

The Future of Intra-state Conflict in Africa

More violence or greater peace?

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*Using the International Futures system from the Pardee
Centre for International Futures, University of Denver*



We live in an era of unparalleled prosperity, peace and fluidity


Conclusion of 2010 edition of the Human Development Report:

“The past 20 years have seen substantial progress in many aspects of human development. Most people today are healthier, live longer, are more educated and have more access to goods and services. Even in countries facing adverse economic conditions, people’s health and education have greatly improved. And there has been progress not only in improving health and education and raising income, but also in expanding people’s power to select leaders, influence public decisions and share knowledge.”

Global growth – history and forecast (bn 2005 USD)

GDP (MER) History plus Forecast


GDP (MER) History plus Forecast[Base](World)



But Africa...

Historical GDP growth rates for Africa


GDPR[Base](Africa)




Reasons for African growth

1. Population growth and urbanization
2. Responsible macroeconomic management and reform
3. Improved agricultural output and industrial management
4. Relatively stable political frameworks
5. More effective aid, targeted debt relief & increased domestic revenues
6. Growth in remittances and foreign investment
7. Global economic growth - demand from China in particular but also India, Brazil and others
8. Commodities boom – important but declining in relative contribution

Population size – past and future



East and West Africa's population growth



Source: IFs version 6.7


Current conflict characteristics in Africa

1. Typically fought on **peripheries of states**. **Insurgents tend to be militarily weak & factionalised**. Thus increasingly **fragmented** and **the number of actors, particularly non-state factions, involved in conflicts rising**. Complicates picture of state vs non-state actors.
2. Many insurgent groups have **strong transnational characteristics** and move relatively easily across borders and between states
3. **Convergence and connection** between networks of organised crime as well as their illicit activities, including money laundering, kidnapping, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.
4. To some extent, era of democracy and elections has seen violent competition move from armed opposition in marginal rural areas to **violence around the election process itself**.
5. Localised **violence over access to livelihood resources**, such as land and water, on the increase - includes farmer–herder conflicts. Resource competition at community level quite prone to violence.

Globally - most conflict internal (intra-state)




Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2011



Globally – generally less war but more minor instances of violence



Armed Conflicts by Intensity, 1946-2011




Globally, Africa and Asia have most armed conflict




Armed Conflicts by Region, 1946-2011

■ Europe ■ Middle East ■ Asia ■ Africa ■ Americas



7 relationships explain relatively high levels of internal violence in Africa (and other low-income regions) in comparison with more prosperous regions

1. Population structure & dynamics (youth bulge, exclusion...)
2. Transitions to democracy – which tend to be violent
3. Level of inclusion (democratic deficit)
4. Bad neighbourhood effect
5. History of previous intrastate violence
6. Governance issues
7. Poverty and violence/instability






1 Countries with large youthful populations suffering from widespread exclusion, rapid urban population growth, etc more conflict prone

- For each 1% increase in youth bulges (15 to 24), the risk of conflict increases by more than 4%.
- When youth make up more than 35% of the adult population, risk of armed conflict 150% higher than in countries with an age structure similar to most developed countries.
- Effect of youth bulges is greater in most autocratic regimes as well as in most democratic states. I.e. youth bulges provide greater opportunities in autocracies and greater motives in democracies.



Source: Hendrik Urdal, Demography and armed conflict: assessing the role of population growth and youth bulges, CPRD working paper no 2, September 2011

1 Countries with large youthful populations suffering from widespread exclusion, rapid urban population growth, etc more conflict prone

Youth Bulge, Percent of Adult Pop Between 15 and 29



Urbanizing Africa...




2 Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy are Unstable



- Large number of African countries trapped – neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic but ‘anocracies’
 - Anocracies about 6x more likely than democracies and 2.5x more likely than autocracies to experience new outbreaks of intrastate war.
 - States that experience stalled transitions from autocracy to democracy or adverse regime changes tend to be more prone to conflict and instability.
- Anocracies highly unstable, with over 50% experiencing a major regime change within 5 years and over 70% within 10 years
- Partial democracies with factionalism exceptionally unstable


3 Democratic Surplus vs Deficit



4 Previous or Repeat Violence/5 Bad Neighbourhood




- 90% of last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that experienced a civil war in the last 30 years (WD Report 2011)
- Breaking the conflict cycle...
- “a country making development advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7% of GDP every year for each neighbour in conflict” WDR 2011)



6 Governance

Consisting of: (a) the provision of domestic security; (b) the capacity to effectively administer the territory and provide minimum of services; and (c) perception of domestic legitimacy and international recognition





Three additional sub-components of governance


- Poor countries with high single commodity dependence (resource curse)
- Local livelihood conflict is increasing (but not threat of interstate resource conflict)
 - Population growth and water availability
 - Scarcity of productive rural land, particularly when high rural population growth and low agricultural yield
 - Sub-regional differences in access
 - Low adaptability and mobility of people
- Poor advancement of women

7 Poverty and Violence

Poverty does not cause violence, but violence is characteristic of countries with large, urbanizing, youthful populations, little work prospects and high rates of urbanization (i.e. changing social dynamics). Poor countries cannot provide security or effective governance due to capacity constraints and the result is high rates of exclusion, alienation and frustration.



Millions
people



Population
living on <
\$1.25 per day

%
population

Source: IFs version 6.7, Base Case forecast


Why, despite recent upsurge, is the level of intrastate conflict declining?

- End of proxy wars and normalization
- International and regional investments in conflict prevention and management (UN & AU), particularly increased African ownership and leadership in peace processes
- Progress in international rule of law (ICC, etc)
- Investments in development assistance/aid
- Africa's new development trajectory and rise of China (in particular)


Conclusion...

The world is changing (obviously)

GDP at PPP (2005 currency) History plus Forecast



GDP Per Capita key RECs




Countries in the World with the highest growth rate potential ...

Fastest growth rate in...				
	In 2010	In 2020	In 2030	In 2040
1st	Qatar	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone
2nd	China	Turkmenistan	Angola	Tanzania
3rd	Mongolia	Mozambique	Turkmenistan	Uganda
4th	India	Timor-Leste	Tanzania	Ethiopia
5th	Bhutan	Angola	Laos	Mozambique
6th	Angola	Uganda	Liberia	Burkina Faso
7th	Turkmenistan	Laos	Mozambique	Somalia
8th	Laos	Rwanda	Zambia	Zambia
9th	Eq Guinea	Liberia	Iraq	Ghana
10th	Mozambique	Zambia	Uganda	Laos

Africa's GDP (MER) History and Base Case Forecast


This is not where we want to be!




Large External Uncertainties for Africa



- Will greater multipolarity lead to greater resilience and stability or drive fragmentation?
- Continued global growth but particularly the future economic trajectory of China?
- Will the conditions that gave rise to 'war on terror' assume a new form – global class competition/sense of relative deprivation?



Agricultural Yield Change from CO2






AFP Central Africa

AFP Southern Africa

AFP East/Horn Africa

AFP Northern Africa

AFP Western Africa




Future intrastate conflict?

- Violent armed conflict will continue to occur mainly in poor countries with: weak governance, previous experience of conflict, spill-over from being located in a bad 'neighbourhood' and/or widespread youth unemployment and exclusion co-existing alongside a median age of below 25 years.
- But intrastate violence will also continue to decline over time, with the nature of violence evolving, blurring the lines between war and crime.
- Continued democratization inevitable and now driven by local demand - but faces an uncertain future and will be accompanied by considerable instability

Trends in Africa

History and Forecast Internal War in Africa



Sub-regionally

History and Forecast Internal War at Sub-Regional Level


(AFP Central Africa)

(AFP Eastern Africa)

(AFP Northern Africa)

(AFP Southern Africa)

(AFP Western Africa)



Summary

- Africa continues to require assistance in various areas including conflict management and post conflict reconstruction - Continued need to invest in UN peacekeeping and APSA as well as PBC, etc.
- Different to much of the developed world, most of Africa needs 'more' not less government – still in process of delayed state formation
- The conversion of the African developmental model to one that can provide jobs and opportunities
- The urban challenge...

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