ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Allan Cain is the Director of Development Workshop, an NGO based in Angola.

Jenny Clover is a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

Richard Cornwell Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

Rick de Satgé is a private consultant.

Andrew Timpson is with the United Nations Development Programme.

Coleen Vogel, Professor at the School of Archaeology, Geography and Environment Studies, University of the Witwatersrand.

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of 2003 the African Security Analysis Programme (ASAP) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) hosted an expert workshop in Pretoria on *Supporting sustainable livelihoods: A critical review of assistance in post-conflict situations*. The aim of the workshop was to bring together a range of experts in the field of post-conflict recovery and development and to stimulate informal discussion and brainstorming.

The Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) approach to conflict, which puts the livelihoods of poor people at the forefront of analysis and action, was the basis for the discussions about development initiatives in post-conflict regions. Country specific examples were used to reflect both on the negative and positive aspects of the approach and how they can aid the development process in post-conflict situations.

Background, motivation and objectives

ASAP's role within ISS is to track and analyse threats to human security in selected countries, focusing broadly on the politico-military and the developmental and humanitarian aspects of conflict situations, with the intention of strengthening African capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution. More specifically, ASAP aims to deepen the human security debate and enrich it with a more profound understanding of the interaction between complex humanitarian and security crises. Several countries in Africa are currently facing situations of chronic conflict and political instability, reflected in situations of an urgent need for food and non-food aid arising from a combination of conflict, drought and economic decline. In addition there is the terrible legacy of health problems arising from war, which creates an environment conducive to the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other infectious diseases. Health problems are further aggravated by the collapse of water and sanitation infrastructure.

Increasingly, we are seeing a 'deadly triad' of interrelated burdens – chronic food insecurity, HIV/AIDS, and conflict – added to which are disease, a reduced capacity to govern and provide basic services, and massive displacement, all of which constitute endemic threats to the livelihoods of Africans. Indeed, many more people are currently exposed to non-traditional threats to their security than to death either directly or indirectly as a consequence of armed conflict. These are not only causing sickness and starvation, but are a severe long-term challenge to economies and societies.

Moving from conflict to recovery

Countries attempting to move from conflict to recovery face a daunting range of tasks if peace is to be sustained, renunciation of violence being just the first step: conflict resolution, peace-enforcement, demobilisation, and meeting chronic and acute humanitarian needs. Key policy objectives are, first, to reduce the risk of further conflict as rapidly as possible and, second, to restore favourable economic and social conditions. Because the domestic costs of civil war continue long after the fighting ends, addressing immediate needs for humanitarian assistance simultaneously while improving the longer-term prospects of communities is critical. More particularly, if peace is to last it is critical that economic policies do not favour a narrow elite (which may also harm the poor). There must be broad-based recovery that improves the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people, especially the poor. The alternative is a fragile, 'negative' peace, an underdevelopment-conflict cycle. Without peace there is no development, and there can be no peace without development.

Difficulties facing humanitarian organisations

Using aid effectively during early post-conflict years is extremely difficult, but can be most effective in raising growth if the institutional capacity to use it is in place. The SL approach requires new ways of thinking about institutional and organisational arrangements for development.

Agencies face three main operational challenges in establishing ways in which development aid can address the root causes of conflict and promote peace during post-conflict transition. First, it is important to link development and peace initiatives with each other so that they simultaneously address the material conditions of violence and empower people to resolve their conflicts

peacefully. Second, to promote long-term development and minimise the chance of renewed violence, aid agencies must incorporate local beneficiaries in the planning and implementation process of projects. Finally, agencies need to develop flexible and long-term frameworks to sustain the peace process.

The first task facing the humanitarian community is to try to navigate through the politics of a region. It is a myth that humanitarian aid is non-political, and it cannot be assumed that the giving of assistance to alleviate pain does not include challenging the status quo. Examples of mismanaged development aid as a source of food insecurity and conflict also abound in Africa. Addressing both immediate and longer-term needs requires that there should be no fixed boundaries between humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development cooperation. This, however, raises difficulties of coordination between government, donors and NGOs, more particularly because war weakens and destroys institutions. The response of humanitarian organisations and governments requires focused attention, a long-term perspective, and also new and integrated responses. Humanitarians are working with very limited tools when responding to immense, multi-dimensional needs. At the same time, conventional modes of humanitarian action, though essential, are trying to find their place within a visionary, comprehensive and long-term redefinition and reorientation of aid.

CHAPTER 1
CONFLICT AND HUMAN SECURITY

Jenny Clover

Africa's pervasive conflicts

For many people the word 'Africa' has become synonymous with conflict and its various stages, all of which affect human security. The continent experiences continuing civil conflicts, countries in danger of descent into conflict, countries facing renewed conflict, countries economically, socially or militarily affected by, or directly involved in, neighbouring conflicts, and countries in transition from war to peace.

There are now a growing number of new conflicts in Africa that are increasingly violent and protracted. This new generation of violence, apparently internal but with international elements, is particularly threatening, not only for the countries involved, but also more broadly for regional and international security. More importantly, peace is often fragile, making it difficult to apply the term 'post-conflict' to many countries – in most cases there is a precarious balance between renewed conflict and sustained peace. Increasingly we are seeing countries that are caught in the 'conflict trap'. Of the countries that are in the first decade of post-conflict peace, perhaps half will fall back into conflict within the decade.

Africa's 'New Wars'

The term 'New Wars' is increasingly being used to capture the changing nature of war, the gradual shift in its causes, the duration and growing incidence of regional conflicts. Conventional approaches to conflict analysis that looked for obvious causes and motives are of limited use in understanding the New Wars, which are ostensibly about identity politics or statehood, and are largely devoid of the geo-political or ideological goals that characterised earlier wars. We see, for example, that the number of conflicts apparently caused by a quest for national and indigenous self-determination has risen sharply. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions and political feuds driven by socio-economic and political grievances, although important, are rarely the principal cause

of civil wars; rather the primary locale of current wars is to be found where there is a combination of entrenched poverty, an excessive dependence on natural resource exports, and poor economic governance and state weakness. These are the critical mediating factors. It is only through a more comprehensive approach to conflict analysis that we see that the outbreak of conflict is usually "triggered by the interaction of economic motives and opportunities with long-standing grievances over poor economic governance (particularly the inequitable distribution of resource wealth), exclusionary and repressive political systems, inter-ethnic disputes, and security dilemmas further exacerbated by unaccountable, weak states."[1]

Vulnerability to armed conflict

The most striking common factor among war-prone countries is their poverty – the poorest one-sixth of humanity endures four-fifths of the world's civil wars. The strong correlation between conflict and poverty includes issues such as deep inequality (one of the foremost causes of violent conflict), expressed in terms both of growth and the distribution of resources. Structurally, this is often related directly to the allocation and distribution of resources, including the scarcity of land and compromising of land tenure rights, because access to, or distribution of, properly managed, protected and controlled natural resources are crucial to livelihood strategies. Although it is difficult to demonstrate empirically that either poverty or environmental factors, in and by themselves, are strong determinants of conflicts, the 'loss of livelihoods' constitutes a missing link in explanations of current conflict patterns. Increasingly, this is being recognised as a common denominator in several recent civil wars. Growing evidence links environmental degradation and competition for natural resources with many of the internal and trans-boundary conflict situations that constitute a large proportion of complex emergencies.

Resource wars

Nevertheless, though prolonged economic decline can be a source of conflict, economic growth does not necessarily prevent or resolve violent conflict and may even intensify tensions. Economics impacts upon conflict dynamics, but what is not always clear is how it does so, and how much relative to other political and socio-cultural factors.[2]

Resource scarcity creates a vulnerability to war, but there is also a strong correlation between natural resource abundance (oil, diamonds) and the risk of armed conflict, such as we have seen in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.[3] In such circumstances governments have generally failed to sustain the policies, governance and institutions that would enable them to both achieve reasonable growth and diversify out of dependence on primary commodities. Groups compete for control of these natural resources, a predatory government viewing control over resources as its 'prize'. The transparency of the management of these resources is often a critical issue, and where there is ethnic and regional competition about scarce resources, it usually results in the opportunistic politicisation of identity.

Such wars are both caused and sustained by a complex and shifting interplay between politics and economics: belligerents rely on their capacity to exploit and commercialise resources, so conflict becomes self-financing, self-sustaining and therefore not readily amenable to mediation. Where there are lootable resources, these frequently become critical sources of survival for the civilian population which, if denied, will exacerbate civilian hardship and maybe even multiply the points of conflict in these combatant controlled war economies. In the vast majority of cases the fighting is not between traditionally organised hierarchical military units but between multifarious factions. Many of Africa's wars are fought by loosely knit groups – the majority of them young males, some teenagers and even children – led by local warlords under little or no overarching structure. In consequence, the distinction between war and organised crime becomes blurred and there is large-scale violation of human rights.

The high degree of complexity that characterises these wars is also reflected in the number of interests external to Africa that continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role in sustaining conflicts.[4] The way these develop within a 'globalised' war economy may involve a multitude of external parties that support and sustain conflict directly, through financing, or indirectly, through the sale of natural resources to outsiders.[5] In fact, intrastate conflicts with strong international dimensions (sometimes referred to as internationalised civil wars) are now the norm, as the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire make clear. In addition the role that African governments play in supporting, or even instigating, conflicts in neighbouring countries is well recognised.[6] This brings into question the applicability of the concepts civil war and intrastate conflict, because the key actors and dynamics driving such conflicts are seldom confined by national boundaries.

Intrastate wars differ from international wars: they are informal, often having no clear beginning or end, they weaken rather than strengthen the authority of the state relative to other actors, and they leave opposing armies to be demobilised within one territory. Even more important, they erode the institutions of civil society, not least of which is respect for the rule of law.

The socio-economic costs of conflict

Traditional definitions of conflict, such as the one provided by SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), describe it "as a situation in which armed force is used to resolve issues of government or territory, at least one of the parties is the government of a country and there are at least 25 battle-related deaths." However, this reading is too narrow to encompass key dimensions of conflict, particularly in the African context. It also ignores the multiplicity of actors and the diversity of cause and motive. Local and international political elites, armed groups, refugees and IDPs, local populations, humanitarian, development and conservation organisations and donors are all actors in the conflict environment.

In many cases **state** actors are involved only peripherally, while in others they are the principal perpetrators of violence against the very citizens that humanitarian law requires them to protect. As Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has pointed out:

> [C]ivilians are no longer just victims of war today. They are regarded as instruments of war. Starving, terrorising, murdering, raping civilians – all that is seen as legitimate. Sex is no defence, nor is age; indeed women, children and the elderly are often at greatest risk.[7]

Human rights violations, disruption and displacement

During conflict situations it is most often **how** wars are fought that puts civilian populations at risk, far more so than the fighting itself. Attacks on civilians are often part of a deliberate strategy rather than a side effect. The increasing use of 'scorched-earth' tactics in several African countries by governments bent on defeating guerrilla insurgencies has had a disproportionate effect on the livelihoods of civilian populations. In 1996 alone, the 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa afflicted by armed conflict accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide.[8]

As any rules of war are cast aside, violations of human rights increase. The number of child soldiers, often forcibly recruited as groups conduct attacks on IDP and refugee camps, exemplifies this. Arbitrary killings and other grave human rights violations such as torture, mutilation and rape have been documented in recent years in many African countries. In Uganda, hundreds of thousands of IDPs live in congested camps subject to frequent attacks by rebels. Massive violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have affected the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – summary executions, some ethnically targeted, rape and looting, have been committed by all the fighting groups.[9] In one of the world's poorest and most inaccessible regions, Darfur in Sudan's western border with Chad, the Sudanese government and the Arab 'Janjaweed' militias have carried out attacks on civilians, massacres, summary executions and enslavement and the burning of towns and villages.[10]

Not only is it increasingly difficult to distinguish between violent crime and acts of warfare, but we are also seeing massive population displacement that is, moreover, a crucial part of the overall intent of the warring parties. At the end of 2003 more than half of the world's 25 million displaced people were to be found in Africa. Attacks on civilians, rather than being a side effect of conflict, are often part of a deliberate strategy by government forces and rebel groups to assert control over areas by intimidation and avoid conventional fighting. Markets are emptied and hospitals, homes, stores and crops routinely looted. Livelihoods are threatened by limited access to food, the collapse of small industry and social services, the increased risk of disease, the collapse or fragmentation of communities, and an increase in the number of female-headed households. Poverty deepens as coping mechanisms falter. Displacement on a grand scale is one of the principal consequences of this strategy. Large numbers of refugees are often inaccessible, as security concerns prevent the humanitarian communities from reaching them. IDPs are particularly vulnerable as, unlike refugees, they lack legal status and have no agency mandated to manage their protection.

Health

An interesting fact that is emerging is that health conditions are at their worst after rather than during the conflict, as the knock-on and cumulative effects resulting from the flight of health care staff, and absence of infrastructure and services become apparent. The ability of health services to function is impaired by the chaotic security situation and people's inability to access

them, the lack of funds and qualified staff. Social welfare services are disrupted and clinics are closed, ransacked or destroyed, making it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure access to quality curative and preventive health services. The incidence of diseases and epidemics (malaria, cholera and meningitis) increases and social indicators deteriorate because of poor or non-existent and uncoordinated health services and a limited response to epidemics as immunisation programmes are discontinued. Infectious diseases are, in fact, the most important cause of the indirect deaths of civil war. Access to potable water and to decent sanitation systems affect all populations displaced by crisis. This is particularly so in refugee and displacement sites. People die as a result of a combination of a lack of food and an inappropriate diet – leading to a decline in nutritional status – an increase in and spread of diseases, and unsafe drinking water.

There is growing concern about the implications of conflict for the spread, management and mitigation of HIV/AIDS in Africa, a continent suffering from a 'deadly triad' of the interrelated burdens of food insecurity, HIV/AIDS and a reduced capacity to govern and provide basic services. The relationship is complex and mutually reinforcing: hunger and poverty fuel conflict; war and conflict quickly lead to hunger; and people who are hungry and without food will tend to engage in risky, more aggressive behaviour. Conflict magnifies the complex series of ways in which HIV/AIDS interacts with livelihoods and contributes to vulnerability and food insecurity.

Although not much is known about the extent of HIV/AIDS in African conflicts and the interactions between conflict and HIV/AIDS, we do know that the chaotic and brutal nature of wars in Africa aggravates all the factors that fuel the HIV/AIDS crisis. Poverty and the gender dimensions of conflict and the pandemic compound both. Conflict situations act as a vector of HIV/AIDS: military personnel, typically young men, tend to have high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV – estimates indicate that rates are two to five times higher than among the general population, even during peacetime. Risks are substantially increased because of population movements, risky sexual behaviour by combatants, the collapse of the health system and sexual abuse of women and girls – often a deliberate tool of warfare; HIV/AIDS just renders it even more lethal. Violations of human rights increase, as the rules of war break down, resulting in a continuum of crime and conflict. The number of child soldiers, often forcibly recruited as groups conduct attacks on IDP and refugee camps, exemplifies this. Itinerant bands of displaced youth and youth militias are a growing phenomenon.

Many refugees and internally displaced people do not return to their original homes after the war ends, but remain in makeshift camps for years. The general population continues to be exposed to conditions that increase the risk of infections. Screening and detection of diseases associated with HIV/AIDS are less likely to take place because of the weakened health system, while the destruction of the education system makes prevention through education and information sharing very much more difficult.

Economic and political

There are a number of features of chronic conflict and political instability particularly relevant to livelihood analysis that do not necessarily occur in politically stable contexts because the structure of the economy is deeply affected.

At a meso and macro level these include the breakdown of social and physical infrastructure and services, collapse of local markets, changes in the wider economy, and in governance structures. Conflict wrecks the physical infrastructure, from hydroelectric schemes at one end of the scale to village wells at the other, and roads, railways and bridges are destroyed. The lack of maintenance during the years of war compounds the breakdown in infrastructure.

Wartime economic management has a long-term impact. Public expenditure is reoriented towards the military effort. Arms purchases not only increase foreign debt, they require the growing of more export/cash crops, often at the expense of food, to earn the necessary foreign exchange. Sometimes weapons shipments have even been paid for by the direct transfer of internationally provided emergency food shipments.

The economic legacy of civil war is to reduce the level of tax revenue for a considerable period, which puts all forms of government expenditure under pressure. Because civil wars often either fail to end decisively or involve the integration of former combatants in an expanded army, it is difficult to reduce military expenditure, which may even increase to levels exceeding those of the pre-war period.

Foreign and local investment, already meagre, dries up in times of conflict. National savings are depleted. Economic assets fall prey to criminalised groups. Government spending in wartime deepens inequality further as what social spending there is flows to safer, urban areas.

War further weakens responsible governance. Scarce resources and energy are diverted towards the war effort, and trained and skilled manpower is redirected from the economy and administration. The result is a lack or weakening of coordination and planning, impairment of regional cooperation, and erosion of local government skills. Poor, or politically motivated, targeting of food aid is a frequent complaint.

Institutions often collapse. In many cases the civil service ceases to function and social services can no longer be delivered effectively, a failure that has short and long-term consequences. Education suffers, jeopardising a generation's prospects and laying the ground for further instability as young males see conflict economies offering better or more realistic opportunities than uncertain peaceful livelihoods.

Because institutions are distorted by protracted conflict it is difficult to reshape them into fully operational and soundly managed bodies during post-war recovery. Re-establishing governance mechanisms, which are accepted by, and accountable to, the population, takes time and insight.

Social and economic impacts also have consequences for the environment: political conflict and environmental degradation are closely interrelated, though the causal link is by no means clear cut or uniform, and cause and effect are difficult to separate. The loss of livelihoods offers some explanation of current conflict patterns. Explanations for the reason that the rank and file of most notorious militias are filled by large cohorts of young men points not so much to the issue of endemic poverty as to the rapid devaluation of their expectations as a result of a sudden fall into poverty resulting from loss of livelihoods, which is in turn often caused or aggravated by environmental degradation.[11]

Loss of social capital

At the household level the more direct effects of conflict such as displacement, forced migration, changing household composition and the impact on income generation, labour and productivity, and the loss, depletion and maintenance of assets, considerably limit livelihood options. Conflict also impacts profoundly upon social networks. Social capital – the individual's access to support, trust and cooperation among families, kin and communities - is a crucial element in livelihood strategies.[12] War reconfigures resources, relationships and ideologies, and people are not passive, but also act as active agents in responding to and shaping conflict.

> A protracted conflict can undermine and even destroy social capital: conflict entrepreneurs – new political actors legitimised by the rule of force and violence – often play a fundamental role in determining access to resources. They patronise their own clientele (their own ethnic group) and thus reinforce intra-ethnic identities and inter-ethnic grievances.[13]

War accentuates inequality, not only in terms of income but also in respect of human development indicators. Households with access to the wartime shadow economy and connections to local-level elites may accumulate assets; the situation of poorer households deteriorates further, as do human development indicators, particularly for women. Civilian incomes from illicit activities may compensate for the state's failure or incapacity to provide basic services, but not only make vulnerability assessments virtually impossible, but also exacerbate the vulnerability of communities, impelling them to deepen their involvement in conflicts. Segments of the elite, themselves frustrated by violent competition, exploit situations of political instability for their own economic purposes, and are able to mobilise large numbers of foot soldiers relatively easily in a situation of pervasive poverty and insecurity. The impact of conflict on social institutions and processes can be seen in the unravelling of 'traditional' kinship relationships and methods of cooperation, mistrust between groups, breakdown in the moral and social order and of 'traditional' methods of cooperation, and the weakening of local governance structures.

Displacement can rupture social relationships but in certain circumstances it can also diversify and strengthen them. Communities cannot be assumed to be uniform in their response to conflict – different social relationships give rise to different coping and adaptation mechanisms, and while conflict results in losses, it also brings changes that transform societies. The implications for those providing support in post-conflict environments are that they must be mindful of vested interests and how (new) political actors play a role in determining access to resources. They must be careful to avoid rebuilding institutions that had roles in creating conflict in the first place; be aware that regulatory reform may reflect only commercial interests; be conscious of alliances between customary authorities and conflict groups, and of the challenges of creating a more inclusive system of local governance for the post-conflict period.

Agriculture and food security

Agriculture and trade, crucial for most people's survival, decline rapidly as conflict devastates agriculture and compromises food security. Widespread

food insecurity and chronic malnutrition become the norm, as they did in Angola, in Mozambique, and now in Burundi. Efforts to develop basic production capacities are continuously hampered by continuing insecurity, and looting of seeds and planting material delay recovery and the stabilisation of food production. The food security situation therefore remains very precarious.

Access to land and markets are hampered. The scarcity of food and resources experienced by armed groups – rebels and government troops – increases the vulnerability of civilians living in refugee camps, as combatants target these sites. Crime levels may rise because of banditry where populations are unable to establish food security.

Lands are often not tended, and protection and storage of stocks are compromised because of massive displacement, insecurity, the presence of landmines, and the conscription of manpower. Social and gender relations, so important to the survival of communities with small margins, are disturbed.

Communities are often displaced on to marginal lands, which in turn results in soil erosion, and depletion or destruction of natural resources that are not managed. Refugee camps and settlements highlight the relationship between conflict and environmental stress and degradation, though they are by no means the only links in this chain. Natural resources are frequently ravaged to finance conflicts. Deprived of funds from international sources and unrestrained by internal and external means of regulating violence, wars are increasingly reliant upon the steady extraction of natural resources and predation of civil assets.

New technological aspects of warfare have also increased the insecurity of civilians. Landmine accidents increase during the agricultural season when returning populations begin cultivating abandoned or unused lands.

Markets collapse as the delicate network of trade between peasant communities is disrupted and even destroyed, as is that between the towns and the countryside. Small traders, the essential links between peasant producers and the urban market, who provide farmers with access to vital agricultural inputs, are driven out of business, either because their stores are destroyed or because hostilities prevent them from selling in needy areas. They therefore refrain from purchasing surplus crops, even when these are available.

Veterinary services and control measures prove impossible to maintain, resulting in the rapid spread of animal disease and massive losses of stock. Resilience

to natural and other shocks is undermined at both the household and national levels and disaster mitigation is extremely limited. Conflicts thus act to drive disaster risk upwards, so that all that is required to trigger widespread suffering is a modest environmental hazard such as an unexceptional drought or heavy rainfall. The relief orientation and prolonged nature of donor support in the case of conflicts act to build a culture of dependence, mitigating against long-term structural, and developmental solutions to food insecurity. Under these conditions, sustainable efforts to reduce disaster vulnerability receive little attention and acts to discourage local initiative for the ownership of, and responsibility for, disaster risk. Furthermore, the apparent lack of strategic capability at local and national level strengthens the case for outside assistance. Communities are often left with little ability to provide for themselves, let alone place demands on their government. Added to this, years of NGO handouts weaken the will to work, leaving a legacy of an 'emergency mentality'.

Livelihoods are threatened because access to food is limited, the collapse of small industry and social services, the increased risk of disease, the collapse or fragmentation of communities, and an increase in the number of female-headed households. The rural economy becomes geared towards obtaining food security through subsistence activity, and poverty increases as coping mechanisms falter.

International assistance in post conflict situations

Donors and aid agencies have an important role to play in maintaining a nascent and fragile peace process in the immediate post-war period. Most notably they have the comparative advantage of being in a position to offer analytical advice and strategic support. But this means they have to maintain a sharper poverty focus and a strong awareness of the most obvious economic legacy of the war, such as its huge negative effect on the capital stock, especially in rural areas where the parties to the conflict generally consider any sign of wealth or government institutions a legitimate target. Extreme, long-term under-development of the rural economy is one of the more lasting effects of political instability and chronic conflict.

Apart from observing the reintegration of refugees and the nutritional and health status of the population, assisting with the one-off donations to physically shelter and feed former refugees, aid agencies can assist in reviving local trading and the local economy. The single biggest poverty alleviation success in Mozambique, for example, has been the increase in smallholders' agricul-

tural output and the improved competition in agricultural markets. Rural agricultural development, however, cannot be addressed in isolation from other income-generating activities that allow households to diversify their income and asset base. Road rehabilitation, maintenance and de-mining promise high and immediate returns, providing employment opportunities, lowering the costs of humanitarian deliveries, and allowing the development of local administrative capacities. Support for government legislative and administrative capacity at all levels aimed at assisting smallholders to increase post-war production is essential. This cannot be done in the absence of an awareness of the way in which the allocation of aid may have a political impact that reinforces the vested interests of elites, thus contributing to political destabilisation and increasing economic inequality across the country.

In the final analysis, human security depends on the interweaving of various dimensions: during periods of reconstruction, the focus has to be on addressing poverty while engaging in economic policy reform. Recovery cannot be compartmentalised – if it is not broad-based, inequality will be sustained.

The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. However, 'human security' has become a buzz-phrase in the public arena, with all the danger this implies for it to become virtually meaningless. Only by locating threats to human security in particular contexts and events can we really bring our critical faculties to bear upon the dilemmas to which it draws attention.

Africa's conflicts: A future perspective

The post Cold-War optimism of a new era of peace and stability has faded. With the ending of the Cold War the veil obscuring the complexities of international interests has been lifted, and we are starting to discern the internal dynamics of conflicts. Sadly, the world, and in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, is neither a fairer nor a more peaceful place than at the beginning of the human rights revolution and the reality, as David Reiff points out, is that

> [F]or most of recorded history, war and not peace has been the norm, and in many parts of the world it is likely to continue to be, perhaps forever.[14]

The globalisation agenda is serving to ensure that the West garners a disproportionate share of the benefits at the expense of the developing world. It

has not succeeded in reducing poverty, or in ensuring stability, even though the need to address conflict and its consequences has become a central concern. The international community seems easily seduced by the glory of a global approach, but overlooks root causes such as those relating to resource exploitation, poor governance and human rights abuses. At the same time development issues have become important, primarily in relation to security concerns. The question remains, for whom and for what ends, is the status quo perpetuated.

At a national level there appears, at first sight, to be a paradox: even in functionally weak states there may be a strengthening of the centre and its security apparatus vis-à-vis the population at large. But this strengthening of regimes is often at the cost of the increasing marginalisation, economic and political, of civil society. In consequence, human-centred development is overlooked, reinforcing and aggravating poverty and inequality, the reduction of which are so vital to mitigating conflict and strengthening post-conflict recovery. For peace to hold, growth must not favour only a narrow elite but must improve the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people. Rather, what we are seeing is that "the only beneficiaries of war economies are the local political elites, business mafias and their henchmen and such merchant adventurers and their global partners as indulge themselves in rough and extractive trade."[15]

We are likely to see more low intensity, localised conflicts, but fewer, if any, large scale chronic conflicts such as those experienced in Angola for 27 years before 2002. We are also likely to see the subsidence of functioning states where there are zones of economic exploitation. There are some positive developments. At a global level we have the formation of the G3, which creates a powerful front for the defence of the developing world's agenda. At a continental level, African leaders are making efforts to chart a new course, to tackle the root causes of poverty and conflict. They are working together with the G8 to agree on a new plan for Africa that includes intense action to resolve conflicts (such as the formation of the Peace & Security Council, SADC's Mutual Defence Pact and developments towards establishing an African Peace-Keeping Force) and address poor governance, as well as extra support in aid, trade and debt relief to those countries committed to good governance. Although this new African security architecture is in its infancy, the momentum has been created for greater involvement of Africa in the resolution and management of its own armed conflicts. Of crucial importance will be the role of regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC and ECCAS in the strengthening of the AU's intervention capacity in the resolution of conflicts.

The UN has a critical role. At the time that the UN was established, concepts such as human security, human development, governance and peace building, if they existed at all, were little used or understood, and it was the rights of, and relationships between, states (rather than individuals or groups) that were the focus of attention. Increasingly since the end of the Cold War, the international community has begun to focus on the linkages between peace and development. This has required an enormous and continuing institutional adaptation within the UN, as a result of which the development and conflict management communities have started to work closely together. Questions about the effectiveness of aid, in particular in those countries affected by violent conflict, have become topical and there is a growing consciousness that underdevelopment frequently coincides with a susceptibility to violent conflicts. This, in turn, makes the very countries most in need of development assistance among the hardest to help. Likewise, the role that development practitioners can play in post-conflict and conflict-prone environments – in mitigating, assisting or aggravating the situation – has come to the fore. The UN Security Council has begun to move away from a narrow political/military conception of peace and security to a much broader understanding that acknowledges the place of human rights, economic and social factors, and even health. This shift has been recognised in the increasing willingness of the Security Council to authorise peacekeeping operations with multidimensional mandates. This trend has contributed to an environment in which the conflict management and the development communities find themselves cooperating more and more often. UNDP teams enter the field even before conflict has ended, to ensure that there is a smooth relief-to-development continuum, and peacekeeping operations are involved increasingly in conflict resolution-peace building mechanisms. The convergence of development/humanitarian and peacekeeping/political missions is an important trend in the way the UN does business, calling for UN agencies, aid organisations and governments to cooperate and coordinate activities in an integrated fashion. This approach is not uncontroversial.

The role of humanitarianism has been questioned increasingly in the last decade. The Rwandan genocide was one of the events of the 1990s that haunted mainstream humanitarianism, confronted by its failure to do more than alleviate. Coupled with this was the recognition that development aid given to corrupt or repressive regimes does little good. This has brought about an integration of the two domains of humanitarianism and human rights – a 'new humanitarianism' – which makes the protection of basic human rights part of the core activities of humanitarian field operations. But this has been accompanied by declining support from donors, which has forced recovery

programmes to scale back their activities. The justification for this reversal is that it is morally unacceptable to cooperate with tyranny, and the principle that has been adopted appears to be one of doing no harm and not escalating violence. This rests on an assumption that withholding aid may ultimately benefit the masses of people the aid was ostensibly meant to assist.

The broad consensus about what needs to be done points to issues such as cancelling Africa's unsustainable and largely illegitimate debt; supporting African diplomats and civil society in resolving conflicts, managing peace negotiations and building peace; investing development resources in health, education, and other sectors that build human resources, and providing adequate resources to support the fight against AIDS. Africa's issues are global issues – the international community cannot ignore this, and must build support for efforts to manage the challenges of poverty, HIV/AIDS and conflicts by way of concrete actions that will support lasting peace and development.

Continuing instability and chronic conflict do not have to dominate Africa's future.

Notes

1 K Ballentine & H Nitzschke, *Beyond greed and grievance: Policy lessons from studies in the political economy of armed conflict,* in International Peace Academy Policy Report, October 2003, p.12

2 Ibid, p.2

3 'Lootable' resources, such as alluvial diamonds and illegal narcotics are more likely to be implicated in non-separtist insurgencies, acting to prolong conflicts through the benefits they bring to rebels and conflict-dependent civilians. 'Unlootable' resources, such as oil and gas, tend to be associated with separatist conflicts. Ibid, p. 1

4 Oil, potentially Sudan's greatest resource, is today its curse. In the first two years of oil production, military spending doubled and the war became more violent, with a fierce increase in aerial bombardment and attacks by helicopter gunships. (Britain plays a significant role, with British-made pumps and pumping stations driving the oil pipeline.)

5 In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials was one of the principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over these resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to sustain the conflict.

6 The DRC has an abundance of natural resources, including diamonds, oil and a range of other minerals. It is this abundance that has been the primary cause of conflict, with different factions seeking to claim ownership of these riches.

7 M Robinson, cited in J Gomes Porto, The role of conflict analysis in conflict resolution: Reflections on international mediation, the case of Angola. Unpublished Ph.D., University of Kent, 2002, p. 13.

8 K Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Report to the UNSC, 16 April 1998.

9 DR Congo: *War crimes in Bukavu*, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2004.

10 Sudan, *Darfur destroyed*, Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org

11 L Ohlsson, *Livelihood conflicts: Linking poverty and environment as causes of conflict*, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agendy, December 2000, p. 3.

12 B Korf, *Contract or war? An essay on institutional logic in violent conflicts*. Berghof Occasional Paper 23, April 2003, p. 20.

13 Ibid.

14 D Reiff, *A bed for the night: Humanitarianism in crisis*, Vintage, 2002, p 332.

15 Discussion with Richard Cornwell.

CHAPTER 2

LIVELIHOODS ANALYSIS AND THE CHALLENGES OF POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY

Rick de Satgé

Introduction and background

The aim of this paper is to provide the elements of a framework for a broader discussion of how best to design and support interventions that strengthen household livelihoods in post-conflict situations.

The paper sets out to:

- Provide a background on key livelihoods concepts and frameworks;
- Examine the diverse impacts of conflict on the livelihoods of different households, and assess the latter's capacity to cope and recover;
- Explore the contributions that adopting a livelihoods approach can offer to the complex challenges of recovery in post-conflict situations; and
- Examine linkages and synergies with other analytical frameworks that emphasise capabilities, political economy, food security and risk and vulnerability reduction.

Livelihoods concepts and frameworks at a glance

This section explores the roots of livelihood approaches in the changing development narratives over the last 50 years, examining the key concept of differentiation that underpins livelihoods and vulnerability analysis. It provides a brief outline of different livelihoods frameworks, and of the concepts that define them; explores the concepts of assets, capabilities and activities that characterise household livelihood strategies; and investigates the interconnections between these elements and factors in the broader environment that affect household livelihood security. It concludes with a brief examination of the concept of vulnerability, and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of livelihoods approaches.

A scan of the literature reveals how the concept of livelihoods has permeated most development domains: poverty reduction, environmental and natural resource management, local economic development, land and tenure reform, disaster risk reduction and post-conflict recovery strategies, to identify but a few.

Ellis[1] notes that it is roughly five years since the "explosion of interest in the concept of sustainable livelihoods". In this period a number of conceptual frameworks have been developed, and a variety of methodological approaches have been adapted to working on different scales. However, the proliferation of frameworks and the debates over the concepts that underlie them have contributed to the general impression that livelihoods analysis is excessively complex, time-consuming and unrealistically holistic. This has led livelihoods practitioners to take stock and refocus on a few core concepts.

Essentially, adopting a sustainable livelihoods (SL) approach involves working with a conceptual framework that assists one to understand how people live, and to identify the trends and factors in the micro, meso and macro environments that enhance or undermine their means of livelihood and their sustainability.

Ellis describes the commonly accepted core of SL thinking as "the requirement to understand and act upon the asset limitations of the poor, the risks they confront, and the institutional environment that either facilitates or blocks them in their own endeavours to build pathways out of poverty". [2]

If livelihoods approaches are to make a meaningful contribution to the development of effective post-conflict recovery strategies, it is important first to review the evolution of livelihoods thinking and assess the significance of the core ideas.

Locating livelihoods approaches among changing development narratives

The graphic on the right provides a schematic summary of changing development trends and themes between 1950 and the present day.[3] Clearly, in reality trends are not neatly packaged into decades. Issues that gain prominence in a particular ten-year span often have their roots in a previous period. For example, SL draws on a variety of earlier sources and applications: Integrated Rural Development, Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), gender, poverty, governance, sustainability and famine research.



The period 1949–1989 saw the growth and decline of the socialist project, which was characterised by the centrality of the state, the party and ideology; rigid and impermeable definitions of class; and highly centralised command and control planning over most aspects of social and economic life. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to map these trends or to explore the socialist experience in African history (or its linkages with anti-colonial national liberation struggles).

1950s and 60s: Modernisation and technology transfer

In the period immediately following the Second World War, the capitalist bloc also emphasised a strong state. Keynesian economic policies predominated, and much confidence was placed in the benefits of modernisation. 'Development' was something done by the state for the people. Development planning was dominated by the positivist paradigm in which "knowledge about the world is summarised in universal or time and context-free generalizations and laws".[4] This era was characterised by top-down or blueprint approaches to development "characterised by external technologies and national level policies".[5]

Great faith was invested in the knowledge of technical experts and the development of technological solutions during this period. Development programmes were often characterised by the 'one size fits all' provision of technical assistance 'packages'. For example, the strategies designed for the agricultural sectors of developing countries involved major investments in crop research and the technology of crop production. Such development initiatives were often appropriated by the elites, and were consequently of little benefit to the households they were intended to assist. In some cases such interventions even contributed the dispossession or further marginalisation of the poor. Very little attention was paid by the planners to how poor people actually lived, or what their priorities were.

1970s: Orthodoxies and alternatives

During the 1970s the global scene was characterised by national liberation struggles, the emergence of more radical social agendas, and an upsurge of environmentalism. All of these meant that it was a decade of contestation. A significant Marxist critique that emphasised issues of class power and social differentiation was levelled against mainstream development orthodoxies. While these issues remain central to development practice, the Marxist theoretical frameworks of the time were highly generalised, economistic and "aspired to excessive explanatory power".[6] Nevertheless this environment of questioning caused some shifts in mainstream thinking, including "the flirtation with ideas of basic needs and redistribution with growth".[7] At the same time attempts were made to address some of the problems emerging from technicist development strategies. Mainstream development agencies began to focus on trying to improve both the management of development projects and the integration between initiatives in different sectors – health, education, infrastructure, water supply, agricultural production, job creation and so on. This gave rise to so-called Integrated Rural Development Projects that were variously interpreted by national governments and international agencies, but in general favoured multisectoral planning and improved local area co-ordination. In practice these often proved difficult and expensive to implement, and impossible to sustain. [8]

1980s: The lost decade

The 1980s, which saw the rollback of new thinking in the 1970s at least within the mainstream, heralded the collapse of the socialist project and the new

eminence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1987 the World Bank introduced structural adjustment policies, which relied on a basic formula: a reduction in public spending; the removal of subsidies on food, health and education; higher interest rates; currency devaluation; lower real wages; reduced tariffs; and the privatisation of services. This laid the foundation for market liberalisation and the globalisation of the world economy. Domestic economies were opened up to international trade and financial flows, which in turn contributed to a diminution of the power of the state (a trend that rapidly gathered momentum during the 90s).

Development reached an impasse in the 1980s, earning it the label of 'the lost decade'. This period was characterised worldwide by a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. Developing countries suffered increasing poverty, exclusion and inequality. There was something of a crisis in development thinking, associated with the removal of socialist trajectories from academic and political development agendas. However this hiatus was short-lived. The new environment quickly opened up fresh perspectives which, interestingly, tended to reject, or at the least show a healthy disrespect for, totalising theory.

Contemporary narratives: 1990 to the present

The contemporary period is one of great complexity. Many of the old areas of contestation have resurfaced in new forms. However the new environment is no longer characterised by simple dichotomies between mainstream and alternative development paths. Alternative discourses promoting popular, people-centred, participatory, gender-conscious and sustainable development are being quickly assimilated into the mainstream.[9]

On the one hand the dominant neoliberal paradigm, with its emphasis on growth-led development, has gathered further momentum with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. This has further weakened the regulatory power of individual states with respect to trade and financial flows, because the WTO aims to create a borderless market where capital and goods (but not people) can move about freely. [10]

Numerous commentators argue that although globalisation removes barriers between nations, it simultaneously erects barriers within nations between the poor and the rich. In so doing it unravels the social contract that lies at the core of the redistributive state. The last decade has also seen important shifts

in environmental narratives. The Earth Summit and the parallel Global Forum in Rio in 1992, followed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, heralded the rise of environmental politics and raised awareness of the concept of 'sustainable development'.

On the other hand, as Lipton[11] notes, since the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen, when countries committed themselves to halving by 2015 the poverty levels of 1990, governments, donors and agencies have made reducing or even eliminating poverty their main objective. But poverty has long been on the development agenda. Over the last 20 years, discourse on the topic has shifted from poverty alleviation to poverty reduction, and on to the current objective of poverty eradication. However, as Ellis and Biggs point out,[12] this change in the labelling of poverty discourse amounts to little more than 'development spin'.

Despite scepticism about the new labels, the current emphasis has led to the development of more nuanced understandings of poverty, many of which derive from participatory assessments. Poverty is now acknowledged to be multidimensional rather than assessable through a simple poverty line measure. Greater clarity is also emerging on the combination of factors that contribute to people's living in chronic poverty, and the pathways followed by households as they move in and out of poverty.

A corrective shift has been made: poor people are no longer regarded as consumers of services, but as citizens with social and economic rights. There is a growing emphasis on rights-based approaches that make connections and "causal links between political marginality and poverty, and thus emphasise questions of social differentiation and social exclusion".[13]

The evolution of livelihoods approaches

The livelihoods approach draws on aspects of:

- Integrated rural development planning during the1970s;
- Food security and famine analysis initiatives during the 1980s;
- Participatory research methods, including Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Resource Appraisal (PRA);
- Farming systems research;
- Gender analysis and household research;
- Entitlement and capability theory;
- Definitions of sustainability;

- Vulnerability theories;[14]
- Risk assessment and reduction strategies;
- Household economy approaches;
- Participatory poverty assessment; and
- Appreciative enquiry.

Early definitions of sustainable livelihoods appeared in the Brundtland report issued in 1987. Chambers and Swift, working at the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton in the United Kingdom (UK), started developing livelihoods concepts during the late 1980s. In the early 1990s Chambers and Conway helped to consolidate the concept by proposing a definition of livelihoods and the factors that make them sustainable. This definition underpins many of the livelihoods frameworks currently in use.

> A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from shocks and stresses, maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels in the long and short term.[15]

In 1997 the concept of livelihoods was made a mainstream issue in the UK government's White Paper on International Development, which committed its Department for International Development (DFID) to promoting sustainable livelihoods while improving the management of the natural and physical environment.

They adapted the Chamber and Conway definition as follows:

> A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social assets) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base. [16]

The original DFID focus on rural livelihoods concerned "mainstreaming environment within a holistic framework".[17]

As numerous other actors in the development field adopted the concept, it became more closely associated with poverty reduction and rights-based

discourses. It also lost its exclusively rural label as it broadened to include urban livelihoods.

An earlier definition expresses these perspectives on what 'livelihoods' entails:

> People's capacity to generate and maintain their means of living, enhance their well-being and that of future generations. These capacities are contingent on the availability and accessibility of options which are ecological, economic, political and which are predicated on equity, ownership of resources and participatory decision making.[18]

The concept of livelihoods has now inserted itself into virtually all development discourse. Hussein[19] has recently published a comparison of the ways in which livelihoods approaches have been adapted by 15 development agencies, which range from bilateral and multilateral bodies to non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Households and differentiation

Livelihoods approaches are household-focused as opposed to community-based. Analysis in this discipline starts from a critical assessment of the concept of 'community'.

Many earlier approaches to development oversimplified realities that are multifaceted and untidy, often tacitly assuming that poor rural and urban communities were homogeneous and that households had a single-purpose reliance on one main way of making a living. Again, earlier mainstream development approaches premised on 'community development' often made the assumption that communities or community groups had common interests. They failed to disaggregate households sufficiently, or to identify disparate social relations of power and influence. In the same way the mantra of 'participation' often obscured who was participating and whose interests such processes served. The recent critiques of participation advanced by Cooke and Kothari[20] are apposite here.

As a result of these early versions of livelihoods analysis, governments, development agencies and NGOs tended to focus on narrow sectoral strategies that commonly bypassed those most vulnerable. They also failed to recognise both the extent to which the rural and urban poor depend on multiple livelihood strategies, and the ways in which these are institutionally mediated.

Livelihoods frameworks

A number of frameworks[21] have now been developed in an attempt to conceptualise the relationship between households, their assets, capabilities and activities and the factors in the local and external environment that either improve or undermine their livelihoods over time.

Visualising these relationships presents a challenge. Although a framework diagram does not try to model 'reality', it is seldom able even to capture conceptually the dynamic interplay of issues within and between households and the environment within which they exist.

The DFID framework

One of the most widely used livelihood frameworks was drawn up by the UK DFID.

Figure 1: Sustainable livelihoods framework



The aim of this framework is to conceptualise the following:

- How people operate within a vulnerability context that is shaped by different factors including shocks, stresses and seasonal or longer-term trends.

- How people draw on different categories of livelihood asset or 'capital' (human, social, natural, physical and financial), access to which is influenced by the vulnerability context and a range of local and external structures and processes. (More recently the DFID has changed its terminology to refer to these structures and processes as 'policies, institutions and processes' – PIPs – meaning the governance environment that shapes local livelihood options.)

- How people use their asset bases to develop a range of livelihood activities to achieve the livelihood outcomes they desire.

The DFID framework has generated a great deal of debate. It has been criticised for paying insufficient attention to issues of politics and power, and for extending economic concepts into the domain of social science, causing a good deal of confusion. Much of the debate centres on the concept of 'social capital', which refers to the "formal and informal networks that enable people to mobilise resources and achieve common goals". Some commentators like Harriss see social capital as 'BankSpeak', a term designed to neutralise and obscure the problems and relations of power,[22] a view also advocated by Fine, who argues that any use of the term social capital implies acceptance of mainstream economic discourse.[23] There is a vast literature on the social capital debate. Unfortunately space does not permit a proper analysis here. However, it is important to recognise Murray's critique of equating assets with varieties of capital.

Equating assets theoretically with varieties of 'capital' intellectually distorts our understanding of capital and politically distorts our understanding of the causes of poverty. On the first point capital is properly a social relation between people, not an attribute of rich or poor households respectively. On the second point attention is displaced from the inequalities of power that must surely be invoked to explain the persistence or worsening of poverty.[24]

Despite the validity of these criticisms, it is worth noting that the concept of social capital has become common currency in policy and development circles that do not subscribe to 'BankSpeak' and advocate strong rights-based approaches to the problems of poverty and development.

The CARE framework

CARE is an international NGO that uses the livelihoods approach as its primary planning framework.

Figure 2: CARE's HLS framework



Source: Sanderson, D. (1999) *HLS in Urban Settlements*. (London: CARE UK), Urban Briefing Note.

CARE emphasises the importance of using a 'light' and adaptable conceptual framework, which focuses on vulnerable households and recognises the factors that perpetuate poverty. It conceives of households as having basic needs. To meet them, members of the household must obtain access to resources by carrying out a variety of activities. There are institutionally mediated barriers, however, which prevent households from gaining access to these resources. Households with a diversified asset base are best able to cope with shocks and stresses in the local and external environment.

CARE also has experience of using livelihoods analysis in post-conflict scenarios. Hussein[25] describes how CARE used household livelihoods assessments in Kosovo,[26] training separate Albanian and Serbian settlement teams to gather information in different locations. This was conceptualised as part of a shift from relief to longer-term livelihoods perspectives intended to assist recovery.

The Learning about Livelihoods framework

In Southern Africa a regional initiative[27] was undertaken to develop a framework to synthesise and simplify aspects of other approaches, and give prominence to issues of differentiation and power.[28] The Learning about Livelihoods (LAL)[29] framework draws on the original Chambers and Conway definition to identify a simple 'household triangle' of assets, capabilities and activities.

It deliberately avoids the concept of capital, for both theoretical and practical reasons. (The theoretical debates were alluded to in the discussion of the DFID framework.) The practical drawbacks were that those involved in the initiative found that field staff and practitioners often had difficulty with the concept of capital or were diverted into debate on the distinctions between different types of capital.

At the core of the LAL approach is the concept of differentiation understanding the differences in power and voice and the disparities in access and entitlement to resources that exist between households and individuals. This has much in common with frameworks in political economy, which are explored further below. Differentiation sheds light both on the complexities in society and livelihood strategies, and on the dynamic interactions of conflict and cooperation, bargaining and negotiation, relative power and powerlessness that define social relations. At the micro level, the approach recognises that there is differentiation between men and women within households, and also examines differences of entitlement between people of the same sex, but of different ages.

The concept of differentiation is particularly important in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. It can help us understand why certain households and individuals are better able to cope than others in conflict situations, and how conflicts may present opportunities for some households while devastating the livelihoods of others.

The LAL framework puts households at the centre, and emphasises their complex, dynamic and differentiated nature. Households come in different shapes and sizes. They are not necessarily 'bounded' – people who are regarded as members of the household may be living elsewhere. They can also be ranked into different categories of well-being, usually derived from locally-defined criteria related to their livelihood activities.[30] Households turn their capabilities – health, labour power, education, skills, knowledge (and rights) – into social and material assets by engaging in multiple livelihood activities.

The livelihood activities undertaken by any household may be more or less sustainable and have more or less desirable outcomes, both for that household and for others. Those strategies that are more sustainable and enable the household to achieve its ends with a low risk of unintended consequences have a positive impact. Often (but not always) this good result filters into the social, economic, institutional and natural environment in which the household operates, by association. The converse can also be true.

However there is an important caveat to be entered here. While the livelihood strategies of one household may be sustainable and have positive effects for the household itself, *at the same time* they may directly undermine the livelihood of another household. Thus the win–win scenario that is often predicated as the outcome of development initiatives to diversify household livelihoods should be critically examined, particularly in conflict and post-conflict scenarios.



Like its predecessors, the LAL framework shows how households and their livelihoods are affected, and in turn affect, the external environment at different levels. (See the graphic on the next page.) The external environment contains factors that either improve or undermine livelihood opportunities, security and sustainability. These factors are located in different spheres, ranging from local to global, and in different sectors: economic, institutional or political, social, the natural and the built environments. They can be grouped

into enabling influences (the top hemisphere) and undermining influences, shocks and stresses (the bottom hemisphere).

The dynamic interplay between these various factors enables analysts using the framework to understand trends and changes over time. These may indicate increases or decreases in household resilience to risk of disaster and threats to livelihood security. The trends identified provide information as to the balance of forces that can either lift households out of poverty or pull them in deeper.



Assets

As can be seen from the frameworks described above, there are different ways of conceptualising assets.

Chambers and Conway distinguish between social and material assets: Social assets are 'intangible', being the benefits that come through relationships with people and institutions and access to resources; and the social and economic rights and entitlements that are determined by local rules, social norms, institutions and political structures. Gender and age also shape the nature of the

claims and access to the benefits that a particular social system will provide. Material assets are tangible, actual physical things that people own, control or have access to. They include land, housing, services, cash, stores of food, furniture, tools and equipment and livestock.

As noted above, the DFID framework conceptualises assets as different types of capital – human, physical, social, financial and natural. The table below consolidates the categories identified in the different frameworks that distinguish between social and material assets.

Social assets	Material assets
Human capital – skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health	**Physical capital** – the basic infrastructure (transport, shelter, water, energy and communications) and the production equipment that enables people to pursue different livelihood options
Social capital – the social resources (networks, membership of groups, relationships of trust, access to various social institutions) upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods	**Financial capital** – the financial resources available to people (savings, sources of credit, remittances and pensions) which can be drawn on to pursue different livelihood options
Political capital[31] – power and rights, development of political capabilities, vertical claims on landlords, the state	**Natural capital** – resources present in the natural physical environment useful for livelihoods (land, water, wildlife, biodiversity)

Capabilities

There are a variety of interpretations of the concept of capabilities. Some are functional; others are a reflection of rights and entitlements. Amartya Sen's capability approach combines "freedoms to achieve in general and capabilities to function in particular". The LAL framework draws on this interpretation, and emphasises that household capabilities are directly affected by factors in the social, institutional and political environment in which each household lives. Household capabilities include health, ability to work, education and skills levels on one hand, and the power to claim entitlements (to land, natural resources, social support, services and so forth) on the other.

Activities

The frameworks use two broad approaches for characterising activities. The CARE framework distinguishes between production and income, consumption, and processing and exchange activities. The LAL framework draws on Moser, who distinguishes between productive, reproductive and community management activities.[32]

It is important to note that not all productive activities are legal. Many of the livelihood strategies of poor households may involve participation in the so-called 'grey economy' – activities such as growing dagga, smuggling precious stones, rustling cattle and selling liquor illegally. In certain contexts such activities may form a significant part of a household's livelihood strategy.

Each of these characterisations of activities has its own logic. The important thing is to distinguish between different types of activity, who the participants are, how much time the activities take and how the household's access to different kinds of resources shapes the time spent on, and value of, these activities. The analysis of activities is closely linked to an understanding both of the variations in resource flows into and out of households at different times of year, and of the nature of the formal and informal markets with which people's livelihood activities articulate.

Examining the interplay between framework elements

The combination of assets and capabilities to which a household has access shapes the range of livelihood activities that its various members are able to carry out. Assets, capabilities and activities are closely interdependent. Clearly, the type of household (such as single-headed or intergenerational) and the defining factors of its physical environment will affect the amount of time that household members have to spend in different types of activity. For example, people displaced by conflict and living in socially volatile areas will have to invest much of their effort in day-to-day survival: fetching water, finding firewood, queuing for assistance, negotiating with local power and administrative structures while simultaneously guarding their possessions.

Similarly, a household may have access to assets but lack the capabilities to make full use of them. This is particularly true where households are headed by older persons, or where a household member has a chronic illness. The impact of HIV/AIDS on household livelihoods has been well documented.

Where a household member who is HIV positive starts to develop full-blown AIDS, much of the time members of the household usually devote to labour will be used to care for that person instead. The same applies to the household's material assets. The pandemic undermines the ability of the household to undertake other livelihood activities, depletes savings and other resources, and dramatically increases household vulnerability. The death of a household member may demand significant financial outlay on the funeral, which poor families cannot afford. Social networks may be stretched to breaking point as relatives take responsibility for the costs of care, medicine, funerals and the children orphaned by the AIDS. When social and material dislocation of conflict accompanies the disease, households can experience major hardship.

Understanding vulnerability

Moser characterises vulnerability as the insecurity of individuals, households or communities in the face of a changing environment. She adds that because people move in and out of poverty, the concept of vulnerability is a better reflection of results of change than the more static measures ordinarily applied to poverty.

Chambers[33] observes that "[v]ulnerability has two sides: an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual or household is subject and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope with damaging loss".

Vulnerability is also a reflection of relations of power. In a conflict situation, poorer and less powerful families may be unable to secure entitlements that are available or to claim them.

Shocks and stresses

Poverty-stricken individuals and households are subject to shocks or stresses in the local or external environment that undermine their livelihoods. Shocks are sudden events that strain the skills of members of the household, erode assets and restrict activities. Everyday examples include retrenchment, the sudden death of a breadwinner, an eviction, a fire, flood, or other extreme weather event. In situations of conflict or violent crime, key assets of a household may be physically appropriated or destroyed, or access to a livelihood source may be denied.

Households develop short-term crisis management responses, known as coping strategies, to survive specific shocks. However, the effectiveness of these strategies depends on the breadth and depth of the household's social and material asset base, and/or on the availability of appropriate external support. Chronically poor households have a thin spread of resources to fall back on, and may depend on very few activities. If they lose a key resource following a major shock, or are prevented from carrying out a particular activity, they may become totally destitute.

Stresses, in contrast, are long-term trends that undermine livelihood opportunities. These can result from factors as diverse as unplanned urbanisation, demographic changes, political and economic decline, environmental degradation and climate change. Some of these stresses may be the spillover effects of conflicts in neighbouring countries. For example, if a refugee camp is established adjacent to an existing community, members of the latter will soon begin to experience a combination of social and natural resource stresses that may represent a threat to their livelihoods over the long term.[34] However, it also important to note that such situations may also contain opportunities for some communities: new markets may open up or wider economic connections may be made.

Increasing costs, hyperinflation or the progressive running down of health and education services are also stresses. Others may take the form of ill-maintained infrastructure, poorly functioning state bureaucracies or dysfunctional local institutions. Another kind of stress may involve households in having increasing numbers of dependants, as relatives take responsibility for children whose parents have died from HIV-related illness. Alternatively, stress may take the form of reduced farming yields or stocking rates resulting from climate change or land degradation.

Over the long term, households adjust their behaviour and practice (using so-called adaptive strategies) in response to such stresses. In conflict scenarios the collapse of markets and their reconfiguration into higher-risk war economies cause changes in economic activity and behaviour that may persist for long periods.

Linkages and trends

Livelihoods analysis involves combining qualitative and quantitative research methods at the micro level. Methodologically, this involves consulting focus groups, compiling life histories, and surveying and profiling households. At

the meso and macro levels the focus is on policy and trend analysis. This is designed to explore connections between the different layers of the external environment, spanning locality, district, province, national, regional and global dimensions as appropriate. The objective is not only to identify key micro–macro linkages but also to isolate the key elements that drive local histories of change. This may allow the analyst to pinpoint a particular policy or institutional failure that has had a particularly damaging effect on local livelihoods. For example it could happen that a change in conservation or natural resource management policies has restricted access to essential livelihood resources for poor households; or that the commodisation of certain natural resources such as medicinal plants affects sustainable harvesting and use and therefore creates a conflict between those people harvesting for the market and local users.

In areas affected by conflict, the whole institutional environment may be radically altered, resulting in a collapse of social mores including consensus, norms, values, and gender and age-related roles.

> Institutions comprise a wide variety of formal and informal relationships that enhance societal productivity by making people's interactions and cooperation more predictable and effective. Some institutions… have organizational form, while others have more diffuse patterns of norms and behavior about which there are social consensus…. [Thus,] institutions can be understood as complexes of norms and behaviors that persist over time by serving some socially valued purposes. Institutions provide shared understanding of the cultural meaning of activities.[35]

Strengths and weaknesses in livelihoods approaches

Ellis warns that where livelihoods approaches have been elevated to a panacea for all development concerns, they inevitably fall short. Ironically, the "explosion of interest" in, and demand for, sustainable livelihoods and "household livelihood security" frameworks and methods of analysis have resulted in a process of "branding".[36] In some cases more energy has been spent on promoting and defending particular frameworks than on engaging creatively with the basic ideas and the practical processes of framework application.

There is also an increasing risk that, as livelihoods concepts become firmly embedded in mainstream development discourse, so the ideas and the frame-

works that animate them will be reduced to politically correct and obligatory simplifications. When frameworks and concepts are routinely applied, they inevitably begin to lose their edge. Ironically this process of 'mainstreaming' is often the precursor to the stagnation of concepts and their eclipse by the next big idea.

Murray[37] has developed a concise summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant DFID livelihoods framework, which is summarised in the table below.

Strengths of the framework	Weaknesses of the framework
It seeks to understand changing combinations of modes of livelihood in a dynamic and historical context	Elements of the vulnerability context such as macro economic trends, inflation, civil conflict and mass redundancy are underplayed
It explicitly advocates a creative tension between different levels of analysis, and emphasises the importance of micro-macro linkages	There is an implicit assumption that people's assets can be expanded in a generalised and incremental fashion
It acknowledges the need to move beyond discrete and narrow sectoral perspectives – urban and rural, industrial and agricultural, formal and informal, and instead emphasises the linkages between different sectors	Inequalities of power and conflicts of interest are not sufficiently acknowledged
It requires investigation of the relationships between the different activities that constitute household livelihoods, and in the process focuses attention on social relations within and between households	The notion of participation may disguise the truth that the enhancement of the livelihoods of one group may undermine those of another
	The continuing vagueness of the concept of livelihood sustainability is accompanied by lack of means to measure this over time

Perhaps the critical weakness is the impracticability of the framework. While it is reasonably clear conceptually, many planners and practitioners seem unable to use it to identify clear, practical interventions that can make a tangible difference to the security of local livelihoods.

Appreciative enquiry

While recognising the need rigorously to analyse social relations of conflict and inequality and to understand the constraints that hamper the livelihood activities of the poor, the analyst must acknowledge that there are limitations to a sole reliance on problem-based approaches, particularly at the micro level.

Appreciative enquiry practitioners have developed a critique of problem-based approaches. They argue that such analyses often ignore local agency, make it difficult for people to see anything but problems, and run the risk of reinforcing a sense of powerlessness and dependency in the poor. They also hold that problem-solving approaches often give more weight to 'expert opinion' and solutions proposed by professionals than they do to local solutions. Rahnema observed that "the problematisation of the poor's needs in modern economic terms further contributes to the disintegration of vernacular spaces, thereby exposing the poor to situations of even more helplessness".[38]

Again, these critics warn that problem-based approaches can privilege technical solutions, which often have unintended consequences and further aggravate existing power imbalances. Crucially, they argue that problem-solving approaches are no longer able to inspire and mobilise people at local level. There is a deepening scepticism on the part of the poor as to whether government or development agencies will ever address the problems that are routinely identified in planning exercises (be they participatory or expert-led).

Appreciative enquiry, as the term suggests, sets out to understand and value what people do to give meaning to their lives and secure their livelihoods. The enquiry involves poor people in discussing and identifying what works, how they cope, what they take pride in, and what they have achieved. From this basis, analysts examine what can be done to build on and consolidate those things that already work.

Given that the livelihoods approach is an asset-based (as opposed to deficit-based) approach, it has obvious similarities with appreciative enquiry, which sets out to enable people to identify their strengths and find ways to use them to the greatest advantage. Appreciative enquiry can provide insights into social and material assets that may go unnoticed by outsiders, and yet are essential to a household's livelihood strategies. It can also suggest ways to enhance them.

There are obvious limitations on the use of appreciative inquiry methods in conflict situations, but the notion of exploring what works for whom, and why, remains valid whether in the context of peace or war.

Livelihoods and conflict

Collinson observes that to date most livelihoods literature has focused on relatively stable development situations. This could led to questions being raised about the applicability of livelihoods analysis to conflict situations.[39] In particular, practitioners need to consider the extent to which a livelihoods approach requires adaptation to accommodate conflict and post-conflict situations. However, even apparently stable situations that are characterised by asset poverty, powerlessness and livelihood insecurity contain the kernel of conflict , though this is likely to occur on a relatively minor scale.

Collinson has adapted the DFID livelihoods framework to make it more appropriate to conflict scenarios.

Collinson's revised framework for conflict or political instability foregrounds political assets and power. It introduces military shocks, war economy and livelihood strategies that include predation and asset stripping. In general she provides a good example of the portability of the livelihoods framework, while also illustrating how an emphasis on political economy can make livelihoods analysis more robust.

She describes political economy analysis as involving:

> The interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. When applied to the situations of conflict and crisis political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and economic aspects of conflict and how these affect power and vulnerability. According to a political economy approach vulnerability should be understood in terms of powerlessness rather than simply material need … A political economy approach should incorporate a wide historical and geographical perspective… The view that it encourages is therefore dynamic, broad, longitudinal and explanatory.

Figure 3: A sustainable livelihoods framework in situations of conflict and political instablilty



Source: Sarah Collinson

In many respects Collinson's description of the political economy approach and the author's account of livelihoods analysis (provided earlier) have a great deal in common. Both need to be extended conceptually to include the ways in which conflict situations undermine the livelihoods of some communities or households, and advantage those of others. Particular attention also needs to be given to the interventions required for conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. Again, in the uncertain, highly fluid and threatening environments that characterise conflict and post-conflict situations there are significant risks associated with external interventions, and a much higher likelihood of unintended consequences. Another area for research is the nature, causes, scale and intensity of any conflict. These need to be understood to enable livelihoods analysts to explore the impact of conflict, both on livelihoods and on the institutional, social economic and environmental contexts that support them.

To extend livelihoods analysis to include conflict situations, a new set of questions needs to be considered.

What are the effects of conflict and war on formal and informal economies?

Conflict situations have major implications for local economies. They affect the ability of people both to gain access to key assets and to continue with particular livelihood activities in safety. A crucial dimension of such analysis in the context of conflict would be to understand how the formal and informal economies that existed in the pre-conflict era could transform into dynamic war economies.

What are the characteristics of a war economy?

How do these characteristics vary from place to place?

What are the commodities and trading relations that drive a war economy?

How does conflict reframe power, gender, age and social relations?

An assessment of the power relations extant in an area prior to the outbreak of conflict is central to understanding how the balance of power shifts as the

conflict plays itself out. The livelihoods analysis would need to examine the following issues:

- Who are the new power figures?
- Who has been eclipsed?
- How does the conflict affect women?
- What changes are there in social relations between young and old as militias recruit child soldiers, or as young men acquire weapons and access to economic opportunities they did not have before?
- What are the impacts on social networks in particular localities? Do they cohere or do they fragment? And if they fragment, along what lines does this occur?

Who are the new patrons?

Conflict creates new sources of patronage. Analysis could be used to map new social and patronage relations, and the extent to which they are dependent on the occurrence of conflict.

What was the content of patronage relations in the period preceding the conflict? How has this changed?

Who now has the power to dispense patronage, and what form does this take?

How will these relations be affected by the cessation of hostilities?

Who is losing what assets, and with what consequences?

A livelihoods analysis would involve understanding the different ways in which conflict affects households and individuals, and in consequence being able to establish what they need to help them recover. These needs are not just material. Households also have to cope with the loss or disablement of family members; and children may be forced to survive on their own because of the death or displacement of their parents.

Overall, analysts need to understand the many different ways in which conflict affects the assets and activities of the poor.

- Have people lost access to their fields due to the laying of land-mines?
- To what extent have food stocks been raided and livestock rustled?
- Has farming and other production equipment been appropriated?
- What effects has the conflict had on seed stocks and the availability of agricultural AIDS?
- Has the conflict resulted in people being forced to provide labour or sexual services? How has this affected households and livelihoods?
- How have infrastructure, housing and community facilities been affected?
- Are there certain areas which have become 'no-go' zones? How has this changed livelihood activities?
- How has conflict affected land security and tenure? Has it altered access to natural resources?

Who is gaining, and in what way?

For young people, combat and the power conferred by the possession of weapons can become a livelihood strategy. This raises a further set of questions for the analyst.

To what extent will a peace-making process depend on the capacity of the new order to reintegrate combatants and find them new livelihood opportunities?

How does the war economy institutionalise new forms of appropriation and corruption? Does it create opportunities for warlords who may subsequently threaten the peace?

How does conflict affect people's general resilience?

Conflict has the effect of lowering people's risk thresholds. Again, different households will experience this in different ways. What is needed is an examination of the interconnection between the dangers presented by conflict and other risk factors. The questions that follow suggest some of the directions analysis might require.

What are the possible effects of a drought on the livelihoods of the poor?

How does a particular conflict affect the provision of primary health services, immunisation and malaria control?

In what ways do conflict, social dislocation and physical displacement render people vulnerable to infection with HIV/AIDS?

How does poverty and desperation connect with high-risk sexual behaviour, which may in itself be a survival strategy?

What are the effects of internal displacement?

The framework of livelihoods analysis needs to be extended to examine both people who have been displaced during a time of conflict, and people who have been affected by the arrival of large numbers of internally displaced persons.

How are the livelihoods of urban dwellers altered by influxes of displaced people from the countryside?

What are the effects that an inflow of displaced persons and refugees on the economies and livelihoods can have on people in neighbouring states?

How are the environment and natural resource bases of countries affected by uncontrolled settlement and their inability to enforce conservation and other policies?

What are the institutional implications of conflict?

Another area requiring analysis is an exploration of the different ways in which conflict affects formal and informal institutions. This could be done by exploring questions such as the following:

How are local norms and values affected by conflict?

What impact does conflict have on local institutions?

How does conflict alter people's rights to land and natural resources?

What happens to local tenure and land rights management systems?

What obstacles to recovery do the institutional changes pose?

The complexities of recovery

A combination of livelihoods analysis and political economy approaches would provide a means to begin exploring answers to the above questions, so that the information gained can provide a platform for targeted interventions. But there are a number of constraints that must be overcome if any practical programme is to be drawn up.

The central constraint is the conundrum propounded by the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank.

Many of the world's poorest countries are locked in a tragic vicious circle where poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty. Eighty percent of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered a major civil war in the past 15 years. On average, countries coming out of war face a 50 percent chance of relapsing in the first five years of peace.

However there are arguments that it is not poverty *per se* that causes conflict, but rather the sudden removal of the means of livelihood that is the trigger.

A common denominator for many, if not most, of the internal wars and conflict plaguing Africa, South Asia, and Latin America during the last decade, is poverty as a result of loss of livelihoods, in turn often caused or exacerbated by environmental degradation. Empirically, it has been difficult to demonstrate that either poverty or environmental factors, in and by themselves, are strong determinants of conflict. Loss of livelihood constitutes an often missing link in explanations of current conflict patterns. While poverty may be a near-endemic condition in certain societies, loss of livelihood marks a rapid transition from a previous stable condition of relative welfare into a condition of poverty or destitution. It is the rapid process of change resulting in a sudden fall into poverty, more than the endemic condition of poverty, that creates the potential for livelihood conflicts. [40]

If the conflict itself contributes to further immiseration, then it follows that a double and sustained pull will be required to reverse the losses of conflict and to re-establish household livelihood security (even if the livelihoods lost were insecure at best). Only success on both fronts will enable sustainable post-conflict recovery.

The challenges to humanitarian agencies represented by scale, urgency and limited resources

The arguments above suggest the need for a revaluation of the way in which humanitarian agencies operate. Collinson points out that there have been high-profile failures of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. She claims that there is mounting evidence that assistance can exacerbate conflict and undermine local capacity, and argues that there is "no strong analytical tradition within the humanitarian system" to redirect it.[41]

Even if this is the case, the nature of the context (the conflicting demands of providing assistance on an appropriate scale, the urgency of the need and the limitations of resource bases) tends to mean that agencies fall back on traditional approaches.

Using livelihoods analysis for developing recovery strategies

A number of tentative suggestions follow for a process that would use livelihoods analysis to plan strategies that assist the recovery of livelihoods in communities affected by conflict.

The need for a spatial framework

Livelihoods research takes time, which is in short supply in conflict situations. Also, to make the best use of limited resources, the researchers need to locate their analysis within an overall spatial framework. How this framework is drawn up would be determined by the circumstances. It might be aligned with zones or theatres of conflict; or agro-ecological zones; or known sites where livelihoods are diverse. Whatever the case, a reasonable spread of research sites should be aimed for, as livelihood contexts and activities can vary substantially from one area to another. This will allow researchers to identify significant changes that occur in some areas but not in their neighbours.

A rapid appraisal of pre-conflict baselines – livelihoods, poverty, hazards and risk

One of the problems found in development work generally is the absence of reliable baseline data. This makes it very difficult to assess both the livelihood

changes brought about by conflict or the effectiveness of remedial measures. Historical information, and particularly data relating to the pre-conflict situation, are a key resource for planners. Clearly an important factor in conflict risk assessment is the collection of data in areas previously identified as being at risk. This would allow pre-emptive measures to be introduced in anticipation of a possible return of conflict.

Livelihoods assessment as a means of assessing impacts of conflict

Targeted livelihoods research, using semi-structured interviews, focus groups, resource mapping techniques, timelines and so on should be able to yield fairly detailed assessments of the nature of the changes brought about by conflict in specific localities. However, the more difficult challenge will be to coordinate this information with that carried by baseline data sources, and to prevent the cooptation of the research process by powerful local interests.

Understanding the different economies of peace and war

As noted above, complex economic transitions are brought about by conflict and war. Collinson advocates the use of commodity chain analysis to explore the particular resources that play important roles in war economies. Given the existence of vested interests, and the potential for the further enrichment of certain powerful individuals or groups created by conflict situations, this is no easy task.[42] Once the differences between peace-time and war economies have been understood, practical measures can be designed to release an economy moving from war to peace from the grip of militias and external actors. Stephen Jackson's insightful analysis of the coltan trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo graphically illustrates the complexities and powerful interests involved.[43]

The acupuncture analogy – identifying key enablers, reducing vulnerability and risk

The process of restoring a country's economy can be described by using acupuncture as an analogy. Both revolve around the identification of the major pressure points, and of the way in which these can be used to bring about relief. As applied to livelihoods practice, the process involves adopting measures that release communities from war-induced vulnerability and risk, and create opportunities for livelihood renewal.

One of these measures is financial assistance, a 'key enabler'. However, another question needs to be asked: What kind of financial aid is most appropriate? For example, the Feinstein International Famine Centre has made a comparison of the benefits of relief grants versus micro loans as offered by humanitarian agencies to assist poor families to recover from the depredations of conflict.

In recent years, some in the humanitarian community have recognised the potential value in certain situations of using credit rather than relief grants to support livelihoods. Some micro credit programs have blossomed in refugee camps, boasting repayment rates of over 98 percent, and outreach to thousands of clients. Others have failed and been forced to shut down by lack of repayment, or the resumption of hostilities. Some income generating programmes have required in-kind repayment. Indigenous, community-based institutions and methods have been supported, including community banks, ROSCAs and rotating livestock credit programs. Many difficulties and dilemmas have arisen concerning the philosophy, implementation and outcomes of these kinds of credit-based approaches in conflict zones.[44] Potentially, micro loans have the capacity to reinvigorate pre-existing institutions, although clearly there are substantial risks involved.

Strengthening institutions and governance

In addition, ways have to be found of rehabilitating and strengthening local institutions and reinstating stable governance. This can be done only within the context of long-term peace-building strategies.

Another requirement is that there should be much closer co-ordination of efforts to assist impoverished communities between government and donor agencies. The latter need to become more aware of the social and political context within which their interventions take place. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) argues that a fundamental shift in orientation is required by external humanitarian agencies, especially from the northern hemisphere, who have often proceeded without adequate consultation with other parties working in conflict-affected areas.

Host governments and southern hemisphere civil society have been largely absent from the design and implementation of tools, frameworks and approaches for peace and conflict-sensitive development practice. These approaches have primarily emerged from northern academic and policy insti-

tutions in co-operation with donor governments and multilateral institutions with little space given to national governments and to indigenous approaches and southern perspectives.

Peace building is a long-term process: structural inequalities within society, such as gross disparities of wealth and inequitable power relationships require long-term sustained engagement by donors.

A long-term orientation that addresses the full conflict cycle and links short-term emergency measures to long-term programmes will be required for maximum sustainability.[45]

Conclusion

Livelihoods analysis which actively incorporates an understanding of the importance of power and differentiation, and which explicitly addresses the political economy of poverty, could offer a valuable tool for the development of a more nuanced understanding of the causes of conflict and its effects on the poor in particular. A combination of micro-level research (which draws on household profiles and histories, and gives a voice to those customarily silenced by conflict and powerlessness) can bring to life the implications of conflict for livelihoods. The linking of micro studies to macro analysis can expose the interrelationships between the causes of conflict, and in so doing disclose potential pathways to peace and the renewal of subsistence livelihoods.

However, this promise is subject to serious constraints. Many of these can be overcome only if the main participants develop new ways of doing things. Work from a livelihoods perspective requires that humanitarian agencies ask new kinds of questions, and look beyond the short-term view of relief. A new emphasis has to be placed on risk reduction strategies related to social, environmental, economic and political threats. Holistic engagement requires different sets of skills, and the ability to manage multidisciplinary teams. It also demands new and better coordinated ways of obtaining, collating and managing information and developing sources of reliable baseline data. Only in this way will the present gap that exists between analysis, the development of practical risk reduction strategies and the demands of operational planning be narrowed.

Endnotes

1 F Ellis, introduction to K Hussein, *Livelihoods approaches compared: A multi-agency review of current practice*, DFID and ODI, London, 2002.

2 Ibid.

3 F Ellis and S Biggs, *Evolving themes in rural development 1950s–2000s,* Development Policy Review, 19(4): 2001, pp 437–448. Also R de Satgé, "'Development' – Changing discourses and paradigms: Locating the emergence of the livelihoods approach", unpublished lecture: PLAAS post graduate programme in land and agrarian studies, LAS 706 Sustainable rural livelihoods and integrated development planning, University of the Western Cape, 2002.

4 I Scoones, and J Pretty, *Institutionalising adaptive planning and local level concerns: looking to the future*, in S Wright & N Nelson (eds), *Power and participatory development: Theory and practice*. Intermediate Technology Publications, London,1994

5 Ellis & Biggs, op cit.

6 D Booth (ed), *Rethinking social development, theory, research and practice*, Longman, London, 1994.

7 Ellis & Biggs, op cit.

8 *Integrated rural development*. ODI briefing paper No 4: Overseas Development Institute, London, 1979.

9 B Cooke and U Kothari (eds), *The case for participation as tyranny,* in *Participation: The new tyranny?* SED, London, 2002.

10 W Sachs, *Development – The rise and decline of an ideal*, Wupperthal papers No 108. Wupperthal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2000.

11 M Lipton, and J Litchfield, *Successes in anti poverty*, *National level poverty performance,* ILO, Geneva, 2001.

12 Ellis & Biggs, op cit.

13 DFID. Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets. *Comparing development approaches – Rights based approaches*, Department for International Development, London, 2001.

14 J Twigg, *Sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability to disasters*, Working paper No 2 Benfield Hazard Research Centre, 2001. Twigg notes that during the 1970s and 80s, especially the latter, the relationship between human actions and the effects of disasters – the socio-economic dimension of vulnerability – was increasingly well documented. In the late 1980s and early 90s, two important conceptual models were developed to give disaster managers a framework for understanding vulnerability and reducing it: (1) Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis, and (2) Pressure and Release/Access models.

15 R Chambers and G Conway, *Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21st Century*, IDS discussion paper No 296, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 1992.

16 D Carney, *Sustainable Rural livelihoods – What difference can we make?* DFID, London, 1999.

17 Ibid.

18 V Titi and N Singh, *Adaptive strategies of the poor in arid and semi arid lands: In search of sustainable livelihoods*, unpublished Working Paper, IISD, Winnipeg, 1994.

19 K Hussein, *Livelihoods approaches compared. A multi-agency review of current practice*, DFID and ODI, London, 2002.

20 B Cooke & U Kothari, op cit.

21 See De Satgé op cit. and Hussein, op cit. for a summary of different livelihoods frameworks.

22 J Harriss, *Civil society: Universal concept or donor fad*, 2002, <http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/destin2002/civsoc.html>, retrieved 24 July 2002.

23 B Fine, *Social capital versus social theory: Political economy and social science at the turn of the Millennium*, Routledge, New York, 2001.

24 C Murray, *Livelihoods research – Some conceptual and methodological issues*, Background paper No 5, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Manchester, 2001.

25 K Hussein, op cit.

26 See CARE International *Urban Briefing Notes – Participatory livelihoods assessment*, Kosovo, January 2001.

27 This initiative was facilitated by Ailsa Holloway of the Disaster Mitigation for Sustainable Livelihoods Programme, and involved practitioners from CARE, Oxfam and Thlavama.

28 De Satgé op. cit.

29 The framework takes its name from the title of the book in which it was published.

30 Such activities could be problematic in post-conflict scenarios, where tensions and grievances may lie just below the surface. Their appropriateness needs to be assessed.

31 For some time there has been debate over whether to include political capital in the DFID framework. The distinction between social and political capital is often based, at least in part, on the nature of the claims that they serve. Social capital relates to horizontal claims on kin, associations, and social networks of different

kinds, while political capital is much more concerned with power, differentiation and vertical claims that households can make on the state or those more powerful than they.

32 C Moser, *Asset vulnerability framework: Reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies*, pp 1–19 World Development, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998. Reproductive activities are those that maintain the household – cooking, cleaning, washing, fetching water and fuel, childcare, nursing the sick and so on. Community maintenance activities are those that strengthen the communities in which people live – involvement in local structures, dispute resolution, natural resource management and others.

33 R Chambers, *Vulnerability, coping and policy*, IDS Bulletin 20, 1989.

34 The video titled *Moving on*, which is part of the Learning about Livelihoods package, tells the story of the Mapeta family, living on the eastern border of Zimbabwe. The members of this household experienced some of the stresses associated with the presence of a refugee camp of 55,000 people located next to their settlement during the 1980s.

35 D Narayan, with Raj Patel, Kai Schafft, Anne Rademacher, Sarah Koch-Schulte, *Can anyone hear us?*: Oxford University Press, New York, published for The World Bank, 2000.

36 In practice, livelihoods frameworks have become heavily identified with the institutions from which they originated – DFID, CARE, UNDP, etc. This can result in the assumption that different frameworks have proprietary associations. People refer to the 'DFID framework' or the 'CARE framework', as if these conceptual creations were brands in some intellectual marketplace, in competition with one another.

37 C Murray, op cit.

38 M Rahnema,. *Participation*, in W. Sachs (ed) *The development dictionary*, Zed, London, 1992, pp 116–131.

39 S Collinson (ed) *Introduction to power, livelihoods and conflict: Case studies in political economy analysis for humanitarian actions*, Humanitarian Policy Group. Report 13, ODI, London, 2003.

40 L Olhsonn, *Livelihoods conflicts: Exploring poverty and environment as causes of conflict,* Department for Natural Resources and Environment, SIDA, 2000.

41 S Collinson, op cit.

42 Ibid.

43 Jackson in Collinson, op cit.

44 Center for Health Communications, Tufts University, *Livelihood interventions in conflict-affected areas: Dilemmas & lessons learned*, Report & Summary of Workshop Proceedings Feinstein International Famine, March 6–7, 2003.

45 IDRC, *Peace and conflict-sensitive approaches to development,* a briefing for the OECD DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Network (CPRN), 2000.

CHAPTER 3

SECURING THE FUTURE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE – SUPPORTING LIVELIHOODS AND DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED SOCIAL POLICY IN TIME OF WAR.

Andrew Timpson

Introduction

The term 'internally displaced people' remains a sterile and rather dismal bureaucratic expression for some of the most acutely disadvantaged people in the world. As a group, internally displaced people (IDPs) do not enjoy the extensive legal rights conferred on refugees. They fall between the cracks of international humanitarian law. Despite the insistence that the state takes the prime responsibility for the protection and care of IDPs, they are often themselves the victims of the state's military objectives in internal conflicts. Forcible displacement has become an increasingly common strategy in the long- standing civil wars that have affected Sudan, Uganda and Liberia, and was a common occurrence in the latter years of the Angolan conflict.

Although international humanitarian assistance has provided life-saving interventions to many war-affected populations in countries such as Sudan and Uganda, there has been a surprising absence of any systematic attempt to act creatively in developing recovery options for IDPs. Food relief remains the most conventional response in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Communities in the *planalto* area of Angola were the recipients of food aid for more than 20 years.

For post-conflict recovery to succeed for internally displaced populations, it is critical to combine emergency relief with complementary interventions at an early stage in a humanitarian crisis. It is this complementary and developmental assistance in protecting livelihoods and supporting resilience that can sustain the economies of displaced people, maintain cultural and community self-esteem and reduce the dependency on external humanitarian aid, which all too often is manipulated by warring factions. With the numbers of internally displaced amounting to several million people in countries such as Angola and Sudan, the importance of supporting these communities cannot be ignored if a stable and peaceful post-war environment is to be sustained.

A lack of integrated support for the needs of displaced people could easily breed further political and ethnic resentment, which would present a concomitant threat to stability.

Context

In recent humanitarian history, it is the IDPs in countries such as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that have been visited by the highest rates of death, disease and malnutrition. In the last decade, the DRC has probably provided the most scandalous case of international neglect in terms of protection. Barely a murmur of disquiet has been heard in response to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives.

Africa now accounts for 52 percent of the world's displaced people. This amounts to well over 13 million persons. Despite the severity of the displacement problem in Africa, the UN's Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recognises that

> internally displaced people benefit from no such coherent international structure. There is no clear trigger for international engagement comparable to a group of refugees entering the territory of another state. No international organisation has the specific and exclusive responsibility for the internally displaced.[1]

The UN Charter also compromises the ability of UN agencies to interfere in matters that are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state" (Article 2.7). This stress on respecting sovereignty provides the historical reason why many states are deeply suspicious of humanitarian interventions.

Despite these inherent constraints, the international humanitarian system has not entirely abrogated its responsibilities for protecting displaced people. In 1992, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights appointed Dr Francis Deng as the UN Secretary-General's representative on IDPs. The UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were promulgated in 1998, and the UN appointed the head of OCHA, the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, to be the international steward of the response and protection interventions for internally displaced populations. These prominent UN officials now have the more structured support of the Inter Agency Standing Committee to improve their decision-making in the areas of access, protection and assistance. A specialist IDP Unit has also been created in OCHA to provide the necessary policy advice to the UN system.

These important institutional reforms, though necessary, do not always prompt enlightened strategies in dealing with the problems of long-term displacement. More effective interventions have often been developed by non-government organisations (NGOs). Within the war zones of Africa, a range of NGOs and international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) work courageously to provide life-saving services to large groups of internally displaced communities. Their work is often subject to the vagaries of international humanitarian funding, which does not always permit a long-term view of support and recovery to take hold. At one level this is absurd, as an often ill-founded optimism in both donors and host government may see displacement as a temporary phenomenon. For people in Angola, Uganda and Sudan, displacement has become a way of life over generations. Household strategies are seldom based on some false hope of returning home, but rather on the development of survival mechanisms in an urban slum.

Developing new humanitarian practices in areas of internal displacement

The prosaic debate on the relief-development continuum or the relief-development dichotomy has fortunately ended in a policy cul-de-sac. There is now a much greater recognition of the need for more integrated approaches to protecting war-ravaged societies. Although the UN is not entirely open to the vital policy discussions that have developed over more creative humanitarian interventions, the policies and programmes of the international humanitarian system have changed. Its work in war zones now shows a degree of enlightenment that would not have been apparent even ten years ago. There is a much greater awareness of the livelihoods of war-affected populations, which has led to the more intelligent and rational provision of assistance, and to more rapid improvements of IDPs' lives in time of peace. A greater understanding of the political economy of conflict has also led to a more conscious attempt by humanitarian agencies to "do no harm".

If Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) represents the *esprit de corps* of humanitarianism, it is also important to note the contributions made by other large international NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children (SCF) and OXFAM. They have used their extensive development experience and long-standing presence in African countries to combine humanitarian aid and successful recovery strategies to secure the livelihoods of displaced people and to reduce the dangerous manipulation of food aid in countries such as Sudan.

The early years of the UN's Operation Lifeline in southern Sudan were dominated by crude distributions of food aid on an ad hoc basis. These contributed to the displacement of transhumant populations, were often very effective in feeding the combatants on both sides, and made a minimal contribution to assisting the varied economic strategies which pastoral groups such as the Nuer and the Dinka had developed.

However, a number of more appropriate humanitarian and development approaches were adopted by a small group of NGOs.

- OXFAM introduced a para-vet programme in the South, which protected the animal assets of pastoral communities.

- The SCF brought in fishing nets, which supplied the means necessary for wet season fishing, giving pastoral families an excellent and abundant source of protein.

- The SCF introduced a revolving veterinary drug fund to treat local herds and so protect vital economic assets.

All of these represented innovative strategies in the early 1990s, based on the selective use of excellent anthropological research and close working relationships with traditional structures, which provided pertinent advice on the most appropriate ways of meeting needs in the south. By no means all of the discussions were about the need for food. Much of the humanitarian analysis related to the support of household or kraal economies. Out of this work a more comprehensive analysis of pastoral economies in the south was developed. In consequence, the thrust of one part of the main humanitarian operation concentrated on those commodities that were no longer provided by market systems that had collapsed along with north-south trade. Such items included mosquito cloth, salt, soap and fishing hooks.

The point to stress here is that these approaches provided the necessary economic stability for displaced people despite the proximity of war. They may also allow them, when peace finally comes to Sudan, to adapt rapidly to the opening up of markets and to manage the injections of recovery assistance much more effectively. These approaches built on the strengths of pastoral economies and prevented these communities from becoming dependent on food aid. They were highly participatory exercises that led to an understanding of how particular communities gain access to food.

Out of this corpus of work has developed a sounder analysis of how households obtain food, even in a time of war. The development of household economy analysis, which was a product of the food security crises caused by war and migration in the Horn of Africa, has had a profound impact on donor and UN assessment of humanitarian need. The clumsy strategies of poorly-targeted food aid and hastily-managed nutritional surveys have given way to a more informed recognition of the complexity of household survival interventions and livelihoods in societies facing severe conflict.

This quiet revolution in analyzing the impact of stress and violence on rural communities has at last acknowledged that communities have a wide range of approaches to dealing with emergencies. Moreover, these strategies developed out of the pressures of poverty and generations of indigenous knowledge, which can make a far more important contribution to household survival than humanitarian assistance from international donors. At times, the clan structures of Somalia provided a much more effective welfare system for protecting the lives of their poorest members than external aid could.

The denial of food aid to displaced people has become a sine qua non of counter-insurgency operations in Africa. However, much greater damage is done to the wellbeing of displaced populations by the destruction of services, markets and trade and the deliberate disruption of agriculture and husbandry. For example, for pastoral people the banning of movement is a highly destructive strategy. Humanitarian agencies need to reinforce their humanitarian advocacy, not just on the essentials of food aid, but by placing greater stress on the need for displaced people to have access to markets and trade.

If innovative livelihood support policies can be established in a time of war, social policy can be equally inventive in areas of conflict. Working with structures of sufficient political and moral legitimacy has been one of the greatest challenges for aid agencies in recent African conflicts. Although the development of civil society has become an essential requirement for NGOs working to create a new moral order, there are also more mundane approaches to partnership, service provision and protection that can improve the lives of displaced communities. Many examples of these different approaches can be found in the annals of recent NGO work in Africa.

Save the Children developed their emergency health work in East and West Africa in very interesting ways which eschewed the temptation NGOs normally feel to develop parallel service structures in a time of crisis. These innovative approaches, described in greater detail below, provided a more effective health

delivery service to displaced people, bringing greater consistency to the care of people, and helping to reduce the exceptionally high rates of infant mortality.

- In Somalia, the SCF's health staff worked with the medical structures of both 'Mogadishu presidents' – Aideed and Ali Mahdi – to develop common protocols for the management of communicable diseases. The Somali doctors on both sides of the 'Green Line' knew each other well, and felt no great personal enmity towards their medical brethren. They were divided by clan ancestry, but they were working towards a future in which they could be colleagues again. Their dialogue on health policy could have provided an excellent foundation for the rebuilding of Somali health systems in a time of peace. Sadly, that peace has not yet been secured.

- As a complementary aspect to its work on communicable diseases, the SCF invested considerable resources and technical training in developing the nascent health structures of the Somaliland government.

- SCF supported a similar approach during the Liberian civil war. Doctors working for the Interim Government and for Charles Taylor's rebel government in Gbarnga were willing to collaborate on joint policies for TB management and maternal and child care. These doctors had trained together and worked under a unified health system before the war, and were very willing to develop policies which would benefit the war-affected populations in both political zones.

- During the mid-1990s ceasefire in Angola, SCF worked with the Ministry of Health and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) medical staff on joint training workshops to improve primary health care management.

In all of these examples, the main strategy was one of working with structures that exhibited professional and technical competence. Long-term relationships were secured through extensive development programmes. However, when these development concepts are not even contemplated, let alone honoured, then humanitarian assistance can go awry, compromising the stability needed for effective recovery operations for displaced people.

Unfortunately, there are still humanitarian practices that disable displaced people and place them at a great disadvantage when the opportunity to restore their livelihoods opens up during a time of peace. It is still apparent that in major emergencies, a horde of disparate NGOs tends to descend on a country and

population in a state of shock after mass killings and displacement. In Rwanda in 1994, nearly 150 NGOs arrived within a short period, competing with each other for prime humanitarian space, and often failing to negotiate with recognised structures. The losers in this humanitarian scramble were the Rwandans themselves: they were provided with shoddy services and excluded from any decision-making, even in matters affecting their lives quite profoundly.

The failure of the early interventions in Rwanda was an extreme example of laissez-faire actions by NGOs. Some of their work threatened the tenuous stability in the region, alienated the embryonic government in Kigali and hampered recovery. These great human tragedies often bring in new agencies that lack any historical understanding of the lives of the people. They are unaware of the capacities in communities to adjust to massive shocks, and fail to consider participatory approaches that might improve the possibilities of recovery in the aftermath of the conflict.

After the Rwanda debacle, a considerable amount of soul-searching was undertaken, by the NGOs in particular. Perhaps the philosophy of humanitarianism has been so much debated in the last decade that the vibrancy of the dialogue itself may have overshadowed the idea of working with IDPs to tailor development support to their particular needs. The Great Lakes crisis of the mid-1990s was a watershed for humanitarianism. Agencies were doing harm by vitiating the ability of local structures to revive. Out of this uncoordinated mess came the need for new humanitarian standards such as the SPHERE initiative and the Codes of Conduct adopted by the Red Cross Movement and a large number of NGOs.

Recovery strategies and the displaced

In its extensive work examining successful post-conflict interventions, the Brookings Institute has suggested a number "of elements which are indicative of the range of needs that must be addressed early in societies emerging from conflict, if the ground is to be secured for sustainable peace and economic development".[2]

These elements include:

- repatriation, reintegration and reconciliation;
- restoration of human rights, including property and identity;

- re-establishing public safety and security, including demobilisation and policing;
- infrastructure recovery, including water, sanitation, shelter and transportation;
- ensuring food security and agricultural rehabilitation, including land tenure designation and registration;
- meeting urgent health, education and basic social welfare requirements, including employment and income generation;
- restoring operative government structures, including the rule of law and other civil society institutions; and
- holding elections that are preceded by voter education.

This list of essential functions calls for a powerful strategic framework that will help develop a consensus on the necessary priorities, policies and interventions. A comprehensive recovery strategy will also require a well-considered division of labour, which will strengthen the partnership between government structures, the UN system, donors and the NGO community.

These approaches and attitudes have become more widespread in the last few years. A plethora of larger international agencies such as the UNDP, the World Bank, the OECD and donors such as the Department for International Development (DFID) have given substantial consideration and funding to post-conflict operations that involve more innovative and integrated methods of engagement and investment. This style of assistance has sometimes been labelled a transitional approach.

In countries such as Sierra Leone and Sudan, the UN agencies appear to have been willing to look at new approaches to building more participatory and developmentally-oriented programmes for post-conflict recovery. The UNDP in Sudan decided to opt for the Millennium Development Goals as the foundation for its Consolidated Appeal in late 2003. The goals represent a key development vision, because they stress the need for the integration – not just co-ordination – of interventions assisting post-war recovery. To enhance integration in Sudan, the UN system will have to agree to a joint assessment model such as the Common Country Assessment, which the UNDP uses for its development framework planning. In recognising the value of the Millennium Development Goals as the main strategy for recovery and reconciliation, the UN has shown it accepts the need for a highly synchronised response to the task of supporting the lives of over 4 million displaced people in Sudan.

The use of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) might be another development planning option that could be used to encourage the ownership of the task of nation building and recovery by displaced people. The PRSP is an ideal approach to examining the factors of poverty in peace/conflict tensions because it stresses the importance for a country of developing its own poverty reduction plan. It would also provide a good vehicle for improving the involvement of displaced people in the revival of local economies. Again, a PRSP could include a specific conflict analysis both to take into account the effects of war on affected communities and to discover whether the corrupt use of resources or the long-term results of under-development were themselves causes of the conflict.

Whatever the reasons for the outbreak of war in African countries, IDPs are often the first casualties of chronic imbalances in wealth and development. Redressing severe development inequities must be a priority in planning the re-integration of IDPs. The continuing security problems in northern Uganda are not wholly attributable to the millennial ambitions of Acholi leaders, but are partly based on grievances caused by decades of inadequate development assistance in the north. The same uneasy situation must be recognised in any political settlement that aims to create stability in southern Sudan.

In the rather arcane world of peace building, the Brahimi Report on the future of UN peacekeeping also stresses the need for greater integration. A team approach is recommended " to uphold the rule of law and respect for human rights and help…communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; [and assist with the] consolidation of disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration programmes".[3] The report recommends the creation of Integrated Mission Task Forces in which each team would consist of personnel taken from a wide range of disciplines across the UN system. Teams would manage a range of activities covering political analysis, military operations, the civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, programmes for refugees and IDPs, public information and peace building advocacy.

This approach certainly goes beyond mere co-ordination. It is prepared to offer a wide portfolio of responses to enhance peace and sustain recovery. IDPs would welcome a more integrated approach that gives them a stronger voice in matters such as:

- human rights;
- health;

- education;
- production systems;
- physical infrastructure;
- environmental rehabilitation; and
- de-mining.

To complement this range of investments in peace building, there is an equal need for comprehensive area rehabilitation schemes. These would not only support demobilisation and the re-integration of former combatants, but also follow an equitable approach to supporting the host communities on one hand, and combatants returning home on the other.

The scale of personnel required for successful recovery interventions cannot be underestimated. In Mozambique, 7 000 UN peacekeepers and police were needed to complement the staff of UN agencies and 150 NGOs in managing a range of recovery and rehabilitation interventions for refugees and IDPs. However, the spontaneous return of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Malawi outpaced the de-mining efforts of the various agencies, leading to 40 deaths a month from landmine-related incidents during the early days of the resettlement.

The early investment in support of IDPs in Mozambique was made using 'Quick impact programmes' (QUIPS), an intervention preferred by the UN when it is supporting hundreds of thousands of people returning home. However, the emphasis on QUIPS cannot adequately meet the profound need for long-term investment in rehabilitating livelihoods. The UN saw its recovery work in Mozambique as an unqualified success in terms of demobilisation, peace building and re-integration: but the war has left a damning legacy of chronic under-development and poor infrastructure investment in northern Mozambique.

Equally, if peace comes to Sudan, the greatest challenge to rebuilding political and economic stability will be the damage done by decades of under-development. The restoration of pastoral economies and markets in the south will not be entirely amenable to QUIPS. A much greater long-term effort will be required, which will involve the country's using the oil resources of the south more equitably. Like Iraq and Afghanistan, Sudan has a strategic importance to donors, which may result in significant external investment in the country's recovery. However, the voices of the displaced will need to be brought

into the debate over recovery policy. Otherwise the military/political elites of north and south will carve up the largesse provided by international aid to the detriment of some of the poorest communities in Africa. If that happens, they will sow the seeds of inequity and discontent once again.

Capacity building

During their own liberation wars, rebel movements such as Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo-Verde (PAIGC) and South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) ensured that they established alternative government structures in the areas that they controlled. These included the provision of health and education services. During the long wars in Ethiopia, the Eritrean and Tigrayan armies emulated these models of liberation governance by creating their own relief agencies, the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Association (ERRA) and the Relief Society of Tigre (REST). These agencies took over the responsibility for all food aid logistics, education and health services and agricultural support. The Eritreans went one step further by establishing their own drug-manufacturing centres and soap-making industries in caves. The personnel managing these rebel relief structures took over key government institutions when the Mengistu regime was overthrown.

The work of ERRA and REST provided examples of unusual practice in which humanitarian structures were integrated into the recovery development of the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments after peace had been secured. Sadly, they have remained the best historical models so far of rebel relief structures being developed during a time of war to provide strong capacity-building support to post-war dispensations. In contrast, the more common tendency is, as the British anthropologist Mark Duffield has stated, for rebel insurgencies in many African conflicts to represent little more than predatory social movements, plundering and enslaving the very people on whose behalf they are ostensibly fighting. (His observation is particularly true of the Lords Resistance Army in northern Uganda.)

Certainly, most NGOs have had frustrating experiences in working with the South Sudan Relief Agency (SRRA) in southern Sudan. Again, when UNITA took over many towns in the *planalto* in Angola in the mid-1990s, their hostile attitude towards NGOs took various forms, including the widespread theft of relief agency assets. The (Sudanese People's Liberation Movement) SPLM and UNITA were predominantly military movements with token administrative

structures. It would have been patently absurd for any relief agency to establish a working partnership with such movements, like the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda, except on matters of access. However, it is equally frustrating to humanitarian organisations that the governments in Uganda and Angola have failed to provide adequate protection and resources to their large populations of displaced persons.

What options do relief agencies have when they are working in an environment of government indifference, or facing the humanitarian after-effects of the rapacious depredations of warlords? One solution may lie in a greater engagement with local organisations, which can be relatively free of bias in a polarised political environment. Certainly empowerment work with women's organizations and with children's groups that include former child combatants can be a significant investment towards adopting appropriate strategies during an emergency period. It could also strengthen the voices of two critical constituencies (women and children) in a time of peace and revival.

This is not merely excessively optimistic development ideology: these approaches can actually work.

In 1994, women in Sierra Leone began defining their agenda for the Beijing Conference. It was during this process that they identified the need to organise in support of the peace process, and take an active role in Sierra Leone's transition to democracy.

> Women's groups in Freetown began mobilising support and demanding peace. They saw democratic elections as a vehicle for resolving drawn-out conflict in their country. They worked to bring the rebels to the negotiating table and to establish dialogue. Village women went into rural areas singing songs and calling on rebels to down their arms. In one instance a planned meeting was discovered by the military, and the women who had gone to meet the rebels were massacred in the cross fire.
>
> However, women's groups all over the country persevered, mobilising substantial support among labour unions, teachers, and civic organisations, and traditional structures for democratic elections. Despite attempts by both the military and rebels, including atrocities and severe human rights violations, to derail the process, elections were held and the military government was replaced by a civilian one.

> Ironically, while working for peace these women's groups failed to ensure their own inclusion on electoral lists.[4]

Children can also provide an important focus for both national and local reconciliation. One of the most impressive aspects of the reintegration of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) combatants into rural life was the widespread use of healing ceremonies to allow combatants, often children guilty of atrocities, to be accepted back into communal society. This work was complemented by a very creative partnership between the SCF and the Ministry of Education, who supported the psychological rehabilitation of children attending school through pastoral work done by school teachers. Structures such as schools also brought a more familiar environment back into children's lives.

The work carried out with children in Mozambique provided an excellent case study to illustrate ways of dealing with psycho-social concerns relating to children who have been caught up in a civil war. The rehabilitation strategy was also supported by the SCF's family tracing programme, which reunited 10 000 displaced and unaccompanied children with their families. The development of this work in a time of war created an excellent foundation for a strong partnership between the SCF and the government of Mozambique in the post-war period. A technical support programme was introduced to improve the ability of the government's social workers to manage rehabilitation programmes, and helped those involved to create more viable policies for helping children affected by war after the conflict has ended. The family-tracing programme also inaugurated a process of policy reform that dissuaded the government from establishing institutional homes for children orphaned by the war. Even today, it is likely that Mozambique has maintained the lowest rates of children in institutions in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, in contrast with Angola, which probably has the highest rates in the region of children living in institutions.

The SCF's work with children in Uganda was equally effective. During the Luwero Triangle war in the early 1980s, the SCF removed displaced and unaccompanied children to places of safety outside the war zone, and then used these bases to trace surviving family members. All of this work was done in collaboration with the government's social workers. In the post-war era, the partnership continued. Uganda, too, became reluctant to institutionalise its war orphans, preferring to continue with family tracing work. In cases where long-term tracing could find no living relatives of war-displaced children, the SCF and the government's social workers introduced a scheme to establish

older teenage children in small businesses. They were set up with small grants that established a degree of self-sufficiency; and their progress was supported by frequent visits from social workers.

In the aftermath of its civil war, Uganda became the most progressive country in Africa in formally recognising children's rights within its national legal framework. All of this was erected on the foundation of the capacity-building work originally done by an NGO and a government in a conflict zone. Many NGOs have established productive partnerships with government institutions in Mozambique and Uganda, which started during the war and have flourished in the post-war period through the radical reform of social policy. However, the fruition of this enlightened trend requires not only long-term funding but a greater degree of flexibility from governments and donors, particularly in allowing displaced people to settle permanently where they can best pursue their livelihoods. That can mean IDPs remaining in the urban areas to which they fled. A group of international NGOs in Luanda including CARE, Development Workshop and the SCF manage an urban fund provided by the DFID to support long-term displaced people with community financing, community-managed water schemes and public health provision.

Conclusions

Post-conflict recovery requires an integrated response on a large scale, where macro-economic, governance, security, reconciliation and national infrastructure needs are recognised and supported. Equally important is a complementary approach offering small-scale support that will revive the livelihoods of the internally displaced, secure their settlement and, if necessary, develop their places of temporary residence into long-term, stable homes.

IDPs face the greatest economic and societal shocks in a time of war. Their future is inextricably linked to that of a country. A successful transition to peace can be achieved only when the internally displaced are effectively reintegrated into normal livelihoods. UN OCHA have made it clear that:

> internal displacement cannot truly be said to be resolved until the people affected have secured a source of livelihood. Without it, they may be forced to move again in order to survive. In the aftermath of conflict that has caused displacement, particularly if the conflict has been protracted, people who are returning or settling in new communities find themselves thrust from one artificial economy into another:

> from a war economy dominated by extortion and the illicit trade in guns and natural resources, to an emergency relief economy dominated by unproductive, externally supplied goods intended for immediate consumption. The displaced person's plight is not resolved until the transition has been made into a normal economy of productive assets. Only then can a development process get under way.[5]

Breaking this cycle could make an important contribution to sustaining peace and recovery in the aftermath of a protracted civil war. Laying a foundation during a time of conflict that supports the livelihoods of displaced people and secures their protection could represent the best foundation for the future. It would reduce the risk that natural resources will be plundered; prevent the wholesale forcing of young people into military service; and allow displaced people some economic space and the confidence that they can contribute their experience to a reconciliation process.

Some of the lessons to be emphasised concern developing relationships with legitimate and professional structures; understanding household economies; supporting the interests of children; and establishing a range of interventions that allow IDPs to survive, sustain their economies and preserve their communities. By acting in solidarity with displaced people during a period of war and working in a range of partnerships to develop livelihoods support, service provision and protection, aid agencies can strengthen their voices at the 'round tables' on post- conflict recovery. The evidence in Uganda and Angola already suggests that aid agencies' contributions are being heard. This allows them the opportunity to boost their advocacy on behalf of IDPs.

Sudan, which has the largest internally displaced population in the world, is on the verge of a new era of peace. Four million displaced people will have a crucial role to play in the success of the peace process in Sudan, and their recovery and development needs must be paramount in securing that outcome. Hopefully, the lessons, which have already been learnt about the economies and survival strategies of the southern peoples, will lay the foundation for effective and practical recovery interventions that will create a state of stability in which IDPs can believe.

Author Note:

Andrew Timpson worked for Save the Children UK for over 20 years, mainly in East and Southern Africa. He currently works for OCHA in northern Uganda. The article reflects his personal views.

Endnotes

1 *No Refuge: The challenge of internal displacement*, UN OCHA, Geneva, 2003.

2 S Holtzman, *Rethinking relief and development in transitions from conflict*, Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 1999.

3 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, New York, 2003.

4 *The DAC Guidelines. Helping prevent violent conflict,* OECD, Paris, 2001.

5 *No Refuge,* op cit.

CHAPTER 4

ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITIONS: MULTIPLE STRESSORS – MINIMAL SOLUTIONS?

Coleen Vogel

Environmental transition – the global context

Several Southern African countries may be described as either going through, or emerging from, periods of transition. These transitions are the product of a number of factors including weak governance, civil strife and conflict, weakening economies, HIV/AIDS, and biophysical stress including droughts, floods, and degradation of natural resources. There are effectively two broad dimensions that underpin the transitions that are being experienced and may face Southern Africa in the future: a biophysical dimension driven at global and more local scales and the second, a socio-economic transition that is entwined with the biophysical aspects in very complex ways. Improving our understanding of these transitions and their implications is critical for both the functioning of the earth system and its inhabitants.

Cumulative evidence gleaned over the past few decades indicates that several planetary environmental changes are occurring.[1] These changes in turn can act as feedbacks that combine to drive the complex functioning of the earth as a system. With increased population, changes in governance, macro-economic changes and biophysical changes (to highlight a few) a number of impacts have occurred including: nearly half of the land surface has been transformed by direct human action, with significant environmental consequences, more than one-fifth of land ecosystems have been converted into permanent croplands and more than a quarter of the world's forest is estimated to have been cleared.[2] Our activities, global environmental change scientists argue, have thus begun significantly to alter the planet and how it functions.[3]

One of the most fundamental biophysical cycles of the planet, the carbon cycle, is linked to steady increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide measured at various sites. This increase in carbon dioxide has resulted in growing concern about the 'heat balance' of the global atmosphere.[4] Shifting or altering the heat balance "will force the global climate system in ways which are not well understood, given the complex interactions and feedbacks involved, but there is general consensus that global patterns of temperature and

precipitation will change, though the magnitude, distribution and timing of these changes are far from certain".[5]

From a global perspective these changes have caused many global environmental change scientists to conclude that we are currently living in a time that may be characterised by several 'transitions', several of which may be abrupt. Rates of change over the past few hundred years have been marked by rapid change. In 2001, several thousand scientists, comprising an expert panel (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), indicated that globally average surface air temperatures would rise between 1.4 and 5.8 °C by 2100 relative to 1990.[6] The last half of the twentieth century experienced warming at various scales (hemispheric and other) unprecedented in the last millennium, with 1998 being noted as one of the warmest years for the past 1000 years.[7] These conditions have been identified as being part of a trend to warmer global temperatures.

A number of impacts may result from these changes in a transition to a warmer world including possible changes in vegetation, surface water, and rangeland condition. Not all of these impacts, however, will be negative and trying to identify the 'winners' and 'losers' in this changing environment at various scales is currently absorbing much scientific energy.[8]

Despite widespread debates around possible outcomes associated with global environmental change, there is a growing body of literature that indicates the earth system is 'fragile'. The notion that there is a single stable equilibrium characterising the natural state of Earth's environment is not supported by observations of past global changes. "The behaviour of the Earth System is typified not by stable equilibria, but by strong nonlineraities, where relatively small changes in a forcing function can push a system across a threshold and lead to abrupt changes in key system functions".[9] Research by world-leading scientists on global environmental change has "clearly shown that the Earth System has moved well outside the range of natural variability exhibited over the last half million years at least. The nature of changes now occurring simultaneously in the global environment, their magnitudes and rates, are unprecedented in human history …the Earth is now operating in a no-analogue state".[10] Such a state may result in various changes, transitions (possibly abrupt) bringing with them several surprises. What may such a global outlook mean for Southern Africa?

Environmental transitions in Africa, including Southern Africa

Making predictions and trying to understand the cascading impacts that may be experienced at global and sub-global scales is clearly not simple.[11] In the IPCC assessment Africa is identified as being highly vulnerable to climate change. Water, for example, is a resource that is critically vulnerable to changes in both physical and socio-economic systems. Trends in regional per capita water availability for Africa over the past century show that water availability has diminished by 75 percent and that reductions in river flows have occurred in Sub-Saharan West Africa, mainly driven by increases in population.

What of the future? How can we get some glimpse of possible outcomes of an Earth system moving through transition? Global circulation models (GCMs) are examples of some 'tools' used to try and provide future scenarios of change that may accompany a 'warmer world'. These models have, and are, being used also to drive more applied environmental scenarios including agricultural assessments, water scenarios and vegetation assessments (e.g. US Country Studies Reports, essentially country studies for most countries in the region see www.gcrio.org/csp/Africa for reports relating to Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe and other areas). Although somewhat dated, they still give an indication of possible changes.

Some models, for example, show a general decrease in rainfall in several parts of Southern Africa, particularly in the south (South Africa). Others show a possible annual rainfall increase for Kenya, with smaller increases (up to 30 percent) over most of Tanzania, Uganda and north-eastern Zambia and very slight increases over smaller areas of western Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia.[12] This is in contrast to decreases in annual rainfall south of Tanzania.

Table 1: Examples of possible indications of climate change derived from various models and sources[13] for the region and particularly for South Africa. [14]

- The increase in temperature will be dependent on latitude.
- The increase in temperature will be greater in the winter rainfall area than in the summer rainfall area.
- The role of the escarpment is important in shaping expected rainfall and other dynamics of the climate system
- Rainfall (greater uncertainty surrounds estimates of future rainfall under a doubled carbon dioxide scenario, than estimates of temperature).
- Overall fewer rain-days are expected, rainfall intensity will increase (implying greater runoff).
- Increases in rainfall likely in summer rainfall, with more intense events
- More convective activity in winter rainfall areas.
- The seasonality of rainfall is unlikely to change and mean annual totals should only vary slightly.
- Rainfall is likely to increase slightly in the tropics (by <10 percent) and decrease somewhat in the east-central interior by about (10–20 percent).[15]
- For drought periods the model indicates increasing probabilities of dry spells or dry years in the tropics, to the south-west of the subcontinent and especially over western South Africa and over eastern Southern Africa including Mozambique.[16]
- Finally, Hulme analysing three regions of Africa suggests a wetting in East Africa, drying in southeast Africa and a poorly specified outcome for the Sahel.[17]

Coupled to these alterations in rainfall are a number of changes that may be induced in the hydrological regime. Decreases in annual runoff over much of South Africa, and over eastern Zimbabwe and most of Mozambique are indicated when using some models. Enhanced runoff, for example, may be anticipated over northern Zambia and Mozambique as well as over eastern Tanzania, with the most significant increases predicted for Kenya.[18]

Overlaid onto these scenarios of climate and related hydrological change is the view that these changes may also be exacerbated by 'shock' events such as drought and floods. Indications from several assessments, for example, show that the Southern African region may experience more extreme rainfall and drought periods. Additional assessments, undertaken by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), show that Africa and parts of

Southern Africa in particular may register negative impacts on cereal production.[19]

Having provided some indications of possible biophysical changes, one must always remember, however, that these are indications of change that have been obtained from a number of models, using different assumed emission scenarios, and therefore results can differ. Changes, for example, related to rainfall are difficult to quantify exactly and predicted changes in variability with warming are less certain.[20] Despite these limitations the available science thus far indicates that changes may occur and that this may, in some cases, aggravate current stresses on agricultural, fresh-water, land and human resources.

Residents in the region, particularly the poor, are usually those most exposed and negatively affected by periods of transition including 'vagaries' in the weather. At a macro level such periods of stress unleash a variety of 'knock-on' impacts that severely curtail livelihoods. The droughts of the early 1980s and 1990s, for example, seriously impacted the Southern African region, reducing cereal production and water supplies with resultant impacts on GDP and the loss of farm workers' jobs and the reduction of overall livelihoods.

The human 'face' of transition in Africa and Southern Africa

Throughout much of the present decade (and while writing this paper) a food emergency 'crises' has gripped several countries in the SADC region. This emergency situation, however, is not solely due to drought. Rather climate stress events have arguably 'exposed' underlying chronic vulnerabilities in the region. Drinkwater[21] in a presentation on vulnerability in the light of an HIV/AIDS Pandemic bravely stated:

> At the onset of the emergency response to the crisis, I was struck by one comment made at a regional VAC meeting in June 2002, that defined the role of assessments as determining the deviation of food security from the 'normal'. This has been a constant refrain during the course of the 'emergency' interventions of the last year. Yet, having worked in Southern Africa for the past quarter century, and researched records of climate and peasant livelihoods over the century before that, one fact that is clear is that there is no such thing as a normal season, and no such phenomenon as a normal food security status.[22] (Emphasis added.)

In a similar voice, but with reference to a rather harsh account of governance in Africa[23] Glantz underscores the need for holistic assessments of transitions in Africa:

> I recently looked through a book on Africa[24] in which the author discussed various complex humanitarian crises in Zaire (Congo), Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, and Angola. In each CHC (complex humanitarian crisis) there are food shortages, population movement, large numbers of refugees, ethnic conflict, brutality, death and destruction. Millions have died from causes, including climate-related problems but for the most part untimely deaths were due to other political, socioeconomic, and military factors.[25]

Mapping and trying to understand the combined (both biophysical and socioeconomic) impacts wrought by complex transitions requires that one understand the array of socioeconomic factors shaping vulnerability to such 'transitions' in Southern Africa. These include macro-economic alterations that are contributing to change (globalisation and structural adjustment), HIV/AIDS, civil conflict and poor governance. There are also a host of transitions that have occurred in the past that have resulted in differential allocations of ecological services, political rights, and access to resources that still have an impact on the region today. This paper cannot do justice to all these dimensions for they are varied and complex (several dimensions such as conflict however, are dealt with by others in this volume). Nonetheless one dimension, health, is briefly highlighted here.

HIV/AIDS and associated impacts are beginning to be increasingly visible in Africa, (although some would argue prediction is limited by accuracy and controversy around data). Estimates, at the time of writing, show that the Southern African region is one of the worst hit by the epidemic.[26] In South Africa, for example, HIV/AIDS prevalence is high with increasing workloads in the health sector. TB cases associated with HIV/AIDS continue to increase (estimated burden of disease for TB 90 747 in 1998 – 108 826 in 2001).[27]

Although difficult to project accurately, a number of impacts coupled to HIV/AIDS for Africa have been documented.[28] Using the farm-household system approach, Du Guerny, for example, traces the impacts on both the household and the farm system of HIV/AIDS, some of which include:

- Reduction in area of land under cultivation
- Declining yields

- Decline in crop variety and changes in cropping patterns
- Decline in livestock production
- Loss of agricultural skills
- Impact on food security
- Heightened vulnerability

The impact and tragedy of HIV/AIDS related deaths are borne, however, not only by the immediate families, but also have other knock-on effects: at a national level, through impacts on GDP in agriculture, for example, and at a local level by severely disrupting the functioning and daily lives of many including women and children. Impacts associated with AIDS include: reductions in labour time (funerals); loss of livestock management skills; decreased management of livestock resources; crop failures including fodder reductions for livestock; decreased livestock products; loss or transfer of livestock (and in cases of small stock such as chickens) from families; and associated overall loss of livelihoods.[29] All these impacts further exacerbate precarious livelihoods.

More recently additional, and yet critical, factors have also emerged that require more detailed investigation. The impacts that result from illness and death among urban residents in several areas raise additional issues of rights amongst orphans and women and an examination of society as we currently perceive it: the fraying and unraveling of 'society' through 'deagrarianisation' and depeasantisation of society.[30] Rural labour supply continues to grow, swelled by increased numbers of children and women and yet this is unmatched by diminishing demand as assets decline.[31] Of a cluster of households interviewed in Malawi, for example, 55 percent were dependent on piece labour work for more than four months of the year:

> Those looking for *ganyu* labour work take what opportunities they can, and since these are most commonly at the peak points of the agricultural cycle, their own crops are neglected and the yields shrink further.[32]

The 'transition' being unleashed by HIV/AIDS is clearly not fully understood but arguably several households currently find themselves or may find themselves in heightened periods of uncertainty.

Interventions – Can we make a difference?

While it is acknowledged that 'something must be done' to manage transitions, with several international declarations documenting required goals (e.g. Millennium Development Goals), there is a realisation that we have to go beyond 'business as usual'. The call for 'better' science that may capture the complex interactions between the biophysical and social sciences is, for example, currently forming the focus of international discussion and action. Some even suggest that the nature of the problems requires 'new and innovative scientific' thinking around managing and adapting to such changes and transitions. A growing body of literature around what has been termed 'a transition to sustainability' and what may required from the scientific and technology community to achieve this is available.[33] A 'sustainability transition' has been described[34] as one in which a stabilising world population meets its needs, reduces hunger and poverty and maintains the planet's life support systems and living resources. Efforts are beginning to identify the types of scientific and political enquiry required, to understand the dynamic processes and relationships that may be required and a number of research areas have been identified. Briefly, suggested themes include better understanding the various user groups involved in such a transition; improved understanding of the governance of various systems required to manage such a transition and those already existing (how are they working, what makes for ineffective governance of complex systems?). Allied to such themes are the probing themes one uses to analyse these problems, including issues of scale, linkages between social and environmental systems and actors; adaptive management and learning - how are we doing, are we learning from the past in terms of how to 'effectively' manage the environment; knowledge – what knowledges are best to begin to address such issues – how does local knowledge fit in and how is this used? Of key interest by those scientists involved in understanding sustainability transitions is the 'framing of the problem – who frames the problem for investigation? "First and foremost, effective R&D systems for promoting sustainability will need to be structured so that they are driven by the most pressing problems of sustainable development as defined by stakeholders in those problems."[35]

Conclusion

In this paper some of the transitions occurring in Africa and Southern Africa have been described. For some, these transitions are reflections of wider global transitions due to drivers of biophysical and socio-economic change.

Although one cannot say with certainty what the implications of such transitions are, there seems to be enough evidence that some may increase and become more visible in the future. Of concern are the indications that such changes may possibly be greatest in the Southern Africa, compounding problems for a region already undergoing dramatic changes.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty coupled to these outlooks, there is a need, however, to try and better manage risks associated with such transitions and to improve adaptive capacity to changes. Several efforts including those of a number of global environmental change programmes (e.g. IGBP, IHDP, WCRP and DIVERSITAS among others), are bringing scientists together to grapple with issues of transition. The focus of the discussions include debates around improved science, the most appropriate methods to use, best ways to integrate social, biophysical paradigms of enquiry and how to translate scientific knowledge to end-users.

From a Southern African perspective the requirements and calls for discussions around the most effective methods to effectively capture transitions and changes in the region have already begun. Drinkwater[36] for example, argues for a rethink around the most appropriate household unit that will effectively capture transitions coupled to HIV/AIDS and food security. The household unit, he argues, is 'mutating' and is at its most fragmented and fragile state in African history and therefore questions its current use as a means for analysis:

> These questions matter, since it is clear that in this situation, blind interventions, whilst in the short term saving life, can beyond the immediate food shortages of the past two years be hugely inhibiting of the search for the kind of pathways that will facilitate the rebuilding of human lives and dignity.[37]

The call for integrated and improved science is being made but the disconnection between better and more useful science translated into action still remains a pressing concern. How can we best convey the urgency of global environmental change and transition in **all** its forms to various policy makers and other 'stakeholders'? What forms should this communication take? What are the best means and methods of this engagement and whose interests are being served in such interactions? These are issues that will need attention if meaningful interventions are to be made to better manage 'negative' transitions. The central, however, may be more personal:

> As scientific researchers, we have a duty to care about the well-being of the people in the places we study. We are often in the awkward position of having to choose between sticking to science only, or embedding the science in its societal setting or telling the story as it is.[38]

Endnotes

1 IGBP, International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme *Global change and the Earth system: A planet under pressure*, IGBP Science (4), Stockholm, 2001; W Steffen, J Jager, D Carson, C Bradshaw (eds), *Challenges of a changing Earth*, Proceedings of the Global Open Change Science Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 10–13 July, 2001, Springer, Berlin, 2002; W Steffen, A Sanderson, J Jager, P D Tyson, B Moore III, P.A. Matson, K Richardson, F Oldfield, H-J Schellbhuber, B L Turner II, R.J. Wasson, *Global change and the Earth system: A planet under pressure*, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 2004.

2 B Moore III, *Challenges of a changing Earth,* in W Steffen, et al, op cit, pp 7–17.

3 Steffen et al, op cit.

4 Moore, op cit.

5 Ibid p. 10.

6 IPCC, *Climate change 2001*: Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. J McCarthy et al., (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook, 3, UNEP, Earthscan publications, London, 2002

7 M E Mann, R S Bradley, MK Hughes, *Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the past millennium: Inferences, uncertainties and limitations*. Geophy Res Lett (26), 1999, pp 759–762.

8 R M Leichenko, and K L O'Brien, *The dynamics of rural vulnerability to global climate change: The case of Southern Africa,* Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change (7), 2002, pp 1–18; W H Adger, S Huq, K Brown, D Conway, and M Hulme, *Adaptation to climate change in the developing world,* Progress in Development Studies, 3, 2003, pp 179–195.

9 IGBP, op cit, p. 10.

10 Steffen, et al., 2002, op cit, p. 30; Steffen et al., 2004.

11 Moore, op cit; J Mitchell, Virtual realities of the past, present and future, (eds), *Challenges of a changing Earth*, Proceedings of the Global Open Change Science

Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 10–13 July, 2001, Springer, Berlin, pp 145–150.

12 R Schulze, J Meigh, and M Horan, Present and potential future vulnerability of eastern and Southern Africa's hydrology and water resources, South African Journal of Science, (97), 2001, pp 150–160.

13 L Y Shackelton, S J Lennon, and G R Tosen, *Global climate change and South Africa*, Environmental Scientific Association, Cleveland, 1996, p 160; A Joubert and B Hewitson, *Simulating present and future climates over Southern Africa using General Circulation Models,* Progress in Physical Geography (21), 1997, pp 41–78; A Joubert and P Tyson, *Equilibrium and fully coupled GCM simulations of future Southern African climates,* South African Journal of Science, (92), 1996, pp 471–484.

14 For more details see an SCF Report, 2002 by Vogel.

15 Joubert and Tyson, 1996, op cit.

16 Ibid.

17 IPCC, 2001, op cit. p. 494.

18 Schulze, Meigh and Horan, 2001, op cit.

19 IIASA, *Achieving sustainable development, The 21st century imperative*, Options, Vienna, 2002. G Fischer, M Shah, H van Velthuizen, *Climate change models predict huge impacts on global agricultural production patterns*, IIASA., 2002.

20 Mitchell, 2001, op cit.

21 Drinkwater, M., *HIV/AIDS and agrarian change in Southern Africa,* paper presented for the United Nations Regional Inter-Agency Coordination and Support Office Technical Consultation on Vulnerability in the light of an HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 9–11 September, 2003, Johannesburg, South Africa.

22 Ibid, 10.

23 B Berkeley, *The graves are not yet full: Race, tribe and power in the heart of Africa*, New York, Basic Books, 2001; M Glantz, *Editorial - Complex humanitarian crises (CHCs): Does climate matter?* Network Newsletter and ENSO Signal, 19 (1), Environmental and Societal Impacts Group, National Centre for Atmospheric Research, Boulder Colorado, <www.esig.ucar/newshp>, 2004, p.1.

24 Berkeley, op cit.

25 Glantz, op cit, p. 1.

26 R Lowenson and A Whiteside, *HIV/AIDS: Implications for poverty reduction*, Background paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme for the UN General Assembly, Special session on HIV/AIDS, 25–27 June, 2001.

27 Republic of South Africa, National Treasury, Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2003.

28 Drinkwater, op cit; D Topouzis, *The implications of HIV/AIDS for rural development policy and programming: Focus sub-Saharan Africa*, FAO and UNDP, 1998; M K Shah, N Osborne, T Mbilizi, and G Vilili, *Impact of HIV/AIDS on agricultural productivity and rural livelihoods in the Central Region of Malawi*, Care International in Malawi, 2002.

29 Gillespie and Haddad, *Food security as a response to AIDS*, in IFPRI Annual Report Essay 2001/2002.

30 Drinkwater, op cit; Bryceson, D.F. (1996) *De-agrarianisation and rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A sectoral perspective,* World Development, 24, 97–111.

31 Drinkwater, op cit.

32 Ibid p. 7

33 ICSU, op cit; Tokyo Summit; T Parris, *Toward a sustainability transition: The international consensus,* Environment, Jan–Feb, 2003.

34 Parris, op cit

35 W Clarke, *Research systems for a transition toward sustainability,* in W Steffen, J Jager, D Carson, C Bradshaw, (eds), *Challenges of a changing Earth*, 2002, Proceedings of the Global Open Change Science Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 10–13 July, 2001, Springer, Berlin, 197–200.

36 Drinkwater, op cit, p.11.

37 Ibid.

38 Glantz, op cit, p.1.

CHAPTER 5
LIVELIHOODS AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN POST-WAR ANGOLA

Allan Cain

Introduction

Angola's last four decades of near-continuous war were years of tremendous human suffering, large-scale displacements of population, heavy damage to property and infrastructure, serious economic losses and accumulation of a massive war debt. At its peak an estimated four million or more than a quarter of the total population was internally displaced. Guerrilla warfare had created insecurity in the majority of the interior provinces, and internal transport was paralysed by ambushes and attacks.

The last ten years were characterised by a series of attempted ceasefires that invariably broke down followed by a return to war. These ceasefires were lost opportunities to build peace through correcting politically divided communities and national economic actors into stakeholders in social reconstruction. The Government failed to implement the expected economic and administrative reforms that were considered as preconditions for major local and international investment. The national private sector did not engage because the Government failed to carry out the promised monetary, banking and legal restructuring which would have stimulated local small and medium scale private sector development. Potential local entrepreneurs lacked confidence because of the slow movement on the peace process and the failure to guarantee free movement of people and commodities around the country and between the cities and rural areas.

Following the death of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA president, a ceasefire was signed between the rebel army and the Government in April 2002. Each subsequent month that passed without a return to conflict has increased confidence that peace can be sustained. The first post-war year, saw a remarkable and spontaneous return of more that half of the internally displaced to their areas of origin. Despite the demobilisation of more than 100 000 UNITA forces only some 25 000 small arms have been handed in, significantly below the real total, which means that both ex-combatants and civilian communities still have easy access to arms.

Previous experience, not only in Angola but also in other countries, shows the dangers of not adequately implementing demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and of the potential for future instability in these cases. There exist risks of banditry and crime if ex-combatants are not fully reintegrated both economically and socially, or the drift to urban areas where high unemployment could in turn increase social unrest and criminal activity. Although the Government has drawn up a number of reintegration programmes and an overall 'Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme' (ADRP) is planned with assistance from the international community through the World Bank, it has not yet begun to be implemented.

A 2002 study on reintegration expectations of ex-combatants done by the International Organisation for Migration indicates that 85 per cent wish to return to their areas of origin that is, in 70 percent of cases, their village of birth and that 43 percent want to be self-employed in agriculture. It is therefore probable that a large proportion of the reintegration options chosen by ex-UNITA combatants will be in agriculture.[1] It is already known, however, that the successful implementation of this component will depend on access to adequate land, and that this was anticipated to be problematic. Ex-combatants left their areas of origin on average 14 years before the ceasefire, and generally began to return in the 18 months following its signature. Development Workshop has tracked the process of reintegration of ex-combatants into rural Huambo and followed their problems of access to land. These studies aim to evaluate the actual needs and potential problems that ex-combatants encounter.

Figure 1: Ex-Combatant prospect employment activity



Figure 2: Acquisition of Land by Ex-Combatants in Huambo by January 2004[2]



Post-war urban challenges

Forty years of war in Angola has had a significant effect in urbanising Angola's population. Forced urbanisation is a corollary of forced displacement as a weapon of war. Urban population growth has been accelerated rapidly by a combination of push and pull factors but largely because the cities of the littoral and particularly Luanda were, and continue to be, seen as relative safe havens from instability and insecurity. Urban growth continued unabated even during the periods of ceasefire and relative security, when roads opened to the besieged provincial cities, and families often used these windows of opportunity to move themselves and moveable resources to the safety of the capital or coastal towns.

In the post-war context migration patterns have become more complex. A recent study[3] commissioned by the Ministry of Urbanism indicates that in the cities of some provinces such as Huambo and Benguela there has been a significant deconcentration of urban IDPs, as populations return to their areas of origin. In Luanda, however, populations are also on the move, but rarely whole families. Families appear reluctant to give up their stakes in the urban informal market economy, and school age youth their places in the educational system.[4]

Farming has resumed in the hinterland of provinces adjacent to the capital. New economic relationships through the extended family, with rural producers

linking with the urban informal markets, appear to be emerging. There is little evidence of deconcentration in Luanda, however, as migration works in both directions and there remains a limited reverse flow of people and resources towards the urban poles.

Figure 3: Six Decades of Urban Growth[5]



Social exclusion and the urban poor

The urban poor in Angola suffer increasing social exclusion, which inhibits their full participation in a post-war recovery. They have been denied access to the means to pull themselves out of poverty.

The poor depend on high-priced parallel market loans and have little or no access to credit as a means to improve their livelihoods. The entrepreneurial creativity of informal sector marketers has not been recognised, and the

poor have been increasingly excluded from carrying out their business in the streets and urban centre of Luanda. In the years since the 1991 liberalisation wealth of a few has been built on privileged access to bank credit and foreign exchange at concessional rates.

Retailing in the informal sector market is the principal coping mechanism for the urban poor in Luanda. The informal market is dominated by women, many of them heads of households and a large portion of them originally migrants to the city. While entry into the informal market economy is open to anyone, regardless of their level of literacy or previous experience, those who succeed need to acquire business skills and sufficient capital to build sustainable micro-enterprises.[6] While high inflation prevents capital accumulation it ironically helps build numeracy among those who almost daily must recalculate mark-ups, profit margins and exchange rates. Only those of the elite with privileged access have been able to get bank loans for business ventures. The poor, arguably, are poor risks since they can guarantee no collateral. The poor therefore are obliged to pay extremely high interest rates to parallel market money dealers for very short term loans, often leaving them in chronic debt.

Figure 4: Importance of informal employment in the urban economy



Access to credit

Investment programmes in the informal economy through micro-loans and savings mechanisms are considered one of the most affective urban poverty alleviation strategies.

Since 1992, Development Workshop has conducted research to try to understand how the informal sector has operated in the highly inflationary and unstable environment of Angola. This included a baseline survey of micro-industries in a peri-urban municipal area of Luanda. Between 1995 and 1998, Development Workshop implemented the Women's Enterprise Development (WED) project, which aimed to improve the economic situation of women in the informal sector in Luanda. A small microfinance project with 48 women in fisheries was piloted between 1996 and 1998. Following an evaluation it was decided that there was potential for a much larger project including both men and women in the informal sector as a whole but using a much more rigorous and sustainable loan methodology. This led to the development of the Sustainable Livelihoods Project. The SLP programme employs a model of micro-finance[7] being tested for the first time in Angola using the practice of group lending, originally developed by the Grameen bank in Bangladesh. Social solidarity is not taken for granted, but is actually engendered by the project through training solidarity groups and building experience through successive cycles of small and eventually larger scale loans mutually guaranteed by the 30 to 40 group members. By the end of 2001 the project had attained a 98 percent payback rate, much better than most commercial banks. The socio-economic impact on poor households has been significant.

The informal economy is the major employer and service provider of the poor.

Sustainable Livelihoods (SLP) group lending model

Development Workshop's SLP programme targets economically active women and men in the urban informal sector. A means test is used to select eligible clients from those suggested by other members of the group following interviews in market places and *bairros*. Women are actively encouraged to participate by the field staff as both members and in leadership. A ten-week orientation is conducted to inform prospective clients of SLP loan policies and expectations, develop a group constitution and strengthen group trust, solidarity and leadership. It also serves to discourage less needy applicants for whom the initial loan size of up to US$ 100–150 would not warrant 10 weeks waiting time before receiving their first loan.

Management structure

Groups are comprised of 20–30 members. Each group develops its own constitution and selects its members, subject to their passing the Means Test. Groups conduct weekly meetings of about two hours to discuss community, business and other issues.

Sub-groups are made up of 5–7 members. The sub-group facilitates the operational functions of the bigger group, particularly in business appraisal, loan and savings monitoring including collections, and recruitment of new members. These activities are then reported to the bigger group during the weekly meetings by a sub-group leader.

Each group has a democratically elected credit committee of 8 members comprising secretary, chair, treasurer, president and sub-group leaders. Leaders are trained to assume all management functions of the group. They receive, deposit, and monitor members' loan repayments and provide weekly reports on financial activities to field assistants, who are members of the SLP staff. Field Assistants oversee eight to ten groups each.

Credit and savings conditions

Appraisal procedure: The credit committee assesses and approves loans to the group members. Committee members get the same amount as everyone else, based on business needs. Fairness is ensured through appraisals by the field assistants.

Loan disbursal: the loan is made to the group and group members receive their loans simultaneously.

Loan size: Group members receive small initial loans of US$50–150 based on their economic activity. Further loans are extended to groups as a continuous, gradual increase. The maximum for solidarity groups is US$300 in the first year. Once a track record is established for a group they graduate to the next tier: the graduate group, where the maximum loan is US$ 700.

Loan repayment: Group loan terms are four months with weekly instalments.

Loan guarantee: Groups do not require collateral but sub-group members co-guarantee all loans and weekly payments.

Interest rate: Group loans are charged at a 10 percent flat rate. Other fees amount to 2 percent of the loan amount.

Savings: Groups contribute savings of 10 percent of what they want to borrow during the orientation period. Groups collect and manage savings from their members on a weekly basis through the weekly meetings. These can be withdrawn by the client at the end of their repayment if they wish.

The pilot work undertaken by NGOs such as Development Workshop in the micro-finance sector has had an important impact on Government thinking and policy development.[8] New legislation regulating the sector is being planned and commercial banks are beginning to set up departments that will eventually offer loans to small scale and even micro-entrepreneurs. There are increasing indications that micro-finance will be main-streamed as a strategy for urban poverty reduction. The implications of scaling up the sector, however, have not been yet thought through. Issues that will need to be addressed are:

- lack of specialisation, over-saturation in a small number of informal sector activities
- increasing competition between micro-entrepreneurs within a limited market may erode profitability
- low basic education levels, particularly of women entrepreneurs, means training and business skill development becomes expensive
- feminisation of household debt adding greater burdens on women, who already carry a large part of the household productive and reproductive loads

- exclusion from political processes of decision making about how the market will be regulated.
- the formalisation of the informal economy brings with it added burdens and costs such as fees and taxes that can reduce profitability and restrict informal strategies of shifting products, geographic location and staffing in line with market changes.

Access to water

The poor living in peri-urban *musseques* pay many times more for water and other essential services than those living in the cement city, meaning they consume less, and the resulting hygiene and health statistics are now some of the worst in the world.

Conventional wisdom among urban planners argues that investment in urban services should first be made in those parts of the city housing the well-to-do, who can afford to pay for those services and generate income that will 'trickle-down' for investment in services for those poorer parts of the city whose residents have little capacity to pay. Institutions like the World Bank have therefore developed strategies based on the 'affordability model' and promote the idea that costs of urban services need to be recoverable from consumers, and eventually to pay for themselves.

A study sponsored by the World Bank in Luanda[9] exposed fundamental errors in these assumptions. The study involved an analysis of the existing informal water market and the communities' willingness to pay for services or participate in the programme in other ways. More than 50 percent of Luanda's population, and most who live in the *musseques*, do not have access to piped water. The peri-urban and *musseque* population is forced to pay extremely high prices for (often untreated) water pumped from the Bengo River and distributed by tanker trucks to informal sellers in the various *bairros*. The system is an example of how the private sector has stepped-in to provide an essential service that the state has failed to deliver. However, the costs are very high, because of the extreme inefficiency of delivering water to the *bairros* by tanker truck rather than by pipe. The study of the water market was even more revealing. It demonstrated that *musseque* residents were accustomed to paying up to 10 000 times more for water to the private sellers than the well-to-do in the cement city were paying for treated water piped to their household taps by the provincial water company. Ironically the poor were far more

accustomed to pay dearly for services than the rich. The study further demonstrated that $35 000 000 per year was paid by the urban poor for purchasing water, and that much of this income could eventually be recovered in water fees if a just set of tariffs was set at equitable prices for all consumers.

Community managed standposts supply water at affordable but sustainable prices.

Standposts have been built by Development Workshop in partnership with the Luanda provincial water authority (EPAL) and a mechanism of community management has been developed based on elected water committees. User fees are paid by consumers and collected by the water committee to cover maintenance costs and to pay EPAL to supply the water. EPAL and communities both have become interested stakeholders and motivated to guarantee the water supply and maintain the network. Users have acquired for the first time, a sense of their rights as consumers and an economic model of local service supply has evolved based on financial sustainability at affordable cost levels.

Access to land

Three-quarters of the residents of the peri-urban districts of Luanda studied have no clear legal title to the land they occupy. They are at risk of expropriation by commercial developers or the state with out legal recourse or appropriate financial compensation.

Land is emerging as the most critical potential flash-point of conflict, as displaced persons seek settlement sites in rural and urban districts alike and this situation will undoubtedly become more acute in a post -conflict period. For the first time since independence, a commercial real-estate market is formalising itself (an informal market has existed for years). The Government has offered major land concessions to commercial developers, many of them international companies, to develop joint-venture residential and industrial complexes (mainly in the south of Luanda).

For the urban poor, who have no access to banking or savings institutions, the acquisition of a housing plot and subsequent construction of a residence is the only means of accumulation of any form of wealth. Thus real estate, particularly housing plots in one of the urban-centre *musseques* such as Sambizanga, Boavista or Rocha Pinto which are close to places of employment, have a high and increasing intrinsic value. Under the Angolan Constitution of 1976, land became the property of the State. Even under pre-independence Portuguese law, most land was held under concession titles from the colonial state and the form of land title was not altered significantly in subsequent laws (the most recent of which was in 1992). Unfortunately, regulatory by-laws have not been put in place since independence to manage urban land nor have the institutions of local government been reinforced to administer or allocate land to the rapidly growing urban population. The population of Luanda has grown eightfold since independence and most of the settlement and housing plot acquisition has been through the informal land market. Only a small percentage of settlers have acquired full legal titles to the land they occupy. Most, however, consider themselves free from threat as a result of the laissez-faire attitude engendered by the inability of state administration to facilitate land registration. Residual occupancy rights[10] may be revoked by new land legislation currently under consideration. The urban poor are therefore left in a position of extreme vulnerability, with weak tenure rights over the land they occupy, and risk being turned into illegal occupiers unless planned legislation is revised.

In the process of urban economic development, the demand for plots in the centre of the city, combined with the upgrading of services, results in increasing

land values. In the natural process of the 'gentrification' of residential districts, the poor often trade off easy access to employment against financial gains by selling their plots close to the centre and migrating to the periphery where land is cheaper. One-off profits can be substantial for poor families. Therefore land and housing (particularly well-located) represent accumulated wealth for the poor that can be converted to cover a family emergency or invested in a child's education, or a business venture. Lack of legal title guaranteeing security of tenure seriously undermines the well-being of poor families and puts at risk one of their principal crisis-coping mechanisms. Mass expropriation of land occupied by poor urban families, with inadequate financial compensation, is becoming a new feature of post-conflict urban development in Angola. Often projects involve joint venture, state-private sector partnerships, where foreign capital is invested to upgrade services and hence significantly increase the land value. Although many of the projects offer alternative settlement sites beyond the city periphery the urban-poor-displaced lose out on the premium benefits or profits that they would normally gain in the course of urban gentrification or upgrading. The alienation of the urban poor from lands that they have lived and worked on for many years is likely to produce serious civic conflict in the years to come, unless the Government develops policies that recognise customary and existing occupational rights.

Civil society, social capital and post-war reconstruction

Angolan civil society is today emerging as a national movement, from its roots in the intellectual and professional circles in the main cities, providing a space for building national consensus and inter-ethnic reconciliation in a post-war Angola. It is beginning to link with peri-urban community associations, NGOs and churches in the *musseques*. But much remains to be done to develop grassroots, peri-urban civil society, and Angola's peri-urban populations are living in overcrowded and unhealthy conditions, with little possibility of improving their situation.

There are strong reasons why development organisations in Angola should continue to follow a community-based approach, or go further and follow a 'civil-society rebuilding' approach.[11] Working together is a necessary step in resolving practical problems and achieving wider objectives. It is unlikely that many of the practical problems poor communities face will be resolved without residents working together on some way. Creating opportunities to work together would be an important contribution to rebuilding the social fabric of a country so strongly affected by war, and making democracy work.

Supporting collective action, however, is not going to be straightforward. The usual advice to development organisations (to build on organisations and mechanisms that already exist) is not relevant in situations where social change has been rapid and severely weakened the bases for pre-existing organisations or the spontaneous creation of new ones. New organisations will need to be created, spaces for debate defined and social activities for people to build new social networks and social capital.[12] The forms of cooperation and collective action that have been encouraged by organisations from outside the community (water committees, commissions, parents at schools and some others), if they are developed with care, may prove to be positive experiences that contribute to rebuilding social capital and encourage further collective action. Doing this may require development organisations to sharpen their skills in social mobilisation and in facilitating contacts with institutional service providers. It may also require development organisations (and their funders) to take a longer-term approach whereby resolving immediate problems is seen as part of a larger challenge of rebuilding community and institutional capacity.

Reconstruction must be the focus of development planning in the post-war phase. Reconstruction has to include peri-urban areas that are likely to remain a permanent reality, providing shelter and livelihoods for a major part of the Angolan population. 'Reconstruction' cannot imply rebuilding the cities on pre-war models. The peri-urban areas were not there on such a scale 25 years ago; so they represent a new challenge for the post-war reconstruction period.

Post-war international donor assistance programmes must include an important component of rebuilding government capacity (particularly at provincial and local levels) as well as capacity of grassroots civil society. These capacities are essential for a functioning society, and have been eroded seriously in Angola during the years of war. *Bairro* residents committees, parents and teacher associations, water management committees, micro-credit solidarity groups that ensure community participation and sustainability of programmes will also provide forums for democratic decision making and platforms for citizens or consumers to negotiate their rights of access to resources necessary for survival and development. Well-designed programmes of transition will provide opportunities for civic leadership to emerge, leaders who will inevitably play roles in local government when anticipated democratic reforms are put in place.[13]

Endnotes

1 International Office of Migration, UNITA EX-FMU Soldiers Demographic, Socio-Economic Profiles for Return and Reintegration Planning Activities, 2002.

2 Development Workshop, *Land & reintegration of ex-combatants in Huambo,* DW Luanda, 2004.

3 Development Workshop, *Study for a legal and institutional framework for improving land management in Angola – Land management and land tenure in peri-urban areas*, Ministry of Urbanism and Public Works & the Ad-hoc Technical Group for Habitat, 2002

4 Experience has shown that once rural-urban migrants have spent more than two agricultural seasons off of their lands the probability of their return falls below half. As time passes the probability decreases exponentially.

5 Development Workshop, *Civil society & reconstruction in post-war Angola*, *international donors and civil society – Implications for Angola's recovery and the displaced,* Luanda, July 2003.

6 INE's 1996 study found that the majority of those employed in the informal sector particularly women were engaged in petty trading, where barriers to entry, skills & capital were low. 51 percent of urban families had at least one family member engaged in informal sector trading; this accounted for 55 percent of urban households' total income (Hodges 2001, p 30)

7 Development Workshop in 1993 began the first intervention on micro-finance for women in the informal sector in Luanda. The DW programme had grown by 2003 to include over 5,000 micro-entrepreneurs and has made loans valued at over $1.5 million.

8 RASME the Angolan Network for Micro-Enterprise Support has been constituted to influence Government policy and provide institutional capacity building by ADRA, CARE, Development Workshop, Oikos and SNV.

9 Development Workshop was asked by the World Bank in 1995 to carry out a study of urban communities who would eventually benefit from their planned Luanda Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project.

10 Civil Code forms the basis of the Portuguese legal tradition and in turn Angolan legislation. It recognizes basic rights of occupation. The link with the Códico Civil is proposed to be annulled in the draft of the new Angolan land law of June 2002.

11 P Robson & S Roque, "Here in the city, everything has to be paid for." Locating the community in peri-urban Angola. Development Workshop Occasional Papers May 2001.

12 Robert Putnam concludes his book “Making democracy work” by arguing that “Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work.”

13 Development Workshop is a human settlements organisation that has worked in Angola since 1981 in partnership with civil society, local government and rural & urban communities. DW can be contacted through allan.dwang@angonet.org

CONCLUSION

A politically sophisticated and realistic sustainable livelihoods approach faces many challenges and calls for an interrogation of current strategies for post-conflict recovery. Some noteworthy points arose in the course of the workshop.

- How is livelihood data gathered? While historical livelihoods analysis is needed to appreciate the nature of livelihoods, this is not always possible because it is difficult to obtain baseline quantitative, given the lack of access to both institutional structures and historic data sets. Furthermore, because situations are so volatile, information may date quickly. Allan Cain suggested that a way around this problem is to make use of 'conflict data' as a baseline set, as was done in Angola during the time of the war. This was found to be as relevant and valuable as longer time series. Another constraint is that conflict environments are seldom conducive to data collecting, as was the case in Angola, which for more than 15 years discouraged social science research.

- The word 'community' is loosely defined and has often been used as a catch-all term. Because the target of a sustainable livelihoods approach is at the community level, the application of this term should be used with an appreciation for the fact that communities encapsulate many different social processes and power dimensions that 'order' communities. Because communities have different power relationships, as do households, 'community participation' can easily be 'abused' by powerful elites as part of a legitimising process.

- How can you assess who achieves a sustainable livelihood and who does not? What are the relevant outcome indicators? War economies often create inflated earnings for individuals and who are too often expected to go back to subsistence farming. This raises the issue of bearing in mind the role of 'political assets' and appreciating how to work with different forms of patrimonialism. Power and reciprocity in vertical networks of support can become important political assets for survival strategies:

people may also benefit economically, gaining considerable wealth by making use of comparative (political) advantages.

- Something that is often overlooked is the changing role of NGOs, indigenous civil society organisations and aid agencies, and the need for collaboration between them, and with government institutions, in establishing new sustainable post-conflict recovery strategies. Linked to this is the question of how to root approaches in an understanding of the historical legacies and current political and administrative arrangements. The role of traditional authorities must not be ignored, although years of conflict may result in the lack of a clear agreement about who wields what influence in a region. One of the issues facing Angola is the renewing of legal structures that existed before the civil conflict. The role of the state in facilitating proper recovery strategies is critical in this regard. Regarding environmental risks and threats, there is a need to bridge the gap between action and information. Agencies are the custodians of much data that is often 'lost' to other interest groups; because of the role that scientists play in driving information, everybody would benefit from greater collaboration.

- The prosaic debate on the relief–development continuum has fortunately ended in paralysis. The predominant belief is that development aid targeted at recovery and reconstruction should be provided only once the situation has stabilised properly, although there is some recognition of the need for transition funding to be made available in the interim. It is not generally acknowledged as a phase deserving in its own right, and currently only USAID and Britain provide some transition funding. Typically humanitarian agencies have envisaged a linear progression from focussing on relief activities – on saving lives – to building sustainable livelihoods. But as Timpson discusses, this is being challenged increasingly as simplistic and inadequate. It calls for a far greater astuteness than is currently noted in the timing of emergency and development aid. The belief was expressed in the workshop that contrary to common belief, development interventions can be started **during** conflict within displaced communities and between individuals. Such an approach, furthermore, serves to create trust with the relevant government. The value of coordinating efforts with government ministries during times of conflict cannot be overlooked as this increases the possibility of government responsiveness to aid agencies in designing post-conflict policy strategies.

- The issue of how to play a constructive role in promoting real redistributive reforms was noted. Given the correlation between poverty and

conflict, recovery strategies and techniques must be broad-based if there is to be balanced economic recovery. It is important to note the institutional processes (formal and informal) that constrain the achievement of sustainable livelihoods for different groups of people. Aid organisations must be willing to take a stand against governments who are 'helping themselves' and who are not allowing for the genuine participation of their citizens in the recovery or development processes. Organisations often fail to take a stand because of vested commercial interests of their own governments within the country concerned, and decisions against governments, which could jeopardise these commercial interests. In Angola, it was noted that communities' coping strategies are under attack and that the socio-economic gap was widening within the country. Empowering national civil society is a key strategy to counteract such developments: social organisations can, and should, play a key role in institutional development and policy debate. Networks around land, gender, environmental change and human rights at all levels are being initiated. In the case of Angola, strengthening indigenous civil society groups would serve to strengthen all other aspects of life; spiritual groups, including churches traditionally have very strong institutional structures that can be leveraged. The role of the media as a tool for 'informal criticism' of government policies was also considered useful. Investigation is needed of the role of horizontal and vertical networks in bringing about policy change.

Concluding comments

The economic, social and human costs of war are enormous. Local populations have to do all they can to develop strategies of survival in the face of a range of assaults such as displacement, forced migration, changing household composition, loss and depletion of assets, deteriorating economic conditions, and changes in social capital. Humanitarian organisations need not only to save lives, but also to support livelihoods. Adopting a sustainable livelihoods assessment approach in such situations contributes to a better understanding of the complex range of problems faced by populations, and to identifying the livelihood strategies people may resort to for their survival. Most notably, it goes beyond ensuring mere food security or survival, and includes an analysis of political vulnerability and the processes that contribute to this, which is essential to determining how to protect populations. Increasingly the need to give attention to the aspects relating to the political economy is being highlighted. The value of doing this lies in identifying the aid channels through

which livelihoods' support can be given, an appreciation for how institutions and structures relate to conflict dynamics, and an understanding of vulnerability that is based not only on poverty but also powerlessness. Furthermore, the qualitative approach of a sustainable livelihoods framework is particularly valuable because it emphasises people's potential in a holistic way, rather than stressing only problems, constraints and needs. It also reveals how civilians utilise networks of social and political capital assets to stabilise their livelihoods and thus shape the evolution of local institutional arrangements.

Peace agreements are only the first step in restoring quality of life to war affected populations. How the ideals of a sustainable livelihood approach – poverty reduction, reducing livelihood vulnerability, improving environmental sustainability, and participatory approaches – can be realised in a post-conflict situation, requires new ways of thinking about institutional and organisational arrangements for development, as well as understanding how poor people can gain access to natural resources and influence policy processes so that their concerns are met. A fresh agenda for external support will serve to target activities to reduce poverty more accurately. Ultimately, however, this requires flexibility on the part of humanitarian and development agencies and their partners, and most particularly a need shift away from operating and allocating resources along sectoral lines. A sustainable livelihoods approach provides a compelling framework for overcoming the structural problems constraining the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADRP	Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EPI	Expanded Programme on Immunisation
ERRA	Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Association
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LAL	Learning about Livelihoods
LGB	Larger Grain Borer
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo-Verde
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PIPS	Policies, institutions and processes
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QUIPS	'Quick impact programmes'
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
REST	Relief Society of Tigre
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCF	Save the Children Fund

SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
SRRA	South Sudan Relief Agency
SRRA	South Sudan Relief Agency
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
WTO	World Trade Organisation