lesotho, the number of Tswanas in South Africa opposed to those in Botswana, or the number of Swazis in South Africa opposed to those in Swaziland. In such cases, the potential for an emergence of a transnational ethnic consciousness is not unimaginable, especially if grievances are fuelled by demagogic leadership. Shifting allegiances in this way can occur within countries and also between them. For instance, Zulus in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa have expressed their desire to be part of KwaZulu-Natal, while sectors of the Ndebele population in southern Zimbabwe - historically related to the Zulus in South Africa - are outraged at being treated as second-class citizens by the Shona majority, and have sought incorporation into the Republic of South Africa.²⁵ In this case, they see themselves as part of a greater Zulu *diaspora*.

While inclusive nation-building would go a long way to assuage such ethnic tensions, poverty also needs to be combated. Economic development is after all one of the most effective ways to overcome ethnic conflict. Whenever or wherever the struggle for scarce resources intensifies, people organise themselves into ever-smaller groups to compete more effectively for access to resources. While such conflicts may be rationalised in terms of religion (for example, between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania), or ethnicity (for instance, between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda), the underlying imperative is the struggle for economic security. Economic growth, coupled with proper distribution policies will go far in averting most of these so-called 'ethnic', 'religious' and even 'regional' conflicts.

Small arms proliferation

A legacy of the almost 25 years of war in Southern Africa has been the surfeit of weaponry introduced into the region. As the region enters a period of relative peace, the problems associated with small arms proliferation, of which the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle is an example, have escalated. These have become tradable commodities that are widely available and are used for a variety of different purposes. In Mozambique alone, there are an estimated 1,5 million automatic weapons which move freely among the population.²⁶ Apart from fuelling crime in a host state, these weapons are increasingly being smuggled into South African townships via regional crime syndicates.

Once inside the townships, these weapons help to transform ethnic differences into ethnic conflict and political differences into political violence. In addition, crime by heavily armed assailants has risen dramatically. Between 1988 and 1993 murders in South Africa increased by fifty per cent, and armed robbery by 109 per cent.²⁷ In 1992, 500 people were killed and 575 injured in 650 incidents in which AK-47s were used. The same type of weapon was used in 165 robberies, indicating an increase of 61 per cent over the 1991 figure.²⁸

In an effort to curb the flow of weapons, Pretoria stepped up patrols on the country's borders and sought to impose more severe penalties on arms smugglers. This strategy met with little success for the following main reasons:

- the length of South Africa's borders make it difficult to patrol effectively;
- the budget of the security forces has been reduced; and
- Pretoria has approached the problem of arms smuggling unilaterally.

In 1992, however, the police established a special task force to stop cross border gun trafficking and began to seek greater co-operation with the Swazi, Lesotho and Mozambican police forces.²⁹ These regional initiatives have already paid some dividends. For example, in June and July 1995, a joint South African-Mozambican police operation inside Mozambique successfully located and destroyed a number of weapon caches.³⁰ The lesson to be gleaned from this is that arms smuggling could be combated more successfully at a regional level, as opposed to a national level.

The rocky road to political pluralism

The poor record of the African continent with regard to the promotion, observation and respect of human rights is increasingly under sharp focus in a bid to improve the situation. The main thrust of this ongoing debate focuses on developing integrated approaches to the protection of

human rights, while at the same time being sensitive to issues such as cultural diversity, pluralism, and minority rights. The major contradiction in this debate lies in the fact that the recognition of human rights as universal, interdependent, indivisible and interrelated, is not reconciled with the reality that human rights cannot be considered as an abstract notion devoid of cultural settings or as a set of values. Despite this, western countries and donor agencies are increasingly using the observance of human rights as a condition for granting aid.

Soon after the imminent destruction of the Soviet system was signified when the Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989, the winds of multiparty democracy started to blow strongly in Southern Africa. The corrupt one-party system of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia was replaced by Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). In Malawi, the despotic rule of President-for-life Hastings Kamuzu Banda came to a peaceful end when Malawians went to the polls for the first time and voted Banda and his Malawi Congress Party out of power. He was replaced by Bakili Muluzi's United Democratic Front (UDF). In Lesotho, the rule of the generals ended and the Basotho National Party lost their dominance in an election which brought Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle and his Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) to power. In South Africa, white minority rule came to a relatively peaceful end on 27 April 1994, the country's first racially inclusive elections. Meanwhile, both of the region's former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique started to make the long and difficult transition to political pluralism.

The history of mankind has not been one of linear progress, and so, invariably, the democratic process received some severe setbacks. Swaziland continues to be ruled by a despotic King Mswati III who treats the country as little more than his own personal feudal kingdom. There are still severe question marks hanging over the political stability of Mozambique and Angola where the advent of multiparty democracy has resulted in the endorsement of FRELIMO and the MPLA respectively. In both countries, opposition parties, such as UNITA and RENAMO, have found it difficult to accept their subordinate position. This is aggravated by the fact that, after years of civil war, a culture of violence has permeated the entire society, reinforcing the perception that changes may only be brought about by the bullet and not the ballot. In Zimbabwe, opposition parties have accused President Robert Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU (PF)) of intimidation. In addition, a democratic press has been gagged effectively by various draconian pieces of legislation and the imprisonment of journalists critical of the ruling party. In Zambia, the newly-elected Chiluba government has lost any pretense of democracy, and ordinary Zambians have increasingly become disillusioned with the MMD. Journalists have been imprisoned, Kenneth Kaunda and his United Independence Party (UNIP), the only credible opposition to Chiluba, have been harassed, and various ministers of the new ruling political elite have been implicated in corruption. In Malawi, the fragility of the African polity in which democratic transition takes place, has been underlined by the attempted *coup* in February 1995 by a group of army officers against the Muluzi administration. In Lesotho, Prime Minister Mokhehle's BCP has increasingly become more totalitarian. All Principal Secretaries in the Lesotho civil service have been replaced by members of the BCP. The use of the Westminster first-past-the-post system in the 1993 elections resulted in the BCP winning all sixty seats in the new Parliament, while the rival BNP, which won 25 per cent of the national vote, obtained no seats. The outcome is *de facto* one-party rule that has inhibited broad political participation, undermined the development of a vibrant civil society, and generated new extra-parliamentary forms of protest and opposition.

Obviously, this is an untenable state of affairs. Southern Africa cannot hope to escape from its current economic *malaise* if there is no democracy. After all, a functional relationship exists between good governance, foreign investment and economic growth. The problems posed by democratic transition in African states are further complicated by poor civil-military relations.

The Role of the Armed Forces

In a historical context, Africa's civil-military relations are characterised by an interventionist political culture, insubordination to civilian control and a lack of transparency, accountability and professionalism. Two factors seem to have played a prominent role to render these relations fragile.

Firstly, the political *elite* of the continent sought to cultivate a close and special relationship with the military, because the military monopolised the use of force and was held in high esteem in those countries where it played a role to end colonial rule or where it was to avert a potential threat of external aggression. This relationship guaranteed special privileges and benefits for the military and in turn placed the politicians in a better position to use the military for political expediency.

The second factor which contributed to erode civil-military relations in Africa was the creation of a situation that would discourage academics and civil society to scrutinise these relations. This was largely the case during the Cold War. Governments and military staff shared a common perception that security forces did not fall into the purview of academic or civilian scrutiny. Security forces also tended to over-exaggerate sensitivity over national security questions to protect confidentiality from civilians whose motives were always considered suspect. Under these circumstances, civil society and academics applied self-censorship and self-restraint because the study of security forces was clearly a 'no-go' area. Sensational events like *coups*, mutinies and strikes became the only events that left the security forces open to scrutiny.

The above factors served as fertile ground for the politicisation of the security forces and their transformation into *de facto* armed wings of ruling parties. In turn, this encouraged forces to demand preferential and different treatment to that accorded other civil servants and encouraged unaccountability and a lack of transparency to prosper. Furthermore, it obliterated any semblance of civil and legislative control over the forces left behind by former colonial administrators.

In recent years the salience of military intrusions into politics appeared to be on the decline as moves toward democratisation gained momentum. There are now indications of a revival of the 'cult of the military', as armed forces once again pose a serious challenge to the state - for example in Gambia, Nigeria and more recently in Lesotho and Niger.

Military intervention is not a habit the men with guns will find easy to abandon. Even in the absence of military threats, many governments and leaders are constantly having to glance nervously over their shoulders to see what their armies are up to, particularly in Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Nor have the traditional devices of recruiting the armed forces from supposedly reliable ethnic groups or deliberately politicising the senior officer corps proved totally reassuring. Military leaders, like politicians, like to stay in power, once they have tasted its heady effects.

A related and disconcerting development is the emergence of shadowy, ill-disciplined, rebel movements comprised of dispossessed and disaffected rural youth, many still children, for whom aimless violence has become a way of life and a source of personal liberation. While several 'terrorist' organisations, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and the elusive 18th February Movement in Kenya, exhibit some of the characteristics of this phenomenon, the paradigmatic case is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ravaging Sierra Leone. Renamo, a

movement accused of many of the same characteristics, was accommodated within a conventional political structure in Mozambique. The end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique has not brought about peace in these two troubled states. Demobilised soldiers have increasingly turned to banditry and other nefarious criminal activities. Two factors enhance such activities: the easy availability of small arms and ammunition, and the freedom from constraints that exists in societies in the process of disintegration.

Given this state of affairs, the major challenge in the proper regulation of Africa's civil-military relations lies in designing mechanisms that will effectively contain the destabilising role of the security forces in their efforts to oust democratically elected governments, entrenchment of civil and legislative control over these forces and the inculcation of a culture of accountability, transparency and professionalism. In a bid to re-design their civil-military relations, African countries have to demonstrate sensitivity towards national interests and other considerations, as opposed to the importation of ideas that may not be compatible to their conditions.

There have been recent indications that organisations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as individual donor countries, accept that the reorientation of the African armed forces, civil-military relations and demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants may have to be part and parcel of any type of socio-economic restructuring package. More bluntly, the allocation of a portion of aid money to the reorientation of the military, getting them back to the barracks and keeping them there, may be money well spent. Included in such measures would be reinvigorating African-Western military ties (to achieve a transfer of organisational culture), comprehensive civil-military education programmes, direct military training assistance and the limited use of the military in support of nation-building activities.

Lack of Economic Growth

Whereas lack of economic growth is prevalent throughout the continent, economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is less than that of North Africa. The continent's poor economic growth is attributed to three major factors: the debt crisis, over-dependence on one or two export commodities and the failure of economic structural adjustment programmes.

Table 3: GNP per capita (1993)³¹

Country	GNP per capita US\$
Uganda	190
Kenya	270
Burundi	180
Rwanda	200
Equatorial Guinea	360
Gabon	4 050
Congo	920
Zaire	210
Angola	620
Madagascar	240
Tanzania	100
Malawi	220
Zambia	370

Zimbabwe	540
Mozambique	80
Namibia	1 660
Botswana	2 590
Lesotho	660
Swaziland	1 050
South Africa	2 900
Mauritius	2 980

A recent World Bank report on adjustment in Africa estimated that, at the present growth rates, it will take forty years before the impoverished African states south of the Sahara regain the level of income *per capita* of the mid-1970s. It is not surprising, therefore, that the economic prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa vary from bad to catastrophic, with even Botswana appearing to falter in its hitherto impressive record. The GDP *per capita* of Sub-Saharan Africa is US \$550, compared to US \$2 200 in North Africa and US \$4 000 for the world. This increases the danger of complete economic collapse and constitutes a threat to any investment in these countries. Needless to say, these problems are not amenable to short term solutions, nor to diplomacy or security co-operation to diffuse them. Such an economic collapse would jeopardise good governance and the ability of states to meet the economic needs of their populations.

Table 4: Global Human Development Ratings, 1992³²

Country	Ratings out of 173
Uganda	154
Kenya	125
Burundi	152
Rwanda	153
Equatorial Guinea	150
Gabon	114
Congo	123
Zaire	140
Angola	155
Madagascar	131
Tanzania	148
Malawi	157
Zambia	138
Zimbabwe	121
Mozambique	159
Namibia	127
Botswana	87
Lesotho	120
Swaziland	117
South Africa	93
Mauritius	60

Dependence on aid and the fact that countries with heavy debts have to pay high interest rates on their loans, are some of the factors that have further aggravated the indebtedness of some

countries in Africa.

Economic and structural adjustment programmes are perceived to have aggravated economic problems in Africa further. In particular, it appears to have created a compulsion of prioritising the export of commodities at the expense of food production. Food production tends to suffer more, because governments are compelled to remove their subsidies on staple foods. This often foments dissatisfaction and political riots, as does the emphasis on the privatisation of non-profitmaking industries which is one of the basic prerequisites in the implementation of these programmes.

Over-dependence on the export of one or two commodities is yet another issue that impacts negatively on the continent. Sub-Saharan Africa relies on the export of primary commodities which cannot compensate for imported manufactured commodities. This has an implication for regional integration, as most countries are producers of primary commodities and minerals which are sold to western markets and thus curtails efforts to increase the level of intra-regional trade. The other implication is that deficits in the balance of payments will always be experienced unless major investments are forthcoming. Food exporting countries will continue to experience problems because of food aid, over-production and the liberalisation of food imports which has led to the reduction of food prices. Countries producing processed commodities are equally not spared, because they face tough tariff barriers.

Other than the above, the lack of technical and entrepreneurial skills, the decline of the natural resource base, an underdeveloped infrastructure, and a lack of political and social stability, more especially in Southern Africa, are factors that have also had an adverse effect on economic growth in Africa.

THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Given the transnational nature of the threats facing Southern Africa, several commentators have suggested that regional integration is the only way that such threats can be dealt with effectively.³³ Sam Nolutshungu, for instance, makes a strong case for a Southern African security community. It is important to understand that such a security community is seen as a precursor to formal regional integration.³⁴ The purpose of this section is to deal with the question of security communities and regional integration conceptually, and to discuss its practical utility in the Southern African context.

Is Southern Africa a region?

Up to this point, the term 'region' have been used rather freely, but it is imperative to arrive at a more precise meaning. The primary, common sense usage connotes physical contiguity, but, as Evans and Newnham illustrate, proximity is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for physical stipulation of a region: *"Between state actors, contiguity as a variable in delineating regions produces mixed results. For example, there is a core area contained within the concept of 'Western Europe' which includes the founding six of the European Community. At the periphery, things become more confused. Iceland and Ireland presumably mark the western fringes but where is the eastern fringe? Similarly, with the region of the Middle East. A core area can be identified but is Libya part of it, or of North Africa? Is Turkey part of Europe or part of the Middle East? ... Clearly, more is needed than proximity to confidently stipulate the meaning of region."*³⁵

To define Southern Africa as a region is similarly problematic. Is the region the Southern African

Customs Union (SACU) states (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland), or is it the twelve Southern African Development Community (SADC) states, or the twenty-two states constituting COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)? By which criteria was Mauritius offered membership of SADC, whereas Madagascar, which is geographically closer to other SADC states, was not?

Obviously, other criteria are needed to define a region. One of the criteria which Evans and Newnham³⁶ have identified is homogeneity at both the social, economic and political levels.

Social homogeneity may be defined as involving socio-cultural factors such as race, religion, language and history. Factors within the state can contribute to a sense of nationalism, while between states it can contribute to a sense of regionalism. But Southern Africa has little homogeneity in this regard. It is characterised by a great deal of heterogeneity at the levels of race, religion and language. On the other hand, its history was characterised by a great deal of violence between the various tribal groupings even before colonialism and white settlement, which further aggravated this violent past. Southern Africa is characterised by neither nationalism (with the possible exception of South Africa) or regionalism; rather it is characterised by a plethora of narrow ethnic sub-nationalisms (as explained above). In fact, there appears to be very little political or economic homogeneity in Southern Africa. By these criteria, Southern Africa clearly fails the litmus test to describe itself as a region.

Towards a Southern African Security Community?

The concept of a security community was first developed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. Deutsch argued that a security community was formed among participating states, when their peoples, and particularly their political *elite*, held stable expectations of peace between themselves in the present and for the future.³⁷ According to Deutsch, the two main indicators of a security community are:

- where policy-makers of political units and their respective societies cease to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare; and
- where states cease to allocate resources for building military capabilities aimed at each other.³⁸

Southern Africa, once more, does not meet these criteria. Who can forget that Botswana and Zimbabwe nearly went to war in the early 1990s over access to the waters of the Saabi River, or the fact that Botswana and Namibia nearly went to war over a territorial dispute. These examples certainly indicate that Southern African states have not ceased to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare. The second criterion is more difficult to prove or, indeed, to disprove. For example, while it is known that Botswana is undergoing a massive military build-up, the purpose of the build-up is unclear. Defence expenditure currently stands at 8,8 per cent of GDP, with indications that it will increase to 12,5 per cent of GDP over the next five years. As to the purpose of this heightened defence expenditure in an environment which is relatively peaceful, the only comment that could be elicited from the commander of the Botswana Defence Force, Lieutenant-General Ian Khama, was: "*We are trying to build a force which will deter any potential threat.*"³⁹ Certainly, this does not reflect much faith in the durability of the climate of peace in Southern Africa.

In addition to Deutsch's two criteria, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff add yet another facilitating factor for the formation of security communities, namely the presence of an external threat of force.⁴⁰ It

could be argued that one of the factors spurring on the development of the European Community was the real threat of Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Similarly, it could be argued that fear of apartheid South Africa's aggression prompted the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). The question which now needs to be addressed is where the external threat arises in the context of a post-apartheid, post-Cold War Southern Africa.

Thus it is doubtful, by the criteria listed above, whether Southern Africa could constitute a security community.

Towards Regional Integration?

What is integration? Jones defines integration as the "*... process by which a supranational condition is achieved, in which larger political units conduct the business now carried out by national governments.*"⁴¹ For Haas integration is "*... the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.*"⁴² Lindberg, on the other hand, sees integration as the process "*... whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs.*"⁴³

Although there are minor differences in each of these definitions, they have one thing in common: each views regional integration as a centripetal process which is supranational in character. This, in turn, establishes one of the basic prerequisites for regional integration: a willingness on the part of states, which form part of the process, to surrender certain powers to a central supranational body. Brussels and the European Union display such supranational characteristics. On the other hand, Gaberone and SADC display the characteristics of an inter-government body as opposed to a transnational one. The reason for this is not hard to find: national self-interest is predominant as opposed to a collective regional interest. It could be argued that a mechanism needs to be found which reconciles national self-interest with a collective regional interest. But this is difficult to do. Consider the case of Nigeria's 'bullying' role within ECOWAS, Chile's 'hegemonic' role within the Andean League, Zimbabwe's behaviour within SADC, and the dissolution of the East African Community. In each of these instances the regional project foundered on the rocks of national self-interest. Within SADC, the danger posed by national self-interest to the regional project has been underlined by the failure of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) initiative. In Southern Africa, the dangers of national self-interest are further aggravated by the role of personalities, where leaders, like Robert Mugabe, seek to dominate the process of regional integration and would view any encroachment on their national power base by a supranational entity with intense suspicion.

The fact that SADC is more an inter-government than a supranational body, accounts for its very weakness. This weakness became apparent in 1994 during the Lesotho constitutional crisis when King Letsie III dismissed the democratically elected Prime Minister. In a bid to restore democracy in the mountain kingdom, South Africa with Botswana and Zimbabwe, successfully pressurised Letsie III to step down in favour of his father King Moshoeshoe II and for Prime Minister Mokhekhle to return to office. What is interesting to note, however, is that the actions undertaken by Pretoria, Harare and Gaberone took place outside SADC structures. More recently, the situation in Swaziland has deteriorated. There is a patent lack of democracy, opposition leaders have been intimidated and imprisoned, and there is evidence of other gross human rights abuses. Although democracy and a respect for human rights is something which

SADC frequently pays lip service to and is supposed to promote in Southern Africa, it has been powerless or has refused to act in the case of Swaziland. Once more, it was left to the regional triumvirate of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to raise the twin issues of political pluralism and human rights violations with King Mswati III.

Another precondition for integration is a high degree of economic and political complementarity.⁴⁴ Does Southern Africa exhibit such a high degree of economic and political complementarity? The answer is emphatically no! At the economic level, South Africa's GNP contributes 84 per cent to Southern Africa's regional GNP. To put it another way, the average South African earns 36 times more than the average Mozambican.⁴⁵ Looking at the European example of integration, it is important to note that such a state of affairs serves as an impediment to regional integration. During the 1960s, when Turkey requested membership of the European Union, its application was repeatedly turned down, as West European leaders feared that the wage differentials of 10:1 would cause Turkey's citizens to swamp West European capitals. Most of the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are similarly structured, and produce, consume, export and import essentially the same goods. Instead of complementing each other, the countries of Southern Africa are competing, especially in exports of mostly primary commodities that are sent to similar markets, generally in Western Europe. They also compete in importing the same products from the same source - again mostly Western Europe. In a comprehensive historical study that was released during April 1995, that looked at attempts at regional integration, irrespective of their success rates, and involved all five continents, the World Bank found that the twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest level of complementarity of all those studied. The bank concluded that *"this strongly suggests that the structure of African countries' exports and imports differs so widely that regional trade integration efforts hold little promise for accelerating industrialisation and growth."*⁴⁶ In fact, only 2,7 per cent of the region's total trade is among members.

As to political complementarity, one need only to point out the level of democracy in South Africa, as opposed to Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe or Zambia, to the tenuous situation in Mozambique and Angola, and the decay of countries bordering on the north and north-west of the Southern Africa 'region'.

Thus, by the various criteria set out above, Southern African regional integration still remains a vision rather than a reality.

CONCLUSION

This paper has situated the debate about security and insecurity within the context of 'new thinking' and argued that these wider, more nuanced conceptions of security constitute a more adequate conceptual 'fit' with the realities confronting Southern Africa. Some of these realities reinforce insecurity, among them the high population growth, mass migration, lack of food security, rising incidence of disease, resurgence of ethno-centred nationalism, proliferation of small arms and ammunition, incomplete and halting progress to political pluralism, continued destabilising role of the armed forces, and the lack of sustained economic growth. Each of these sources of insecurity were briefly discussed and provided the backdrop to discuss the popular quest, at least at the rhetorical level, of regional integration in Southern Africa. The fundamental question is simply: 'Is Southern Africa a region?', to which the objective answer appears negative. In fact, the region described as Southern Africa fails every litmus test on regional integration except that of proximity. In the same manner that living next to someone does not imply good neighbourliness or a community identity in itself, the fact that the countries in Southern Africa share common borders and occupy the southernmost tip of the African continent

does not in itself justify any real 'region', apart from the mere ascriptive use of the term.

Progress towards a shared democratic value system among the various constituent states of the region, and sustainable and rapid economic growth are clearly the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security in Southern Africa. However, the prospects for a greater degree of regional economic integration do not appear to be favourable and the surge of democratisation of the 1980s appears to be faltering.

Although regional economic integration and multilateral co-operation may be a slow process, bilateral security arrangements between South Africa and its neighbours on a variety of issues of mutual interest are flourishing.⁴⁷ While the commitment to SADC and the OAU dominates at a rhetorical level, it is often these bilateral arrangements which rapidly produce tangible results - an impression which is confirmed in private discussions with officials from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

Bilateral agreements have even been signed at provincial level between South Africa and neighbouring regions. During June 1995, for example, Mpumalanga Premier Mathews Phosa signed an agreement with the neighbouring Mozambican provinces of Maputo and Gaza.⁴⁸

In contrast, academic discussions have concentrated on encompassing terms of collective regional security, in which multilateral arrangements would include non-military concerns. This latter debate has been heavily influenced by the model of the former Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE - now the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)). The OSCE's major strength lies in it essentially being a process within which participating states co-operate in finding a solution as against the adoption of a prescription formulated by a qualified majority. The sharing of common values, parity in levels of development, and similarity of geopolitical constellations are some of the instrumental factors that ease communication and foster good relations among participating states. In this way amicable solutions and maximum agreement prevail.

While co-operation is easily achievable among partners sharing a common system of values and the same level of development, this is not readily so when significant disparities are evident among the participating countries. This parity in levels of development clearly does not exist to any real degree in Southern Africa. The absence in parity could lead to the establishment of a hierarchy and domination amongst co-operating partners. Economic leverage tends to determine decision-making and the ability to execute a mandate. In the long run, this could undermine an effective regional co-operative structure.

What are the implications of the above in addressing the various sources of regional security? First of all, it does not mean or imply any reduction in the quest towards regional integration and the establishment of regional co-operative measures. It does imply a measure of prudent caution in the often unrealistic expectations that abound of the capacity of sub-regional organisations to affect meaningful regional integration and co-operation. In fact, the reality of daily experiences in the region underscore the conclusion that technical and bureaucratic co-operation such as that within the ambit of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) is more meaningful and the real substance of regional co-operation, while bilateral agreements and negotiations will dominate formal inter-state relations for many years to come. Such is the reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of Southern Africa.

ENDNOTES

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established grazing, together with temporary fallow land, as a percentage of the total land area).

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33. See Solomon & Carim, *op. cit.*; Nolutshungu, *op. cit.*; P Vale, **Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness: South Africa and Regional Security in the mid-1990s**, CMI Report Series, 4, 1994.
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47. Examples include measures to counter weapon smuggling, drug smuggling, cattle rustling and vehicle theft, disaster relief, security training and assistance, policing of maritime exclusion zones, etc. The recent agreement between South Africa and Mozambique to counter the trade in small arms has led to a joint operation in Mozambique between the South African Police Services and the Mozambican authorities during which the task force destroyed more than a thousand weapons within a matter of months. On 12 June 1995 South Africa and Namibia signed a comprehensive agreement on cross-border policing aimed at combating syndicates smuggling drugs, arms and stolen vehicles. The agreement, signed by South African Minister of Safety and Security, Sidney Mufamadi and Namibia's Deputy Home Affairs Minister, Jerry Ekandjo, also included provision for joint border patrols and the sharing of specialised training and technology; see *SA-Namibia Deal to Fight Border Crime*, **The Citizen**, 13 June 1995.
48. The agreements include increased security against highway bandits, wildlife protection, organised tourist promotion, agriculture, use of common water resources and training of administrative, cultural and sports staff; see *Phosa Signs Security Pacts in Mozambique*, **The Citizen**, 13 June 1995. Provinces are increasingly becoming involved in the execution of South Africa's interests in the region, to the extent that the Department of Foreign Affairs is establishing a Directorate: Provincial Liaison to act as liaison between the provincial administrations and the various branches of the Department, and to co-ordinate activities of mutual concern outside the borders of the country. DFA, *The Southern African Development Community: An Integrated Approach towards Regional Co-operation and Development*, paper read at **The SADC and ISDSC: South African Perspectives**, IDP round-table discussion, 26 September 1995, Pretoria.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Larry Swatuk

INTRODUCTION

*"Southern Africa is undergoing a massive transformation. Cities and towns are mushrooming across the region. Demand for permanent housing, for water, sewage and transport systems, for industrial and consumer products is increasing. Building on the real post-independence improvements in health and education provision, the people of Southern Africa are creating a new landscape much as they created the agricultural landscape of the past. Yet such a process of development brings new problems - not just of pollution and resource exhaustion but, significantly, of renewable resources. Energy requirements, wood consumption and, most importantly, water demand will be critical resources issues to address in the 21st century."*¹

The Southern African region faces common problems which derive in part from the nature of uneven and inconsistent capitalist development. These problems have been exacerbated by decades of liberation struggle, South African state-directed interventions based on political criteria, and, more recently, more than a decade of economic structural adjustment programmes. If the region is to move toward a sustainable and prosperous future, it must move together. For eco-systems respect no political borders: questions of resource use and sustainability must be approached from within a regional framework, otherwise natural resources will mark future sites of conflict rather than sources of co-operation.²

Building a coalition around environmental issues will not be easy. As with every other issue in South(ern) African society, environmental issues are deeply political, conflict generating, and tinged with questions of race.³ According to Ramphela and McDowell, *"[e]nvironmental issues are relevant to all people. It has been argued that they have the potential 'to build alliances across the divides of class and race' as, for example, in the public reaction to the indiscriminate use of pesticides. But in reality, there is no smooth and easy convergence of class and race interests around this issue."*⁴

This must begin to change if the environment is to become a focal point for 'healing' rather than 'disease', for signs of the ailment is everywhere: unchecked urbanisation, misuse and abuse of diminishing amounts of communal lands, virtually unregulated commercial agricultural and large-scale industrial practises, and the incapacity and/or unwillingness of government to deal with any or all of the aforementioned pressures.

Moreover, an increasingly and disturbingly familiar array of symptoms suggests that the patient, if left unattended, may reach a terminal condition: reassertion of diseases such as tuberculosis, cholera, and bilharzia; desertification due to overgrazing, overstocking, and heightening uses of fuel wood; siltation of dams and riverbeds due to soil run-off; water and air pollution due to improper use of pesticides, toxic waste dumping and inadequate control of industrial emissions.⁵

The costs of continually ignoring these problems are beginning to be recognised. And if the language of 'sustainable development' remains more rhetoric than reality, at least the region has begun to move in the direction of co-operation on some of these issues.⁶

It is the purpose of this article to explore some of the obstacles and incentives for increased regional co-operation on issues of the environment. It locates the majority of these obstacles and incentives within prevailing forms of regional state formations and economic interaction. It emphasises the long term sustainability of the region's political economies on these bases, and points to areas of potential co-operation. These areas, if left unexplored, may ultimately lead the region toward conflict and continued decline. If addressed systematically and seriously, these areas will form the basis for potential co-operation and renewal.

A GLOBAL 'PARADIGM SHIFT'?

In a trenchant summary of the implications for future developments in South Africa of the Earth Summit, Rachel Wynberg notes, "*almost 50 000 people gathered in Rio de Janeiro during June 1992 for what has been described as the inception of the Environmental Revolution.*"⁷ Perhaps its revolutionary potential lay in the fact that a wide range of non-government organisations (NGOs), and representatives from women's, indigenous peoples', youth and children's, religious and academic groups and organisations were able to attend in an official capacity. Even though many were unhappy about the 'inclusiveness' of this non-government sector, their participation marked a watershed in international dialogue on environmental issues: not only a move toward co-operation and away from confrontation, but a move toward decentring the state and recognising the fundamental importance of non-state actors, forces and factors, on issues of the environment.⁸

BETWEEN 'SAYING' AND 'DOING'

The Earth Summit has built on twenty years' of discussion at the international level: from the first Stockholm conference in 1972 through the Brandt and Brundtland reports of the late-1970s and mid-1980s. What emerged from the Rio meeting, its inclusiveness notwithstanding, was much the same as emerged from past meetings: incisive analyses and lofty proclamation about what should be done to achieve sustainability in global development.⁹

As to what is being done, the world of policy-making and inter-state concerns looks much the same in 1996 as it did in 1972. Yet, the world has changed utterly, even though policy-making and political behaviour have not.¹⁰ The 'deep greens', for one, argue that these profound structural changes in global political economy and ecology are due to the intractable pursuit of 'business as usual'. The global political economy with its emphasis on states and markets operating in varying contexts of anarchy is leading inexorably toward a global 'tragedy of commons'.

NEVERTHELESS, SOME 'THINKING'

Despite the continuing dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm, the discourse of 'sustainable development' has had a positive impact on popular and policy-making communities throughout Southern Africa. The global trend toward the language, if not always the practise, of 'sustainable development' has at least forced the racist, exploitative, and very often unscrupulous corporate and political *elite* in the region toward some sort of environmental accountability. While these kinds of activities continue, it is clear that the global environmental movement has had some effect on business in Southern Africa, if only their decision to 'circle the wagons'. For example, in 1991, business convened the Southern African International Conference on Environmental Management in Cape Town (SAICEM I), which has since become a regular event. At the same time, business has joined together on environmental issues in South Africa *via* the Industrial Environmental Forum (IEF), and in Zimbabwe *via* the Environmental Forum of Zimbabwe (EFZ). These efforts clearly came in response to the growing popular excitement over the Rio Summit on the Environment in 1992.

To be sure, capital continues to resist infringement on its profit-making abilities. It also continues to argue that marketisation and rapid economic growth are the *panaceas* for environmental degradation.¹¹ Nevertheless, they have joined the dialogue, provide a useful counterpoint to deep green perspectives, and so facilitate debate.

Also in response to developing global environmental 'norms' (indeed, conditionalities), each state in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has established an Environmental Council and/or Commission.¹² In addition, "[s]ince 1987, and especially since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, African countries have begun to develop plans and strategies to address their environmental problems. One of the principal methods for accomplishing this has been through national environmental action planning (NEAP) ... NEAPs are strategic frameworks within which environmental and sustainable development issues are identified and prioritised, and constitute the foundation for a plan of action."¹³ At the same time, "[i]n an increasing number of African cities, local environmental action planning (LEAP) has begun", including Cape Town and Dar es Salaam.¹⁴

At the regional level, SADC-ELMS (SADC's Environment and Land Management Sector) produced a special report for the United Nations Convention on Environment and Development (UNCED) Secretariat entitled **Sustaining our Common Future** in 1991. More recently, SADC in association with Panos Publishers, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), produced an overview of environmental issues and problems in the region.¹⁵ SADC has also taken a leading role in turning the Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN) into a regional project. There has also been a proliferation of country-specific environmental think tanks, of which SARDC is a good example. Originally started as a research centre documenting South Africa's destabilisation of the region, SARDC has since grown in scope and size, with a significant amount of its resources committed to environmental issues.

THE PERILS OF SAYING, BUT NOT DOING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Though much 'thinking' and 'talking' has been done, it is still early days in terms of action. In Southern Africa, this lack of action is particularly serious. All SADC countries' economies, save for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS), contracted significantly during the course of the 1980s. Botswana, still the 'darling' of the neo-classical economic world, has for several years been suffering economic contraction.¹⁶ Causes of poor economic performance are legion and well known. Resulting debts have led to *de facto* and *de jure* adoption of economic structural adjustment programmes throughout the region. Trends in world production have moved toward a new international division of labour, involving in part, the globalisation of production, the exponential increase in the speed and magnitude of finance capital flows, and a general decline in demand for resources which drove heavy industries in the past.¹⁷

Southern Africa's states and peoples increasingly find themselves on the periphery of this process: their products poorly developed and in little demand save for limited special preferences *vis-à-vis* Lomé and limited special performances by a few regionally-based multinational conglomerates such as Lonrho, Anglo American, and De Beers in the areas of sugar, timber, textiles and minerals. Moreover, regional 'development' is hampered by capital flight and limited foreign investment, the legacy of apartheid-driven sanctions and regional instability.¹⁸ Like the African continent in general, Southern African states have often declared their intention to take a collective approach to problem solving in the region. Yet, strong, vested domestic interests - from protected companies to embattled regimes - combine with the imperatives of international capitalism - particularly through structural adjustment programme (SAP) conditionalities - to limit regional co-operation and push Southern Africa's peoples further toward Kaplan's hypothesised "*coming anarchy*".¹⁹

In the wake of this behaviour, new threats have emerged in all SADC states, including its

newest member, South Africa. The feelings of alienation from and abandonment by the state on the part of the majority of the region's peoples, exacerbated in some cases by the negative impacts of structural adjustment, have given rise to sub- and supra-national redefinitions of 'security' and 'community': from Islam and ethnicity to crime networks and co-operatives.²⁰

Everywhere there is increasing incapacity of the state to take remedial actions. As a result, unemployment is increasing and the majority of Southern Africans find themselves engaged in some form of informal sector activity, including some specifically unsavoury pursuits, such as drugs, wildlife, and weapon trade, in order to make ends meet. Clearly, Southern Africa's political economies cannot continue on this highly destructive path.²¹

BUILDING CONFIDENCE, FINDING CONSENSUS

Post-apartheid South(ern) Africa desperately needs to focus on issues with co-operative and consensus-building potential if anything positive is to emerge out of the new dispensation. Only in this way may the legacy of suspicion and conflict in inter- and intra-state relations begin to be overcome.²² The environment is such an issue. Albie Sachs touched a nerve when he argued that South Africa's new constitution should include 'third generation' or 'green rights': "*[The struggle against apartheid] is first and foremost a battle for political rights, but it is also about the quality of life in a new South Africa. It is not just playing with metaphors to say that we are fighting to free the land, the sky, the waters, as well as the people. Apartheid not only degrades the inhabitants of our country, it degrades the earth, the air and the streams. When we say Mayibuye Afrika, come back Africa, we are calling for the return of legal title, but also for restoration of the land, the forest and the atmosphere: the greening of our country is basic to its healing ... There is a lot of healing to be done in South Africa.*"²³

LEARNING BY DOING I: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS

In the South(ern) African case, resource use issues have usually been resolved by a combination of conflict and violence: from relatively peaceful demonstrations over pollution of the coastal waters around the Western Cape, to physical removal of black families for apartheid and/or 'development' purposes. Yet, resource issues need not always be dealt with in this way. People, particularly policy-makers, will often take a peaceful path around an issue if possible. One of the major problems with Kaplan-type scenarios over the environment is that they overstate the degree to which problems of scarcity will lead directly to or be resolved by violence. State-makers and citizens alike can and do 'relearn' their interests, especially when peaceful options with variable pay-offs can be presented to them.²⁴

With regard to the question of whether international actors 'learn' and therefore modify behaviour depending on specific clusters of issues, Haas tells us that "*[c]hanging perceptions of values and interests among actors are associated with changed behaviour, though not in obedience to any pattern of rationality imputed or imposed by the observer. There is no fixed 'national interest' and no 'optimal regime'.*"²⁵ Similarly, it can be argued that there are neither fixed interests nor optimal ways of organising inter- and intra-state behaviour on issues of the environment and development. Positions change as information changes.

There is scope for co-operation on many environmental issues. Regionally and in South Africa in particular, the environment has been a recurrent site of struggle leading to violent conflict. The very notion of the 'environment' needs to be reconfigured and presented anew to the public. One possible point of departure, as argued by David Fig, is the appointment by government of an 'environmental champion' - like Albie Sachs, for example - a person who appeals to a broad

base of society and is not associated with middle-class, white, 'conservationism' under the old apartheid regime.²⁶ Susan Tanner, director of Friends of the Earth Canada, argues that Vice President Al Gore serves such a role in the US and along with Carolyn Browner, Gore has managed to push ahead with progressive environmental legislation: from mandatory Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), to sanctions against Taiwan for their role in the global trade in endangered species.²⁷

There is also a need to strengthen national and regional environmental institutions. These institutions can serve dual purposes: as talking shops where antagonistic interest groups can present their cases and ideas in a civil(ised) setting; and as research institutions, as information is crucial to this process. Regional governments must also work to enhance their capabilities for environmental monitoring and analysis. Moreover, governments must commit enough resources to environmental issues so that 'needs' can be discerned, appropriate policies identified, and compliance with the appropriate legislation enforced. Whatever one may think about the political and economic philosophy of the World Bank, after Rio the Bank is committed to assist in data gathering on environmental and sustainable development issues. The Bank's recently tabled Africa Technical paper, **Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A World Bank Agenda**, is a case in point. So too is its series of publications, entitled **Towards Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa**.

SADC governments and SADC as an organisation must work toward new regulations for business and industry. Government clearly has a central role to play, for it is government which sets the regulatory framework within which business and industry operates.

The need for broad-based 'learning' cannot be overestimated. In its special report for the UNCED Secretariat,²⁸ SADC highlighted a series of interlinked institutional handicaps inhibiting 'learning' and prohibiting action on environmental issues. In every state across virtually every environmental issue, SADC's members were seen to suffer from

- a lack of scientific information about the state of the physical environment; and
- the inability to collect such information due to inappropriate institutional frameworks, a lack of trained personnel and too few funds to direct toward environmental concerns.²⁹

Nevertheless, there is a good deal of ongoing intra- and inter-state activity which seeks to rectify this. Given the importance of water resources and the related need for cheap energy in the region, most progress has been made in this area (see below).

LEARNING BY DOING II: DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Yet, government alone cannot do enough. Civil society should be encouraged to organise against common environmental enemies and concerns: waste generation, air and water pollution, toxic waste and nuclear power, to name but a few of the obvious focal points. Community based organisations should also be encouraged, perhaps with the assistance of international NGOs like the World Conservation Union and the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Africa 2000 programme, to press for recognition of their rights to equitable resources use (see below). St. Lucia-type conflicts should be avoided by a general move toward what the IUCN, among others, calls "*sustainable utilization*", in other words, shared resource use by all stakeholders in a given geographical space. The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe is most often put forward as a viable model in this regard.

LEARNING BY DOING III: MAKING BUSINESS

A PARTNER, NOT AN ADVERSARY

Equally important is the need to involve business and industry in this project of 'renewal'. Their interests in resource use differ markedly from those of society, with resource use fundamentally being a class issue. The numerous conflicts over nuclear power generation, mineral exploitation, and industrial exploitation and despoilation of human resources and natural environments - problems seemingly inherent to capitalist, industrial development - are testimony in this regard. Yet, the effort must be made to move business and industry toward a sustainable development model.³⁰ Indeed, given emerging, particularly post-Rio, pressures from Western donors, investors, interest groups and markets, South(ern) African business is quickly learning that profit and expansion are tied to their being 'green'.³¹ Government, through creative tax incentives, and civil society, through a combination of confrontation and dialogue, must push business in the direction of sustainability.

There will inevitably be numerous setbacks, given the degree to which the problems and programmes of apartheid and raw materials-based capitalism are entrenched. But, at the same time, environmental issues seem to hold more promise than almost any other issue for confidence building and consensus-making in the 'new' South Africa.

ONE POINT OF MULTIPLE INTERSECTION: WATER

It is a truism to say that "[w]ater is Africa's critical resource",³² for all life on Earth depends on water. Nevertheless, regular and increasingly prolonged occurrences of drought, combined with burgeoning human populations, and highly skewed patterns of resource access and distribution throughout Southern Africa make water an ever scarcer and more precious commodity. According to the African Development Bank, "[c]urrent calculations are that by 2000, South Africa will suffer water stress, Malawi will have moved into absolute water scarcity and Kenya will be facing the prospect of living beyond the present water barrier. By 2025, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe will suffer water stress, Lesotho and South Africa will have moved into absolute water scarcity, and Malawi will have joined Kenya living beyond the present water barrier ... Competition for shared water resources will intensify."³³

Water resource use everywhere has given way to a multitude of related environmental problems:

- serious water-related over-grazing (e.g. around boreholes in Botswana);³⁴
- erosion along the banks and siltation of the Zambezi River due to inappropriate farming practices and large numbers of small scale gold panners;³⁵
- severe siltation and pollution of the region's myriad freshwater resources - dams, lakes, rivers, dambos;
- coastal erosion and destruction of shrimp nurseries in Mozambique and Tanzania due to unchecked exploitation of mangrove forests;³⁶ and
- declining fish stocks due to over-exploitation of the resource and/or eutrophication of water bodies.³⁷

The list goes on. South Africa, no less than its fellow SADC members, faces these same

problems, often to more serious degrees.³⁸ According to Yeld, *"much of South Africa will experience the equivalent of permanent drought somewhere between 2002 and 2040. Water rationing is likely to become a fact of life."*³⁹ At the same time, *"[m]ost South African rivers are impounded or regulated at one or more points along their length, radically altering their ecological status. So much water is now extracted from previously perennial rivers - for example, the life-sustaining arteries of the Kruger National Park, the Letaba and Levuvhu rivers - that they have ceased to flow for long periods, despite good rains."*⁴⁰

Both the need for 'water security' and actions taken to assure this, highlight the potential for increased conflict (in addition to co-operation) over water resources in the near future. Moreover, given the ubiquitous human need for water, but incredibly uneven usage and demand (between, say, rural farmers and Anglo American's industrial holdings; or South Africa - which consumes eighty per cent of the region's water, but has only ten per cent of the resource - and the rest of SADC's member states), resource use conflicts are likely to involve multiple stakeholders with widely varying powers. Varying types of water usage also ensures future sites of conflict: agri-business, industry, small scale rural farmers and fishers, urban consumers, and tourists all have differing needs and perceptions of water resources. Conflicts, therefore, will be of the inter-state and intra-state variety, involving both state and non-state actors at local, national, regional, continental and global levels.

WATER AND INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION

In terms of inter-state relations, wetlands and other water resources and their use all have transboundary characteristics: proposed upstream interventions, like the Namibian National Eastern Water Carrier (NNEWC) or the proposed Pungwe River dam in Zimbabwe can have serious downstream consequences. Whereas the NNEWC proposes to *"extract a limited 3m³/sec from the Okavango River early in the next century, which is less than one per cent of the present inflow"*, the Pungwe River dam will cut off the traditional water supply for many rural people in the Beira area of Mozambique.⁴¹

Similarly, Botswana's use of the Chobe impacts on riverine communities along the Zambezi. Lesotho and South Africa co-operate on the Highlands Water Project which intends to bring water to South Africa's industrial heartland. South Africa and Mozambique, and South Africa and Zambia co-operate on supplies of hydro-electrical energy.⁴² The Swazi case points in a hopeful direction. *"Swaziland has four major river basins, namely the Lusutfu, the Komati, the Mbuluzi and the Ngwavuma. All the rivers originate in South Africa except the Mbuluzi and Ngwavuma. Each river basin is shared either with Mozambique or South Africa or both. Therefore international negotiations are necessary before any water resource development can be undertaken by the country. The three countries have formed a Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee to advise the respective governments on technical matters of common interest relating to water use and availability in any of the basins. Negotiations for the sharing of water resources are based on the Helsinki rules."*⁴³

FINDING ENERGY FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Hydro-electrical power generation has historically been a controversial and conflict-generating endeavour, the Tonga in the Lake Kariba area being a famous case in point. Given the alarming rates of air pollution from the use of fossil fuels in South Africa, particularly in the townships, and by thermal power-generating plants in the Gauteng region, many in South Africa are keen to increase urban electrification, while simultaneously decreasing the amount of fossil fuel consumed.⁴⁴

Energy use in South Africa is extremely inefficient. For example, South Africa has 0,7 per cent of the world population, but it accounts for two per cent of global greenhouse emissions.⁴⁵ In addition, an estimated 3,7 million dwellings, comprising two-thirds of South Africa's population - 24,5 million people - are without electricity.⁴⁶ These households are dependent on kerosene, liquid petroleum gas, coal, wood, candles and batteries for their daily energy needs.⁴⁷ Moreover, given that the highest grades of coal are exported, rural and township dwellers are burning lower grade, high ash producing coal. This has resulted in extremely hazardous health conditions leading to, among others, respiratory illnesses.

Eskom has argued that its policy of 'electrification for all', which entails 2,6 million 'financially viable' new connections planned for 1992-8, will lead to improved air quality and therefore quality of life in the townships.⁴⁸ While acknowledging that increased demand for electricity will increase pollution in the Eastern Transvaal where the majority of its thermal generating plants are located, Eskom argues that transference of pollution out of the peri-urban areas to plant locations will amount to net benefits.⁴⁹ Despite scientists' scepticism over these claims,⁵⁰ both Eskom and the ANC-led government are determined to pursue this policy path.

Recognising the potential international outcry against still more environmentally unfriendly energy production (Eskom presents the township electrification and installation of desulphurisation scrubbers in either/or terms),⁵¹ many of SADC's other member states perceive national and regional benefits - specifically foreign exchange earning capability - in the creation of regional power grids based on hydro-electric generation.

The electrical parastatals of Zimbabwe and Zambia, which co-operate via the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) on potential and future use of the Zambezi, have recently entered into a contract with Eskom for the creation and sale of energy. A similar deal has been struck with Mozambique. Ironically, though sharing the same river basin, the ZRA excludes Mozambique. Actions taken upstream clearly have downstream effects, and separate agreements signed with South Africa have the potential to create conflict between these states.

INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION AND INTRA-STATE DISAFFECTION: A ZIMBABWE CASE STUDY

One potential means of moderating these conflicts is through inter-state co-operation. Yet, an important criticism of inter-state co-operation on resource use issues is that it ignores the interests of those most in need of access to the resource: indigenous peoples. How Zimbabwe's peoples and policy makers have addressed this issue, is worth detailed analysis.

From Lake Kariba to the Osborne farm: failing to learn

In a landlocked country inhabiting a region which chronically suffers prolonged periods of drought, decisions regarding water resources are high politics. Zimbabwe has no indigenous lakes. There are, however, roughly 8 000 impoundments, of which 150 (besides Kariba) are considered to be large, i.e. over one hectare in size. Of the total water consumed in Zimbabwe, more than ninety per cent goes to agriculture. Ironically, "*[b]ecause the pumping costs to areas with good agricultural potential would be prohibitive, almost no agricultural use is made of [the] Kariba Dam.*"⁵² However, Kariba, like other large dams, was constructed primarily for hydro-electric power generation. At the same time, Lake Kariba forms one of the major tourist attractions in Zimbabwe. It is therefore a highly valued foreign exchange earner, and contributes significantly to Zimbabwe's gross national and domestic products (GNP and GDP).

Dam construction, however, is not always as successful or sustainable. In almost all cases, the social costs of construction, particularly where indigenous peoples are to be uprooted and resettled, are very high. Many Third World countries, however, tend to gloss over the social costs of dam construction and place too high a value on hydro-electric generation, tourism and other water-related industries. In fact, the vast majority of dams constructed can no longer be used after fifteen to twenty years.⁵³ In assessing whether or not dam construction is ecologically, socially and economically viable, therefore, an open dialogue among all affected and interested parties should ensue. Historically, this has not been the case.

The potential for conflict at and around proposed dam sites, due in large measure to top-down types of agreements, remains severe. The lessons of the Tonga seem not to have been learned. The Tonga, who numbered about 86 000 people, farmed the Gwembe Valley, producing two rain-fed or floodwater-fed crops per year. Fishing was conducted along the banks and floodplains of the Zambezi and was done for consumption and barter.⁵⁴ As Masundire⁵⁵ points out, "*[t]he socio-economic life of the Tonga was intimately linked to the Zambezi valley.*" Resettlement took place between 1956 and 1959. The Tonga were forcibly moved to higher ground "*with poor soils and terrain which was unsuitable for agriculture.*"⁵⁶ In all, roughly 45 000 people were resettled. According to Machena, "*[t]here was no compensation from government. Agricultural risk became very high and even today drought and malnutrition are a continuous situation that the Tonga must face. In addition to loss of agricultural land, their social pattern was disrupted and there was a permanent barrier from their Zambian relatives. It was hoped, however, that the development of a fishery would at least absorb some of the displaced populations.*"⁵⁷ What was once a sustainable society has since developed into an impoverished 'bantustan' on the margins of a major tourist centre.

Yet, these kinds of decisions continue to be handed down. Hundreds of families were displaced without adequate compensation prior to the construction of the Manyuchi Dam in Mwenezi District of Masvingo Province. The recent commissioning of the Osborne Dam, situated on the Odzi River, thirty kilometres northwest of Mutare in Manicaland Province has displaced 1 600 families.⁵⁸

The desire for hydro-electric power is compelling and overwhelming. The provision of power for industrial development, the prospect of a steady source of foreign exchange deriving from, for example, the sale of hydro-electric power, fish exports, and tourism, among others, in addition to the creation of numerous jobs in seriously debt distressed national economies, are clearly hard to resist. Large scale dams, in spite of their localised negative effects and the controversy they continue to generate, are likely to continue being built in the foreseeable future. Engagement, not disparagement, remains the only option for civil society.

From Zacplan to Batoka Gorge: failing to listen

Engaging the state, however, does not necessarily mean that its representatives will listen. This is particularly the case with international waterways, where 'high politics' tends to pre-empt or upstage state-civil society relations. In Southern Africa, the development of Zacplan is one such case.

The Zambezi is the fourth largest river basin in Africa, flowing eastward 3 000 kilometres from its source on the Central African Plateau. It is shared by eight countries, and for some of these countries, like Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is the principal water source. The basin includes numerous types of water resources. Surface water resources include river systems, swamps

(e.g. the Okavango which is 26 750 km²; Kafue which is 7 000 km²; and the Lubanga which is 2 600 km²), and lakes, both natural and manmade. Groundwater resources are also numerous and varied.⁵⁹

Thirty per cent of the total population of the eight basin countries, i.e. twenty million people, live within the river basin. Of the four main 'basin countries' - Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe - this total increases to 94 per cent of their total populations over 79 per cent of the total basin area.⁶⁰ Major industrial sectors exist in these countries: metal manufacturing, machinery, textiles, clothing, footwear, fertilisers, pesticides, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, furniture, plastic and rubber goods, cement and food processing.⁶¹ One of the main water consumers and polluters, however, is the coal industry. The highest water consumption is that of the aluminium smelters. According to Lazlo, "*[t]he negative effects of mining and industrial development are many. Worth mentioning are over-exploitation of natural resources and pollution.*"⁶²

In 1985, the United Nations (UN), through its Environmentally Sound Management of Inland Waters (EMINWA) programme, established a working group to explore inter-state co-operation on the sustainable use of the Zambezi River basin. A myriad of problems was identified - inadequate monitoring, soil erosion, deforestation, lack of portable water and sanitation, lack of community participation, inadequate protection of wetlands, inadequate dissemination of information to the public - and Zacplan was formed as an action programme of SADC. "*[SADC] initiated discussions among its members to pre-empt possible conflicts over sharing of Zambezi river water, or any other shared water bodies in the region. Started in 1985 as the Zambezi River Action Plan ... discussion on ways to share water equitably among the Zambezi River states has grown into a draft treaty among all SADC members governing any shared watercourse in the SADC region.*"⁶³

Zacplan consists of four major components, each with numerous sub-components:

- environmental assessment;
- environmental management;
- environmental legislation; and
- supporting measures.⁶⁴

According to SARD, "*[t]he treaty will be an important step for SADC. With several countries eyeing the Zambezi waters thirstily and other water-rich countries considering international trade in water, the potential exists for mutually beneficial cooperation.*"⁶⁵ At the international level, it seems as if there is indeed a concerted effort borne of necessity to address the needs of the region based on consensus. However, according to Matiza-Chiuta, Zacplan is a failure: not only does it ignore extant social needs and problems of rural basin communities, it also serves to exacerbate them.

In its formulation, Zacplan was a UN-initiated, government-controlled project where NGOs had no voice and stakeholders were not consulted. Inter-state co-operation on River Basin management paves the way for more Kariba-type solutions, including the marginalisation of indigenous voices from the negotiating process and, ultimately, peoples from the land. To this day, thousands of marginalised peasants practise small scale gold panning throughout the basin area, particularly in north and northeastern Zimbabwe, causing serious problems. These include

erosion, but also violent conflict as internal migration puts individuals from beyond the district against indigenous peoples, and of AIDS, alcoholism, and accidental deaths, as river banks collapse and bury panners in their tracks.⁶⁶

At the same time, plans by Zimbabwe and Zambia on construction of a new hydro-power station at Batoka Gorge, which runs between Victoria Falls and Kariba along the Zambezi River, have raised the interest of state and non-state actors around the world. Many people are concerned about the impact of this project on the Falls. In Zambia's case, however, the possibility of an additional source of foreign exchange seems overwhelming. "[T]he state-run Zambia Electricity Supply Authority (Zesa) are determined to see that the project is implemented. 'I believe this investment is justified and has as much significance as the copper mines', Zesco managing director Robinson Mwansa said. Mwansa said the station could earn Zambia much needed convertible currencies through power exports to Zimbabwe and other neighbouring countries."⁶⁷

The importance of water for regional co-operation is manifold. Its use involves people and institutions that transcend state boundaries and narrow, often narrowly-scientific, perspectives. People can no longer be satisfied with leaving Zambezi River management to organisations like Zesa. It is imperative that a broad-based dialogue on water resource uses is encouraged.

Save as the future?

It would seem that where water resources are concerned, particularly in a part of the world which suffers both chronic water shortage and highly skewed capitalist development, the state-capital coalition (a coalition which many define as 'corporatist'), invariably wins the day. However, there is some evidence from Zimbabwe that this may not always be the case. Dialogue has become a key element in several instances of water resource use. Most often it involves international, high profile groups (like IUCN and UNDP) supporting an array of unorganised and under-funded community-based organisations (CBOs) by pushing states toward inclusion and negotiation rather than exclusion and confrontation; and by lobbying for direct participation of CBOs at all levels of the policy-making process, including, in many cases, a central position for rural women.⁶⁸

Recent experience concerning rehabilitation of the Save River catchment area provides some evidence of this. In mid-1994, the IUCN convened a seminar on the Save River catchment area. The catchment extends over 4,2 million hectares, covers roughly ten per cent of Zimbabwe's land surface, and contains the country's major interior river. The river itself runs nearly 400 kilometres from the central watershed to south-eastern Zimbabwe and into Mozambique. The Save River encompasses about twenty per cent of all the cultivated land in commercial hands of Zimbabwe and has forty per cent of the communal land population. It is of national importance in Zimbabwe's agricultural development as it forms the basis of several of the major irrigation schemes in the country, notably those at middle Save and Chisumbanje. The south-east lowveld of Zimbabwe has the best potential for extensive irrigation development in the country. However, in recent years the river system has suffered from excessive siltation caused by increasing population pressure and the associated problems of deforestation, overgrazing, stream bank cultivation and soil erosion induced by poor land management.

The seminar convened by the IUCN, attempted to address popular problems and issues on the way the Save was handled by government. The seminar would mark, it was hoped, an initial step toward establishing a broad-based dialogue concerning resuscitation of the river. Like most environmental issues, however, action on the Save had been marred by an elitist, exclusivist approach. For example, the UNDP, through its Africa 2000 programme, compiled two studies of

the Save River catchment focussing on the need to involve indigenous peoples in the decision-making process and to approach resuscitation of the catchment on a regional (i.e. including Mozambique) basis. These were presented to the Zimbabwe government, but the government made no response.⁶⁹

As with ZACPLAN, governments will perceive other interested parties, legitimate though their interests may be, as competitors, not partners. So, for example, problems of erosion and siltation due to streambank cultivation were 'solved' by forcibly removing small scale farmers from the area. And problems concerning the loss of woodland cover due to overcrowding on communal lands have been neither considered part of the Save River rehabilitation scheme, nor seriously addressed at all.

The seminar, in contrast, saw 86 groups represented, including many representatives from Zimbabwean-based local communities, the international donor community, conservationists in Zimbabwe and elements of the corporate sector representing lowveld sugar estates.⁷⁰ To this point in time, little progress has been made beyond establishing a "*catchment coordinating body*". According to the IUCN, local involvement in the whole catchment area remains limited. However, without intervention from international actors, like the IUCN and the UNDP, draconian state measures would have remained the order of the day. Here, at least, is an inkling of change.

The IUCN intends to organise more of these kinds of meetings, particularly at the regional level, with one of the main aims being to encourage inter-racial and intra-regional dialogue.⁷¹ With the movement of white South African farmers into parts of western Mozambique, and recent discussions about transnational game parks management, the Save River seminar seems an important step toward finding common solutions to water resource problems.

Toward a more nuanced understanding of water

Dam construction is but one small, if important, element of inter- and intra-state co-operation on water issues. Ironically, the Wetlands Programme for Southern Africa was started by SADC in recognition of the negative impact of haphazard and unco-ordinated developments in the region on wildlife. It was, therefore, neither a water resource nor a sustainable development/sustainable livelihood issue.

According to Thabeth Matiza-Chiuta, IUCN/ROSA co-ordinator of the Wetlands Programme, the IUCN was invited by SADC particularly in recognition of its diverse state, international NGO, and business membership base. Given this base, the organisation was seen to be well placed to deal with conflict/co-operation in the area of transboundary water resource issues.⁷² The Wetlands Programme seeks to integrate all aspects of water resource utilisation and management: from ocean fisheries and mangrove cultivation, to hydro-power, tourism and national parks management along lakes and rivers, from dambo-based, small scale agriculture, to groundwater borehole construction and its use.

Recognising that water may be the *casu belli* in the region in the 21st Century, it is incumbent upon all groups interested in conservation, sustainable utilisation, sustainable livelihood, economic growth and sustainable development to talk to each other. It is imperative that the pressures under which governments operate are recognised, not trivialised: problems of debt, structural adjustment, burgeoning populations that increasingly live in poverty, and within a decaying environment, ensure that these resources will be used. It is imperative that stakeholders and other members of civil society, both in the region and internationally, are made

aware of the issues, the stakes, and the proposed options, and take an active role in discussion.

EMPOWERING CBOS: FROM 'CONSERVATION' TO 'SUSTAINABLE UTILISATION'

At the same time, these issues overwhelmingly mean the preserve of bureaucrats, technocrats and politicians. There remains little room for empowering people at the grassroots level. However, it seems that there is both space and hope for CBOs and, by extension, for regional co-operation in the direction of sustainable development. Firstly, both the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid provide the political context within which the needs and demands of civil associations must be taken more seriously. Indeed, 'democracy' has become a *de facto* cross-conditionality in inter-state, donor-recipient negotiations. Secondly, many international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) (like the IUCN, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the UNDP, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)) now endorse an approach based on sustainable utilisation.⁷³ This approach recognises that conservation is not possible unless the people who live within these eco-systems are themselves given a voice regarding preservation of the natural environment and sustainable utilisation of the resources therein: sustainable utilisation for sustainable livelihoods.⁷⁴

Programmes like CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources), the Selous Conservation Programme in Tanzania, and Pilanesberg National Park in South Africa are all examples of peoples' empowerment at the local level, as are game farms and commercial hunting.⁷⁵ As Mokone, the Permanent Secretary in Botswana's Ministry of Commerce and Industry, has stated with regard to the culling and subsequent marketing of elephants and elephant products: *"Bringing benefits to our local community by way of employment creating and income generating opportunities would be very difficult, because the domestic market for elephant products is small. In essence, CITES is blocking our ability to manage our elephants on sound bio-diversity principles and sound sustainable utilisation principles. There are, of course, those who advocate that we should let nature take its course and do nothing. However in Botswana's circumstances, doing nothing would not only mean loss of bio-diversity, but also loss of elephants through starvation and famine, particularly in time of drought. This is a crueller way of dying compared to professionally undertaken cropping or culling."*⁷⁶

COMMUNITIES, GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATIONS: A SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY

As with issues of water resource use, the history of 'conservation' in Southern Africa is charged with the politics of race and disagreements over the meaning of 'development'. Since the mid-19th Century, conservation policy and practise served racially-exclusive needs. During the colonial period, conservationist legislation was diametrically opposed to the holistic relationship between people and their environment that had generally characterised the culture of most indigenous African societies. Crop and livestock farming by local peoples were seen as 'unnatural' and ecologically unsound. Subsistence hunters became defined as 'poachers' - often by the same settler population that had once relied on this form of economic activity for its survival. The emergence of paramilitary conservation authorities, funded by the state and devoted to the armed policing of protected areas under their control, was a logical outcome of this preservationist way of conceiving the relationship between man and nature.

Beyond conservation

In the late-20th Century, this approach is no longer feasible. As suggested throughout this article, contemporary approaches to resource conservation must recognise that

- economic growth is the driving concern of business, labour and government;
- as populations grow and make more demands on government, scarce resources will be utilised; and
- conservation in its 'traditional' sense is outdated and unrealisable.

Indeed, given the historical legacies of racial domination in Southern Africa, it is essential that historical approaches to 'conservation' be rejected as viable forms of natural resource management.

Ecological conservation has too long been associated with the marginalisation of local communities from their lands and their resources⁷⁷: *"If conservation means losing water rights, losing grazing and arable land and being dumped in a resettlement area without even the most rudimentary infrastructure and services, as was the case when the Tembe elephant park [near Kosi Bay] was declared in 1983 ... this can only promote a vigorous 'anti-conservation' ideology amongst the rural community of South Africa."*⁷⁸

Increasingly, where governments take decisions without consulting local communities, conflicts ensue and, in cases of conservation area or national parks creation, several diverse impacts materialise: relocation of indigenous peoples, restricted access of indigenous peoples to park resources, disruption of traditional ways of life, often including a decline in traditional patterns of authority and reciprocity, and widespread hostility leading to the setting of fires, vandalism and resource poaching.⁷⁹ In South Africa, conservation policy has long been a nexus of violent conflict.

St. Lucia: Toward sustainable utilisation?

Debates over natural resource use continue to be dominated by those with the time and capital to devote to these issues. The multi-year debate over proposed mining of the dunes north of St. Lucia along South Africa's east coast is one example. Involved in this dispute were, on the one hand, Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), which sought to mine titanium in an area considered by many to be worthy of World Heritage Site status; and, on the other hand, a number of environmental and labour groups either permanently or temporarily opposed to the plan. The issue first arose in the latter part of 1989 and was temporarily 'resolved' four years later when an independent tribunal headed by Justice R N Leon found in favour of the environmentalists and decided to ban mining from St. Lucia. According to an International Development Research Centre (IDRC) sponsored study, *"the St. Lucia wetland comprises an estuary, a string of lakes and wildlife reserves, and is the cutflow of a number of Natal's rivers. For almost a century, its wildlife areas have been managed by the Natal Parks Board. The complex of terrestrial, estuarine and marine systems include rare mangrove forests, turtle breeding areas, tropical forest systems, and coral reefs."*⁸⁰

RBM was keen to strip mine titanium over a 1 400 square kilometre section of St. Lucia dunes. Reserves of the strategic mineral were said to be worth R5 billion and the government revenues to be derived worth R1 billion. The site was chosen over similar sites in the US and Madagascar, in part, because anti-mining environmental lobby groups had pressured the company to look elsewhere.

At the same time, the site seemed ideal: RBM already had a large mine and processing plant 25 kilometres south of the dunes at Richards Bay Harbour. Moreover, its supporters argued, location of the mine in South Africa would allow the country to monopolise world supply of titanium.⁸¹ Titanium is used in the construction of military aircraft and weaponry, more specifically in the production of durable and lightweight aircraft skins and warhead coatings, and as a substitute for lead in paint.

To many observers the mine seemed a *fait accompli*: the prospect of large foreign currency earnings for the government, coupled with the strategic content of the product, seemed to overshadow the more 'mundane' considerations of environmental conservation. Nevertheless, once the issue came into the public eye, a formidable coalition of environmentalists emerged to argue against mining and for eco-tourism.

This confrontation must be understood in its global context, as notions of 'eco-tourism' became very fashionable in the late 1980s, particularly in response to the widespread deforestation of the Amazon in Brazil. Indeed, South African environmental groups adopted global tactics in the fight against RBM, first by attempting to have St. Lucia's dunes declared a World Heritage Site along the lines of the Okavango Delta in Botswana, and secondly, by turning to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and its designation of St. Lucia as an area of extreme biological diversity worthy of preservation. Thirdly, they not merely argued for the conservation of the dunes area, but for the practise of 'sustainable development', a concept which had gained international notoriety following the 1987 publication of the Brundtland Commission's Report, **Our Common Future**.⁸²

These emerging global norms and ideals, particularly that of 'sustainable development', in combination with white South Africa's abiding interest in conservation, turned informed public opinion against the RBM. At the same time, under South Africa's system of Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), an EIA was commissioned for St. Lucia and carried out by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).⁸³ The study which emerged, is widely regarded as a 'landmark' in the struggle for sustainable development and steers away from the hitherto dominating mineral-based mentality in South Africa. It considered two options: mining in combination with some eco-tourism (that favoured by RBM); and eco-tourism only (that favoured by the environmental lobby).

The conservationists fought RBM, not only in terms of the mine's capacity to spoil the environment, but in terms of what kind of economic development would be most profitable in the long term for the St. Lucia area. Tourists come to South Africa, it is argued, first and foremost for the flora and fauna. Tourism is a big business, bringing in an average of 1,7 million visitors per year in the pre-1994 period, directly employing 300 000 people (i.e. one out of every fourteen 'actively employed' South Africans), and generating R2,5 billion in foreign exchange per year. With an end to violence in the post-apartheid era, tourism's contribution to GDP will be larger than the mining sector. Moreover, tourism, and in particular eco-tourism, is an industry with an unlimited shelflife. In contrast, mining involves the stripping of assets which are eventually exhausted. In the case of the proposed mine at St. Lucia, operation of the mine and its eventual rehabilitation would commence after 2000 and last for only twenty years.

Among the environmentalists, the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM) emerged as the premier think tank for progressives. Two of its members, Jacklyn Cock, a professor of Sociology, and Eddie Koch, a well-known journalist, published an influential and award-winning book entitled **Going Green: People, Politics and the Environment in South Africa**. Also in 1991,

two labour leaders, Rod Crompton of the Chemical Workers Industrial Union and Alec Erwin of the National Union of Metalworkers, published a book, **Green at the Grassroots: Politics and Environment in South Africa**.

In January 1993, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) came out with a compromise position. In the short term, they stood opposed to mining in the dunes. In the longer term, however, they suggested that mining may have to go ahead. Their decision was based, in part, on the desire to see the issue put before a post-apartheid government, and thereby re-examined in a more equitable context.⁸⁴ However, since there remained substantial differences of opinion within both NUM and the ANC, neither actor could make a definitive intervention. Indeed, according to the IDRC, "[w]hilst ANC economists favoured the mining option, President Nelson Mandela was one of 40 000 signatories who favoured protecting the dunes."⁸⁵

In March 1993, RBM released information outlining the benefits from a mixed mining and eco-tourism approach. In their 1989 claims, RBM stated simply that 130 jobs would be created, R1 billion in government revenues would be generated, and that the mining company would contribute R8 million per year to 'social responsibility programmes'. In the post-Rio era they were more sophisticated in their calculations: *"Mining combined with eco-tourism will generate R460 million for RBM as well as R196 million for the Natal Parks Board from tourism activities. This option will create more than 900 temporary and permanent jobs, 613 in the mining operations as well as up to 392 posts in the tourism industry. The new mine will indirectly generate between 1 275 and 4 675 jobs through the multiplier effect, pay R157,1 million to the government in tax and earn R606 million in forex. The company will also spend R8 million on social upliftment programmes in a region where poverty ranks with the lower levels of the lower-income countries of the world'."*⁸⁶

Supporters of the 'eco-tourism only' option came to see the EIA process as biased in favour of the mining option. For example, how could it be that, during the scoping process, the US Embassy and the Atomic Energy Corporation were identified as *"interested and affected parties"*, while indigenous peoples were completely ignored?⁸⁷ In September 1993, John Ledger, director of the Endangered Wildlife Trust, suggested that the environmental coalition face facts: at some point RBM would get the go ahead, so it was imperative to think of a win-win situation whereby members of the St. Lucia community could be involved in some form of sustainable eco-tourism.⁸⁸

A continuing criticism of the EIA, in particular, and of the entire dialogue between business and the environmental lobby, was that the voices and concerns of indigenous people were ill-considered at best, and not considered relevant at worst. According to Webster and Cock, *"[a] criticism made by a number of commentators was that the views of only a small proportion of the South African public were presented in the Environmental Impact Report; that the views of local people had not been adequately reflected; that the attitudes of local communities needed to be canvassed and submitted to a Review panel. To address these concerns the 'Rural Liaison Programme' was subsequently established."*⁸⁹

Yet, for Webster and Cock, this process *"failed to achieve any deep and extensive process of consultation"*, having gone no further than *"employed workers, traditional tribal authority structures and one Inkatha official."*⁹⁰

To the surprise of almost everyone, the decision handed down by Justice Leon's Review Panel on 10 December 1993 went in favour of the 'eco-tourism only' option. Environmentalists were *"amazed and delighted"*, and in spite of a promise by the Minister for Mineral and Energy Affairs

to uphold the decision of the Review Panel, no decision was taken prior to the April 1994 election.

While this decision obviously pleased environmentalists and the Natal Parks Board, David Fig, director of GEM, lamented the absence of communal groups from the decision-making process. According to Fig, "*[u]nless local communities are given a full say, right from the start, in decisions about the different ways in which their land can be used for economic development it will be impossible to promote popular support for these projects.*"⁹¹ The local community had sought return of the land for their own designated purposes.⁹² At the same time, many members of the local community, Natal Parks Board workers and trade unionists favoured development of the proposed mine and the jobs it would create. In the absence of popular participation in the decision-making process, Fig warned, "*[t]here is no doubt [the tribunal's decision on St. Lucia] ... will be seen by these people as yet another autocratic decision to protect the rights of animals and wealthy tourists before those of ordinary people. They will resist it - and there is a grave possibility of violence.*" Ironically, new land dispensations under the Government of National Unity (GNU) suggest that those communities forcibly removed from the area in the 1960s may possess title to the affected land. The GNU is being "*asked to reopen the Environmental Impact Assessment process and to widen the scope of participation.*"⁹³

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This article has presented a relatively limited picture of factors affecting and movement toward environmental co-operation in Southern Africa states, with a particular focus on water and conservation issues in South Africa and Zimbabwe. With regard to the potential for the environment to serve as a focal point for national and regional healing as opposed to continued disease and debilitation, the evidence is clearly mixed. The forces for the *status quo* are undoubtedly legion and powerful. At the same time, non-state and non-corporate actors continue to press their interests. Given the present trend toward democratisation and more open state-civil society dialogue, it seems reasonable to suggest that past practises can be overcome.

Indeed, there are many other hopeful signs as well:

- pressure from IGOs and international NGOs on business to practise and participate in sustainable development;
- attempts by civil associations to foster indigenous NGOs, link with them regionally and perhaps build a core in each group to deal with commonly shared problems⁹⁴;
- the commitment of some IGOs - like the UNDP's Africa 2000 - to environmental education, resource training, popular participation and peoples' empowerment at village level⁹⁵; and
- the clever use of limited resources by NGOs, like Earthlife Africa and Environment 2000, to heighten peoples' environmental awareness on both basic (e.g. litter, recycling) and complex but key issues, such as nuclear power, thermal pollution, and toxic waste.

What is important is that these issues transcend class, race and state in almost every case. Though they constitute sites of continuing conflict, support for environmental issues often makes for very strange bedfellows. As such, they hold forth the hope of new coalitions within civil society at national, regional and international levels; and between civil society, the state and capital.

Formal institutional structures, such as Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) and EIAs, can foster dialogue and co-operation. SIAs can assess the social sustainability and other social implications of proposed projects⁹⁶, while EIAs can address their ecological sustainability. It is imperative that proposed solutions seek to avoid zero-sum scenarios, and search for variable and relatively equitable pay-offs. Stakeholders have different preference curves, so consensus and enhanced co-operation may be possible

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69. Interview with Moyo-Mhlanga, *op. cit.*
70. There were no representatives from Mozambican groups or farms at the seminar, though the Save/Runde floodplain borders on and extends into Mozambique.
71. Interview with Droz, IUCN, Harare, 1994.
72. Interview with Matiza-Chiuta, *op. cit.*
73. Kudzai Makombe, *Sharing the Land: Wildlife, People and Development in Africa*, **IUCN/ROSA Environmental Issues Series**, 1, 1993.
74. See Munslow & Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of sustainable livelihood.
75. See also, GEM, **People and Parks Project 1994: National Conference Proceedings**, Johannesburg, 1994.
76. African European Institute, **Post-apartheid Regional Cooperation: International Support for Transforming Southern Africa**, AEI, The Hague, 1992, (conference report), pp. 51 & 52; CITES refers to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.
77. Eddie Webster & Jacklyn Cock, *Looking before They Leap: Environmental Impact Assessments and Social Impact Assessments*, unpublished paper, 1994; they have been theorising ways around this fact. One proposed solution is to introduce 'social impact assessments' alongside 'environmental impact assessments' when considering resource use.
78. Anti-conservationism or anti-environmentalism goes beyond the individual or community level. According to Barney Desai, senior member of the PAC, "[f]or the majority of black states whose lives and aspirations are dictated by the struggle for survival, environmental considerations are regarded with indifference or hostility"; see *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 16 - 22 November 1990.
79. This list is drawn from Webster & Cock, *op. cit.*; see also the sectional, country based discussions on *Resource Use Conflicts* in Moyo *et. al.*, *op. cit.*
80. IDRC *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
81. According to the IDRC report (*ibid.*, p. 41), RBM, which is jointly owned by Rio Tinto Zinc and by the local mining conglomerate Genmin, "*is aiming to corner 25 per cent of world market share. In anticipation of this, it has constructed a titanium smelting plant at Richard's Bay.*"
82. Indeed, in the **Environmental Conservation Act**, no. 73 of 1989, which came to replace the earlier 1982 Act, South African policy makers have clearly adopted the Brundtland Commission's definition of 'sustainable development'; see also endnote 83.

83. In 1982, the South African Council for the Environment was established under the terms of the **Environmental Conservation Act**, no. 100 of 1982. This Act was subsequently replaced by the **Environmental Conservation Act**, no. 73 of 1989. Among the Council's executive committees and commissions is one concerned with Integrated Environmental Management. Among its working definitions are conservation and development. 'Conservation' is defined as "*management of man's use of the environment so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.*" 'Development' is defined as "*utilization of natural resources and the consequent modification of the environment by man to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human life.*" The Council considers conservation and development to be part of an integrated system of environmental management. The IEM system was established in 1984. IEM identifies three categories of proposed actions: policies, programmes and projects. All proposed actions pass through four stages of development: proposal generation; assessment; decision; and implementation. Given that some proposals have more serious environmental implications than others, IEM identifies three classes of assessment: high impact; some impact; and negligible impact. The RBM proposal clearly fell in the first class.
84. **Weekly Mail & Guardian**, 22 - 28 January 1993.
85. IDRC, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
86. **Weekly Mail & Guardian**, 19 - 25 March 1993.
87. IDRC, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
88. **Weekly Mail & Guardian**, 17 - 23 September 1993.
89. Webster & Cock, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-13.
91. **Weekly Mail & Guardian**, 17 - 22 December 1993.
92. As it happens, the very land to be mined was part of the traditional lands of the community which had been forcibly removed in the 970s when the park was established. Clearly, indigenous peoples trusted neither RBM, the Natal Parks Board - which had failed to defend them against their earlier removal - nor the EIA process.
93. IDRC, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
94. Interview with Mbogori, Harare, July 1994; MWENGO & AACC, **Civil Society, the State and African Development in the 1990s**, Central Graphics Services, Nairobi, 1993.
95. Interview with Moyo-Mhlanga, *op. cit.*
96. Webster & Cock, *op. cit.*

INTRODUCTION

Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa range from two to eight million. Whatever the exact figure, it could be argued that the presence of such large concentrations of undocumented migrants holds a serious threat to the stability of the South African state and adversely affects the quality of life of ordinary South Africans. For instance, in 1994 12 403 illegal immigrants were arrested in South Africa for committing serious criminal offences, including rape and murder. The negative security implications of hosting a large illegal foreign population are well documented, not only in South Africa, but in Asia, Europe, the Americas and in the rest of Africa. It is not the purpose of this article to analyse the facilitating factors which lead to population displacements or the effects of such mass migrations. There is a burgeoning literature on these aspects¹. Rather, it seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of various strategic responses to curb the influx of illegal immigrants into the country and to conclude with a few concrete proposals.

SOUTH AFRICA'S MORAL DEBT: A CASE OF MISDIRECTED MORALITY?

There is an argument that, given the years of apartheid destabilisation of the region, South Africa owes a moral debt to the region. This debt prevents South Africa from employing coercive measures to solve its illegal alien problem. Rather, it is argued that South Africa needs to accommodate the region's people within its borders in some form or another. This is not only dangerous, but its logic is extremely fallacious.

It is dangerous because, as any realist knows, if a relatively safe and prosperous country (as South Africa is within the African context) opens its borders, it risks being overwhelmed by a massive influx of immigrants from poor or violent countries. Myron Weiner puts it this way: *"Any country rich or poor, that opened its borders might soon find other states taking advantage of its beneficent policy. A neighbouring country whose elite wanted a more homogenous society could readily expel its minorities; a government that wanted a more egalitarian society could dump its unemployed and its poor; an authoritarian regime could rid itself of its opponents; a country could empty its jails, mental institutions, and homes for the aged. In an extreme case, an overcrowded populous country could take over a hypothetically generous country simply by transferring a large part of its population, and an aggressive country would no longer need tanks and missiles for an invasion."*²

But the logic of the moral argument is also fallacious, and several criticisms can be levelled against such a view. Can the current South African government be held accountable for the actions of the previous illegitimate apartheid one? Can the current French government of Jacques Chirac be held responsible for the turmoil Napoleon Bonaparte had caused in Europe in the nineteenth century? The answer is obviously no!

Secondly, regional destabilisation was far more complex than some commentators would have us believe. The truth is that certain of South Africa's neighbours benefited a great deal from co-operation with the apartheid state. Consider just two examples: Malawi and Swaziland. Malawi, under President-for-Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was one of the few African states to enjoy full diplomatic relations with South Africa. For this and its co-operation in other spheres it received various material benefits from the apartheid pariah. Swaziland, too, benefited greatly from co-operating with the South African state. One of the alleged undertakings between South Africa and Swaziland in the 1980s was a secret security agreement. In return, Swaziland was to

receive part of South African territory - in the form of Ingwavuma - for its troubles.³ To emphasise the underlying point once more: regional destabilisation was far more nuanced than was apparent. However, to extend the moral argument to the case of Malawi and Swaziland: does this mean that South Africa should close its borders to these states for co-operating with apartheid Pretoria, while according preferential access to the country to those states who suffered greatly from regional destabilisation such as Mozambique or Angola? If one was to accept the moral argument, then the internal consistency of this argument must be accepted.

There is another side to South Africa's relationship with its neighbours that revolves around the relationship between its liberation movements and the Front-line States (FLS). Soldiers of the African National Congress' armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) fought alongside Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) fighters during that country's rocky road to freedom. Does this mean that Zimbabwe also owes South Africa a moral debt for assisting them in their independence struggle? Does this debt cancel out the debt caused by apartheid regional destabilisation?

Thirdly, while there should be concern over the welfare of human beings everywhere, does the South African state not owe a greater moral debt to its own citizens: large numbers of whom are homeless, unemployed and illiterate?

Finally, how does one quantify a moral debt?

The moral argument has been evaluated and found wanting. While personally appealing, morality is an inadequate basis for the development of sound policy.

THE AMBIGUITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Some of those who embrace the moral argument also point out that there are various international norms which prevent the state from undertaking several coercive measures, such as enforced repatriation, to deal with the question of illegal aliens. Once more, there are problems inherent in this argument that stem largely from the fact that international law is rather ambiguous on the question of trans-border migration.

Various global norms have evolved to deal with issues of international migration. The foremost of these is the 1948 **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** which provides that "*everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.*" Balancing these individual rights, however, are agreements emphasising the rights of states to regulate their borders. For example, the 1954 **Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country In Which They Live**, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, states: "*Nothing in this declaration shall be interpreted as legitimising any alien's illegal entry into and presence in a State, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay ...*"

Hence, one may conclude that the various international legal provisions regarding migration do not take away the power of the state to regulate its borders: states are free to decide who should enter and in what numbers.

THE EFFICACY OF CONTROL?

There is an argument which posits that given the 'failure' of control measures to stem the tide of

illegal immigrants, these aliens should somehow be accommodated in South African society. Accordingly, the supposed 'failure' of these control measures is evinced in the fact that despite enforced repatriation⁴ the influx of illegal immigrants continues unabated: illegal immigrants are said to enter the Republic at a rate of one every ten minutes.⁵

Some of the scholars who question the efficacy of control measures, argue for intervention as an alternative to control and accommodation measures. This seeks to address the root causes which give rise to population displacements. What follows is a brief account of Europe's relative success in applying such an approach and the utility it holds for Southern Africa.

The objective of the interventionist approach is to provide incentives for prospective emigrants to stay within the borders of their own country. Essentially, this aims to redress the political and economic causes which give rise to mass migrations.

One line of the strategy argues that political pluralism should be encouraged in the Third World. This is generally seen in terms of liberal democracy, a multiparty system, and free, fair, and frequent elections. These, the argument runs, would stem political conflict and civil war, and reduce population flows. As the resumption of fighting after the elections in Angola in 1992 suggested, it could have the opposite results to those desired. This point is of special relevance to Southern Africa where "*... the difficulties which transitions pose are exacerbated by the overall weakness of the polities within which change is taking place.*"⁶

Recognising that poverty, or rather the lack of economic opportunities, is often at the root of population movements, the interventionist approach stresses the need for economic development within sending states. This is often done by special trade agreements, investment programmes and educational schemes. A programme of this kind has been proposed by Italy and Spain with regard to North Africa. The hope is that these policies will result in job-creation and economic stability and hence that they will reduce population movements from North Africa into Southern Europe. One criticism which can be levelled against this approach, however, is that South Africa is a Third World state whose own development needs are such that it cannot become a donor country in the foreseeable future.

Another weakness of this approach is that it tackles the global nature of the problem on a piecemeal basis. Globalists argue that only a restructuring of the international economy will reduce south-north and south-south flows and, until this happens the haemorrhage will continue. This also has special relevance for South Africa which is not only facing an influx of illegal immigrants from the region, but also from as far afield as Nigeria, Algeria, Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, even if such a strategy is to prove successful in the long run, it does have contradictory results in the short to medium term. Hamilton and Holder puts it this way: "*The development process itself tends to stimulate migration in the short to medium term by raising expectations and enhancing people's ability to migrate. Thus the development solution to the problem of unauthorised migration is measured in decades - or even generations ... Any cooperative effort to reduce migratory pressures must stay the course in the face of shorter term contradictory results.*"⁷

A more sophisticated strategy is to encourage regional integration. Proponents of such a strategy see regional integration as the key to stem migration flows and point to the European Union (EU) as a successful example. For instance, Gomel⁸ points out that the countries of Southern Europe in the 1970s (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) ceased exporting their 'surplus labour' to the more affluent countries of Northern Europe as a direct result of EU regional integration; which effectively decreased wage differentials and generally increased economic

and social homogeneity within the EU.

On the surface such a strategy seems feasible. However, on closer inspection, various cracks are revealed. For example, the decrease in population flows from Southern to Northern Europe was not only the result of economic factors - demographics also played a role. A lowering of birth rates decreased the pressure on the social and economic infrastructure, increasing the overall living standards of the population, thereby diminishing the impulse to migrate.

Meissner⁹ contested whether wage differentials between Southern and Northern Europe were that wide in the first place. She also pointed out that Turkey's application for membership of the EU was turned down for fears that with wage differentials of 10:1, economic integration might lead to substantial emigration from Turkey to Europe. She used this as an example of migration acting as a serious deterrent to broader economic integration. This is an important lesson for the states of Southern Africa, which are considering regional integration, and where large wage disparities exist, for example, between South Africa, Botswana and Namibia on the one hand; and Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique, on the other. Could such wage disparities serve as a spoke in the wheel of regional integration in Southern Africa? The case of the EU suggests that it may. Furthermore, doubts regarding the future of the regional project are reinforced by the weakness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the fact that there is not a single regional vision of integration as is evidenced by the plethora of regional organisations in Southern Africa: in addition to SADC, there is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The alternative approaches to controlling undocumented migration put forward by the critics of control measures have been evaluated and they were found wanting. Moreover, if it should work, Hamilton and Holder have already noted that it would take generations. The question then is what to do in the interim?

TURNING BACK THE TIDE: THE WAY FORWARD

In an effort to turn back the tide of illegal immigrants, Pretoria's responses has generally been reactive, *ad hoc*, short term policy measures. These have ranged from misdirected control measures - including deploying a further 5 000 SANDF troops to beef up border security; the use of airborne camera surveillance on remote-controlled drones; enforced repatriation; and the establishment by the South African Police Services (SAPS) of a Technical Sub-committee on Border Control and Policing - to accommodation - for instance, the recent cabinet decision to legalise the presence of illegal immigrants who have resided in the country for longer than five years, who have been gainfully employed, who have no criminal record, or who are married to a South African spouse.

These, however, have failed to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. A convincing argument could be made that the reason for this failure lies in the fact that neither of the above approaches takes into consideration the underlying root factors which motivate people to move in the first place. It can be argued that any policy to curb the inflow of illegal aliens should be the result of both control and interventionist approaches.

South Africa's failure to apply control measures should not be seen as a failure of control measures in general. After all, other countries have made use of control measures with a great deal of success. For instance, the United States Border Patrols along the Rio Grande have managed to reduce the flow of illegal Mexicans into the US by sixty per cent. This was achieved by the extensive use of floodlights, 400 motion detectors and heat sensors.¹⁰ In addition to

stronger border controls, what is needed is stronger internal controls. This includes:

- tamper-proof identity cards;
- a system to ensure that illegals are not employed in the underground economy; and
- a comprehensive national registration system (such as in Sweden) with built-in punitive measures against employers who do not check the national registry before employing anyone.

In addition to this, and given the failure of the regional project in Southern Africa, South Africa needs to establish a number of bilateral agreements between itself and its neighbours. The substance of such agreements would reflect both control and interventionist measures. Africa has a long history of bilateral treaties between countries regulating population movements. Consider here the agreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea and between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire regulating population flows. Such bilateral agreements also exist between Burkina Faso and Gabon; between Gabon and Cameroon; and between Ghana and Libya. These treaties all cover issues of both entry and departure. More comprehensive agreements covering not only issues of entry, residence and departure, but also occupational and social rights, participation in trade unions and social security rights, also exist between France and its former French colonies of Senegal, Mali and Mauritania.

Building on this long tradition, South Africa also seems to be going the bilateral way. Consider here the agreements between the Minister of Home Affairs and his Zimbabwean and Mozambican counterparts. The objective of such bilateral agreements does not only need to be the control and regulation of population flows, but can also pro-actively aim at intervention to address the root causes of mass migrations. Note in this regard, Pretoria raising concerns about the lack of democracy in Swaziland with King Mswati III. The success South Africa has had in these agreements can be seen in the recent decision by the Swazi monarch to undertake constitutional reforms.

The merits of such an approach lie in the fact that it bridges the concerns of illegal aliens and those of the state. From the perspective of potential illegal immigrants who do not really want to leave their country of birth but find that the 'push' factors are so great that it leaves them no other option but to cross national frontiers, it addresses the root causes which motivate people to migrate. From the perspective of the potential host state, it relieves the burden on the socio-economic infrastructure which illegal immigrants inevitably cause.

ENDNOTES

1. See for instance Sarah Collinson, **Europe and International Migration**, Pinter, London, 1994.
2. Myron Weiner, **The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights**, Harper Collins, New York, 1995, p. 175.
3. This did not materialise because of strong opposition from Inkatha.
4. In 1994, South Africa forcibly repatriated 90 692 illegal aliens to 39 countries. This constitutes a 100 per cent increase from 1988 when 44 225 illegal aliens were forcibly deported.

5. M Reitzes *Alien Issues*, **Indicator South Africa**, 12(1), 1994, p. 9.
6. P Vale, *Southern Africa's Security: Some Old Issues, Many New Questions*, paper read at the **Seminar on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa**, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Windhoek, Namibia, 24-26 February 1993, p. 5.
7. K A Hamilton & K Holder, *International Migration and Foreign Policy: A Survey of the Literature*, **The Washington Quarterly**, 26, 1991, p. 201.
8. G Gomel, *Migrations Towards Western Europe: Trends, Outlook, Policies*, **The International Spectator**, 27, 1992, p. 70.
9. D Meissner, *Managing Migrations*, **Foreign Policy**, 86, 1992, p. 82.
10. CNN World News, 2 January 1996.