



# Forecasting long-term fragility in Africa

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*Using the International Futures system from the Pardee  
Centre for International Futures, University of Denver*





# Purpose

To present a long-term forecast of 26 “more fragile” countries in Africa using the International Futures forecasting system (IFs), based on our analysis of the structural drivers of conflict.

*Paper available, monograph to follow.*



# Structure

- Forecasting and the International Futures (IFs) system
- Summary trends in Africa (Base Case)
- Our understanding of fragility (some theory...)
- List of 26 'more fragile' countries
- Trends: more fragile vs more resilient countries
- Policy space for the 26 'more fragile' countries
- Recommendations




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# **THE INTERNATIONAL FUTURES FORECASTING SYSTEM (IFs)**

# International Futures (IFs)

- Forecasts +200 variables for 186 countries using +2 000 data series from WB, IMF, UNDP, etc.
- Database for trend analysis
- Scenario-creation parameters to shape alternative futures
- Open source and free educational tool developed over 3 decades
- Used for analysis in:
  - *Human Development Reports, 2011 & 2012 (United Nations)*
  - *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (US National Intelligence Council)*
  - *Patterns of Potential Human Progress Series (Pardee Centre)*





# The Nature of Forecasting

- No matter how sophisticated, forecasting is not prediction. Its an aid to understanding one set of possible futures. Reality will inevitably unfold differently.
- If rooted in data and historical trends, such analysis is particularly useful in thinking creatively yet in a structured and 'bound' manner about what could be possible.
- We used a dynamic Base-Case forecast, and an optimistic and pessimistic forecast as outer boundaries
- And years 2010, 2030 and 2050 to benchmark changes




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# **BASE CASE TRENDS IN AFRICA**

# Global vs African growth rates

(base case forecast)




# The African economy

(Base Case – US\$2005)

- Increases more than 9x in MER terms (from US\$1 2 trillion to US\$11,1 trillion by 2050)
- Currently around 2,5% of global economy, 3,8% by 2030 and 6,5% by 2050.
- GDP per person (PPP) will grow steadily from US\$2 718 in 2010 to US\$7 588 by 2050


| Fastest growth rate in... |              |              |              |              |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|                           | In 2010      | In 2020      | In 2030      | In 2040      |
| 1st                       | Qatar        | Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone |
| 2nd                       | China        | Turkmenistan | Angola       | Tanzania     |
| 3rd                       | Mongolia     | Mozambique   | Turkmenistan | Uganda       |
| 4th                       | India        | Timor-Leste  | Tanzania     | Ethiopia     |
| 5th                       | Bhutan       | Angola       | Laos         | Mozambique   |
| 6th                       | Angola       | Uganda       | Liberia      | Burkina Faso |
| 7th                       | Turkmenistan | Laos         | Mozambique   | Somalia      |
| 8th                       | Laos         | Rwanda       | Zambia       | Zambia       |
| 9th                       | Eq Guinea    | Liberia      | Iraq         | Ghana        |
| 10th                      | Mozambique   | Zambia       | Uganda       | Laos         |

# Africa's GDP (MER) History and Base Case Forecast




# Poverty in Africa

(base case forecast)



# Trends in Internal Conflict in Africa



Source: IFs version 6.7



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# OUR APPROACH TO FRAGILITY




# Defining fragility

*Fragility can be defined as low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development. A state is fragile when it is unable to provide for basic human security and or to create the public goods and conditions needed for a minimum of human development.*

# Causality and Fragility




- Fragility originates from variety of diff sources such as poverty, poor governance, global context, bad neighbourhood, etc.
- Each country unique, we focus on structural causality
- Drivers/causes can be direct or indirect, deep or proximate
- Causality is complex and interact as part of a system = a syndrome





# Many fragile states in Africa evidence a delayed process of state-formation

1. Historical sequencing of transitions to greater *security*, *capacity* and *inclusion* has given way to a simultaneous and compressed process in Africa
2. Government/political elites have limited ability/agency to determine outcomes/control process:
  - Greater infusion of global/external concepts and ideas
  - Power and influence of private and financial sectors
3. Africa's positive new development trajectory provides new impetus to process of state formation but at time when the state has less agency/freedom of action
4. Personal and elite politics lies at the heart of the challenge of rebuilding fragile states





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# **IDENTIFYING AFRICA'S 26 'MORE FRAGILE' COUNTRIES**



# Africa's 26 'more fragile' countries

- 1. CPIA 19:** Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe
- 2. Plus 7:** Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda & Rwanda  
= 26 "more fragile" countries (Sudan/South Sudan)
- 3. 'More resilient' countries:** the rest






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# **COMPARING 26 'MORE FRAGILE' VS 29 'MORE RESILIENT' COUNTRIES**

## Poverty Less Than \$2, Log normal Formulation




| Year | More Fragile<br>Million people/% population | More Resilient<br>Million people/% population |
|------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 2010 | 302 million (70%)                           | 317 million (54%)                             |
| 2030 | 365 million (53%)                           | 282 million (33%)                             |
| 2050 | 394 million (39%)                           | 198 million (17%)                             |

# Internal War



## State Failure Internal War Event, History and Forecast







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# **BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM – SCENARIO'S FOR THE 26 'MORE FRAGILE' COUNTRIES ONLY**

## State Failure Internal War Event, History and Forecast



## Poverty Less Than \$2, Log normal Formulation






## 2030 differences in forecast size of the economy in MER and GDP PPP per person between worst and best case scenario for 26 more fragile countries

| Country           | Difference in size of the 2030 economy (MER) | Difference in GDP per person by 2030 (PPP) |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Burundi           | \$571 million                                | \$99                                       |
| Cameroon          | \$7,6 bn                                     | \$340                                      |
| CAR               | \$767 million                                | \$174                                      |
| Chad              | \$3,2 bn                                     | \$272                                      |
| Comoros           | \$96 million                                 | \$115                                      |
| DR Congo          | \$2,7 bn                                     | \$42                                       |
| Rep of Congo      | \$4,9 bn                                     | \$887                                      |
| Cote d'Ivoire     | \$5,6 bn                                     | \$219                                      |
| Eritrea           | \$376 million                                | \$77                                       |
| Ethiopia          | \$14,1 bn                                    | \$207                                      |
| Guinea            | \$2,1 bn                                     | \$236                                      |
| Guinea-Bissau     | \$195 million                                | \$151                                      |
| Liberia           | \$1,2 bn                                     | \$229                                      |
| Madagascar        | \$1,6 bn                                     | \$120                                      |
| Malawi            | \$2,7 bn                                     | \$200                                      |
| Mali              | \$4,5 bn                                     | \$234                                      |
| Mauritania        | \$947 million                                | \$283                                      |
| Niger             | \$1,7 bn                                     | \$100                                      |
| Rwanda            | \$3,8 bn                                     | \$357                                      |
| Sierra Leone      | \$1,9 bn                                     | \$280                                      |
| Somalia           | \$1,2 bn                                     | \$125                                      |
| Sudan/South Sudan | \$9,2 bn                                     | \$203                                      |
| Togo              | \$1 bn                                       | \$166                                      |
| Uganda            | \$12,8 bn                                    | \$316                                      |
| Zimbabwe          | \$1,3 bn                                     | \$166                                      |

Source: IFs version 6.7

# Summary Forecast





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# KEY RECOMMENDATIONS



# **1. Engagement with 10 long-term fragile countries**

1. Set up a long-term fragility facility that is dedicated to the support of the 10 long-term fragile countries with a 20-year horizon.
2. Embark on discussions with each to support a jointly owned and collaborative effort towards a 20-year national development plan. This plan and adherence to it should serve as a basis for the engagement by the international community and neighbours.



## Engagement with 10 long-term fragile countries (cont)

3. Develop a methodology and undertake/ commission annual independent political-economic assessments over at least an initial 10 year period, longer if possible, to track progress.
4. Work with each of the country's concerned to establish a self-evaluation process based on the example of the APRM, rooted in RECs and the AU



## **2. Go Beyond Traditional Analysis!**

Our forecasts and analysis is only as good as our data – and Africa's data problem will take decades to fix. Therefore:

Support exploration on use of 'big data' that could complement more traditional efforts of World Bank and others. In this manner partners could short-circuit many of traditional data constraints and benefit from innovative new approaches to understanding (fragility in) Africa.



### **3. Support Cash-Grants to address Deep-Seated Poverty**

Direct transfer payments to the poor are the most effective single measures to alleviate structural poverty while helping to establish tax base and develop social compact

Work towards up-front wealth sharing agreements in fragile countries that are expected to benefit from future oil and gas incomes. Aim should be to dispense large portion of additional revenues from resource income such as oil/gas as taxable income directly to poorest using cell-phone and biometric ID technologies



## **4. Mainstream and encourage Futures Analysis and Visioning**

Looking at the future allows us to see what can be possible if appropriate choices today.

Encourage integrated futures discussions at various levels (not only national) to serve as the basis for planning and use of resources, building non-formal partnerships that can bridge state institutions and authority with traditional and informal institutions.

ISS busy establishing a 'futures hub' with Univ of Denver.



## **5.Support for g7+**

Strong endorsement of the self-identification prioritization adopted by the g7+ group of fragile countries.

Offer to support the African members with the development of national plans and future's forecasting.

Advocate and offer support for a simplified version of the APRM process of self-evaluation.

Advocate for a “balanced approach” in advancement of institutionalization of governance, measures to reduce poverty, reduce inequality and conflict mediation

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