

PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

Contributions by the United States

Dan Henk

Monograph No 35

March 1999

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This publication is published in support of Training for Peace, a project sponsored by Norway and executed by the ISS in partnership with the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

Introduction

The focus

This is an overview of contributions to peace and security in Africa by the United States. It includes a brief identification of the public and private sector organisations that interest themselves in the issue, and the kinds of activity they currently undertake. This monograph also provides a brief assessment of the relative effectiveness of these programmes. However, the potential scope of the subject is very broad, more so than meaningfully can be addressed in a short treatment. To avoid over-generalisation, it reflects two measures to provide focus. Firstly, it addresses a limited period of time: the present, immediate past and immediate future. While the monograph will allude briefly to events and issues prior to 1990, it will concentrate on the present and will not endeavour to look into the far future.¹

A second measure to achieve focus is the construction of this publication around four broad questions:

- What do Americans² mean by ‘instability and insecurity’ in Africa, and how do they believe these conditions can be attenuated?
- Who in America cares about peace and security in Africa, and why?
- What are the activities of Americans currently engaged in promoting peace and security in Africa? (And are these likely to change in the foreseeable future?)
- How can Americans be induced to change the scope or nature of their current activities related to peace and security in Africa?

The first question may seem to be a preoccupation with the obvious; however, it is important. Before considering how Americans — or any actors — endeavour to resolve an undesirable condition, it is useful to consider how they see the problem. This monograph will identify what US interlocutors would mean by ‘instability and insecurity’, and note the circumstances which, according to them, cause these conditions in Africa. It will then list measures that Americans have concluded, will attenuate instability and conflict.

The Problem

Many of Africa’s 53 or so states enjoy relative peace and have seen improvement in the quality of life of citizens over the past decade. However, most of Africa’s largest and potentially most influential countries — from Algeria to Nigeria to Sudan to Ethiopia to the Congos to Angola are wrenched either by internal conflict or war with neighbours. Their travail is shared by many of their neighbours.

Using the phrase ‘instability and insecurity’ is a way of characterising a variety of severe problems in parts of the African continent that disrupt traditional patterns of human relations and bring about difficult conditions of life over which societies have little control. The problems themselves are complex and multifaceted. They produce a pervasive fear and sense of insecurity, limit the quality of life for many, and deny Africans the ability to achieve their potential.

Africa’s problems of instability appear in different forms. Since the end of the Cold War, some

regions have seen the violence of conventional warfare between national armies, or the more chronic conflict between national armies and well-armed insurgent groups. Refugees from violence in one country have been profoundly destabilising in others. Violence has occurred in the disagreements between ethnic or class-based groupings and between factions of religious zealots. In some countries, oppressive civil authorities routinely employ the coercive powers of the state to deny basic human rights to citizens. Elsewhere, lives, livelihood and property are continually threatened by violent criminality. Instability sometimes appears in the rage of populations suddenly possessed of an acute sense of victimisation. It is manifested at times in the unrest stimulated by rapid social and economic change, or sudden, severe deterioration in the conditions of life.

Insecurity in Africa is promoted by conditions that destabilise any society: lack of opportunity, exploitative relations of production, collapse of traditional social institutions, weak civil society, inept or unaccountable governance, infrastructural deterioration, ready availability of arms, and efforts of irresponsible opportunists to take advantage of these conditions. Instability is also a common result of problems from elsewhere (i.e. refugees), natural disaster, severe degradation of the environment, and disease. Profound instability and chronic violence, in turn, provide fertile breeding grounds for criminality, ethnic chauvinism and ideological fanaticism, thus compounding the problem.

The Solution

The broadness of the definition indicates the difficulty in finding a long-term solution. There is no one fundamental underlying cause. There is no simple 'fix'. There is no inexpensive panacea to problems of instability and insecurity in Africa. There are, however, many measures that contribute in some degree to the attenuation of these conditions. In isolation, they are sometimes effective. Taken together, and assuming time, interrelation and synergy, these measures can have beneficial results. Americans believe that such measures include those enumerated below, though they do not believe that these measures should be undertaken by the US alone:³

- military interventions to halt ongoing violence or to facilitate transitions to peace by former adversaries;
- offers of good offices or forums in which combatants may negotiate an end to ongoing conflict;
- promotion of indigenous capacities to prevent or resolve conflict, or to halt violence when it occurs;
- material assistance to populations that are victims of violence, natural disaster and epidemic disease, including efforts to repatriate and resettle refugees;
- measures to improve general health and reduce environmental health threats;
- encouragement of sustainable economic development and economic opportunity, including measures to protect the natural environment and increase the productivity of agriculture;
- promotion of free enterprise economies with minimal state involvement;
- encouragement of humane, managerially competent, accountable governance, including

professional law enforcement, justice for all members of society, and total subordination of security services to civil authority;

- encouragement of democracy, defined by open and regular elections, and multi-party political systems with parties defined by issues;
- strengthening of the capacity of states to manage national resources and distribute the goods and services of the state responsibly, efficiently and equitably;
- limitation of military establishments to small, technically proficient, apolitical, ethical forces, adequate to the defence of the state, with the smallest possible defence budget;
- assistance in combating transnational threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons as well as the threats posed by international criminal and terrorist groups;
- promotion of institutions that strengthen civil society; and
- assistance in providing the kind of education that best suits the development needs of the society and encourages responsible collective behaviour.

At least to some degree, Americans have been involved in all of these activities in Africa, though by no means as a result of any centrally planned or co-ordinated effort. But before describing the activities themselves, it is useful to briefly assess the identity and motivations of Americans who involve themselves in promoting peace and security in Africa. As shall be shown, these represent both the public sector and a wide range of private sector groups.

Why do Americans care?

US National Interests in Africa

Scholars of international relations tend to describe the actions of nation-states in terms of a relatively coherent pursuit of national interests. In this model, political leaders define clear interests, develop strategies to secure those interests, then implement the strategies using the various instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic, informational and military.⁴ This is an elegant model, and has some usefulness in explaining why US national leaders might involve themselves in efforts to promote peace and security in Africa. But it is by no means the entire story. Americans are not fundamentally agreed on what constitutes 'national interests' in Africa.⁵ Neither public nor private sector American activities that generally contribute to peace and security in Africa are preceded by any deep search for a national interest to justify the activity.

While American leaders often allude to 'American interests', no US administration has developed a mature, long-term strategy to guide its activities and involvement in Africa.⁶ In other words, no administration has ever offered an unambiguous listing of the nation's interests in Africa with a coherent plan for using all of the instruments of national power in an integrated way to secure or advance those interests.⁷

This said, American policy-makers and citizens generally agree that the US has interests in Africa, but that aside from the safety of US citizens and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, none are vital.⁸ The Clinton Administration has indicated its intention to

promote "... a stable, economically dynamic Africa", clearly inferring that this is in the national interest.⁹ The same document states that "... one of the key impediments to development in Africa has been the persistence of conflict", and goes on to list the Administration's efforts to resolve various African conflicts.¹⁰ The Administration's senior policy-maker for Africa describes conflict resolution in Africa as an American 'imperative'.¹¹ From this, it can be concluded that a key American interest in Africa is regional stability.¹²

The Profit Motive

Some Americans may be motivated to contribute to peace and security in Africa in the hope of profiting from Africa's impressive resources.¹³ The Clinton Administration (rather hopefully) argues that "... increasing both the US market share and the size of the African market will bring tangible benefits to US workers and create wealth in Africa."¹⁴ In fact, the Administration has endeavoured to back this conviction by sponsoring legislation that encourages US commercial linkages and investments.¹⁵ The Administration's efforts are encouraged by the Corporate Council on Africa, an increasingly influential private sector interest group seeking to encourage US economic involvement in the continent. However, in a world rife with relatively risk-free investment opportunities, US businesses have been very reluctant to invest in troubled regions, including much of Africa.

Interest Groups

Small groups in America have other connections to Africa that result in support for activities which they believe will promote peace and security. Their interest derives from a variety of different motivations. These include, among others, Africanist scholars, a wide variety of religious and humanitarian groups, and Americans of African descent. To date, none of these groups has succeeded in bringing African issues to the consistent attention of the public or that of the national political decision-makers.

The Attentive Public

Africa has touched a nerve within that part of the educated US public that concerns itself with foreign policy issues. One result has been a commitment by a wide range of groups and educational institutions to a 'National Summit on Africa', scheduled to reach its crescendo in 1999. This grassroots effort has mobilised an unprecedented interest in finding solutions to Africa's problems. However, it touches a very small part of the American public as a whole. And it remains to be seen if this effort will result in tangible long-term private sector or public sector commitments.

The Public at Large

To ordinary Americans, Africa is a metaphor for interminable tragedy and suffering. This perception results from the remoteness of Africa to the daily lives of Americans, and the sporadic coverage of the continent by the mass media in the US. American notions are reinforced by the media's tendency to emphasise misfortune when its interest turns to Africa.¹⁶ And while common American stereotypes are often poorly informed, they nonetheless grow from the very real fact that many countries and regions in Africa have been buffeted over the past three decades by severe man-made and natural disasters.

A very important part of US public and private sector involvement in Africa is distinctly humanitarian: Americans respond with compassion and generosity when confronted with

situations of human suffering, whether in Africa or elsewhere. That said, it is in the nature of Americans to be much more willing to relieve the suffering caused by sudden catastrophes in foreign lands than to devote significant resources in efforts to prevent it. Americans are profoundly sceptical that their government — or any other government — will use the taxpayers' money wisely to prevent tragedy abroad.

The Tragedy Factor

It should be realised that for most Americans — including those involved in the process of formulating US foreign policy — Africa is remote and sometimes unfathomable. It tends to burst on the public consciousness when terrible tragedy strikes. Otherwise, it is not at the centre of public concern, and does not continuously occupy the attention of senior decision-makers. America's 'African' policy has typically been reactive rather than proactive.¹⁷ Thus, when America has responded to African tragedy, its actions have sometimes appeared self-serving, naive, culturally insensitive, and inclined to unilateralism. But that appearance obscures a profound humanitarian impulse in the national psyche, and one rooted very deeply in traditional American values.

Who in America cares about peace and security in Africa?

Though they form a very small minority of the American population, there are groups of Americans who follow African issues very closely. Any understanding of 'what' Americans do to promote peace and security in Africa must commence with some perception of the groups or organisations involved. These differ substantially, and reflect very diverse motivations and agendas. Some are government agencies. Some are private sector agencies. Some have a broad range of interests and involvements. Others concentrate on a narrow interest.

For ease of classification, three broad categories will be identified: public sector organisations, private sector organisations whose prime interest is influencing US policy, and private sector organisations whose interest and involvements are not primarily connected to the public sector.

The Public Sector

General

The formulation of US foreign policy — including that which is intended to promote peace and security in Africa — results from complex interactions between the Administration (the President and his executive branch), the Congress, and the public. In contrast to the formulation of foreign policy, implementation of the policy is the prerogative and responsibility of the Administration.

The Administration determines the national agenda. In its conduct of foreign policy, it provides a focus for US public sector activities in Africa. But that focus is far from carefully articulated. While the US Constitution endows the President with the responsibility to develop and conduct US foreign policy,¹⁸ there is no single large US government organisation — including the Office of the President — that can dictate US policy on Africa.¹⁹

Within the US national government itself, a variety of separate institutions and bureaucracies have some concern for Africa. Generally, this means that a larger organisation will have a worldwide focus, while a smaller, subordinate element will be concerned with African issues. This is true for both the executive branch and the legislative branch of the US national government.

The executive branch agencies endeavour to translate the Administration's foreign policy objectives into specific programmes. They also develop and implement the Administration's foreign policy initiatives that happen to fall within their area of responsibility. They co-ordinate with each other to pursue programmes that fall within multiple areas of responsibility.

But the executive branch agencies are only part of the picture. The responsibilities for foreign policy are diffused between the executive and legislative branches of the US government. To understand how that affects US activity in Africa, it is appropriate to briefly describe the interactions of the Administration and the Congress, beginning with an overview of the Administration's role.

The Administration

Each new presidential administration brings its own perspectives and inclinations to its conduct of foreign policy.²⁰ For African affairs, America's presidents typically rely on a senior public servant to energise and oversee the nation's programmes. Normally, this person is an assistant secretary in the Department of State,²¹ although that can vary. For instance, the Clinton Administration's 'Africa' policy has been managed by Susan Rice since 1994, first while she was Director for Africa on the staff of the National Security Council, and then in her current position as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

While a presidential administration sets the focus and direction of foreign policy for the Executive Branch agencies, the detailed application comes from one of two processes. Firstly, the agencies themselves have considerable autonomy in formulating and managing the routine programmes under their purview (such as the development programmes of the US Agency for International Development or the peacetime military-to-military programmes of the Department of Defense). Secondly, in unusual circumstances, policy decisions emerge from a process of consultations among the executive branch agencies, starting among relatively junior staff officers and continuing through meetings of progressively higher officials. This is called the 'interagency process'.²²

For example, this process occurs when the US is contemplating a humanitarian intervention. There are intensive consultations among officers of the Departments of State, Defense, and other relevant departments that ultimately result in options offered to the President for his decision.²³

Interagency consultations are supposed to precede the President's major foreign policy initiative. The idea is that pitfalls are identified and details carefully vetted within the executive branch before a final plan is approved and implemented. Occasionally, an administration is tempted to announce an initiative or policy shift for political purposes before it can be thoroughly vetted by the interagency process. This always poses risks. The hastily announced initiative may be acclaimed for bold vision. But it may also be reviled for poor planning and clumsy implementation.²⁴

The Congress

Despite an administration's exclusive role in the conduct of foreign affairs, the US Constitution assures that foreign policy formulation cannot be the exclusive domain of the President. For instance, the President generally cannot pay for foreign policy initiatives without obtaining funding from the legislative branch — the Congress. The Constitution also requires that the

upper House (the Senate) approves treaties and the appointment of senior diplomats. If Congress is dissatisfied with the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs, it can bring considerable pressure to bear by public pronouncements, by withholding the necessary funding, by refusing to confirm appointments of senior officials or by holding hearings that discredit the Administration. Often the threat of hearings produces the desired result.

Congress occasionally plays other roles in the national foreign policy domain. For example, in the mid-1980s, key legislators concluded that the Administration did not have a clear grand strategy for pursuit of the nation's security interests. In 1986, Congress passed legislation requiring the President to prepare an annual national security strategy report.²⁵ Congress intended that this would identify US national interests, then indicate the ends, ways and means by which the Administration would seek to secure those interests around the world. While it has not become the 'grand strategy' expected by Congress, the National Security Strategy does reflect the Administration's foreign policy objectives and perspectives.²⁶ This annual document lists, for instance, the Administration's objectives in its policy toward Africa.

In 1985, Congress also founded the United States Institute of Peace, an independent, non-partisan federal institution intended to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. This institute promotes education and research on the subject of peace and conflict resolution. It organises conferences and colloquia and co-operates with other private and public sector organisations with the same interests.²⁷

Both the Administration and Congress are very sensitive to pressure from the public. While the American public rarely places heavy demands on its government over African issues, it does so on some occasions.²⁸

Public pressures on Congress can affect US foreign policy — including peace operations — in a variety of ways. One illustration is US relations with the United Nations. Available research shows surprisingly high support among the US population for UN peace operations and for US support of such activities.²⁹ Yet, a small, vocal segment of the American public has strong reservations about the existence and activities of the UN. The result is congressional scrutiny of UN operations, demand for reforms and reluctance to pay assessments or arrears. While congressional pressures have resulted in UN reforms, the refusal to fully pay the arrears has embarrassed the Administration and has limited the ability of the world body to support some peace operations in Africa and elsewhere.

Members of Congress reflect the interests and concerns of the constituencies that elected them. As has already been indicated, the African-American community in the US has a somewhat greater interest in issues relating to Africa than the public at large. Most African-American members of Congress are part of the Congressional Black Caucus, an informal group particularly interested in the concerns of African-Americans. This group has exerted formal and informal pressure on the Administration over African policy issues.

Foreign leaders endeavour to influence US policy by cultivating members of Congress, sometimes to the exasperation of the Administration. A noteworthy example was the relationship that developed in the mid-1990s between Illinois Senator Carol Moseley-Braun and Nigerian strongman Sani Abacha.³⁰

While some individual members of Congress have expertise or experience in African affairs, and exert influence in US relations with Africa, the real interest in Congress resides with the hired staff members who work in the committees. These are the individuals who craft the legislation,

structure the legislative hearings and deal with executive branch agencies. Members of Congress typically give their staffs considerable leeway in this process. In fact, the business of Congress is primarily done in committees or subcommittees, and this includes its role in foreign affairs. Each of the two Houses of Congress has a committee specifically chartered to address foreign affairs, and in each case, a subcommittee concerns itself with African issues.³¹ For routine issues of US policy that contribute to peace and security in Africa, this is where Congress exerts its most consistent and important role.

There is always potential for significant disagreement on foreign policy issues between the executive and legislative branches of the US government.³² And in recent years, this has been compounded by the increasing overlap between foreign and domestic political issues.³³ However, what is not highly visible to outsiders is a considerable amount of routine co-ordination between congressional staff members and the mid-level officers of executive branch agencies. For instance, mid-level officials in the Department of Defense and the Department of State communicate regularly with the congressional staff that craft foreign assistance legislation. Most of the potential disagreements are worked out before they would ever become public.

From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that both the executive branch of the US government and the legislative branch are involved in formulating US policy intended to promote peace and security in Africa. It should also be evident that this process is somewhat analogous to a formal dance: one partner dominates, but both must move in close concert for the activity to succeed. Neither can move too far ahead of the other. Sometimes, a close and profitable partnership is evident. At others, it is absent.

The executive branch agencies

Within the executive branch itself, a variety of departments and agencies have some interest in Africa. However, four have a predominant involvement in the activities intended to promote peace and security in Africa. These are the Office of the President, the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Agency of International Development (better known as USAID).

The Office of the President

The President himself typically depends on his National Security Advisor and the permanent staff of his National Security Council (NSC) for translation of his personal vision into regional policies. Within the Office of the President, Africa-related activities are generally overseen by the Senior Director for Africa on the permanent staff of the National Security Council.³⁴

The Senior Director, with the help of a small staff, serves as a conduit for Africa-related issues to and from the President. S/he also oversees the President's 'African' initiatives. Whether this office plays the decisive role in determining US African policy, or merely co-ordinates it among interested agencies, depends upon the President, the National Security Advisor and the personality of the Senior Director. This distinction is important. The coherence and relevance of the Administration's Africa policy are profoundly affected by the influence of the advisors that immediately surround the President.

The Clinton Administration's substantive involvement in Africa started very inauspiciously with tragedy in Somalia. What had begun in December 1992 as a US-led humanitarian relief operation, was transformed in May 1993 into a UN peacekeeping operation.³⁵ An October 1993 ambush in Mogadishu resulted in the death of eighteen US military personnel. This traumatised the Administration, produced months of angry recriminations among US government agencies,

and severely reduced the Administration's enthusiasm for military interventions.

One clear result was a wrenching review of the Administration's policy on US military participation in peace operations. The results soon appeared in the (now famous) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which provided a template for US decisions on involvement in multinational peace operations. This document also called for specific reforms in the management and conduct of UN interventions.³⁶ Another result was the Administration's reluctance to intervene in Rwanda the following year, even after the commencement of the genocide in April 1994. When the US did commit forces to humanitarian relief in Central Africa in July,³⁷ the mission was very limited in scope, its objectives were modest and clearly defined, and the US military commander withdrew the force as soon as he believed the objectives had been accomplished.³⁸

However, the impact of Somalia had begun to wane by mid-1996, when a military *coup* in Burundi revived the fears of renewed genocide in Central Africa, and stirred the Administration's interest in solutions. One result was a US proposal in October 1996 to assist in the creation of an African Crisis Response Force.

The rebellion in eastern Zaire in late 1996 further tested the Administration's 'Africa policy' inclinations. Under growing pressure from humanitarian groups caring for (Rwandan) refugees in eastern Zaire, the US sent a small military team to Central Africa to assess the situation, and (somewhat reluctantly) agreed to participate in an international coalition under Canadian leadership. The US team could not verify the claims of the humanitarian groups and could not determine a clear purpose for intervention. The situation resolved itself before the international community could react.

While it has remained cautious about military interventions, the second Clinton Administration has demonstrated more interest in stability, security and peace in Africa than any administration before. This is reflected in a significant number of presidential initiatives (discussed below) aimed directly at promoting conflict resolution, human rights, and economic and social development.

A highly public demonstration of the Administration's interest occurred in early 1998, when Clinton conducted the first substantial visit to Africa by a sitting US President since the visit of President Jimmy Carter some twenty years earlier. On his trip, Clinton commended leaders who had achieved national reconciliation and economic progress. He also committed the US to the prevention of future genocide in Central Africa, and announced several policy initiatives, including US support for an African Center for Security Studies.

While the Clinton Administration has clearly articulated an American interest in regional stability, resulting in much rhetoric and a number of programmes and initiatives, its approach reflects uncertainty about how best to promote it.³⁹ The failure of robust international military intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s led to increasing US interest in promoting indigenous solutions to problems of conflict.⁴⁰ It also led the Administration into seeming endorsements of African leaders it considered reflective of a new generation of pragmatic realists: leaders like Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda's Paul Kagame. And it led the US to seek a uniquely intense bilateral relationship with South Africa. The wisdom of these approaches remains to be seen. What remains undone is an overarching strategy that ties all of the various regional programmes, initiatives, and relationships into a well-focused, mutually reinforcing whole.

The Department of State

As the 'foreign ministry' of the US, the Department of State mediates its relations with the rest of the world, and plays a critical, if not always primary, role in the formulation of US African policy. The Department of State is responsible (on behalf of the Administration) for determining what US public sector assistance should be provided to foreign countries and for requesting that Congress fund such assistance.⁴¹ Thus, the Department plays a critical role in US contributions to various activities designed to promote peace and security in Africa.

Members of the Department of State form the diplomatic corps which maintains official US relationships with the rest of the world. As such, it is connected in some respect to almost all US public sector involvement in Africa, including those intended to promote peace and security. This is true of the region as a whole and of US bilateral relations with individual African countries. For example, a US Ambassador in a country is responsible for overseeing all of the official US peacetime activities by elements or personnel of the US government. Depending on the country, this American community could include a variety of aid, informational, Peace Corps, law enforcement, military, and other functionaries, all with some role in economic and political development, relief, institution-building or training of the security services.

For the region as a whole, US diplomats have played key roles, often behind the scenes, in negotiations to end minority rule and civil war in Africa. This included significant contributions to the Lancaster House negotiations that brought independence to Zimbabwe in 1980.⁴² American diplomats in the Reagan and Bush Administrations (1981-1992) worked for years to negotiate independence for Namibia, the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola, and a political settlement to the Angolan civil war. American diplomats were present at the negotiations in Rome that finally ended the Mozambican civil war in 1994, and at Arusha in 1993 and 1994 where the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Habyarimana government agreed on a settlement aborted by Habyarimana's assassination. An American official, resident in Luanda, is accredited to the Angolan Peace Process.

When Liberian rebel (now President) Charles Taylor suggested in 1993 that he would agree to disarm his faction only to an Anglophone contingent from outside West Africa, the US sent a team of diplomats and military officers to various East and Southern African countries seeking agreements to contribute troops. Both Uganda and Tanzania responded, each by sending a battalion for a year of peacekeeping duties between 1994 and 1995.⁴³

The US has dispatched special envoys to communicate with key actors in circumstances of conflict or transition. Most recently, these have included Howard F Jeter, US special envoy to Liberia, Howard Wolpe, US special envoy to the Great Lakes countries, Assistant Secretary Susan Rice (sent in 1998 to help mediate an end to the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia), and Thomas Pickering to consult with the new leader of Nigeria after the death of strongman Sani Abacha.

Since the mid-1990s, US diplomats have increasingly been active in international conferences addressing problems of conflict in Africa. Some of these conferences have been designed to identify areas for co-operation in training of African military forces for peace operations and in rationalising the efforts of donors. Others have addressed regional problems like the proliferation of small arms. Although there is much room for further improvement, the consultations have produced a significantly higher degree of communication among potential donors than was true in the early 1990s, and have resulted in a modest but growing co-operation.

Senior US diplomats also endeavour to develop a US public constituency for the Administration's African policy. Noteworthy examples include an active itinerary of public speaking by Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and by Ambassador Marshall McCallie, head of the Interagency Working Group for the African Crisis Response Initiative.

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

The US Department of State itself is a small organisation with a very modest budget primarily intended to fund its own operations. However, the Secretary of State oversees an autonomous organisation called the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which is responsible for most of the non-military US assistance provided to African countries. Most of this assistance is designed to promote sustainable economic development, but a substantial amount is also devoted to emergency relief, disaster assistance, food security, health, infrastructural rehabilitation, encouragement of political reform, post-conflict demobilisation, and promotion of human rights.⁴⁴ USAID supervises the disbursement of the bulk of the US \$700 million in aid which the US provides each year to sub-Saharan Africa.

USAID works in Africa through bilateral missions in individual countries and through three substantial subregional centres: one each in Bamako, Nairobi and Gaborone. Most of the USAID projects reflect bilateral relationships between the US and individual countries. These activities fall under the supervision of the US ambassador in the country at issue.

Over the past decade, USAID has endeavoured to encourage transregional development and to forge relations with international organisations and research centres in order to leverage the effect of its activities. For instance, it co-operates with international agricultural research centres to improve agricultural performance. The regional centres endeavour to assist subregional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in efforts to achieve regional economic integration.

USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of Transitional Initiatives have played key roles in providing critical relief to stressed African populations. Senior US officials have commended these organisations for their efficiency and responsiveness.⁴⁵

While the USAID projects themselves tend to have a developmental and human rights focus, Americans believe that these contribute to peace and security by improving conditions of life and strengthening civil society. The efforts are also intended to build co-operative economic relations across wider subregions of the continent, attenuating interstate tensions.

More than any other single Agency of the US Government, USAID maintains close relationships with US and foreign private sector organisations concerned with development, relief, human rights and health issues. In that sense, it also does what no other agency has done so far: combining a wide range of public and private sector efforts to achieve synergistic effects.

The Department of Defense

During much of the Cold War, the primary role of the US military establishment was preparation for general war with a 'near peer' enemy of similar size and sophistication. The relevance of that role seemingly dissolved with the Soviet Union. Adjusting to the new roles in the post-Cold War world, concurrent with a dramatic downsizing, has been a difficult process for America's military

Military activities in Africa since 1990 capture the essence of various dilemmas which the US faces in the 'new world order'. The US military found itself engaged not in conventional war, but in humanitarian relief — and in protecting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing such relief. Coalition partners were very unfamiliar. Threats to US forces in these interventions were impossible to predict and difficult to understand. The US military found itself attempting to resolve problems that were moral, economic, social and structural, and not amenable to permanent solution by coercion. It has taken time to adjust to these demands, and some of the early lessons were painful.47

While senior military leaders still insist that the primary mission of the US military is to fight and win the nation's wars, the doctrine and training include an increasing emphasis on peace operations.48 The military establishment now devotes considerable amounts of its time, effort and resources to what it calls 'shaping' the international environment.49 These activities include building and strengthening alliances, building indigenous capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations, encouraging adherence of governments and security forces to international norms and discouraging arms races and the proliferation of weapons. The activities are intended to enhance regional security and reduce threats to regional stability.50

The humanitarian relief operations in Somalia (1992-1993) and Rwanda (1994) generated intense publicity. For many Americans, they tend to be the stereotype of US military activity in Africa. Ironically, these operations represent only a tiny fraction of US military involvements on the continent. The scope and intensity of peacetime military activities have increased since the end of the Cold War.51 It may even be argued that in the post-Cold War era, the US has significantly overemphasised the military instrument of national power in Africa at the expense of the diplomatic and the economic.52 That being said, America has no military bases in Africa. The only permanent US military presence on the continent is the small numbers of attaché, security assistance and guard personnel attached to some of the embassies.

The Department of Defense implements presidential initiatives that are security-related, like the training associated with the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).53 Most of the activities in Africa are routine military-to-military contacts such as officer visits, staff consultations, conferences, information exchanges and similar activities. They include participation in combined exercises (some organised by the US military and some by African military organisations). They include donations of surplus military equipment for humanitarian purposes, and management of the sales or grants of limited quantities of military materiel. Most importantly, they include a substantial amount of military training offered to African military personnel under the US International Military Education and Training Program (see Appendix A).

The manner in which the US military goes about these activities brings with it a number of advantages and disadvantages. The US divides its worldwide overseas military presence into five large commands, each responsible for US military activities in a separate geographical region. Each has substantial autonomy in preparing its contingency plans and in implementing its various programmes, including peacetime military-to-military relations with countries in its area of responsibility.

Most African countries fall within the area of responsibility of the US European Command, headquartered in Germany. Seven countries in the northeast corner of the continent fall under the area of responsibility of the US Central Command, headquartered in the US. This means

that if the intervenes with military force in Somalia, that force will be organised by the Central Command. If the US intervenes with military force in Rwanda, that force will be organised by the European Command. The same relationship holds true for routine peacetime activities. Senior American generals from the European Command would visit South Africa on normal military-to-military exchange visits. However, the senior American generals visiting Ethiopia generally would come from the Central Command.

This American way of assigning military responsibility is a legacy of the Cold War and of earlier crises in the Persian Gulf region. The fact that two different commands bear responsibility for parts of Africa means that there will be differences in military-to-military relations between the US and African countries due to the divergent perspectives of the American regional commanders and their staffs.

Until the early 1990s, the US regional commands paid relatively little attention to Africa. After the Cold War ended, the interest increased dramatically.⁵⁴ However, the key focus of the regional commands still remains elsewhere. The European Command finds US interests and resources taxed to a greater degree by operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Bosnia than by instability in Africa. The Central Command must accommodate the Administration's greater concern about hostilities with Iraq than about border wars in the Horn.

The 1990s have seen a process of adjustment between the leadership of the US regional commands and that of African military and political leaders. In the early 1990s, African military leaders tended not to understand the roles played by the US regional commands. For their part, the US regional commands had much to learn about Africa and about communicating effectively with potential African partners. While the adjustment is still ongoing, and much room for improvement remains, the ties are far closer now than in the early 1990s. American military leaders believe that the growing relationships will facilitate US participation in peace operations and humanitarian relief.

Both the European and Central Command have recently produced senior leaders personally committed to peace and security in Africa — General James Jamerson and General Anthony Zinni, respectively. These generals have made concerted efforts to establish and maintain close communication with African counterparts. Both have convened recurring conferences and exercises in which senior African leaders played key roles. Both generals have been strongly committed to combined and individual training programmes with African military establishments. However, the agenda of these generals is a reflection of their personal vision. Their successors may be less interested and involved in African issues, particularly if faced with difficult contingency requirements in Europe or the Persian Gulf.

One particularly difficult adjustment for the US military in its African relief operations was that of integrating and accommodating the role of NGOs. These organisations offer critically important humanitarian and relief assistance during complex humanitarian emergencies. However, they are not always inclined to co-operate smoothly with each other or with military intervention forces. Often, they have agendas at odds with those of their military counterparts.

The relationship between the military and NGOs is an area in which the US military has made considerable improvement since the early 1990s.⁵⁵ After the US intervention in Somalia highlighted many of the problems in these relationships, both the US academic community and various public sector organisations — including the military — explored the issue in numerous conferences and colloquia. US interventions in Central Africa, Haiti and Bosnia reinforced a growing understanding of the importance of civil-military co-operation in complex humanitarian

emergencies, leading to a 1997 Presidential Decision Directive defining roles and responsibilities of US agencies involved in 'complex contingency operations'.56

At the national level, strategic war games and exercises now routinely include representatives from NGOs. The regional commands include NGO representatives in planning cells which refine contingency plans. US military doctrine for peace operations specifies the creation of civil-military operations centres to assure that humanitarian (and other NGO operations) are co-ordinated with military operations. An expected result of this communication is that humanitarian agencies will be able to provide relief services quickly and efficiently during military interventions in Africa and elsewhere.

Other Federal agencies and organisations

A variety of other executive branch agencies have some involvement in Africa, including the US Information Service (USIS), the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and others. Furthermore, among those that could have a direct bearing on peace and security in Africa are agencies concerned with law enforcement. Americans generally believe that competent law enforcement and an effective, fair judicial system are important ingredients of stability. Despite an obvious need, this conviction has unfortunately not resulted in much tangible assistance to Africa. The Department of Defense is prohibited by law from providing training to foreign policy forces.57

The US does not have a national police force.58 Rather, it has several national law enforcement agencies with narrowly circumscribed roles. These include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Both of these agencies have small contingents in a number of African countries where their role is to protect the US itself from criminal threat. These small cells provide a very modest level of assistance to African law enforcement agencies, but they do not have the resources to contribute much capability to their host countries.59

One exception is a small organisation in the US Department of Justice called the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Founded in the mid-1980s, this organisation has provided police training to a number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the reconstruction of a police force in Haiti. ICITAP has trained police in Somalia, Rwanda, South Africa and Liberia, but its African activities have been limited.60

A final organisation that warrants mention is the US Department of Transportation, which is charged with the responsibility for air safety. This organisation plays a significant (if relatively unnoticed) role in assuring the safety of aircraft, airports and air traffic control systems around the world, including in Africa. The increasing, worldwide importance of air travel as an 'economic line of communications' suggests that the security of air travel can contribute to development and stability in Africa and elsewhere.61

Private sector groups that influence policy

While the executive branch of the US government manages foreign policy, and Congress provides checks and balances in that process, the American public itself includes various groups that influence foreign policy.

One such a group is the national media, particularly the television media. The Bush Administration's decision to intervene in Somalia in late 1992 was clearly influenced by public

pressure. The precipitous withdrawal after October 1993 was likewise influenced by media coverage. However, the media in the US do not have any particular common agenda with regard to Africa, and as is evident, their attention to events on the continent is episodic, selective, and generally brief. Still, the media play a role in convincing some Americans of the desirability of peace and stability in Africa. The media probably also play a role in convincing others that Africa's problems are insoluble and that such a quest is hopeless.⁶²

More focused and more effective private sector groups that influence US African policy can be found in academic communities.⁶³ For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are very active in promoting conferences, colloquia, and publications on African issues, including conflict resolution and peace operations. These two centres are located in Washington, and their meetings attract US officials engaged in foreign policy, as well as diplomats from African embassies and members of African interest groups.

Groups of prominent Americans in organisations like the American Assembly or the Council on Foreign Affairs develop positions on African policy issues.⁶⁴ The membership of such groups includes scholars, policy-makers and respected former civil servants. Think tanks like the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation also seek an official audience for their assessments. These various groups have been interested in African issues in the 1990s, and have offered their own perspectives on US contributions to achieve peace and security.

It is worth noting that the largest group of Africanist scholars in the world is the US-based African Studies Association.⁶⁵ Though its membership is international, a majority are American citizens, and most of its formal activities — including most of its annual meetings — occur in the US. Many of the US government officials concerned with African issues are also members. While the African Studies Association has rarely exerted effective pressure on an administration for broad-based changes in policy, its activities inform much of the debate and help public and private sector individuals to understand the issues better. There is therefore some movement of information and insight occurring between American Africanist scholars and US government offices.⁶⁶

A number of advocacy groups seek to inform policy debates on African issues. Among the most effective are TransAfrica, the Africa Fund and the Africa-America Institute.⁶⁷ Various US-based religious and humanitarian organisations also seek to influence US policy toward Africa. Many of these have a relatively narrow interest and tend to engage policy-makers only when such an interest is threatened. A recent example is the reaction of some US religious organisations to the persecution of co-religionists in Sudan, in which the religious groups pressured both the Congress and the Administration to sanction the Sudanese government.

Americans of African descent have demonstrated a community-wide support (or opposition) to US Africa policy on occasion. The most notable example of this has been with regard to US policy towards white minority regimes in Southern Africa. However, other than the struggle against apartheid,⁶⁸ this community has not produced the highly effective, focused American advocacy groups comparable to those that pressure the US government on issues pertaining to Israel, Cuba, Greece or Armenia.

Africans themselves have sought to influence American leaders and US policy in a quintessentially American way — by hiring US consulting firms to lobby Congress or the Administration on their behalf. This practice is very widespread. For example, African clients

have hired consultants to press for increased levels of foreign aid funding, or US support in negotiations with international monetary agencies, or an end to political and military sanctions. American consulting firms, for their part, have sought African states as clients. Consulting firms are another category of Americans that can be interested in pressuring the US government on African issues, as long as there is some likelihood of African clients with money to spend.⁶⁹

Private sector groups with programmes outside the public sphere

A wide variety of US-based private sector individuals and groups are involved in conflict resolution, humanitarian, development, institution-building, educational and similar activities in Africa. (These include the American missionary groups, which have had a significant presence in Africa since the waning years of the 19th century.) At least 24 000 American citizens are involved in religious, humanitarian or developmental work in Africa, of which at least 11 000 are in Africa.⁷⁰ It is important to note that this number vastly exceeds that of public sector personnel permanently stationed in Africa or involved with Africa as a primary daily concern. This monograph can hardly do justice to their various activities, but some illustrative examples may suffice.

Perhaps the highest profile private citizen involved in conflict resolution in Africa is former US President Jimmy Carter who heads the Carter Center in Atlanta. In addition to his centre's involvement in health and nutrition issues in Africa and elsewhere, Carter himself has participated in conflict resolution efforts in the Horn of Africa, Sudan, the Great Lakes region and Liberia. He has served as an election monitor in Liberia and Zambia. This distinguished American has demonstrated a unique gift as a mediator and facilitator in negotiations to end conflict.⁷¹ Surprisingly, his efforts at mediation in Africa have been greeted, at best, with lukewarm approval from the Clinton Administration, which has little control over his agenda and seems to suspect his motives.⁷²

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is notable for financing the activities of a wide range of NGOs in Africa and elsewhere in the world. In 1997, the organisation distributed a total of almost US \$4 million to some 61 separate projects in a wide range of African countries. The NED-funded projects ranged from the promotion of reconciliation dialogue in Angola to the establishment of a Peace Center in northern Nigeria to human rights seminars in Sudan.⁷³ NED funding was provided to US-based and foreign organisations. Most of the NED-funded activities have a direct or indirect bearing on African stability.

A large number of American private voluntary organisations maintain programmes in Africa, with activities ranging from rural agricultural development to education, health, human rights and relief efforts in crisis situations. (A sampling of the more prominent groups is provided at Appendix B.⁷⁴)

Americans also contribute to, and participate in international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP). Many American citizens serve in NGOs with a more international flavour such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, OXFAM and *Médecins sans frontières* (Doctors Without Borders). Not only do the numbers of US citizens directly connected to Africa through all of the NGOs exceed the number of US public sector employees so engaged, but the private sector voluntary funding which sustains much of their effort also exceeds the US public sector foreign development assistance. African needs, however, are far greater than the resources available to all of these agencies.

The various NGOs which work in Africa do not all subscribe to the same perspectives and agendas, although many of them co-operate with each other. A significant percentage are linked to 'umbrella' organisations such as the American Council for Voluntary International Action (INTERACTION) or the Fund for Peace. However, no common agency or oversight group controls their activities: each group negotiates its own relationship with African host countries. At times, there are strained relations over conflicting agendas within NGO communities in African countries.

The US private and public sector can work together effectively in efforts to promote security and a better quality of life in Africa. This is illustrated by the close relationship between USAID and the NGOs through which it does much of its work. However, the US government does not have any inherent control over American NGOs unless they break American laws. Some US officials have personal objections to the activities of various NGOs.⁷⁵ And, on occasion, relations between these private sector groups and American government officials in Africa have been difficult. In the worst cases, disgruntled NGOs have mounted international media campaigns to pressure the US government to support their agenda.⁷⁶

Key programmes and initiatives of the Clinton era

There are many specific ways in which the political leaders and private citizens of the United States endeavour to contribute to peace and security in Africa. Some of these efforts are directed towards the resolution or attenuation of existing conflict, some are directed towards relieving the suffering of victims of natural and man-made disasters. Much of the effort is intended to reduce the root causes of suffering, instability and conflict. This variety has been noted in the general discussion up to this point. To gain an appreciation of the nature of the US public sector commitment, it is useful to consider several of the more important Clinton era programmes and initiatives. These are divided into two categories: efforts targeted at resolving and managing conflict, and those designed to prevent it by reducing the sources of instability.

Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management

The US has been particularly active since the end of the Cold War in efforts to end conflict in Africa. Public sector efforts have included the exercise of diplomacy, the use of economic incentives, and the occasional use of military power. The broader diplomatic and military efforts have been described earlier, but a number of specific activities and initiatives deserve particular mention.

International organisations

One of the results of the October 1993 military debacle in Mogadishu was a desire among senior US political and military officials for specific reform of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This was evident in PDD-25 (May 19), which listed 25 desired reforms. Vigorous subsequent US diplomatic efforts resulted in the implementation of twenty of these proposed reforms. The reforms have enhanced the DPKO's ability to field and support peacekeeping operations. (One material US contribution to this effort has been the gratis provision of up to thirteen US military officers to DPKO, out of the total of 125 gratis officers in the Department as a whole.⁷⁷) Reforms in the DPKO have a direct potential impact on peace and security in Africa.

Regional and subregional organisations

Organisation of African Unity

At its annual Assembly of Heads of State in 1993, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) undertook to reform its mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution.⁷⁸ In November 1993, it established a conflict resolution and peacekeeping mechanism within its Secretariat. These events encouraged the Administration to sponsor legislation, signed into law in 1994 as the **African Conflict Resolution Act**, which authorised a somewhat open-ended regime of funding and technical support for regional and subregional organisations engaged in conflict resolution activity. By 1994, the US was funding the structure to support a hundred-man OAU rapid deployment observer force and the automation of the Conflict Resolution Centre in Addis Ababa. The US also posted a diplomat at its embassy in Addis Ababa to work with the OAU in implementing these reforms. US policy-makers are very interested in seeing these efforts result in an OAU capacity to manage peace operations, but progress has been very slow.

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

The US has contributed funding, materiel and transport to Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace operations in Liberia. This has included a US \$13 million effort to deploy a 1 500-man Senegalese unit to Liberia in 1991. It also included a US \$31 million project to support a battalion each from Uganda and Tanzania in Liberia from 1994-1995, some US \$15 million in equipment, services and airlift for ECOMOG contingents in 1996, and some US \$3,9 million to support ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone in 1998. The US has provided US \$28 million in contracted transportation to ECOMOG contingents between 1996 and the present. Other contributions include several million dollars worth of excess military equipment.⁷⁹ While ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been problematic in many ways, American policy-makers believe that West Africans have endeavoured to build an indigenous regional conflict management capacity, and deserve both commendation and support.⁸⁰

Multilateral peace operations exercises

The late 1990s saw the appearance of multilateral subregional military exercises designed to test and refine indigenous peace operations capabilities in Africa. US officials recognised the importance of this development and almost immediately began to look for ways to encourage it.

The first occurred in April 1997, when Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom co-hosted a subregional peace operations exercise, Blue Hungwe, in Zimbabwe. According to its director, its aim was "*... to enhance regional liaison, co-operation, military skills and interoperability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of international peacekeeping.*"⁸¹ This was the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. Two US observers attended the exercise.

Activity escalated in 1998. In February, Senegal and France co-hosted a sophisticated field training exercise in Senegal, Guidimakha-98, also built around the theme of a complex humanitarian emergency. Exercise participants included not only eight West African countries and France, but also contingents from Belgium, the United Kingdom and the US. The US contribution included some fifty military personnel and the use of two military transport aircraft for airlift.⁸²

In July 1998, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, in an unprecedented display of common purpose, organised and conducted Exercise Natural Fire, again with a peace operations theme. The US

provided funding, logistics, transportation, and more than 460 military participants for the exercise.83

Another Southern African exercise, Blue Crane, to be hosted by South Africa in November 1998, has attracted international attention and commitments of support. The US government has committed itself to provide five military observer/instructors and US \$1 million in military airlift for exercise participants.84

It is possible for external observers to overestimate African capabilities as a result of the recent exercises. Africans also may find themselves pushed by donors to schedule more exercising than they are ready to do. However, the exercises are indications of a maturing collective African approach to conflict management. They have attracted the interest and support of international donors, including that of the US. That is likely to continue.85

The Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

Few African initiatives of the Clinton Administration have generated as much controversy as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) or its immediate predecessor, the African Crisis Response Force. The initiative was an Administration effort, begun in mid-1996, to find an indigenous solution to anticipated internal conflict in Burundi. The Administration originally envisioned a multinational African force, trained and supported by the US and other European donors, capable of conducting peace operations. The initiative was announced in late 1996 with little warning and minimal consultation. African and European responses were lukewarm at best.86

The Administration persevered, however. It engaged Africans, European allies and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in consultations to identify an appropriate US role. It also obtained congressional funding for a five-year programme (US \$15 million for the first year, US \$20 million for the second year and US \$20 million requested for the third year).

ACRI subsequently evolved into a bilateral training programme (with some multilateral features) in which the US provides peace operations training to ground force battalions in individual African countries.87 The training consists of an initial seventy-day programme followed by up to five iterations of sustainment training. The US provides participating units with modest quantities of non-lethal materiel, particularly communications equipment. Eight African countries have agreed to participate. At the time of writing in September 1998, five of the eight countries have already received the initial training.88

Since its inception in 1996, various authorities have analysed this programme.89 Most call attention to its limitations, the most important being the relatively small number of African subscribers, the absence of any overarching structure to mobilise, deploy and command the scattered ACRI-trained battalions, and the fact that the programme is designed only for a five-year period from inception to completion. However, ACRI has already performed two invaluable roles: it has energised a search for more useful alternatives and has stimulated a much greater level of communication among US, African, European and DPKO military staffs on issues of peace operations training.90

The African Center for Security Studies (ACSS)

Since the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense has been interested in establishing a centre in which senior African civil and military leaders can be provided with a world-class learning

environment to study the issues of regional security, national security structures, civil-military relations, the role of militaries in a democracy, and defence resources management. The Marshall Center in Germany offers such a programme for the countries of Europe and Eurasia, and has been highly acclaimed.

Speaking in Senegal during his African visit, President Clinton announced his commitment to such a centre. However, no American official wants to repeat the mistakes of the ACRI. As this is written, officials of the Department of Defense are in the early stages of designing a centre in co-operation with African partners. They are engaged in intensive consultations with African officials, private sector scholars and potential foreign partners to assure that an ACSS meets African expectations and African needs. This programme is likely to start with a small pilot effort in 1999 before transforming it into its more permanent form early in the next century.⁹¹

US training for African military personnel

The attention directed to ACRI training somewhat obscures the fact that the US has a long-standing programme of training for African military personnel. (See Appendix A for funding detail.) The training provides a wide variety of technical skills and professional military knowledge. African students attend every level of military education available to US military personnel.⁹²

US policy-makers who oversee the training expect it to aid in the professionalisation of African armies, improving their ability to identify and meet their nations' security threats. American policy-makers also expect US military education to prepare African leaders for leadership roles in international coalitions involved in humanitarian relief and peace operations.⁹³

More importantly than all of these, US military training at all levels places great stress on the ethical standards expected of military professionals. These standards include the subordination of security forces to civil authority, responsible command, the importance of personal and organisational integrity, good stewardship of national resources, regard for the international laws of land warfare, respect of human rights, ethical treatment of civilians in peace and war, and effective military justice.⁹⁴ It seems intuitively obvious that a well-led, professionally competent, ethical army itself will not be a source of instability.

Conflict Prevention: Attenuating the Sources

Much of the activities of the private sector humanitarian organisations and of USAID are intended to promote stability. As has been shown, these include economic and infrastructural development, empowerment of disadvantaged groups, reduction of health threats, encouragement of civil society, and similar objectives. The Clinton Administration has also announced a number of special initiatives that pursue the same ends. The more prominent of are mentioned below.

African Growth and Opportunity Act

This 'flagship' legislation, proposed by the Administration and awaiting congressional approval, would fund efforts to assist in economic reform and growth throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Among its key provisions are mechanisms to encourage US private sector commercial linkages with Africa and preferences for African exports to the US. Programmes under this Act would be overseen by USAID. Underlying this initiative is a fundamental American belief that economic opportunity and private sector dynamism are important components of stability.

Great Lakes justice initiative

This US \$30 million initiative is designed to attenuate (what Americans believe) are key obstacles to stability in the Great Lakes countries of Central Africa. Programmes under this initiative would help build effective, impartial law enforcement and judicial systems, stress the regard for fundamental human rights by military and civil government personnel, and assist in the demobilisation of military and irregular forces. The programme would also link these efforts to the rehabilitation of civil society, including professional organisations interested in legal reform. Complementing the Great Lakes justice initiative is a US \$2 million fund for returned Rwandan refugees, designed to provide assistance in rebuilding homes and community infrastructure.

Greater Horn of Africa initiative

This initiative, valued at US \$15 million, is designed to fund activities in East African and the Horn which reduce local tensions and provide development and opportunity for local populations, and will be overseen by USAID. Complementing the initiative is a US \$2 million programme for the rebuilding and infrastructural rehabilitation of rebel-plagued northern Uganda.

The US Initiatives: A Characterisation

The Clinton era initiatives reinforce an important point about US African policy. Though this Administration has shown more interest in African peace and security than its predecessors, its policy is essentially reactive. Despite some rhetoric about 'shaping' the environment, the US activities and programmes follow a familiar pattern. A crisis occurs. The US, along with other developed countries, searches for solutions to the crisis. After some analysis, new programmes are announced to resolve such a crisis and the problems that caused it.

No US administration has ever undertaken an intensive all-agency review of the entire regional policy to identify clear national ends and develop a rational, long-range regional strategy to pursue them. No administration has ever been able to mobilise a national constituency for an African vision. The result is an increasing accumulation of small-scale initiatives, programmes and involvements which lack focus and are rarely studied to assess their true effectiveness. The US public sector activities do not always articulate well with each other, with the efforts of the US private sector, or with the efforts of other partner nations.

The problem is not a lack of compassion. Americans have made considerable efforts to address the problems of peace and security in Africa, though the needs admittedly far exceed the contribution. The missing ingredients are political will, vision and strategy. But this should not be surprising. The President and his inner Cabinet typically cannot afford to pay close, regular attention to African issues. Because Africa is remote from America's vital interests, an administration takes a risk in displaying boldness in Africa policy. There is no large domestic constituency for such policy. If it succeeds brilliantly, an administration obtains little political advantage. If it fails, it can be a serious domestic political liability. That is why it is unrealistic to expect a bold, visionary, comprehensive, highly focused and well-resourced US African policy.

Advice to Africans

From the foregoing discussion, it should be evident that no single individual or agency controls the wide variety of American involvements in Africa. The US President oversees the US public sector activities, but the Administration has little inherent control over the vast array of private

individuals and organisations that also aspire to play this role. Nor is the Administration able to prevent the US Congress from asserting a role in Africa policy, even if congressional activity conflicts with the Administration's priorities and objectives.

The US government sometimes finds itself at odds with private sector organisations and actors involved in humanitarian or development activities in Africa. This means that if someone wants the US to do something, or change something that Americans are already doing, it is important to identify which American agency is interested in the issue. It is entirely possible that the most appropriate US response to an African need is accessible only in the US private sector. It is entirely possible that the Administration has no control over a private American organisation that might be objectionable to others.

One can very easily overestimate the degree of attention and interest which senior American policy-makers devote to African issues. For an administration, oversight of African policy is generally delegated to a senior appointed official. The identity of that person is very important. If the broad policy decisions of the US government have to be influenced, it is necessary to get the ear of the individual to whom the Administration turns for management of its African policy portfolio. This can sometimes be done through the US private sector — by lobbying or by stirring the interest of the Africanist scholars in the think tanks and international relations study centres like CSIS. It is probably best done by persistent diplomatic contact in Washington.

It is very important that African leaders communicate their concerns directly and unambiguously to their American counterparts.⁹⁵ While Africa should not hesitate to express dissatisfaction, the communication should also include commendation of those programmes that are effective and efforts which should be encouraged. American leaders hear many conflicting recommendations about regional policies. It helps when the same message is conveyed by more than one African interlocutor.

Africa should particularly commend efforts by the US (and other donors) to blend their development programmes in order to achieve synergy. There should also be strong insistence on African representation in consultations and conferences about assistance to Africa.

One way of influencing broad US policy is through the use of the media — particularly the US media — to call international attention to situations that needs to change, or to portray successes for which greater US support is desired. This requires some sophistication, and a willingness to view the media as an ally to be cultivated rather than a threat to be avoided.

Use of the media to reach an American audience requires an understanding of American cultural peculiarities. For example, Americans respond with compassion to suffering, but are less sympathetic to suffering caused by the poor economic choices of national leaders. On the other hand, Americans are impressed by success under difficult circumstances, and probably would be inclined to encourage and support it. The key here is to use the media to communicate an unambiguous message.

Intelligent use of the media is but one dimension of the increasing power inherent in managing information. Another is the use of modern communication technology like the Internet. Access to this essential tool is imperative and it should be used to keep abreast of developments in the US (and elsewhere) that are of interest to Africa. It should also be used to communicate rapidly with US public and private sector individuals who can assist in furthering the continent's interests.

Still another avenue of access to broad US policy decisions is the US Congress — which funds an administration's foreign policy. Some members of Congress undertake substantial foreign

visits in an effort to understand foreign issues better. This offers an excellent opportunity to acquaint US officials with African perspectives, and it is worth considering an invitation if the issue is of sufficient concern. In recent years, Nigeria and Sudan have endeavoured to influence US policy by cultivating visiting members of Congress.

However, for congressional access, it is probably more productive to establish contact with the legislative staff who form the core of the foreign policy expertise. These individuals are found primarily in the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They are also accessible through advocacy groups such as TransAfrica.

If the desire is to sway US foreign policy, it may well be worth the while to hire a US public relations firm with access to all the Administration, congressional and private sector angles. South Africa, Nigeria and Angola have had some success with this approach. It probably will not change a firmly established policy, but might be very influential as policy is being formed.

If the concern is a narrow issue rather than broad policy, it is probably wiser to approach the US government organisation most concerned with the issue itself. As has been shown, the detailed application of US regional policy falls to the various departments and agencies of the US government, primarily the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and USAID. These institutions have substantial autonomy. The Department of Defense and USAID also have impressive resources. Each of them is searching for solutions to instability in Africa. Each is involved in a somewhat different series of activities to promote stability. Each represents a potential point of contact for African interlocutors.

For broad issues, it is best to approach the department or agency headquarters in Washington. However, both the Department of Defense and USAID have regional headquarters. These may be more responsive to some concerns and issues. The best access is probably the military representative or aid mission associated with a local US embassy.

Finally, the US public sector will never provide more than a modest contribution to peace and security in Africa. That contribution may be very important, but it will never address all of the needs and opportunities. Public sector involvements will also vary from administration to administration. They will be effected by events elsewhere in the world where US interests are greater. And they may be particularly unfocused during periods of transition from one administration to another.

The US private sector, whether the business, religious or humanitarian communities, offers a far greater, more consistent long-term potential contribution to African peace and security than the public sector. It does so by assisting in attenuating the root causes of instability. By their nature, US businesses and private voluntary organisations are difficult to harness. Their agendas are not always compatible and easy to blend. Still, it is worth cultivating them and weaving them, along with their international counterparts, into national and regional strategies for conflict resolution and development.

The bottom-line to this discussion is that the United States as a people — not just its government — offers something of a buffet of resources for peace and security in Africa. That buffet is neither particularly focused nor centrally organised, and it is not in itself a full prescription for Africa's needs. The United States is not, cannot be, nor ever will be the great Mansa, Oba, Kabaka, Mwant Yav or Mwene Mutapa that brings health to the land and prosperity to the far-flung villages. That role is reserved for Someone with infinite wisdom and unlimited resources. What the United States can be, is a brother nation and a partner in the

world-wide search for stability, peace and well-being.

Appendix A

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (funding in thousands of US\$ per indicated Fiscal Year)

Country	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98
Angola	0	0	0	125	200
Benin	99	161	281	350	350
Botswana	364	440	454	450	500
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	0	0
Burundi	0	44	71	0	0
Cameroon	100	0	83	100	125
Cape Verde	0	75	64	100	100
Central African Republic	0	186	110	150	150
Chad	225	62	0	25	50
Comoros	0	0	64	75	75
Congo-Brazzaville	109	150	162	175	175
DRC	0	0	0	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	150	120	151	150	150
Djibouti	106	125	150	100	100
Eritrea	82	200	261	375	400
Ethiopia	113	248	327	400	450
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0
Gabon	0	0	0	0	0
Gambia	100	0	0	0	0
Ghana	229	222	257	260	285
Guinea	88	155	35	150	150
Guinea-Bissau	102	75	88	125	125
Kenya	288	283	297	300	400
Lesotho	0	32	72	75	75
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0
Madagascar	0	0	102	100	100
Malawi	125	125	154	225	225
Mali	134	163	155	150	175
Mauritania	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritius	0	0	0	25	50
Mozambique	0	138	203	175	175
Namibia	220	126	190	200	200
Niger	200	189	11	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	75	50	243	300	300
Sao Tome	0	29	75	75	75
Senegal	450	598	637	650	675
Seychelles	0	10	31	75	75
Sierra Leone	0	52	134	115	115
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0

South Africa	104	297	466	700	800
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	57	50	75	75
Tanzania	114	81	126	225	225
Togo	0	0	0	25	40
Uganda	128	138	189	300	350
Zambia	75	92	99	150	150
Zimbabwe	241	232	224	275	350

Appendix B

Sampling of US Private Sector Groups with Programmes in Africa

Action Against Hunger

Crisis relief, nutrition, food security, water and sanitation, health
Programmes in 14 African countries

Adventist Development and Relief Agency

Relief, national development

Active in 143 countries

Africare

Democracy and private sector development, food/water/environment, health and nutrition,
relief/refugee assistance

Programmes in 28 African countries

Africa-America Institute

Human resource development, informing US policy, trade, investment, economic development

American Friends Service Committee

Economic justice, peacebuilding, demilitarisation, social justice, youth development

Programmes in Mozambique, Somalia, Zimbabwe

America's Development Foundation

Human rights, civil society development, human resources development

Programmes in seven Africa countries

Amref

Child/adolescent health, sexual/reproductive health, clinical services and emergency response,
health policy systems reform, environmental health

Offices in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa

Bread for the World

Hunger relief

Care

Education, emergency relief/rehabilitation, environment, food security, health, economic development

Active in East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa

Carter Center

Health, food security

Catholic Medical Mission Board

Relief, health care, health care supplies health education

Catholic Relief Services

Emergency and long-term relief, health peace and justice, micro-finance, agriculture, education

Active in 80 countries

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee

Disaster relief, community development, education

Active in 30 countries

Christian Children's Fund

Health, nutrition, agriculture, education

Programmes in 10 African countries

Church World Service

Refugee relief, literacy, food security, community development

Food for the Hungry

Relief, nutrition, community development, child/adolescent health

International Republican Institute

Human resources development, economic development, good governance

Lutheran World Relief

Disaster relief, nutrition, health

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Civil-military relations, human resources development, humane/competent governance

Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Hunger Programme

Relief, food security

Save the Children

Child/adolescent relief and development

World Resources Institute/Natural Resource Policy Consultative Group for Africa

Environment, development, informing US policy

World Vision-USA

Development, economic empowerment of women, child care, water, primary health care, micro-enterprise, relief, agriculture, food security, literacy, orphan care, community reconstruction

Programmes in 29 African countries

Endnotes

This monograph is an edited version of a paper entitled *US contributions to peace and security in Africa*, read at the **Symposium on International peace and security: The African experience**, jointly hosted by the SA Military Academy and the Institute for Security Studies, Saldanha, South Africa, 23 September 1998. The author is the Director of African Studies, US Army War College, Carlisle PA.

1. Since US foreign policy can vary dramatically in its detail from presidential administration to administration, defining US Africa policy for more than one administration beyond the present would probably be an exercise in rank speculation.
2. Elsewhere in the monograph, the author distinguishes between categories of Americans who interest themselves in 'African' issues. Here, the author is speaking in general of the 'attentive public', and acknowledges that many in the US general public have little or no interest in African issues.
3. This is the author's list, based on a careful comparison of public sector documents, private sector studies and conferences, and personal conversations with Africanist analysts and scholars.
4. See, among others, M G Roskin, **National interest: From abstraction to strategy**, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1994.
5. See D Henk, *US national interests in sub-Saharan Africa*, **Parameters**, 27(4), Winter 1997-98, pp. 92-107.
6. The Clinton Administration prefers to offer 'objectives' or 'policy goals'. According to its senior

policy-maker for Africa, America has two "overarching policy goals for Africa: (1) accelerate Africa's full integration into the global economy; and (2) protect the US and [US] citizens from threats ... that emanate from Africa." See S Rice, Address, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Columbus, Ohio, 14 November 1997.

7. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
8. See, for instance, D F Gordon, *Africa today: Worst of times, best of times*, **Great Decisions: Journal of the Foreign Policy Association**, 1998, p. 53; US interests in sub-Saharan Africa, **United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa**, official publication of the Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995, pp. 3-7.
9. NSS, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, May 1997, p. 28.
10. Ibid.
11. Rice, op. cit., p. 9.
12. For a detailed discussion of US interests in Africa, see Henk, 97/98, op. cit.
13. See, for instance, *Africa's untapped millions*, **US News and World Report**, 20 January 1997, p. 48; J Goldberg, *Their African problem and ours*, **New York Times Magazine**, 3 March 1997.
14. NSS, op. cit., p. 28.
15. This is the **African Growth and Opportunity Act**, still pending approval in Congress at the time of writing. It would provide assistance in economic reform and offer preferential treatment to US-African private sector commercial relations.
16. Schraeder refers to this as the "... safari tradition of US journalism — sending generalists to Africa on short-term assignments as opposed to those willing to make a long term commitment to becoming authorities on Africa." See P J Schraeder, **United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and change**, University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 5.
17. Ibid., pp. 2-10.
18. **The Constitution of the United States**, Article II, Section 2. The President's role in managing the country's foreign relations derives from the constitutional provision that the President is commander of the armed forces and (with the approval of the Senate) has the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors.
19. It is useful to distinguish between the 'making' of foreign policy (the complex interaction of Administration, Congress and the people) and the 'conduct' of foreign policy, which is the prerogative of the Administration. One authority provides the following useful illustration: "... you make policy when you decide to protect the security of the Persian Gulf; you conduct policy when you send the Navy to do it." See *US policy and the American political system*, **Great Decisions: Journal of the Foreign Policy Association**, 1998, p. 7.
20. Scholars argue whether or not US African policy actually changes to any fundamental degree from administration to administration. See Schraeder, op. cit., pp. 5-7. Schraeder cites a consensus among American Africanists that "... US Africa policies largely have been marked by continuity

rather than change."

21. In the Reagan Administration, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker managed the Africa portfolio, in the Bush Administration, Assistant Secretary Herman J (Hank) Cohen.
22. For a useful summary, see D M Snow & E Brown, **Puzzle palaces and foggy bottom: US foreign and defense policy-making in the 1990s**, St Martin's Press, New York, 1994, pp. 149-155.
23. During this process, US diplomats and military officials typically also consult with allies and international organisations to identify the external interests and sensitivities, and to identify multilateral options.
24. A good example of a premature initiative is probably that of the Africa Crisis Response Force announced by the Clinton Administration in late 1996. Although the initiative had been rescued by very competent reparatory diplomacy by late 1997, the circumstance of its initial announcement left much to be desired. See D Henk & S Metz, **The United States and the transformation of African security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and beyond**, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1997, pp. 22-37.
25. For a more detailed discussion of this legislation — and its ramifications — see D M Snider, **The National Security Strategy: Documenting strategic vision**, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1995; D C Lovelace, **Unification of the US armed forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act**, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1996.
26. The National Security Strategy has become a somewhat self-congratulatory public relations document rather than the objective, detailed grand strategy that Congress originally intended. Still, it is an important indication of the Administration's foreign policy objectives and perspectives. It serves as a guide (or justification) for other executive branch regional activities.
27. For a detailed discussion of the origin and function of the US Institute of Peace, see R Miller, **Institutionalizing peace: The conception of the United States Institute for Peace and its role in American political thought**, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 1994.
28. One such an occasion was over the **Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act** of 1986, which (then) President Reagan vetoed. The veto was overridden by Congress under particular pressure from the African-American community. Another occasion was the Bush Administrative humanitarian intervention in Somalia in late 1992 and the precipitous US withdrawal from Somalia after the death of eighteen US servicemen in October 1993.
29. See, for instance, **American attitudes on peacekeeping**, University of Maryland Center for International and Policy Attitudes, 1998, APIC, <www.igc.apc.org.2998/OAPIC-DOCS/R884674631.13797.3>
30. See J Hammer, *A strange friendship*, **Newsweek**, 26 August 1996, p. 40.
31. These are the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. For a useful overview of functions, see R H Davidson & W J Oleszek, **Congress and its members**, Congressional Quarterly, Inc, Washington, DC, 1998.
32. The US Constitution has been described as an 'invitation to struggle' between President and

Congress over the making of foreign policy. See *US Foreign Policy and the American Political System*, op. cit., p. 5.

33. Ibid.
34. The National Security Council itself was created by the **National Security Act** of 1947 to enable the President to integrate and co-ordinate national security policy. Its members are the 'inner Cabinet' members that head the large executive branch departments. However, these 'statutory' members are not the same as the permanent staff. The latter form that part of the Office of the President, which concerns itself with security policy and foreign affairs issues.
35. For an excellent discussion of the event and its ramifications, including the background to PDD-25, see I H Daalder, *Knowing when to say no: The development of US policy for peacekeeping*; and W J Durch, *Introduction to anarchy: Humanitarian intervention and state building in Somalia*, in W J Durch (ed), **UN peacekeeping, American politics, and the uncivil wars of the 1990s**, St Martin's Press, New York, 1996.
36. *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, May 1994.
37. For the context, see J M Vaccaro, *The politics of genocide: Peacekeeping and disaster relief in Rwanda*, in Durch, op. cit., pp. 367-407.
38. Author's conversations with Lieutenant General Daniel R Schroeder (US Army, retired) who commanded the US forces deployed to Rwanda in 1994.
39. The gap between the Administration's inclinations and its actual performance is illustrated by a White House conference on Africa in June 1994. Attended by the President, Vice-President, many prominent Americans from different professions and a large number of Africanists, the conference produced a body of noble resolutions and much rhetoric about solutions to African problems, but seems to have had little effect on Administration policy. See C A Crocker, *Why Africa is important*, **Foreign Service Journal**, 72(2), June 1995, pp. 24-33.
40. For an 'insider' view of the impact on US policy of the interventions in Somalia and Rwanda, written by an individual who served on the National Security Council Staff in the early 1990s, see S H McCormick, *The lessons of intervention in Africa*, **Current History**, 94(591), April 1995, pp. 162-166.
41. This is not done in a vacuum, of course. The Department of State works with other interested US government agencies to make these determinations. Once funds are allocated by Congress, other agencies of the US government, such as the US Agency for International Development, or the Department of Defense, will generally be responsible for managing the details of the foreign assistance programmes.
42. These US efforts included pressure on various organisations and individuals to accept compromises that resulted in the agreement. The US role was co-ordinated by its embassy in London. The US also provided substantial military airlift in 1979 and 1980 from the United Kingdom to Zimbabwe for British and Zimbabwean personnel. Information provided by Ambassador E G Lanpher, former US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, and participant in the negotiations.
43. Interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D Marley, US Army (retired). Marley participated in

these events while assigned to the US Department of State in 1993 and 1994.

44. For detail on USAID programmes, see the annual *USAID Congressional Presentation Document*.
45. Interview with Colonel Scott Fisher (US Air Force, retired), staff officer in the Interagency Working Group for ACRI, 11 September 1998. Fisher has served repeated assignments as a senior policy-maker in the Department of Defense and Department of State.
46. Use of the US military establishment in ‘peace operations’, as in other ‘military operations other than war’ remains controversial among security analysts and senior military leaders. See R J Rinaldo, *Warfighting and peace ops: Do real Soldiers do MOOTW?*, **Joint Forces Quarterly**, Winter 96/97, pp. 111-116.
47. One innovation which played a significant part in this transformation was the US Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI). This is a subordinate organisation of the US Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. PKI, with a small staff, participates in international conferences and colloquia on peace operations, sponsors its own conferences, organises after-action reviews of US military peace operations, conducts research, assists in contingency planning, assists in the development of US military doctrine, and even provides members of its own staff on occasion for actual roles in contingency operations. PKI has developed a close relationship with the US academic and humanitarian community concerned about responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.
48. See, among others, **US (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Joint Publication 3-07**, August 1995; and **US Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations**, December 1994.
49. For detail on how this is done, see particularly *Instruments for shaping, Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace*, National Defense University, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1998, pp. 19-38.
50. NSS, op. cit., p. 6.
51. For specific detail and assessment of effectiveness, see D Henk, *Uncharted paths, uncertain vision: US military involvements in sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of the Cold War*, **Occasional Paper**, 18, US Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, Carlisle, PA, March 1998.
52. Ibid., p. 15.
53. However, in the case of ACRI, overall management is the responsibility of an Interagency Working Group (IWG) overseen by a senior Foreign Service Officer from the Department of State — Ambassador Marshall McCallie. McCallie’s full-time staff includes State Department and Defense Department officers.
54. The author served as a military attaché in Southern Africa in the early 1990s, and witnessed a dramatic intensification in visits, conferences and other Africa-related activity by the US European Command.
55. For a discussion of what US military officials believe they have learned about these relationships, see C Seiple, **The US military/NGO relationship in humanitarian interventions**, Peacekeeping Institute of the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1996.

56. *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive — 56*, May 1997.
57. **Foreign Assistance Act** of 1961, as amended, *Prohibiting Police Training*, Section 660.
58. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an investigative agency, not a national police force in the European model.
59. The US national law enforcement agencies do not have any equivalent to the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme supervised by the US Department of Defense.
60. ICITAP has considerable potential as a resource for improving the law enforcement/legal environment. However, it is underused, partly because it does not have its own allocated funding — which must come from other agencies, generally USAID. ICITAP also does not actively solicit opportunities. It responds to funded requests for its services. Author's interview with Robert Perito, Deputy Director of ICITAP, Department of Justice, 8 September 1998.
61. The Clinton Administration shares this view, as indicated by the announcement in 1997 of a Safe Skies for Africa Initiative, backed by US \$1,2 million.
62. For an interesting discussion of the role of the media in reporting situations of conflict, see N Gowing, **Media coverage: Help or hindrance in conflict prevention**, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Special Report, 1997.
63. For some useful detail, see J I Guyer, **African studies in the United States: A perspective**, Africa Studies Association Press, 1996.
64. The American Assembly, a very influential public policy group, has devoted much of its 1998/1999 agenda to African issues. See www.igc.apc.docs97/amas9704.1.html for details.
65. For information, see www.sas.epenn.edu/African_Studies/Home_Page/ASA_Menu.html
66. A prominent example is that of the eminent Yale political scientist, Professor William F Foltz, a noted Africanist scholar who served for several years in the early 1990s as the National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
67. See www.interaction.org/mb/aai.html for details.
68. See S Metz, *The anti-apartheid movement and the populist instinct in American politics*, **Political Science Quarterly**, 101(3), 1986, pp. 379-395.
69. Interview with Mr James Woods, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and now a senior partner in the consulting firm Cohen and Woods International, Inc, 25 August 1998.
70. Author's estimate based on available documentation, embassy reporting and personal research and experience in Africa.
71. Interview with Vincent Farley, retired Foreign Service Officer and former diplomat in residence at the Carter Center, 29 August 1998. Farley participated in virtually all of Jimmy Carter's conflict resolution activities in Africa between 1993 and 1997.

72. Ibid.
73. NED, **1997 Annual Report of the National Endowment for Democracy**, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 8-17.
74. A listing and description of many US-based PVOs involved in Africa is available from the American Council for Voluntary International Action (INTERACTION) at <www.interaction.org>
75. Many of the private voluntary organisations consist of people of faith whose work has a religious motivation. In this, they are ideologically quite distinct from many of the US diplomats, who tend to be quite secular in personal perspective. The author has heard diplomats and USAID officials dismiss the activities of World Vision, for instance, as ‘blurred vision’.
76. This was the case in late 1996 and early 1997, when humanitarian organisations working in eastern Zaire endeavoured to pressure the US into a military intervention. Information based on author’s interviews with US diplomats in the US Embassy, Kigali, June 1997. See also J Pomfret, *Aid groups help needy and greedy*, **The Washington Post**, 3 September 1997, A-1; N Gowing, *New challenges and problems for information management in complex emergencies: Ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997*, conference paper, 27/28 May 1998.
77. Interview with Major James A Faber, USAF, Military Assistant to the US Ambassador to the UN, 4 September 1998. Faber noted that the *gratis* military officers in DPKO (almost all from developed Western nations) will be phased out by February 1999 in favour of seconded officers — drawing UN salaries — from a more representative sampling of countries. While politically popular in the UN, this measure will probably reduce DPKO’s effectiveness.
78. This agreement is reflected in the **Cairo Declaration** promulgated as a result of the deliberations. See *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, **OAU Information Services Publication — Series (II)**, (no publisher or place of publication) 1993. See also W Nhara, *Conflict management and peace operations: The role of the Organisation of African Unity and subregional organisations*, in M Malan (ed), **Resolute partners: Building peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa**, ISS Monograph, 21, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, February 1998, pp. 32-42.
79. In its bilateral relations with countries participating in ECOMOG, the US also has endeavoured to express its appreciation by special considerations.
80. Interview with Ms Catherine Byrne, staff officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 4 September 1998 and with Mr Rudy G Hall, Officer in Charge of International Projects, Department of State, 10 September 1998.
81. M Nyambuya, *Zimbabwe’s role as lead nation for peacekeeping training in the SADC region*, in Malan, op. cit., p. 92.
82. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Cox, USAF, staff officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 11 September 1998.
83. Interview with Lieutenant Commander Mark Laxen, US Navy, Action Officer in the Operations

84. Interview with Ms Amanda Dory, staff officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 9 September 1998.
85. The US has conducted various small-scale bilateral military exercises with African countries for some years. The tenor of these changed in the late 1980s, and in the 1990s became much more concerned with peace operations themes. One particular series of exercises, however, contributes directly to the attenuation of sources of instability: the MEDFLAG series begun in the late 1980s. MEDFLAGs are exercises involving a large contingent of US medical personnel, the African host country's military, and private sector and NGO/PVO participants. MEDFLAGs enhance the host country's ability to cope with a sudden health care catastrophe. For detail, see C W Fox, Jr., **Military medical operations in sub-Saharan Africa: The DoD "Point of the Spear" for a new century**, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1997.
86. For detail on the origin and initial reception of ACRI, see Henk & Metz, op. cit., pp. 22-30.
87. There are multilateral aspects to some of the training. For instance, ACRI training in Ghana in 1998 included US and Belgian military instructors. Training planned for Côte d'Ivoire will include US and French instructors. The programme is sufficiently flexible to include a variety of different programmes of instruction and instructors drawn from different states. Information based on interview with Colonel Scott Fisher (USAF, retired), staff member of the Interagency Working Group for ACRI, 9 September 1998.
88. Participating countries include Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda. Each country has offered a battalion-sized force for training, except Ethiopia and Ghana. Ethiopia has offered two battalions and a brigade headquarters, but the training has been deferred due to the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict. Ghana has offered three battalions and a brigade headquarters. Countries which have undergone at least the first phase of training at the time of writing are Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda. Information based on interview with Colonel Scott Fisher, *ibid.*
89. See, among others, R M Williams, *Don't hold the African Crisis Response Force hostage to unrealistic demands*, ISS Papers, 20, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, April 1997; M Malan, *US response to African crises: An overview and preliminary analysis of ACRI*, **ISSPapers**, 24, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, August 1997; Henk & Metz, op. cit.
90. The Interagency Working Group on ACRI, headed by Ambassador Marshall McCallie, has achieved a remarkable consensus among European donor countries and engages in recurring conferences and consultations on ACRI-related issues. In mid-1998, staff officers in the US European Command informed the author that, due to ACRI, they now held regular consultations with interested military staff officers of NATO allies. Such recurring consultations on African issues apparently had not occurred prior to the mid-1990s.
91. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Andrew H Cox, USAF, staff officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 11 September 1998.
92. For specific detail and discussion of categories, see Henk, March 1998, op. cit., pp. 27-32.
93. This is not an unreasonable expectation. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D Marley, US Army (retired) calls attention to the fact that in the UN intervention force in Rwanda in 1994, both the commander

(a Canadian major general) and his deputy (a Ghanaian brigadier) were graduates of the US Army Command and General Staff College. The author would not argue that US military education is inherently superior to that of other countries, simply that a commonality of professional education is a significant benefit in coalition operations.

94. US military training available to African students includes training teams sent from the US to African countries. In recent years, a high proportion of this kind of training has involved civil-military relations, defence resources management, and military justice.
95. In the author's personal view, one reason why American officials are enamoured with Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame is that he knows how to communicate with them in a quintessentially 'American' way. He is blunt, direct and conveys an air of simplicity and sincerity.