Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)

Harvard Kennedy School of Government &
The US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
Purpose

To provide an overview of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project.
Begun in 2007 as joint partnership between Carr Center and PKSOI, funded by Humanity United.

Goal: To support military planning for effective mass atrocity response.

Context: PoC, R2P, Other Operations

Efforts:
- DoD doctrine, education, exercises, strategic guidance
  - MARO Military Planning Handbook
  - Tabletop Exercises (TTX)
- USG policy and strategic guidance
- IGO doctrine (UN, AU)

"A new idea is first condemned as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it becomes what everybody knows".

- William James, 1879
2010 National Security Strategy, p. 48:

The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.

In the event that prevention fails, the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. vi and 15:

“...the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include... preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad."
Operational Environment

- 2010 Joint Operational Environment (JOE) p. 52:
  “...the Joint Force may be called upon to provide order and security in areas where simmering political, racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal differences create the potential for large scale atrocities.”

- Director National Intelligence Testimony, 2 Feb 2010:
  “...a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing. Among these countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in southern Sudan.”

- Army Operating Concept, 19 Aug 2010:
  “Future Army forces must be prepared to conduct mass atrocity response operations (MARO) as part of full-spectrum operations.... MARO requires combined arms formations and unity of purpose with interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to create a secure environment, establish rule of law, and build security and government organizations able to maintain stability and prevent further atrocities.”
MARO Planning Handbook

I. The MARO Concept

II. MARO Planning Considerations

III. Future Research Areas and Ways Forward

ANNEXES

- MARO Similarities and Differences to Other Operations
- MARO distinctions
- Operational and Political Implications

- Mission Analysis
- Courses of Action
- Plan Design and Implementation

- Mass Atrocity Crimes: Legal Definitions
- Draft Strategic Guidance
- Sample Critical Factors Analyses
- Assumptions
- Task List
- Intelligence Considerations
- Flexible Deterrent Options
- Selected Bibliography
- History of the MARO Project
MARO Distinctions

- Multi-Party Dynamics
- Illusion of Impartiality
- Escalatory Dynamic
Operational and Political Implications

- Different Information, From the Outset
- Advance Planning
- Speed vs Mass
- The Power of Witness
- Symptoms or Root Causes—Can there be a Hand-Off?
- Immediate Non-military Requirements
- Moral Dilemmas
- Political Guidance
MARO Mission Analysis

- Operational Environment
  - Actors (Perpetrators, Victims, Interveners, Others)
  - Geographic, Political, Military/Security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Informational

- Endstates and Objectives
  - Strategic Guidance Distillation

- Resources Available

- Critical Factors Analysis

- Planning Considerations

- Mission Analysis Results
MARO Prevention
Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)

- FDO Purposes:
  - Expose perpetrators to international scrutiny
  - Establish intervention credibility and capability
  - Protect potential victims
  - Dissuade or punish perpetrators
  - Build and demonstrate international resolve

- FDO Categories:
  - Low-Level FDOs: Security Force Assistance, activate HQs, planning, deployment preparations, PSYOP
  - Mid-Level FDOs: Expand regional presence, ISR, shows of force, expanded PSYOP
  - High-Level FDOs: No fly zones, aggressive air/land/sea patrolling, NEO, strikes/raids, limited missions, SOF insertion, EW
## MARO Intervention Approaches

<table>
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<tr>
<th>APPROACH</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 1</strong></td>
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</table>
| **SATURATION** | • Wide area control  
• Unit sectors  
• Mobile patrols  
• Checkpoints  
• Outposts  
• Mobile Operating Bases  
• Similar to COIN in Iraq | • Requires adequate forces, extensive logistics and weak adversary  
• Suitable when victim population is widely dispersed  
• Extensive stability operations necessary |
| **Approach 2** | | |
| **“OIL SPOT”** | • Clear-hold-build  
• Focused, systematic advance within capabilities  
• “Mobile” forces clear; “static” forces maintain security  
• Based upon classic battle | • Fewer forces required than Saturation Approach  
• Suitable with strong perpetrators and concentrated victim populations  
• Ceases territory to perpetrators  
• Extends commitment |
MARO Approaches
MARO Design Framework

**Military Objectives**

1. Vulnerable populations are secure from atrocities.
2. Leadership of perpetrators is identified, captured, and detained.
3. Humanitarian assistance is enabled where needed.
4. Transition to appropriate civil entity that will promote good governance, permanent security, and social well-being is accomplished.
MARO Planning Phases

- **Phase 0: Shape**
  - Normal day-to-day affairs, TSC, planning

- **Phase I: Deter**
  - Crisis management, support diplomacy, shows of force, stage forces in region

- **Phase II: Seize Initiative**
  - Initial deployment, secure footholds, establish credibility, secure vulnerable populations, attack resisters

- **Phase III: Dominate**
  - Main body deployment, secure necessary area, eliminate organized resistance, establish Transitional Military Authority

- **Phase IV: Stabilize**
  - Transfer responsibility to Transitional Civilian Authority, set conditions for Phase V

- **Phase V: Enable Civil Authority**
  - Transition to original government, new indigenous government, or other legitimate authority
# MARO Phasing

## PHASE OBJECTIVES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>DETER</td>
<td>SEIZE INITIATIVE</td>
<td>DOMINATE</td>
<td>STABILIZE</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Current Ops</td>
<td>- Begin: FOCs</td>
<td>- Begin: D-Day</td>
<td>- Begin: MTF expands beyond lodgements</td>
<td>- Begin: TCA assumes control</td>
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<tr>
<td>- End: MA likely based upon MW</td>
<td>- End: D-Day</td>
<td>- End: MTF established and ready to expand ops</td>
<td>- End: MA &amp; organized opposition ends; MTC freedom of ops; TCA ready</td>
<td>- End: MTF redeployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PHASE OBJECTIVES

- **Endstate**: Widespread mass atrocity is stopped or prevented and is unlikely to occur in the future.

### MILITARY OBJECTIVES

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### PHASE LINES OF EFFORT

- **ISR**
- Unity of Effort
- Strat Comm
- TSC
- Readiness

### MAJOR PHASE ACTIVITIES

- Monitoring
- TSC
- Plan/Coordinate
- Support Diplomacy
- FDDs
- Establish Logistics
- Deploy
- Plan/Prepare
- Strat Comm

- Initial Entry
- Protect Civilians
- Support Ops
- Defeat Perpetrators
- Deploy/Build Force
- Strat Comm

- Secure AO
- Stability Ops
- TMA
- Support TCA
- Prepare TCA

- Maintain Security
- Stability Ops
- Support TCA
- SPFA
- HN
- Strat Comm
- Redeploy
Discussion

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/index.php

http://pksoi.army.mil
http://www.pksoi.org