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Introduction

During March 1997, an ISS Paper1 which suggested how the political and security dimension of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) might be structured, advocated an integrated approach to economic and security co-operation in Southern Africa. A model was proposed with one SADC summit at the apex, but with organisationally divergent structures below this level. Over the past year, however, regional security dynamics, and indeed, the tone of the regional security debate, have shifted to such an extent that there is a need for a reappraisal of this approach.

Last year bore witness to a number of events and processes which should sound a very clear wake up call for those concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Southern and Central African regions. The most dramatic of these was undoubtedly the eight-month military campaign to oust long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Zaire by Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL). As the vanguard of his victorious army entered Kinshasa on 17 May, Laurent Kabila proclaimed himself President of

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1. The paper cited here is no longer available for reference.
the new Democratic Republic of Congo. Although this take-over was widely welcomed by the African and international communities, it fundamentally changed the balance of power in the Central and Southern African regions, and (as yet largely unpredicted) repercussions will be felt in the region for years to come.

Congo `Kinshasa' had barely been declared a Democratic Republic, when the civil war in the neighbouring Congo Republic threatened to engulf several more African nations in a regional conflict. The war started as a rebellion against the Congo Republic's president, Pascal Lissouba (once a Mobutu ally), when he ordered the pre-election disarmament of the militia forces of former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso. Congo Republic soon became a battlefield on which Angolan antagonists, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and various mercenary forces were all involved. With UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan still pleading with the Security Council to prepare to send a peacekeeping force, Brazzaville fell to the forces of General (now self-proclaimed President) Denis Sassou-Nguesso on 15 October 1997.

To the south, after involvement on the side of the victors in the wars for both Congos, the Angolan government began threatening military action against the beleaguered UNITA. Aside from the loss of key allies and rear bases, UNITA, which reportedly still has about 35 000 men under arms in violation of the 1994 Lusaka peace accords, also faced tough sanctions from the UN Security Council for non-compliance. However, there is no telling what a cornered UNITA will do, and prospects for sustaining the Angolan peace process look grim.

North of the Congos, in the Central African Republic, an 800-strong peacekeeping force of soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo have been propping up the 25 January 1997 peace deal to end political and ethnic clashes between supporters and opponents of President Ange-Felix Patasse in the army. The precedent was set for stretching Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to its limits in Africa when, on 6 August 1997, the Security Council retrospectively authorised this Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB). Significantly, the Security Council provided MISAB with a Chapter VII mandate (which provides for the use of force), and UN member states will not be assessed for any portion of the mission costs, which must be borne by participating countries.

By 28 October 1997, the `Central African meltdown' seemed to have spread as far as Lusaka, when a junior army officer announced on national radio at dawn that the military had taken over the government. This had been preceded by weeks of political wrangling over an electoral law which, on the grounds of lineage, prevented former president Kenneth Kaunda from running for office. Within hours, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was able to announce that the attempted overthrow had been crushed, and that he was in full control of the government. However, the incident led to the arrest of Kaunda and served to illustrate the contagious nature of regional conflict and to confirm the continued vulnerability of elected governments to armed challenge especially when the electoral process is widely perceived as being undemocratic.

On the eastern seaboard, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi's twenty-year hold on power has also come under siege, following waves of public protests to reform the Constitution in order to ensure that the end of year elections would be free and fair. Despite another electoral victory by Moi, ethnic violence was soon to erupt north of Nairobi between Kalenjin warriors and a Kikuyu community which had voted overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition. Opposition forces in Kenya will, no doubt, continue to push impatiently for a new regime.

The point to be made from this brief review is that there is little room for complacency, and that
the time is ripe for revisiting the sometimes acrimonious debate on the future of SADC and its Organ for Politics, Defence and Security not for the purpose of inciting further animosity in the region, but in order to advance some new ideas on how to break what appears to be an impasse on the development of a suitable Southern African structure and mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.  

The aim of this monograph, therefore, is to take stock of the progress made in the structural development of SADC and the Organ, and, through a brief comparison with other regional security arrangements, to suggest an alternative course of action to the current stalemate in institutionalising security co-operation in the Southern African region.

The Evolution of SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). For the first twelve years of its existence, SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol. Conscious of the poor record of regional economic integration schemes in Africa and in other areas of the developing world, the founders opted for a loose organisation to promote co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal integration. Their aim was to reduce signatories' external economic dependence, mainly but not exclusively on apartheid South Africa, and to promote development. SADCC's original strategy was to concentrate on promoting co-operation in the field of infrastructure. In practice, its primary activities were aimed at the co-ordination of members' development initiatives and assisting in raising donor funds for these projects.

At the 1989 SADCC Heads of State meeting in Harare, a decision was finally taken to formalise the organisation and to provide it with a legal status to replace the existing Memorandum of Agreement. Four years of consultation followed. The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC, eventually signed by Heads of State and Government in Windhoek in 1992, expressed confidence that recent developments, such as the independence of Namibia and the imminent liberation of South Africa, would "... take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These are prerequisites for development ...".

With the change of name, the emphasis of the community also changed from `development co-ordination' to `development integration'. In essence, the true vision of SADC has become one of regional trade liberalisation, and the eventual full economic integration of the Southern African countries. SADC has also increasingly come to be regarded as a subregional political organisation of the type envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As a result, there has been considerable ambiguity and confusion on the real nature of SADC, with the organisation often entering areas far removed from that of development co-ordination and facilitation.

This ambiguity has been exacerabted by recent initiatives aimed at rationalising SADC to enable a more effective pursuit of its integration aims and at providing a sensible framework for the co-ordination of activities of member states in the realm of politics, defence and security. SADC is now in a stage of fundamental flux and uncertainty with respect to both the economic and the political and security activities of the organisation.

The economic activities of SADC have been pursued through a complex system of commissions and sectors, which have been formed to guide and co-ordinate regional policies and programmes in specific areas. The sectors are allocated to individual member states to co-ordinate and provide regional leadership. There are currently sixteen Sector Co-ordinating Units,
which are also further divided into a number of subsectors which may be co-ordinated by other countries. For example, Zimbabwe is responsible for the sector on Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, which is divided into the following seven subsectors:

- Agricultural Research and Training (Botswana);
- Food Security (Zimbabwe);
- Forestry (Malawi);
- Inland Fisheries (Malawi);
- Wildlife (Malawi);
- Livestock Production & Animal Disease Control (Botswana); and
- Marine Fisheries (Namibia).

However, the capacity of many countries to co-ordinate activities in their allocated sectors and subsectors is limited as is progress in that particular sector. Very few member states have officials who are appointed to deal solely with SADC issues, and in cases where the local civil service suffers a lack of resources in the fulfilment of its daily, ongoing tasks, SADC responsibilities are 'over-and-above' functions which are often left for last.

By 1996, it was apparent that some sort of structural reform was necessary. A committee of four member states (Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) was entrusted with the task of conducting a Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action (SPA). This led to the appointment of three specialist consultants from Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe and the launching of a study in July 1996 to appraise the entire SADC through consultation with the relevant stakeholders in each country. The consultants' report, published in April 1997, was based on information gathered through interviews, questionnaires, and a series of workshops conducted in the SADC region.

The team of consultants devised a methodology for conducting a trial evaluation of the regional impact of the current SADC project portfolio. This revealed that only 22 per cent by number and twelve per cent by monetary value of the portfolio meet the criteria of being immediately acceptable as SADC projects. The implication is that many ostensibly regional projects are in fact national projects. Their report also indicated that SADC should be more focused on the provisions of the Treaty and should be affordable in view of the scarce resources in the region. Moreover, SADC should move from a project approach, steered by co-operating partners, to the harmonisation of policies and procedures that will enhance integration. The major recommendations contained in the consultants' report are summarised below.

THE CREATION OF NATIONAL SADC COMMITTEES

In each member state, a national SADC committee should be formed involving all stakeholders. These committees should focus their activities on policies and strategies for integration and community-building in the SADC region. The committees should have a permanent chairperson and a secretarial staff appointed by the national contact ministry, but should not operate as government institutions. A meeting of the chairpersons of the national SADC committees in member states should replace the current meeting of senior officials.

Each national SADC committee should form subcommittees in the following fields:

- Human Resource Development and Technology;
- Food production, Natural resources and Environment;
- Economics, Finance, Investment and Trade;
Infrastructure and Communication; and
Community Development.

These national subcommittee should meet regularly for the purpose of harmonising policies and standardising procedures, in order to accelerate integration and steer the process of community development.

THE CREATION OF REGIONAL DIRECTORATES

The current sector/commission arrangement in SADC should be replaced by five regional umbrella institutions corresponding with the disciplines in the subcommittees of the national SADC committees. These regional institutions may either be centralised in Gaborone or decentralised in countries like Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in buildings owned by SADC. The institutions are called directorates for the purpose of the study, and should be staffed by regionally appointed officials based on a work study yet to be undertaken.

The responsibility of the directorates would be to implement the policies created by the Subcommittees within the national SADC committees of member states, and they would report to the meeting of senior officials (the chairpersons of national SADC committees).

RATIONALISING THE SADC SECRETARIAT

The SADC Secretariat should be headed by an Executive Secretary who reports to the Council of Ministers. The following four units are foreseen in the Secretariat:

- a Policy Unit, comprising a mixture of economists and strategic planning specialists, responsible for regional planning;
- an Information Unit, to manage public relations and information collation and dissemination;
- a Conference Unit, to service the Summit, Council of Ministers and officials meetings as well as regional workshops and meetings; and
- an Administration and Finance Unit, to service regional appointees.

Implications of the Review and Rationalisation Report

After consideration of the recommendations made in the study by the meeting of senior officials, the report was workshopped nationally by member states. A regional workshop was convened in Gaborone towards the end of 1997, in order to advise the Council of Ministers on the implementation of the study. However, it is felt that the findings and recommendations are "controversial" and "radical", and little progress has been made in preparing for the implementation of the proposals. Further discussion was postponed until the January 1998 SADC Council of Ministers Meeting in Maputo. The process of building consensus on the rationalisation of SADC is bound to be long and arduous not least because a leaner and more efficient SADC may threaten vested interests, established over the past seventeen years, within the various SADC national contact ministries. The final model accepted by SADC may therefore differ significantly from that contained in the recommendations.

The general thrust of the report also indicates a shift from SADC as a government institution, towards a more private sector driven process of co-operation and integration in which all
stakeholders should be involved. The business-like approach to the pursuit of SADC objectives is evident in the use and recommendation of concepts such as `cost-effectiveness', `outsourcing', `systems for portfolio management', `ideal skills profiles', `mixtures of market mechanisms and interventionist policies', `partnership with the private sector', and `investment prospectus'.

The authors graphically summarised, as their point of departure, the objectives of SADC which are supposed to be achieved through the SPA. These are (correctly) derived from the SADC Treaty, and include the evolution of common political values, systems, and institutions; and the promotion and defence of peace and security. However, the pursuit of the latter was not addressed anywhere in the report. The authors also omitted a number of other key provisions of the SADC Treaty in briefly outlining the fundamental point of departure for their study. For example, they did not refer to the principles of SADC, upon which the Community's objectives are based. Article 4 states that, "SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles:

a) sovereign equality of all Member States;

b) solidarity, peace and security;

c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;

d) equity, balance and mutual benefit;

e) peaceful settlement of disputes."

Moreover, Article 21 spells out a number of areas of co-operation, including politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. While the report admittedly concentrates on development integration, it does so by conveniently ignoring the critical linkage between development and security. This is a serious omission, given the recent history of armed conflict in the region, the legacy of ideological conflict and regional destabilisation of the apartheid era, the fragility of the peace process in Angola, and the extension of SADC to include the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, the report does address key issues of concern common to both the political and economic objectives of SADC such as SADC institutional structures and the financing of SADC institutions but it does so in a manner which totally ignores the political principles and objectives of the organisation.

However rational the report may appear from the perspective of development integration, it is deficient when linked to the overarching objectives of SADC. An institution which increasingly operates according to business principles is clearly unsuited to deal with matters of politics, defence and security. This lends credence to the notion that SADC qua SADC is not (or should not be) equipped to deal with issues pertaining to security co-operation and conflict resolution, and that the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security should "function independently from other SADC structures."

Defence and Security Co-operation under the Auspices of SADC

Interstate security co-operation in the Southern African region dates back to the early 1970s, when the independent states of Tanzania and Zambia formed a grouping known as the Front-Line States (FLS) in order to lobby for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. As
other countries in the region gained independence from colonial rule, they joined the FLS in its
resistance to exclusive white rule in these three countries. Upon independence in 1980,
Zimbabwe joined the FLS to play a key role in the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. The
FLS dealt with security issues on an informal basis, where the longest serving member acted as
chairperson at joint meetings.

However, it was the resolutions and recommendations of the SADC Workshop on Democracy,
Peace and Security, which was held in Windhoek from 11 to 16 July 1994, that set SADC on a
course towards formal involvement in security co-ordination, conflict mediation, and even
military co-operation. The Windhoek initiative was strengthened by the decision of the FLS, on
30 July 1994, to dissolve and "become the political and security wing of SADC."12

Importantly, one of the Windhoek working groups on conflict resolution, recommended that "...
Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation become a `Sector', the responsibility for which
would be allocated to a SADC member state", and that a Protocol on Peace, Security and
Conflict Resolution be drawn up. The Windhoek proposals were subsequently referred to the
next meeting of the Council of Ministers in Botswana during which many of the intrusive and
potentially prescriptive recommendations which could infringe upon the sovereignty of member
countries were abandoned. At this meeting it was decided rather to establish a wing for conflict
mediation and prevention, as opposed to a sector.

At the next meeting of SADC Foreign Ministers, convened in Harare on 3 March 1995, the
creation of an Association of Southern African States (ASAS), under Chapter 7, Article 21(3) (g)
of the SADC Treaty, was recommended.13 The idea was for ASAS to replace the defunct FLS
co-operative framework with a mechanism to deal with conflict prevention, management and
resolution in Southern Africa. It was envisaged that ASAS would function independently of the
SADC Secretariat, and that it would report directly to the SADC Heads of State and
Government. It was also envisaged that ASAS would incorporate two specialised SADC sectors,
one dealing with political affairs and the other with military security.

These recommendations were considered by the August 1995 SADC Summit which was held in
Johannesburg. However, the foreign ministers’ proposals had not been based on consultations
with the various ministers of defence and police, nor the intelligence community.14 Moreover,
some of the delegates were uncomfortable with the name of ASAS and the idea that such
sensitive sectors would be accorded to individual member states (as had been the practice with
the sixteen sectors dealing with economic co-operation and integration). The decision to
formalise the political and security dimension of SADC was therefore postponed until the 1996
Summit, with the final Johannesburg communiqué simply stating that, "... [t]he Summit
considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the
sector to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations
among themselves and with the Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC
Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures, for the sector."15

This challenge was taken up on 18 January 1996, at a meeting in Gaberone of the SADC
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. The ministers agreed at this meeting to
recommend to their Heads of State the creation of a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and
Security, which "would allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to
sensitive and potentially explosive situations." This agreement, it was assumed, would allow for
a permanent SADC mechanism while maintaining the flexible approach of the old FLS
grouping.16
The concept of this political and security `leg' of SADC was accepted by the SADC Heads of State at the 28 June 1996 Summit in Gaborone. Indeed, the Summit went further and defined sixteen substantive political, defence and security objectives to be pursued through the Organ. It was, perhaps, the articulation of these objectives that precipitated the current `crisis' in SADC political and security co-operation, for it signalled the need for a break with the informality of the FLS. Clearly, none of these objectives can be addressed either by existing SADC structures, or the rationalised structure outlined in the previous section. But the only authoritative guidelines which have thus far emerged for an institutional framework for the pursuit of these objectives, derive from the same communiqué, namely:

- the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security will operate at the Summit level, and function independently of other SADC structures;
- the Organ will also operate at ministerial and technical levels;
- the Chairpersonship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a troika basis;
- the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) will be one of the institutions of the Organ; and
- the Organ may establish other structures as the need arises.

As outlined in the introductory section, the need has clearly arisen for other structures, and for placing the present activities of the ISDSC within a rational framework for the pursuit and co-ordination of the political and security objectives stipulated in the SADC Treaty and refined at the Gaborone Summit. However, several proposals on structuring the Organ in line with a `two-legged', or `triangular' SADC (meeting at the level of the Summit, but totally organisationally divergent at lower levels) have been met with considerable resistance notably by the incumbent chair of the Organ.

One of the reasons that SADC seems no closer to resolving the pressing issue of truly `operationalising the Organ', is the inverted role of politicians and officials. In most intergovernment organisations, heads of states and government, ministers, and ambassadors emerge dishevelled from the Summit after fighting their points of view and achieving substantial consensus on meaningful policy direction. It is then up to senior officials to co-operate in giving effect to such broad policy guidelines based on consensus. In the case of SADC, however, the politicians appear very ready to agree on what emerges as hollow policy i.e., lofty goals with very little in the way of substantial policy guidelines, and then leave the real policy debate to the officials, who, however technically competent, have to refer all the details back to their principals, since they are often left in the dark.

At present, these officials seem deadlocked between two divergent views on structuring the Organ. The South African point of view sees the legal basis of the Organ deriving from Article 10 of the SADC Treaty, which states, among others, that:

- the Summit shall consist of the Heads of State and Government of all member states, and shall be the supreme policy-making Institution of SADC;
- the Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC;
the Summit shall elect a chairperson and a vice-chairperson of SADC from among its members for an agreed period, on the basis of rotation; and

the Summit shall decide on the creation of commissions, other institutions, committees and organs as the need arises.

The Treaty makes no provision for a SADC Summit which is separately constituted, under separate chairpersonship, and with a separate mandate to that of SADC proper. It would therefore appear as if such an arrangement is untenable under the present SADC Treaty.

On the other hand, Zimbabwe believes that it is entirely possible for the Organ to continue to function under a separately constituted summit within SADC, under a separate chair, as the idea is to run the Organ on the same 'flexible and informal' basis as that of the FLS prior to the end of apartheid rule in South Africa. However, this implies that the Organ would not be based on a firm legal principle. Moreover, sensitivities resulting from informal leadership and institutional roles may undermine the credibility of SADC, and frustrate further attempts to rationalise SADC proper.

The tensions between these opposing viewpoints came to a head at the 1997 SADC Summit, which was held in Blantyre, Malawi, on 8 August. The Summit was shrouded in controversy created by media reports which intimated that presidents Mandela and Mugabe were at loggerheads about the future development of the Organ, and that Mandela had threatened to take South Africa out of SADC if he did not get his way on the issue. While such reports were obviously exaggerations of fact, they did sound a clear warning that the Organ has the potential to become a source of conflict, rather than an instrument for its prevention, management and resolution.

Nevertheless, the Summit "reaffirmed the importance of the Organ as a vehicle for strengthening democracy in the region and co-operation in defence and security matters," without any further reference to how the wheels will be put on this vehicle. The matter of mobilising the Organ was postponed until a further meeting of Heads of Government, to be held in Luanda during September 1997 a meeting which, for fairly obvious reasons, never took place. President Dos Santos apparently did not want a 'bun fight' in his capital to upset the delicate Angolan peace process.

Time for an Amicable Divorce?

Thus, at the end of 1997, it appears as though the 1994 'Windhoek vision' has been blurred, if not eclipsed by the 'blow-up in Blantyre', and that the Organ will continue to exist merely on paper as an ill-defined and rather unwanted appendage to the Southern African Development Community. The regional co-ordinating structures which are embraced by the SADC umbrella are now in a state of fundamental review which is likely to involve a lengthy process of debate, consultation and negotiation. In the interim, opportunities for meaningful co-ordination and co-operation on defence and security matters will likely remain almost entirely within the realm of the ISDSC, which has neither the mandate nor the structure to deal appropriately with conflict prevention, management and resolution.

While SADC was born in 1980 as the successor to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has been regarded as the successor to the Front-Line States (FLS). Without denigrating the important role of the FLS organisation in liberating the region from the yoke of colonialism and apartheid rule, it is now
clearly time for regional leaders to look to future challenges, rather than to hanker after relationships which are more suited to a bygone era.

The demise of apartheid rule in South Africa coincided with the end of the Cold War, and created new opportunities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict by intergovernment bodies. Indeed, the imminent dismantling of apartheid enabled the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to adopt the 1993 **Cairo Declaration** and to embark on a brave new role in this arena. Similarly, the termination of the Cold War has allowed the United Nations to take hitherto unprecedented measures in its attempts to maintain and restore international peace and security. The Southern African region is seen as a key partner of both these organisations in such endeavours. It is also relevant to note that both the UN and the OAU have realised the need for significant organisational restructuring in order to deal with the new challenges to peace and security.

The point has perhaps been reached where a fundamental decision needs to be taken: to organisationally divorce the embryonic Organ on Politics, Defence and Security from SADC, and to negotiate a separate treaty which creates a more appropriate framework for addressing the type of political and security objectives which have already been articulated by the leaders of the region.

This does not mean that the **SADC Treaty** must be amended to eliminate the political principles and objectives, but it may be refined to state that such objectives may best be pursued by SADC member states acceding to a treaty which establishes an appropriate framework for political and security co-operation. Indeed, the report on the Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action already recognises and admits the need for amending the **SADC Treaty** in order to implement the proposed new institutional structure of SADC proper.

If the concept of a `divorce' is accepted, the SADC consultants' report can be embraced and debated with the enthusiasm it deserves. There are, after all, sound reasons for separating development integration from many of the thorny `political' issues on the current SADC agenda. Not least among these may be the contention that "the aims of economic [in]dependence and self-reliance of SADC had been undermined by the insistence of the so-called donor community and its partners in South Africa that the strategy of SADC be based on sectoral projects co-ordinated by donor agencies," and that the leaders of the former FLS recognised "that the involvement of donors influenced the secretariat of SADC and an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security could not afford the same level of influence."\(^{20}\)

However, the proposed divorce from SADC of defence and conflict management issues should be an amicable one, and be built on the hard-won gains around which consensus has already been achieved. These gains culminated in the objectives articulated by the Heads of State at the June 1996 SADC Summit in Gaberone. As it was only after this Summit that the consensus around the Organ broke down, these objectives remain a useful starting point for picking up the pieces and moving towards the creation of a functional Southern African structure and mechanism for conflict management. There is also no reason why meaningful gains should be lost or reversed it is simply a matter of taking a new tack when the sails of the evolving security architecture start flapping.

The lessons from other regions with a longer history of intergovernmental security co-operation indicate that it is necessary to realign security arrangements with significant changes in the overall security environment, and that this can be done without undermining unity of purpose.
Comparative Arrangements

In Africa, there is one little-known example of formalised security co-operation which is not linked to a subregional economic organisation. In June 1977, a non-aggression and mutual defence and assistance agreement was signed in Abidjan by seven francophone West African states, for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the region, and for consolidating the political independence of the signatories. The *Accord de Non Aggression et D'Assistance en Matière de Défense* or L'ANAD (the treaty of non-aggression, assistance and mutual defence), was signed by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Togo. Benin and Guinea Conakry were granted observer status at the meetings of L'ANAD.21

L'ANAD adheres to the principles articulated in the charters of the UN and the OAU, especially those regarding the primacy of dialogue and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is designed to promote the security and stability which are essential for the economic development of the countries of the subregion. L'ANAD does not develop military policy, and is not a supranational body which subsumes the sovereignty of its member states. Since its inception, L'ANAD has only once had to intervene in order to resolve conflict between two of its member states. This was from December 1985 to January 1986, between Burkina Faso and Mali. This first action by L'ANAD provided the opportunity to test the structure and aims of L'ANAD, and operationalised the concept of the agreement.

The members of L'ANAD have declared that they will not commit any act of aggression among themselves, nor against any country or grouping of countries which are not a signatory to the L'ANAD agreement. As far as military threats are concerned, L'ANAD is a defensive alliance. However, any act of armed aggression on a member of L'ANAD will be considered to be an attack on all the member states. The concept of mutual assistance operates in two different contexts. Firstly, an act of aggression between two member states will demand pacifist resolution measures, such as dialogue and negotiation. However, should the situation degenerate, the deployment of a L'ANAD peace intervention force may be considered. Secondly, an external act of aggression against one or more L'ANAD members would demand the following responses, in order of sequence and preference:

- a search for a diplomatic solution;
- the imposition of sanctions short of the use of armed force; and
- as a last resort, the use of armed force to counter and reverse such aggression.

While originally narrowly conceived as a non-aggression and mutual defence pact, L'ANAD is now moving beyond narrower conceptions of subregional security to include areas such as common policy formulation and co-operation on broader issues of human security, such as economic development, population migration, banditry, pollution, etc. It has a large permanent secretariat in Abidjan, and functions at the levels of a Conference of Heads of State and Government; a Council of Ministers; and a General Secretariat.

The Conference of Heads of State and Government is the supreme authority of L'ANAD. It meets every two years, and decision-making is based on the principle of unanimity. It is responsible for appointing the Secretary-General and Comptroller of the Budget, as well as for approving the biennial budget of the General Secretariat.

The Council of Ministers comprises ministers of Defence, as well as the chiefs of Defence Staff of member states. It meets once every two years in advance of the Summit of Heads of State and Government, and is directly responsible for drafting the defence concerns to be tabled for
discussion and decision at the summit. The Council of Ministers may convene in extraordinary session in the event of a threat or an act of aggression.

The General Secretariat is the permanent organ of L'ANAD, and is responsible for the daily administration of the organisation, management of its budget, and the implementation of decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government. It is directed by a Secretary-General of the rank of a General Officer, who is appointed for a three-year term which may be renewed on the proposal of the Council of Ministers. The Secretary-General is assisted by 26 professional staff, a number which is to be increased to 45.

In line with the Cairo Declaration of 1993 and pronouncements made at subsequent summits of the OAU Heads of State and Government, the L'ANAD secretariat feels that the emphasis in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution should be placed at the level of subregional organisations. It considers this to be both a geographic and a political reality. The chiefs of Defence Staff of the L'ANAD member states have therefore been mandated to investigate the modalities for establishing a subregional peacekeeping force and to make recommendations on collective measures for combating problems related to banditry, smuggling, illegal immigration, etc.

Although L'ANAD is considered by its signatories to be the principal subregional organisation for preventing and dealing with conflict in West Africa, this role has been overshadowed by the presence of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force in Liberia since 1990 and in Sierra Leone since 1997. There are some obvious reasons for this, not least because of francophone exclusivity of L'ANAD and the dominant role played by especially Nigeria, as well as Ghana in orchestrating and sustaining the ECOWAS intervention. Moreover, the dominant role which France has continued to play in guaranteeing the security of the L'ANAD signatories placed them in a unique situation when designing this security structure.

While L'ANAD appears to be moving towards a broader approach to security concerns, its existing structure and initial narrow conceptualisation in the realm of defence is likely to mitigate against significant advances in the area of politics and security in the near future.

The subregional arrangement which is structurally perhaps the closest to SADC is the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established on 8 August 1967 in Thailand, with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the five original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined the Association on 8 January 1984, and Vietnam became the seventh member on 28 July 1995. Laos and Myanmar were admitted into ASEAN on 23 July 1997.

Like the SADC Treaty, the Bangkok Declaration united the ASEAN member countries in a joint effort to promote economic co-operation and the welfare of the people in the region. It set out guidelines for ASEAN's activities and defined three main objectives:

- to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the region through co-operative programmes;
- to safeguard the political and economic stability of the region against big power rivalry; and
- to serve as a forum for the resolution of intraregional differences.
ASEAN has also followed a sectoral approach to the challenge of economic development, but
summits have hitherto been held at erratic intervals, and progress in institutionalising regional
development has been much slower than within SADC. Although political and security co-
operation began early in ASEAN's formative years, the degree of formalisation and
institutionalisation is still far behind that which has already evolved in the SADC region. It was
only in 1994 that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established to serve as a multilateral
consultative forum aimed at promoting preventive diplomacy and confidence-building among the
states in the Asia-Pacific region. The Forum consists of 21 foreign ministers of key countries of
the Asia Pacific region and has different categories of membership:

- the nine ASEAN Member Countries;
- Cambodia as an Observer;
- ten Dialogue Partners; and
- Papua New Guinea as a Special Observer.

The ARF has agreed on a three-stage approach to co-operation, namely:

- the promotion of confidence-building;
- the development of preventive diplomacy; and
- the elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution.

Similar to the ISDSC, the Meeting of Senior Officials for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF-SOM) has been institutionalised to provide support and follow-up actions on the activities of the
ARF. Intersessional activities are conducted through the Intersessional Support Group on
Confidence-Building, the Intersessional Meeting on Disaster Relief, the Intersessional Meeting on Search and Rescue Co-operation, and the Intersessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations.

However, the ARF has yet to set a formal agenda, and is still in the first stage of co-operation.
The informality of its meetings, for example, is maintained in order to enhance confidence
among the very diverse participating countries. SADC, on the other hand, has indicated an
intention to move rapidly into the areas of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. This
means that pointers may rather be found in more mature security arrangements, such as those
that have evolved in Europe.

Europe has a highly complex regional security architecture, which includes:

- the 185-member United Nations;
- the 55-member Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
- the 16-member North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) plus 15 NATO Partnership for
  Peace (PfP) nations; and
- the 28-member West European Union (WEU).

This cannot be seen in isolation from the dynamics of economic integration under the European
Union (EU) and its various institutions. However, the OSCE is now taking a leading role in
fostering security through co-operation in Europe, and it would be folly to ignore the positive
lessons from this experience. From a Southern African perspective, the two most relevant
institutions in this complicated security matrix are probably the OSCE and the WEU, as they are
respectively somewhat analogous to the OAU and SADC (Organ) in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

As is the case with SADC, the OSCE has its origins in an earlier co-operative framework which dates back to the Cold War era. But unlike SADC, it had to deal with regional security issues from the outset. Its predecessor was created in the early 1970s as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. It was thus not born of the same type of regional solidarity that characterised the FLS and, indeed SADCC in their united battle against apartheid. Nevertheless, the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, signed in 1975, managed to cross the East-West ideological divide and established a number of basic principles governing the behaviour of countries towards their citizens and each other.

Until 1990, the CSCE functioned as a series of meetings and conferences setting norms and commitments and periodically reviewing their implementation. The Paris Summit of 1990 set the CSCE on a new course. In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CSCE was called upon to contribute to the management of the historic changes in Europe and to respond to the new challenges of the post-Cold War period.

A series of regular meetings between 1990 and 1994 established new mechanisms, offices and principles for addressing these challenges, and at the 1994 Budapest Summit, the CSCE was reconstituted as an organisation, rather than a conference. The name change gave the OSCE a new impetus as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and as a primary regional instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The legal framework of the OSCE is dynamic, in that it is made up of a whole range of agreements which supplement the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.25

The OSCE takes a comprehensive view of security and pursues a co-operative approach to a wide range of security-related issues, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, election monitoring and economic security. As is the case with the OAU and SADC, all states participating in OSCE activities have equal status, and decisions are made on the basis of consensus.

Although delegations of the OSCE states meet almost daily in Vienna, the regular body for political consultation and decision-making is the Permanent Council which meets once a week. Vienna is also the site of meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation (which deals with arms control and confidence and security-building measures), the Joint Consultative Group (responsible for promoting implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) and the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

In addition to these bodies, the political directors of participating states meet three times a year in Prague as the Senior Council. OSCE foreign ministers also hold an annual Ministerial Council Meeting and an OSCE Summit of all Heads of State or Government is convened every two years. The Secretariat, which provides operational support to the organisation, is based in Vienna, while a small office is also maintained in Prague.

The Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), is a key component of the OSCE, and it plays an active role in monitoring elections, assisting in the drafting of constitutions and laws, and in promoting the development of civil societies. Of particular importance in the field of early warning and conflict prevention, is the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The High Commissioner assesses, and attempts to
defuse at the earliest possible stage, situations involving national minority issues by encouraging the parties to pursue non-confrontational policies.

As with the OAU Central Organ (and as stipulated for the SADC Organ), the chair of OSCE rotates annually, and consists of a troika of the current chairperson, the previous chairperson, and the succeeding chairperson. Significantly, the chairperson is a foreign minister, rather than a head of state or government.

Like the OAU in Africa, the OSCE has deployed peace missions of limited size in several European countries, including Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Tadjikistan, and Ukraine. The organisation is playing an important role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where, in terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it supervises the election process, monitors human rights and assists with negotiations on confidence-building measures and arms control.

The OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly meets once a year to discuss issues pertinent to OSCE affairs and consider declarations, recommendations and proposals to enhance security and cooperation in the OSCE area. The Assembly’s Secretariat is located in Copenhagen.

In its structure, functions and scope, the OSCE is perhaps more akin to the OAU than to SADC. The fact that it has 55 members (compared to the 53 of OAU), and the fact that both the OSCE and OAU have deployed limited missions of observation, indicates that both organisations are currently on a much higher level in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution than the fourteen-member SADC subregional organisation. However, the European example may also provide hints for appropriate linkages between regional organisations and subordinate security arrangements. It is in this realm that the WEU should be of particular interest to the SADC countries.

Although the WEU was created a year ahead of NATO by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (by Britain, France and the Benelux countries), its role was largely subsumed by NATO and it remained dormant throughout the Cold War. By the end of the 1980s, Europe (like Africa) realised that it would have to bear a greater responsibility for its own security in the new strategic environment, and the WEU was resuscitated (with a good deal of encouragement from France and Germany).

In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty gave the WEU the responsibility for European defence and security policy formulation. The 1992 Petersburg Declaration assigned, among others, priority for crisis management and peacekeeping to the WEU, rather than NATO Article V-type defence, and stated that WEU may support UN or OSCE initiatives on a case-by-case basis. At the 1996 Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers, it was decided to establish a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). France and the US diverged on this issue, with the French wanting a much stronger independent European defence capacity and the Americans wanting to maintain the trans-Atlantic linkage. The somewhat complex compromise which was reached, was that the ESDI should develop within the NATO framework especially for crisis management operations. A significant step was taken at the June 1997 (fifteen-state) Inter-Governmental Conference of the EU, which dealt with the security chapter of the EU treaty. It was decided that the EU would have a politically superior role to the WEU.

The WEU now consists of 28 nations, divided into the following membership categories:

- full members ten nations which have signed the Brussels Treaty and which are also NATO
and EU members;

- associate members three nations which belong to NATO, but not to the EU;
- EU observers five nations which belong to the EU, but not to NATO; and
- associate partners ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe which participate in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), which are candidates for NATO membership, and which have applied for EU membership.

The WEU has two primary tasks:

- to act as a forum for security discussions and the harmonisation of security policy among all 28 states (in this respect it mirrors the NATO PfP, but the latter is more practically oriented); and
- to prepare the capacity and structures for conflict management operations (with the focus on future operations where it may be more appropriate to use an all-European capacity than NATO or UN).

The decision to use the WEU in conflict management operations may be taken on the strength of a UN or OSCE request, or upon the request of EU foreign ministers after consultation with the US and Canada.

In terms of operational capabilities, the WEU has no standing forces or permanent command structure. However, it has developed procedures for establishing and conducting operations. The planning cell also has a system of standby arrangements involving national forces of WEU members, but the final decision on deployment rests with the respective governments (as with the UN Standby Arrangements system). The WEU is also planning to use multinational European forces, such as the Euro Corps, and can potentially also draw upon NATO assets with the approval of the NATO Command Council. At this stage, however, the WEU does not have the capacity to engage in politically or militarily complex operations without US participation or drawing heavily on NATO.

In the Southern African context, it would also be premature to strive towards an autonomous regional capacity for executing complex military operations. However, the important lessons from the WEU arrangement lie beyond the narrow realm of military operations. For example, it is pertinent to note that the WEU is an organisation which is dedicated entirely to security and conflict management issues. Moreover, it provides for incremental expansion, without overextension, through the acceptance of different membership categories.

Lessons for Southern Africa

The brief overview of comparative regional security arrangements presented above suggests a number of pertinent lessons for the design of a functional security architecture for Southern Africa specifically in terms of membership, focus, structure and process.

**MEMBERSHIP**

The West African experience suggests that the membership of any regional security organisation should err on the side of inclusiveness, rather than exclusivity, and that this
membership should be wider than that of any overlapping regional economic grouping. If this is not the case, the ECOWAS experience suggests that it is the economic component that will take the lead in handling issues related to regional peace and security a role for which such groupings are clearly not designed.

The other examples suggest that it is easier to allow for the expansion of a regional security arrangement than it is to expand an economic community of member states. While a longer-standing economic grouping (where mutual trust has historically been built) may form the core of the membership, a system of differentiated membership (including full members, associate members, observers, dialogue partners, etc.) facilitates expansion in the security domain.

In this way, certain conflict-generating aspects of economic integration (and hence vacillation in decision-making) can be avoided, while benefiting from confidence-building among a wider range of countries. This is particularly relevant in sub-Saharan Africa, where both border configuration and regional demarcation are largely artificial constructs, and where security concerns do not match arrangements for economic co-operation.

FOCUS

While the major thrust of the arguments presented thus far aim at divorcing economic issues from security concerns, the example of L’ANAD also warns against too narrow a conceptualisation of security, and of focusing almost exclusively on defence, rather than on several security ‘baskets’. The OSCE, on the other hand, takes a comprehensive view of security, to include issues of arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, human rights, and election monitoring. While the WEU assumes the responsibility for European defence and security policy formulation, its priorities lie in the area of conflict management and peacekeeping, rather than mutual defence. Defence is also downplayed as a key issue in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which aims at confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution.

Thus, while the stillborn SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is perhaps nominally appropriate in its focus, the reality of functioning only at the level of the ISDSC, where defence and police predominate, mitigates against the adoption of a comprehensive approach to regional peace and security. The clear lesson is that, even if an appropriate focus is defined at the higher political level, this becomes blurred (or narrowed) if the vision is not backed by relevant structural arrangements.

STRUCTURE

The structure of the OSCE reflects its purpose and focus. The creation of an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which plays an active role in election monitoring and provides assistance with constitutional engineering, is an essential ingredient of an organisation which encompasses a number of formerly hegemonic regimes. Likewise, the High Commissioner for National Minorities lends credence to the notion of conflict prevention through early involvement in potential ethnic conflicts. The relevance of these structures should be obvious to Southern Africa, with its recent history of apartheid rule and ethnically-based single party governance.

Both the WEU and the OSCE have a firm but flexible legal structure, which makes them legitimate instruments for conflict management under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The legal basis for delegating responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa
to SADC remains extremely vague, and the legality (or lack of) under the SADC Treaty of the
Organ for Politics, Defence and Security remains a major point of contention among member
states. It would thus appear that the negotiation of a completely new treaty defining the
modalities for security co-operation has become an urgent requirement.

While L'ANAD has a biennial Conference of Heads of State and Government as the supreme
authority, the ARF is controlled by a forum consisting of the foreign ministers of member
countries. The OSCE convenes a biennial Summit of Heads of State or Government, but the
foreign ministers also hold an annual Ministerial Council Meeting. However, the Permanent
Council of the OSCE meets once a week and delegations of member states meet almost daily in
Vienna.

The OSCE example, in particular, indicates the importance of creating a firm basis for regular
meetings of the various bodies making up a regional security organisation, as well as the utility
of formalising meetings, with declining frequency, according to the levels of seniority of the
attendant officials. This allows for continuity, for delegation, and, most important, for the
implementation of decisions taken at each level.

Given the negative impact on the evolution of the Southern African security architecture of
personality-based leadership at the Chief Executive level, it would be advisable to formalise a
similar hierarchical arrangement in the subregion, with clear channels of authority from summit
level down to the level of officials. Moreover, even with its limited role and functions, L'ANAD
has been blessed with a permanent, well-staffed Secretariat and a mechanism for implementing
the (albeit infrequent) political decisions of ministers and heads of government. This is
something which has been sadly lacking in the Southern African region.

PROCESS

The ARF example highlights the utility of a phased approach to regional security co-operation,
beginning with confidence-building and ending with instruments for the conduct of preventive
diplomacy. While the urgency of the security challenges in the Southern African region preclude
the luxury of a drawn-out process to establish a viable conflict management mechanism, it may
be noted that the SADC countries have already enjoyed a number of meaningful confidence-
building engagements in the nearly four years since the demise of apartheid.

On the other hand, the WEU experience and the limited utility of L'ANAD warn against `jumping
the gun' by the premature creation of a mutual defence pact. While a non-aggression pact is a
good starting point for regional security co-operation, the inclusion of a mutual defence pact in
the initial agenda endorsed by Summit for the SADC Organ was patently overambitious. Overly
ambitious agendas tend to create doubt and suspicion, and eventually undermine the credibility
of an institution when their terms can simply not be met.

The lesson for Southern Africa is that a process is necessary in which a modest but meaningful
security agenda is articulated, and systematically expanded once member countries have
exhibited a proven commitment to co-operation in these areas. After all, the organisation which
promises to be all things to all people raises dangerous and unwarranted expectations, and
eventually ends up by being nothing unto itself.

Conclusion

The traumatic and violent political power struggles which racked the subcontinent during 1997
provide clear evidence that perceptions of Southern Africa as a `zone of peace' are misguided, and that there is a need to institutionalise a mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. On the other hand, the historical development and present restructuring of SADC mean that it is increasingly difficult to incorporate political and security dimensions, as well as mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict into the organisation through simply drafting an additional protocol to the SADC Treaty.

Moreover, since the articulation of the objectives for the SADC Organ, the Heads of State have agreed to admit two new member states (Congo `Kinshasa' and the Seychelles) into SADC, based primarily on (perhaps unwarranted/highly exaggerated) predictions of mutual economic benefit. There is also a strong likelihood that a number of other sub-Saharan states (such as Kenya and Uganda) will soon seek admission to the SADC fold, thus further complicating the issue of simultaneously broadening and deepening SADC co-operation in both the economic and security spheres.

It is therefore time to create a new security family in Southern Africa, with a flexible legal framework which can adapt to the (all too frequent) changes in regional security dynamics. The starting point could be a `Southern African Security Convention', or a series of such meetings, convened initially by SADC, to which all sub-Saharan African states and observers from farther afield are invited. The purpose of the convention should be to deliberate on the sixteen objectives articulated for the Organ, with the view to determine their veracity and to examine modalities for the pursuit of an appropriate and achievable agenda for security co-operation. The result of such a process may be the drafting of a treaty establishing something like a 'Southern African Union', which would act as the principal forum for security discussions and the harmonisation of security policy in the region, and which may move towards establishing the capacity and structures for conflict management.

Aside from the sixteen `Organ' objectives, comparative arrangements from other regions suggest that the structural issues for debate might include matters such as:

- the provision for various categories of membership accommodating overlapping and discrete membership of the `Southern African Union', SADC, ISDSC and other organisations such as the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), etc.;

- levels at which members meet and the frequency of meetings at each level;

- relationships between the `Union' and SADC on the one hand, and between the `Union' and the OAU and the UN on the other;

- `early warning' in the regional context;

- mechanisms for promoting democratic institutions and human rights;

- modalities for handling issues of national minorities and promoting national reconciliation, and

- whatever else is necessary to contribute to confidence-building, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.

Of course, matters relating to the establishment of a secretariat, various offices, funding, etc.,
would also have to be addressed, but these issues would probably be beyond the ambit of an initial gathering.

While conventional wisdom holds that `the devil is in the detail', the failure to institutionalise the SADC Organ highlights the dangers of being overly prescriptive, and of suggesting anything like a detailed `model'. Rather than a model, a process may be initiated that begins as a conference and results in an organisation with a wider and more varied membership than SADC, and with a more suitable structure for promoting preventive diplomacy, confidence-building, and common security. Through such a process, it may indeed prove possible to achieve a balance between that which has historically worked well in the subregion, and that which is currently necessary to cope with evident and emerging challenges.

Finally, the idea of organisationally divorcing security from economic development and integration need not undermine the cohesion of SADC. Indeed, the Southern African Development Community would yield the core membership and probably be the driving force for the process. This would obviously require the abandoning of existing, ego-inspired `turf wars' and a commitment on the part of all Heads of State and Government to be true to the SADC Treaty. In this they promised to be "mindful of the need to involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law," and recognised that "mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the Region are indispensable to the realisation of these ideals." 28

Endnotes


2. Chapter VIII deals with `regional arrangements', Article 52 (1) stating that, "[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." The Charter provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, but these might include regional military alliances and multilateral military interventions. Article 53 refers to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that, "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council ..."

3. The force, which had been operating without international approval since early 1997, consists of voluntary troop contributions by Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, and Togo. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MISAB is now entitled to use force in order to implement its mandate, which includes the disarmament of rebellious factions of the CAR military.

4. Southern Africa, according to SADC Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, is "that part of Africa which is south of the equator." Quoted in C Chimhete, SADC Admits New Members into the Community, Southern African News Features, 29 September 1997.

5. For an idea of exactly how acrimonious the debate on the future of the SADC Organ has become, see for example SAPEM, 10(12), 15 September 15 October 1997. In this issue,
the Organ debate is covered in the editorial comment and in two cover page articles all of which focus on the animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe, rather than presenting a logical analysis of the problem of creating viable conflict resolution mechanism in Southern Africa. While the editorial comment points to the need to redefine a subregion "which was made after the image of white domination," H Campbell's article, entitled *SADC Heads at Loggerheads?*, reduces the problem of the Organ to South African arrogance in general and to the continued influence of `apartheid era ideologues' on South African policy in particular. Indeed, an earlier attempt by the ISS to propose a structural model for the SADC Organ made the Institute a prime target for vitriolic (and factually incorrect) criticism in Campbell's article.


7. The SADC Programme of Action (SPA), which is meant to give effect to the overall objectives of SADC, is still based on a complex and confusing array of sector co-ordinating units charged with co-ordinating a portfolio of about 470 projects at a total cost of some US $8 500 million. The SPA is extremely reliant on donor funding. Only about twelve to fourteen per cent of the total cost of the project portfolio is sourced within SADC, while donor funding amounts to approximately seventy per cent of the total funding secured for the current SPA.

8. Summarised from *Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action*, submitted to SADC in April 1997 by a team of consultants consisting of Chinyamata Chipeta (Malawi), Berenice V Lue (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, South Africa), and Keith Atkinson (Imani Development, Zimbabwe).


10. Article 21 of the *SADC Treaty* states that, "In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to co-operate in the areas of:

a) food security, land and agriculture;

b) infrastructure and services;

c) industry; trade, investment and finance;

d) human resources development, science and technology;

e) natural resources and environment;

f) social welfare, information and culture; and

g) politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security."

For the purpose of simplicity, the collective omissions in the author's point of departure (issues pertaining to common political values, systems, and institutions; the promotion and defence of peace and security; solidarity; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; peaceful settlement of disputes; diplomacy, and international relations) are hereafter
referred to as `political principles and objectives of SADC'.

11. Paragraph 4.3.1 of the communiqué of the June 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State or Government states that, "... [t]he SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures ..."


13. See endnote 10 above.

14. The support of these roleplayers should have been deemed essential, as they had been collaborating on security issues for a number of years under the auspices of the ISDSC. The ISDSC is a forum at which ministers of Southern African states responsible for Defence, Home Affairs/Public Security, as well as State Security meet to discuss a wide range of issues relating to their individual and collective defence and security issues. Such meetings also take place at the level of officials, in order to increase functional co-operation in the realm of defence and security. Established in 1983 under the aegis of the FLS, the ISDSC initially included seven member states. During November 1994, South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland became members of the ISDSC, and its membership now mirrors that of SADC. The ISDSC is also an informal structure which operates in accordance with practices that have evolved over time with the mutual agreement of member states. It has neither an executive secretary nor a permanent secretariat.


17. According to the SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996, the Organ is to:

* protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and external aggression;

* promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;

* develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and to lobby as a region, on issues of common interest at international fora;

* co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;

* mediate in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;

* use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;

* where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic
means. Only where such means fail, would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. These responses would be agreed in a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution;

* promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN;

* promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;

* give political support to the organs and institutions of SADC;

* promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security; develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent;

* develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region, with a view to address cross-border crime, as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;

* encourage and monitor the ratification of UN, OAU, and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;

* co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and

* address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.

18. Actually, Mandela had threatened to resign as chairperson of SADC, and not to take South Africa out of SADC.

19. SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997.


22. The first Summit Meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia in February 1976, during which the five member countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. There have been four more Summits held in the thirty years of ASEAN's existence. At the fifth Summit, held in Bangkok during December 1995, the leaders agreed to meet informally on an annual basis between summits.

23. Some of the most important accords adopted by ASEAN include the 1971 declaration
designating Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) of 1995. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord contains the principles and framework for ASEAN co-operation in the political, security, economic and functional fields.


25. The most important OSCE documents are: the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (which deals with co-operation in the military, human and economic areas); the Copenhagen Document of 1990 (which addresses issues of democracy, human rights and rule of law); the Paris Charter of 1990 (confirming previous results and establishing new institutions); and the Budapest Document of 1994 (by which the CSCE was turned into a permanent organisation through the creation of OSCE and the strengthening of the role of chairperson and other institutions. Moreover, the 1994 Vienna Document obliges states to show transparency and predictability in their military activities. The OSCE has also recently adopted a military Code of Conduct setting out principles to guide the role of armed forces in democratic societies, and the organisation is the repository of the EU-initiated Pact on Stability.

26. It is interesting to note that the 1997 SADC Summit also discussed the establishment of a SADC Parliamentary Forum, which would comprise members of parliament of all the member states. It approved the establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum as an "autonomous institution which will play a major role in promoting dialogue and popular participation in the affairs of SADC." SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997.

27. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, states that, "[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."