

CONTINUITY IN CHANGE

The SA Army in Transition

edited by Jakkie Cilliers

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Introduction

Dr Jakkie Cilliers

When the predecessor to the ISS, the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) started with its projects on the armed forces in early 1991, defence issues were central in South Africa's transformation from apartheid. At the time, there was little room for the involvement of non-state actors in the security debate. Discussions in those years were secretive and starved of information. Intimidation was rife and often brutal, as was evident from the covert campaigns that the former South African Defence Force (SADF) launched against the IDP.

While still important, defence in South Africa is no longer as crucial as it was six or seven years ago. The name change from IDP to the Institute for Security Studies early last year is but one manifestation

of the shift in focus. By 1998, the public focus on defence issues is limited to sound-bytes on problems regarding discipline, arms thefts, the integration of forces, defence exports, arms purchases and retrenchments. Yet, while South Africa often lacks the type of in-depth analysis that should characterise defence issues, given the critical nature of the subject, organisations such as the ISS, can now exert a measure of indirect control and supervision through open debate, media scrutiny and academic research. The public can now also influence policy indirectly through their members of parliament, directly by participation in interest and pressure groups, or by being consulted by the government through public forums.

The process of formulating the **White Paper on Defence** in 1996 was characterised by such a concerted effort to achieve a national consensus on defence policy through extensive consultation with the parliamentary defence committees, political parties and civil society. This was followed by an equally consultative Defence Review where the Department made a remarkable effort to inform and consult broader civil society on its thinking and the available options. The result was, undoubtedly, a groundswell of informed support for the Department, although the real extent to which civil society could impact upon conceptual and force design debates is necessarily limited. Both the **White Paper** and the Defence Review process were therefore important, but inevitably the views of the core team of drafters and strategists within the Department predominated, as indeed could be expected. The major achievement of these processes, both within the broader polity and civil society, is the legitimisation of the Department. No more an instrument of racial oppression, the military is increasingly accepted and politically poised to perform its mandated policies and accept its responsibilities.

At the parliamentary level, democratic South Africa demonstrates a much greater degree of legislative oversight over the military and a clear limit to executive dictate. A comprehensive system of civil control over defence has been established in South Africa and civic education programmes have been designed and are being taught. In fact, a tremendous effort is under way to teach and inculcate a new ethos into the military.

Reforming security forces to improve accountability and professional conduct and strengthening civilian oversight are obviously crucial, particularly since armed forces by their very nature have tremendous power. The military is the sword of the state, the final resort and final arbiter. This power is intended to defend the country and its people but it may also be misused to interfere in the political process and itself present a threat to the government and citizens. Yet, professional armed forces under civil control are also a major asset to any country. They serve not only as instruments of crisis prevention and intervention, but also to further foreign policy interests, and to meet regional and international obligations. In a highly volatile region and an insecure world, armed forces remain an important component of sovereignty.

In the interests of domestic and regional stability, safety and peace, the sustainable transformation of South Africa must be underpinned by institutions capable of deterring and controlling socio-political tensions, conflict and violence. There is a very close - even intimate - relationship between peace and security. In essence, security sector reform, such as that which is evident in a democratic South Africa, should strengthen respect for the state's legal and prescribed monopoly over the use of force. The reform of the SA Army, by far the largest of the four arms of service, is central to this.

In South Africa, the Army had always been the dominant and largest service within the armed forces. Within the former SADF, the Army was Afrikaans and conservative in nature, while the Air Force and the Navy had a much larger component of white, English-speaking officers. These two services also had a more functional approach to discipline and were more occupational in their approach to service in the military. This is a trend still apparent today, although it is undergoing rapid change. South African defence policy has also always been oriented towards a landward threat, not a naval invasion. It has also not been overly concerned with air power - although there is the dominant, if unstated view, that air power should serve to supplement ground forces in the extended African battlefield and not the other way round.

The annual SA Army conference upon which this monograph is based, reflects some, but not all these

issues. The conference has now become an annual and important event during which the Army senior command staff talk to the leadership of the SA Army, and in particular, to the leadership of the Part-Time Forces. The conference on 11 June 1998 in Pretoria was no exception. In excess of 550 persons attended the event under the challenging topic The SA Army in Transition - Continuity in Change.

Rather than making a selection of presentations, we have decided to include all the papers presented at the conference in this single monograph. The papers are not of equal quality, nature or length. Collectively, they provide a snapshot of the transformation of the SA Army. The picture that emerges is not altogether reassuring and reflects, more than ever, the massive tasks that still lie ahead both at the operational level and in translating policy into practice.

The first paper in this monograph is by the head of military intelligence from Tanzania, Brigadier Derrick Mwamunyange, who addresses the issue of building regional security in Southern Africa. Brig Mwamunyange makes a plea for regional economic and political co-operation and a collective approach to security threats, while acknowledging the limitations and constraints in this process. Such an approach, he argues, should be "... based on consensus and equitable arrangements" and not, therefore, dominated by a regional power such as South Africa. His paper emphasises the importance of confidence and security-building measures, including frequent consultation, exchanges of information, a formalised system for notification of military activity, joint and regional training, etc. He does not call for a leadership role by South Africa. In fact, his paper reflects a clear perception that South African concerns will remain domestic, given the internal challenges that face the country.

Recent years have not been easy for the Department of Defence. Due to its size and nature, the SA Army faces the biggest challenge to integrate, change and downsize. In fact, one could argue that, by 1998, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) suffers from a severe case of transformation fatigue, institutional overstretch and possibly, poor role-definition. The transformation upon which the Department has embarked has now been under way for several years. Yet, it is clear from the opening remarks made by the Deputy Minister of Defence (the second paper in this monograph), as well as that of the newly appointed Chief of the SA Army (the last paper in this monograph), that the SA Army is still viewed as essentially 'untransformed'. The resulting responsibility and burden on the leadership of the SA Army, are onerous.

In his paper Planning for Transformation, Brigadier General Chris Venter notes that, "[i]nternational studies reveal that not many large institutions or organisations are very successful at profound transformation, despite their good intentions ... It would appear that such failures lie mainly in the area of change management. In most cases, it will be found that the more technical aspects - designing and implementing new and sound processes, structures and systems - are well executed by competent people. The lack of success seems to be as a result of the failure by the organisations' executives to enlist employee support."

Given the apparent lack of finality on force structure evident by mid-1998, the funding crisis that the Department is facing, and the serious problems of a never-ending integration process on top of the transformation conundrum, the challenges facing the leadership of the SA Army are immense. The majority of these continue to lie within the human resources domain, exemplified by the remarks by the Deputy Minister and the expansive paper by Major General Matanzima on the human resources challenges. In fact, the impression is increasingly that transformation has gained a different content as time passes. Originally conceived as a change in policy, ethos and structure, the emphasis at the level of the parliamentary committee and much of the newly appointed command cadre, appears to be that of representivity.

General Matanzima addresses a broad canvas in his paper, ranging from the process of force integration, rationalisation, representivity, the Part-Time Forces and education. The most vexing of these must surely be that of integration and the lack of a political decision to terminate a process that has now dragged on for more than four years. With yet another 'final' integration intake scheduled (for July 1998), the amalgamation of the various armed forces into a single SANDF does not appear to be close to termination while the personnel register upon which it is based, continues to expand. New integration

intakes clog up the training system and demand continued expenditure on an assembly area, bridging training and related structures. Normal training and promotion are often delayed. Needless to say, planning is very difficult under these circumstances. Commentators could well ask to what extent integration has replaced recruitment, as the most important source of personnel, given the poor harvest of regular, short term and affordable recruits.

As the 1999 elections come closer, the inordinate amount of the Defence Budget that is spent on personnel and operating costs will surely not easily be reduced. It is hardly likely that the Minister of Defence will authorise the speedy implementation of the retrenchment programmes that are required to ease the pressure on the capital expenditure budget. The knock-on effect is unpalatable. Without substantial reductions in the personnel budget, procurement remains in limbo, training has been curtailed and operational capability is declining.

It is to the credit of the Department of Defence and the SA Army that clear goals have been set regarding the demographic composition of the forces. Although substantial and steady progress is being made in this regard, massive imbalances remain, with white officers disproportionately dominating all rank groups except at the rank of lance-corporal and private. Inevitably, there will therefore be a significant outflow of white, middle-rank non-commissioned officers and officers from the SA Army in the months and years that lie ahead. Given the time and funds required to train staff-sergeants, warrant officers, majors and colonels, this exit of technical skills from the SA Army will undoubtedly severely impact upon already declining standards of operational effectiveness and possibly discipline.

In response to this challenge, the SA Army has embarked upon an ambitious programme of competency development, including the establishment of assessment centres, the expansion of its existing adult basic education and the like. The challenge to retain, change and develop appropriate competencies for the future SA Army is large. While not reflected in this monograph, a recent initiative is also under way to transform the Service Corps into a placement agency to assist the social reintegration of former combatants.

The challenges in the human resources field are compounded by the fundamental business re-engineering programmes that the Department has embarked upon. In short, the Department is moving from a functional to a process-based structure and way of operating.

In his paper on the newly established Joint Operations system, the Chief of Joint Operations, Brigadier General André Bestbier motivates the acceptance of a dictum of 'jointness' as central to the training and deployment of forces. Whereas the various arms of service had previously been responsible for training and the employment of forces, a clear distinction is now being made between responsibilities for force preparation and force employment. In future, force employment will be undertaken by the Chief of Joint Operations. The role of the arms of service, including the SA Army, is the provision of combat-ready forces. This theme is picked up in the brief paper on the provision of combat-ready supported forces by Brigadier General Leon Wessels. The paper is schematic in nature and links the SA Army's planning into the transformation process already under way at the departmental level.

As part of the transformation process, planning staffs have 'reverted to basics' in an attempt to design an appropriate force structure from first principles. There is therefore much talk of 'user systems', 'higher order user systems', of processes and functions and of different 'user levels'. Much of the management terminology must fall hard on the ears of officers and other ranks more used to units, formations, commands and orders, and less accustomed to 'management-speak'.

Eventually, the challenge of matching established units and bases with force requirements and budget constraints remains the final test. The subtext here appears to be that the SA Army planning teams have not yet been able to define their combat forces within the available budget constraints. The fact that such a lack of certainty and clarity effects morale is a moot point. Commanders - the Part-Time Component, in particular - want clarity on which units will survive, and which will close, move or contract. Within the tremendous state of flux that characterises the SANDF of today, such certainty and guidance are crucial.

Without clarity on strategy and force structure, logistic concepts are difficult to finalise, yet the paper by Brigadier General Thys Snyman provides a snapshot of thinking on future logistic concepts within the largest of the arms of service of the SANDF. His paper reflects the extensive current restructuring as the SA Army moves from logistic support in the field based on maintaining reserves on wheels (as part of B echelons) to a cargo drop system. Inventories will be decreased, working on a 'just-in-time' rather than a 'just-in-case' system. Such developments have sequential implications down the logistic chain and require careful management. Outsourcing and the greater involvement of civilians are key components in the thinking on these issues, but the collective impression is that the extensive changes will require considerable experimentation, research, training and management in the years that lie ahead.

The world is not only going through a 'revolution of military affairs' in the technological sense, but is also being forced to rethink the nature of military professionalism and the use of forces in the post-Cold War era. At a philosophical level, much thinking is being devoted to civil-military relations in developing countries, the linkage between security and development, and between security and justice. In many of these debates, South Africa is at the cutting edge of the philosophical discourse. Yet, there are serious problems emerging in translating policy into delivery. While we are fortunate to be in a position to revisit the fundamentals of defence and security, fundamental issues of discipline, morale and effectiveness are increasingly in the spotlight.

Institutional stability within the SA Army is undoubtedly some years off, as is the final transformation of the SA Army into a disciplined, motivated and operationally effective force capable of performing its key functions. One can only hope that domestic and regional developments will afford South Africa this space.

Jakkie Cilliers
Halfway House
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Building Regional Security in Southern Africa

Brig Gen Derrick , Chief of Military Intelligence, Tanzania People's Defence Forces defining security

I have been asked to talk about regional security and I thought I should approach the subject in the following manner. Firstly, the issue of security, in general, will be addressed. For the purpose of this presentation, it is perhaps important to have a common understanding of security. Secondly, I will briefly mention a few issues concerning Southern Africa. And lastly, I will dwell upon ways to build regional security in the subregion.

I will begin with a question to which I, unfortunately, do not have a specific answer: What is security? Obviously, the word is not new. It is widely used in our everyday life, its meaning is always easily understood and, perhaps, sometimes taken for granted, when used in various contexts. But how does one clearly and specifically define security in a manner that encapsulates and reflects both the individual and collective understanding of the word as it relates to each one of us in physical terms? Much has been written or said by politicians, intellectuals, diplomats and others about security. But I find the definition of security given by the **Oxford Companion to Politics of the World** rather interesting: "... *security is a concept which is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning. In the most fundamental sense, to be secure is to feel free from threats, anxiety, or danger. In this regard, security depends on the perceptions people have of their position in their environment, not on an objective view of that environment. It is a subjective state of mind, not an objective condition of being. Accordingly, what makes one feel secure may not be sufficient to make another feel so. In this sense, one person's security can well be another's insecurity.*"

Following the above description, it could therefore be argued that, in order to assure yourself of security, you also need to have or at least show concern for the security of others as well. Security is thus an inclusive and not an exclusive, egocentric concept.

Since societies consist of individuals, their perceptions of what constitute security are shaped by how they feel about their personal security. By extension, regional security, in simplistic terms, could be defined as a sum of perceptions held by different societies in a region regarding their respective security interests. These include all things that affect national life and stability.

In today's interdependent world, societies need to develop a broader, more realistic concept of security. The position of the nation-state is increasingly tested and the challenges that we face, transcend such arbitrary geographical expressions as national boundaries. Evidently, solutions to security-related problems cannot be found by single governments in isolation.

At this point, let me diverge from the semantics related to the concept of security, and turn to our region, Southern Africa, in the context of regional security.

Southern Africa

Without being oblivious to the fact that I am speaking to an audience of Southern Africans, whose knowledge of their region is unquestionably immense, first-hand and encyclopaedic, I feel obliged to highlight some basic facts about this region:

- Over 140 million people, or approximately forty per cent of Africa's current population, live in this region of about seven million square kilometres.
- Southern Africa accounts for eighty per cent of Africa's exports and 81 per cent of total imports.
- Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries also account for 81 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) of the entire continent.
- The region produces or has reserves of nearly all the important precious metals, including gold and platinum. In addition, there are also huge deposits of oil, uranium, natural gas and other important minerals.
- The region is also endowed with great potential for hydroelectric power generation, a thriving fishing industry, as well as irrigated farming.
- In terms of cultural background, the peoples of Southern Africa are as diverse as their countries and yet, their harmonious relationship and interaction represent an amazing social mosaic.

It is important to add that co-operation on security and economic issues is highly developed in this southern subregion. SADC continues to evolve as the principal vehicle to promote greater intraregional trade and security co-operation. As a result of this co-operation, the subregion is steadily moving towards greater peace and stability.

All this shows that the subregion, as an economic entity in Africa, is one of the most attractive areas for foreign investment.

Although the future of Southern Africa in terms of development, peace and security looks quite promising, we should not allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that the subregion is still fraught with a wide range of problems which, if not properly managed, can contribute to insecurity and instability. As our extensive borders are porous to virtually everything — from movement of people to that of goods — these problems can easily spread or shift from one part of the region to another. Uncontrolled cross-border movements tend to exert a substantially negative impact on the economic and social development, as well as the security and stability of the affected countries. Furthermore, the question of access to land, means of sustenance, education and job opportunities, tends to breed tension in most countries of the region. These problems require a co-ordinated subregional approach.

This leads me to the last part of this presentation, namely the question of how regional security can be built or rather enhanced in Southern Africa.

Building Regional Security

I am fully aware that various experts, both within the region and outside, have already made in-depth and invaluable contributions to the debate on this particular subject. I will therefore make an immediate disclaimer, by pointing out that my discussion is not going to add anything new to what is already known. If anything, it is just simply my view of what are important factors that need to be taken into consideration when we talk about building regional security.

The building of regional security requires, first and foremost, a common and unambiguous understanding among all people in the region of what constitutes threats to the security of their region. However, there is a great deal of difficulty in defining such threats. There are essentially two main reasons for this difficulty. The first relates to the very subjective nature of security as I have alluded to at the beginning of my remarks, i.e. the issue of perceptions. More often than not, different countries may not share the same perception of threats to their security, even if they are co-located in the same region. Moreover, threats that dominate perceptions may not necessarily have much substantive reality.

The second reason pertains to the difficulty in agreeing on the criteria for distinguishing threats to regional security from normal day-to-day national problems or challenges which may not need regional attention.

Despite the difficulty involved in the articulation of a common perspective of threats to regional security, I believe there is broad agreement among us that the security challenges confronting our region at present are multidimensional and often transcend the power and authority of affected nation-states. Effective security is thus derived from an aggregate of political, economic, cultural, ecological and military factors. Environmental degradation, population growth and movement, ethnic and religious differences, economic issues, terrorism, the traffic in drugs, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, food and water shortages — the list is endless — are problems that require multilateral solutions.

Democracy, economic globalisation and the explosion of information technology undoubtedly contribute to the escalation or complication of some of those problems. Democracy for instance, tends to awaken sleeping conflicts or generate new types of problems and challenges. Economic globalisation, for its part, can trigger radical or fundamentalist movements, since much fundamentalism is known to have economic causes. This shows that effective security is far more than national territorial integrity. It is rather about effective co-operation in meeting these global challenges.

A common perspective of threats to regional security must be followed by a firm commitment to a collective effort to deal with those threats. This commitment should be based on the political will of the people, expressed through their appropriate national institutions. This is important in terms of conferring the necessary legitimacy on multilateral decisions and actions. Depersonalised political commitment will also help to prevent changes in national leadership from jeopardising the implementation of agreed upon collective decisions.

Along with a firm commitment, there is also the need to put realistic, competent and effective structures in place that would facilitate the translation of decisions into actions. It has to be acknowledged that a commendable effort has been made in a relatively short period of time to establish the necessary multilateral structures to deal with security-related issues in the region. The results are quite encouraging. Within the current co-operative framework — the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security — the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) has continued to play an effective role in the promotion of subregional co-operation in defence and security matters. The committee has managed to conduct a wide range of activities, including regular meetings, seminars, as well as a combined military exercise in Zimbabwe last year. A similar exercise will be conducted in South Africa, in November this year.

It is evident that the relevant key actors in the defence and security arena are genuinely and unflinchingly committed to the consolidation and improvement of their co-operative structures in order to make them more efficient and effective. However, their efforts may be hampered by a number of constraints, ranging from limited financial resources to weak national institutions which may find it difficult to make the expected contributions to regional structures. There is also the problem of determining the extent to which sensitive national interests can be discussed at a regional forum.

In order to circumvent such constraints so that they do not impede collective efforts, it could be desirable to adopt a step-by-step approach regarding the formulation and implementation of programmes. This may help to ensure that member states of the region are not overburdened with regional obligations which may be unrealistic or too costly for them. In other words, we should avoid doing too much too quickly. The bottom line is the need for consensus in the decision-making process, based on close and sometimes informal consultations among all the countries of the region.

Some people contend that, since South Africa is the largest economy in the region and is technologically advanced, it ought to play a locomotive role in promoting regional security. In response to that, I would like to observe that, whereas South Africa's economy is indeed relatively powerful, the country has many of its own problems to deal with in the short term, including unemployment, housing, migrants, crime and education. In the light of these problems, domestic priorities will obviously come before regional needs in the allocation of its resources. In any case, it would be unrealistic to expect South Africa to carry more than its fair share of the burden of regional security co-operation. Of course, one cannot discount the considerable contribution that South Africa has made and may continue to make towards enhancing regional security, but it would be appropriate if such a contribution would be based on consensus and an equitable arrangement.

However, South Africa can indeed play a pre-eminent role in the building of co-operation, not only in the security domain, but also in regional economic development. Other countries must also endeavour to play their respective roles, both at the national and subregional level. It is important to note that the key to successful regional co-operation lies in confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). We must always trust each other as one and the same people who share a common destiny. Perhaps we all need a self-administered socio-political psychotherapy to cleanse our minds of any vestige of outdated ideas, attitudes or sensitivities which are incompatible with the contemporary global and regional environment.

There are numerous ways and means by which confidence can be built. However, it could be worth remembering that we cannot build confidence without knowing and tackling the root cause of distrust. CSBMs in Southern Africa must be seen as a component of a broader programme to build common security and not as an isolated phenomenon capable of achieving military confidence on its own. Secondly, the route to peace and security on the sub-continent lies primarily through national solutions and regional co-operation at political and economic levels rather than in the military sphere.

Despite the above comments, I would like to stress the fact that our relations in defence and security-related matters are of enormous significance to confidence and security-building. Frequent consultations, including relaxed and informal exchanges of information on the security situation, contribute to confidence-building. There could also be a formalised process for notification of major military activity, whether scheduled or unscheduled. The training of each others' officers at various levels, along with combined military exercises, can also reinforce mutual confidence. In this way, national training institutions can complement regional structures. Such measures would assist us, not only in the building of confidence, but also in our ability to actually operate together in operations such as regional peacekeeping.

Regional seminars and workshops involving intellectuals, politicians, the military, civil service officials, non-governmental organisations and others, convened to discuss general issues of interest to regional security, are also ways in which confidence-building can be enhanced.

Conclusion

No country in the region will be fully secure and free from the contemporary multidimensional threats to its physical security, if some part of the region experiences turmoil, conflict or instability. All countries in the region therefore need to take a long term and broad view of security and strive to maintain regional stability.

The relationships between democracy, economic growth, economic interdependence and security are extremely complex and, in the case of Southern Africa, the full implications of the unfolding economic and social interaction for regional security and stability have yet to become evident.

The development of confidence, based on mutual trust throughout the region, will be best realised if countries in the region consult regularly, and are able to speak frankly about their security concerns. Achieving this objective requires all the countries in the region to work towards the development of closer bilateral ties, in addition to contributing actively to multilateral co-operation in the region. I must emphasise that multilateral efforts in the region are not an alternative to bilateral relationships, or vice versa. Indeed, the two are mutually supportive.

In order to strengthen regional security co-operation and to establish effective regional security institutions, it is necessary to recognise the national interests of individual countries in the region and to accommodate their distinctive national styles and outlooks.

Progress in Transformation

Mr Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defence, South Africa

We are living in an historic period for defence issues in a democratising society - the disaffected might say the 'interesting times' of the Chinese curse. As a realist, I would rather call it an invigorating and vital time.

Symbolic of the changes currently under way, was the recent handing over of the command of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from General Georg Meiring to General Siphwe Nyanda at Thaba Tshwane. And, of course, as we are all aware, the Army command changes from General Reg Otto to General Gilbert Ramano at the end of June.

There have been other notable changes at senior command level, among them Lieutenant General Masuku succeeding Lieutenant General Neil Knobel as Chief of Defence Medical Services (SAMS), and Lieutenant General Motau taking over the leadership of Defence Intelligence on 1 July.

During the past year, four of the nine Territorial Commands in the country have come under the command of black generals. Interestingly enough, three of the four General Officers Commanding at the territorial level are former Transkei Defence Force officers, a fact that bears testimony to their high standards. The rest of the appointments mentioned above are former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) officers. These changes at the top of the Defence hierarchy are certainly not cosmetic.

I do not apologise for using colour labels, as these are the only way to measure representivity. In the Army, five of the top ten generals are black, including the soon-to-be Army Chief. A ratio of 50:50 is extremely positive in terms of representivity and is better than in any of the other services of the armed forces, or in the public service in general. This bodes well for the potential unity and partnership within the Army.

While these historic changes clearly point to a changing of the guard, the question some might pose is whether this denotes the total replacement of the old guard. Or put more bluntly: Is there a future for former South African Defence Force (SADF) officers in the new SANDF or, for that matter, for white servicemen and women?

The key to the above are the following questions:

- In what direction is the SANDF transforming?
- Is there continuity in the envisaged change?

Change clearly causes tension and, without a doubt, there is a great deal of apprehension prevalent in the ranks of the Army and the SANDF, which must be addressed if we are to manage the process successfully. To do otherwise is to emulate the ostrich with its head hidden in the sand.

Indisputably, the changes under way are for the benefit of our armed forces, and I firmly believe that all those prepared to participate honestly in the process of establishing a new SANDF, have a promising future. They should feel secure about their careers and their value to our government and nation.

As is well known, the starting point for the creation of the SANDF was the integration of eight former adversarial forces into a qualitatively enhanced new defence force. In retrospect, the dominance of the old SADF - both in terms of numbers and their administrative and cultural hegemony, ownership and control of the physical apparatus of the armed forces, its equipment, bases, and so on - might have led some to conclude that the old order and culture of Defence would prevail, despite the nature of democratic change in our country and the implications of the negotiated decisions.

This was reinforced by the fact that the former Liberation Forces - and, indeed, members from the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) forces, were being integrated, *holus bolus*, into the old SADF.

Members of the former non-statutory forces (NSF) were at a particular disadvantage. They came mostly from exile, without accommodation, pensions or savings, and needed to adapt to a conventional standing army and its requirements - a formidable personal challenge for each one of them. Despite some hitches, integration has been a marked success, and all concerned need to be warmly congratulated.

The problems of merging into a new SANDF, and of transforming the inherited institution, have proven to be a monumental challenge. This is exemplified by the perception or perhaps fear of former TBVC and NSF members that they are being absorbed by the old SADF rather than experiencing an even-handed integration of all members - the SADF included - into a new force. And, without a doubt, we should not fool ourselves - this could easily be experienced, let alone perceived, as a race issue.

We are still a country of two nations, as Deputy President Mbeki has recently termed it - a country of the privileged and disadvantaged.

The military - a microcosm of our country, reflecting the same prejudices and divisions - is easily contextualised in the same way, particularly where the former SADF has clearly been in the driving seat. The statistics reflect this: seventy per cent of SANDF members are black and, until 1997, only 22 per cent of the officers were black. The figure for this year has improved by six per cent, with the total now at 29 per cent, an important sign of progress, even though there is still a long way to go.

I have already referred to the 50:50 ratio at major-general level in the Army. But consider the following:

- of brigadier generals, only thirteen out of forty are black;
- 32 out of 241 colonels;
- 112 out of 736 lieutenant colonels;
- 310 out of 861 majors;
- 428 out of 1 028 captains; and
- 876 out of almost 2 000 lieutenants.

This is an enormous disparity, given our country's demographic and political reality.

Turning to sergeant majors, only 582 out of more than 2 400 are black. But the balance changes at the lower rank levels. Of sergeants, about 2 500 out of 5 000 are black. Towards the base of the pyramid, there are about 9 500 black corporals and lance corporals out of a total of 10 900. But most obvious of all, at the lowest rank level, of all privates, 25 000 are black and a mere 400 are white.

A white officer in the old SADF once commented that, with our largely white officer corps and black troops, we would be one of the best armies in the world. A cynic would have said: "*Like the British Raj - white officers and black subalterns.*" The modern Indian Army is much more professional and proficient than it ever was in colonial times. An unkind cynic might have said, "*black cannon fodder*", and that is the way many of our black troops might have seen themselves, especially if the attitudes of their officers were not appropriate.

Need I refer to the case of the 44th Parachute Brigade sergeant and others charged with the theft of weapons and ammunition and the cold-blooded murder of two black subordinates?

Negotiations and agreements of the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) were about the creation of a single new force of equals and, indeed, brothers and sisters in arms - a force where the playing fields were level.

The Minister of Defence has stressed our vision of a force repeatedly: broadly representative of the country's people at all

Planning for Transformation

Brig Gen Chris Venter, Acting Chief of Army Staff Planning

INTRODUCTION

In a recent ISS publication,¹ Dr Jakkie Cilliers made the following statement with regard to the defence transformation process: "*With the worst pains of the transformation behind it, the South African Department of Defence is now struggling to re-focus on its primary role and functions - and the equipment to support these.*"

The planning side are over for certain role-players, but the pains will remain with the South African Department of Defence (DoD) for quite some time. Planning is the one side of the coin, implementation has its own pains, complications and challenges, all still facing Department.

Much has been written and said about transformation and its reasons by the DoD in the period since 1994. This paper will therefore concentrate specifically on the planning for the transformation of the South African Army as part of the DoD that has been launched by the Ministry of Defence. The new role of the SA Army is to provide combat-ready supported forces.

'Planning' in this paper is used in a broad sense and refers to the determination of a course of action. It also refers to the continuous process of planning and adjusting throughout the duration of the transformation phase.

REQUIRED END-RESULT OF THE SA ARMY'S TRANSFORMATION

Effective action can only be undertaken if an unambiguous end-result serves as the point of departure during the planning of any endeavour. The determination of the required end-result of the SA Army's transformation is therefore a necessity. This will ensure that the execution of the SA Army's transformation fulfils the requirements contained in DoD documentation on transformation.

The required end-result of the SA Army's transformation is defined as follows: "*To within the prescriptions and guidelines of DoD transformation documentation, transform the SA Army into a productive organisation by means of a migration plan managed as a program. The completion of the migration plan will result in the execution of a cost-effective Integrated SA Army Provide Forces process. This process is to be executed by competent and duly authorised SA Army personnel, supported by a cost-effective organisation structure, information systems and an appropriate culture. It needs to be ensured that the Provide Forces process effectively integrates with the rest of the DoD's processes.*"

The migration plan referred to is the plan of activities that have to take place to transform the SA Army from its present situation to the required future state. The following discussion documents indicated the aspects that were taken into account during the determination of the required end-result:

- the contents of **DoD Transformation Design Workshop** (Volume 1, draft 4 and its appendices) conducted at the end of 1997;
- draft DoD documents on leadership, command, culture and management; and
- management literature on the manner in which the cost-effective transformation of an organisation can be achieved.

Based on the above documentation and publications on transformation, it was determined that the following actions should form part of the SA Army's transformation:

- revisit and, where necessary, refine the 'provide forces' process in order to ensure its complete understanding;
- finalise and refine, where necessary, the subprocesses involved in 'provide forces'.
- develop effective boundary management with regard to the interdependencies between the SA Army's 'provide forces' process and other DoD processes;
- design and develop or, where applicable, redesign and develop management information systems that will effectively support the execution of the individual subprocesses of the SA Army's 'provide forces' process.
- identify the operating (executive and administrative) processes which support each subprocess of the 'provide forces' process cost-effectively (effectively and efficiently);
- design and develop or, where applicable, redesign and develop a computerised administrative information system that will enhance the cost-effectiveness of the SA Army;
- design an organisation structure for the SA Army that will bring about the effective execution of all the subprocesses of the SA Army's 'provide forces' process, as well as the related operating processes;
- determine and formalise delegations of authority which will be required by officers who are responsible for decision-making during the execution of each subprocess of the 'provide forces' process;
- formalise the command or management directive or duty sheet for each position in the organisation structure;
- identify the leadership traits required by members who will be appointed to each of the managerial posts in the organisation structure of the SA Army;
- develop syllabi for the training of appointees who will be responsible for the execution of each subprocess of the SA Army's 'provide forces' process and the supporting operating processes;
- appoint and train members who will be responsible for the execution of each subprocess of the SA Army's 'provide forces' process and the supporting operating processes;
- execute ongoing change management, by means of interventions and communication programmes (oral and written), in order to keep SA Army members informed;

- change the organisational culture where changes brought about by the actions referred to above require such change;
- devise the migration plan to bring about the cost-effective transformation of the SA Army; and
- design and staff a programme structure in order to ensure the integrated management of all the actions referred to above. The programme structure will be divided into project structures responsible for the execution of each action in order to ensure their cost-effective execution.

The list presented above is not necessarily in the order in which they will be executed. The nature of the interdependencies between these actions will determine the extent to which individual actions will be executed sequentially or concurrently.

METHODOLOGY

A suitable methodology is required to successfully achieve the end-result discussed above. 'Methodology' refers to predetermined systematic steps to be followed to achieve a specified end-product. DoD members know from experience that, in order to ensure quality products, the transformation of any resource must be based on a methodology which is suitable for the transformation of that particular resource. For this reason, methodologies have been created for the transformation of required operational capabilities (ROCs) of resources into products which meet the ROCs. Methodologies for the transformation of ROCs for weapon and information systems, for example, have been created. These methodologies differ, however, since they must provide for the peculiarity of the specific type of resource. A process within an organisation is also regarded as one of the resources which is utilised in pursuing its aims. It is therefore appropriate that the transformation of an organisation's processes should be based on a methodology suitable to its particular nature.

Any methodology must furthermore be based on certain generic characteristics if goal-directed and systemic transformation is to be ensured. These characteristics are as follows:

- The product delivered by the execution of the methodology must meet the requirements contained in a formalised ROC, which have been approved by the organisation's top management (this contributes to goal-directedness).
- The applicable generic phases of a resource's life cycle must form the foundation of transformation, namely a **concept**, **design**, development and implementation (this contributes to systematic execution). During the concept phase the manner in which the requirements of the ROC can be met, are considered. During the **design phase** the chosen concept (the whole) is broken down hierarchically into its smallest parts. During the **development phase** the development of the smallest parts and the combining of these parts at each hierarchical level are brought about.
- The activities forming part of each phase and the products which must be produced by the execution of these activities, must be clearly described (this does not only contribute to goal-directedness during the execution, but also to clarity on what is to be produced and how to produce it). Having such clearly defined phases and the products that are to be delivered, provides participants in the transformation effort with a clear 'road map' of how transformation will be brought about.
- The product delivered at the end of each phase must not only meet the predetermined requirements, but the development of the product should also continuously be tested and evaluated against the product of the previous phase in the methodology (this contributes to goal-directedness, since the satisfaction of the ROC is implied at the end of each phase).

The methodology for transformation in the SA Army will consist of several projects that are to be managed as a total programme. The reason for this approach is that there is not only one resource that

has to be transformed. The affected resources to be transformed, among others, are:

- the management system consisting of a number of management processes;
- the operating processes executed to support management processes;
- the management information systems and operating information systems;
- the management and operating structures, as well as the accompanying job descriptions, requirements, management directives, and duty assignments;
- prescriptions, such as policy and work procedures; and
- organisational culture.

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

International studies reveal that not many large institutions or organisations are very successful at profound transformation, despite their good intentions. Why is this? Is a large and complex organisation such as ours doomed to a similar fate? It is submitted that such failures mainly lie in the area of change management. In most cases, the more technical aspects - designing and implementing new and sound processes, structures and systems - are well executed by competent people.

The lack of success seems to be as a result of the failure by the organisations' executives to enlist employee support. Studies seem to point to the requirement for an understandable change message to employees, in particular as seen from their point of view. Employees' concerns have to be addressed. Executives, and not lower level managers, should help people to visualise their contributions to change. This needs to be addressed throughout the implementation and continuously reaffirmed. Executives are to be seen as leading and showing the way.

The importance of training and planning for it cannot be overemphasised. Leaders and their people need to be prepared and empowered to make them feel confident that they will operate well in the new environment where new values will apply. Reaffirmation of old values or the creation of new ones should be made very clear to employees. A good example of this was evident in the speech by General Siphwe Nyanda, Chief of the SANDF, upon assuming command. Little doubt remained about the values he will adhere to during this period of transformation.

Trainers and organisation development (OD) professionals are to become increasingly involved in facilitating the change process in order to accelerate it. The SA Army's OD staff are trained and positioned to support the top management with this task.

The greatest challenge in transforming a large and complex organisation, is to ensure continuity while implementing change at as rapid a rate as possible. By making the change message easy to understand and accept, executives can shorten the change process and focus everyone's attention on doing what is in their collective best interest.

CURRENT PLANNING FOR TRANSFORMATION

The total environment within which the DoD finds itself has changed dramatically. Much has been said and written about these changes and will not be dealt with now. These changes have led to a new defence environment described in published documentation on political and national security, defence policy, the new social paradigm and the role of defence forces in the post-modern era.

New structures for the DoD have already been announced, including a Ministry of Defence comprising new divisions, and replacing the existing Defence Headquarters and Arms of Service headquarters. The now approved Defence Review arrived at a visionary peacetime force design. Macro force design and

structures were produced at the end of last year by a design workgroup constituted for that purpose. As the proposed structures have not yet been approved, they will not be discussed at this stage. The process of moving to the future structures has to be effected within the foreseen budget allocation to the DoD.

New business processes for the DoD were designed and approved which serve as a baseline for further transformation planning.

FUTURE PLANNING FOR TRANSFORMATION

It is at this juncture that the SA Army finds itself planning for its transformation and utilising the methodology referred to above. The major challenge to be overcome is to migrate from the present organisation to an affordable and sustainable organisation within the new budget allocation. This migration has to be achieved in a very short time to realise the required cost reductions within the present allocated funds.

ENDNOTES

* General Venter has subsequently been appointed as Major General in the post of Chief Director Planning in the SA Army.

1. J Cilliers, *Defence Acquisitions - Unpacking the Package Deals*, **ISS Papers**, 29, March 1998, p. 1.

Requirements and Expectations of Joint Operations

*Brig Gen André Bestbier, Chief of Joint Operations, Director Planning and Conduct of Operations**

INTRODUCTION

This paper briefly indicates what the Chief of Joint Operations requires and expects from the South African Army, as well as from the other arms of the service. The focus is on the rationale behind the establishment of Joint Operations, the nature of war and armed conflict, and of defence, and the nature of the armed forces required by South Africa

It is clear that the South African government's preferred course of action is to prevent conflict and war, and that it will not have aggressive intentions towards any state in the future. It regards the use or threat of military force as a measure of last resort in the face of aggression when non-violent forms of conflict resolution have failed. The emphasis lies on preventing conflict, particularly in Southern Africa.

In the light of this and South Africa's commitment to abide by international law, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will have a primarily defensive orientation and posture. This has implications for doctrine, training and force design.

South Africa will turn to military means only when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed. Deterrence, however, requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore necessary to maintain a core force capability. This core force capability must be well balanced and sustainable and must be able to deal with a wide range of small contingencies of a short term nature while, at the same time, having the ability to expand to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate.

The SANDF is currently employed on a widespread basis in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS). This situation is likely to persist for some time because of the ongoing public violence. However, the government's goal is to build the capacity of the SAPS to deal with this situation on its own. When this goal has been achieved, the SANDF will then only be deployed in the most exceptional

circumstances to restore law and order. However, border control is and will be the primary responsibility of the SANDF and we will have to execute this task for the foreseeable future.

As a fully fledged member of the international community, South Africa will also have to fulfill its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.

Other defence functions include disaster relief, the provision and maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of South African citizens/officials from high threat areas, protection of marine resources and regional defence co-operation. It should be noted that these are secondary functions and that the government would be disinclined to employ the SANDF, except in the most exceptional circumstances, in these other functions. Nevertheless, because of its specialised skills and resources, the SANDF can and will be called upon to assist.

RATIONALE BEHIND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

The following appeared in a letter from the Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise, dated 13 December 1997:

- *"The intention is to create a single corporate, co-located, integrated 'head office' in which staffs are to be shared by both the Defence Secretary and the C SANDF.*
- *Arms of the service headquarters are to disappear as separate entities. The future arms of service leadership, together with their appropriate management support, will be found in the new corporate 'head office' complex, wherever that may eventually be.*
- *There will be a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the arms of service for the provision of combat ready or mission ready forces and the employment of such forces by the organization created for that purpose by C SANDF. Arms of the service will no longer be responsible for both these processes.*
- *The provision of common services will be catered for in an integrated, agency concept. The purpose is to eliminate unnecessary duplication and to maximize the productivity and utilization of scarce resources.*
- *The concept of 'jointness' will be the single most important characteristic of our new way of doing things."*

This instruction by the Minister, the proposed budget cuts and the change imperatives concerning social norms, for example, promoting civil control and representivity, resulted in a need to change.

Various workgroups, representative of all the arms of service and staff divisions, were established to investigate the establishment of a joint operations process and to provide suggestions with regard to an organisational structure. After in-depth deliberations and consultation, a Chief of Joint Operations system and structure were developed.

The Joint Operations system comprises the following subsystems:

- Chief of Joint Operations and staff located in the Ministry of Defence (MoD);
- task force commanders at the intermediate level; and
- task forces received from the arms of service for utilisation in the conduct of operations and joint exercises.

The main output from the Joint Operations system is 'achieved operations'.

The main responsibilities of this system is to develop contingency plans and joint doctrine, to make joint

forces mission-ready, and to conduct all operations including joint and combined exercises.

The Chief of Joint Operations is a staff officer of the Chief of the SANDF.

Joint Task Force Commanders are appointed by means of an operations directive by the Chief of the SANDF to execute specific operations/tasks with constituted forces as supplied by the arms of service. These commanders are either permanently or temporarily employed.

The Chief of Joint Operations and his/her staff continuously analyse and monitor the operational situation.

The Joint Operations System consists of the Chief of Joint Operations with staff, and Joint Task Force Commanders with staff, where necessary.

The arms of service will mobilise and demobilise combat-ready forces and remain responsible for sustaining these forces during the execution of operations.

The Chief of Joint Operations is responsible to exercise all joint and combined forces and for the co-ordination of the rehearsal of contingency plans.

In order to execute the 'employ forces' core process, the following activities will be performed:

- The departmental force employment implementation plan will be developed.
- Contingency plans will be developed.
- Planning for and the conduct of operations, including joint and combined exercises, will be done.
- Specific force employment doctrine will be developed.
- Operational capability requirements will be formulated.
- Operations' unique support and sustenance requirements will be ensured (e.g., logistics for operations, command management information for operations, personnel for operations, etc.)
- Forces required for operations will be specified and evaluated once they are received from the arms of service in terms of combat-readiness.

THE NATURE OF WAR, ARMED CONFLICT AND DEFENCE

To determine the SA Army's requirements and expectations of Joint Operations, it is necessary to consider the nature of war and armed conflict, as well as the nature of defence.

Armed conflict is a situation in which there is a threat or the use of violence or military force. War is the most extreme manifestation of armed conflict and is characterised by intense, extensive and sustained combat, usually between states. Conflict may occur between states or within the borders of a country (civil war, insurrection of terrorism). In addition, third parties not involved in the dispute may engage in military activity to resolve or terminate a conflict.

The causes of conflict are as old as human history. They are often based on territorial competition for resources, exacerbated by human behaviour and emotions, such as fear, greed, hatred, and ambition, coupled with political, economic, religious, ethnic, nationalistic, linguistic and environmental interests. Similarly, the fundamental character of conflict seems likely to remain unchanged: a dynamic contest of wills, involving death, destruction, terror and human suffering. For the participant, warfare will continue to represent a physical and moral challenge. However, as circumstances change, conflict can manifest itself in new ways.

The Dimensions of Conflict

The spectrum of conflict embraces a wide range of situations in which military forces may be required to operate, from stable peace to nuclear war. It is multidimensional and the varieties of conflict defy simple categorisation. However, a range of interrelated factors determine the shape of a conflict. These include the nature of the participants; the degree of interest involved; the nature and extent of any limitations imposed; the character of forces engaged; the level of intensity; and the projected or actual duration. Each of these factors can vary in scale or form according to the circumstances. In combination they determine the dimensions and character of a particular conflict at a certain time. During the course of a conflict circumstances or policy may change, altering the relationship of the factors and thus the nature of the conflict.

The nature of the forces involved in a conflict can also vary widely. The principal factors involved are size, training, equipment (including support), leadership and motivation. These factors can vary in a particular nation's forces, both between and within individual services.

Time has a significant impact on the way in which a conflict is conducted. There is often an imperative to achieve early success in order to avoid escalation. Other factors may create pressure to attain objectives quickly; it may even be necessary to delay operations until a sufficient size of force has been created and trained.

Conflict in the Modern World

Conflict is commonplace in the modern world and there is frequently no clear distinction between war and peace. Even relatively minor, localised conflicts may have implications for world peace, stability and trade. Therefore, many nations not directly engaged in conflict are involved in efforts to monitor, manage and resolve actual or potential conflicts. Against this background, technological, political and cultural developments shape the nature of modern conflict.

Success in conflict requires the ability to exploit information, while denying it to an enemy. Weapon developments allow military force to be applied at longer range and more accurately than before, by day and night and in poor weather. In combination, these developments mean that modern conflict has the potential to be fought simultaneously over a wide expanse in all three environments (sea, land and air) exploiting the entire electromagnetic spectrum, at a much faster rate than before. The interactions between sea, land and air forces, therefore, are more complex and more crucial than before. It is difficult to conceive operations on any scale that will not be undertaken jointly. This means that military forces need to be able to operate jointly and effectively under all circumstances and under all conditions.

Types of Conflict

The factors which determine the character of conflict and the features of the modern world which influence it, interact to generate different types of conflict. The following are terms which are commonly used to describe these differences of classification, but it bears repeating that conflict defies simple categorisation. Dividing lines are often blurred, categories are not exclusive and individual conflicts may spread across boundaries. Thus, each crisis or conflict needs to be addressed in terms of its specific circumstances.

- **General war:** Conflict between major powers in which their large and vital interests, perhaps even survival, are at stake.
- **Limited conflict:** During the Cold War, the classification 'limited' was used to describe international conflict short of general war.
- **Regional conflict:** This term describes a limited conflict arising out of regional issues. The conflict may be contained within the region, but the political and economic effects are likely to reverberate further afield. There may also be involvement from beyond the region, such as non-

belligerents supplying military equipment, advisers or volunteers. There may be military intervention under the authority of a United Nations mandate to resolve or terminate the conflict. There is also the danger that the conflict will spill over beyond the region. There will not necessarily be any constraint on the size of the forces deployed, the types of weapon used, or the duration and ferocity of fighting. From a South African perspective, a war in another region which does not involve any of the neighbouring states or access to strategic resources is unlikely to threaten national survival or vital interests. However, it may threaten secondary interests and therefore call for action to contain and resolve it. Such action would normally be collective, under the aegis of the United Nations.

- **Civil war:** This is largely conducted within the boundaries of a state in which a significant part of the population is associated with opposing sides.
- **Insurgency:** This normally describes the actions of a minority group within a state intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure. Again, each side may have help from outside. There is not a clear distinction between civil war and insurgency. Indeed, a successful insurgency may pass through a phase of civil war.
- **Terrorism:** This may be defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated by groups or individuals and usually intended to influence an audience wider than that of its immediate victims. In one form, terrorism may be an element of insurgency. In another, it may be employed for objectives short of the overthrow of the state. It may also be used by one state against another.

THE NATURE AND COMPONENTS OF DEFENCE

Defence is the military contribution to national security and is a major element of a government's wider security policy. Defence policy specifies the structure and capabilities of armed forces and guides the contribution they make to the achievement of the country's defence and security goals. It must be in accord with foreign and economic policies. The principal purpose of a democratic state's armed forces is to provide the potential for the application of force to ensure the security of the nation, the freedom of its people, and the promotion of its interests. However, armed forces can be used for a variety of other tasks, short of conflict, to protect and promote national interests. The possession of a credible military capability confers influence and, allied to manifest intent, provides a deterrent against aggression and coercion. Military capability underpins diplomacy and, used judiciously, can encourage stability within which broader interests can be pursued.

The Components of Defence

The principal components of defence are the armed forces, an organisation to make decisions and the means of implementing these. These components need to draw on a wide range of conceptual, moral, personnel and material resources throughout the country and abroad. In addition, the armed forces require a substantial supporting infrastructure, both civilian and military.

- **Decision-making** is the central component of defence. It remains under political control and draws on both the conceptual and the moral base. It must provide sound policy and strategy, efficient allocation of resources, an effective crisis management organisation capable of providing a balanced response to any situation, and clear strategic direction of operations. It must also deal with the daily management of the full range of defence activities and commitments.
- Implementation requires an established and effective **command and control structure** within the armed forces, and a swift, reliable **communications and information system**. Planning for all contingencies should be based on organisations founded in peacetime that can be progressively developed, if necessary, as the threat increases.
- In a democracy, armed forces are established on a **legal basis**, retained **under political control**

and must answer to elected representatives. They require a disciplined organisation with effective command and control to ensure that political direction is carried through to actions at the front-line.

- The **size, shape and capabilities** of the armed forces should be matched to the security needs and economic circumstances of the state. The capabilities (in particular, the reach) of modern weapons and surveillance systems mean that there is a close interaction between conflict in sea, land and air environments. Security therefore normally requires armed forces with the ability to operate in all three environments, with both defensive and offensive capabilities. Individual elements of each service must be able to operate with elements from the other services and with allied forces, and the overall defence decision-making component must be able to apply military force in a co-ordinated way in each of the environments. The armed forces comprise the people, equipment, stores and command organisations which, together with doctrine and training, provide operationally ready military capability. These elements need to be harmonised so that, for example, the training of the people matches the technical complexity of the equipment, and tactics are aligned to the capability of the people and equipment. This is particularly important as the forces develop to match new policy or changing circumstances. The ability to react quickly and to succeed in modern fast-moving, highly technical conflict with the least demand on resources requires well-trained and equipped professional forces.
- The conceptual base for defence provides the intellectual material needed for decision-making. Accurate and timely **information and intelligence** are crucial to effective decision-making.
- The **moral base** for defence underpins the motivation of the armed forces. It is founded on public support and on the political will of the government to maintain and, when necessary, use effective armed forces. The moral base also embraces the national will to ensure the welfare of military personnel and the efficient management to provide this.
- The national population provides the base from which **servicemen and women** are recruited, either as regular service personnel or as volunteer reservists. It also contains the large number of civilians - government servants and others - who provide essential support to the armed forces. If the armed forces are to be properly staffed, the civil population must produce an adequate supply of recruits who are sufficiently educated and fit for military service, while the status and conditions of a military career need to be such that the right calibre of recruits is attracted. Moreover, if the armed forces are to rely on augmentation by reserves in times of crisis, the reservists will require periodic training to acquire and maintain their skills. There must therefore be adequate legislation to ensure that they are available when needed for training and operations.
- All armed forces require an assured **industrial source of equipment and stores**. Effective, affordable equipment that exploits high technology, is essential to provide a battle-winning edge in modern combat. The long development period of much modern equipment requires decisions to be based on an informed assessment of how military affairs are likely to develop over the next ten to twenty years. This is notoriously difficult to predict. Long development, together with high costs, mean that military equipment must have a long useful life, but this needs to be balanced against the imperative to maintain capability in the face of the increasing pace of technological change. Therefore, an equipment procurement programme needs to integrate the timely introduction of replacement systems, funded and managed on a whole life basis, with allowance for planned capability updates during their lifetimes, where appropriate.
- Armed forces require a **supporting infrastructure** of bases, ports, airfields and communications. They also need an organisation to store, supply, repair and dispose of equipment and stores. Realistic and effective training is fundamental to the military capability of the armed forces. This requires a mix of both live and synthetic training facilities. However, it is difficult to achieve in a number of respects. It requires ready access to training ranges on land, at sea and in the air. An appropriate balance needs to be struck between the training needs of the forces and the effect of training on the environment and the population. Realistic training with certain weapons or in

particular situations may be impossible. Moreover, live training is becoming increasingly expensive. Therefore, synthetic training is an essential complement to live training and it needs to be developed and improved as financial and environmental pressures on live training increase.

The Use of Military Force in Defence

Armed forces derive their utility from the ability to threaten or bring to bear controlled military force, at a chosen place and time, to achieve military objectives in pursuit of political ends. In general, the aim will be to avert conflict, or if conflict is inevitable, to force the enemy to submit. Military force can be employed in the following ways:

- **Deterrence** is based on the potential of military force and is a central function of defence. Deterrence aims to dissuade a potential adversary from resorting to a particular course of action by convincing him that the costs of pursuing it will outweigh potential gains. Deterrence with conventional forces requires a demonstrable capability, readiness and sense of purpose.
- Deterrence, as described above, is essentially a passive function seeking to influence the behaviour of a potential adversary through his perception of the risks which might accrue to military aggression. **Coercion** (sometimes called 'compellence') moves deterrence onto an active and more focused plane by the direct threat or the use of force in a measured way, not as an act of conflict or to achieve a military objective, but in order to compel a particular course of action. The concept of coercion is confined, essentially, to the use of conventional weapons.
- The most obvious use of military force is the **destruction** of something - for example, an aircraft, a ship, a bridge or a whole enemy force - to prevent the enemy using it for his own purposes and so bring about his defeat. Thus, destruction is a form of denial.
- **Constraint** is another type of denial, which involves the use of force to deny something without destroying it - for example, denying the use of a bridge or road by blocking it, or the use of a maritime blockade.
- **Disruption** is the use of force to shatter the cohesion of a military formation to prevent it from functioning effectively in combat. It may be achieved by destroying elements essential for cohesion, such as the command and control systems.

Types of Military Operation

Armed forces are raised, structured and equipped principally for combat. Combat operations may take a variety of forms, of which the following examples are illustrative, but not exhaustive:

- **high intensity warfare** with a well-defined enemy: the use of military force is likely to be the prime means of resolving the conflict;
- **armed intervention**, in a situation short of war: involving the entry of combat forces into the territory or area of jurisdiction of another state, where opposition is expected;
- **counter-insurgency operations** against an elusive foe; and
- **counter-terrorist operations** conducted under the direction of the civil authority in accordance with domestic law.

However, armed forces may be used in a range of operations other than combat. In some situations, the dividing line between these operations and combat may not be clear, and each condition may flow from the other. Moreover, many of these roles depend on the armed forces' inherent combat capability for enforcement, coercion, deterrence or self-protection. Other roles exploit the forces' transport capability and specialist communications, engineer logistics, medical or other skills. These roles, which the SANDF may be required to undertake, are:

- **Deterrence:** Conventional forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating their effectiveness on operations and by maintaining manifestly high standards of morale, training, equipment and readiness. Counter-terrorist forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating the SANDF's capability to resolve serious terrorist incidents by force if all other means have failed.
- **Support to diplomacy:** Military forces may be used to support diplomatic efforts during an international crisis. They may also be used in a more routine way to support wider diplomacy either nationally or as part of an international strategy.
- **Peacekeeping:** Peacekeeping operations are authorised by the United Nations or an appropriate regional organisation and carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties. The aim of such operations is to support efforts to achieve or maintain peace, in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or limited conflict. Tasks include observation and monitoring, supervision of truces and ceasefires, interposition between belligerent forces, demobilisation and disarmament, humanitarian relief and its protection, operational mine clearance and projects to support a civilian authority. Designated peacekeeping forces operating with consent will normally be relatively small and dispersed, with only sufficient combat power for self-defence.
- **Peace enforcement operations:** Such operations must be approached like any other military operation, with a thorough military appreciation, clear strategic direction and an effective chain of command, able to give proper political and military direction at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Effective forces must be committed. These operations may involve the use of armed force and are intended to maintain or restore peace between belligerent parties who may not all consent to intervention. Enforcement operations are coercive. Peace enforcement tasks include peace restoration by impartial actions, conflict containment by interposition and forcible separation of warring factions. Other tasks are establishing or protecting designated safe areas, guaranteeing or denying movement, and embargo or sanctions enforcement. The volatile geopolitical situation and the increased United Nations commitment to enforcement operations mean that they may be mounted in situations akin to civil war or insurgency. A peace enforcement force need not necessarily be large, but it must be prepared, if necessary, to impose its will in accordance with predetermined rules of engagement; it therefore requires a combat capability. Its size, equipment, organisation and support must be appropriate to the level of resistance anticipated.
- **Military aid to the civil community:** This includes the provision of service personnel and equipment both in emergencies, such as natural disasters, and in routine situations to assist the community at large.
- **Military aid to the SAPS:** Such aid is provided to maintain or restore law and order in situations which are beyond its capacity to resolve. The military operate in co-operation with the SAPS, but under military command and remaining subject to domestic law.
- **Non-combatant evacuation operations:** The SANDF may be used to evacuate South African nationals, and other nationals if requested, from potential war zones or other crisis areas.
- **Humanitarian aid:** Military forces are frequently used to provide humanitarian aid around the world to mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters, such as famine, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and civil wars. There are inherent difficulties in providing humanitarian aid during conflict. Apart from the possible need for protection of those engaged in humanitarian tasks, competing factions are liable to interpret humanitarian operations as attempts to support one side or the other.

THE NATURE OF THE ARMED FORCES REQUIRED BY SOUTH AFRICA

In conclusion, the South African Army must be capable to confront and defeat an enemy who may be armed with the full range of modern weaponry, with the aid of allies, where appropriate.

The South African Army will almost invariably operate jointly and often in combination with allied or coalition forces. Therefore, it needs to be commanded, structured, equipped and trained for joint and combined warfare, yet retain the capability and structure to undertake national operations, if necessary.

The South African Army must have the ability to defend South Africa. It should be capable of being regenerated and, if necessary, reconstituted to meet a major external threat to national security, within the warning time of such a threat emerging. Regeneration is the timely activation, in full or in part, of existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to war levels. Reconstitution is the expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the raising of new units and formations and the expansion of industrial capacity, to support the procurement of equipment and stocks.

The deterrence of aggression or escalation requires all elements of the South African Army to be effective and be seen to be so.

If they are to contribute to the full range of potential commitments, the South African forces require a mix of defensive and offensive capabilities to fight on land, in the air, and on and under the sea. They also need to be able to exploit and deny the electromagnetic environment. They must be capable of operating at long distances from their home bases for extended periods. In short, the South African forces require an expeditionary capability.

To provide a short-notice, flexible capability to operate outside South Africa at any level of conflict, will require professional, well-equipped and well-trained armed elements which are deployable at short notice. If it is decided to rely on reserves to provide part of this capability, they must be available and trained for service and deployment within the appropriate period of notice.

The circumstances at any particular time dictate how ready the Army needs to be for operations. A unit or formation is said to be ready when it is staffed, equipped and trained for the task and supported appropriately. It would be highly inflexible, expensive and bad for morale to hold all South African Army elements at very high readiness all the time. It therefore makes sense to adopt a system of graduated readiness for different units. This should be arranged so that the required balanced military capability is available in the necessary timescale. It should be possible to vary readiness states easily to match changing circumstances. Principal factors which need to be taken into account are the nature and imminence of threats to security, the warning time expected, the nature and duration of anticipated operations and the degree to which different types of operation are concurrent.

While the higher level management of defence, the procurement of equipment, the management of crises and the strategic direction of operations are undertaken centrally, the personnel of the SANDF are recruited and organised on a single-service basis. It is the single services, in this case the SA Army, which provide front-line military capabilities. Therefore, the Chief of the SA Army is responsible for the fighting effectiveness, efficiency and morale of his service, and to make well-trained and disciplined combat-ready forces available to operate jointly in the defence of South Africa.

ENDNOTE

* General Bestbier has subsequently been appointed as Major General in the post of Chief Director, Joint Operations.

A Transformed SA Army: Providing Combat-Ready Supported Forces
Brigadier General Leon Wessels, Director Training, SA Army

INTRODUCTION

One of the guiding principles for defence in a democratic South Africa is that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force with its primary function being to defend South Africa against any external military aggression (protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity). All other functions are regarded as secondary. Although a conventional threat against South Africa, at present and in the foreseeable future, is unlikely, it is nevertheless essential that the SANDF maintains a core defence capability.

A core defence capability, among others, can only be maintained if top priority is given to a comprehensive force preparation programme. The main focus of such a programme is to facilitate:

- the functional training of the SANDF force structure;
- an equal opportunity programme;
- international peace support training in co-operation with foreign partners;
- civic education on defence democracy;
- international law on armed conflict training; and
- regional training within the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Resulting from this programme, it is envisaged that the SANDF will have a core force that is properly trained which will comply with international standards of competency and obligations.

The above imperatives consequently provide the SA Army with a mandate to formulate a force preparation strategy. Against this background, the SA Army's core business will be to provide combat-ready supported forces.

The aim of this paper is to outline the manner in which the SA Army will provide combat-ready supported forces in a transformed SANDF. The following aspects will be covered:

- the force employment strategy and how it relates to force preparation;
- the 'prepare forces' process and the extent to which it guides the SA Army's core business;
- the demarcation of the SA Army's core business within the SANDF;
- the SA Army's force preparation system; and
- its force preparation structure.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY

The force employment strategy provides the strategic, operational direction for landward defence. This direction defines roles and functions, areas of operations, the operational capabilities required to operate in an external and internal environment encompassing mobile and area defence operations. It also prioritises operational commitments, force maintenance and technology and equipment programmes. Furthermore, it identifies the force structure elements required for operations and prescribes guidelines for the preparation of these forces.


Forces cannot prepare for operations if the above direction is not forthcoming. It therefore stands to reason that the force employment strategy is the main driver for the formulation of a force preparation strategy, and that there is a direct relationship between the two.

The SA Army currently formulates its own force employment strategy. This, however, will terminate as soon as the newly established Joint Operations Division is in position to provide the required strategic, operational direction.

'PREPARE FORCES' PROCESS

The purpose of the 'prepare forces' process is to provide the 'employ forces' process with forces to perform its task. This is achieved by the following steps: structuring user systems (US); training user systems and higher order user systems (HOUS); mobilising forces as required; and demobilising forces after employment. The 'prepare forces' process is directed by the Department of Defence's (DoD) planning and policy (see 'prepare forces' process in Figure 1).

Figure 1: 'Prepare forces' process



User systems comprise force components provided by other processes, i.e. in-service product systems and personnel educated, trained and developed to specification. These components are then integrated into user systems by the necessary command and control elements. Similarly, higher order user systems are made up by the integration of user systems.

After structuring US or HOUS, training can commence. The main output of the training process is combat-ready user systems (CRUS) and combat-ready higher order user systems (CRHOUS), ready to be mobilised in response to instructions from the 'employ forces' process.

The 'prepare forces' process ensures that the required support is provided by other processes during the 'employ forces' process. To this end, the 'prepare forces' process makes use of resources and/or services from other supporting processes, i.e. personnel, logistics, finance, etc.

#From the SA Army's point of view, this process has a profound impact on its activities. SA Army US and HOUS (units/brigades) are to be trained, retrained and declared combat-ready on a continuous basis irrespective of operational employments. Our core business is clearly the preparation of forces.

DEMARCATON OF THE SA ARMY'S CORE BUSINESS

From the Army's perspective, the three main role-players involved in a combat-ready Army US and HOUS are the Chiefs of Joint Operations (C J Ops) and Joint Training (C J Trg), and the Chief of the Army. In order to demarcate the SA Army's core business, it is essential to reflect briefly on the main perceived activities of each of these role-player.

The Chief of Joint Training is responsible for developing and implementing a Joint Training System for the DoD. Subsystems will include:

- A military and professional education, training and development delivery system, for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, ratings, civilians and the Part-Time Component. Specific fields that will be covered, include tertiary education, young officers training, command and staff training, battle simulation, military research, training of civilian members of the DoD, assessment and learning centres, to name but a few.
- A support training subsystem (common support training) which will include human resources, administration, technical support, driving, catering, military intelligence, languages, sport and physical training, as well as recreational training.
- Project management of parallel projects is the third subsystem which includes the creation of a management information system for joint training, accreditation of military qualifications at the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) and the National Qualifications Framework

(NQF). It also includes special programmes, such as equal opportunities, civic education, leadership, command and management practices, professional skills, philosophies and principles, and peace support operations training.

The main output of the Joint Training system is individuals who are educated, trained and developed in accordance with client (DoD) specifications, as well as education, training and development advice within the DoD. The main functions of the Joint Training system will be performed at a Joint Training Institute organised in arms of the service wings or branches and their satellite training establishments. Core training centres or centres of excellence are to be established and will form an integral part of the future Joint Training Institute. In summary, the Joint Training system will be primarily responsible for DoD common individual development training.

Although the Chief of Joint Operations' core business focus is primarily directed at the employment of combat-ready forces, it also embodies a specific training function. This function mainly embraces force training preceding the conduct of actual operations. These training activities include:

- joint force training which is normally conducted at formation or higher level exercises at the operational/strategic level involving two or more arms of service;
- combined training which is similar to joint force training but, additionally, involves the participation of one or more foreign forces (allies);
- mission-ready training which is conducted by Joint Operations to facilitate mission readiness of CRUS and CRHOUS immediately preceding operational employments; and
- exercises in order to test and evaluate specific operational plans made on a contingency basis.


Many of the above training activities are currently still vested in the SA Army's 'as is' training system. Accepting that the 'to be' training system will be realised as described above, it is a foregone conclusion that the SA Army will concentrate its main efforts on service-unique training activities. To this end, the Army must develop a training system which is supportive to service-unique training.

SA ARMY'S FORCE PREPARATION SYSTEM

The SA Army is in the process of developing an 'Integrated Provide Army Forces System'. An integral subsystem of this structure will be the 'prepare forces' system.

It is clearly indicated, at this stage, that the force employment strategy, the 'prepare forces' process and the SA Army service-unique training responsibility are closely interwoven and impact heavily on the SA Army's core business. This provides the direction to be followed in designing an Army force preparation system. In analysing the DoD's transformation design and migration plan the organisational levels and structure types are indisputably prescribed. Furthermore, the Army system is described in detail but excludes the units at Level 4. All the above information (guidelines) sets the stage for an Army force preparation system to be developed with the end result being a structure that can ensure the provision of combat-ready supported forces. Figure 2 below reflects this point of view.

Figure 2: Army Force Preparation System



FORCE PREPARATION STRUCTURE

Using the force preparation system model as the point of departure, bearing the SA Army's 'to be' force design and structure in mind, and identifying the main functions at each level, now allows for a structure to be formulated. At Level 2, the main functions are the management of Administration and Operating Technical (AOT) training policy, combat-readiness, education, training and development, research and financial administration. These functions are all incorporated into the force preparation structure, which is a substructure of the Army division. The other substructure is personnel, planning and weapon system management. At Level 3, the intermediate level type formations are found. A type formation for each identified system is to be structured. The headquarters of a type formation will allow for the management of user systems, product systems and personnel.

The force design of the Army makes provision for two conventional brigade headquarters. These headquarters conduct force preparation as is the case with all other US. As soon as other US (infantry, armour, artillery, etc.) are attached under operational command of these headquarters they become HOUS. These attachments can be made for purposes of force preparation or force employment. Figures 3 and 4 provide a schematic picture of these relationships.

Figure 3: Proposed Structure Level 2





Figure 4: Proposed Structures Levels 3 and 4



CONCLUSION

The transformation process has produced a satisfactory prepare forces system as a subsystem of the 'Integrated Provide Army Forces System' to meet the Army's obligations. Furthermore, the provisional training system and structure, described in this paper, will ensure the provision of combat-ready supported forces. This system/structure is obviously not the final end-product, but it will form a sound basis on which the ultimate design can be built.

ENDNOTE

* The post of Director Training has subsequently been changed to Director Force Preparation.

Human Resources Challenges

*Maj Gen TT Matanzima, General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province Command**

INTRODUCTION

The management of the human resources of the SA Army within a changing environment, brought about by, among others, the process of transformation itself is a challenge. However, for the present short and even medium term, the most important human resources issues for the SA Army revolve around the following:

- the finalisation of integration and whether or not a final date for integration is determinable;
- the rationalisation of members of the SA Army in a professional way, to become an affordable, efficient and accountable force;
- the enhancement of representivity within the SA Army in accordance with the South African population mix - not only broadly, but within each management level and even rank group;
- the establishment of an integrated, professionally competent Part-Time Component (PTC), representative of the whole community; and
- the development of appropriate competencies by means of assessment (assessment centres), civic education, and adult basic education.

The aim of this paper is to emphasise important human resources issues within the SA Army, identify the

challenges resulting from them and their management to ensure optimal allocation and utilisation, as well as budget allocations, according to the envisaged transformed force design and structure.

FINALISATION OF INTEGRATION PROCESS

Within the south African context, "*[i]ntegration is a process whereby the former Non-Statutory Forces (NSF) involved in the liberation struggle are amalgamated with the Statutory Forces to form a new force.*"

Major General Andrew Masondo, Chief Defence Corporate Communication, compares the integration process with the baking of bread. When you bake bread you use flour, sugar, baking powder, water, etc. - all different ingredients each with its own characteristics. You need to mix and knead the ingredients, place it in an oven and apply heat. All the ingredients mix together to make bread. The same applies to the SANDF.

The physical integration of the various constituent forces (statutory and non-statutory) is but only the first step. The real challenge arises when the different military cultures and characteristics are brought together to form a completely new and different force with its own military culture, a sense of belonging and loyalty to the new organisation.

Seven different forces are integrating to form a new SANDF and SA Army - the former South African Defence Force (SADF), the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) forces, and the former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Azanian Peoples- Liberation Army (APLA) forces. Also forming part of this process is the former Kwa-Zulu Self-Protection Force (KZSPF), that were not integrated but incorporated.

Nobody in South Africa had previous experience of such an involved and complex process. No military textbook or doctrine was available to predict and govern such a sensitive issue as integration. Problems faced were of a different nature, of which the following are but a few:

- maladministration;
- lack of training and acceptance of the new situation;
- distrust between the parties involved; to NSF members, it seemed that they were being absorbed and not integrated. The fact that former SADF bases were utilised for the integration process was the main reason for this feeling; and
- the time it took to integrate the NSF. In some cases, it took certain members of the NSF approximately three years to become members of the SANDF and the SA Army.

It can be rightfully said that integration has been a process wrought with challenges. However, the former forces are successfully being welded together to form a new SANDF and SA Army with a new military culture and values.

One important challenge that remains, is to set a date for the finalisation of the integration process. Presently, the SA Army is planning for yet another integration intake to take place from 1 July 1998. The planning figure for this intake is 1 300 former NSF members. They will assemble at the Wallmansthal Assembly Area where all previous intakes were accommodated and processed.

It is clear from the provision in Section 236(8)(d) of the **Interim Constitution** (1993), that the integration process should not be allowed to continue *ad infinitum*. This specific section provides that entering into an agreement with the SANDF should be done within a reasonable time. Since the start of the integration process on 27 April 1994, it is evident that nominal members (names and particulars appearing on the formal Certified Personnel Registers) cannot be allowed to postpone their entry into an agreement beyond what can be regarded as a reasonable time.

The final date will be set after the 1 July 1998 intake. This date will be made public as soon as possible to ensure an 'reasonableness' and in view of the important fact that the new force design and structure are soon to be implemented.

It is foreseeable that, notwithstanding widespread media coverage and other measures, some individuals and even small groups as in the case of medical personnel of the former NSF, may still report after the final date and will demand to be integrated. Provision will be made to accommodate such cases.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW SANDF

The SANDF and the various arms of service were established in accordance with the **Constitution of the Republic of South Africa** (1993). As previously mentioned, it entailed the integration of seven existing forces and the establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat. It was generally accepted that this process, despite the effect of demobilisation and natural attrition, would result in an oversized and unaffordable SANDF and SA Army.

Consequently, a rationalisation programme for the down and rightsizing of the SANDF and SA Army is required. The envisaged rationalisation process will endeavour to do this as best as possible.

The SA Army's budget allocation, together with the Defence Budget, has been reduced on an annual basis since 1994. In order to adjust and cut Department of Defence (DoD) expenditure in the medium term to the prescribed normative ratio (personnel forty per cent, capital thirty per cent, and operating thirty per cent), the SA Army needs to reduce its personnel strength from ±59 000 to approximately 42 000 by the financial year 2000/01.

RATIONALISATION

The following values, derived from the **Constitution** and **White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service**, will regulate the personnel rationalisation process of the SA Army:

- **Fairness:** Actions and decisions will be objective, consistent, equitable and without prejudice. Actions will be fair, transparent and in accordance with applicable labour legislation.
- **Equity:** Unfairness in the past will be rectified and corrective measures will be implemented to ensure that human resources are free from discrimination, invisible barriers and unjustness which will impede equal employment opportunities - the right to appeal for those adversely affected by the rationalisation process is part of this specific value.
- **Transparency:** All human resources management practices related to rationalisation in the SA Army will be open, democratic and subject to public scrutiny within reasonable limits.
- **Professionalism:** The rationalisation process will be conducted competently, and will reflect the highest norms and ethical standards, as well as exemplary behaviour.
- **Effectiveness and efficiency:** Rationalisation actions will be directed to promote effectiveness, efficiency and an unhindered continuation of services in the SA Army.

Rationalisation methods to be implemented with effect from the 1999/2000 financial year will aim to effect the optimal quality and quantity mix for the future SA Army. The following methods will be utilised in the sequence in which they appear below:

- **Natural attrition:** The first method of separation will be natural attrition. To utilise this method to its maximum effect, recruitment in the SA Army has been minimised to address only the filling of critical posts. According to projections, natural attrition, as a first method, will accommodate ±3 000 members over the next two financial years.

- **Voluntary severance initiative (VSI)** as a method of separation has been implemented since May 1996 - a total number of 9 360 applications have been approved since its implementation.
- The selective **non-renewal of contracts** is a third method of separation. A significant number of members (under-achievers) can be identified and 'retrenched' in this way. At present, a decision has to be made at political level to implement the non-renewal of service contracts as a method of separation.
- **Retrenchment:** Employer-initiated retrenchment constitutes the fourth and final method. In view of the fact that attrition, non-renewal of contracts and VSI alone will not allow the SA Army to downsize to its envisaged new force design and structure, it is imperative that employer-initiated retrenchment be introduced to contribute to the required personnel reduction - a negotiated retrenchment package needs to be considered, approved and introduced.

As with the process of integration, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) will again be involved as adjudicators during the total process of rationalisation (including the appeal procedure).

REPRESENTIVITY

The Defence Review determined the representation (quotas) per former force. In the case of the SA Army, the distribution will entail the following percentages per former force:


ORIGIN	PERCENTAGE
Former SA Army	30%
Former MK	19%
Former APLA	7%
Former KZSPF	4%
Former TBVC	10%
New SA Army (members joined after 27 April 1994)	9%
Civilians	20%

At present, the SA Army does not reflect the demographic composition of South Africa, but is committed to rectify the historic imbalances of the past in the short, medium and long term.

The Defence Review stipulates that the new SA Army will be broadly representative of the population mix of South Africa, on each managerial level and within each rank group. The percentages as mentioned in the Defence Review are as follows:

GROUPS	PERCENTAGES
Africans	64,68%
Whites	24,35%
Coloureds	10,22%
Asians	0,75%

Figure 1: Projected SA Army Strength after Rationalisation (linear projection)



A scrutiny of the present population mix within the SA Army reveals the following:

GROUPS	PERCENTAGES
Africans	71%
Whites	19%
Coloureds	9,84%
Asians	0,16%

This picture is actually misleading. One needs to consider percentages per rank group, and even go a step further by projecting the colour shortages in the future SA Army of ±42 700 members. The shortages within each rank group from staff sergeant and upwards to general (specifically with reference to African members) is alarming. This is where the real challenge for the future lies - to restore these imbalances.

As previously mentioned, recruiting in the SA Army is restricted to the essential minimum. The only 'large scale' recruiting is undertaken on an annual basis when successful Voluntary Military Service (VMS) candidates - ±1 000 per year - are invited (recruited) to join the SA Army in the Short-Term Service. The leader group composition of the VMS intake for 1999 has been adjusted as follows:

GROUPS	PERCENTAGES
Africans	64% (previously ± 30%)
Whites	24% (previously ± 60%)
Coloureds	10% (previously also ± 10%)
Asians	0,75% (previously ± 0,01%)

This will result in sufficient African candidates being available to rectify the existing imbalance at junior management level. These percentages will be maintained in future.

On middle management level, the immediate action being taken is to identify fast trackers for promotion within the sergeant rank level - for promotion to staff sergeant and also direct appointment as officers (lieutenant/captain).

Figure 2: Representivity per Race: SA Army Lieutenant General to 2nd Lieutenant as at 31 May





Figure 3: Representivity per Race: SA Army Warrant Officer to Private as at 31 May 1998



The real challenge lies on senior management level (major to general). Majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels are not recruited from the street - they are promoted through the ranks, gaining vast experience during their careers. These imbalances can only be rectified in the medium to long term - eight years in the case of majors, and even as long as fifteen to twenty years in the case of brigadier-generals and generals.

The SA Army is on track to address these imbalances, as stipulated in the Constitution (equality in the Public Service and equal opportunities for all categories or groups of persons). However, the road to representivity cannot be travelled overnight, except if you are prepared to lower your standards and your operational preparedness significantly.

THE PART-TIME COMPONENT

White Paper on Defence

The Part-Time Component (PTC) of the SANDF is envisaged as an important component of the SA Army's capabilities in both the Constitution and the **White Paper on Defence**, particularly with regard to the ability to expand to a full wartime force. It is therefore incumbent upon the Army's planners to ensure that this capability is maintained. This imperative may be projected into various areas such as force design and structure, human resources management and the adequate funding of the PTC in order to maintain a viable core capability.

The realities of the transformation in South Africa have also resulted in a greater need for and a premium being placed on the capability to execute the Army's secondary roles adequately. The territorial PTC

units are playing an increasingly active and important role in support of the SA Police Service (SAPS) with regard to the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), particularly in the rural areas.

Within this environment and particularly as a result of the necessity to spend each rand cost-effectively, there are a number of challenges which need to be met if the PTC is to become and maintained as a viable component of the Army's force levels. It is also becoming clear that we need to recognise and acknowledge the differences between the conventional and territorial PTC units and that our approach, planning, strategies and procedures with regard to everything from operational doctrine to personnel administration may need to be revised and adjusted, taking their different roles, functions, demographics, history and military culture into account. The conventional and territorial PTC units are distinct entities within the one-force concept.

Staffing the Part-Time Component

The system of national service which was in place until 1993 ensured a regular flow of trained manpower to both the Full-Time and Part-Time Components. This source also ensured regular and sufficient feeding of the PTC, particularly the conventional units. A balanced mix of leader group and troops was also possible due to the large numbers available.


The Full-Time Component also recruited untrained members into the regional battalions and many of the supporting structures. At the time when the transformation process was initiated in 1994 and the integration of the different forces became a reality, the Full-Time Component was therefore already moving towards representative numbers of all population groups. The leader group, however, was still largely white, as was the flow of national servicemen to the PTC.

From 1994, however, the newly introduced system of Voluntary Military Service attracted large numbers of African applicants to undergo the twelve-month initial training period. This system was primarily designed to feed the PTC with trained human resources. However, the realities of budget constraints, due to the relatively small intakes, have resulted in a large proportion of these trained persons being recruited into the Full-Time Component, and this system has not therefore materialised as a source of recruitment for the PTC.

Although the number of volunteers in the PTC who have signed the new service commitment, have reached almost 53 000, many of the units, particularly the conventional units, are significantly understaffed. The territorial units, particularly the commando units, are in a much better position with regard to staffing levels and some units are almost at full strength, even though many are still understaffed in terms of their establishment tables. Progress has been made with representivity in the PTC, but the leader group remains essentially white.

In the current financial climate, the staffing of the PTC will remain a major challenge in the medium term. Budgetary constraints presently preclude a system of training human resources exclusively for the PTC, particularly for the conventional force, and these units will need to recruit from the pool of trained personnel on reserve, the former non-statutory forces and the former Full-Time Component source. As this strategy has not yet been tested as a viable means of providing human resources to the PTC, it will need to be thoroughly evaluated and revised if necessary. In the short to medium term, the conventional force units will need to focus their efforts on recruiting and maintaining a strong and effective leader group.

Figure 4: Total Recruited to VPTC per Race and Gender as at 20 May 1998



The territorial force, specifically the commando units, have been relatively successful in recruiting and training members locally and will need to continue this strategy in the medium term. A viable means of providing well-trained junior leaders to these units is a matter which must receive attention. Empowerment of people to move into these positions by means of accelerated training and career advancement is of prime importance.

PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT

In the past, the approach to training for both the Full-Time and Part-Time Components was not radically different and had a strong emphasis on functional (corps) training with the primary focus on force employment (operational) objectives. A strong emphasis on written evaluation and a broad training approach in order to qualify many people to the same standard, were the norms.

In the context of transformation and without sacrificing operational standards and requirements, the approach has shifted to a greater balance between individual development and force employment objectives. More emphasis is being placed on outcomes-based training to enhance individual competence. There is also a shift in focus to requirement-driven training aimed at qualifying specific members to occupy specific posts, a trend which will also necessitate a greater degree of effective individual career planning.

Specifically in terms of the PTC, the approach is to make as little intrusion as possible on the member's civilian career, while still maintaining standards. Methods to achieve this, such as distance education and computer-based training, are being investigated. Staff courses which take cognisance of the civilian qualifications of part-time members are also being considered.

While the current approach, as in the past, is more inclined to objective-driven training and a strong theoretical base with the achievement of set pass marks, the vision for the future is a shift towards the evaluation of performance, retraining/refreshers training and a competence-based approach with the practical demonstration of capability rather than theoretical excellence as the criterion, where practically feasible and desirable. In order to obtain employer support for the PTC, it will also be necessary to demonstrate clearly how leadership and management skills have been enhanced during training.

Training courses for both the Full-Time and Part-Time Components have tended to be protracted residential courses with the methodology based on labour-intensive practices and 'low tech' training aids.

The additional training requirements brought about by the transformation have seen a limited swing to the use of technological means to overcome the limitations, as well as the use of computers, simulators

and a measure of decentralisation in the presentation of formal training.

The SA Army envisions, within budgetary constraints, that continuous residential training will be replaced, wherever practically feasible, with distance education, pre-study material and a modular approach with self-paced learning to ensure success. Greater use of simulators and computers will also facilitate decentralisation and reduce costs. Plans are already in place to modularise PTC training courses and the guideline is that continuous or residential phases of training should not exceed two weeks. Several courses are already being presented on this basis.

Specifically with regard to the PTC, the Army has a major challenge in making training accessible, attainable, exciting and stimulating enough to attract volunteers to the Part-Time Force. The development of the capability, including the availability of equipment, to present training on a decentralised modular basis to Part-Time Force members will be a major contributor to the success of the voluntary system.

Competency Development (Assessment Centres)

The latest international trend, reflected in South Africa by the National Qualification Framework (NQF) and the **South African Qualification Authority Act (SAQA)**, is to focus specifically on the development of personnel competencies. Therefore, one of the new challenges facing any organisation today is the assurance of competence.

Competencies involve the individual's skill, knowledge and personal traits, and can be seen as those characteristics needed to perform or function effectively in a given environment. In order to optimise its own effectiveness, it is essential for an organisation to develop the competency potential of its personnel. To achieve this, the organisation must follow an holistic competency development programme. This programme must be based on the functional working environment, but may also entail the organisation's vision and mission to meet its transformation and the challenge to change. Competency profiles will therefore represent either the current job essentials, or prospective job objectives.

In order to identify and measure an individual's competency potential, assessment centres are the most effective method available. The SA Army is currently operating a Learning Centre to enable participants to gain insight into their present competency proficiencies, against international standards. It also empowers a person to create a development plan for the next higher level's performance requirements. By following this dynamic adult-learning approach, the individual is held responsible for his or her own development.

However, an organisation should ensure that development opportunities are available to improve capabilities and organisational performance, by employing formal and informal training courses and incentives for building an awareness of the self as a leader. An 'on-the-job' Plan, must be designed to provide individuals with the necessary exposure and experience, by using methods such as coaching, mentorship, role-modelling, etc. It is important that follow-up occurs through performance feedback, appraisals and re-assessments.

Learning Centre

The ideal for the future of the SA Army's Assessment Centre is to develop a centre of learning within the DoD. This centre will focus on the development of the individual, group and/or team, from the moment when the individual joins the Department, until s/he leaves it, making competency development a life-long and career-long learning experience. Just as it has to modernise and uphold its armament and material resources, if the SA Army is to function effectively in the new millennium, it must also focus and develop its human resources' competencies.

Civic Education Programme

The purpose of the civic education programme is to instill respect among members of the DoD for the values of a democratic South Africa through appropriate education and training. The programme is also

intended to make a significant contribution towards the building of cohesion, loyalty and discipline around a common set of values within the SANDF. The end result of civic education will be to enhance pride and confidence in the SANDF among military personnel and the public.

The relevant values for such a programme are mainly derived from the Constitution. These include respect for human rights, the rights and duties of soldiers, the rule of law, political non-partisanship, non-discrimination, and civil supremacy over the armed forces.

The programme has the following objectives:

- to ensure that the functioning of the Department is consistent with constitutional principles, democratic values and the law;
- to ensure that military personnel treat each other and members of the public with respect and dignity;
- to maintain and enhance military professionalism;
- to build public confidence and pride in the SANDF;
- to build patriotism, loyalty, unity, discipline, morale and combat-readiness within the SANDF; and
- to prepare the SANDF for service in respect of South Africa's international obligations.

In the light of these objectives, the civic education programme comprises five focus areas:

- the key features of democracy - the Constitution and the Bill of Rights;
- civil-military relations;
- international humanitarian law;
- respect for cultural diversity; and
- military professionalism.

The programme will extend to all members of the Department, but will necessarily be tailored according to appointment, rank and function.

Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) in the Army

Adult education has always been the orphan of education. Many adults did not have the opportunity to qualify themselves academically. Stakeholders have realised that there is vast potential in these people and that they must get the opportunity to develop their abilities. People in rural areas often had less opportunities to attend school due to distances from school. Stakeholders in the DoD realised that many of their people fall in this category and that something had to be done to address this problem. Many centres were established where workers could be trained. Throughout the country, people stated their willingness to attend school, because they realised that this would unlock many opportunities. Their self-respect increased because they were no longer dependent on other people to read and write for them; they could read instructions on forms and their duty sheets.

The most important asset of the DoD is its people who must be developed. Adult education broadens the frame of reference for uneducated people. The reasons why people want to become literate differ from person to person. Some want to read the Bible, others newspapers or instructions. As there are no curricula available, teachers have to be innovative and creative. The maximum can be obtained with the minimum. A culture of lifelong learning must be established, and experience must be used and developed.

It is of the utmost importance that people should develop themselves to make a positive contribution to the development of South Africa. It is the moral and social task of the Army to help these people to be

trained and developed.

SA Army Tertiary Institutions and Opportunities

The SA Army affords several members the opportunity to improve their educational qualifications (undertaking studies at tertiary institutions) annually. The field of study must be relevant to the member's career. The number of authorised applications depend on the budget available for tertiary studies. It will still be important in the future for members of the SA Army to be able to improve their educational qualifications through tertiary studies.

The Military Academy, which houses the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch, provides university education and military training to those young men and women who wish to serve as military professionals. The Military Academy is an investment in the education and training of our future military leaders and the SA Army must ensure that the opportunity is utilised by junior officers of the SA Army.

Opportunities are also available within the allocated budget for SA Army members to attend foreign courses. Where necessary, Army courses are adapted to ensure that international standards are maintained. Unfortunately, all the invitations cannot be accommodated within the budget and the SA Army must ensure that our future requirements are satisfied when sending members on foreign courses. The knowledge and skills acquired by Army members attending foreign training are utilised by the SA Army. Members of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) receive priority when the SA Army offers vacancies to foreign students on its courses.

CONCLUSION

The SA Army has not only identified the most important challenges within the human resources environment, but is also prepared to meet them.

We are confident that all the issues will be resolved to ensure the finalisation of the integration process, rationalisation to an affordable force, the enhancement of representivity, staffing the Part-Time Component and developing our most important resource, the people within the Army.

ENDNOTE

* At the time of this conference, General Matanzima was the Chief of Army Staff designate. He has subsequently been appointed as Chief Director Force Support.

A New Concept of Logistic Support

Brig Gen Thys Snyman, Acting Chief of Army Staff Logistics

INTRODUCTION

The SA Army's logistical support system is responsible for the landward support of forces of the SANDF. The transformation of the logistical system of the SANDF will obviously have an influence on the way in which the SA Army will support the landward forces in future, since it is within this restructured logistical system that the SA Army will provide logistical support to landward forces. The SA Army is to maintain military expertise within the first and second line support areas, i.e., operational logistics including peacekeeping operations.

The aim of this paper is to present a future vision of the SA Army's logistical support system, within the overall framework of the total logistical system of the SANDF.

The driving force behind military logistics all over the world is to ensure that the correct commodities in sufficient quantities reach the soldier in the field at the desired time and in a serviceable condition, in the

most cost-effective manner. Due to decreasing defence budgets, the emphasis is on cost-effectiveness. In order to describe logistical support in the SA Army in the future, with cost-effectiveness being a primary concern, it is necessary to consider the following aspects:

- distribution;
- inventory management;
- outsourcing;
- management information; and
- life cycle management.

DISTRIBUTION

In future, the distribution system for the flow of materiel in the SANDF distribution chain will change rapidly. The SA Army's main responsibility in the distribution chain will be to ensure that distribution of logistic requirements at operational level is cost-effective. The first line is stores and equipment required for immediate use, and the second line is the stores and equipment readily available for replenishment of the first line.

The SA Army remains responsible for the development of systems to ensure cost-effective operational support. In the past, logistical support in the field was done by maintaining reserves on wheels. This refers to the large B echelons (vehicles used for replenishment of first line) which resulted in the large B vehicle (SAMIL) fleet now in the SANDF, which has never been fully utilised, and which will become redundant and obsolete in the near future. Its replacement is one of the major cost factors which will have to be addressed in future to ensure cost-effectiveness.

To enhance mobility, maintain the necessary reserves, yet remain cost-effective, the SA Army will move to a cargo drop distribution system. The cargo drop distribution system entails the transporting of detachable cargo containers by means of B vehicles which will drastically reduce the number of vehicles required, yet maintain the ability to maintain and support a high flow of materiel.

This concept of mobile operational reserves, and the investigation for the replacement of the SAMIL fleet, are part of an investigation into a new distribution system.

Modern weapon systems require large volumes of ammunition, and to ensure that the flow of materiel is not restricted at the end of the distribution chain due to handling problems, the mechanical handling of materiel needs to be investigated. The requirements for the logistic support of the artillery G6 system are being addressed, but modern technology will have to be implemented elsewhere. The current use of manual labour and forklifts in the combat zone, for example, will have to be improved, since it hampers the rapid flow of materiel in the distribution chain. We are also likely to see the increased utilisation of civilians in the distribution chain. These civilians will be used in the transportation area, as well as in the other logistic services.

MANAGEMENT OF INVENTORIES

The inventory of the SA Army is too large. Surplus main equipment will have to be disposed of, thereby reducing the size and number of depots and vehicle reserve park. The logistic costs to keep equipment already disposed of in depots, are high. Quicker methods to obtain authority and then to dispose of surplus/redundant equipment will have to be found, and the present turnaround time of about three years for major weapon systems will have to be reduced.

Once the inventories have been reduced, the goal should be to work on the 'just-in-time' principle, not the 'just-in-case' principle. The just-in-time principle entails the supply and delivery of stores in time for immediate consumption/utilisation by the user. To achieve this, we will have to improve our procurement and distribution system and support decision-making processes with excellent management information.

The lead-time for procurement at present requires larger than necessary buffer stock. Innovative means

to overcome the large buffer stock will have to be found between the Department of Defence and the private sector. The use of electronic data interchanges between suppliers and the military procurement departments must be investigated.

Electronic data interchange is fast becoming an integral part of electronic commerce. This refers to the computer-to-computer exchange of machine-processable business documents. It covers traditional applications like planning, purchasing, pricing, tenders, contracts, scheduling, shipping and receiving, invoicing and payment processes.

The use of this technology will reduce the lead-time for delivery of materiel, and also improve the payment of suppliers. The means are available, but must be utilised to our benefit.

The United States' Department of Defense will have all contracting for major weapons systems, including contractor selection, contract writing and administration, and payment and accounting, performed electronically by 1 January 2000. By the same year, ninety per cent of purchases under US \$2 500 (R12 000) will be made through the international merchant purchase authorisation card - a type of commercial credit card that allows the DoD to buy goods and services directly from suppliers rather than having to work through procurement offices.

If these systems are to be implemented in the financial year 2000 in the US, arguably the most productive and sophisticated economy in the world today, what must we do to implement similar systems in order to achieve our goal of lower inventories, but maintaining high service levels? Arriving at effective solutions will be a joint challenge to both the private and public sectors. Without introducing improved business practices, we will most likely not achieve the aim of being more cost-effective.

OUTSOURCING

Outsourcing has been identified as an area in which large cost-savings can be achieved. The concept of outsourcing is not new in the SA Army. Outsourcing of the following three services is already part of our logistical support system.

Vehicle Fleet Support

At present, private companies are providing manpower support, operating alongside our military technical support personnel, in military facilities, assisting with the repair and maintenance of all A vehicles, and B vehicles in certain units and bases.

This is an area in which greater private sector involvement must and can be achieved. The SA Army is planning to create centres of excellence at dedicated bases around the country to technically support the type formations. These centres will be staffed by a combination of military and private sector personnel supporting the SA Army, for example, the concentration of artillery technical support personnel of the SA Army and the private sector at Potchefstroom. One will find this support at both the anti-aircraft and armour type formations as well.

The technical support for weapon systems during operations will be obtained from these dedicated maintenance centres. The use of civilians in support functions in the operational areas is not entirely new, and the Part-Time Component of the SA Army will have a larger role to play in this area. The civilian members can have a dual role: when required to perform a service in the operational area, they are recruited and serve as Part-Time Component members. In this way, their expertise will not be lost and they can be utilised in their specialist roles to the benefit of the SA Army, the private sector and the individual.

This concept has already been experimented with in the maintenance area, and can be broadened to include such services as catering, base maintenance, etc.

Catering Services

Due to the shortage of military personnel, the SA Army was forced to outsource this service and, at present, about fifteen messes have been privatised. This is an area in which much creative thinking can widen the scope, not only to privatise messes (meals), but the privatisation of the total facility to provide a service similar to that of a hotel, catering for all requirements.

Transportation

The transportation by road of personnel and freight is already outsourced and has a proven record of being cost-effective. Further privatisation of transport functions, such as fuel and vehicle hire, can lead to substantive savings.

Summary on Outsourcing

With our increasing experience of outsourcing, it will be possible to look at all the logistical services not yet outsourced, and plan for their outsourcing.

The use of civilians in the logistic support system may be particularly at stake if underfunding of the force structure continues. It is likely that, when faced with the dilemma of trying to maintain one force level structure while being funded at a lower level, the choice will be made to retain a higher 'tooth-to-tail' ratio. This means that the choice will be to retain combat units at the expense of logistical support units. The result will be a greater reliance on civilian contractors to provide logistics on a surge basis during times of crisis, rather than maintaining this built-in capability for utilisation in a time of crisis, at a cost.

There are a few points, however, that will have to be considered:

- We will have to remain a knowledgeable and responsible client and not outsource our ability to plan and control the function or service.
- The cost of outsourcing will have to be at an acceptable level. One of the reasons why the SA Army has probably not outsourced more than it has already done, is because the direct costs are too high and could not be covered by the present budget limitations.
- The SA Army's operational requirements for logistic services must be guaranteed. We cannot allow industrial unrest, operational risks and other limitations to have an impact on our ability to provide logistical support. To overcome the human resource challenges related to outsourcing, the Part-Time Component will have a large role to play during operational support.

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

To effect all the changes in the logistical environment, and still remain cost-effective and efficient, will require careful planning and decision-making based on sound management information.

The requirement will be for an integrated logistic management information system, supporting the SANDF. There is much debate presently regarding the future system. Must a new system be developed, can a commercial 'off-the-shelf' programme be bought and adapted to military requirements, or must we look at the utilisation of existing systems?

The SA Army has developed an integrated logistic management information system (CALMIS) and has been implementing this system since 1994. The system has resulted in improved serviceability of main equipment and improved productivity at unit level. The SA Army is on its way to achieve cost reduction through inventory savings with this system.

The advantage of CALMIS is that it is a modern, totally integrated system which is flexible enough to be adapted as technology changes. It also covers the total spectrum of transactional processes at unit level which the other systems are not capable of.

The disadvantage of this system is that it was developed for the SA Army, while the SA Air Force developed a parallel system (SLIS) for the management of its weapon systems.

The alignment of the new logistic business practices must first be investigated, enabling the present systems to be measured against the business practices to determine the fit and to ensure that the new system is capable of meeting the future demands. Interfaces to the other functional systems, (personnel, finances, operations) must also be ensured so that a totally integrated DoD system will exist, with the SA Army being a client of this system.

The challenge for the future will be to utilise the existing building blocks to satisfy the future requirements for a logistic management information system. It has been proven in the rest of the world that commercial 'off-the-shelf' systems do not satisfy the needs of the military for an integrated logistic management information system, and to adapt such a system or develop a new system to satisfy military requirements would be very expensive.

LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

It is the SA Army's responsibility to manage the unique army/ landward weapon systems throughout their life cycle. It is also a fact that these systems are very complex, requiring highly skilled product system managers.

The SA Army's human resources do not provide for engineers. It is also the only arm of service which does not have its own engineers. Both the Air Force and the Navy have uniformed engineers.

To overcome this problem, and still remain a knowledgeable client to direct and give the necessary inputs to the industry, the necessary human resources will have to be insourced, either from within the DoD, e.g. ARMSCOR, or from the private sector. In the latter option, care must be taken as a conflict of interest could cause the life cycle costs of systems to increase rather than decrease, thus defeating the aim of the exercise.

CONCLUSION

Total quality management - the continuous aspiration to improve quality by examining the way in which work is done in a systematic, integrated, consistent organisation-wide perspective - must become the management philosophy of the logistician. This is not only applicable to the SA Army, but to the SANDF as a whole. Logistics experts in the SANDF must continually remain abreast of the developments in the private sector, other armies and the world at large. We have been able to do this in the past, but the future will place more demands on us as our resources become limited and the demand for our services increase. As can be seen from this paper, there are still many challenges to be tackled and answers to be found for the issues raised. In the SA Army, we are aware of these issues, and the answers lie in co-operation with Chief of Logistics and the private sector. It will be an ongoing process to find the best solutions.

The SA Army's Strategic Intent

*Maj Gen Gilbert Ramano, Chief of the SA Army designate**

INTRODUCTION

The official military dictionary of the Defence Force lists definitions for everything strategic, from strategic advantage to strategic withdrawal, and a whole host of strategic endeavours in between. No 'strategic intent', however. The dictionary does define 'strategic' as "*higher level management considerations concerned with the broad, open and more global state of affairs in the organisation and the implications thereof, usually on a long-term basis, for the effective functioning of the organisation*

and to attain over-all objectives." It defines 'intent' as "... *relating to action that will be carried out provided no prohibition is received.*" This address will touch upon both elements.

Firstly, what I have to say is broad, it concerns the SA Army as a whole, and it looks to the future. Secondly, it is in line with governmental, departmental and Chief of the National Defence Force requirements, therefore not likely to be prohibited, and it stresses action and the imperative to carry it out.

The papers in this monograph build upon each other, culminating in this brief glimpse of where I would like to see the SA Army in the medium to long term. The Army is in a state of transformation. Inevitably, transformation implies change, and generally change is resisted. Woodrow Wilson said that, "*if you want to make enemies, try to change something.*" This resistance has manifested itself in many ways over the past few years, from attitudes reported by the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in their report currently under review, to the commemoration of events such as Cassinga.

My task is to ensure that every member of the Army understands the need for transformation, embraces it and strives enthusiastically to achieve it. The Army must transform, not because it cannot fight and win battles - even in its 'untransformed' state, it is still the best Army in Africa. But it has to keep pace with international, regional and social demands and trends. The Deputy Minister referred to underhand activities as Machiavellian in his recent speech to Parliament during the Budget Debate. However, Machiavelli - who has become a metaphor for all things sly - also spoke eloquently when he said, "*whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.*" I echo his words by saying that the SA Army most definitely desires constant success and therefore we are willing, able and prepared to change with the times.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Perhaps the single most important ingredient of change is to know what we are changing to and where we want to be in the medium to long term. Current wisdom seems to favour the formulation of a 'vision' and a 'mission'. We are still busy with this key step and I therefore cannot present a clearly defined 'vision'. However, I can take a few moments to briefly touch on where I would like to see the Army in three to five years from now. These thoughts, and others of course, will guide us when formulating our new 'vision'.

Let me phrase my thoughts as statements of fact. Please indulge me by imagining a somewhat older, somewhat greyer, Gilbert Ramano reading the part of his retirement speech where he conveys the state of the SA Army at that time:

- The SA Army has restructured successfully to achieve the relevant goals of the **White Paper on Defence**, the Defence Review, the requirements of the Department of Defence, the orders of the Chief of the National Defence Force, and the needs of the Chief of Joint Operations.
- The SA Army has rationalised its excess personnel in a way that has maintained morale, essential skills and experience while satisfying political and social expectations with respect to representivity.
- The SA Army reflects the demographic realities of South Africa on all levels of the hierarchy, and the incumbents in all posts are properly empowered through training and education to meet the demands of their tasks.
- The Part-Time Forces have been rejuvenated and now represent all population groups. Territorial Part-Time Force units are to be found throughout South Africa, serving their own communities. Conventional Part-Time Force units are adequately stocked with personnel according to war establishment tables, are effectively trained, and are enthusiastic to reclaim their rightful place as the most critical element of our combat forces.

- Racism is a concept that we smugly refer to as 'that which happens outside the SA Army'.
- The SA Army is disciplined to the point that commendations exceed courts martial and there will never be sufficient funds for merit bonuses. A proud public sees the Army as an effective, professional fighting force which embodies all that is good in our society.
- The SA Army has overcome problems of obsolete and unserviceable equipment and logistic support has been restructured to meet the needs of any military scenario. Main equipment has been replaced and all forms of wastage have been eradicated.
- All personnel are properly trained to carry out their core functions as well as those secondary tasks which may be given from time to time. 'Service unique' training is of the highest order and forces provided to the Chief of Joint Training, and subsequently to the Chief of Joint Operations, are capable of being integrated into highly effective joint combat forces.

Wishful thinking, you may say ... But General Colin Powell states that "*perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.*" I am very optimistic, and in the absence of budget funds, what we really need right now is a force multiplier. I am convinced that the future statements of fact regarding the condition of the Army in the medium to long term are attainable given the right resources and, more importantly, the right attitude of every member of the Army. Both General Meiring in his retirement speech of 29 May, and General Nyanda in his subsequent inaugural speech, mentioned the need for funding and replacement of equipment. The Army is at the mercy of political will regarding this kind of resource. We will have to find ways to better utilise, care for and distribute our material resources so that, in the absence of adequate funding, we still achieve the goals set. We are, however, in a much better position regarding human resources and the challenge will be to manage these correctly. Given that we succeed in managing both of these resources efficiently, I cannot see why we will not achieve our 'vision'.

Allow me to revisit the words of the previous papers. Each touched on a subject essential to the achievement of our 'vision' and it is necessary to dwell shortly on each in order to see the mission of the Army holistically.

OPERATIONS

Lieutenant General James Gavin said, at the time of the Korean War, that "*organisations created to fight the last war better, are not going to win the next.*" Some might say that the concept of independent arms of service, preparing and employing their own forces, served South Africa well in the past. Others might disagree. The point is that reality now clearly dictates that this concept is ill-suited to current and possibly future funding levels and it is not in line with projected tasks of the Defence Force. Minister Modise summed it up in the words conveyed by Brigadier General Bestbier: "*the concept of 'jointness' will be the single most important characteristic of our new way of doing things.*"

The SA Army fully endorses this statement and, in fact, is currently busy defining our role within this concept. I understand that it is not possible at this stage to assess all future possibilities and scenarios and that, while most landward tasks appear obvious or straight-forward at this time, the circumstances in which the Army will be used in future may change. It is therefore imperative that our force structure or size and shape be inherently flexible, as well as the training of our human resources.

Our core business - as an old soldier this term makes me nervous, I far rather prefer the old form 'our mission' - is to provide suitably prepared landward combat forces for utilisation by the Chief of Joint Operations. I remain responsible, in the words of Brigadier General Bestbier, for the fighting effectiveness, efficiency and morale of my service. I look forward to the challenge and I know that the Army has the inherent capability and will to succeed.

While it is justified, in fact essential, that we utilise scarce resources to train for all eventualities, including complicated new concepts such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and while we have a

commitment to provide forces on a daily basis for fixed tasks such as border control, I am concerned that we are expending too much effort and resources on secondary tasks. The most expensive of these secondary tasks, and the one which just never seems to go away, is support to the police service. Whereas I understand the urgent need to establish or rather, regain law and order in our society, this is not our mission and it is my intention to seek ways to move away from this resource-draining task. Of course, the Army cannot do this unilaterally, but I will seek support via the chain of command.

Brigadier General Bestbier has termed the units and formations required to wage successful military operations, the tools which must be provided by the arms of service. It is my intention to provide the best tools in the box. I realise that the material requirements of the Army may not be satisfied for some time to come and that we will have to concentrate initially on honing our human resources tools. I take heart at the words of two old soldiers. Marshall Andrews said that "*machines do not fight; men do*", and these words are echoed by Dwight D Eisenhower who remarked that "*dollars and guns are no substitutes for brains and willpower*." The Army will continue to prepare its human resources for joint operations as a priority, while concurrently planning to marry personnel and new equipment as it is provided.

PLANNING FOR TRANSFORMATION

Change programmes are usually less than successful when executives fail to enlist employee support. Allow me to translate: change programmes inevitably fail when commanders neglect to enlist the support of soldiers. Franklin D. Roosevelt said that "*new ideas can be good and bad, just the same as the old ones*." This is a very simple truth and the degree to which we heed it will have far-reaching effects on our success - or lack of it. We have taken note of the theoretical model for transformation which is now to be put into practice. The command structure of the Army is fully aware of what has to be done and why. Brigadier General Venter has stressed that this migration from where we are, to where we have to be, must be completed in as short a timeframe as possible. He has spelled out the desired result of transformation, and all are in agreement ... Or are we?

Our success in this endeavour will depend on how successfully we carry over the transformation message to the officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers involved. To get back to President Roosevelt: we will have to convince the personnel of the Army that our 'new ideas' are good and that not all the 'old ideas' are bad. It will be disastrous for the morale and functioning of the Army to convey the idea that all soldiers, from whichever constituent force, belong to an inherently malfunctioning organisation. This is not true and there are innumerable aspects of the current Army which will be kept, nurtured and utilised on our 'migration'. On the other hand, we must identify those aspects which restrict change and development, and we must root them out as a matter of urgency.

It is my responsibility to convince all Army personnel that we are changing for the better. A German proverb states that, "*to change, and to change for the better, are two different things*." Many will say that I am constantly referring to former South African Defence Force (SADF) members when I mention resistance to change. This is incorrect. We not only have to convince former SADF and TBVC members that we are changing for the better, but we also have to ensure that sceptics among former non-statutory force members understand that the envisaged change is real and will benefit all soldiers. These sceptics are as much an obstacle to change as those that resist. If these groups withhold support, the methodology outlined by Brigadier General Venter cannot succeed.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Major General Matanzima's paper undoubtedly has to deal with the most contentious subject of the conference. A discussion on human resources issues in these times usually includes words and phrases such as 'retrenchment', 'redeployment', 'change', 'work harder', 'achieve more with less', 'discipline' and the like. A discussion of this nature seldom includes phrases such as 'salary increase', 'improvement of living conditions', etc. It is for this simple reason that soldiers are distrustful of any general who attempts to address the issue. While I sympathise with him, it is essential that we meet this challenge head-on. Human resources transformation, preparation and effective utilisation are the most important tasks of the Army in these times.

Five essential human resources issues face us, namely integration, rationalisation, representivity, part-time forces and competency. I will address each of these briefly.

Integration, as an element of the complete transformation of the Army, is a factor which now, more than ever, requires finalisation. Perhaps it was wishful thinking, or perhaps poor insight, but when we stood at Wallmansthal in 1994, we genuinely believed that integration would be completed if not in that year, at least by the end of the next.

We now stand halfway through 1998 and once again are about to receive an intake of former non-statutory force members at the assembly area.

This does not even signal an end to integration. At best, if all those who report are appointed as privates, the process will take another year of bridging training. At worst, a colonel or two among them, could retard our progress for as long as four years.

It is not only the public and Parliament who want to see integration come to an end. The Army cannot complete its transformation objectives while intakes and bridging training continue. A member cannot be fairly rationalised until s/he has had the opportunity to be trained and work in an environment where assessment can be done. Never-ending intakes and bridging training effectively imply that either a person is rationalised unfairly, or becomes exempt from rationalisation at the expense of others. General Matanzima mentioned the values identified for rationalisation. The Army cannot achieve these while integration is still under way.

Integration also brings with it inherent distrust and suspicion. General Nyanda raised these issues during his inaugural speech of 29 May. Deputy Minister Kasrils touched on the matter during the Budget Debate. South Africa could have chosen an integration model such as Ethiopia where the former government's armed forces were simply disbanded and the victorious opposition forces took over. We could have elected to go the route taken by Germany where the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic were effectively absorbed into those of West Germany. We decided, however, to integrate all seven constituent forces on an equal footing, no single component being subservient to another. We decided to do this in a spirit of national reconciliation, to utilise skills and strengths of the former statutory forces while recognising that the former non-statutory forces brought their own unique skills and abilities to the table. We decided to ensure that the new Defence Force recognised the cultural and ethnic diversity of South Africa, while maintaining stability and harmony during the difficult period of transformation.

When I say 'we', who do I include? I am sure that most, if not all, of the generals in the Army understand the concept of integration and identify with it. It is patently clear, however, that this sentiment is not as universally accepted as the ranks descend. It is my responsibility, indeed my quest, to ensure that this situation changes. To paraphrase General Matanzima, "*our challenge lies in how we are going to synthesise the differing characteristics of the seven former constituent forces to achieve a new Army with its own unique culture, a sense of belonging and where all are loyal to a common cause.*" I echo the words of the Chief of the National Defence Force when I say that I will not tolerate wilful disruption and sabotage of the integration process.

I have already touched on rationalisation. Allow me to add a few points. While the Army recognises that the most expedient method to achieve acceptable force levels is through natural attrition, we fully understand that this alone will not achieve the desired result within given time restraints. The numbers leaving through retirement and ill-health are just too few. As far as voluntary severance is concerned, the nature of many of those leaving is detrimental to the continued effective functioning of the Army. Voluntary severance, to a large extent, has reduced numbers of highly capable officers and other senior ranks. These were the people whose personal qualities ensured them of employment outside the Army. Many others, whose poor personal qualities deny them favourable employment outside, have elected to stay. I generalise of course, and by no means imply that those who left were all good while those who stayed are all bad, but I do imply that there were many who left whom we would have liked to stay,

while others have stayed whom we would dearly have wanted to leave.

It appears therefore that retrenchment is an inevitable option. The Minister, Deputy Minister and the Chief of the National Defence Force have all made recent statements about the imperative of representivity on all levels. Herein lies the dilemma facing the Army. The Defence Review has set the percentages of the former forces to remain in the Army after rationalisation. On the other hand, statistics given by another speaker show current former force and racial percentages in the various rank levels. Simple arithmetic demonstrates clearly that, while there are too many Africans and too few whites in the Army, there are currently too many whites in senior ranks and too few Africans. One does not need to be a mathematical wizard to realise that there is no way to achieve desired levels of representivity without alienating large numbers of people. Either Africans are going to feel short-changed or whites are. One could argue that, in time, the pendulum would naturally reach equilibrium. Unfortunately, we do not have such time available, and so much innovative thought is going to be required which must be supported by a sincere and programmed communications plan. I have used the examples of Africans and whites as these are the main groups involved. I do not negate the fears and aspirations of the other ethnic groups at all. They have as much at stake.

Whether individuals like it or not, the achievement of representivity on all rank levels is not only an Army imperative, it mirrors government policy. General Nyanda addressed this issue in forceful terms on 29 May. He stated clearly, however, that the achievement of representivity must not take place at the expense of other race groups and all efforts must be made to ensure that every member of the Army feels that s/he has a place to occupy and a part to play. He stressed that, once equity has been obtained, further advancement of individuals will depend on merit only. The Army identifies fully with these sentiments. Of course, this is easier said than done, and we will have to convince all involved that the staff work currently being undertaken is for the good of the Army and, consequently, for the country. It is inevitable that personnel involved with rationalisation will fear that the very policies and procedures which they are helping to formulate, may in time be used to rationalise them. People do not give their best under these circumstances and to them it is akin to having the condemned prisoner erect his or her own scaffold. We will have to manage this very carefully.

Major General Matanzima discussed the requirement for the development of the Part-Time Forces at length. This urgent need cannot be overemphasised. While we have made considerable progress with the staffing of the Territorial Part-Time Forces, and I might add, in a representative manner, the same cannot be said for the Conventional Part-Time Forces. We are in serious danger of losing expertise and skills in these forces, especially on senior level, and whereas the voluntary military service system was initially designed to fill this gap, it has not been largely successful. We also have to ensure that, within budgetary restraints, we continue to utilise these forces on a regular basis, even if only to provide continuous training. The Part-Time Forces are often the direct link between the public at large and the Army. Our success at rejuvenating this essential element of our force structure will not only provide adequate, properly prepared combat elements for the Chief of Joint Operations to employ, but also enhance the public image, acceptability and credibility of the Army among the general population. The Part-Time Forces are at the very centre of the core business of the Army and may not be neglected.

Moving on to the last section of the human resources discussion - the section involving assessment centres, civic education and adult basic education - I would be amiss not to endorse all efforts to educate, develop and mould all members not only into efficient, competent soldiers, but also into model citizens. Sometimes one embarks on a project which appears innovative and new, but then a little research shows that there really is little which is truly new. Chapter one of the **British Field Service Regulations**, dated 1909, opens with the words: "*Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Skill cannot compensate for want of courage, energy, and determination; but even high moral qualities may not avail without careful preparation and skilful direction. The development of the necessary moral qualities is therefore the first of the objects to be attained; the next are organisation and discipline which enable those qualities to be controlled and used when required.*"

On this note I wish to make it clear that the SA Army will enthusiastically and energetically execute the civic education programme of the Department of Defence. This programme - coupled with the emphasis

on ethics, loyalty and discipline which must permeate through all training - is aimed at establishing a culture of service, of national pride and through these, also pride in the Army. Ill-discipline is a manifestation of a lack of pride, whether it be lack of pride in the self, the unit, or in the Army. Recent events have highlighted the great danger of breaches in discipline and it is my firm intention to act swiftly and harshly when ill-discipline puts the reputation and efficiency of the Army at risk. Where ill-discipline puts national security at risk, the danger is even greater and acts such as these will not be tolerated.

The South African Army, like any other, can only function when all soldiers execute their duty efficiently and effectively. Our culture assigns responsibilities and accountability on various levels to all members and I intend to hold each and every man and woman to this. Accountability begins at the top and I, the generals under my command and everyone lower down the hierarchy, must realise what a great responsibility has been laid on us. Acts of ill-discipline, corruption, self-enrichment, negligence and recklessness will be firmly dealt with, irrespective of who is involved.

LOGISTICS

In terms of logistics, Brigadier General Snyman explained the concepts 'just-in-time' *versus* 'just-in-case'. These simple words go a long way to set the scene for a logistical transformation which is not only long overdue, but is also essential in today's financial climate. South Africa simply cannot afford 'just-in-case' anymore. If we want to achieve the right balance between personnel, capital and operating expenditure, the Army has to look towards reducing inventories, simplifying support systems and closing duplicate facilities. One does not even have to enter logistical bases or even unit stores. A simple helicopter flight over 4 Vehicle Reserve Park, any mobilisation depot and even Army auction centres will demonstrate that we not only have too much equipment, but also decaying equipment that cannot possibly be maintained cost-effectively.

'Just-in-time' has inherent risks, however, and we will have to manage this transformation very carefully. The temptation to overdo the exercise exists, and we must take care not to let our enthusiasm run away with us. A situation must never be allowed to develop where the Army finds itself committed to provide forces which cannot be maintained through lack of skills, dedicated personnel or material. The costs associated with outsourcing must be carefully evaluated and if our own capabilities prove cheaper, then we should retain them. However, one must remember that cost not only applies to the purchasing of supplies and material, but also to personnel. It may be cheaper in terms of direct price of rations to cook our own food while in base camps, but the personnel costs associated make it less feasible. On the other hand, the effects of outsourcing certain electronic repairs may prove more expensive when a deployed force cannot operate due to labour unrest, the refusal of civilian workers to operate in or near operational areas, or loss of expertise in the private sector.

The Army is committed to implement the new logistical concept in the shortest possible time.

TRAINING

The previous paper by Brigadier General Wessels, clearly explained the 'as is' force preparation situation *versus* the 'to be' scenario. Not only is 'as is' too expensive, it cannot effectively support a joint operations strategy as envisaged. Obviously, the implementation of the 'to be' force preparation strategy requires detailed and copious planning and co-ordination, and cannot be fully implemented overnight. The Army will therefore continue with elements of the proposed joint training function, relinquishing specific aspects as they come online within the joint scenario.

Although employment of forces rests outside the Army, it remains essential that the force employment strategy guide the preparation of forces on arm of service level, even if this eventually will only involve 'service unique' training. 'Service unique' training remains essential to maintain an effective core defence capability, and this is true not only for Full-Time Force soldiers, but even more so for Part-Time Force personnel. The Army looks forward to the finalisation of planning and co-ordination for joint and common force preparation. This will set the scene for effective 'service unique' training and thereby

ensure that the product provided for force employment is adequately prepared. Of all 'service unique' training, the preparation of the individual soldier is probably the most important. Lieutenant General Arthur Collins, US Army, writes that, "*individual training is the foundation on which unit effectiveness is built. It is the source of a soldier's confidence and trust in the army.*" We will be concentrating on getting back to basics in order to ensure that this trust and confidence are developed. I must stress, however, that the SA Army remains an army and carries its uniqueness into the new dispensation. I sincerely hope that no one is going to attempt to get us to drill like the Navy!

CONCLUSION

I have briefly dwelled on each of the papers. This is not because I consider them inadequate to convey the subjects under discussion, but rather to endorse them and thereby commit myself and the South African Army to cost-effectively, speedily and enthusiastically achieve the various objectives and policies outlined by the previous speakers.

There are, however, a few aspects of particular concern to me. The first involves the matter of leadership. Frank Waldrop writes in a treatise on the nature of generals that "*the modern general must know many things. He must be a mathematician. He must have good grasp of physics ... He must beware of the law. It is no longer permitted that the battle chieftain is a law unto himself. He is just a servant of the law, which is the weapon of the civilians in government. His duty is not the making of governmental policy but the enforcement of it. He is not authorised to declare war. He is ordered to win it.*" This essay was written in 1943. Obviously, there were no female generals as he writes only about men. Let us forgive him this and at the same time accept that his words apply now to all leaders: officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

The SA Army must inculcate in its leaders that they have a duty to serve the nation and not to snipe at government policy. They have a duty to educate themselves continuously, while their subordinates look to them for leadership, direction and most importantly, example. The Army is not a commercial enterprise, it is not a social club, it is not simply another government department. It is an institution in which honour, integrity, duty, loyalty, courage and selflessness are the cornerstones of its existence. Whereas moral values may not play such an important role in other pursuits, the military leader who exhibits an immoral lifestyle will lose the respect and loyalty of his or her subordinates. The Army is therefore justified in taking a keen interest in the so-called after-hours activities of its leaders. It is interested in how they manage their personal finances. It is concerned with the image which a military leader reflects in public, even when out of uniform. These things have direct consequences on the effectiveness of the Army as a combat force, and indiscretions will not be tolerated.

Besides the moral aspects of military leadership, I am concerned that our leaders do not read about and study their craft beyond that which is laid down during military training courses. This also applies to subjects of a general knowledge nature. I am convinced that to achieve success and to attain those future statements of fact which I mentioned at the start of my address, we will have to encourage the personal development of each and every leader. Professionalism implies a constant striving for knowledge within one's chosen endeavour.

Secondly, the soldier must actively work towards a state or condition where s/he is not only fully accepted by the general population as a necessary and welcome servant of the people, but will also be viewed with respect as a highly-trained, disciplined and efficient protector. It is no accident that one finds military leaders being elected to school governing bodies, church councils and the like. This situation results from the qualities which we should look for and engender in our military leaders. Private community service should be encouraged, of course as long as it remains apolitical.

The transforming South African Army has and will continue to earn the respect and admiration of the people of this country.

The new formal 'vision' of the SA Army still has to be formulated. However, I foresee that those future statements of fact I catalogued earlier will form the basis of that 'vision' and that it will be attained. The

'strategic intent' of the Army includes both 'what' is to be achieved and 'how'. The 'what' includes the ability to provide adequately prepared, combat-ready forces, in time, correctly equipped and supported as required by the Chief of Joint Operations. The organisational structures will be functional, affordable and flexible in order to achieve any operational tasks issued.

The 'how' includes an holistic human resources strategy capable of providing the right personnel, in representative numbers, well-trained and educated, who are loyal, disciplined, eager to achieve and who are provided with professional leaders on all levels. The human resources strategy will be supported by a new, sophisticated, but cost-effective logistic system, a streamlined 'service unique' training programme and education in civic responsibilities.

The environment in which the 'what' and 'how' is to be achieved, will be transformed to meet the social and political demands of the time and most importantly, it will take cognisance of the pressing financial situation both now and in the future. The South African Army will achieve its mission cost-effectively and responsibly. We embrace change and identify fully with it. In fact, the first words one reads on entering Army Headquarters is a sign proclaiming: A New Army for a New Challenge. It is perhaps significant, in the light of our stated defensive posture, that I end an address on the 'strategic intent' of the Army by quoting one of the most respected pacifists of all time, Mahatma Gandhi: "*We must become the change we want to see.*" We are becoming it.

ENDNOTE

* General Ramano has subsequently been promoted to Lieutenant General, Chief of the SA Army.