Reintegrating ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region

Lessons learned

Nelson Alusala

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises this vision by:

- Undertaking applied research, training and capacity building
- Working collaboratively with others
- Facilitating and supporting policy formulation
- Monitoring trends and policy implementation
- Collecting, interpreting and disseminating information
- Networking on national, regional and international levels

© 2011, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers.

The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.

ISBN 978-1-920422-44-8

First published by the Institute for Security Studies,
P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square 0075
Pretoria, South Africa

www.issafrica.org

Cover photograph Taken by the author

Design, layout and printing Marketing Support Services +27 12 346-2168

Reintegrating ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region

Lessons learned

Nelson Alusala

Monograph 179
May 2011

Contents

Abbreviations and acronyms iii

Executive summary vii

Chapter 1
Contextualising Africa's DDR challenges 1
Lessons from the MDRP initiative

Introduction 1
Background to the MDRP 2
Objectives and eligibility criteria for MDRP beneficiary countries 5
MDRP programme components 6
Assessing the performance of the MDRP 9
From MDRP to TDRP 14
Operationalising the TDRP 15

Chapter 2
MDRP and the reintegration process in the Republic of Congo 17

Background to demobilisation and reintegration 17
MDRP Fund 18
Mainstreaming IDDRS and SIDDR standards in DDR programmes 31
Conclusion and recommendations 32

Chapter 3
Ex-combatant reintegration and community support in the Central African Republic 35

The socio-political and economic context of the CAR 35
MDRP funding and the demobilisation of former fighters in the CAR 40
Complexities of the D&R process under PRAC 44

D&R and the security sector reform process 46
Community support projects 48
Closure of PRAC 49
Conclusion 50

Chapter 4
Disarmament and reintegration challenges in Liberia 53
Introduction 53
Background to the conflict 55
DDRR strategy and operational framework 58
The disarmament programme 59
Issues emerging from the disarmament process 63
Rehabilitation and reintegration (RR) hurdles 66
DDR linkages to related programmes 69
Lessons learnt 80
General conclusions from the study 81
Conclusion 84

Chapter 5
Conclusion and lessons learnt 85
Why DDR? 87
African wars and their linkage to DDR 89

Notes 101

Abbreviations and acronyms

AfD	Arms for Development Programme
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ATU	Anti Terrorist Unit
AU	African Union
BWI	Booker Washington Institute
CACD	Community Arms Collection for Development
CAFF	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CAR	Central African Republic
CBR	Community Based Recovery
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CEMAC	*Commission de la Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale*
CNDDR	*Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration*
CNPDR	*Commission Nationale contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre pour le Désarmement et la Réinsertion*
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
COFS	Combatants on Foreign Soil
DD	Disarmament and Demobilisation
DDC	District Development Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

EDLV	Egregious Domestic Law Violations
EDRP	Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project
DFID	Department for International Development
D&R	Demobilisation and Reintegration
EBK	Edward Beyan Kesselly Barracks
FACA	*Forces Armées Centrafricaines*
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FNL	*Forces Nationales de Liberation*
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHRV	Gross Human Rights Violations
GLR	Great Lakes Region
GOL	Government of Liberia
HCREC	*Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-combattants*
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ICC	Interim Care Centre
ICGL	International Contact Group on Liberia
IDA	International Development Association
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFs	International Futures
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IOM	International Organization of Migration
ISF	International Stabilisation Force
I&S	Information and Sensitisation
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
JOP	Joint Operation Plan
LANSA	Liberia Action Network on Small Arms
LDP	Letter of Demobilisation Policy
LEAP	Learning for Equality, Access and Peace
LiNSCA	Liberia National Commission on Small Arms
LNP	Liberian National Police
LPRC	Liberia Petroleum Refinery Corporation
LTC	Liberia Telecommunications Corporation

LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-donor Trust Fund
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission to Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MRU	Mano River Union
MTR	Mid-term Review
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NCDDR	National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NCDDRR	National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPA	Liberia's National Ports Authority
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NTGOL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCAD	*Projet de Collecte d'Armes pour le Développement*
PMC	Project Management Committee
PNDDR	*Programme National de Désarmament, Démobilisation et Réinsertion*
PRAC	*Projet de Réinsertion des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés*
PRASEJ	*Projet d'Appui à la securité Juridique*
PSPD	*Projet Sécurité Pour le Développement*
PSU	Police Support Unit
QUIPS	Quick Impact Projects
RCERP	Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Programme
RoC	Republic of Congo
RR	Rehabilitation and Reintegration
RRR	Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SIDDRS	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration Standards
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SOD	Special Operations Division
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSS	Special Security Service
TCG	Technical Coordination Group
TSA	Transitional Safety Allowance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WAFF	Women Associated with Fighting Forces
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

Executive summary

Life after surrendering a gun is the most daunting experience for a seasoned combatant. This makes reintegration, the process through which ex-combatants leave their fighting units to resume civilian life within their families and communities, the most important aspect of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. Studies indicate that DDR programming, which determines its implementation, can have wide-ranging implications for the sustainability of reintegration processes.

Experience shows that the design of reintegration programmes should, as a matter of priority, include a clear understanding of the social, cultural, economic and political dynamics of both ex-combatants and the recipient communities. An understanding of these aspects should inform the planning of a reintegration programme, and hence its sustainability. More often, however, DDR programmes have been designed with little or no consideration for either ex-combatants or the communities they are to be reintegrated into. In many cases donor communities are more concerned about fundraising for the DDR kitty and less about the programming of the reintegration process. By the time the reintegration stage is reached, the funds are usually exhausted, or donor fatigue will have set in, thereby crippling the realisation of the most critical element of the DDR process.

In certain circumstances the shear magnitude of the challenge and the urgent need to mitigate the situation can obscure proper programming, and even where the challenges have been taken into consideration the reintegration process may hardly be an end in itself, and needs to be followed by other programmes. A review of the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which so far is the largest programme of its kind to be implemented in the world and was designed to support an estimated 400 000 ex-combatants in nine countries of the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Central Africa, brings to the fore fundamental lessons.

The most important question is how attractive, after the closure of the MDRP in 2009, would former combatants still find it to remobilise into a fighting force of future unrest. The propensity for ex-combatants to remobilise willingly in part depends on the success and sustainability of their reintegration. An analysis of the implementation of the MDRP reveals the successes and challenges that the programme encountered, and helps to inform future programmes of this nature, particularly in Africa. This is the central theme of this monograph. Sustainable reintegration is one that inculcates in ex-combatants a sense of social belonging, and provides them with a long-term stake in national economic development, thereby providing powerful incentives for ex-combatants to continue their civilian lives. Similarly, sustainable engagement by national governments as they address the needs of ex-combatants and the wider society remains an important factor in state stability.

To illustrate the challenges facing the reintegration of ex-combatants in Africa, the monograph analyses in depth the MDRP process as was it implemented in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of Congo (RoC). An analysis of the United Nations (UN)-led Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme (Chapter 4) acts as a control case to the other two cases (CAR and RoC) that focus on MDRP involvement in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. The monograph also cites other cases, such as Sierra Leone among others, in an effort to substantiate further the arguments. The author would like to draw your attention to the concluding chapter (Chapter 5), which provides a synthesised version of the monograph as well as the lessons learnt.

1 Contextualising Africa's DDR challenges

Lessons from the MDRP initiative

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the World Bank and its partners in the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants initiated a new programme known as the Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (TDRP) to replace the former Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which closed in 2009, after seven years of existence. The main objective of this monograph is to analyse how the MDRP was planned, how it functioned and how far it met its objectives. The monograph further examines the reasons that led the World Bank and its partners to introduce a new programme, the TDRP, to replace the MDRP.

There are two main research questions that the monograph attempts to answer. The first is: 'How different was the MDRP from the TDRP? And how beneficial are these programmes to Africa, judging from how the MDRP operated?' For instance, what advantage does the TDRP have over the MDRP? In seeking to answer this question, the monograph analyses how the MDRP was planned and implemented; examines its objectives, successes and challenges; and weighs these results against the objectives of the newly initiated TDRP.

It is hoped that the findings drawn from the analysis of the implementation of the MDRP will inform the implementation of the TDRP. The second question is: 'What differences and similarities exist between the World Bank-led demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) programmes and the UN-led ones under the conventional disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes?'

In illustrating the operationalisation of the World Bank-led D&R programmes as well as the UN-led ones, the monograph reviews three African case studies in detail. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the case of the MDRP as implemented in the Republic of Congo (RoC) and Central African Republic (CAR) respectively, while Chapter 4 examines the D&R component of the UN-led Liberian DDR process. The aim of reviewing the Liberian case is to extract, where pertinent, some of the best practices from a UN-led process that could enrich future D&R processes such as the World Bank-led MDRP.

The first case is the MDRP, which was a multi-agency effort that supported the D&R of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. The MDRP targeted an estimated 400 000 former combatants in seven countries affected by conflict. These countries were Angola, Burundi, CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the RoC, Rwanda and Uganda.[1] In evaluating the successes and challenges of implementing DDR projects in Africa, this monograph presents an analysis of the cases of the CAR and the RoC with regard to how the MDRP funding was implemented in these countries. The case of the CAR is covered in Chapter 2, while the RoC case is covered in Chapter 3.

The second DDR approach used to assess the successes and challenges of DDR in Africa was the UN-led DDR process in Liberia, which has been lauded as one of the most successful DDR processes on the continent. This case study is covered in the fourth chapter.

BACKGROUND TO THE MDRP

The MDRP was premised on the fact that since DDR was a common facet of largely all the peace agreements that had ended the recent conflicts in the region, there was an urgent need to provide the former fighters with an alternative source of livelihood in the absence of war, on which they had relied. For instance, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in 1999 called for the need for tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting all armed groups. Similarly,

the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed by Burundi in 2000 and the Bicesse Accords signed by Angola in 1991 spelled out arrangements for establishing national armies. All these agreements contained provisions for a DDR process that envisioned the disarmament of combatants from warring factions. DDR was also a precursor of the national elections that ended the transitional governments in Burundi and the DRC.

The volatile and persistent nature of the conflict in the GLR, especially the war in the DRC, was therefore one of the major reasons for the creation of the MDRP in 2002. The need for such a structure was further underscored by the call for an inter-Congolese dialogue, the disarmament and demobilisation of armed foreign groups and the withdrawal of foreign troops, as contained in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July1999.[2] By signing the agreement, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to pull their troops out of the DRC. Consequently, the UN passed a resolution setting up the Organization Mission to Congo (MONUC)[3] with an initial mandate of planning for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces, as well as of maintaining liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Later in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of MONUC (now MONUSCO[4]) to include supervising the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The findings of consultations between the stakeholders in the countries involved, concerned donor countries, the UN and the World Bank were presented in two documents, 'Towards a Regional Framework for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the Greater Great Lakes Region'[5] and 'Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration,'[6] presented to the parties in Paris in 2002. The two documents provided the basis for a regional D&R strategy and laid the ground for an approach to mobilise resources for the implementation of such a strategy. Representatives from 13 donor countries, eight regional governments and 12 international organisations attended the meeting that offered to contribute their funds to a common kitty in the form of the MDRP.

The fund originally targeted nine countries in the GLR that had been embroiled in the regional conflict that had originated from the DRC in the 1990s and extended into the 2000s. The countries targeted initially were Angola, Burundi, CAR, the RoC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the DRC. Zimbabwe and Namibia never pursued MDRP resources, and in turn the MDRP did not seek their involvement. Similarly, Namibia was a middle-income country

and thus was not considered a good candidate for trust fund financing, while political conditions in Zimbabwe were viewed as rendering the country unfavourable for funding. There was also strong disagreement among donors over the inclusion of Zimbabwe on the list for political reasons.[7] The inclusion of the CAR and the RoC in the MDRP programme was because of the regional and strategic importance of the two countries, as expressed in the objectives of the MDRP.

The total amount of over $450 million contributed by the 13 donor countries and the World Bank financed the demobilisation of 300 000 ex-combatants in

Table 1.1 MDRP total receipts as at the end of 2009

Funding Agency	In Donor Currency	In USD
Belgium	EUR 10 007 938	10 992 483
Canada	CND 24 499 910	19 475 901
Denmark	DKK 26 872 000	4 033 720
European Commission	EUR 20 000 000	22 764 000
Finland	EUR 1 000 000	1 356 450
France	EUR 2 000 000	2 078 600
Germany	EUR 10 684 966	13 994 288
Ireland	EUR 500 000	659 550
Italy	EUR 1 500 000	1 714 050
Netherlands	EUR 103 000 000	125 831 219
Norway	NOK 45 000 000	6 875 376
Sweden	SEK 60 000 000	8 260 619
United Kingdom	USD 35 000 000	35 000 000
Total Donor Contribution		253 036 256
Investment Income		7 214 774
Total Trust Fund Receipts		260 251 030
IDA		191 384 533
Total		451 635 563

Source *MDRP final report by Scanteam, June 2010.8*

seven countries; helped set up national programmes and national implementing bodies that took ownership and leadership of their respective D&R programmes; supported cross-border learning and networks; generated new knowledge, insights and experience of great value to future D&R operations; and provided a series of lessons regarding funding, secretariat organisation, national ownership, regional collaboration, capacity building and technical assistance, beneficiary targeting, quality assurance and performance tracking, and linkages to other activities.

OBJECTIVES AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR MDRP BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES

The MDRP strategy defined its key objectives as being to:

- Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts
- Establish a single mechanism for donor co-ordination and resource mobilisation for demobilisation and reintegration
- Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilisation and reintegration programmes

The key operating assumptions of the strategy were:

- MDRP DDR strategy exists within a broader framework for peace and security and cannot be a substitute for that
- No single donor or agency can address the complexity of DDR in the region
- Partner contributions should be based on their respective comparative advantages and governments' preferences (which vary by country)
- Co-ordination is necessary to ensure that the MDRP does not operate in a political vacuum and that approaches are consistent irrespective of funding source
- Links with other efforts aimed at enhancing security and reconstructing shattered societies are important
- National programmes are prepared, appraised and supervised by national authorities and stakeholders, supported by interested donor and agency partners

The MDRP's criteria were such that for a country to qualify:

- It had to be actively involved in the regional peace process
- The government had to prepare a Letter of Demobilisation Policy (LDP) showing commitments to the regional peace process, D&R, and plans for social expenditure; prepare a national D&R programme, including its implementation plan; ensure that co-ordination and monitoring capacity and participation of relevant political and security stakeholders were in place; and ensure safeguards were in place and fiduciary measures had been taken[9]

Further to the above wide-ranging criteria, the sequencing of the demobilisation of government and irregular forces was to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis. While its implementation was to be defined locally, the execution could be undertaken by or in collaboration with UN agencies and international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).[10]

MDRP PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

In order to encourage ownership of the programme, the MDRP adopted a national ownership approach, which was different from the traditional trend in which DDR operations were managed by external organisations. The operational definition of national ownership meant that governments took the responsibility for the implementation of DDR programmes. As such, national governments were the recipients and executing agencies of the International Development Association (IDA) and the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) grants. The exception was the CAR, where, according to the analysis of the MDRP, conditions did not exist for supporting grant financing to the government, or for programmes targeting special target groups or implemented in areas out of government control. In such cases, UN agencies or NGOs implemented MDRP-financed activities on behalf of the government, as special projects.[11]

The entire MDRP programme was divided into four major programme components, which are outlined below.

The first component comprised national programmes. This category contained six sub-components: disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, reintegration, support to special groups and implementation arrangements. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures were also included in the D&R phase. The actual composition of national programmes was determined by the

specific socio-political context and the socio-economic profile of ex-combatants in their respective countries. The methodology of how countries were to implement the above six sub-components was left to each country to determine. In other words, the composition of national programmes would be determined by the specific socio-political contexts and socio-economic profiles of ex-combatants in their respective countries.

The challenge to this approach was that respective governments were left to design their own methodology and criteria for eligibility. Although the MDRP provided a guideline of principles to be followed, these were general in nature, and hence open to a wide range of interpretations. For instance in its national guideline principles, the MDRP adopted the definition of a child soldier of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), which states that

> A child soldier is any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or group. This includes those who are forcibly recruited as well as those who join voluntarily. All child or adolescent participants regardless of function – cooks, porters, messengers, girls used as 'wives,' and other support functions – are included as well as those considered combatants.

While this definition serves well in situations of relatively newly terminated armed conflicts, it may not be suitable in countries where the eligibility criteria encompass ex-combatants of wars of ten years and longer. This is because while the fighter may have been a child soldier (say ten years old) at the time of the conflict, such a person was most likely to be older than 18 if the conflict ended more than ten years ago. Such individuals would no longer fit the definition of 'child soldier', thereby raising the need for a better approach. Such was the case in the RoC (see Chapter 2, which deals with the RoC).

The ad hoc manner in which the MDRP tackled certain issues in the course of its implementation may have also contributed to the challenging nature of its implementation. For instance, in 2004, in response to a request by one of the MDRP partners, the MDRP secretariat created a new document, 'Targeting MDRP Assistance: Ex-combatants and Other War Affected Populations', which provided a definition of beneficiaries in response to a request by one of

the MDRP partners. As such, four additional criteria were added, including the adoption of the Cape Town principles and associated definitions of child soldiers. These additional criteria were incorporated into the national programmes of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. The evaluation report does not explain why the same criteria were not included in the rest of the countries' national programmes.

The second component was that of special projects. This component included two categories, the first being support to special target groups such as the resettlement of ex-combatants who were not willing to return to their country of origin, or who opted for third countries, and the second comprising activities carried out in parts of a participating country outside the control of the relevant government, as was the case in the CAR where the UN agencies and NGOs able to operate in areas beyond state control developed and executed MDRP-financed activities.

The third component entailed regional activities. The World Bank itself executed these activities, which included: support for cross-border information and sensitisation campaigns to apprise combatant groups of the options being developed, associated national programmes and special projects; timely and action-oriented knowledge generation and research to deepen the understanding of cross-border and cross-sectoral DDR issues (such as access to land, gender dimensions, mutual impact of MDRP, and national programmes and special projects); technical knowledge-sharing, capacity building and joint analysis among participating national programmes through semi-annual meetings of the regional Technical Coordination Group (TCG); and harmonisation of databases for national programmes and special projects to avoid having ex-combatants cross borders to benefit from DDR operations in neighbouring countries.

The fourth component of the MDRP consisted of programme management. This included six main tasks: (i) managing the partnership; (ii) preparing and supervising D&R operations (national programmes and special projects); (iii) managing the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) including mobilising resources (the MDTF was for paying for special projects; regional activities; and management and monitoring of the overall programme); (iv) providing technical assistance to client countries; (v) implementing regional activities; and (vi) developing and executing a communication and outreach strategy for the MDRP and reporting regularly on the programme to partners. The key partners to the

MDRP were the World Bank, national governments, bilateral donors, UN agencies, NGOs that contributed local capacity and knowledge to the programme, and regional and other partners such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union (AU) and the United States (US).[12]

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MDRP

A more focused assessment of the MDRP for the case study countries (DRC, RoC and CAR) is provided in the following chapters in this monograph. It is, however, important to note that at the closure of the MDRP in 2009, the programme's secretariat commissioned an evaluation whose terms of reference had three objectives:

- To identify the results of the MDRP vis-à-vis the objective of demobilising and reintegrating 400 000 ex-combatants in the GLR and to assess whether these activities contributed to the MDRP's development goal of increased peace and security in the GLR
- To identify the factors that contributed to the results achieved, with a focus on the effect of the design features/principles of the MDRP on which the programme was based
- To identify lessons and present recommendations for future programming and operations and for institutional stakeholders such as the World Bank and its donor partners[13]

A particular requirement to the evaluation team was that the evaluation should be restricted to the existing evaluations and reviews, and not carry out any own results' assessments on the ground but rather build on what was already in place. As contained in the second objective, the evaluation was to identify those design features of the MDRP itself that could explain results attained. There was, hence, no original work undertaken at 'country-results level'.[14] The mandate that governed the evaluation was therefore relatively restrictive, as it left no room for the evaluation team to look at country-specific outcomes and challenges. As the evaluation report states, 'The evaluation was restricted basically to assessing the achievement of MDRP objectives.' The evaluation report does not provide reasons for this restriction. Could it have been due to lack of resources or to a time factor? Or was it because prior (mid-term) evaluations

and reviews had covered country-specific issues and therefore there was no need for a further country review? From available data, there are no indications that country evaluations were conducted.

In planning a project of MDRP magnitude, monitoring and evaluation of the activities undertaken in target countries would provide specific lessons learnt, which in turn could be used to improve future programmes of a similar nature. This is because different countries exhibit different experiences.

In its report, the post-MDRP evaluation extracted various lessons learnt, among them the fact that too little thought at the outset was put into how the secretariat would function and how complex D&R operations would be managed inside the World Bank. The capacity building and technical assistance needs of the countries were not planned for, which left the secretariat constantly scrambling to bring experts on board and train them adequately in Bank operations. The evaluation report further recommended that it would have been better for the secretariat to be based within the region of the target countries, not only to enhance its engagement at policy level with national counterparts but also because in most fragile countries issues tend to move fast and therefore the ability to take quick decisions may depend on the secretariat's proximity to the situation.[15]

By and large, it is arguable that the GLR provided a difficult environment for the logistically complex D&R operations. Much as there were many challenges, the countries largely met their D&R targets, as per the standards set at their national levels. In its final report, the MDRP secretariat acknowledged that while most the beneficiary countries remained fragile, the region had, as part of the MDRP impact, experienced a positive trend in stability and economic growth. The report adds that the number of internally displaced persons and refugees dropped during the period of the MDRP's operation (2002 to 2009) from 10 million to 3,6 million, while the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased overall from US$ 12,4 billion in 2002 to US$ 53.3 billion in 2007, resulting in improved trade.

The trend in GDP of the seven countries depicted in Figure 1.1 below is due to many other factors that contribute to the GDP of any given country and not necessarily the impact of the MDRP fund on these countries. It is observable from the graph that from around 2002 there was a relatively sharp increase in the GDPs of Angola and Uganda, while the rest of the countries indicated steady growth. This tends to coincide with the MDRP's observation of the GDP

Figure 1.1 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) history plus forecast for the seven MDRP target countries



Source *International Futures (IFs) base case version 6.38.*

of these countries. One can therefore state conclusively that the MDRP contributed to the growth in GDP of the target countries.

Also important to note is that the MDRP secretariat initiated the D&R programmes at different times in every country and not simultaneously, and as such the impact on GDP was not immediate in all countries. The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides one of the most widely used indices through which human development and living conditions are tracked across the world, also provides a good indication of the impact that a project of MDRP magnitude could bring to its beneficiaries, such as living a long and healthy life and being educated and knowledgeable.

Figure 1.2 below provides the HDI of the seven countries. It is observable from the graph that from 2004 all the seven countries registered a sharp

Figure 1.2 HDI (Human Development Index) history plus forecast for the seven MDRP target countries



Source *International Futures (IFs) base case version 6.38.*

improvement in their HDI. A variety of factors such as the MDRP fund, the gradual return of peace and security and improved governance may have contributed to this sharp increase in HDI.

The delay in the implementation of the programme in some of the countries, orchestrated by political stalemates or weak national management, also partly contributed to erratic commencement of the programme, leading to variations in countries' HDI.

According to the MDRP final report of July 2010, the fund benefitted five national programmes with financing of US$ 355.7 million and ten special projects with financing of US$ 54.9 million. The bulk of the special projects were implemented in the DRC. Over the life of the MDRP, 279 263 adult combatants were demobilised through MDRP-supported national programmes and special projects; 244 597 ex-combatants received reinsertion

Table 1.2 Number of adult ex-combatant beneficiaries of D&R programmes, by gender and country

Beneficiaries						
Country	DDR Process	Male	Female	Total	Target	% Achieved
Angola	Demobilisation	94 052	3 338	97 390	105 000	93%
	Reinsertion			52 721	62 716	84%
	Reintegration			92 297	133 662	69%
Burundi	Demobilisation	25 767	516	26 283	35 000	75%
	Reinsertion			23 022	35 000	66%
	Reintegration			21 012	35 000	60%
CAR	Demobilisation	6 380	1 176	7 556	7 565	100%
	Reinsertion			7 533	7 565	100%
	Reintegration			7 556	7 565	100%
DRC	Demobilisation	99 404	2 610	102 014	150 000	68%
	Reinsertion			102 014	120 000	85%
	Reintegration			52 172	90 000	58%
RoC	Demobilisation				11 000	0%
	Reinsertion				11 000	0%
	Reintegration			15 179	30 000	51%
Rwanda	Demobilisation	29 699	65	29 764	36 000	83%
	Reinsertion			44 491	47 400	94%
	Reintegration			43 891	50 000	88%
Uganda	Demobilisation	14 115	2 141	16 256	15 310	106%
	Reinsertion			14 816	15 310	97%
	Reintegration			n/a	n/a	n/a
MDRP Total	Demobilisation	269 417	9 846	279 263	359 875	78%
	Reinsertion			244 597	298 991	82%
	Reintegration			232 107	346 227	67%

Source *MDRP Final Report, July 2010.*

assistance; and 232 107 received support for economic reintegration (see Table 1.2 above).

The report further states that 53 880 children associated with fighting forces were assisted in being reunified with their families and reintegrated into their communities. The report clarifies that data on the outcomes of the MDRP is unfortunately incomplete and inconsistent across countries, but available information suggests reasonable results overall, especially if one considers the objective of reintegration, which is to put ex-combatants on par with other community members. In many cases, this meant reintegrating ex-combatants back into poverty.

Another major challenge that the MDRP faced was that of reaching female and war-wounded ex-combatants. The MDRP final report indicates that only 9 846 female combatants were demobilised, as opposed to 269 417 males. The difficulty of reaching female ex-combatants was experienced across all the countries, including those that had greater implementation capacity and stronger institutions. Ensuring that female ex-combatants were on par with their male counterparts after they had received their reintegration support presented the biggest challenge, prompting the MDRP to put into place in 2007 a number of measures to address gender in its programming. One such initiative was the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace (LEAP) Programme, which aimed to strengthen gender responsive DDR programming across MDRP countries.[16] However, LEAP was launched at a time when the MDRP was nearing its closure, hence was not able to realise its full potential.

FROM MDRP TO TDRP

Unlike disarmament and demobilisation, reintegration is a gradual process that could take several years to achieve. There are often a myriad of factors to take into consideration in ensuring that an ex-combatant is successfully reintegrated back into society. These factors include age, gender, marital status, number of dependents, level of education, formal qualifications, work experience, reasons for involvement in the conflict, original combat force type and structure, military rank, duration and nature of combat experience, duration of time away from home, community of return and one's health status (including disability, chronic illness, etc.).[17]

Despite the MDRP having been an ambitious and complex undertaking for the World Bank and its partners, the programme presented an informative platform from which future similar programmes could be modelled. Several advantages accrued from the programme. Firstly, the MDRP had a positive impact on the lives of a number of ex-combatants, providing them with an opportunity for a new start in life. In this way, a foundation was set for beneficiaries to start a new beginning, especially economically. Secondly, a number of lessons drawn from the implementation of the MDRP, if taken into consideration should inform the newly launched Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (TDRP).

OPERATIONALISING THE TDRP

The transitional nature of the TDRP means that it aims to support countries that transition from demobilisation and reintegration efforts into longer-term development programmes. The programme is to run for a period of three years, from 2009 to 2012. The transitional nature of the programme is meant to create linkages between ongoing DDR activities and longer-term stabilisation and development programmes.

The original seven countries that participated in the MDRP – Angola, Burundi, the CAR, DRC, RoC, Rwanda and Uganda – are the countries eligible for TDRP support. There is also grant financing to governments, only available to countries that meet the eligibility criteria of all contributing donors to the TDRP trust fund. Other countries outside the GLR may be eligible for technical assistance on an exceptional basis, but such support must be approved by the TDRP Trust Fund Committee.[18]

2 MDRP and the reintegration process in the Republic of Congo

BACKGROUND TO DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

The last civil war in the Republic of Congo (RoC) was the 1998-99 war, which ended with the forces of President Sassou Nguesso emerging victorious and hence dictating the terms of peace. A ceasefire agreement in late 1999 laid out a plan for a national dialogue, demilitarisation of political parties, and the reorganisation of the army, including the readmission of rebels into the security forces. Building on its significant military gains, the RoC Government granted amnesty to all militia combatants on 15 August 1999, and at the end of 1999 ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreements were signed between the government and key military commanders representing all warring parties, under the mediation of the late President Bongo of Gabon.[19] Prior to the MDRP-funded programme, there were two initial reintegration attempts: one financed jointly by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and a second one funded by the World Bank IDA. Both programmes focused on reintegration of ex-combatants. The UNDP/IOM, which helped to reintegrate 8 019 ex-combatants, took place between July

2000 and November 2002, while the programme financed by the World Bank through the IDA started at the end of 2001 and ended in February 2005, having reintegrated 9 000 ex-combatants.[20]

The main aim was to ensure the sustainability of the 1999 ceasefire agreement and cessation of hostilities, thereby consolidating peace and security. The process formed a strategic instrument for social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as a stopgap measure in preventing a possible recurrence of the conflict. The reintegration programmes entailed financing micro-projects focusing on income generation, equipping the beneficiaries with basic formal training on their skills of choice, providing medical and psychological rehabilitation, and providing basic community infrastructure and capacity of trainers.

MDRP FUND

The negotiation between the Government of the RoC, the World Bank and its partners started in 2004, leading to the approval of the fund in February 2005, followed by the signing of the agreement in January 2006.[21] The RoC was the last country to benefit from the MDRP funding, out of the seven. The programme closed in 2009, marking the last phase of the MDRP.

The MDRP reflected a significant departure from the conventional approach to programming in terms of the D&R into civilian life of former combatants. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, prior to the MDRP project, D&R processes were typically designed and implemented at national level. The rationale for this new approach was that, given that the armed conflict in the DRC was regional in nature in that a number of countries and rebel groups from neighbouring countries were directly involved, a regional response was required. The mid-term review of the MDRP described the programme as 'a radical innovation … a bold and experimental effort, one that is unprecedented in the post-conflict field'.[22]

Following the signing of the agreement between the World Bank and the Government of the RoC in 2006, most activities were centred on the planning of the D&R project in which the main activities entailed the setting up of eligibility criteria, identification and enrolment of possible beneficiaries (as not everyone who qualified and appeared on the list was an eligible candidate) and the validation of the list (the list was sent to France for *matching* of the beneficiary details to authenticate validity by eliminating cases of double registration. The

list was brought back to Brazzaville in July 2007, after the *matching* process). This elimination process was vital, as lessons from earlier reintegration processes had proved challenging owing to incidents of falsification of identity and/or double dipping.

Programming of the MDRP fund in the RoC

The total MDRP fund for the RoC was US$24,2 million and it was managed by the *Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-combattants* (HCREC) or simply 'Commissariat' – a government section that deals with DDR projects. The MDRP fund was implemented under a programme known as *Programme National de Désarmament, Démobilisation et Réinsertion* (PNDDR), which was also responsible for the planning of the process.

The national objectives of the MDRP project in the RoC were to:

- Contribute to the improvement of security through the disarmament and demobilisation of up to 11 000 combatants
- Support social reintegration through rehabilitation of social infrastructure, conflict management, and reconciliation and
- Support economic reintegration through income-generating activities for ex-combatants[23]

The PNDDR targeted 30 000 ex-combatants, composed of 5 000 Ninja rebels from the Pool region, who were still armed and commanded by Pasteur Ntoumi; 6 000 composed of the national security forces; and 19 000 self-demobilised ex-combatants *(ex-combattants auto démobilisés)*, who include former militias (Cobras, Mambas, Zoulous) as well as child soldiers. The figure of 30 000 was arrived at on the basis of the budget constraints and those who were left out of the current programme were advised, through the PNDDR's section on 'Conflict Prevention and Violence Reduction', to wait for future programmes.[24] According to the information made available by the PNDDR, a total of US$25 000 was needed if the programme were to reasonably cover its objectives and involve a sizeable number of beneficiaries. The shortfall (US$8 000), according to the PNDDR, was raised through other bilateral relations with foreign donors.[25] According to the MDRP final report on the RoC, the country's outcome success rating was moderately unsatisfactory since the

project's demobilisation objectives and some of its reintegration objectives were not achieved.[26]

PNDDR structure and eligibility criteria

The PNDDR programme was composed of five sections: (a) disarmament, (b) child soldiers and other vulnerable groups, (c) security sector reform, (d) demobilisation and reinsertion, and (e) conflict prevention and resolution.

In its approach, the PNDDR envisaged helping strictly those who had participated in the conflicts directly, and where children and women were considered they had to qualify as having played an active additional role as well, for instance as logisticians (supplying the fighters with ammunition, food, information and espionage). Women accompanying fighting forces (WAFF) and children accompanying fighting forces (CAFF) as well as widowers were left out owing to limited funds. In principle this approach largely contrasted with the conventional disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) processes, such as used in the Liberian case, which adopted the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) by integrating wider community needs (see the Liberia case study in Chapter 4). In a focus group conducted by the author in the *Arrondissement de Total BaCongo,* the participants wondered why the demobilisation and reinsertion programme was being implemented ten years after the war, and only to benefit those that had actively fought, while neglecting those who accompanied them, including supplying them with logistics. To many that felt left out, the process only served to resuscitate the community's emotions towards those who committed atrocities against them. A similar focus group was held in M'pila, north of Brazzaville, and composed of five ex-combatants, three of whom said they had been registered by PNDDR and were awaiting formal feedback on whether they had 'succeeded' while another two had deliberately not presented themselves for registration, basing their reluctance on the tediousness of going to look for their former commanders in order for them (former commanders) to authenticate their eligibility. The PNDDR's five sections are discussed below.

(a) Disarmament

While the other four sections of the programme were covered by the PNDDR, disarmament, which remained an integral part of the PNDDR, was undertaken

by the UNDP through a project known as *Projet de Collecte d'Armes pour le Développement* (PCAD) in co-ordination with other national security forces. This approach was necessary as the disarmament component fell out of the MDRP sphere. The PCAD's aim was to collect an estimated 41 000 small arms circulating among Congolese civilians. This estimate was established by a study conducted by Small Arms Survey in 2001. The first phase of the PCAD started in November 2005 and ended in November 2006 and operated with a budget of €2 million donated by the European Union.[27] In total the PCAD helped to collect 1 308 small arms, 626 503 rounds of ammunition and 2 434 assorted explosives, in exchange for various tools (fishing nets, hoes, photocopiers, bicycles, flour mills, etc.); building material (cement, timber, iron sheets, etc.); and home equipment (mattresses, bed nets, shaving machines, clothing, etc).[28] The figure of 1 038 weapons collected in the first phase was way below the expected figure of 15 000 weapons.[29] The disarmament process was voluntary and individuals were allowed to disarm individually, in groups or as communities (villages, etc.). Each calibre of weapon surrendered was given a corresponding number of points, and this determined the type of compensation that one got in return. Table 2.1 below shows some of the grading by the PCAD.

For non-functional weapons and munitions, the points were divided by three. Cartridges and ammunitions that have to be fired by use of an additional weapon were not accepted unless they were accompanied by the relevant firing weapons. The points corresponded to a list of an assortment of tools and equipment; for instance, a machete was valued at 664 points, a pair of bed sheets was 395 points, a hoe was 321 points, and a mattress was 2 005 points.[30]

Table 2.1 Weighting of weapons collected by the PCAD

	Arms and ammunitions	Value in points
Arms	1 rocket launcher, machine gun…	400
	1 assault rifle (AK47, UZIS…)	200
	1 pistol	100
Munitions and explosives	1 explosive (hand grenade, RPG, TNT…)	50
	1 high calibre munition	25
	1 cartridge or a firing element	1

Source *UNDP/CONGO: PCAD public information pamphlet on disarmament (undated)*

There were instances where a community or group of individuals pooled their points, thereby qualifying for an item of benefit to them all, such as a flour mill. In such an instance, the group/community would forward the request to the PCAD and after the weapons were surrendered and points allocated, the PCAD would purchase the equipment on behalf of the group. Where communities were involved, often requests entailed community projects such as the rehabilitation of education, sports and cultural equipment.

The PCAD also allowed individuals, groups and community representatives that wished to surrender their arms the liberty of contacting PCAD offices either physically or by telephone. The persons would then organise with HCREC and PCAD staff where and when the arms would be surrendered. Often (especially in the case of individuals) the operation to surrender weapons was conducted secretively for fear of other community members identifying them as being in possession of weapons long after the war had ended. The PCAD's guiding philosophy in the collection of surrendered weapons was that '*les armes n'aiment pas le bruit*', or 'guns hate noise'. This meant that the confidentiality of the entire process of weapons surrender and collection had to be safeguarded as much as possible so as not to alarm the community. In addition to this, the general belief was that guns are not items that should feature in the daily lives of individuals unnecessarily and, therefore, discussing them in public, with the aim of collecting them, would only persuade those who had them to conceal them even more, as no one would willingly want to be associated with an illegal weapon long after the war had ended. The logic was to avoid resuscitating emotions and fear within the community. 'Imagine how traumatic it would be if one learnt that one's neighbour of seven or so years suddenly pulled out a cache of arms in the name of disarmament. Such occurrences would deeply traumatise the communities and create deep suspicion and mistrust among individuals.'[31] In its awareness programmes, therefore, the PCAD avoided open campaigns and instead used village elders, chiefs and religious leaders to pass the message quietly on to their communities and congregations.[32]

The second phase of the PCAD activities could not start immediately after the closure of the first phase in November 2006 owing to financial constraints. With a new fund of US$2 913 524 secured from the Government of Japan, the second phase of disarmament started in November 2007. Unlike the first phase, which covered only Brazzaville, the second phase covered Brazzaville and the Pool region besides other regions.

(b) Former child soldiers and other vulnerable groups

Another concern related to eligibility criteria was that of child soldiers. It was considered that close to ten years after the conflict had ended most (if not all) of the then-child soldiers during the war were now adults and therefore could not be defined as 'child soldiers'. To tackle this anomaly, the PNDDR chose 1990 as the cut-off date of birth for people presenting themselves for eligibility as former child soldiers, alongside meeting other elements of eligibility. Such an individual, after being classified as having been a child soldier, joined the mainstream ex-combatant process. In total the PNDDR enrolled 2 800 child soldiers (excluding those in the Pool region, as Pasteur Ntoumi was yet to give consent to the PNDDR to access the area).[33] The age limit for the eligibility of girl-ex-child soldiers was set at 25 while that of boys was set at 21 in order to allow for inclusivity. Disabled and/or chronically ill ex-combatants were provided with special assistance under the PNDDR framework.

Disabled ex-combatants were provided with social and economic reintegration assistance, while the chronically ill (including those afflicted with HIV/AIDS) were given medical services, counselling and sensitisation, besides reintegration support. In instances where an ex-combatant was unable to take full advantage of economic reintegration assistance, the PNDDR sought to ensure that the ex-combatant's dependants had access to the service or support. The PNDDR realised the importance of continued support to certain ex-combatants and/or their dependants, and as such endeavoured to make local arrangements that could provide for this category of ex-combatant when the programme came to a close.[34]

(c) Security sector reform as part of PNDDR

According to the British Department for International Development (DFID), security sector reform (SSR) is the transformation of the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that the system is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development.[35] The overall objective of SSR is hence to contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development.

The objectives of Congo's SSR were to align the security forces with the security needs of the country, to nationalise the country's armed forces and hence make them more operational, and to demobilise and reinsert into civilian life those forces that did not meet the set criteria for being part of the national security forces.

Of the 30 000 ex-combatants, 6 000 were envisaged as coming from the military (*Forces Armées Centrafricaines* – FACA), as a result of the SSR process in which the armed forces, gendarmerie and the national police were reorganised into a modern force. This selection process was necessary in order to clean the security forces of irregularities that characterised the recruitment of the security forces in the aftermath of the war when militias were simply remobilised into security forces without strict, formal criteria.

The SSR process therefore had the aims of disarming and demobilising the security forces that did not meet the specified criteria; i.e. (i) those ascertained to be illiterate or with insufficient basic education (according to the set standards of a conventional armed forces) to qualify them for advanced training; (ii) those who did not meet the basic age of recruitment. This was deemed necessary for cleaning the military of militias recruited at advanced age without observing a cut-off age for military recruitment. For instance it was established that if one was recruited at the age of 30 or older, such an individual, at the time of retirement, would not have met the pensionable requirements of the armed forces, hence the need to lower the recruitment age to a much younger one; and (iii) those whose state of health made them unfit for service or those declared to be addicted to drugs and/or other addictive substances.

(d) Demobilisation and reinsertion process

The demobilisation process was administered by the PNDDR. The process started with public awareness campaigns aimed at sensitising the communities about the programme and its beneficiaries, followed by the cantonment of ex-combatants in demobilisation centres for five days during which other processes took place, such as:

- Verification of identification, followed by orientation
- Provision of more information on the D&R programme, accompanied by civic and moral education
- Provision of information on HIV/AIDS

- Trauma and psychosocial counselling
- Issuing of a transitional safety net that entailed US$150 as well as the ex-combatants' immediate needs such as food, clothing and bedding
- Recording of ex-combatants' socio-economic data
- Transporting of the ex-combatants to their localities

A similar process was followed in demobilising the security forces, although in this case the cantonment process was carried out in the military barracks.

After demobilisation, the ex-combatants were reinserted into their communities of origin or of their choice, as the first step towards reintegration. Reinsertion, according to the PNDDR, was both economic and social in nature. The economic aspect of it entailed exploring the possibilities of job placement for the ex-combatant, in line with either availability of vacancies and/or individual skills; providing direct support to beneficiaries through self-initiated micro-enterprises; providing technical and professional skills as a way of empowering the beneficiaries; and placing the ex-combatants, including the demobilised security forces, in public projects such as road construction. Similar attention was given to former child soldiers who had, through the passage of time, attained adult age as well as ex-combatants incapacitated by the war. On the other hand, social reinsertion consisted of psychosocial and medical rehabilitation. This implied conducting regular medical reviews and administering the necessary medication.

As a way of fostering reconciliation between ex-combatants and their communities of return, the PNDDR tried (although this was not comprehensively successful) to rehabilitate some basic communal infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war, such as schools and clinics, or sections of them. Ex-combatants were involved in carrying out such renovations as one way of providing labour and inculcating a sense of ownership in them. It was also a healing process as well as a form of reconciliation with the community for those ex-combatants who had played an active role in the destruction of those facilities.

Demobilised security forces were combined with the rest of the PNDDR beneficiaries at the reinsertion stage. This was necessary in order to lessen stigmatisation and the risks of those demobilised taking up arms again since most of the members of the security forces had a history of war and many had links to the communities of their origin, especially to their former militia colleagues

who did not join the security forces. It was therefore wise to put them under the PNDDR programme where, like the rest of the beneficiaries, they would be socialised in the same way, including benefitting from destigmatisation, psychosocial counselling and reintegration packages.

The reintegration programme

In the RoC, the body entrusted with the reintegration process under the MDRP was called the 'Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Programme' (RCERP) and this body formed part of the regional MDRP programme for the greater Great Lakes Region (GLR). The general objective of the RCERP was to consolidate peace and economic stability while at the same time supporting sustainable development in the RoC and in the greater GLR.[36]

To achieve its development and poverty-reduction goals, the RCERP was modelled along the objectives of the *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* and the World Bank's Transitional Support Strategy. The wider objective of the programme was to establish favourable conditions in rural and urban areas that encouraged ex-combatants and the population at large to resume productive lives in the rural and urban economy, as well as free up additional national resources for investment in social and economic sectors as well as in the human capital of ex-combatants and communities alike. Upon the adoption of the PNDDR by the Government of the RoC on 31 December 2004, the PNDDR and RCERP adopted the approach of the earlier IDA-funded and government-executed Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (EDRP) so that benefits provided to eligible ex-combatants under the RCERP would be comparable to those given under the EDRP to avoid a situation where different groups of ex-combatants received different treatment, which might have undermined the objectives of the new programme.

The eligibility criteria used in identifying the 30 000 beneficiaries for demobilisation and reintegration were drafted jointly by the MDRP secretariat, the government and partners. An ex-combatant qualified for the programme if he or she:

- Proved participation in armed combat or sustained logistical support during the civil wars
- Indicated a preference for training and/or a micro-project creating employment or income for the beneficiary (this did not apply to those for whom job placement was available)

- Had not been included in labour-intensive projects or received other salaried employment and
- Had not benefited previously from UNDP/IOM or HCREC reintegration assistance. This was very challenging to prove, as the data was not entirely accurate

In addition, the programme also took into account whether the ex-combatant had surrendered a weapon in the context of the UNDP-led disarmament programme or had been demobilised from the army. While this was not a necessary condition for one to qualify for reintegration benefits, the surrender of a serviceable weapon gave an individual priority status in the processing of micro-project applications.

Relative to earlier processes, the PNDDR programme's procedure for the verification of eligibility status was significantly tightened in comparison to the previous IDA-funded D&R programme. For instance, ex-combatant status would need to be verified by the regional programme representatives *(Chef d'antenne)* as well as a witness, certifying the dates and localities where the ex-combatant had been active, including proof that he/she was jobless at the time of this new consideration for D&R. Similarly, an internal control mechanism was established to conduct random audits of eligibility decisions to ensure the strict application of criteria and fairness in the distribution of benefits across regions as well as to determine whether the recipient had previously received benefits under the UNDP/IOM programme. This was meant to check incidents of double-dipping or other unjustified receipt of benefits, which, if discovered, would lead to recovery of funds and prosecution of the offender under applicable laws.[37]

The PNDDR programme covered all the departments of Congo apart from three (Kouilou, Sangha and Likouala). The justification for excluding the three was that they had not been greatly affected by the war, which was mainly fought in Brazzaville. In addition, accessing the would-be beneficiaries in the three departments would not have been possible as some of the departments were not easily accessible. Another challenge would have been the burden of proof for authenticity of supposed ex-combatants. The argument was that inhabitants of these departments could not bear witness to their youth's participation in the war because they (the inhabitants of the three departments) were not in Brazzaville during the war to witness their youth's alleged participation.[38]

According to the programme budget, the highest allocation (64%) went to the socio-economic reintegration aspect, while prevention/reduction of conflict and violence had the smallest allocation (2%). The indication was that the programme's emphasis was more on reintegration and less on addressing the root causes of conflicts. Similarly, there was less focus on community support (4%) than on project management (12,4%). The budget allocation could be analysed further in terms of the long-term human security impact and project efficiency (these lie outside of the scope of this monograph). Table 2.2 below depicts the breakdown of these costs.

The reintegration programme was modelled along the approach used in the previous reintegration processes, namely that ex-combatants identify a project of their choice and present it to the PNDDR for validation before the funds were released. In this process individuals were encouraged to team up in groups of not more than 15 people and identify a project of choice. Projects ranged from livestock keeping to fish farming.

According to the policy framework of the RoC funding proposal to the MDRP, the objective of the economic reintegration was to create durable

Table 2.2 Demobilisation and reintegration programme costs

Component	Average unit cost (US$)	Total programme cost (US$ millions)	Per cent
1. Demobilisation and transition	80	2,4	9,6%
2. Socio-economic reintegration	533	16,0	64,0%
3. Reintegration support to communities	33	1,0	4%
4. Special groups	33	1,0	4%
5. Prevention/Reduction of conflict and violence	16	0,5	2%
6. Programme management	103	3,1	12,4%
Sub-total	800	24,0	96%
Contingencies	33	1,0	4%
Total (estimated)	833	25,0	100%

Source *RoC Proposal to the MDRP Trust Fund Committee of the Multi-donor Trust Fund, 2004*

employment and/or income-generating projects for ex-combatants and to re-integrate them into their communities with the ultimate goal of rendering a possible re-mobilisation less likely. By creating such an environment the option for war would certainly be unattractive to ex-combatants as they would risk losing their investments if they favoured conflict. In addition to lessening the chances of conflict, the approach envisaged providing equal benefits to all, irrespective of rank, former affiliation, region or gender. Beneficiaries were, however, allowed to choose their communities of reintegration freely. To the extent possible, the provision of reintegration support was to be based on the conditions that:

- The support would lead to durable incomes for the beneficiaries
- It would use locally available technology and natural and human resources
- It would comply with environmental and social safeguards and
- The total amount available for reintegration support would not exceed US$400 per beneficiary

Eligible ex-combatants were offered a choice of options to be exercised individually or in groups of ex-combatants. These options included:

- Placement in existing or future employment
- Direct financial support to ex-combatants who opted to create micro-enterprises or income-generating activities
- Technical or professional training, possibly in combination with the options above
- Placement in labour-intensive projects

Local civil society organisations were selected to act as caretaker trainers (*Agences d'encadrement*) responsible for the initial evaluation of micro-projects on the basis of guidelines developed and circulated by the PNDDR. These organisations were to assist (mentor) ex-combatants in the implementation stages of their micro-projects by providing counselling and advice where necessary.

In addition, to facilitating social reintegration and local reconciliation, the PNDDR also provided support to communities that had suffered from the effects of the war as well as those where ex-combatants had been reintegrated.

Such support was in the form of infrastructure repair, notably in the education and health sectors.

Each beneficiary's US$400 was invested directly in the project in two equal tranches. The beneficiaries were first trained on how to manage their projects of choice. Regular follow-up sessions were conducted in which the caretaker trainers would continuously mentor the beneficiaries for a period of one year.

(e) Prevention and reduction of conflict and violence

The conflict prevention aspect of the programme was the least funded of all, as indicated in the budget estimates set out in Table 2.2 above. The inclusion of this aspect in the PNDDR programming was as a result of the wish by both the government and the Congolese civil society to address the cultural and psychological aspects of the conflicts. The civil society was of the view that, while several years had passed since the end of hostilities, the potential for violence erupting as a result of poverty, ethnic tension, criminal behaviour, and the trauma of war remained high across the RoC.[39] This component was, therefore, included in the programme with the view to promoting a national consensus on the need to reduce the potential for violence. It was the only aspect that was concerned with addressing factors that had been known to catalyse the past Congolese conflicts. Activities under this component included seminars and workshops aimed at promoting a culture of strengthening traditional community-based methods of conflict resolution as well as establishing a modest monitoring mechanism to identify areas where tension might increase or where problems remained unresolved. This mechanism also included an ombudsman that provided a feedback mechanism on the effectiveness of the overall programme for target groups as well as for the population at large.

The prevention and reduction of conflict and violence section of the programme was also responsible for handling any allegations of benefit abuse or other improper use of PNDDR funds by working with internal auditors who would be assisted in this matter by an independent financial management agency. This section was also responsible for consoling those ex-combatants that would be dropped from the D&R programme owing to limited funding. The prevention and reduction of conflict and violence component also served as a vehicle for transmitting messages to the communities, and for informing them that those who had been left out of the programme would most likely be considered in the subsequent one.[40]

MAINSTREAMING IDDRS AND SIDDR STANDARDS IN DDR PROGRAMMES

From the foregoing analysis of the demobilisation and reintegration execution plan in the RoC, it is possible to make a theoretical assessment of whether the said planning and execution of the programme was in line with the IDDRS and the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration Standards (SIDDRS). The IDDRS have been drafted on the basis of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all the UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved in providing the UN system with a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context. However, while the IDDRS were designed with peacekeeping contexts in mind, much of the guidance contained within these standards is also applicable in non-peacekeeping contexts, in line with the three main objectives of the IDDRS, which are:

- To give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions, based on a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR activities
- To serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated operational planning in headquarters and at country level and
- To function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists

On the other hand, the SIDDRS provides a holistic view of such programmes where opportunities and limitations are considered from the perspective of the overall approaches to ensure the long-term personal security for people, rebuilding of post-conflict societies and laying of foundations for sustainable development.

The SIDDRS therefore take cognisance of the fact that processes of DDR need to be addressed through a comprehensive approach that benefits a post-conflict society at large. It is critical to ensure that an ex-combatant need not return to using violence to survive. The report, therefore, endorses the provision of what has come to be known as a 'transitional safety net' that enables the ex-combatant to survive and take care of his or her family and cope while adjusting to his or her new status as a productive member of society. The SIDDRS also emphasise the need for the immediate short-term focus on the combatant

through reinsertion, which takes care of the combatant before the longer-term focus on sustainable reintegration.

Similarly, the SIDDRS advocate the creation of alternative incentives to violence for ex-combatants in order to make it less likely for them to disrupt ongoing peace efforts while awaiting a more long-term, sustainable reintegration and return to a productive civilian livelihood. The SIDDRS framework spells out that local communities need to be taken into account in order to build their capacity to absorb returning soldiers as well as to minimise possibilities of new tension between ex-combatants and their communities of return. In this way, it is fundamental that parallel programmes are developed early in the programme so as to provide communities with support for receiving ex-combatants as a direct complement to a DDR programme.

From the review of the implementation of the MDRP in the RoC, it is clear that although the programme made a positive contribution in reintegrating a number of former fighters back into the community, the programme suffered a shortfall of funds, necessitating a cutback in the number of targeted beneficiaries. Reintegration is a long-term gradual process whose timelines are not fixable.

It is recommendable that future MDRP-type D&R programmes incorporate IDDRS approaches in planning in order to lessen unexpected occurrences. In the same measure, positive tenets of MDRP that are not covered in the IDDRS should be espoused in the designing of future D&R programmes.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter has underscored the fact that there is no a blueprint approach to DDR. What works in one country may not necessarily work in another country. While the chapter underscores the important role that D&R plays in abating chances of further escalation of violence, it contends that circumstances surrounding a conflict such as its nature, duration, participants and causes are some of the variables that should be taken into account when designing a D&R programme. The chapter has attempted to bring to the fore some of the common challenges widely experienced in Africa. As laid out in the recommendations below, D&R programming should be based in the context of transitioning from war to peace. Such an approach should have as its central objective creating linkages between D&R and more traditional forms of recovery and

development assistance. With regard to the MDRP process in the RoC, that the following recommendations are made:

- In future, D&R planning should continue to seek the participation all concerned in order to ensure a national ownership of the process, especially at the implementation stage. The desire by governments (or the winner in a war) to assume control of state apparatus results in the tendency of the government/winner to assume ownership of the process, thereby sidelining other partner(s) to the agreement. There is always a risk that the government could use the opportunity to consolidate its power to the detriment of groups that were in armed opposition, if left to steer the reintegration process. The MDRP appears to have managed this aspect well in the context of the RoC.
- In the context of the main DDR programming, it is advisable that any inconsistencies in funding be avoided, as renewed grievance, especially when corrupt leaders use resources allocated to DDR programmes to pursue their political ambitions such as favouring certain former armed factions over others, rewarding past allegiances, discrediting opposition parties or favouring particular constituencies such as ethnic or religious groups, could easily lead to renewed fighting. In order to avoid this pitfall, it is advisable that the government's role and responsibilities be spelt out in the peace agreement, which should also provide for the equal treatment of all groups signatory to the agreement. A classic example of such an initiative is Mozambique.
- D&R needs to be linked to human security and community recovery programmes. To achieve this, aspects such as the demographic, social and economic impacts of ex-combatants on host communities have to be fused into the programme from the start in order to prevent D&R from being seen as centrally focusing on ex-combatants. Then mitigation measures must be put in place to lessen negative social and environmental impacts. However, owing to the need to ensure that former fighters do not seek solace in taking up arms again, a comprehensive DDR assistance to ex-combatants is critical.
- The need for D&R to develop an effective exit strategy is paramount in order for the society not to view the drawing down of a D&R programme support as a form of abandoning the society to relapse into conflict. One effective way of achieving this would be to create a network of complementarities, where UN agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the World

Health Organization (WHO), and the UNDP co-ordinate with strategic civil society organisations in the host country to continue offering support and monitoring and evaluation to beneficiaries of D&R programmes. This is most essential in the reintegration phase. The pullout should be implemented gradually as opposed to sudden stoppage.

- Effective counselling on available skills at the start of a reintegration process could help avert preferences for skills that do not have market value in the rural areas. Selection of appropriate skills facilitates a smooth reintegration of ex-combatants into the various communities through collaboration with local institutions with the capacity to engage in the process, such as those with the ability to deliver viable projects effectively. Adopting the IDDRS is advisable because of the comprehensive manner in which they address the wider concerns of DDR programming.
- DDR programming also needs to integrate other processes such as SSR and post-war justice and reconciliation processes. This is because in many post-war situations the planning for a reformed security sector would ideally define the parameters and modalities of disarmament and demobilisation. If not for the sheer costs of maintaining a large national army, it might in some cases be attractive to absorb as many former rebels into the regular (reformed) national army as they qualify and postpone DDR, whilst other core issues are being addressed.[41]

3 Ex-combatant reintegration and community support in the Central African Republic

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE CAR

According to the 2003 census, the Central African Republic (CAR) had about four million inhabitants, of whom about one million were directly affected by conflict, banditry, violence or displacement.[42] The country's economic growth index between 1990 and 2001 stood at -0,3 per cent, while in 1992 it was -6 per cent. By 2001, the year that marked the epitome of the conflict that culminated in the 15 March 2003 change of government, CAR economic growth stood at -0,4 per cent. In 2009, the CAR's human poverty index (HPI) was 42,4 per cent, with a ranking of 125 out of 135 countries for which the index was calculated.[43]

Between 1996 and 2003, the frequency of political turbulence in the country had escalated tremendously such that in April 1996 there was a mutiny in agitation for salary arrears and improvement of living conditions for soldiers; in May 1996 another mutiny occurred, leading to the capture of Bangui by the military, in which the presidential palace was surrounded; in November 1996 another mutiny took place in which the military called for the dismissal of President Ange-Félix Patassé; in May 2001 an attempted coup d'état took place, led by

General Kolingba; in October 2002 another attempted coup d'état occurred, led by General Bozizé; and finally on 15 March 2003 General Bozizé successfully took power in another coup d'état.

According to the baseline study conducted by the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the social, political and military tribulations of the CAR have their origin in the mismanagement of the country's financial systems.[44] In 2000, 67 per cent of Central Africans were living below the poverty line, and the situation had not changed much several years down the line.[45] The 2009 human development index (HDI) report, between 1980 and 2007, indicated that the CAR's HDI rose by 0,36 per cent annually from 0,335 to 0,369, but the report notes that the country had experienced periods of slower growth or even reversals in some instances.[46] One of the major challenges to human life in the CAR has been the prevalence of HIV/AIDS; according to a study conducted prior to the launch of the MDRP-led D&R, the prevalence among expectant mothers in 2002 stood at 15 per cent, making the CAR the tenth most affected country in the world, and the worst affected in the Central African region then.

A similar rise in the infant mortality rate has been experienced gradually over time, from 97 deaths per 1 000 in 1995 to 131 per 1 000 in 2000, two years before the launch of the MDRP's D&R. As at 2002, when the MDRP was launched, the CAR remained the leading country in maternal mortality, with 1 100 deaths in every 100 000 births.[47] A similar trend had been experienced in the levels of literacy, which dropped from 37 per cent in 1994 to 24 per cent in 1999, levels lower than they were in 1960 when the country gained independence. This situation was as a result of several years of infrastructural degradation that had rendered the human situation alarming across the country. The situation was aggravated by the mutinies and attempted coup d'état of 25 October 2002, in which the systems of production, and of health and education were worst affected.

Conflict has therefore engendered poverty, making poverty an intractable phenomenon in the history of the CAR, and one that influences social interaction among the masses. For almost four decades, various policies were applied in an attempt to improve the country's socio-economic development, with mixed results. Progressively the situation in the country was characterised by widening poverty due to weak economic growth that failed to keep up with

the high population growth. The years of conflict had social and economic consequences such as weakened government revenue collection and a heavy foreign debt burden. This has continuously hindered the government of CAR from adequately financing public investments. Publications on human development regularly place the CAR among the poorest countries on earth, both in terms of sustainable human development and GDP per capita.[48] According to the Human Development Reports, poverty in the CAR stems mainly from the country's weak economic performance and is rooted in various structural factors, including an unstable macroeconomic and financial environment, and low productivity because of the country's dependence on the traditional agricultural sector.[49]

An understanding of the economic status quo in the CAR and how the economy has affected the spread of armed violence (and vice versa) helps explain the weak position. The HDI for the CAR in 2009 stood at 0,369 (the same as at 2007), at the closure of the MDRP activities in the Great Lakes Region's (GLR) seven countries (See Graph 1.2 in Chapter 1), which ranked the country at 179 out of 182 countries,[50] down from position 171 (out of 177) in 2005.[51] Research commissioned by the World Bank indicates that an average civil war lasts seven years, with the growth rate of the country in conflict reducing by 2,2 per cent each year.[52] Further studies have revealed that the average cost of a conflict can be as high as US$54 billion for a low-income country.[53]

According to Collier et al, a civil war has the consequence of raising military spending, leading to declining investment not only in the country affected but also in the region as a whole, thus disrupting trade routes.[54] Beyond the macro-level, the cost of a conflict has a disproportionate effect on poor and marginalised people because it cuts them off from the markets on which they depend. In the case of the CAR, the cycle of conflict has led to a disturbing social situation, according to the office of the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator. In an ad hoc report, the UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator reveals that, in 2005, all social indicators for the country were dangerously low, and many continued to worsen while the poverty rate remained high and the internal efficiency rate continued to fall compared to neighbouring countries and the entire Africa (0,35 in the country, versus 0,64 in the Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa [*Commission de la Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale* – CEMAC] area and 0,73 across Africa).[55] Average life expectancy has dropped from 45 to 39 years over the

past 15 years, a rate of five months per year. Health care coverage is extremely weak (800 patients per bed) and citizens do not have easy access to care. The school attendance rate has remained as low as 67 per cent, compared with 82 per cent in the CEMAC area and 95 per cent across Africa, while the country's literacy level has remained lowest of all the seven MDRP target countries, as depicted in Figure 3.1 below.

Food availability remains critically low. An average of 1 930 kcal/day is consumed in good times, far below the 2 700 kcal/day recommended by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This picture has been made even more dramatic since 2002 by the pervasiveness of diseases that are typical of catastrophic socio-economic situations: the advent of tropical ulcers; the massive spread of tuberculosis; and diarrhoeic diseases.[56] Figure 3.2 below presents a comparative situation of the seven beneficiaries of the MDRP fund. The CAR and the RoC are the two countries with the lowest agricultural production, and

Figure 3.1 Literacy, history plus forecast for the seven MDRP target countries



Source *International Futures (IFs) base case version 6.38.*

Figure 3.2 Agricultural production, history plus forecast for the seven MDRP target countries



Source *International Futures (IFs) base case version 6.38.*

the trend is forecast to continue beyond the year 2020. For the CAR to recover from this situation there is an urgent need for a comprehensive approach to the many challenges that the country faces, including the reintegration of the many ex-combatants from the past wars. The recent MDRP effort is just one of many such efforts needed.

According to the UN, 2005 was considered a turning point in the growth of economic activity in the CAR, '…which over the last 10 years had unfortunately experienced a steady and significant destruction of its production system so that the average income of citizens declined by 32 per cent over the past two decades'.[57] Starting in 2005, growth was expected to resume in most economic sectors, mainly because of the hopes rekindled, firstly, by the 2005 semblance of a return to constitutional order and, secondly, by the expected resumption of co-operation between the country and its major donor partners.

The political and socio-economic occurrences in the CAR led to a political landscape dominated by a small group of individuals (ruling elite), who manipulated the system, leading to political coups at the expense of social development. The most relevant question now is: given the political instabilities and related military activities and mutinies that have marked the change of regimes in CAR, especially before the 2005 democratic elections, what is the status quo of the many arms that were used in the past? Similarly, how can the new democratic dispensation be sustained so as to avoid further military activity in the country?

Recurrent politico-military crises that characterised the CAR particularly between 1996 and 2003 also led to a massive flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) into the country. For instance, the mutinies of 1996 and the attempted coups that took place between May 2001 and March 2003 were characterised by looting of armouries and indiscriminate distribution of weapons and ammunition to various armed groups that included rebellious security forces such as *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA) and militia groups such as Ex-Patriotes, Ex-USP, *milices de nature politco ethniques*, Karako, Balawa, Saraoui as well as other informal armed groups.[58] Neighbouring countries also contributed to the influx of arms into the CAR. The conflicts in the DRC, Sudan, Chad and the RoC significantly impacted on the internal security of the CAR. The permeability of the regional borders allows for unrestricted circulation of weapons in the country, while armed groups use the border areas as safe havens from which to organise and conduct their operations.[59]

The rapid deterioration of the security situation was also linked to a steady erosion of the capacity of the national defence and security forces, both at the human level and at the level of equipment and infrastructure, owing to continued mono-ethnic recruitment and repeated salary arrears. As a result, the army was greatly demoralised and became disorganised, leading to significant desertions (totalling around 1 300 soldiers after the failed coup d'état of May 2001), but also to systematic recruitment of thousands of militia and other unconventional forces by the different actors of the crises.[60]

MDRP FUNDING AND THE DEMOBILISATION OF FORMER FIGHTERS IN THE CAR

The entry of the CAR into the MDRP pool of beneficiary countries had its basis in an MRPP country meeting held in November 2003, in which the delegation

from the CAR presented the security context of the country. This included the country's state of security sector reform (SSR), the need to ensure the country's territorial security, and the need to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate a significant number of ex-combatants who had participated in the numerous coups d'état and mutinies. Of the three objectives, the most essential element was the DDR one, based on the need to secure the country as soon as possible, as a prerequisite to other development processes, including creating an environment conducive to the disbursement of humanitarian aid as well as to the fostering of national reconciliation.

On the basis of the need to respond to the above, the MDRP project in the CAR was named 'Ex-combatants Reintegration and Community Support in Central Africa'.

The objectives of the programme were to:

- Support the D&R of ex-combatants by financing micro-enterprise activities in, for example, agriculture, mining and reconstruction
- Assist in the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure and the creation of income-generating activities, as well as reconciliation and dialogue activities

The final MDRP assessment report provided an overall outcome rating for this project as being *unsatisfactory*. The report documents that the project failed to deliver on a number of its objectives, particularly that of disarmament, which recorded dismal results, with only 190 arms collected from the 7 556 demobilised ex-combatants.[61] These dismal results were largely because the concept of weapons in exchange for development was only partially implemented, with many ex-combatants receiving their reinsertion kits and incentives in cash, as opposed to the initially envisaged in-kind reinsertion kits. This was also the case in the DRC, where few weapons (equivalent to less than 30 per cent of the demobilised) were recovered.[62]

Operationalisation of MDRP

The MDRP Secretariat acted in response to the requests by the CAR Government by supporting the setting up of *Le Projet de Réinsertion des ex-*

combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (PRAC), an integrated approach whose main objectives were:

- Disarmament of ex-combatants and any other persons posing a danger to peace and security
- Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into their own communities or communities of their choice
- Capacity building for communities receiving ex-combatants, with the aim of enhancing acceptability of the ex-combatants being reintegrated amongst them and
- Direct support to the most vulnerable communities, with the view to reducing insecurity and preventing conflicts

With the above objectives serving as its guideline, PRAC envisaged creating an integrated system in which the needs of individual ex-combatants would be fused with those of the larger community, thereby creating an environment for sustainable reintegration. In order to have more impact, PRAC targeted regions that were most affected by the conflicts as well as those still vulnerable, namely the prefectures of Ouham Pende, Ouham, Kembo, Nana-Grébizi and the commune of Bangui.

PRAC was funded by a combined effort of the MDRP and UNDP. The demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as community capacity building for communities of settlement were funded by the MDRP, while the UNDP catered for disarmament and security and conflict prevention, as was the case in the RoC.

An analysis of the implementation of the MDRP project in the CAR revealed several issues of significant interest, as discussed below.

The lifecycle of the programme was three years, from 2004. The total budget was US$12 978 593, of which the MDRP and UNDP contributed US$9 777 343 and US$3 201 250 respectively. The project was aimed at demobilising and reintegrating 7 565 ex-combatants (and where possible at collecting arms) by the time of its closure in February 2007. Each ex-combatant received US$700 in the form of a reinsertion/reintegration kit (which included cement, roofing sheets, fishing kits, and livestock keeping kits) and US$150 as a transitional safety allowance (TSA).

Unexpectedly, and to the surprise of those implementing the project, a large number of ex-combatants rejected the reinsertion kits, alleging that the

kits were overpriced, as they 'could source them elsewhere cheaply, if they were given cash'.[63] The ex-combatants accused PRAC staff of misappropriation, claiming that the implementers were giving them a raw deal. They, therefore, agitated for cash payments, abandoning the kits on site.

Skills training was another component of the reintegration package, aimed at providing sustainable sources of livelihoods to ex-combatants. When choosing reintegration packages the beneficiaries were advised to select skills that they were already engaged in and/or were familiar with from the past, so as to increase their chances of success. Those that chose other skills apart from retail trade *(petit commerce)* were supplied with the necessary tools of trade while those that chose retail trade were given cash (capital) to start their businesses. The cash payout to those who chose retail trade attracted the majority of ex-combatants, who chose the retail trade option even when it was not of interest to them. In total, 3 577 out of the 7 556 ex-combatants chose retail trade. They were subsequently provided with the cash capital. The retail traders registered the highest percentage of failure (95 per cent) in their businesses. The numbers relative to choices of reintegration skills are shown in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 Skill types chosen and the corresponding number of ex-combatants

Training options	Total	Percentage of the total
Agriculture	893	12
Livestock keeping	1 447	19
Fishing	779	10
Technical and professional training	767	10
Retail traders	3 577	48
School and university	90	1
TOTAL	7 553	100

Source *Final report by PRAC, Bangui, February 2007*

COMPLEXITIES OF THE D&R PROCESS UNDER PRAC

Various bottlenecks hindered effective implementation of the D&R programme in the CAR. A chronological approach to the programming of the process brings to the fore some of these challenges. For instance, negotiations on the funding of D&R in the CAR started in November 2003, when the government presented to the MDRP its *Lettre de politique generale du Gouvernement en matiere de defence globale et processus DDR*. The signing of the agreement occurred in July 2004 between the World Bank/UNDP and the Government of the CAR, followed by the promulgation of the *Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CNDDR) in September 2004. The official launch of the DDR process took place on 7 December 2004 in Bassangoa prefecture. This was followed by the official launch of the process in Bangui on 18 June 2005 and in the rest of the prefectures.[64] So, the processes leading to the first launch of the programme took one year.

According to former officers of the CNDDR, the execution of the MDRP/UNDP project was left to PRAC (the implementing body appointed by the donor countries). Although PRAC tried to put into place the necessary mechanisms to ensure that the process would not be prone to abuse, the preventing mechanisms were fraught with several weaknesses, making them ineffective. Some of these weaknesses include those outlined below.

Abuse by deactivated and serving FACA soldiers

Discussions with both active and deactivated soldiers as well as civilians in Bangui after the closure of the MDRP process revealed that on average each FACA soldier continued to hold at least three weapons acquired during past political instabilities, of which none, or in rare cases only one, was officially registered.[65] Traditionally, owing to incipient political instability and shifting alliances in the CAR political systems, it was difficult to enforce weapon accountability at the time a soldier quitted or deserted the force. This left soldiers in possession of several weapons, corresponding with the number of alliances one had switched sides to. When PRAC was introduced, most ex-combatants, for 'fear of possible retribution' if their names featured in official D&R documentation, fronted vulnerable civilians by giving them one of their guns to pose as potential 'ex-combatants' turning up for D&R. In return the owner of

the weapon would be the beneficiary of what accrued from the D&R process, especially the monies paid out. In one case an *ex-Patriote* handed out six AK47 assault rifles to four women and two men and in return earned US$4 200, 24 iron sheets, 30 bags of cement and several kilos of building nails. After distributing meagre shares of the 'returns' to the 'beneficiaries' he retained the rest.[66]

Lack of inclusiveness

The fact that the task of implementing DDR had traditionally been a function of the CNDDR meant that the introduction of PRAC as the MDRP/UNDP executing body equipped with expatriates that were far better salaried than the CNDDR government officials who suffered chronic salary arrears caused friction in the relations between the two bodies. The CNDDR levelled accusations against PRAC for implementing certain projects that the CNDDR perceived as not having initially been factored into the budget, such as rehabilitation of certain regional administrative centres that were in a state of disuse.

Problematic eligibility criteria

Related to the lack of inclusiveness was the fact that the time frame within which ex-combatants were considered was so wide (between 1996 and 2003), encompassing participants of several cycles of coup d'état. Lack of dependable past data convoluted the process of authenticating genuine beneficiaries. In the process, a large percentage of those who registered were not truly

Table 3.2 Ex-combatant figures

Prefecture	Total no. of ex-combatants	Female combatants
Ouham Pende	192	42
Ouham	224	49
Nana-Grébizi	223	63
Bangui	6 515	890
Kembo	402	141
TOTAL	7 556 demobilised ex-combatants	

Source *PRAC, Bangui, February 2007*

ex-combatants. When this was realised, the CNDDR blamed it on PRAC's lack of knowledge of the local dynamics. It was also revealed that contrary to the norm that in the CAR not many women join the military, the ratio of women to men 'qualifying' for the D&R process was almost equal, revealing a glaring inconsistency in the eligibility criteria. It was later concluded that corruption had been rampant during the identification process, guided by former commanders of various factions. Table 3.2 above presents the figures of ex-combatants from the five participating prefectures.

Delay in issuing of reinsertion kits

The reinsertion kit consisted of US$700, of which 10 per cent was deducted at source as a training levy to be paid to a training institution to which the ex-combatant was attached. The rest was given to the ex-combatant in the form of materials that the ex-combatant required to start off his or her enterprise. Initially, about three months passed before the reinsertion kits arrived, causing panic among ex-combatants and prompting them to demonstrate in the streets of Bangui regularly. This caused anguish and rumour mongering among ex-combatants, thereby impacting on the credibility of the process.

D&R AND THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROCESS

The SSR process in the CAR entailed restructuring of the FACA, gendarmes and the police. The process was provided for comprehensively in the *Dialogue National sur le sujet de la Défense nationale et Sécurité*, which called for integrity in defence and security matters, as well as good governance. Some of the criteria involved in the SSR process included giving priority to people with HIV/AIDS, the handicapped and those who were injured while serving in military. Gender balance was also considered across the board. Unlike SSR processes in other countries (see the case of the RoC), the level of education was not among the aspects covered by the criteria for ex-combatants joining the new national security forces.

The SSR process entailed fresh training for recruits on the basis of which they would take up new appointments. A document entitled *La Lettre de Politique en matiere de Defence Globale et de Demobilization, Désarmement et Reinsertion des Ex-combattants en particulier* provided a framework for gradual

restructuring of the security forces, leading up to the year 2010 in the manner shown below.

Table 3.3 Projections for SSR restructuring

	FACA	Gendarmes	Police
2010 target	6 000	4 000	4 085
Available recruits as at 30/09/2003	4 442	1 310	1 600
New recruits available for training	1 800	600	600
To be deactivated	1 185	306	310
Targeted for Recruitment	2 500	2 000	2 500

Source *PRAC, Bangui, February 2007*

Table 3.4 Breakdown of various factions for SSR and PRAC

Name of armed group	Identified elements	Integrated under SSR programme	Retained into new security system	To join PRAC
Ex–Patriotes	1 640	540	150	950
Ex USP (Presidential Security Unit)	1 345	345	–	1 000
Private security companies	850	–	–	850
Parallel police	820	–	–	820
Karako militia	593	–	–	593
Balawa militia	510	–	–	510
Saraoui militia	600	–	–	600
Participants of the May 2001 events	2 400	408	–	1 992
Identified foreign forces	250	–	–	250
TOTAL	9 308	1 293	150	7 565

Source *Lettre de Politique en matiere de Defence Globale et de Demobilization, Désarmement et Réinsertion des Ex-combattants en particulier, dated 5 November 2003, for the Transitional Government of the Central African Republic*

Under the new SSR programme, former soldiers willing to be remobilised into the new security structures were admitted into the new FACA and trained under a new military partnership with France in which the recruits (both old and new) in the FACA, police and gendarmerie were trained and redeployed, as per the restructuring targets.

Table 3.4 above depicts how the members of the various armed groups were distributed between those that joined the SSR process and those that joined the D&R process under PRAC. Only a limited number of ex-combatants were identified for rejoining the new forces while the rest were to be demobilised and reintegrated under PRAC.

Under a partnership agreement with France, a French military advisor was attached to the ministry of defence in Bangui to oversee the training of three battalions of the FACA (1 950 forces), a squadron of gendarmerie, a mobile rapid intervention unit and 45 infantry brigades.[67]

COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS

The component on community support entailed rehabilitation of schools, health facilities and provision of water, as shown below.

While it was a commendable effort, most of the communal facilities became unserviceable as the beneficiaries lacked the know-how regarding their maintenance. Similarly, congestion, especially in schools and health services, remained high, with over 3 000 persons per health centre.[68]

Table 3.5 Total community support projects implemented under PRAC

Sector intervened	No of micro-projects
Education	19
Health	2
Water and sewerage	12
Other forms of infrastructure	7
TOTAL	40

Source *PRAC, Bangui, February 2007*

CLOSURE OF PRAC

An evaluation conducted in March 2006 to establish the effectiveness of PRAC revealed certain anomalies (some documented in the foregoing sections) that necessitated remedial changes. The evaluation recommended certain changes. Firstly, contrary to the initial procedure in which ex-combatants were issued with reinsertion kits before the commencement of training, they were now obliged to go through the training first before being issued with the kit.

Secondly, public awareness programmes on fraud and corruption were now communicated publicly. For instance, PRAC and CNDDR officials engaged in live debates over the radio as part of which ex-combatants could call in to ask questions.

Thirdly, any further identification of fresh ex-combatants had to seek the support (mainly regarding authentication of eligibility) of CNDDR officials as well as local persons.

Fourthly, ex-combatants were encouraged to form own groups in which they discussed issues affecting them. This was an important step that provided ex-combatants with a platform from which to voice their views. One such group was the *Association des Groupements de Ex-Combattants de Centrafrique pour la lutte contre la pauvrété.*

PRAC came to a close in February 2007, having lived its full life of three years, but with relatively dismal results. However, while it did not fully realise its potential, PRAC assisted the CAR to put in place mechanisms necessary for future programmes. For instance, three new transitional programmes were introduced, namely:

- *Projet Sécurité Pour le Développement* (Project on Security for Development) – PSPD. This was funded by France at a budget of US$1,8 million
- *Projet d'Appui à la securité Juridique* (Judicial Support Programme) – PRASEJ, also funded by France with an amount of US$0,4 million
- *Projet de lutte contre la prolifération des armes legères et de petit calibre* (Project on the Fight Against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons). This programme operated under a fund provided by Japan, totalling US$2 million[69]

The three transitional projects were chosen according to the results of a needs analysis of the CAR's economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants. The main aim of these projects was to mitigate unforeseen challenges that would arise when the MDRP-funded process came to a close.

As a way of accompanying the operations of the transitional projects, the Government of the CAR issued a decree on 1 September 2006 that created *la Commission Nationale contre la Prolifération des Armes legères et de petit calibre pour le Désarmement et la Réinsertion* (CNPDR), which replaced the former CNDDR. CNPDR was expected to assume the overall duty of tackling the problem of small arms in the country, which had been identified as posing one of the biggest challenges.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has concurrently presented an overview of the MDRP-funded project in the CAR and the challenges, outcomes and (to a certain extent) successes of the project. The chapter began by presenting a socio-economic analysis of the country in order to present a clear view of the state of the country at the start of the MDRP project. From the analysis provided it suffices to conclude the following:

- Generally, the MDRP did not get the full value for the funds provided for the project. The dismal achievement performance of the programme may have been as a result of insufficient planning and/or a lack of clear understanding of the expectations of the CAR society (particularly ex-combatants) at the time of the MDRP intervention. For instance, the weapons-per-person ratio was far too small for a country that had experienced several cycles of armed conflict for decades.
- In general a few ex-combatants benefited from the fund, such as those who chose to go back to school, those who chose livestock keeping or to build houses with the resources provided. A large number of ex-combatants, however, sold their reinsertion kit and drank away the money.
- Community-support projects might have recorded the highest success if more emphasis had been put on them, as they served the entire society. This effect would have largely neutralised the divergent feeling of 'them against us' between ex-combatants (viewed as the main beneficiaries) and the

general society (viewed as losers). Although this divergence did not project itself rightly, the sentiments were common among the community members.

- A participatory approach involving the CNDDR and other national experts at the planning and execution stages of the project would have minimised the differences that arose between PRAC and the CNDDR during the implementation stage.
- There was a need for short-term (for instance three-month) evaluation processes for such projects, in which intervention measures could be implemented whenever necessary, to rectify the situation.

4 Disarmament and reintegration challenges in Liberia

INTRODUCTION

Close to a decade after the last civil war in Liberia, thousands of ex-combatants still roam the country with hardly any meaningful source of livelihood, having been left out of the reintegration process that came with the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programme that lasted close to three years. According to the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), a group consisting of an estimated 23 000 very vulnerable ex-combatants was yet to benefit from the reintegration programme, which was paralysed by lack of funding that had resulted from donor fatigue.[70] Only 75 000 out of the 103 019 DDRR caseload had been placed in donor-funded training programmes to learn skills such as plumbing, carpentry and masonry, by the end of 2007 when donor fatigue set in. Others had been enrolled in secondary schools and other higher learning institutes while a further 3 500 were enrolled in programmes that were yet to start.[71]

Judging from the above, it will be a long time before the legacy of the Liberian civil war dissipates from the memories of most Liberians. The psychological

healing and physical reconstruction will also take a while to achieve. The 14 years of war took a heavy toll, especially on the common Liberian, in a way that seemed to confirm Sun Tzu's warning about the need to wage war as economically and as cheaply as possible.[72] The bigger part of the life of Liberian youth today is laden with the memories of the war, and this is the generation that is expected to pull Liberia onto the healing and reconstruction path. Although the end of the war in 2003, followed by democratic elections in 2005, brought relief to the Liberians, the real challenge rests in upholding the peace in a country that had, for a long time, been characterised by dysfunctional national institutions and enormous levels of illiteracy. Of importance is the realisation that '…with the collapse of an authoritarian regime, there emerges a new nation full of needs … and full of rage' that is characteristic of democratic transitions in a way that Scheper-Hughes calls a 'dangerous hour'.[73] This is because new democracies must negotiate a treacherous path encompassing difficult and sometimes contradictory ethical, moral and legal considerations while at the same time attempting to achieve some measure of reconciliation and justice within the country.[74]

Similarly, the State Task Force cautions about the fragility of post-conflict societies when it states: 'Data indicates that emerging democracies are much more unstable than either fully democratic or authoritarian regimes.'[75] In the same vein, Zatman adds that while 'good things' such as democracy and economic restructuring may be stabilising in the short term, they are necessary in the long run, and the challenge is thus how to manage transitions in such a way that they do not contribute to further conflict.[76] For a new democracy such as Liberia, therefore, the situation calls for cautious implementation of the various reconstruction processes, primary among them being the process of DDRR.

This chapter reviews the DDRR process in Liberia, with the objective of assessing the human security impact the process has had on the community. The chapter also provides an example of a UN-led DDR process (to contrast with the World Bank's MDRP process covered in previous chapters), with a particular focus on demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia. Parallels can be drawn and lessons learnt from this comparative analysis. Hence, the chapter analyses the impact of the DDRR process and related programmes such as the security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice and weapons collection on the community in Liberia.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, political killing has as its goal a change in leadership or form of government, and such assassinations often occur during a military coup.[77] In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe assassinated President William Tolbert and 13 close associates of Tolbert's in a coup, transforming Liberia's political landscape into one of revenge and vengeance. In the country's 163 years of independence (1847 to 2010) there have been 24 heads of state[78] amid three interruptions due to a coup d'état, the first civil war (1989 to 1996) and the second civil war (1999 to 2003). In the course of his reign, Doe promoted individuals from his own ethnic Krahn group to military and political positions, thereby not allowing for alternative political expression. In 1985, shortly after Doe's party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), won in elections that proved to have been rigged, General Quiwonkpa from Sierra Leone unsuccessfully tried to overthrow Doe. In 1989, amid increasing political tensions and economic decay, a full-fledged civil war broke out. Initially, Doe crushed opposition forces within his government but when his tribesmen, the Krahn, declared war against other tribes, especially in the Nimba County,[79] he began losing control.

This was followed by Charles Taylor, a former ally of Doe, breaking ranks with Doe's government. Taylor later assembled a group of Libyan-trained rebels in Côte d'Ivoire under the name of the 'National Patriotic Front of Liberia' (NPFL).[80] He then invaded Liberia in 1989 through Nimba County, prompting Doe to retaliate by ordering the Liberian Army against the whole population of Nimba. The army attacked unarmed civilians and burnt villages.[81] This triggered a mass flow of Liberian refugees into Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and other neighbouring countries. In the course of time, Prince Johnson, who had sided with Taylor in the invasion, developed operational differences with Taylor and formed his own guerrilla force based on the Gio tribe, called the 'Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia' (INPFL). Johnson's forces captured and killed Doe in September 1990.[82]

Doe's assassination deepened the civil war by creating a power vacuum. This prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene,[83] thus preventing Taylor, who was increasingly gaining an upper hand, from capturing the Liberian capital of Monrovia. ECOWAS subsequently facilitated the formation of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU),

which was established in Gambia in 1990, under the leadership of Dr Amos Sawyer, who was subsequently declared the President of the IGNU.[84] Taylor refused to work with the interim government and continued the war.

The war spilt over into Sierra Leone in 1991, when Foday Sankoh led a mixed group of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans into Kailahun in eastern Sierra Leone in support of Taylor.[85] Sierra Leone's President Momoh's troops attempted to train a fighting force from among the 250 000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone to counter Taylor and Sankoh, but this failed to materialise. In another attempt to counter Taylor, the ex-Liberian Broadcasting Corporation head, Alhaji Kromah, organised Mandingo Muslims and Krahn refugees in Freetown to form the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO). ULIMO broke into two opposing wings in 1994 in order to meet the demands of internal factions.[86] On the one hand, there was ULIMO-J, a Krahn faction led by General Roosevelt Johnson, and, on the other hand, there was ULIMO-K, a Moslem/Mandingo-based faction under Alhaji Kromah.[87]

A peace accord signed in Cotonou in 1994 was overlooked because the war raged on.[88] As mediation efforts intensified, the seven warring factions (NPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, the Liberia Peace Council, NPFL – Central Revolutionary Council, the Lofa Defence Force and remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia loyal to former president Doe) continued to fight. Finally, in September 1995, under the auspices of ECOWAS, the Liberian Council of State comprising the seven warring factions was formed with the signing of Abuja Peace Accord.[89] Throughout January and February 1996, the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to monitor the peace process stalled owing to a lack of funding and political will, creating an impasse in the search for peace. The armed groups exploited the situation, leading to the second civil war in Liberia.

The Second Liberian Civil War began in 1999 when a rebel group named 'Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy' (LURD), backed by the Government of Guinea, emerged in northern Liberia[90] where it mounted its first rebellion in April 2000 in Lofa County, at the border between Guinea and Liberia. LURD's political purpose was to force Charles Taylor out of office. Most of the fighters were Muslims from the Mandingo and Krahn ethnic groups and they controlled northern Liberia, with their headquarters at Tubmanburg in Bomi County.[91] In June 2003, the group laid siege on Monrovia and assaulted

the city during several bloody battles, killing dozens of people. Taylor's Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU) and other militias further exacerbated the fatalities.[92]

While LURD intensified its rebellion in the north and western provinces of Lofa, Bong, Gbarpolu and Bomi counties, a split developed among its leadership, resulting in the formation of a second rebel group in early 2003 called the 'Movement for Democracy in Liberia' (MODEL).[93] MODEL drew its membership mainly from the Krahn ethnic group and operated along the Ivorian border, with support from the Ivorian Government in reciprocity for MODEL's support in fighting Ivorian rebel groups operating in western Côte d'Ivoire. By June 2003, MODEL controlled most of south-eastern Liberia, including Grand Gedeh, River Gee, Grand Kru, Sinoe and Maryland counties.[94]

While representatives of the international community were meeting in Akosombo, Ghana to find a solution to Liberia's internal armed conflict, fighting between LURD and government forces broke out in Monrovia in June and July 2003. LURD rebels launched three attacks code-named World Wars I, II, and III, shelling Monrovia with mortar bombs and killing and wounding masses of civilians.[95] In the aftermath of LURD's invasion of Monrovia, ECOWAS intervened in August 2003, after a meeting to enforce the ceasefire agreement of June 2003. Throughout the ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks in Ghana, the representatives of the various Liberian women's organisations, through the famous Golden Tulip Declaration, exerted pressure on all parties to end the fighting.[96]

On 11 August 2003, President Taylor resigned as part of the peace agreement and left for exile in Nigeria. Interpol later issued a warrant of arrest for Taylor for war crimes committed by his rebel allies in Sierra Leone. A week after Taylor's resignation and departure the three warring parties signed the Accra Peace Agreement,[97] paving the way for a two-year transitional government, disarmament and demobilisation of the fighting forces, and the holding of democratic elections in 2005.

On 18 August 2003, the Liberian parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that marked a formal end to the 14 years of civil war. The parties to the agreement requested the UN to deploy a force to Liberia with a Chapter VII mandate of the UN Charter to support the National Transitional Government in implementing the agreement. Part Three of the agreement establishes the NCDDRR, which is an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental body responsible for the co-ordination of DDRR activities.[98]

By the time of the signing of the CPA, the civil war had caused the deaths of over 150 000 people, mostly civilians, and resulted in about 850 000 refugees.[99] In his report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the situation in Liberia, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that one of the greatest challenges in Liberia and the neighbouring countries was the presence of thousands of combatants, including children, of various nationalities, and that successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all of those ex-combatants would be crucial to sustainable peace and security. The Secretary-General further estimated that Liberia had 27 000 to 38 000 combatants, many of whom were children.[100] He subsequently proposed the establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as envisaged by the UNSC resolution 1497 (2003)[101] and the CPA. Subsequently, the UNSC, through resolution 1509 (2003), established a 15 000-strong stabilisation force for Liberia to assist in implementing the peace process.[102]

DDRR STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The UNSC resolution 1509 (2003) provides the key objective of the Liberian DDRR programme, to disarm and demobilise combatants of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Government of Liberia (GOL), LURD, MODEL and other paramilitary forces and militias. The resolution also calls for the preparation of sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants in support of long-term peace and security in the country.[103]

The Liberia DDRR programme was implemented by a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) headed by a programme and policy adviser, and the JIU was responsible for the daily operations and execution of the programme. The JIU was supervised by the NCDDRR, which comprised representatives from the GOL, LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union (AU) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL).[104] The duties of the NCDDRR included policy guidance to the JIU; co-ordination of all government institutions in support of the DDRR programme; identification of problems related to implementation and impact of the programme; and development of remedial measures where necessary.[105] The JIU was structured into four functional units:

Disarmament and Demobilisation (DD) Unit: was staffed primarily with experts from UNMIL in the areas of disarmament and demobilisation. This included desk officers, field officers and national support staff.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR) Unit: was composed of experts in reintegration, vocational training, small enterprise development, employment creation, apprenticeship promotion, and agriculture and food production. Such individuals were drawn from the UNDP and other relevant national agencies.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit: was mainly staffed by technical assistants from the UNDP and consisted of M&E expert analysts, data entry clerks and field monitors, who were mainly national staff.

Information and Sensitisation (I&S) Unit: was staffed with experts from UNMIL and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This unit consisted of specialists in public information development and dissemination, social adaptation programmes in the area of civic education, psychosocial counselling, community-based reconciliation, and peace-building measures.

The four units were responsible for leading the entire DDRR process. Each of the processes was tackled as discussed below.

THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME

After the signing of the CPA, the immediate task was to remove arms from all the parties to the conflict in order to establish peace and stability. The pressure to prevent any armed threats to peace drove UNMIL to embark on disarmament as soon as the force was deployed. To achieve this, eligibility criteria were drawn up outlining the parameters that qualified one as an eligible participant, as shown below.

The Liberian disarmament process has been acclaimed as being the most inclusive to date for allowing non-fighting groups such as women and children that accompanied combatants also to be eligible for disarmament, thus obtaining the same DDR benefits as the combatants. The form used for disarmament, the 'Ex-Combatant Disarmament Form', included a section for the non-fighting groups.[106] Such an individual qualified:

- Having demonstrated to the observer's satisfaction that they had participated as an active combatant of the above fighting forces in Liberia at the time of the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003 and
- Having delivered at least a personal weapon or belonging to a group of at most five combatants delivering at least one group weapon or

- Being an underage combatant, accompanying minor, unaccompanied minor, or any other participant under the age of 18 or female, presenting with any of the fighting forces

Table 4.1 Qualifying parameters for the DD process: weapons

Approved weapons	Qualified no of personnel per weapon	Remarks
Rifle/Pistol	1	Serviceable weapon only or no entry (no major parts missing)
RPG Launcher	1	
Light MG/Medium MG/Heavy MG	2	Belt-fed weapons only
60 mm Mortar	2	Tube, base plate and stand
81 mm Mortar	3	Tube, base plate and stand
106/120/155 Mortar/Howitzer	6	
AA Guns	4	

Source *Information based on the information provided by NCDDRR officials during an interview with the author, Monrovia, 26 November 2008*

Table 4.2 Qualifying parameters for the DD process: munitions

Approved munitions	No of personnel qualified	No of munitions	Remarks
Grenades	1	2	
RPG (rocket & grenades)	1	1	Together or no entry (not to be handed in as separate items)
Smoke Grenade	1	4	
Ammunition	1	150	Single or linked

Source *Based on the information provided by NCDDRR officials during an interview with the author, Monrovia, 26 November 2008*

Failure of the first disarmament process

In what appeared to be an underestimation of the expectations of the post-conflict Liberian society, coupled with insufficient preparedness on the side of UNMIL as a result of undefined administrative and operational issues within its commanding structures, UNMIL prematurely embarked on the process of disarmament on 7 December 2003, a situation that led to a near disaster. On that day, the government fighters, angry at not being paid immediately for turning in their weapons, beat people and fired guns into the air at the disarmament camp. When UNMIL began disarmament, hundreds of fighters armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars gathered at Camp Schieffelin, 35 miles east of Monrovia, to turn in their weapons and receive US$300.[107] The riots began when they found out they would receive only US$150 and the other $150 at the end of a three-week demobilisation programme.

Camp Schieffelin's shortcomings proved to be the tip of the iceberg of the challenges that awaited UNMIL. Extreme poverty and the un-disbanded command structures (by then) among the former fighters and the fact that they gathered in large numbers in one spot, armed and with cash in the vicinity, were enough to trigger pandemonium.[108] UNMIL staff manning the cantonment site expected to process at most 250 ex-combatants on each day. They were overwhelmed when more than 1 000 ex-combatants showed up to be disarmed. This caused frustration among the ex-combatants. The crowd began shooting and rioting, overrunning Camp Schieffelin. This resulted in the death of nine people. A group of ex-LURD combatants during a group discussion disclosed that their understanding was that … 'if one presented a weapon to the UNMIL officers at Camp Schieffelin, one was to receive a cash payout of $300, so we all wanted the money, including our generals'.[109]

Increased insecurity and cases of combatants disarming twice led to the postponement of the process until April 2004.[110] It was later established that UNMIL's inability to anticipate these occurrences as well as misinformation and the lack of adequate sensitisation of the public about the process were some of the major causes of the initial disarmament programme at Camp Schieffelin, which was later renamed 'Edward Beyan Kesselly Barracks', often known simply as 'EBK Barracks'. To a large extent, the planning process for disarmament was not comprehensive and did not take into account the desperation that had set in throughout the Liberian community. This is typical of most communities

emerging from prolonged armed conflicts in dire need of basic amenities and commodities. Such communities are often potentially sensitive and explosive, requiring in-depth pro-poor planning.

Various arguments have been put forth to explain the Camp Schieffelin incident. One explanation is that inadequate planning was largely due to a rush by UNMIL because of its desire to prove its ability to the international community.[111] This was a mistake because UNMIL's troop deployment was considerably low at the time. This approach points to a lack of strategy and criteria for disarmament within UNMIL at the time. Gradually UNMIL's force increased to 15 000 in a country of just above three million people,[112] giving the mission one of the highest peacekeeper-to-person ratios in DDR history.[113]

According to the Liberian DDRR Programme Strategy and Implementation Framework, only combatants presenting serviceable weapons were to be disarmed and demobilised, with the exception of child combatants, a child or woman associated with fighting forces (CAFF, WAFF) or disabled/wounded people. These were screened and confirmed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) women's agency representatives in co-operation with UNMIL military observers to have participated in the fighting or to have been part of a fighting force.[114] For ex-combatants to qualify, therefore, they had to meet the outlined criteria as shown in Table 4.3 below. Further to this, weapons surrendered by ex-combatants had to be functional for the bearer

Table 4.3 The breakdown of disarmed programme participants by phase

		Phase 1	%	Phase 2	%	Phase 3	%	Total	%
Adult	Male	11 297	86,1%	35 306	68,6%	22 678	59,0	**69 281**	67,3%
	Female	424	3,2%	10 853	21,1%	11 179	29,1%	**22 456**	21,8%
Child	Male	1 253	9,5%	4 089	7,9%	3 429	8,9%	**8 771**	8,5%
	Female	151	1,2%	1 221	2,4%	1 139	3,0%	**2 511**	2,4%
Sub-total		**13 125**	**100,0%**	**51 469**	**100,0%**	**38 425**	**100,0%**	**103 019**	**100,0%**

Source *JIU Statistics. Monrovia, 24 November 2006*

to qualify for entry into the DDRR programme. Ex-combatants presenting unserviceable or fake weapons were therefore not eligible and such weapons were confiscated and systematically destroyed.

According to the NCDDRR, from the inception of the programme on 7 December 2003 until 22 November 2004 when it formally ended, a total of 103 019 people were disarmed, accounting for a total of 28 314 weapons and 6 486 136 small arms ammunition.[115] These figures were unrealistically small in a country that was awash with weapons during the conflict. Table 4.3 above provides a breakdown of the various phases of the disarmament process.

ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS

The Liberian disarmament process exposed a complex interrelationship between expected outcomes and the real outcome. The issues that emerged provide vital lessons in the shaping of future similar disarmament processes. Some of these related to:

- ***Statistical discrepancy of the process*:** During the first phase of disarmament at Camp Schieffelin, 13 125 combatants were disarmed in an exercise in which 10 321 weapons were collected. It is of concern that during the two subsequent phases a total of 89 894 ex-combatants handed in only 18 002 weapons.[116] Table 4.3 above shows that the percentage of male ex-combatants decreased from Phase 1 (86,1 per cent) to Phase 3 (59,0 per cent) while that of female ex-combatants increased from 3,2 per cent to 29,1 per cent respectively. The reasons why the number of men turning up for disarmament increased while the numbers of women and girl children decreased could not be ascertained but one reason could be that the all-inclusive nature of the Liberian disarmament process,[117] which allowed eligibility for non-fighting groups that accompanied ex-combatants (such as children and women), may have largely contributed to this trend. However, this does not sufficiently explain the variation in the trend between male and female ex-combatants. It could also be that at the inception of the disarmament process, women and girl children feared the rushing and jostling that marked the initial stages of the process, as the process was dominated by men at those stages, so that when the scramble eased after most men had been served, women and girl children got a chance to turn up for disarmament.

According to the National Commission on DDR (NCDDR), 60 per cent of the total caseload was registered as fighters of the GOL/Armed Forces of Liberia, 28 per cent as LURD members and 12 per cent as members of MODEL. By the end of the disarmament process, 28 314 weapons, 33 604 heavy munitions and 6 486 136 rounds of small arms ammunition had been surrendered.[118] The weapons included 21 286 assault rifles (such as AK47s), 715 machine guns, 665 pistols, 1 841 RPGs, 208 mortars and 3 599 miscellaneous weapons. The heavy munitions included 12 512 mortar bombs, 9 001 RPGs, 10 975 hand grenades, 12 surface-to-air missiles and 1 101 miscellaneous munitions. In addition, 2 332 unserviceable weapons were collected.[119]

- ***Inability to 'manage expectations'*:** The disarmament process in Liberia provides a lesson regarding a weapons buy-back approach to disarmament and how this can cause unrealistic expectations among post-conflict communities. The Liberia disarmament programme 'pegged a price' on weapons and ammunition, thereby creating a situation in which, for those who had no weapon or ammunitions to qualify for disarmament, missing the $150 meant 'missing out on free cash'. People were pushed into hoarding arms and ammunition and distributing them for a price to those who desperately sought to meet the disarmament criteria. This led to an increase in the caseload beyond the anticipated figures; an occurrence that indicated that the disarmament planning did not sufficiently anticipate the demands of the Liberian society at the time. The situation also brought to the fore the link between poverty and disarmament. In situations where poverty, conflict and resources (money in the case of Liberia) were concerned, and especially where the criteria were quite integrated, the planning should have taken into consideration the expectations of the society in order to avoid a bloated caseload.
- ***Victimised ex-combatants*:** In a discussion by the author with a group composed of 25 ex-combatants, three individuals gave instances in which their factional commanders, at the start of the disarmament process, ordered ex-combatants to surrender their arms and ammunition to them for group disarmament, only for the commander to disappear with the arms, which he later distributed to his family members, allowing them to qualify for the disarmament money.[120] There were also instances where some former militia commanders sold weapons for as little as US$15 each to those wishing to qualify for the DDRR process.[121] While the number of interviews and group

discussions may not be a fair representation of the total sample statistically, information gathered indicated that the behaviour of factional generals also partly contributed to the overwhelming caseload. Several cases arose where individuals presenting themselves to the JIU offices complained about having been disqualified from the DDRR process on the basis of a lack of arms to hand in when their weapons had in actual fact been taken by their commanders. A former commander from the LURD faction attributed the failure by some ex-combatants to join the DDRR process to the fact that some villages became inaccessible owing to the rain that fell at the time of disarmament. This affected a number of his ex-combatants '…who eventually gave up on waiting for the programme to reach them. They were now engaged in their own illegal rubber tapping businesses.'[122] According to other claims, some legitimate combatants did not obtain DDRR programme benefits because they could not answer some of the questions from the peacekeepers.

- ***Unsatisfactory demobilisation framework*:** During the demobilisation process, the length of stay for ex-combatants waiting to disarm in cantonment sites[123] was originally planned to be 30 days for adults while children were to be taken to Interim Care Centres (ICC) for a varied duration of up to three months, depending on the delay and feasibility of family reunification.[124] In the Joint Operation Plan (JOP), an adult's stay in the cantonment sites was shortened to three weeks, while in practice the stay was further reduced to five days per adult participant, in what was said to be a way of minimising idleness.[125]
- ***Foreign ex-combatants*:** Combatants on foreign soil (COFS) continuously pose a major challenge to peace and security in most conflicts in African countries, as was demonstrated in the Liberian conflict. Since most African disputes are regional in nature due to trans-boundary overlapping of ethnicity and porosity of borders, COFS are usually involved in most African conflicts. In certain instances DDR programmes have been exploited by COFS who move around in the region with their weapons in order to enrol in programmes offering the most attractive benefits in exchange for their weapons. According to UNMIL, as at 15 February 2005, 612 foreign combatants had officially entered the Liberian DDRR Programme (308 Guineans, 242 Sierra Leoneans, 50 Ivorians, seven Nigerians, four Malians and one Ghanaian). Of this number, 485 were adults while 127 were children.[126]

- ***Disarming of the rubber plantations*:** During the civil war, as the rebels approached the rubber plantations the workers fled, leaving the plantations at the mercy of the rebels. The most affected were government plantations, particularly Guthrie, Sinoe and Cocopa, which were occupied by LURD rebels towards the end of hostilities in 2003.[127] Rubber tapping was therefore one of the most lucrative post-conflict economic enterprises that rebels undertook to sustain their activities. In 2006 UNMIL, in collaboration with the GOL, strengthened efforts to reach a peaceful resolution to the illegal occupation of the rubber plantations by ex-combatants. Within the framework of a Joint Government-UN Task Force known as the 'Government Interim Management Team', UNMIL assisted the government to re-establish state authority over Guthrie. More than 200 registered ex-combatants who resided on the plantation registered for participation in the RR programme, and most of them relocated to their counties of origin. Others decided to remain in the plantation and seek employment with the interim management team.[128] For the duration that the rebels occupied the rubber plantations they mismanaged the rubber trees by tapping them unskilfully and carelessly.[129] The occupation of rubber plantations by rebels demonstrates the need to have appropriate structures in the management of the natural resources of Liberia as one of the basic elements of long-term peace, stability, reintegration and economic recovery of the country. UNMIL, with possible donor support, organised a separate RR support structure for 529 people residing in Sinoe rubber plantation and who did not qualify for the formal RR programme during the official disarmament and demobilisation.[130]

REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION (RR) HURDLES

While the DD process was relatively successful with regard to the incentives that were immediately made available to those who willingly surrendered their arms, it was not the case with the RR process, which was an equally crucial element for the long-term human security of the country. RR, which began in June 2004, continued to face increasing challenges, especially with regard to its sustainability. Unlike the DD phase where ex-combatants were paid US$300 in a relatively short timeframe, in the RR phase they were paid US$30 per month in addition to being fed and housed.

To many of the ex-combatants the $30 per month was too little. Many opted out of the training to earn their own living as an alternative to RR. The explanation was, '… After all during the six to eight months training in the RR phases, one was only paid $30 per month while out here I am able to earn the same amount in only a week or two, by tapping rubber,' explained one of the dropouts of the DDRR programme who refused to join the RR phase after the DD phase. He also disclosed that he was in touch with his former rebel 'general', who had assisted him in securing his current rubber-tapping job on a private farm in Sinoe County.

Even so, not all those who went through the entire DDRR process became gainfully employed. A number of them sold their reinsertion kits for meagre sums of money to those with already established businesses. According to the principal of Booker Washington Institute (BWI), only about 30 per cent to 40 per cent of his trainees per training phase were successful in using the acquired skills for livelihood.[131] Asked to comment on this dismal performance, a member of the JIU remarked that it was better that some of the ex-combatants quickly found alternatives to DDRR, and were able to survive on their own as a manifestation of self-reliance.[132] According to a psychosocial counsellor with the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), part of the ex-combatants' high failure in reintegration was due to the limited time given for psychosocial therapy. It was impossible to demobilise in days someone who had fought for 14 years.[133]

Livelihood

According to UNMIL, when the demobilised combatants were asked to identify their training preferences in February 2005, 40 per cent chose formal education, 14 per cent auto-mechanics, 11 per cent generic skills training, 7 per cent driving, 7 per cent tailoring, 4 per cent agriculture and 3 per cent masonry.[134] These figures contrasted with the findings of a survey conducted in December 2006 by UNMIL's Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery programme (RRR) among the ex-combatants, which revealed that farming was the most common occupation of ex-combatants (23%), with 'unemployed' and 'student' categories being the next two most common responses (19% and 17% respectively).[135]

Most ex-combatants attributed their inability to farm effectively to the inaccessibility of the countryside and unserviceable infrastructure. One of the

reasons contributing to this phenomenon could be that at the time of joining the DDRR programme they were usually enthusiastic, with very high goals and expectations. As they entered the RR stage that led to the end of training, '... their optimism started dwindling at the realization that there were hardly any sustainable markets for their products to assure them of gainful employment', remarked one trainer.[136]

Governance and security

Increased levels of crime such as robbery and illicit drugs occurred especially in Monrovia, after the closure of the DDRR programme. This was exemplified by the fact that, in the month of September 2006 alone, five cases of homicide and nine cases of armed robbery were reported to the UN Police in Monrovia.[137] While it was true that the DDRR programme had registered relatively good success in consolidating national security, it was not possible to determine whether this success was largely due to the monitoring enforced by the 15 000 peacekeepers, or to war fatigue or to the real impact of the DDRR programme; or perhaps it was due to a combination of all these factors. This could be determined only if one variable was evaluated in the absence of the others, and particularly after a complete drawdown of UNMIL.

Economic reintegration

The success (or failure) of socio-economic reintegration needs to be measured against the macroeconomic reality of Liberia, which, during the DDRR process, was not able to provide sufficiently the variety of job opportunities and other elements that ex-combatants seeking quick economic recovery were desperately in need of. According to UNMIL's RRR programme, ex-combatants in urban centres (such as Monrovia) found it more difficult to get meaningful employment than those who were in rural areas, partly because the rural-based ex-combatants engaged in subsistence farming activities or were able to seek temporary employment on plantations, whereas those in the urban centres had comparatively fewer options.[138] For this reason, the unemployment rate among those in urban areas appeared to be higher than those who were reintegrated into rural settings. In some cases poverty and unemployment drove ex-combatants to seek assistance from their former faction commanders during the

war. There were cases where former factional commanders had connected their former fighters to jobs in rubber plantations around Monrovia.[139] This phenomenon presented a danger to the total reintegration process, as it instilled a sense of dependency among ex-combatants.

Social reintegration

The Liberian communities appeared to have reconciled with ex-combatants, whom they accepted into their socio-economic settings. However, within some communities there was a call for the youth to have the same training opportunities as ex-combatants in order to limit undertones of exclusion between the two groups.[140] In practice there were no major concerns by the communities concerning the priority given to ex-combatants' training. A notable oversight of the RR programme, however, was the omission of the provision for community projects that should have run alongside training programmes. This would have been a useful element of practical training and would have shifted the focus from individuals to the community. The communal aspect was partially mitigated by UNMIL's RRR programme that provided work-for-food projects to willing ex-combatants within Monrovia, which entailed drainage clearing, road repair and garbage collection among other community work.[141]

In summary, therefore, the challenges facing the Liberian society regarding reintegration comprised a higher-than-expected number of combatants and their dependants that had to be reintegrated into an environment of collapsed infrastructure, insufficient public institutions (schools, hospitals, justice, etc.), lack of professional skills and weak capacity of local implementing partners.

DDR LINKAGES TO RELATED PROGRAMMES

The planning for DDR programmes has much higher chances of succeeding if it is undertaken with the aim of linking (relating) it to pre-existing post-conflict recovery programmes. A well-linked DDR programme will ensure that when the formal DDR process closes down (perhaps with the end of donor funding), there is continuity based on pre-existing communal structures. With regard to the Liberian case it is practical to conclude that in order to reinforce sustainability; therefore, DDR planning should incorporate the following.

Beneficiary involvement and participation

Under this guideline, the GOL committed itself to ensuring participation of all parties to the conflict, including pertinent stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of the DDRR programme. In principle this was sound and comprehensive but when the programme kicked off most of the focus was on the main parties to the conflict: the GOL, LURD and MODEL. Other related groups such as women and children associated with the conflict were easily overlooked, an issue that provoked the intervention of UNMIL's Office of the Gender Adviser.[142] This late realisation that women and children related to the conflict needed to be incorporated into the programme contributed in a way to unexpected variations in ex-combatant caseloads, creating a false feeling of dependency by the masses on the DDRR programme. Several people were tempted into abandoning their small but sustainable sources of livelihood to rush for the 'hand outs' in the name of a transitional safety allowance (TSA), under the pretence of being associated with ex-combatants.

Sensitisation and a nation-wide reconciliation campaign

Prior to demobilisation, the government, with the support of UNMIL and the JIU, undertook sensitisation and nation-wide reconciliation campaigns aimed at educating the general public about the programme and the role of ex-combatants in a post-conflict society. During focus group discussions, participants reported UNMIL radio as the single most important source of information that explained the DDRR process and other post-conflict-related processes. Other means used to sensitise communities included community outreach programmes and focus group discussions, drama and skits.

The state of destitute children

The DDRR process, to a large extent, was preoccupied with ex-combatants while CAFF, WAFF and the disabled/wounded were taken care of by other organisations such as UNICEF, the WHO and the UNDP. In doing this, the DDRR did not include in its planning the element of destitute children whose situation was as a result of family break-ups. Mass displacements resulted in many children losing track of their parents and guardians. A report entitled *Human Rights in*

Liberia's Orphanages, released by UNMIL in March 2007, reveals the fragility of the life of Liberia's destitute children, many of whom lived in appalling orphanages that characterised the post-civil war Liberia.

The dire situation of the destitute children led to the mushrooming of charitable organisations, several of whose motives were to attract donor funds for their own selfish ends, at the expense of the presumed beneficiaries.[143] It was, therefore, not surprising that the objectives of most of the orphanages were questionable, according to the report, which details several examples during the last half of August 2006. At this time more than 700 children were removed from their families and taken to newly opened and unaccredited orphanages.[144] In some cases the children involved were returned to their relatives after intervention by the government and child protection agencies. The separation of children from their families contradicts the post-war attempts that aimed at rebuilding the social fabric that included the reuniting of children with their families.

The civil war and its distorting effect on family structures set the ground for the proliferation of childcare institutions in Liberia. This can be corroborated by the fact that in 1989, on the eve of the 14-year civil wars that plagued Liberia, there were only about 10 orphanages, while, by 1991, the number of registered orphanages had risen to 121. Despite all the efforts that the GOL put in place to mitigate what was increasingly becoming a social problem, the proliferation of orphanages seemed to take a new turn, spreading into the rural spheres and in all counties. With the reestablishment of peace in 2003, the Child Protection Network Taskforce conducted a pilot study in 2004 that covered two counties (Montserrado and Margibi) and established that there were 4 792 orphans in 96 orphanages. The 2004 assessment report recommended that 39 sub-standard orphanages be closed, while 17 needed improvement and only 40 could be accredited.[145]

The security sector reform process (SSR)

The case of Liberia provides a good example of peace agreements that provide an opportunity to establish useful frameworks and mandates for SSR, if the goals and principles of security and justice reform can be agreed in the main peace agreements. This serves to increase the accountability of the security and justice sectors right from the beginning of the process.

In most cases (and as was the case in Liberia), while peace agreements attract the participation of all stakeholders, including the civil society, SSR and related security issues (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; the creation of a new integrated army; and training of police units), the process tends to be controlled by governments, with little or no involvement of the civil society. The process is often mired with mistrust and a feeling of insecurity between government and civil society, with the latter being critical of the former. It is for this reason that the challenges and opportunities for SSR and appropriate approaches to reform sometimes differ between post-conflict countries and those that are undertaking normal SSR processes.[146] The basic tenet is that despite variations in circumstances, it is important to ensure an integrated approach when designing and implementing SSR processes.

Part Four of the Liberian CPA signed in 2003 deals with the issue of SSR. Soon after the two-year National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGOL) was put into place, it set up the Defence Advisory Committee, under the Ministry of Defence. After a series of consultations with the donors, UNMIL and government departments, the Ministry of Defence recommended the creation of a force made up of 6 500 forces.[147] At the initial stages of recruitment, fear and suspicion among the would-be recruits made them too fearful or shy of associating with the military, based on the atrocities that the military had committed against the society during the war.

In order to mitigate these effects, UNMIL, in conjunction with the government, conducted a national dialogue in which avenues of improving the process were explored. For instance when, in 2006, a new government was sworn in, a new SSR process was defined in which the GOL adopted a total transformation approach, following which none of the elements that were party to the conflict would be reintegrated into the new forces.[148] While this approach had the intention of 'cleaning up' the military, it left out a large number of ex-fighters, some of whom were capable of serving in the new forces.[149] The society was, therefore, obliged to contend with former fighters, of whom a large majority hardly knew anything more than how to use a gun, as many had been born and brought up in the course of the civil war.[150] The grouping of the former fighters was composed of the about 4 500 AFL that had served before 1990, and whose pensions, including many months of salary arrears, were still outstanding.[151] There was also another group called 'draftees', composed of those who had

served in the AFL in the post-1990 period. These were about 9 400 in number.[152] Another group was composed of DDRR dropouts from the 103 000 that formed the caseload. All these groupings were concentrated in Monrovia, awaiting the government's attention.

One of the reasons that nearly all the former forces were not considered for serving in the new forces was that it would raise the question of impartiality, given that the ex-fighters had fought on opposing sides during the civil war. 'Who then would be considered for remobilization into the new military outfit, and who wouldn't; and what criteria would be used? At the same time some of these ex-forces had committed atrocities against their own communities and therefore it would have been quite demoralising if they were seen in government security outfits again,' posed a senior staff member of the Liberian SSR process.[153]

The failure to consider the ex-military personnel for remobilisation into the new defence force led to the ex-soldiers of the AFL and other retired members of the deactivated outfits forming what they called 'Combined Forces', with the option of agitating for their benefits, which ranged from salary arrears to retirement benefits.[154] The government, on its side, considered all benefits to the retired officers paid, with the exception of their monthly pension.[155] This situation illustrates the need to incorporate an inclusive strategy when designing SSR processes. The Liberian SSR process was profoundly political because it focused on the most sensitive sector of the society: it challenged power relations, vested interests and dominant paradigms; hence, if not properly implemented, it had the potential to provoke contestation within the state and between the state and other actors, and was influenced by, and could exacerbate broader political struggles.[156]

While it was true that SSR could not fulfil the expectations of everybody in the society, it should have endeavoured to minimise resentment by those who perceived themselves as potential beneficiaries. This could have been attained in part, according to the DAC Guidelines on SSR, if the process had been comprehensive enough to include:

- Core security actors: armed forces; the police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias)

- Management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions)
- Justice and the rule of law: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems and
- Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias[157]

A major challenge in a widely inclusive process such as proposed above is that of resources. Lack of sufficient funding was a major contributing factor to most problems linked to SSR processes in Liberia, which meant that, if it were not for the involvement of the international community (as discussed below), the process would have faced much more serious challenges.

The implementation of SSR in Liberia: The election of a new government in Liberia in 2006 marked a major turning point in the implementation of the SSR objectives as set up in the CPA. Part Four Article VII of the agreement deals with the SSR. The article starts with a call for the disbandment of irregular forces and the reform and restructuring of the AFL. The article goes on to stipulate that the forces may be drawn from the ranks of the GOL forces, LURD and MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience. All the parties are encouraged to allow ECOWAS, the UN, AU, and the ICGL to provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform effort. The article singles out the US as a country that should play a leading role in the implementation of the SSR programme.

The call on the US to play a leading role in the SSR processes in Liberia resulted in the outsourcing of most SSR services to US companies.[158]

An American company, Pacific Architects and Engineers, was in charge of specialised training, equipment, logistics and base services, for part of which the US Government offered US$95 million for training. An evaluation of the Liberian SSR process pointed to the influence of the US in the Liberian SSR programme. For instance, it was largely the Pentagon's decision that the Liberian

army would have 2 000 soldiers, according to the budgetary provisions made by the Pentagon.[159]

An informal focus discussion with a mixed audience comprising Liberian university students, civil society and deactivated forces brought to the fore a wide range of issues regarding foreign companies operating in Liberia.[160] One of the most contentious issues was that of the US$200 million budget allocated for the training of 2 000 military officers. The main criticism was that as at May 2007, an estimated US$100 million of the US$200 million had been spent on training only 104 military officers, of whom just nine were commissioned officers. According to the deactivated former AFL member, they were all fit to be remobilised into the new forces, being between the ages of 35 and 45. One particular individual appeared to justify his case by stating that in 1994 he had been sent to a college in the US where he had trained in forensic science but now he had arbitrarily been deactivated. Others raised various concerns that ranged from accusations of DynCorp having been involved in prostitution and sex scandals in Colombia to the appointment of a Nigerian as Chief of General Staff of the Liberian military, while capable Liberians had been deactivated.

In the course of the group discussions, two other issues raised touched on the morale of the police. The first was that a few of the former police officers that were absorbed into the new recruitment seemed to be demoralised because their former ranks and experience had not been considered, so they had to undertake the basic training in the same way as the new recruits. Related to this was the issue of the purported difficulty faced by the recruits when they graduated. The argument was that during the training the recruits were housed and fed, enjoying air-conditioned housing and a monthly subsidy of US$50 per person, services that they could ill afford after graduating. Whether these allegations were legitimate or not, what was apparent was that the general feeling among some Liberians was that the SSR process was not inclusive enough.

The police and SSR: Article VIII of the CPA deals with the restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security services. The article calls for an immediate restructuring of the LNP, the Immigration Force, Special Security Service (SSS), customs security guards and other such statutory security units. It goes on to urge restructured security forces to adopt a professional orientation that emphasises democratic values and respect for human rights, a non-partisan approach to duty and the avoidance of corrupt practices.

Of particular importance was the decision to disarm and disband the special security units that were infamous during the civil war for terrorising citizens, such as Charles ATU, the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the LNP and such paramilitary groups that operated within organisations as Liberia's National Ports Authority (NPA), the Liberia Telecommunications Corporation (LTC), the Liberia Petroleum Refinery Corporation (LPRC) and the airports.

Until the deployment of a newly trained national police force, maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia was the responsibility of an interim police force and the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) components, an arrangement under which the interim police force would only be allowed to carry side arms while large calibre weapons were carried by the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) officers.

In this regard, therefore, the reform and restructuring of the police and other law enforcement agencies was a co-operative effort as laid out in the CPA. In May 2004, UNMIL and the transitional government jointly initiated the first recruitment campaign aimed at creating a new police force of 3 500 officers.[161] The Police Academy in Paynesville, Monrovia was subsequently reopened after refurbishment. The first batch of police training involved 1 633 officers, a combination of both veteran and new. In April 2006, the LNP and UNMIL relaunched a campaign across the country to recruit the remaining number of about 1 400 personnel. According to a member of the Police Support Unit (PSU), the general public's previous image of the police was one of a notorious organisation, infamous for torture, brutality and illegal arrests.[162] This made many people apprehensive of the police and other security organs of government, an aspect that made recruitment of new officers difficult. In an effort to enhance public relations, the LNP recruitment mobile teams took their messages to the public by holding open campaigns in trading centres and sometimes going from door to door urging eligible men and women to join the force.[163] They also used flyers, posters and banners to reach those eligible.

Newly trained officers earned a more attractive salary and with better incentives than in the past. New officers earned on average US$90 per month (up from an average of US$20), with more chances of further training abroad, as well as the possibility of joining UN peacekeeping missions in other countries. Possibilities of accrediting the Police Academy to the University of Liberia were also being explored as a way of attracting university students into the police

force. In an open acknowledgement of the difficulty of attracting new recruits to the police, the LNP Director, Beatrice Sieh, the first female chief of police in the history of Liberia, observed that the police service had remained unattractive to the public as a result largely of two factors: low salary and incentives, and the negative perceptions of the public towards the police as a result of its role in the country's civil wars.[164] In terms of gender, while the recruitment drive had a special focus on attracting female recruits, it only managed to achieve dismal results.[165]

Community arms collection and development

The Liberian Community Arms Collection for Development (CACD) project was initiated in January 2006 and was co-ordinated by the UNDP. The pilot phase of the programme operated as a preparatory assistance phase of the UNDP within the framework of the Recovery and Reintegration Programme, and it closed in June 2006. The CACD, also referred to as the 'Arms for Development Programme' (AfD), was a key activity under the community participation strategy.

The main objective of the programme was to help reduce the number of small arms circulating in civilian hands. To achieve this, the programme used development incentives, education and awareness campaigns as well as capacity building of the LNP, the National Commission on Small Arms and the Liberia Action Network on Small Arms (LANSA).

After the pilot phase, the CACD's objectives were expanded from focusing on the initial four chiefdoms to the rest of the country. This was achieved through training that the UNDP's Community Based Recovery (CBR) programme delivered to the District Development Committees (DDCs). The aim of the training was to encourage communities to initiate voluntary weapons-collection schemes through which the communities would surrender weapons in exchange for community-focused projects or equipment of their choice such as clinics, schools, agro-processing machines, solar energy, food and banks.[166] CACD's objectives envisaged putting into place a more robust process of arms collection in which Project Management Committees (PMCs) and DDCs would be charged with the management of the incentive projects, among other tasks such as sensitising community residents (through such offers as free-play radios).[167]

The main aim of the CACD programme was therefore to promote the country's national recovery efforts through measures for the restoration of civil authorities and governance structures, resettlement and voluntary repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees as well as the war-affected population within the framework of the 4Rs (reconciliation, reform, rebuilding and recovery) process developed by the UNDP and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as other agencies.[168]

The CACD's success was largely dependent on its public awareness and education campaign on the dangers of small arms and light weapons and its first initiatives began in the counties of Lofa, Nimba, Grand Gedeh and Bong where, in addition to running campaigns to educate the public on the dangers of small arms, the UNDP helped to establish DDCs which comprised government officials, civil-society representatives and private individuals. The DDCs' role was to gather information on local arms caches and alert the police and UNMIL for rapid intervention.[169] According to the programme, once the weapons had been collected, the police would certify that the district was weapons free and then the DDC would approach the UNDP with its priority needs. The UNDP, following an analysis of the needs (such as health clinics, sports fields and rural feeder roads), would then provide the technical support necessary for these projects. In order to ensure that the district remained weapons free, the programme endeavoured to promote community policing to supplement the efforts of the national police. Community policing included training elders, the youth, women and other residents in basic intelligence skills. This helped the community to detect arms entering or passing through their districts.[170] The Liberian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently established the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms (LiNCSA) to continue with the process of public awareness and the collection of arms after the closure of the UNDP-led process.

The truth and reconciliation commission (TRC)

Liberia's TRC was created by an Act of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly on 12 May 2005, and was officially launched in June 2006 to start a two-year mandate aimed at investigating human rights abuses that had been committed between 1979 and 2003, when the CPA was signed.[171] Article XIII of the CPA calls for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission that would provide a forum for addressing issues of impunity, and also provide

an opportunity for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

Under the CPA provisions, the TRC comprised a panel with nine commissioners. The panel's mandate was, among other things, to investigate gross human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law as well as abuses that had occurred, including massacres, sexual violations, murder, or extra-judicial killings, and economic crimes such as the exploitation of natural or public resources to perpetuate armed conflicts during the period January 1979 to 14 October 2003. The inception of the TRC marked a potentially crucial milestone in Liberia's transition – from a period of despair to a time of healing and hope.[172]

The TRC initiated outreach and awareness campaigns that called for widespread participation from all members of the society. In an effort to make the process more inclusive, the Commission's awareness campaigns were extended to the US. The TRC concluded its work with a presentation of a final report in June 2009. The report contains major findings on, among others, the root causes of the conflict, the impact of the conflict on women, children and the generality of the Liberian society; responsibility for the massive commission of Gross Human Rights Violations (GHRV), and violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) as well as Egregious Domestic Law Violations (EDLV). The report also determined and recommended that criminal prosecution for these violations, reparations and a 'Palava Hut' forum are necessary and desirable to redress impunity and promote peace, justice, security, unity and genuine national reconciliation.[173]

Although the TRC's mandate covered the period ranging from 1979 to 2003, it was also mandated to look into Liberian history and make recommendations on the way forward.

Regional sensitivity of the programme

The integrated nature of the Liberian DDR process was able to accommodate foreign combatants, thereby taking into consideration the realities of the West African conflict system. This was in line with the UNDP Mano River initiatives that provide a regional framework for co-operation.[174] One of the objectives of the Mano River Union (MRU) is to establish a regional initiative in which

a common legislative framework would be developed, with country-specific programme support for the target population, and prevention of recycling of ex-combatants through the establishment of a centralised database for information exchange.

LESSONS LEARNT

While recognising that the DDRR programme in Liberia has had a substantially positive impact on the society by lessening the chances of the society relapsing into conflict, the basic lessons drawn from the DDRR process have been that the planners of the DDRR programme, just as was the case with the MDRP planning (see preceding chapters), either did not anticipate the desperation of the community that came with the ending of the war or in formulating the DDRR strategy did not sufficiently address certain fundamental realities of the communities such as the aggravating poverty situation resulting from the long years of war, illiteracy (since most ex-combatants grew up in war hence lacked basic education), and inaccessibility of some of the target regions of the countries due to collapsed infrastructure and weak economic bases among other issues. The Liberian DDRR process was specifically affected in the ways outlined below.

When the DDRR process was launched in 2003, the disarmament package and the safety net allowances offered to ex-combatants dramatically attracted a large section of the society, from an estimated number of 38 000 to 103 000. People were simply attracted by the weapon buy-back approach of the disarmament process. This affected the process, bloating the caseload and bringing it to an abrupt halt from December 2003 to April 2004.

Once people met the criteria of DDRR, they were automatically classified as 'ex-combatants' and were issued with a DDRR identification card with very limited further authentication of their real ex-combatant status. This resulted in a lack of adequate training institutions that could absorb ex-combatants, which created, in certain cases, long waiting periods between the DD stage and the RR stage. In certain cases ex-combatants waited between six months and two years before joining training institutions. In the process of waiting some ex-combatants gave up hope and sought alternative means of survival.

Most counties were not accessible by road and were therefore unattractive to many ex-combatants who had initially preferred to be reintegrated back into

their original counties. This resulted in most ex-combatants opting to reintegrate into Montserrado County, in which Monrovia is situated, thereby overstretching the social amenities in Monrovia. It also led to an increase in crime and related social ills.

In general, ex-combatants preferred urban centres to rural areas owing to the availability of social amenities in the former. For instance, of the 74 ex-combatants in their final stage of training who formed a focus group during this research, 63 per cent of them indicated their wish to reintegrate into Montserrado County, with only 11 per cent and 6 per cent expressing willingness to reintegrate into Bong and Margibi counties respectively. The desire by most ex-combatants to be reintegrated into towns indicated that they had received insufficient psychosocial orientation prior to reaching the reintegration stage. The other 14 counties were not made attractive enough to ex-combatants. This could have been achieved, for instance, through the introduction of community-based projects.

There were a few gaps in record keeping as well. For example, information on the number of ex-combatants that were unemployed after the DDRR process was lacking within the NCDDR. Unlike in the case of MDRP the communities of return in the Liberian case were not directly catered for in the DDRR planning. However, the response of the communities to the returning ex-combatants was generally positive and rarely did the ex-combatants face resistance. Although some communities had reservations about the ex-combatants, they felt obliged to accept their return 'home,' fearing that if rejected they would pose a danger to the society. Lack of sufficient resources for the RR phase of the process impacted negatively on the sustainability of the individual's long-term reintegration into the community. While disarmament and demobilisation were fairly easier to achieve, rehabilitation and reintegration needed a much longer-term commitment. Reintegration faced a number of challenges. Reintegration normally requires an integrated, country-specific approach that takes into consideration the realities of a given society.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY

From the analysis provided in this chapter, it is practical to extract certain observations which, if considered, would contribute to better planning and implementation of similar processes in future.

- *Compensation*: Payments (particularly cash) promised to ex-combatants undergoing RR (including subsistence allowances) should be paid out on time so as to avoid a feeling of desperation and anxiety that comes with such a delay. However, where the delay is unavoidable the message should be relayed to affected ex-combatants immediately and a constant update maintained regarding the arrival of the funds.

  In the case of Liberia, the turnaround time for issuing toolkits following graduation was long, taking several months in some cases.
- *Sustainability:* The Liberian DDRR process, apart from contributing to the ending of open conflict and reducing its chances of further recurrence, did not register great success with regard to the general community. For instance, not many direct community-based projects were envisaged in the planning stages, especially those geared at improving the economic and social wellbeing of the communities. This led to ex-combatants overcrowding in Monrovia in search of a 'good life'.
- *Skills acquisition:* A considerable number of ex-combatants sold their toolkits or pawned them on receipt. On the other hand, those who graduated with various skills were appreciative of the training they had received, although they believed the training period was too short as several of them had yet to learn how to write, read and manage their own businesses when the training ended. It was clear that the programme was providing beneficiaries with marketable skills but within the context of high unemployment in the country. There was, therefore, very limited opportunity for them to apply the skills learnt because of lack of capital, limited markets owing to the low purchasing power of the general public and the saturation of the market with people with similar skills, such as carpentry, hairdressing and tailoring.
- *Being sensitive to realities:* DDRR beneficiaries did not seem to be worse off than the rest of the population, with an average earning of more than US$2 per day. In several families, owing to rampant joblessness, a family member qualifying for DDRR meant that he/she became the breadwinner of the family, as all the siblings looked forward to being sustained by the monthly stipend of US$30 that the individual was paid during the training. In cases where the individual graduated and was issued with a reinsertion kit, the pressure to fend for their family led them to sell off the kit immediately after graduation.

- *Acceptance by communities:* The majority of beneficiaries were easily reaccepted back into their communities, with very few cases of rejection. This did not mean that the ex-combatants had not committed atrocities against their own communities, but, according to the TRC commissioners, the long period of war had left most Liberians too weary and fatigued, and '… therefore everyone was ready to accept peace, in whichever way that may guarantee it'.[175] This made the reintegration process much easier. However, reintegration did not mean obliterating the past, as was demonstrated by some ex-combatants who still spent their free time with their friends from the war.
- *Emphasis on SSR:* The main aim of SSR was essentially to ensure that the GOL provided security to its citizens and that it did so taking into consideration the plight of the entire society in order to prevent situations where deactivated forces as well as ex-combatants would feel disenfranchised. It is, however, understandable that in (most) developing countries whose security structures have been wrecked by conflict, governments have to make far-reaching political decisions with scarce resources, hence being constrained from allocating sufficient resources to SSR processes.[176]

  The exclusion of former combatants from joining the new military led to some disgruntlement among former fighters, most of whom had not been paid considerable outstanding allowances, pension or salaries in arrears. These included 4 500 retirees who had served in the AFL before 1990; 9 400 'draftees' (former AFL members who had served in the post-1990 era) and the other ex-combatants who had failed to join the DDRR process for various reasons. All these groups, including returning refugees and IDPs, were concentrated in Monrovia. This mix presented a precarious security situation for Monrovia and its surroundings. Incidents of theft and armed violence became common, as did demonstrations by members of the deactivated forces, such as those of 'Combined Forces'. These activities were prevalent in areas where UNMIL presence was so strong.
- *Civilian arms collection:* Sustainability and success of the AfD programme and the awareness-raising strategy depended largely on the ability of the GOL, the UN system, the civil society and, quite importantly, support by the international community at two major levels: one being in terms of funding and the other regarding the need for the countries neighbouring Liberia to show a willingness to strengthen their border control mechanisms so as to

ensure that the problem of illicit transfer of arms across national borders was restrained. Although there was a feeling that the threat posed by illicit small arms to the peace and stability of Liberia had lessened, violent crimes in which arms were used were still very prevalent. The focus group discussions of this research revealed the main sources of conflict within the Liberian communities to be: (a) bad leadership/corruption; (b) crime/lawlessness; (c) land ownership; and (d) unemployment/idleness/youth dissatisfaction. Of least concern to the sample of ex-combatants was the illegal possession of firearms and the reintegration of IDPs and refugees.

CONCLUSION

Besides the hurdles that faced the Liberian DDRR process, there was strong evidence that the programme had indeed enabled a much better life for those ex-combatants who had completed their programme of training compared to those former fighters who had chosen not to register for reintegration. In almost every sub-facet of the dimensions of reintegration (social, economic, and political), the DDRR programme graduates were at least managing to cope amidst the prevailing challenges.

The assessment of the impact of the DDRR programme on the Liberian community in general was based on the principle that in designing specific components for the DDRR of ex-combatants, general parameters such as the target group's socio-economic stability, the welfare of the communities of return and existing potentials or opportunities for successful reintegration into the preferred area of settlement were of crucial concern in ensuring sustainable human security. On this basis, the research evaluated the DDRR planning and process in Liberia with a view to establishing whether these factors were considered. The findings of this research were based on these objectives. Recommendations have been systematically incorporated into the body of the chapter alongside the issues covered by the research.

5 Conclusion and lessons learnt

This chapter, while recognising the vital role that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes play in stabilising post-conflict societies, provides a summary of various weaknesses of DDR programmes, as discussed in the foregoing chapters, which have looked in detail at the situation of DDR in Africa as implemented by the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa, and by the UN in Liberia. The chapters have highlighted the implications for the lives of those targeted. The emerging conclusion is that although Africa is a leading recipient of disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programmes,[177] including being a beneficiary of the world's first largest demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) programme (under MDRP), the continent continues to register a high level of conflict even in countries where DDR/R has previously taken place, including the GLR, which benefitted from the MDRP fund. From this study, it can be concluded that despite Africa being a major beneficiary of DDR processes in the world, the impact of these initiatives has not been very visible for various reasons such as:

- The frequency of armed conflicts in the continent leading to the need for DDR processes has continued to outweigh the intensity of the DDR intervention processes, thereby obscuring, to a certain extent, the success gained in intervention.
- In some cases the DDR programming has failed to take into consideration the social, economic and political contexts of the targeted beneficiaries and/or their expectations and the willingness of recipient communities to support the reintroduction of ex-combatants back into their midst. This is more especially true of communities where ex-combatants seeking reintegration may have committed atrocities within the communities.
- The question of national ownership was another fundamental aspect of the MDRP programme. In whose interest was the reintegration of ex-combatants taking place? Was it in the interest of MDRP partners or in the interest of recipient country? According to the MDRP Final Evaluation Report, the centrality of national ownership was indeed identified at the programming stage, where the MDRP Strategy stated that, 'the MDRP would promote country ownership of national programs'.[178] The guidelines to national programmes states that the MDRP would 'support national programs tailored to the requirements of a given country. To optimize flexibility and to exploit emerging opportunities, the timing of national programs would be determined by national leaders in consultation with international partners' (para 150.i). National ownership as a principle was supported by all the MDRP partners, based on the lesson that unless there is national ownership, DDR processes are likely to fail.
- National ownership was not specified in the MDRP strategy at the conceptual stage of the programme. The strategy document noted that *national* and *government* ownership could be used inter-changeably. According to the MDRP strategy document, there were, however, several issues that needed clarification, such as (i) ***who*** were the local 'owners', (ii), ***what*** did ownership entail, (iii) ownership of ***what:*** a political process, implementation, design, management, and (iv) how did different ***contexts*** affect national ownership and thus implementation of the DDR process?[179] The prioritisation of national ownership by MDRP was of fundamental importance to the project because it acknowledged the need for national ownership.
- The Mid-term Review (MTR) carried out in 2004 produced a report, *A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation*, which was the main item at the

> February 2005 meeting in Paris. The thrust of the report was that it gave high marks for the innovative approach, the coordination that MDRP represented, and the unique potential that this broad coalition could bring to bear on the region's problems. On the critical side, the Bank had 'administrative procedures that are slow, insufficient permanent presence of staff in the field, a lack of distinction between national ownership and government ownership, and a tendency to conceive of reintegration in terms of short-term process'.

It was discernible that some of the challenges that confronted DDR programmes in Africa could partly be attributed to the vagueness of the mandates when they are conceptualised, as well as a lack of sustainable approaches to DDR processes. The realisation of this anomaly has prompted a shift in recent years toward what is regarded as a more focused intervention.

A more recent approach, Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), comprises a set of policy guidelines developed in 2005. Although the newer DDR/R programmes have resulted in the disarming of hundreds of thousands of combatants, the programmes remain poorly funded, and lack of research has prevented practitioners from developing better reintegration programmes.[180] On the basis of the weaknesses and strengths demonstrated in the case studies covered in this monograph, the emerging question is, what wisdom underlies the need for DDR? This is discussed below.

WHY DDR?

Perhaps this question should have been addressed in the introductory section of this monograph. Or, it might have been framed better to read, 'What was it like in Africa before the advent of DDR programmes? How did Africa reintegrate its former fighters back into society when wars ended?' While answers to these questions lie outside of the scope of this monograph, it may be instrumental to highlight that the lethality of the weaponry used in today's wars and its sophistication and durability call for an urgent need to ensure that weapons are removed from society at the earliest opportunity. This is unlike the olden days when spears and arrows were the norm, and only in a few communities would one find a hunting rifle. In the most basic terms, therefore, a DDR programme is supposed to ensure a faster return to a 'weapons free society' when

active conflicts end, so as to ensure the beginning of a return to normalcy and security.

For anyone who has attended conferences and seminars where issues of arms proliferation are discussed in Africa, it is not strange to hear questions about why manufacturers and suppliers of arms to Africa cannot be curtailed from servicing African wars. Often those who ask such questions are not interested in academic lengthy explanations of a technical nature such as the fact that there is a Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. More often those who ask these questions are individuals who have borne the agonising brunt of war, or who live in war zones or are just tired of the whole issue of Africa and unending armed conflicts … such individuals can hardly understand complicated explanations, and hardly get a chance to attend these high-level meetings. A similar situation is confronted by recipients of DDR/R programmes. To many of them, DDR/R appears to be an alternative to the 'employment' they 'lost' when they surrendered their guns during the disarmament programme at the end of conflict.

Although most DDR programmes have been implemented in Africa, little has been done to assess the reasons that motivate armed groups to sign peace agreements, or even accept agreements they had rejected before, as was the case with Burundi's only remaining rebel group, the *Forces nationales de liberation* (FNL), which, upon being granted permission to transform into a political party to contest the 2010 general elections, agreed to stop their armed struggle. This transformation left an estimated 11 000 FNL ex-combatants in limbo, without a framework for their reintegration, after only a few of them had been chosen for reintegration into the country's military.[181]

Most armed groups agree to down their weapons for expected political and economic motivations. Lessons learnt from countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Burundi and several other African countries demonstrate that most ex-combatants, after undergoing a DDR/R process, find it difficult to reintegrate into their own communities for various reasons. In most of these cases such individuals conglomerate in cities and towns (See Chapter 4 on the Liberian DDRR programme), thereby constituting a new form of security threat.

The tendency of ex-combatants to be less willing to be reintegrated into their communities has not been thoroughly explored by the implementers of DDR/R processes. In most occasions the emphasis is on disarmament (taking away the gun from the ex-combatant) and demobilisation (physical disbanding of the command structures of the former combatants by separating them), while reintegration, which is supposed to constitute the ultimate aim of ensuring lasting peace, often carries less weight. In trying to bring to the fore some of the challenges facing reintegration of ex-combatants in Africa, the discussion below examines lessons learnt from DDR programmes implemented across Africa. Examples are drawn from various African countries in highlighting these challenges.

AFRICAN WARS AND THEIR LINKAGE TO DDR

Lessons emerging from civil wars in Africa indicate that the challenge of rebuilding post-conflict societies lies in the fact that ending a conflict is one thing, while preventing a society from relapsing into conflict is a different thing altogether. To a certain extent, failure to appreciate this fact contributes to rushed post-conflict remedial measures that sometimes require a DDR/R programme to be stopped and re-planned, and sometimes to be repeated for several years to the extent of creating a DDR/R dependency syndrome in the target society. Such repetition tends to create a semblance of dependence among beneficiaries of these programmes. In the same vein, limited understanding of the level of desperation of the target community leads to unexpected occurrences such as bloated caseloads when swathes of community members overwhelm expected target numbers.

To state that DDR programmes in general are an adequate response to a reconstruction of a post-conflict society is an overestimation. DDR programmes are not the solution to a country's problems; neither does DDR aim to transform ex-combatants into entrepreneurs overnight. In the view of some practitioners, DDR is successful as long as the programme manages to collect arms from the society at the end of the conflict. Reintegration is expected to be a natural, gradual process. In the words of a DDR practitioner in Liberia, the collection of arms signifies that '… at least the war is over and although not all arms have been collected, peace is returning gradually. Those who fought are Liberians and so we expect them to reintegrate back into their society naturally

after the DDR programme closes.'[182] Although this does not appear officially in the structuring of DDR programmes, practical lessons drawn from DDR processes indicate that too much emphasis is placed on the disarmament component rather than on reintegration, with the main objective being to take the gun from the combatant. Overconcentration on the disarmament component of the process presents the risk of former fighters perceiving recovering the gun from an ex-combatant as a moneymaking venture. It is, in other words, seen as a form of employment owing to the monetary incentives that come with it. This has led to ex-combatants perceiving DDR processes in various ways, such as those listed below.

DDR as an income-generating venture

Mehler captures this perception when he states that, when war ends, one of the primary objectives is to collect weapons from the society and destroy them. However, the collection of weapons is an activity that frequently demands material input by donor organisations. The arms collection process usually takes an approach known as 'arms for cash' or 'buy-back'. Mehler cautions that buy-backs carry the potential risk of incentivising former fighters by acting as demobilisation rent, or a source of income, hence concluding that DDR programmes, if not well targeted, could engender perverse conflict-prolonging effects, if beneficiaries are exclusively those who took up arms in the first place.[183]

The monetary value placed on arms during DDR programmes acts as a nucleus around which several monetary malpractices occur, such as ex-combatants engaging in double dipping or acting as impostors in order to meet the DDR criteria. Double dipping occurs when beneficiaries of a DDR process falsify their identity so as to benefit multiple times. This malpractice has been noted to be most common at the disarmament stage during buy-back events, when cash is normally exchanged for weapons handed in.

DDR as a military practice

While DDR is not necessarily a military-dependent affair, the fact that it tends to be a component of the UN and other multilateral peace operations depicts the process as a military one, especially so because oftentimes it ensues from peace agreements marking an end to a conflict. Another aspect that gives DDR

a military face is the fact that the authorisation of peace operations ensues from the UNSC resolutions with a mandate on how to deal with concerned armed groups, troop-contributing countries and the UN mission personnel.[184] In essence, the local population is hardly informed about the approach and broad objectives of the mission. By acting in this way the DDR planners overlook the fact that the cessation of hostilities does not necessarily mean that the root causes of a conflict have been addressed, and that civilians, just like ex-combatants, have a stake in determining the long-term success of the DDR processes, especially the reintegration of ex-combatants. Similarly, by narrowing the focus to only those who participated in the war directly, at the expense of the general public, the planners of conventional DDR programmes fail to recognise that social inequality is frequently aggravated by war, thereby rendering the society susceptible to perennial instability, often aggravated by the fact that the actual root causes of the conflict are not immediately addressed.

DDR as an externally driven process

In most cases DDR planning is undertaken without the full involvement of the recipient country. In several cases, the implementation of the programmes has encountered challenges that have often necessitated redesigning the programme, sometimes while its implementation is underway. A case in point is the DDR programme in Sierra Leone.

When the Sierra Leonean DDR Programme (DDRP) officially closed in February 2004, a major lesson drawn from the process was that loose linkages between the DDR programme and other longer-term reintegration and recovery programmes in the country affected a smooth transition to longer-term recovery. The DDRP in Sierra Leone was divided into three phases, with Phase 1 from September to December 1998, Phase 2 from October 1999 to April 2000 and Phase 3 from 18 May 2001 to 6 January 2002.

The major developments of these phases can be gleaned from the manner in which they were planned and executed. For instance, Phase 1 was drawn up in April 1998 and was envisaged as being nationally owned. In this way the government would implement the programme with the assistance of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the UNDP. The criteria used were such that the process would target anyone who belonged to any of the armed groups that had participated in the

civil war following the coup of 25 May 1997. On the basis of the criteria set, the targeted caseload totalled about 75 000 combatants comprising 10 000 ex-Sierra Leone Army (SLA)/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); 55 000 Civil Defence Forces (CDF); 7 000 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and 3 000 child combatants (as well as 300 disabled).

However, just before the Sierra Leonean DDR process was launched, the World Bank intervened to have the planned programme reviewed in order to adopt the Ugandan model. This entailed the establishment of the National Commission on DDR (NCDDR). Consequently, the caseload of combatants was reduced from the estimated 75 000 to 45 000 combatants (6 000 SLA; 15 000 RUF, 15 000 CDF, 7 000 AFRC and 2 000 paramilitary elements).

Of the 45 000, only 3 200 were disarmed, mostly ex-SLA/AFRC, before the process was interrupted following the deterioration of the security situation and a rebel attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999. It is not clear whether the reduction of the caseload by around 30 000 combatants contributed directly to the society relapsing into war, but the participation of disgruntled elements dropped from the DDR programme cannot be ruled out.

The conflict that led to the disruption of Phase 1 of the DDR ended when the parties to the conflict, namely the government and RUF, signed the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Article XVI of the agreement called for the disarmament of all the combatants of the RUF, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The parties also requested the UN to deploy military observers to monitor the ceasefire signed in May 1999. Further to this, the UN established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) through the UNSC's resolution 1270 of October 1999, which succeeded ECOMOG, with a mandate to carry out the disarmament of combatants.

The second phase (Phase 2) of the DDRP was therefore based on the Lomé Peace Agreement. The programme was further reviewed and redesigned to represent a multi-agency effort, through an agreed 'Joint Operation Plan' involving the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), the World Food Programme (WFP) and other agencies and donors. During this phase, a total of 18 898 people were disarmed. However, the arms collected were of inferior quality. The UN expressed concern over the quality of weapons being surrendered by ex-combatants, as well as the deterioration of the security situation in a number of DDR camps, especially in Port Loko. Also of concern, according to the UN Security Council

(UNSC), was the perception by Sierra Leoneans that the UN was responsible for replacing ECOMOG with the UN contingents, whom they did not perceive to be as dependable as ECOMOG was, in terms of equipment and motivation for protecting lives.[185]

In a situation dramatically similar to the breakdown of the first phase of DDR, the second phase was besieged by an enormous challenge. The RUF rebels took about 500 UN troops hostage, killing several of them. The RUF launched the attack as revenge on the UN peacekeepers, whom they accused of surrounding the house of their leader, Foday Sankoh, in Freetown. The hostilities broke out in May 2000, leading to the interruption of political processes and resulting in the exclusion of RUF members from government, the arrest and detention of Foday Sankoh and other senior RUF members, and Sankoh's replacement by Isa Essay. The DDR programme was also derailed, resulting in the re-arming of many ex-combatants.

Any attempts to revive the Sierra Leonean DDR programme had to wait for a fresh round of negotiations between the parties in conflict. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN intervened in bringing back the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone into the peace process. Subsequently a ceasefire was signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000, and an agreement was reached on 2 May 2001 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to resume the disarmament.

On its part, the Government of Sierra Leone came to recognise that it could not eliminate the insurgency, and neither could it rely on the allegiance of its own military, which had become partisan. The rebels, on the other hand, factored in British military intervention and regional development, such as the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of the government there. These considerations, together with the change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in a more robust commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The commitment of all parties to the peace process deepened, and both parties started seeing DDR as a means to achieving peace. Accordingly, the disarmament was simultaneously relaunched in Port Loko for the CDF combatants and Cambia for the RUF on 18 May 2001, marking the start of the third phase of DDR.

The linear nature of the DDR process that characterised the Sierra Leone programme created numerous lapses in timeframe. The fact that the programme was intermittently interrupted meant that ex-combatants waited

for months in temporary camps before they could return to their communities, and delays in transition payments left ex-combatants without a means of support. 'We risked our lives to hand in our weapons,' said a former fighter, '…we are incapable of feeding our families and cannot even pay the rent. The solution is for these people to give us our weapons back.'[186] This underscores the frustrations of an ex-combatant in the event of a disrupted DDR process.

When President Alhaji Tejan-Kabbah declared the decade-old civil war over on 18 January 2002 with the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation of former RUF and CDF combatants in all 12 districts of the country, it was estimated that only around 7 000 of an estimated 48 000 child soldiers had been demobilised.

Several lessons can be drawn from the way in which the DDR process in Sierra Leone was conducted. The involvement of non-regional actors such as the UN and the British Sandlines may have been premature, thereby heightening tension between the parties in the conflict. Very few options seem to have been available for the parties to select mediators of their own choice. This resulted in the parties not taking ownership of the peace processes that ensued. The process was therefore largely considered to be externally driven, hence lacking legitimacy, especially in the view of the rebels.

The experience of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone brings to the fore the need for intervening parties to be sensitive to internal dynamics of a conflict as well as ensuing interests and differences.

DDR as a criteria-driven process

DDR programmes are based on set criteria, often due to the need to ensure that only individuals who have participated directly in conflict are targeted. Every DDR programme sets its own eligibility criteria based on various circumstances, primary among them being the funding available for the programme. The duration of the programme is also usually pegged on the funds available. A major challenge arises when the eligibility criteria fail to take into account the general conditions of the target community.

For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone the eligibility criteria set were such that for one to qualify for participation in the DDR programme every combatant was required to prove that they had been a combatant member of the RUF, the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone or the CDF. In addition to this, the combatant

was required to present a serviceable weapon or a group weapon and munitions, at an acceptable ratio of two or three persons to weapons with appropriate rounds of munitions, and where applicable a valid SLA number. Although the criteria also recognised accompanying minors, unaccompanied minors and other participants under the age of 18, such individuals had to undergo the burden of proving that they were aligned with one of the combatant groups besides meeting the eligibility criteria as set. These requirements caused enormous hurdles for the women and children associated with the fighting groups and they were often excluded from the process.

The burden of proof is a hindrance to survivors of conflict who may have endured suffering either directly or otherwise, and who for various reasons may be unable to provide tangible evidence to meet the eligibility criteria set.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) case, the MDRP programme targeted both former combatants and those associated with them. The basis for this was that generally the entire society in the east of the DRC had been militarised by conflict to the extent that the majority of all able-bodied people, whether male, female, child or elderly, had been associated with the war either directly (as a combatant) or indirectly (by being inclined towards a particular armed group).

The MDRP programme also recognised that some of the people had grown up in the war; hence their daily survival was dependent on switching alliances within the armed groups. Others had largely thrived on warmongering as an alternative occupation, thereby exhibiting a complexity that made it difficult to distinguish, for instance, a Mai-Mai militia from a normal civilian. Some of the elderly people had turned into spies and war advisers, having been active combatants in their youthful years. The best way forward was therefore a blanket approach to the problem. Arms were collected communally and reintegration benefits provided, regardless of whether one was an ex-combatant.[187] Rockley points out that donors have the mistaken idea that: 'As soon as you get guns out of their hands, they are suddenly innocuous human beings again, but that is not the case at all.'[188]

DDR as an 'alternative to war'

The term 'DDR beneficiary' has almost become a cliché in all societies that have 'benefitted' from the process. This can be deduced from the manner in

which post-war communities perceive the process, in cases where they may not be conversant with the reasons for those they perceive as having wronged the society being 'rewarded' for having participated in the conflict. On their side, ex-combatants generally regard DDR as an alternative source of livelihood, replacing their 'loss' of employment when the war ended.

Under circumstances where not all ex-combatants are assisted or where there are delays in processing and disbursing assistance, serious tensions and possible relapse into violence may occur. Structurally, the long-term effect of incomplete or ineffective reintegration of ex-combatants into civil life may result in armed criminality by former soldiers.

In enduring conflicts, such as civil wars in Africa, becoming a fighter is viewed sometimes as a more rational option than less promising opportunities in the labour market, particularly for male former fighters with fewer survival options in a post-conflict environment. As an easy alternative to war, former fighters may revert to armed blackmail and looting as easy and profitable options. This, in the minds of former fighters, may be easier than focusing on DDR programmes that may appear less responsive to their immediate needs and expectations. The traumatising effects of past violence may partly contribute to similar harmful behaviour among children and adolescents. This may be the starting point for a 'career' change from victim to perpetrator and thus can be a conflict-prolonging factor unless sustainable intervention measures are applied.

Divergence in views and expectations between communities and ex-combatants has the potential of watering down the objectives of the programme. This is evident when viewed through Collier's prism of predation theory of greed and grievance, where he argues that most rebel movements thrive on grievance. This occurs when groups perceive themselves as being denied what they should have (a social phenomenon known as 'relative deprivation'). In pursuit of their goals, argues Collier, frustrated individuals such as ex-combatants whose expectations may not have been adequately met can easily be motivated by greed, lust for power or grievance to cause chaos. Collier contends that war cannot be fought just on hopes or hatreds alone; rather, it is motivated by predatory behaviour such as the use of force to extort goods or money from their legitimate owners, as a means of financing the conflict.[189]

The need to balance ex-combatants' expectations and those of the society into which they are to be reintegrated is a principal factor in determining whether a DDR programme attains its reintegration goals. Wars affect the psychology of

war participants just as they affect victims and the community in general.[190] In a study based on household data and post-war outcomes, the authors examined the effects of the 1991 to 2002 civil war in Sierra Leone to conclude that people who had experienced violence were 2,6 per cent more likely to vote and 6,5 per cent more likely to attend community meetings and contribute to public good. These findings underscore the fragility of a post-conflict society and the need to handle the process with sensitivity. Ex-combatants ought to be sensitised that the processes are meant to facilitate their return to normal life and that DDR is not an alternative to war, nor should DDR be viewed as an automatic source of employment.

A pertinent lesson could be drawn from the Liberian disarmament programme. When the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) embarked on disarming the community, it had not anticipated the extraordinary events that ensued. UNMIL embarked on the process in what could be termed a 'premature debut,' with an underestimation of the expectations of the post-conflict Liberian society. Likewise, UNMIL had apparently not prepared sufficiently in terms of administration or operationally when it embarked on the process on 7 December 2003, a situation that led to a near disaster (see Chapter 4 on the Liberian DDRR programme).[191]

DDR and skills promotion

The ultimate goal of DDR is to reintegrate ex-combatants in the smoothest manner possible. In this regard, therefore, the aim would be not only to provide skills to former fighters, but also to ensure that the skills provided yield the expected effect. Lessons drawn from various African DDR engagements show mixed results regarding skill provision for ex-combatants. This challenge continues to impact negatively on the success of reintegration processes in Africa, thereby compromising the success of DDR programmes. Several cases demonstrate this.

Firstly, it is important to distinguish between the provision of short-term (transitional) alternatives for survival purposes and skills provision for long-term stability of ex-combatants and the society they aim to reintegrate into.

The best example of short-term survival projects in a post-war environment is the Quick Impact Projects (QUIPS). QUIPs provide emergency employment for both ex-combatants and the community at large. Because they are labour

intensive, QUIPs employ large numbers of skilled and unskilled labourers for limited durations, with the aim of rehabilitating public infrastructure while at the same time injecting cash directly into communities. For instance, the Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR) Section of the UNMIL used the QUIPs approach to engage the Liberian public in urban public works projects, with the aim of cleaning and improving drainage systems in selected cities, while providing employment opportunities to the local populations.[192]

In addition to creating employment, these initiatives were essential in helping to reduce incidents of flooding, improving urban sanitation and facilitating movement of traffic. Other projects include community-based initiatives for the production of crushed stone, which initiatives supply material to various road projects. In 2008, UNMIL-RRR was involved in the rehabilitation of secondary/feeder roadways in most counties of Liberia with support from the WFP's 'Food Support for Local Initiatives' programme. Local community members improved road conditions in their vicinity by side-brushing and undertaking minor repair works. These projects opened up feeder roads to markets and farms, thereby supporting rural recovery and trade. It was estimated that over 8 000 community members were employed.[193]

While QUIPs provide a plausible approach to mitigating various social ills that come with unemployment, the risk is that, when such programmes are interrupted or terminated (when their funding cycle ends or when the peace mission eventually draws down), the society crumbles to a halt, and sometimes disillusioned beneficiaries, who are seldom properly informed in advance about such drastic 'changes,' are rendered vulnerable.

If long-term stability of post-conflict societies is to be strengthened, it is inevitable that providing long-term skills to the entire community must be aimed for, with a special focus on the most vulnerable groups such as ex-combatants and the youth. However, utmost care needs to be taken when designing and exposing ex-combatants to options of skills available. The designing or choice of the set of skills should be based on the value of those skills to both the trainee and the society into which the trainee will be reintegrated. It is understandable, however, that often ex-combatants are not highly learnt people, and that the thing they know best is the gun. Contrary to this reality is the fact that ex-combatants are often full of expectations. Many want to become engineers, doctors, great sportsmen and sportswomen, pilots and even academic professors.[194] They often fail to realise the magnitude of the challenges that come with

such ambitions, based on various factors such as their levels of literacy, age and available resources. When presenting options for skills to such individuals, an element of psychosocial counselling in which ex-combatants' expectations are scaled down to reality should be an important accompaniment throughout the reintegration process so as to avoid disillusionment.

An analysis of reintegration programmes across the spectrum indicates that more often ex-combatants choose skills whose reintegration package comprises a cash payment as capital, as opposed to those skills that entail issuance of tools or education. For instance, in the case of the CAR, ex-combatants were advised to go for skills relevant to occupations that they were already engaged in and/or were familiar with, when selecting their reintegration packages. An interesting development was that an overwhelming majority of ex-combatants chose retail trade *(petit commerce)* over other occupations. It was later established that this choice was the most motivating because while for other skills beneficiaries were provided with the necessary tools of trade such as hoes, calves and seedlings, in the *petit commerce* option traders were given cash (capital) to start their businesses.[195]

DDR and corruption

Societies emerging from conflict are normally characterised by collapsed infrastructure, not least of this being the national security sector. Even with external intervention such as by the UN, the rule of law is never reestablished immediately.

Because of the lacunae that exist during the transition period, between the time the war ends and the period when the state apparatus assumes a semblance of normalcy, the environment is usually widely characterised by a conglomeration of self-styled recalcitrant and abusive security elements that range from police to vigilante groups, thereby creating a model of protectors of the public trust in a few short months. In such situations, even well-equipped peacekeepers will have difficulty in securing national borders in unfamiliar and rugged terrain against criminals such as smugglers or spoilers. With regard to reintegration, malpractices may manifest themselves in tendering procedures, in which certain companies induce those in charge to award them contracts such as supplying training skills to ex-combatants as well as supplying reintegration packages.

Emerging DDR culture

Owing to a combination of the foregoing factors that characterise DDR programmes in Africa, a systematic response by recipients is gradually manifesting itself. For example, interaction with the war veterans in the RoC revealed that the society often looks forward to benefitting from subsequent processes aimed at benefitting them. This was confirmed by a war veteran when he stated that he did not benefit from the first and second DDR processes because in the first one he was cheated by his former commander into giving the commander his weapon, and in this way did not qualify for DDR because he had no weapon to hand in. When enrolment for the second DDR programme took place in Brazzaville, he was away in the village, and by the time he got the news the registration process had closed. He then decided to stay in Talangai (a suburb of Brazzaville) with his compatriots in anticipation of a new DDR programme. 'Even if they need me to present a gun to qualify I will, because I have one already…,' he added. [196]

The RoC, CAR and Liberia have presented classic cases where approaches to disarmament and demobilisation (DD) and DDR/R programmes targeting former fighters have created a sense of entitlement among the former fighters, although on average the processes have achieved some success, despite there being room for further improvement.

Notes

1 See Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) Factsheet, August 2008. MDRP was financed by the World Bank and 13 donors – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission. It collaborated with national governments and commissions, and with over 30 partner organisations, including United Nations' agencies and non-governmental organisations.

2 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by all state parties to the DRC conflict, namely the DRC, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The government of Zambia, SADC, the OAU and the UN all signed the agreement as witnesses. The then two main rebel movements – the RCD and the *Mouvement de Liberation du Congo* (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) (MLC) – only endorsed the agreement on 1 and 31 August respectively, after initially having refused to sign.

3 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999), which established MONUC.

4 In July 2010, the United Nations Security Council transformed MONUC into MONUSCO (Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), in accordance with Resolution 1925 (2010).

5 World Bank, *Towards a Regional Framework for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the Greater Great Lakes Region*, Washington D.C., 2001.

6 World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, Washington D.C., 2002.

7 World Bank, *MDRP final report, overview of programme achievements*, Washington, D.C., 2010, 6.

8 Ibid, 15.

9 A Disch et al, *MDRP final report*, Oslo: Scanteam Analysts and Advisers, 2010, 11.

10 Ibid.

11 See Chapter 3 on D&R in the CAR.

12 See Disch et al, *MDRP final report*, 14 for detailed explanation on this component of the MDRP.

13 Ibid, 7.

14 Ibid.

15 For more on lessons learnt, see Disch et al, *MDRP final report*, 23-26.

16 See Disch, et al, *MDRP final report*, 2.

17 S Michael, *Reinsertion assistance for ex-combatants: good practices and lessons for the MDRP*, Working Paper No 1, 2006, 3.

18 See *Frequently asked questions about the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme*, http://tdrp.net/en/faqs.html (accessed 15 January 2011).

19 MDRP discussion documents provided to the author by MDRP staff during an interview with the author, Brazzaville, 24 July 2007.

20 See the *Programme National de Désarmament, Démobilisation et Réinsertion* (PNDDR) report to the Cabinet, December 2004.

21 Editorial, La premiere phase a tenu ses promesses, *Reinsertion,* No. 00, août-septembre 2006.

22 Development Alternatives, Inc. *A partnership in need of reaffirmation: mid-term review of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*, Bethesda: Development Alternatives, 2005, 2.

23 World Bank, *MDRP final report, overview of programme achievements*, 64.

24 Author interview with the planning staff of the PNDDR, Brazzaville, 25 July 2008.

25 La premiere phase a tenu ses promesses.

26 World Bank, *MDRP final report, overview of programme achievements*, 64.

27 Author telephone interview with former PCAD operations staff, 9 May to July 2010.

28 For a complete and detailed list of the disarmament breakdown, see: *La lettre d'information du Projet de Collect et destruction d'Armes pour le Développement (PCAD)*, Brazzaville: UNDP, 25 July 2007.

29 Republic of Congo, Proposal to donors – Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Programme, Brazzaville, February 2005.

30 Ibid.

31 Author discussion with a PCAD officer-in-charge of operations, Brazzaville, 26 July 2008.

32 Ibid.

33 Author interview with the former officer-in-charge of *la Composante ex-enfants soldats* (Section on Ex-child Soldiers) at the PNDDR headquarters, La Tour Mabemba, Brazzaville, 26 July 2008.

34 Author interview with the former head of Ex-child Soldiers and Vulnerable Groups, PNDDR, Brazzaville, 23 July 2009. Also see MDRP Position Paper, *Targeting MDRP assistance: Ex-combatants and other war-affected populations*, www.mdrp.org (accessed 5 August 2009).

35 British Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), *The global conflict prevention pool. A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict*, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:YOg1H6qowKwJ:www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/conflict/docs/global-conflict-prevention-pool.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2011).

36 Author telephone interview with the former staff of MDRP project implementation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the RoC, 24 May 2010.

37 Author telephone interview with the former staff of the MDRP project implementation for the DRC and the RoC, 15 April 2010.

38 Ibid.

39 Author interview with the former section head of the Prevention and Reduction of Conflict and Violence Section at the PNDDR in the RoC, 24 May 2010.

40 Ibid.

41 K Kingma and R Muggah, *Critical issues in DDR: context, indicators, targeting and challenges.* Paper presented to an international conference on DDR, Cartagena, Colombia, May 2009.

42 See *Consolidated appeal for the Central African Republic 2009*, http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1719 (accessed 5 July 2010).

43 See UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009, Central African Republic: The Human Development Index – going beyond income*, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_CAF.html (accessed 7 May 2010).

44 See *Projet de Réinseration des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (PRAC) – Document revu par LAC* – Bangui, 5 Février 2004.

45 Author interview with a UNDP expert on statistics, Bangui, 22 August 2007. Also see World Bank, *Human Development Index Report*, 2000.

46 See *Human Development Report*, 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_CAF.html (accessed 12 June 2009).

47 Nation Master, Maternal mortality per country, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/hea_mat_mor-health-maternal-mortality&int=- (accessed 4 April 2011).

48 These publications include the World Bank *World Development Reports* and the UNDP *Human Development Reports*.

49 Ibid.

50 See *Human Development Report*, 2009.

51 United Nations Human Development Index, 2005.

52 P Collier et al, *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy*, Washington D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003.

53 P Collier and A Hoeffler, *The challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war*, Paper prepared for the Copenhagen Consensus Project, www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf (accessed 10 October 2009).

54 Ibid.

55 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Humanitarian situation and humanitarian activity in Central African Republic*, Ad Hoc Report, July 2005.

56 Ibid.

57 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic*, S/2005/414, 27 June 2005.

58 Author interview with a former officer of FACA, Pretoria, 22 August 2009.

59 See UNDP, Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS), *Project Summary Sheet,* Bangui, 2004.

60 Ibid.

61 World Bank, *MDRP final report, overview of programme achievements*, 69.

62 Ibid, 67.

63 Author interview with former PRAC staff, Bangui, 17 August 2008.

64 C Zoumara, *Projet de Réinseration des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (PRAC)*, Paper presented at the closure of PRAC, February 2007.

65 Author interview with the local residents of Bangui, Bangui, 27 August 2008.

66 Author interview with an ex-Patriote soldier now guarding Bangui M'Poko International Airport, Bangui, 28 August 2008.

67 *Projet de Réinseration des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (PRAC) – Document revu par LAC*.

68 Author interview with the medical staff attached to PRAC, Bangui, 27 August 2008.

69 Details of the funding are as provided in the final report of PRAC.

70 Liberia, *Donor fatigue threatening DDRR process*, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71730 (accessed 18 January 2011).

71 Ibid.

72 SunTzu, quoted in M Handel, *Masters of war: classical strategic thought,* London: Routledge, 2005, 138.

73 N Scheper-Hughes, Undoing social suffering and the politics of remorse in the new South Africa, *Social Justice*, 25 (1998).

74 Tulane Conflict Study Group, *Conflict in Africa: a review of literature on selected topics.* A paper prepared for United States Agency for International Development, 1999.

75 See State Task Force, *Phase II findings,* McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 1998.

76 W Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

77 Britannica Student Encyclopaedia, *Assassination*, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/ebi/article-196809 (accessed 11 March 2010).

78 These are the only presidents to be sworn in after the declaration of independence of Liberia on 26 July 1847.

79 Nimba County is one of 15 political subdivisions in Liberia. During William VS Tubman's administration (1944 to 1971), the region now called Nimba County was one of three of Liberia's provinces – Western Province, Eastern Province and Central Province. In the 1960s, Tubman changed these provinces into counties. Central Province became what is known as Nimba County. Before the civil war of Liberia in 1989, Nimba County had a population of over 310 000 people. It is the second-largest county in Liberia in terms of population. See *Nimba County,* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nimba_County (accessed 15 January 2010).

80 Global Security.org, *Liberia – First Civil War – 1989 to 1996*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm (accessed 15 January 2007).

81 Human Rights Watch Report, *Liberia: a human rights disaster, violations of the laws of war by all parties to the conflict*, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/liberia/ (accessed 18 February 2007).

82 Global Security.org, *Liberia – First Civil War – 1989 to 1996*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm (accessed 12 April 2010).

83 For an elaborate account of ECOWAS' intervention in Liberian conflict refer to IDRC Books free online, *Interventions after the Cold War (part 1)*, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28498-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (accessed 20 January 2010).

84 Conciliation Resources, *Bringing peace to Liberia – part 2 international responses*, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/bringing-peace2.php (accessed 22 October 2009).

85 R Wadlow, *Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone: was it more than money?* http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/832/63/ (accessed 3 March 2010).

86 L Supuwood, The LURD. *The Liberian Post,* http://liberian.tripod.com/Post26.html (accessed 20 March 2011).

87 Conciliation Resources, *Liberia: warring factions*, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/profiles.php (accessed 15 May 2010).

88 There were seven major ECOWAS-sponsored agreements signed before the Cotonou Accord. These were the Bamako Ceasefire of November 1990, the Banjul Joint Statement of December 1990, the February 1991 Lomé Agreement, and the Yamoussoukro I-IV Accords of June to October 1991. The Bamako, Banjul, and Lomé agreements may be co-considered as the first stage of ECOWAS diplomacy, underwritten by Sir Dawda Jawara, President of The Gambia and Chairman of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). See Conciliation Resources, *Commentary on the accords*, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/commentary.php (accessed 28 January 2010).

89 United States Institute for Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Liberia, *Abuja Agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement.* Done at Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, this nineteenth day of August 1995, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08191995.html (accessed 20 January 2010).

90 International Crisis Group (ICG), *Guinée: Incertitudes autour d'une fin de régne,* Africa Report, 74, 19 December 2003; Liberia: Security challenges, Africa Report, 71, 3 November 2003, <http://www.crisisweb.org> (accessed on 21 January 2007).

91 Author interview with an ex-LURD combatant, Monrovia, 18 November 2006.

92 Author interview with an ex-LURD commander, Monrovia, 18 November 2006.

93 Human Rights Watch, *The guns are in the bushes: continuing abuses in Liberia,* Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, January 2004.

94 Author interview with a former MODEL fighter, Kakata, 22 November 2006.

95 Human Rights Watch, *Weapons sanctions, military supplies, and human suffering: illegal arms flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 shelling of Monrovia,* Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, November 2003.

96 See *The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women attending the peace talks in Accra,*

Accra, Ghana, 15 March 2003, < http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Liberia/GoldenTulip.html> (accessed 4 June 2010).

97 See *Comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and political parties*, http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/liberiapeace.pdf (accessed 21 January 2010).

98 Ibid, Part Three.

99 See Liberia – UNMIL – Background, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unmil/background.html (accessed 28 January 2010).

100 UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia*, S/2003/875 of 11 September 2003.

101 UNSC/RES/1497 of 1 August 2003, http://unmil.org/documents/resolutions/1497.pdf (accessed 9 March 2010).

102 UNSC/RES/1509 of 19 September 2003, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-62FB7D?OpenDocument (accessed 30 January 2010).

103 Ibid.

104 Author interview with NCDDRR staff, Monrovia, 20 November 2008.

105 Ibid.

106 Author interview with NCDDR planning officers, Monrovia, 27 November 2008.

107 Author interview with JIU officers in Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie, 24 November 2008.

108 Author interview with JIU officers in Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie, 24 November 2008.

109 Author interaction with a group of 18 ex-LURD rebels, now in vocational training, Booker Washington Institute (BWI), Kakata, 01 December 2008.

110 Cases of disarming twice were noted when thousands of copies of registration forms issued to combatants by UNMIL during disarmament remained unclaimed after the ex-combatants proceeded with the DDRR process in 2004. Since the procedure was 'one weapon one form' per ex-combatant registration, it was only possible that unclaimed forms belonged to those who had disarmed in December. Author interview with UNMIL planning staff, UNMIL headquarters, Monrovia, 23 November 2008.

111 Author interview with UNMIL Civil Affairs Section staff, Monrovia, 23 November 2008.

112 According to the *Encyclopedia of the Nations*, the population of Liberia in 2003 was estimated by the United Nations at 3 367 000, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Liberia-POPULATION.html (accessed 28 January 2010).

113 Author interview with staff of UNMIL force command. Monrovia, 27 November 2008.

114 See, UNMIL DDRR Strategy, 'Liberian DDRR Programme Strategy and Implementation Framework,' Monrovia: UNMIL. October 2003.

115 An UNMIL Officer-in-Charge of the DDRR Unit provided these figures, Monrovia, 21 November 2008.

116 *NCDDRR first quarterly report*, Annex 2, 2003, based on JIU validated figures.

117 Author interview with the JIU staff, Monrovia, 22 November 2008.

118 These figures are based on data provided by NCDDR officers during an interview conducted by the author, Monrovia, 26 November 2008.

119 Ibid.

120 Author group discussion with ex-combatants, Kakata, 24 November 2008.

121 Ibid.

122 Author interview with an ex-LURD commander, Monrovia, 28 November 2008.

123 Cantonment sites were also called 'D2 sites', as opposed to 'D1 sites', which were only for disarmament. Author interview with UNDP disarmament staff, Monrovia, 29 November 2008.

124 Author interview with UNICEF staff, Monrovia, 30 November 2008.

125 Author interview with a psychosocial counsellor, Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Kakata, 27 November 2008.

126 UNMIL, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation, http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=ddrr (accessed 15 February 2010).

127 Author interview with the Government Interim Management Team, Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie, 20 November 2008.

128 Among those ex-combatants who opted to remain within Guthrie were foreigners, including women, some of whom were fighters while others had accompanied their spouses who had died in the war. Author interview with 'Mother Blessing,' from Sierra Leone and a former LURD faction commander, now a security woman under the Interim Management Team, Guthrie Plantation, Guthrie, 24 November 2006.

129 Author's tours of Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie, 29 November 2008.

130 Author interview with the Interim Management Team, Guthrie, 29 November 2008.

131 Author interview with the Principal of BWI. Kakata, 01 December 2008.

132 Author interview with a JIU staff member. Monrovia, 2 December 2008.

133 Author interview with a psychosocial counsellor, YWCA. Kakata, 27 November 2008.

134 UNMIL, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation, <http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=ddrr (accessed 15 February 2010).

135 These figures were provided by UNMIL RRR staff during their interview with the author. Monrovia, 22 November 2008.

136 Author interview with the staff of Land Mine Action, Monrovia, 26 November 2008.

137 Author interview with the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVIPOL) staff, Monrovia, 29 November 2008.

138 Author interview with UNMIL's RRR staff, Monrovia, 22 November 2008.

139 Author interview with the Government Interim Management Team, Guthrie Rubber Plantation, Guthrie, 20 November 2008.

140 Author interview with a worker at Mamba Point Hotel, Monrovia, 28 November 2008.

141 Author interview with UNMIL's RRR staff, Monrovia, 22 November 2008.

142 Author interview with an official of UNMIL's Office of the Gender Adviser, Monrovia, 22 November 2006.

143 Author interview with the staff of UNMIL Human Rights Section, Monrovia, 16 May 2008.

144 See UNMIL Human Rights Report, *Human rights in Liberia's orphanages*, March 2007, 6.

145 Ibid, 7.

146 See *The OECD DAC hand book on security system reform*, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/events/details.php?id=39 (accessed 28 July 2009).

147 Author interview with members of the Liberian Defence Advisory Committee, Monrovia, 17 July 2008.

148 Author interview with UNMIL CIVIPOL, Monrovia, 24 November 2008.

149 Author interview with a senior UNMIL officer in the Civil Affairs Section, Monrovia, 29 November 2008.

150 A focus group discussion in Monrovia on 21 November 2008 between the author and 11 ex-combatants revealed that each of them had spent an average of eight years in the bush and that at the time of disarmament most of them still believed that they would be reintegrated into the new military structures.

151 Author interview with the staff of UNMIL Civil Affairs Section, Monrovia, 27 November 2008.

152 Ibid.

153 Author interview with the staff of the SSR office, Monrovia, 18 July 2008.

154 Author interview with a leader of the 'Combined Forces', Monrovia, 23 July 2008.

155 Author interview with the Ministry of Justice staff, Monrovia, 20 July 2008.

156 L Nathan, *No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector reform*. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2007.

157 OECD, *Security sector reform and governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 2005, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf. (accessed 10 January 2011).

158 DynCorp International was charged with restructuring and training the military, as well as with vetting and recruiting members of the armed forces. DynCorp's contracts ranged from providing the State Department with support services in Kosovo to supplying Kuwait with repair and maintenance of military aircraft. The US Government, DynCorp's biggest client, accounts for about 95 per cent of sales. Founded in 1946, other African countries in which DynCorp has operated include Somalia, where DynCorp provided support services for famine aid in 1992, as well as Angola, where DynCorp has been supporting UN peacekeepers since December 1997. DynCorp also had a contract with the State Department to provide the US contingent of ceasefire verifiers in Kosovo. See *The whores of war – and DynCorp*, http://www.rense.com/general25/whoresofwar.htm (accessed 18 June 2010).

159 Adedeji Ebo, Liberia case study: outsourcing SSR to foreign companies, in L Nathan (ed), *No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector reform,* 80.

160 The group discussion was convened by the author in the course of field research in Monrovia on 21 August 2008.

161 Y Maenda, Police recruitment drive re-launched, *UNMIL FOCUS* 2(03) (March – May 2006).

162 Ibid, 18.

163 Author interview with officers of the Police Support Unit at the Police Academy, Paynesville, Monrovia, 22 May 2007.

164 Maenda, Police recruitment drive re-launched, 19.

165 Ibid.

166 Yankah Kojo. *The dangers of small arms in Liberia: a national awareness campaign strategy*, UNDP Liberia: Small Arms Control Programme, 2007, 5.

167 Author interview with the staff of UNDP CBR programme, Kakata, 17 August 2008.

168 E Harsch, Communities mobilize to protect Liberian peace, *Africa Renewal,* 19(4) (January 2006).

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.

171 Editorial, Welcome, TRC, http://www.analystliberia.com/editorial_welcome_trc.html (accessed 20 September 2008).

172 Author interview with the staff of the TRC, Monrovia, 15 August 2008. Also see Editorial, Welcome, TRC.

173 See: *Liberia's TRC presents final report*, http://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/liberia2019s-trc-presents-final-report (accessed on 9 January 2011).

174 See: *Report on the Mano River Union Peace Forum inauguration February 7th 2004*, http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/report_on_mru_forum_inauguration.pdf (accessed 20 February 2010).

175 Author interview with the TRC commissioners, Monrovia, 15 August 2008.

176 Nathan, *No ownership, no commitment*, 11.

177 See: *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa*,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12650/disarmament_demobilization_and_reintegration_ddr_in_africa.html (accessed 25 May 2010).

178 A Disch et al, *MDRP final report*, Oslo: Scanteam Analysts and Advisers, 2010, 68.

179 Ibid.

180 S Hanson, *Backgrounder: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa*. Council on Foreign Relations, New York: Brooking Institution, 2007.

181 Burundi: FNL becomes Burundi's 42nd political party, *Enrique en Ligne,* http://www.afriquejet.com/news/africa-news/burundi:-fnl-becomes-burundi%27s-42nd-political-party-2009042226084.html (accessed 18 May 2009).

182 Author interview with a UNMIL DDR field staff member in Monrovia, 28 November 2008.

183 A Mehler, Major flaws in conflict prevention policies towards Africa. The conceptual deficits of international actors' approaches and how to overcome them, *Working Papers, Global and Area Studies*. German Overseas Institute (DÜI) Research Unit. Hamburg: Germany, June 2005.

184 I Douglas et al. *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. A practical field and classroom guide*, Stuttgart: Jutta Herden, 2004.

185 UN Security Council Press Release, SC/6821 of 13 March 2000.

186 Hanson, *Backgrounder: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa*.

187 N Alusala, Arms and disarmament DRC's unending story, in N Alusala, *Armed conflict and disarmament, selected Central African case studies.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph 129, 2007.

188 See *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa*, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/JFRN-6YGRAB?OpenDocument (accessed 10 April 2009).

189 P Collier, *Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.

190 J Bellows and E Miguel, War and institutions: new evidence from Sierra Leone, *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* 96(2) (2006).

191 World briefing | Africa: Liberia: militia riot at disarmament camp. *New York Times* 9 December 2003.

192 Author interview with the project staff of UNMIL-RRR in Monrovia, 24 November 2008.

193 Ibid.

194 Author interview with ex-combatants in Kintele, Republic of Congo, 22 July 2007. Similar ambitions were expressed by a group of disabled ex-combatants in a discussion with the author in Monrovia on 16 September 2009 at Opon playground in Monrovia, Liberia.

195 Author interview with the staff of *Le Projet de Réinsertion des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés (PRAC),* Bangui, 23 August 2008.

196 Group discussion between the author and Ninja ex-combatants, Kintele, Republic of Congo. 2 March 2009.

ISS Head Office
Block D, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street
New Muckleneuk, Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 346 9570
E-mail: iss@issafrica.org

ISS Addis Ababa Office
5th Floor, Get House Building,
Africa Avenue, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251 11 515 6320 Fax: +251 11 515 6449
E-mail: addisababa@issafrica.org

ISS Cape Town Office
2nd Floor, The Armoury Building, Buchanan Square
160 Sir Lowry Road, Woodstock, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 461 7211 Fax: +27 21 461 7213
E-mail: capetown@issafrica.org

ISS Dakar Office
Stèle Mermoz, 100x Elhadji,
Ibrahima Niasse MZ83, Senegal
Tel: +221 33 824 0918/21 Fax: +221 33 824 2246
E-mail: dakar@issafrica.org

ISS Nairobi Office
Braeside Gardens,
Off Muthangari Road, Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 20 386 1625 Fax: +254 20 386 1639
E-mail: nairobi@issafrica.org

ISS Pretoria Office
Block C, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street
New Muckleneuk, Pretoria
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 460 0998
E-mail: pretoria@issafrica.org

www.issafrica.org

ISS MONOGRAPH 179

La région des grands lacs d'Afrique a connu des confits durant une période de temps considérable avec plusieurs initiatives visant à gérer la situation de manière durable. Une de ces initiatives était le Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration (MDRP), dirigé par la Banque mondiale, de 2002 à 2009. L'initiative qui a porté sur une sélection de pays dans les grands lacs, était axée sur la démobilisation et la réintégration des anciens combattants dont l'objectif principal était d'améliorer les moyens de subsistance des communautés touchées. Malgré les défis que le MDRP a rencontrés, le programme a réalisé un certain nombre de succès et a apporté de nombreux enseignements. Ce sont ces leçons que cette monographie a cherché à décrire, dans l'espoir de contribuer, à l'avenir, à une meilleure planification de programmes similaires. La monographie utilise des études de cas de la République centrafricaine et de la République du Congo pour illustrer la façon dont le MDRP a été mise en place, alors que le Liberia est inclus en tant qu'étude de cas témoin.

Africa's Great Lakes region has known conflict for a considerable period of time, and this has been met with several initiatives aimed at managing the situation in a sustainable way. One such initiative was the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), led by the World Bank, from 2002 to 2009. The initiative, which looked at selected countries in the Great Lakes, focussed on the demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters, with the main objective being to improve the livelihoods of affected communities. Despite the challenges that the MDRP encountered, the programme realised a number of successes and brought to the fore numerous lessons learned. It is these lessons that this monograph has sought to document, with the hope of contributing to the better planning of similar programmes in future. The monograph uses case studies of the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo to illustrate how the MDRP was implemented, while Liberia is included as a control case.

ISS Monograph No 179

ISBN 978-1-920422-44-8

9 781920 422448

This publication was made possible through funding provided by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.