

Terrorism, counter-terrorism and norms in Africa

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Terrorism and counter-terrorism measures have undermined the norms, rules and institutions that underpin security in Africa. Through the use of indiscriminate violence, terrorism has maimed and killed innocent people, threatened jobs and various social activities, and dented democratic processes of resolving conflict in society. Similarly, military and legislative counter-terrorism measures have caused the deaths of innocent people, undermined democratic governance and eroded civil liberties. In the face of these problems, African states need creative and innovative approaches to combat terrorism. A sustainable counter-terrorism strategy should focus on institutions, development and social justice.

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Introduction

This article stems from the recognition that since the 1990s, and especially after September 2001, terrorism has acquired great national and international significance. At the time of this writing, terrorism remained a major security issue in much of Africa. Moreover, for countries that rely on funds from foreigners to survive, terrorism has the potential to deter tourists and foreign investors.

The argument in this article is based on two main hypotheses. The first is that terrorist activities and some of the recent counter-terrorism measures have undermined the norms, rules and institutions in which African security is embedded. Indeed, unless counter-terrorism measures are planned and executed very carefully, they can have the same effect as terrorism on norms, rules and institutions. The second hypothesis is that safeguarding the security of African states and peoples requires policies that undercut the bases of terrorism and, at the same time, enhance norms, rules and institutions. In other words, the so-called war on terror should not be seen simply as a technical, management or military issue, but as a set of political, social and economic initiatives that minimise the conditions that give rise to terrorism while maximising those that strengthen norms, rules and institutions.

The rest of the article is divided into five sections. The first defines norms, rules and institutions. This is followed by an analysis of the relationship between terrorism and norms, rules and institutions. The third section argues that all security ought to be viewed as people-centred and that the distinction between ‘security’ and ‘human security’ is unsustainable. The fourth section examines how counter-terrorism measures, which are underpinned by norms, rules and institutions, could undermine the same norms and institutions. The fifth section suggests a counter-terrorism model for African states based on institutions, development and social justice.

Institutions, norms and rules

One of the propositions of this article is that terrorism threatens our way of life largely because it undermines the norms, rules and institutions in which security is embedded. Therefore, it is necessary that we start by explaining norms, rules and institutions. Different authors have interpreted institutions in various ways. For example, Robert Keohane defines institutions as “related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time”.¹ He argues that institutions are “persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles”.² Similarly, Hedley Bull defines an institution as “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals”.³ He views institutions as “an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions – and at the same time a means of sustaining

this collaboration”.⁴ According to Bull, institutions include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the managerial system of the great powers.⁵ John Mearsheimer offers a similar perspective when he claims that an institution is “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate or compete with each other”.⁶ However, he differs with Bull when he argues that “[t]hese rules are typically formalised in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organisations with their own personnel and budgets”.⁷

The above accounts interpret institutions in two senses. In the first, institutions are regarded as ‘stable sets of norms, rules, and principles’ that ‘constitute actors as knowledgeable social agents’ and ‘regulate behaviour’.⁸ Thus, several variables that underpin security, such as sovereignty, diplomacy, anarchy, self-help, international law and multilateralism, are institutions. This is consistent with Bull’s and one of Keohane’s definitions. These habits and practices have previously been described as ‘primary’ institutions.⁹ In the second sense, institutions are formal organisations like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). Mearsheimer’s definition applies to such organisations. Keohane also calls such organisations institutions. However, Bull excludes them, arguing that by institution he does “not imply an organisation or administrative machinery”.¹⁰ These organisations have previously been described as ‘secondary’ institutions.¹¹ Primary institutions underpin secondary institutions. Thus, we attach meaning and significance to an international organisation, such as the AU, because we accept the primary institution on which it is constructed, namely multilateralism. This paper refers to primary institutions as ‘institutions’ and to secondary institutions as ‘international organisations’.

Most accounts of institutions suggest that they “are made of rules and norms”.¹² Moreover, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink claim that the difference between norms and institutions lies in aggregation. They argue that “the norm definition isolates single standards of behaviour, whereas institutions emphasise the way in which behavioural rules are structured together and interrelate”.¹³ So, what are norms and rules? Norms are historically contingent and shared understandings about appropriate behaviour and practices. They are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.¹⁴ Using the above definitions, it is plausible to argue that in the present world, norms include the expectation that rich countries will provide development assistance to poor African states, that international society will offer humanitarian assistance in a situation like that in Darfur, Sudan, and that states, including African countries, will help their people enjoy certain levels of freedom, education, shelter, food and affordable health.

Unlike norms, rules are prescriptive and more specific. As Bull argues, rules are “general imperative principles of conduct”.¹⁵ These rules “require or authorise prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways”.¹⁶ Bull claims that these “rules

may have the status of law, of morality, of custom or etiquette, or simply of operating procedures or ‘rules of the game’.¹⁷ Similarly, Stephen Krasner defines rules as “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions”.¹⁸ It is plausible to argue that in the present world, global rules include the requirement that states adhere to the UN Charter, respect each other’s sovereignty, and undertake to treat prisoners of war humanely under the Geneva Conventions.

The claim which this article makes – that norms, rules and institutions are shared understandings – requires at least two qualifications. First, there is no unanimity in the way that international actors, including African states, interpret institutions. Instead, there is continuous contestation about the status and roles of norms, rules and institutions. Second, power and interests play an important role in generating, shaping and implementing norms, rules and institutions. While it is plausible to argue that “the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas”,¹⁹ it is the interests and preferences of great powers or hegemonic states that determine the shape of norms, rules and institutions. This implies that existing institutions may not reflect the values, preferences and standards of the African states. Even international law appears to be culturally biased. Both the structures of international law making and the content of the rules of international law privilege Westerners and reflect the interests and preferences of Western societies. As we shall see below, security is embedded in norms and institutions. Therefore, those who shape norms and institutions influence the way security is conceptualised. Indeed, without norms and institutions, there would be no sense of order, security and justice. Even the ‘war on terror’ is intelligible only because international society has constructed norms, rules and institutions.

The norms, rules and institutions that modern terrorism appears to undermine include the following: democratic procedures; human rights, including the right to life; the expectation that political disputes should be resolved peacefully; the laws of war; and the due process of the law.

Terrorism, norms and institutions

In general terms, terrorism can be regarded as a technique of warfare that is as old as human society. However, it is through our theoretical frameworks and other values that we make sense of its nature, causes and remedies. For example, realists view terrorism as an irresponsible use of force that must be countered by military power, and they prescribe military responses, including assassinations. However, liberals regard terrorism as a deviation from acceptable norms and prescribe the elimination of its underlying causes, such as poverty and social injustice. Constructivists, on the other hand, view terrorism as primarily an ideational phenomenon. They regard terrorists as purposive social agents that are constituted by ideas, namely their norms, beliefs, and identities.

The terrorists' material capabilities matter because they affect the possibility of certain outcomes. However, these capabilities and outcomes are themselves circumscribed by ideas. This article contends that understanding, and effectively combating, terrorism requires these three and other theoretical perspectives.

Over the years, the term 'terrorism' has been used and abused by policy-makers and analysts alike. Those who seek to delegitimize the goals or tactics of their opponents often label them terrorist. It was for this reason that liberation fighters such as Nelson Mandela were considered terrorists. Like many phenomena that have a history, the meaning of terrorism cannot be fixed in time or space. It is historically contingent and may be based on political, religious, social, cultural, economic, or environmental grievances.

Paul Wilkinson defines terrorism as political violence.²⁰ This is because terrorism is associated with the arbitrary use of violence. The al-Qaeda terrorists that simultaneously destroyed the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998 used violence. The Nairobi attack resulted in 291 deaths, with 5,000 injured, while that in Dar es Salaam resulted in 11 deaths and 77 injuries. Militant Islamic forces used violence in Kenya again in November 2002 when they targeted the Kikambala Paradise Hotel near Mombasa. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have also experienced terrorist violence in the past few years. Indeed, Egypt has continually experienced terrorist attacks from local and foreign militant groups since 1992, with the latest attack taking place in the Red Sea resort town of Dahab on 22 April 2006.

Gerard Chaliand describes terrorism as "the most violent form of psychological warfare".²¹ This is because terrorists may seek to intimidate a people, society, state or government so that they give in to terrorists' demands. Terrorism maims and kills innocent people, undermines certainty in social activities, destroys property and undermines the norms, rules and institutions in which security is embedded.

If terrorism undermines norms, rules and institutions, how is it constituted? At one level, terrorist groups may be sponsored by international actors in pursuit of their own selfish interests. For instance, states and non-state actors, Western and non-Western entities, have perpetrated terrorism. States may sponsor terrorism by providing money, logistical support, training, weapons and safe passage to the terrorists. Indeed, many states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the US, and the former Soviet Union, have at various times been accused of supporting terrorist organisations in Africa and elsewhere.

At another level, terrorism is constituted by ideas, culture and identity. Indeed, while it is reasonable to argue that terrorism is a threat to norms, rules and institutions, it is also possible to show that terrorism is a product of norms, rules and institutions. Terrorism is driven by the same factors that make security possible: the need for

development, health care, education, self-determination, democratic governance, human rights, emancipation, empowerment and human dignity. Terrorism may be a threat to international law and other conventions, but it is also motivated by some of the values that underpin international norms, rules and institutions.

While terrorists may appear to be bandits whose aim is to cause fear and destruction through violence, they represent the values, interests and identities of the social formations from which they emerge. This implies that, at a certain level, terrorism may be viewed as a contest between conflicting norms and institutions. A large part of the world and some Muslim governments may regard Osama bin Laden as evil, but his interpretation of the dangers that Islam faces in a globalised world resonates with various Islamic communities. Therefore, terrorists should be viewed as part of the social structures, processes and values that have created them. As it will be explained below, the most effective strategy against terrorism is for African states and other countries to devise ways of undermining the social structures, processes and values that produce terrorism. In other words, counter-terrorism should be seen as a contest of ideas.

Security, institutions and norms

Whatever the causes of terrorism in different parts of Africa, there is growing evidence that it is a major security issue which few African states can ignore. Those countries that rely on tourism as an important foreign exchange earner are likely to be targets, and this applies to the majority of African states. Those countries that host Western diplomatic missions, especially UK and US embassies, could also be targets, and again this applies to most African states. Moreover, those countries with porous borders, which is the case with almost all African states, cannot shut out terrorists or effectively monitor them once they are in the country. Thus, terrorism remains a significant security challenge for many African states. However, thinking about security in Africa has not changed. Unfortunately, as Peter Vale has observed, “old understandings reproduce past mistakes”.²²

How should African states and peoples view security? Security should be viewed as people-centred, and whether states achieve, undermine, or are irrelevant to security is an open question, depending on time and place. Security is the protection of the people and the preservation of their norms, rules, interests, institutions and resources, in the face of military and non-military threats. The latter may include natural disasters, ecological and environmental degradation, poverty, severe economic problems, human rights abuses and the erosion of democratic institutions. This definition includes the preservation of states and the structures, principles and institutions on which states are anchored, but only to the extent that protection of state boundaries and the governing structures and elites is not privileged over people.

Defining security as people-centred raises some questions. First, does this mean that the military should play no role in security? Second, is this people-centred security not the same thing as human security? The answer to the first question is fairly simple: military capacity is one of the important *means* by which people and political communities can protect themselves and their norms, rules and institutions, but it is just one of the means and is not an end. Security is the *end*.

Addressing the second question is more complicated. The term ‘human security’ came into vogue in 1994, but the issues that it incorporates had been canvassed under ‘security’ for decades. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) definition of human security states: “For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.”²³ The Commission on Human Security defines human security as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”.²⁴ It further states: “Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life.”²⁵ The Commission on Human Security also states that human security entails the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats, and the use of “processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations”.²⁶ Moreover, it argues that human security “means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity”.²⁷

These views resemble earlier formulations of security. For instance, in 1984 Gwyn Prins argued:

Security is produced by general social well-being. Social-well being is the sum of individual fulfilment, which depends upon the civilised arbitration of conflicts of interest in society, which in turn depends upon a just provision of goods, services and opportunities for all. Security is thus intimately bound up with another important concept ... freedom. Freedom from want, freedom of thought, freedom from fear: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are the minimum requirements of security ... So security is a state of mind, which also contains future hope.²⁸

Prins’ definition was not labelled ‘human security’ because some scholars at the time believed that the meaning of security was too narrow and needed to be expanded. Third World scholars, for instance, claimed that security in developing countries needed to be viewed in relation to efforts to meet the basic needs: food, shelter, clothing, clean water and health. For example, Al-Mashat defined security in terms of “tranquility and well-being”.²⁹ Even in developed countries, some scholars argued that a proper definition of security needed to incorporate the protection of human rights.

A proponent of human security, Caroline Thomas, posits that human security “has both qualitative and quantitative aspects” and that it is “pursued for the majority of humankind as part of a collective, most commonly the household, sometimes the village or the community defined along other criteria such as religion or caste”.³⁰ She argues: “At one level [human security] is about the fulfillment of basic material needs, and at another it is about the achievement of human dignity, which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community.”³¹ Thomas observes that human security is “engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global”.³² She claims that the achievement of human security goes beyond basic needs and requires emancipation from oppressive structures. Thomas’ view of human security is similar to her earlier definition of ‘Third World security’, which includes “internal security of the state through nation-building” and “secure systems of food, health, money and trade”.³³

The thrust of this article is in agreement with those who believe that security should deal with the concerns that the UNDP, the Commission on Human Security, Thomas and others raise. However, its criticism of the term ‘human security’ is in three parts. First, it argues that there is no need for the label ‘human security’. In this era, in which human rights and democracy have been recognised as global entitlements, no definition of security should ignore people’s needs and aspirations. Public policies, including military and security policies, are expected to be people-centred, and those that are not, should be considered misguided. Second, the idea of human security may unwittingly legitimise security that is not people-friendly. If it is acknowledged that security ought to have a human face, then the task ahead is to ensure that all security policies reflect such concerns. The discourse of human security indirectly suggests that it is legitimate to have, for example, something called military security, which may not take into account human rights and the social well-being of the people. Third, as it has already been indicated, human security is similar to the proposals for an expanded security agenda that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. The notions of security articulated by Prins, Al-Mashat, Thomas and other scholars in the 1980s need to be intermarried with those underpinning the discourse of human security to redefine all security as people-centred.

Definitions of human security suggest that this form of security is embedded in norms and institutions. Its legitimacy derives from the fact that the issues that it canvasses – democratic governance, development, emancipation, empowerment, human rights, clean water, food, health care, job security, shelter and education – are accepted as global norms. If human security is embedded in the global normative structure, it should be seen as the only legitimate form of security. As the only legitimate form of security, it does not need to be qualified by the term ‘human’. Hence the contention that all security ought to be viewed as people-centred.

In the present era, is security enhanced or undermined by counter-terrorism measures? The next section addresses this question.

Counter-terrorism, norms and institutions

Counter-terrorism may have initially emerged as a reaction to terrorism, but it has become a continuing practice that anticipates, prevents or pre-emptes terrorist activities. In principle, counter-terrorism measures are conceived within norms, rules and institutions, but, in practice, the template that African states have been required to adopt since 2001 has the potential to undermine universally accepted norms, rules and institutions.

Indeed, since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, the US and the UN, especially through the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, have initiated wide-ranging counter-terrorism measures which African states and other countries are expected to implement. Most of these measures are technical and legal in nature, and range from the tightening of financial, aviation and border controls, to the protection of critical infrastructure and communications. In their quest to suppress dissent and, in some cases legitimate political activities, various African countries have passed laws that go far beyond constraining the terrorists.

The measures that African states have taken individually to detect, deter, arrest and prosecute terrorists may be important in the short term. However, if such measures provided a lasting solution to terrorism, Israel would not be having problems with Hamas and Hezbollah. An analysis of the African landscape reveals that many states have poorly trained security and intelligence agencies, porous borders and enormous governance problems. Some of those with long coastlines on the Indian and Atlantic oceans do not even have boats to patrol their coastlines. Even if these structural and technical weaknesses were addressed, terrorism would remain unless the social, economic and political causes were eliminated.

Several African countries, from Egypt to South Africa, and from Nigeria to Kenya and Uganda, have adopted legislative anti-terrorism measures that, in varying degrees, erode human rights and civil liberties. These include Uganda's Suppression of Terrorism Act (2002), Tanzania's Anti-Terrorism Law (2003), Kenya's International Crimes Bill (2003 and 2005) and South Africa's Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Bill (2004). Kenya has also established a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, but there have been claims about a rift between the Kenyan government and its donors over the priorities of the centre. Although the South African anti-terrorism bill had been under consideration for about nine years before President Thabo Mbeki signed it into law in November 2004, it fits into the pattern of other legislative measures by African states, which were required by Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001. The common feature of these legislative mechanisms is that they threaten human rights, and they do so more seriously in countries that do not have human rights legislations or other human rights protective mechanisms.

Of the 52 AU member states, only 20 have established human rights commissions or similar bodies.

Amidst official claims that democratic governments cannot, and should not, give in to terrorists, several African, and non-African, governments have adopted counter-terrorism measures that show that terrorists have compelled them to undertake steps that inconvenience their own citizens. The terrorists who masterminded the events of 11 September 2001 may not have intended to cause wholesale changes in the governance structures of Western countries, let alone those of other countries, but the legislative measures adopted by various African countries suggest that these events have caused political consequences far beyond the terrorists' dreams.

In the 1970s, Paul Wilkinson claimed that the "primary objective of counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law".³⁴ He posited that "this aim over-rides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence".³⁵ Contrary to Wilkinson's thesis, the post-September 2001 counter-terrorism measures have undermined the norms, rules and institutions that have been threatened by terrorists.

What, then, is the way forward?

Proposed counter-terrorism model

This counter-terrorism model is based on four pillars: the traditional approach, institutions, development, and social justice. These options overlap and they are by no means the only ones that could be useful. Some situations may require one approach rather than the other, but whatever option is taken it is likely to have greater international legitimacy if it reflects consensus in international society and is sensitive to norms, rules and institutions.

The 'traditional' counter-terrorism approach relies on the use of intelligence agencies, the police and the judiciary. It does not address the root causes of terrorism. It offers only a band-aid solution, but it is less harmful than the George W Bush-generated template. In the past, this approach was effective in containing terrorism in Germany, India, Italy, the UK, and other countries, but it did not involve the erosion of civil liberties. Some scholars and policy-makers might argue that in the aftermath of the events of September 2001, the traditional approach does not work. Those who would make this point would be ignoring the fact that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were possible partly because of the failure of US intelligence agencies to share information. Unfortunately, the US and other governments over-reacted and instituted far-reaching counter-terrorism measures even before the cause of the 11 September 2001 problem had been fully investigated. The

legislative measures that have been undertaken undermine democratic governance and fundamental freedoms, and inconvenience the citizens of democratic states. The use of the traditional approach would have several advantages. First, it would demonstrate that governments have not panicked or been intimidated by the terrorists to inconvenience their own citizens. Second, it would create an atmosphere for the enhancement of democratic governance and basic freedoms while combating terrorism.

The 'institutional' counter-terrorism option is based on the understanding that institutions can reduce the likelihood of terrorism in various ways. First, institutions constitute the identity and regulate the behaviour of actors, including governments and terrorists. Without institutions, there would be no sense of order, security and justice.

Second, to the extent that institutions also constitute terrorism, the challenge is for policy makers to devise ways of promoting those institutions that promote human solidarity and encourage the 'self' to respect the 'other'. Keohane argues that one of the functions of institutions is to limit the use of large-scale violence and "to provide a guarantee against the worst forms of abuse ... so that people can use their capabilities for productive purposes".³⁶ Disseminating and enhancing institutions that promote human solidarity can help remould the identities of would-be terrorists and modify the behaviour that leads to terrorism. Such efforts may include providing education, showing respect for cultural, ethnic or other differences, and giving support to the struggle for self-determination and the promotion of democratic governance.

The 'development and social justice options' are the most appropriate in Africa. Development and poverty alleviation have been part of the global normative structure since the 1940s. However, the meaning of 'development' has evolved. After World War II, it was associated with self-sustained economic growth and measured in GDP figures. Development also referred to attempts to redistribute resources between countries. Since the 1980s, the term development has come to refer to both qualitative and quantitative changes in a variety of areas: economic, environmental, political, cultural, social and human. At first, this effort to expand beyond economic-oriented development included provision of basic needs such as shelter, water, sanitation, education and health, which are a part of social justice. Social justice has been defined as "a morally justifiable distribution of material or social rewards, notably wealth, income and social status".³⁷ The expanded definition of development is reflected in the UNDP's *Human Development Report*, which, since 1990, has listed maternal and infant mortality rates, access to health, education and safe water, as indicators of a country's development.

Development has further expanded to include human empowerment, especially increased participation by the people in the management of their economic, political, cultural and social affairs. As Boutros-Ghali argues, development "can only succeed if it responds to the needs of the people, and if it articulates these needs into a coherent

policy framework”.³⁸ Development includes capacity building in its broadest sense, thereby implying the introduction of new ideas, standards, institutions, norms and techniques of overcoming obstacles to human progress. It also includes democratisation, an independent judiciary and an open, responsible and accountable government. Thus, development provides the basis for security.

Moreover, development, poverty alleviation and social justice can reduce the chances of terrorism by facilitating human empowerment while at the same time eliminating the conditions that produce political discontent. As Wolfensohn says:

The international community has already acted strongly, by confronting terrorism directly and increasing security. But those actions by themselves are not enough. We will not create that better and safer world with bombs or brigades alone.³⁹

He goes on:

We must recognise that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both between states and within them; while the fight against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the world; while the link between progress in development and progress toward peace is not recognised – we may win a battle against terror but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace.⁴⁰

Poverty *per se* does not cause terrorism, but it could combine with other factors to ignite political violence. Wolfensohn says: “Poverty is our greatest long-term challenge ... poverty which, while it does not necessarily lead to violence ... can provide a breeding ground for the ideas and actions of those who promote conflict and terror.”⁴¹ Moreover, poverty, combined with the politics of identity, can fuel terror. People, like those who masterminded the events of 11 September 2001, do not have to come from poverty-stricken homes in order to identify with the poor. These terrorists might have been rich, but they defined their identities in terms of the aspirations of those who had been denied justice in the Middle East. Development, poverty alleviation and social justice can help people redefine their identities and refocus their interests and energies, and, thereby, reduce the chances of terrorism.

Conclusion

Terrorism and counter-terrorism measures have undermined the norms, rules and institutions that underpin security. Through the use of indiscriminate violence, terrorism has killed innocent people, threatened jobs and dented democratic processes of resolving

conflict in society. Similarly, military and legislative counter-terrorism measures have led to the deaths of innocent people, undermined democratic governance and eroded civil liberties. In the face of these problems, African states need a creative and innovative approach to counter-terrorism. A sustainable counter-terrorism formula should include options for undermining terrorism while enhancing the normative structure in which security is embedded. Such a counter-terrorism strategy needs to shift from the short-term emphases on political suppression and military force, to a long-term values-oriented formula that is based on institutions, development and social justice.

Notes

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