

THE NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE, VIOLENCE ON THE EAST RAND AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE NPKF IN KATORUS

*Report on a joint project between the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and
the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP)*

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Report on a joint project between the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)
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1.1 INTRODUCTION

During its short existence the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was the subject of a considerable degree of media and general comment. Most of this was negative, culminating in very public problems which the NPKF experienced during its first days of deployment in the East Rand.

Most politicians and commentators would prefer to forget the NPKF, but in so readily confining the NPKF to the dustbin of failed transitional mechanisms, there is an urgent need to assess the lessons learnt from it. There are, in fact, many lessons that can and should be learnt about the NPKF. Summarizing these lessons for use in the future restructuring and integration of the Security Forces, is in fact only one purpose of this document. After all, this Force cost the South African taxpayer in excess of R250 million rand. The second purpose is to present as complete a history of the NPKF as has yet been published for future reference, within the context of the violence in the East Rand and the expectations of the public in KATORUS (Kathlehong/Thokoza/Vosloorus).

The Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) had a long involvement in the NPKF, albeit that of commenting from the sidelines. IDP hosted two large conferences on it, during August 1993 and in January 1994 (with the Centre for Policy Studies), held press conferences warning about the expectations that were being created around this force as early as June 1993 and dealt with scores of media inquiries on the issue.¹ The Institute also published extensively on the NPKF in its journal, the *African Defence Review*.

¹ A South African Peacekeeping Force - practical aspects, a round-table seminar hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 26 August 1993; and *The Future of the National Peacekeeping Force - legitimising public order policing in South Africa*, a conference jointly hosted by IDP and the Centre for Policy Studies, Midrand, 25 January 1994. Also see L. Coutts, *Peacekeepers will cost 'annual R1bn'*, in *Business Day*, 14 June 1993.

1.2 PROJECT BACKGROUND

During January 1994 the IDP and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) approached the SADF and the NPKF with a proposal to execute a comprehensive research programme to track the ability of the NPKF to execute its brief from inception, both **internally** (i.e. by monitoring the internal dynamics of the Force) and **externally** (i.e. by monitoring the acceptability and effectiveness of the Force in the area of deployment and amongst the general public). Both projects would, amongst others, have made use of a series of attitudinal surveys which would have provided a future government with an empirical base line data for future decision making. Five surveys were, in fact, planned. Three of these surveys were to have taken place within the NPKF: one at the time of assembly of the NPKF at De Brug; one just after completion of training and the last two months after deployment. The purpose of this internal study would have been to monitor the preparation and integration of the force, thereby identifying bottlenecks which could be valuable with a view to the integration and reconstruction of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Command Council of the NPKF (NPKFCC) however refused access to the NPKF for execution of these three surveys.

Two further surveys among the public were also planned. The aim of these surveys was to establish the initial public expectations of the NPKF (at the time of deployment) and then track any changes in public attitudes regarding the NPKF by doing a second survey in the same area two months later. Both surveys were to have been done in the areas where the NPKF was to be deployed. After permission was refused to continue with the three internal surveys, the IDP and the HSRC decided to continue with the two surveys among the public. The first of these surveys was done in KATORUS on the evenings of 18-21 April 1994. As planned this coincided with the deployment of the NPKF. The first two evenings, 18 and 19 April, were marred by violence between members of the Self

Defence Units (SDUs) in the township and hostel residents in Thokoza, especially in the area around Thokoza Hostels 1, 2 and 3. Under intense media focus, the NPKF fumbled and soon failed.

Shortly hereafter the NPKF was withdrawn from the KATORUS area and disbanded. There was obviously no need for a second public survey.

The reluctance of the Sub-Council of Defence of the Transitional Executive Council (and of its sub-structures) to allow *bona fide* research as well as to avail themselves of academic research assistance, was disappointing and short-sighted. It is time that officers and politicians alike translate lip-service to transparency and public accountability into practise. The Security Forces of South Africa do not stand outside of our society. More often than not leaders appear fearful of outside involvement instead of realising that such assistance could benefit all concerned, instead, of course, if, in their opinion such involvement would uncover things best kept hidden.

1.3 SCOPE

Apart from the introduction and executive summary (Chapter 1), this report is divided into three chapters:

- **Chapter 2:** an interpretive history of the NPKF;
- **Chapter 3:** an analysis and interpretation of violence on the East Rand from 1990 up to the events in KATORUS at the time of the deployment of the NPKF in that area during April 1994; and
- **Chapter 4:** the results of an HSRC telephone opinion survey on the public's perceptions of the NPKF done amongst a representative sample of residents of the KATORUS area on the evenings of 18-21 April 1994.

1.4 THE NPKF: WHAT CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS?

Chapter 2 traces the history of the NPKF—from the original concept, through its delayed establishment, tortuous birth at De Brug and later at Koeberg and culminating in its failed deployment in Thokoza during April. Right from the start there was a lack of clarity on the specific role of this force, on its doctrine, training, long-term future, commander, equipment, size, de-

ployment—in virtually every meaningful aspect of its creation and existence.

It would eventually be fair to comment that **the NPKF was provided with neither the opportunity nor with sufficient time to succeed.**

Only one of the four battalions of the NPKF was (almost) ready for deployment in KATORUS at the end of March, a small force considering the area and its requirements. For its part, the former South African Defence Force (SADF), which is better trained and has the operational experience in the area, deployed three battalions in the East Rand, but withdrew more than two thirds of these forces at the time the NPKF was being deployed.

Besides all the logistical problems the NPKF experienced, added to the short period it had for training and preparation for deployment, it is evident that **even if it had been sufficiently trained, they may not have been able to cope with an area as volatile as the East Rand.** Appeals by experts, including the Commonwealth Group, the United Nations Observer Mission and defence analysts, that the force be deployed in a 'soft' area were rejected. Alternatively, the NPKF could have been deployed in support of the SADF right from the start, and not be left on its own. **The decision to deploy the Force in KATORUS with, amongst others, its intensive IFP/ANC conflict, and as a Force perceived sympathetic to the ANC and lacking any IFP component, was wrong.**

The tragedy of the NPKF is that its lack of success was predictable, expected and therefore unnecessary. Nothing that happened at De Brug and in KATORUS should have come as any surprise to the informed observer. The blame does not rest on the members of the NPKF. They tried their best against virtually insurmountable odds. Rather, proper planning and careful design of implementation and strategy regarding the establishment and deployment of the Force was required.

In retrospect the crux of the problem at De Brug was:

- **insufficient time** for selection, training of the leader group, training of the troops, evaluation, re-training and deployment drills. Allowing a mere eight weeks for all these activities was completely unrealistic.
- **no clear and uncompromising (high) entry standards**, given the short training period. In

fact, no common entry standards appear to have been negotiated.

- the multi-faceted and therefore **complex and involved nature of the integration process** between former enemies (e.g., SADF and MK), police and military personnel and different organisations (four military forces, six police forces and one guerrilla force).
- an **MK contingent** which was **not militarily organized** in terms of ranks and general administration, and which included members of Self Defence Units, and **demotivated SADF and SA Police** members (evidenced by the fact that the majority of resignations from the NPKF came from the SADF and SAP);
- **absolute crisis management** (due to the lack of time) to address problems which required a much more solid approach. For example, the De Brug contingent required in excess of 360 drivers but only had about 60. As a result driver training had to be condensed and various other measures had to be adopted.
- management by committee, and even worse, **detail management by committee**. Instead of making the appointment of the best available commander their first priority, the Sub-Council on Defence made it one of their many priorities.
- a **long and complex chain of command** which included the officer commanding the NPKF, the NPKFCC, the Sub-Council on Defence, the management committee of the TEC and eventually the TEC. This apart from the political requirement of the transition which necessitated that each political party regularly consult with its principals (i.e. obtain approval for each detail decision).
- **poor logistic support and preparedness**. Since the NPKF was dependent for its logistical support on the SADF, the commitment of that organisation was crucial to its success. Various parties, such as senior members of MK, the Commonwealth Observer Mission to SA (COMSA) and NPKF commanders themselves, allege, however, that **the NPKF could not count on the full support of the SADF**. Circumstantial evidence would indicate that the relationship of the SADF to the NPKF was, at best, ambivalent. It reflected the technically 'proper' relationship between two independent organisations, but no more.

The Koeberg battalion did not suffer all of these defects. Nor was the force ever deployed or subjected to the intensive media focus of the De Brug contingent. It remained untested to the day of its disbandment in May 1994.

1.5 VIOLENCE IN THE EAST RAND: A SUMMARY OF TRENDS AND FACTORS

Chapter 3 addresses the high levels of violence and subsequent efforts for peace during the period 1990-1994 in the KATORUS (Kathlehong/Thokoza/Vosloorus) area, including the Phola Park informal settlement, on the East Rand. These levels of violence have, according to the authors, been linked to an unofficial and undeclared war between hostel residents and township residents. This war encompasses 'battle lines', 'no man's land buffer areas', night patrols and guard duties. Minnaar and Shaw state that the war is justified by both sides as an act of self-protection. While hostel residents believe that the township residents want to expel them from the area, the township residents feel that they are under constant attack from hostel residents.

The authors provide a detailed overview of the war and take as its starting point an incident at an IFP rally on 22 July 1990. Although there have been short periods of peace during the period July 1990 to the present, they assume the war still to be in progress. Therefore, the overview encompasses the entire period from mid-1990 to May 1994. Statistics indicate the human and other costs involved. The reader is provided with an insight, not only into the war as a whole, but also into the individual events which constitute it.

Various debates concerning the conflict are brought to the fore, including the division into warring factions along ANC/IFP lines, ethnicity (the Xhosa/Zulu divide), the importance of socio-economic factors, the different kinds of refugees and the complete breakdown of services such as transport. Furthermore, the role of dynamics such as the atmosphere of threat, political competition and the cycle of revenge and retaliation, are discussed. The analysis underscores the complexity of the conflict in the KATORUS area.

The chapter also addresses the changing pattern of the war from large scale clashes on open ground to attacks aimed at so-called 'soft targets'. During the course of this discussion the possibility of third force involvement, as well as some evidence from the Goldstone Commission's enquiries into the violence on the East Rand, is presented.

In dealing with the efforts which aimed to establish peace in the area, the authors mention only the most important ones. These are the National Peace Accord, the deployment of the Internal Stability Division (ISD), their replacement by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and, finally, the brief deployment of the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF). All of these are critically examined to provide the reader with some insight into the reasons for their failure.

The authors conclude with a brief mention of the role of the South African Defence Force in establishing peace in KATORUS, with specific reference to the fact that they are currently the only persons perceived by both sides to be legitimate in their quest for peace.

If the new SANDF is perceived to be the only force capable of policing the area, this may undermine the role of the new South African Police Service from the beginning and divert resources away from re-establishing proper forms of policing in the area. As soon as KATORUS has been stabilised, active attempts must be made to allow the deployment of substantial numbers of police officers in the area, while the SANDF still remains. Only after a period of overlap should the army be withdrawn. There must be no question of the SANDF remaining permanently deployed on the East Rand despite the temptation such a course of action may hold in the short to medium term.

1.6 PUBLIC OPINION OF THE NPKF IN KATORUS—A SYNOPSIS

The telephonic survey on the public's perceptions of the NPKF was executed by Markdata on 18 to 21 April 1994 in a random sample of residents of the KATORUS area and then analysed by the Division for Socio-Political Analysis of the HSRC.

In contrast to the 'national' public sentiment and certainly that of the media, the people in KATORUS had a more positive assessment of the NPKF than was expected. Admittedly, the survey excluded hostels and informal settlements, i.e. it was done in areas with generally high levels of ANC support.

Given the relatively positive evaluation of the NPKF (although it was deployed for only about a week) the very negative media image that South Africans had of the NPKF does not ap-

pear to be completely justified. It is also questionable whether the NPKF was given enough opportunity to prove itself in a supporting role to the SADF. Indeed, all survey data indicate that the NPKF was reasonably positively evaluated in areas where it functioned under relatively normal circumstances.

The greatest single proportion of the respondents in KATORUS (43%) felt that the presence of the NPKF in the township did not add to their feeling of security. In Thokoza, where most of the violence occurred during the deployment of the NPKF, almost two thirds of the respondents indicated that the presence of the NPKF did not add to their feeling of security.

Although the overwhelming majority of the respondents (88%) were aware of the deployment of the NPKF in their area, there was some confusion as to the main purpose of the NPKF. Of those who stated that they felt the NPKF was not needed in their area, the greatest proportion (26%) expressed the view that it was not well trained. The events at De Brug and the media focus on the many problems which were experienced at that base had clearly affected the expectations of the residents of KATORUS.

More than three-quarters of the respondents indicated that the NPKF should be allowed to do the following: crowd control, riot or unrest control, arrest people, mediate in conflicts, search people, search vehicles and search hostels. More than two-thirds of the respondents felt that the NPKF should be empowered to search people's homes. The greatest single proportion of the respondents (45%) felt that the NPKF should be allowed to teargas people. More than half the respondents stated that the NPKF should not be allowed to shoot people or hit people.

This last finding probably also reflects an aversion to violence which is to be expected in most people. It reaffirms the commitment to the principle of the minimum of violence as far as is possible. In spite of this, those feeling unsafe or very unsafe appear to see the need in some situations for the use of stronger measures.

The importance of impartiality received high priority from the results of the survey which tested perceptions of neutrality. Once a public order policing organisation has been ascribed the image of partiality (with or without reason), as has happened to the ISD, that body will not be able to restore order and

keep the peace. It should be mentioned here that only 11% of the respondents thought that the ISD was neutral enough to ensure peace before, during and after the election in April. The image of the regular police has been seriously affected by the negative image of the ISD. Although it was not possible to test this perception during the survey, the significantly large MK contingent within the NPKF and the lack of IFP representation created the expectation that the NPKF would be sympathetic to the ANC. This expectation was borne out by the reaction to the NPKF by a number of SDU members during its deployment who wanted to 'join up' with the NPKF 'against' the hostels.

Perceptions that the NPKF was needed, declined once that force had been deployed and violence escalated. Although the NPKF clearly had a large degree of legitimacy, the majority of residents appeared to realise that the Force was not very well trained, had done little to stop the violence and, in some cases, may even have contributed to the violence. To some degree, therefore, the track record of the SADF as an effective (and increasingly legitimate) force in stabilising the area overrode the initial acceptance by the community of the NPKF. Therefore, the more unsafe the residents felt, the more inclined they were towards the SADF.

The surprisingly high acceptance and legitimacy of the SADF was reinforced by the perceptions of respondents as to how the NPKF should be composed. A clear preference was expressed for the SADF (26%), MK (9%), the SA Police (8%), Peace Monitors (5%) and the civics (3%). A large proportion (35%) of respondents were uncertain in their response. These views on the SADF are reinforced by the perceptions regarding the neutrality and capacity of various organisations involved in combating violence. Close on 80% of respondents believed that the SADF was both neutral and effective in maintaining peace during the elections. Just over half of the respondents (56% and 51%) felt that both the NPKF and the Peace Structures had a similar capacity.

In contrast, the ISD scored very badly on all counts. It was **perceived as neither effective nor legitimate.** The NPKF, by contrast, had an initial legitimacy which was inevitably undermined by its lack of effectiveness and method of operations. **The SADF, initially an illegitimate force, through the support it received**

publicly from the ANC at the time of its deployment and its effective operations in the eyes of the community thereafter, succeeded in earning legitimacy over time. In sum, legitimacy bestows authority. In itself it is insufficient if not supported by effective and impartial execution.

1.7 CONCLUSION

There appear to be two general sets of conclusions which one can draw from the attached report and which have not yet been adequately dealt with. First, why did the SADF succeed where the NPKF failed? Second, given the legitimacy problem of the ISD and the disbandment of the NPKF, who or what is going to augment the SA Police Service in violent areas?

Chapter 2 (summarized in section 1.4 above) provides a concise review of the problems experienced within the NPKF. Obviously these factors go a long way towards explaining why the NPKF appeared to fail so dramatically once it was deployed. Yet this is only half the story. The other half relates to the question as to why the SADF was apparently so successful in KATORUS.

An analysis of the successful SADF operations from 14 January to 15 April 1994 reveal a number of crucial lessons for future similar operations. Implicit in these guidelines are many of the reasons why the NPKF, deployed in great haste to replace the SADF, clumsily rushed into a situation which the SADF had nurtured for many months.

Right at the start the SADF was **welcomed and accepted by the ANC**, the majority party in the region. In turn, the SADF rapidly established open and direct communication channels with community and other leaders in KATORUS, and persisted in negotiations with **the IFP leadership** in the hostels until such time as it had also established direct communication links with this sector of the community.

The SADF also availed itself of **professional advice and assistance regarding conflict management, negotiation and communication skills**, etc. Most of these skills were drawn from within the SADF, in particular from the Medical Psychology Unit of the SA Medical Services.

Effective communication was the focus of the SADF deployment practices. It occurred with the local inhabitants of the area; with the media; and internally within the SADF.

Of these, **internal communication within the SADF** forces was the most important. By ensuring that all soldiers knew and fully understood the operation and their role and responsibilities, the SADF commanders ensured that every soldier was part of the larger team. This set the scene for effective communication with the community and the media.

Communication with the local population occurred at every level—from the use of ground shout, distribution of pamphlets, etc. to personal communication between local residents and individual troops on deployment. These efforts kept the local inhabitants informed of local events, SADF planning and actions. A crucial element of this communication effort was the establishment of **liaison forums** between the SADF and community, church, political, taxi leaders. Liaison forum members participated as observers in SADF patrols and were involved and consulted in all major decisions affecting the community. Any perceptions of politically biased actions by the SADF were, therefore, soon proven to be incorrect.

SADF relations with the media in KATORUS were open, accommodating and transparent. A media room was established within which representatives of the media were received and briefed. Every effort was made to respond effectively and accurately to media requests, including allowing the media to accompany patrols when and if requested. As a result a constructive relationship developed between the SADF and the media which contributed to the acceptance and image of the SADF.

Through its various communication fora the **SADF** reiterated its '**rules of the game**', based on the three principles of **reward, punishment and transparency**. Despite its emphasis on communication, explanation and liaison, SADF actions were firm and uncompromising. In contrast to the uniform application of 'minimum force in every situation', acts of aggression against the SADF were, for instance, not tolerated, nor acts of overt intimidation against members of the public. Generally, the SADF applied the principle of 'sufficient force to meet the objective as opposed to 'minimum force'.

As a result of open communication channels established at every level with the local inhabitants as well as with their leaders, an **effective intelligence** flow was ensured. Without timely, accurate intelligence, effective operations are impossible. With every soldier a source of information, the SADF set up an internal collection and interpretation process which served as a basis for operational planning.

The second broad conclusion flowing from this study is premised on two questions. The first question is: Who is going to assist the normal (community-based) police service on a permanent basis to stabilise violence torn areas in the foreseeable future? The second question is who or what is going to coordinate, manage and integrate the various efforts required for ongoing conflict management, conflict resolution and mediation which will inevitably remain a hallmark of large areas of South Africa for some time to come?

There is no simple or easy answer to the first question. **Clearly there is a need to undertake a comprehensive and fundamental review of the whole South African security system, i.e. of the national police, provincial police, municipal police, police reserve, military (including the Citizen Force and Commandos), National Peace Accord structures, SDUs and the private security industry.** Such a review would, in our opinion, have indicated a number of alternatives to the mere **disbandment of the NPKF.**

With the NPKF having failed to meet its designated objective a number of options presented themselves:

- additional bridging and conversion training and preparation for the NPKF to be converted into normal light infantry battalions and integration into the SANDF;
- additional training in preparation for the NPKF to be transformed into a South African contingent for participation in future UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (such as in Rwanda);
- additional bridging and conversion training with the purpose of combining the NPKF with the ISD as either:
 - * part of the public order police force contingent of the SA Police Service at national or provincial level; or

- * as a separate and independent public order force; or
- * as a fifth arm of service of the SANDF (together with the commando's and territorial commands).

As South Africa has experienced a serious wave of crime and much political violence, it has become apparent that **very serious consideration should be given to the separation of the functions of normal policing and public order policing.** If this is not done, the police service may not be able to implement both community-based policing and a programme to combat crime effectively.

There will remain, for many years to come, a requirement for a public order police force in addition to a community-based police service. If the Internal Stability Division (ISD) of the SA Police Service has become so discredited so as to be beyond redemption, a replacement will have to be created. **The real challenge should have been how to use the NPKF to legitimise the function of public order policing in South Africa.** The conversion of the NPKF into an alternative to the ISD or, integration into the ISD, would have enabled the SA Police to concentrate on crime prevention and community-based policing. In addition, it would have made a positive impact upon the available police numbers for these purposes. The disbanding of the NPKF compounded an expensive exercise in futility.

In particular we need to:

- restructure and legitimise the organisation tasked with public order policing (presently the ISD);
- establish nine provincial police services and as a result, reorganise the police service at a national level;
- deal with the SDUs in as positive a manner as is possible;
- establish, under provincial control, formal conflict management, resolution and mediation mechanisms which also formally draws in the various National Peace Accord, monitor and marshal structures;
- get the military out of the townships and back to their own job; and

- **make border control and security a major focus of our security effort, designating forces and resources to this task.**

All of this will occur against the backdrop of the requirement for the integration of former opposing forces, massive pressure on state expenditure and affirmative action programmes.

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L. Coutts, *Peacekeepers will cost 'annual R1bn'*, in Business Day, 14 June 1993.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE¹

*Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Director, IDP,
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& Mr Tsepe Motumi, Researcher, IDP*

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Following a troubled history, the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) has been disbanded. These events started earlier this year when the force was assembled at De Brug outside Bloemfontein. At the time, problems dogging the force ranged from poor logistical supply to strikes over pay. To place these problems in context, it is important first to examine the force from its inception.

The scope of this chapter is as follows:

- the recommendation by the Technical Committee on Violence;
- peacekeeping, peace enforcement or public order policing?;
- command, control and committees;
- composition of the NPKF;
- training;
- the (lack of a) long term future;
- the De Brug intake;
- the Koeberg intake;
- international assistance;
- logistics, finances and salaries.
- deployment planning;
- winding down; and
- conclusion.

2.2 THE RECOMMENDATION BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE

The idea to establish a 'new', neutral peacekeeping force during the political transition originated from several quarters within South Africa during 1992. Publicly various general proposals were made regarding the creation of such a force, for example by the former chief of MK staff Chris Hani, and a number of religious leaders such as Bishop Stanley Magoba.² It was a notion which was very attractive to the ANC who were hesitant to be solely dependent upon the SADF and the SA Police in the run-up to and during elections. Both forces had been at the forefront of the campaign against the ANC, prior to 1990 and both were suspected of being involved in ongoing attempts to discredit and undermine the ANC thereafter.

Formally the concept of establishing such a peacekeeping force received a huge boost when the Technical Committee on Violence at the World Trade Centre recommended the creation of such a force in its fourth report to the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum on 2 June 1993.³ This

¹ The greater part of the material for this chapter was gathered through extensive interviews with members of the NPKF and persons within the NPKF/TEC command structure. They have all requested to remain anonymous.

² Hani was, for example, quoted as stating that 'We need to build a broad peace corps within our townships and places of work. Should we not have township-based, non-partisan SDUs funded and trained by a future democratic state? I am thinking of paid or voluntary services, let us say 500 people from a township like Sebokeng doing a two-year stint assisting with crime control, patrolling, clean up campaigns and general service to their townships'. *Work in Progress* (July/August 1993: 19). In making this proposal he was apparently prompted by the problems with and within the SDUs in the townships, especially in the Vaal Triangle.

³ The members on the Technical Committee on Violence were Mr. W. Felgate (later replaced by Ms. S. Vos, Mr. P. Hatty (chairman), Mr. S. Mufamadi (later replaced by Mr. M. Phillips), Mr. G.B. Myburgh, Mr. V. Ntsubane, Adv. P. Oosthuizen, Prof. A. Seegers, Prof. H.W. Vilakazi. The IFP later withdrew from the Committee.

hugely ambitious recommendation read as follows⁴:

The Committee proposes the establishment of an independent peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its functions thereafter should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, should be constituted in such a way as to have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.

Considerable debate apparently preceded the wording adopted by the committee on the function of the NPKF. The recommendation of the working group was, in fact, based on two bilateral agreements between the SA Government and the ANC on the one hand and the SA Government and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on the other. The agreement between the SA Government and the ANC originated in April 1993 at a meeting in Simonstown. Thereafter the idea was carefully inserted into the national debate in the turmoil that followed the assassination of SACP leader, Chris Hani, during April 1993. In July, ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa urged that such a force be established to prevent democracy from being drowned in blood, and that it replace the SADF and Police in the townships. Then Minister Leon Wessels and State President De Klerk publicly stated Government support for such a force 'in principle'. Soon thereafter the IFP walked out of negotiations and their crucial involvement in the NPKF (which would have been provided from the Kwazulu Police Force) did not materialize. The lack of IFP involvement cut to the very essence of the NPKF, for it was dependent upon its inclusive nature as a primary source of legitimacy. Logically the fact that the IFP did not participate in the force should have precluded the deployment of the NPKF in areas of IFP and ANC rivalry such as Natal and most townships on the East Rand. This was not to be the case.

⁴ For an analysis of the recommendation see J K Cilliers, *A South African Peacekeeping Force - is it practicable?*, *South African Defence Review*, No 11, 1993

2.3 PEACEKEEPING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT OR PUBLIC ORDER POLICING?

Following the recommendation of the Technical Committee in early June 1993, various organisations submitted memorandums on the NPKF to the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum at the World Trade Centre during June 1993.⁵ But having made the recommendation to establish the NPKF, the Technical Committee on Violence did not pursue the matter further. The implementation of the recommendation was left to the major political parties, where the urgency of the NPKF had to compete with a host of other issues—all urgent and all dependent upon the laborious process of legitimisation through detailed, multi-party negotiation. Inevitably, any progress on the implementation of the NPKF now became hostage to the national negotiation process. Delays at a national level inevitably delayed progress with the NPKF—and reduced the available time once the date for the election, 26-28 April 1994, had been decided upon.

A vigorous, if ineffectual, debate on the merits and demerits of details regarding the NPKF now ensued outside the World Trade Centre.⁶ These ranged from its composition, to its doctrine, its training and so forth. Two reports are

⁵ Lawyers for Human Rights, *Representation to the Goldstone Commission on Violence and Intimidation re the Role of a National Peace-Keeping Force in creating an environment for free and fair elections*, no date; Centre for Intergroup Studies, *Memorandum on the Peacekeeping Force*, (to the Technical Committee on Violence) June 1993; Institute for Defence Policy, *A peacekeeping force for South Africa - is it practicable?* (to the Technical Committee on Violence), 14 June 1993; Inyandza National Movement *Submission on a National Peace Keeping Force during transition*, (to the Technical Committee on Violence), 11 June 1993; Democratic Party, *Youth Services Corps*, (to the Technical Committee on Violence), 10 June 1993; Institute for Defence Policy, *Demobilisation, Integration and the Sub-Council on Defence*, (to the Technical Committees on Violence and the TEC), 8 June 1993; Inkatha Freedom Party, *Proposal National Peace Corps*, (to the Technical Committee on Violence), 28 May 1993; ANC, *Proposed terms of reference for Sub-Council on Law, Order, Stability and Security and proposed ancillary mechanisms* (to the Technical Committee on Violence), no date.

⁶ See, for example, A. Omar, *Keep the Peace*, in *Work in Progress*, 90, July/August 1993. G. Mills, *Is a non-aligned peace-keeping force possible?*, in *Cape Times*, 30 June 1993; L. Coutts, *Peacekeepers will cost 'annual R1 bn'*, in *Business Day*, 14 June 1993; B. Seery, *Proposed peace force too pricey*, in *Sunday Star*, 13 June 1993; J. Cilliers, *Be wary of the costs and complexity of a peacekeeping force*, in *Business Day*, 4 August 1993

noteworthy. The first was that of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) entitled *A South African Peacekeeping Force—is it practicable?* which was also published in the *South African Defence Review* (Cilliers, 1993). The second was by the Goldstone Commission.

Cilliers argued, amongst others, that a long term perspective should be taken with the establishment of the NPKF. Its nature should be that of a public order police squad, eventually serving to legitimise the function of public order policing in South Africa given the legitimacy crisis of the Internal Stability Division (ISD) of the SA Police and the ongoing requirement for such a force. The IDP also presented an analysis of the financial and manpower implications regarding the establishment of such a Force with the warning that it would be expensive, could not be done effectively in the time available and that care should be exercised when selecting recruits.

During August the Goldstone Commission released a very comprehensive report entitled *Report to the Commission on the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation by the Multinational Panel to inquire into the curbing of violence and intimidation before, during, and after the forthcoming South African Elections*, dated 11 August 1993. The panel made a number of important recommendations related to the NPKF—virtually all of which were ignored.⁷

The crux of the debate revolved around the nature of the NPKF, in other words its doctrine and composition, and the inclusion of the ISD. The Goldstone panel and the IDP had both urged that the NPKF virtually replace the ISD as

an instrument of public order policing, taking great care to ensure a high calibre of constituent troops, which would then have to be trained for a considerable period of time. Since the task of training the NPKF was a massive one, both recommended that outside help be sought from member states of the European Community and the Commonwealth at an early stage and that training of senior officers should begin immediately (i.e. August 1993). So, as we understand, did the SADF.

In contrast to the arguments in favour of a public order police approach, the Sub-Council on Defence, and the public at large, allocated to the NPKF the task of 'peacekeeping'—at that stage a vague concept in South Africa. To this end, the bulk of the training was based on emulating United Nations practices in international, so-called 'blue beret', peace-keeping along the lines of the operations in Namibia, Somalia and Cambodia. In a very useful *Adelphi Paper*, Mats Berdel (October 1993, p. 12) recently identified eight categories which collectively embrace contemporary peacekeeping operations, only some of which could be applicable to South Africa. These are:

1. *Electoral support. ...*
5. *Preventive deployments. ...*
6. *The separation of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, custody and/or destruction of weapons.*
7. *The establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies.*
8. *Disarming paramilitary forces, private and irregular units.*

These categories also serve to describe the nature of peacekeeping operations, particularly the emphasis on military or preventative actions. It is this emphasis on a holding (military) action rather than the restoration of law and order in areas such as the East Rand upon which the NPKF was built. Instead of looking at a means to legitimise the function of public order policing and taking a strategic perspective on the problem, South Africans added to their existing problems. The reason for this was closely related to the political agreement which was struck between the ANC/MK and the SA Government/SADF and the hostility of the ANC and much of the general public towards the ISD.

⁷ The essence was that 'The principal function of the PKS [Peace Keeping Service] is to bring to public order policing, in its broadest sense, a newly coordinated approach that has both credibility and the capacity to cope with all aspects of the election process. ... we do expect the Service to assume responsibility for many of the functions performed by the SAP - and all those performed by the ISU - in dealing with marches, rallies, and demonstrations and in responding to incidents of violence wherever they occur.' (p. 55). The purpose of the PKS, as envisaged by the international panel, would be to be responsible 'for coordinating and managing the police role during the election period, including police response to election related violence and election day security.' (p. 39). The panel did warn that '... recruiting, training and integrating of new members of the Peacekeeping Service (PKS) will take months, and South Africa cannot afford to wait that long.' (p. 40). Time was of the essence and an important factor in the creation of the PKS. It also recognised the inherent difficulties in trying to merge what it called multiparty affiliated forces to create a united PKF.

The fact that the NPKF would inevitably serve (at least in some areas) to replace the discredited ISD was factually correct, but politically unsavoury in the South Africa of 1993. Rather than discuss specifics, analysts sympathetic to the NPKF resorted to vague distinctions regarding peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement—emphasizing the fact that the NPKF would (somehow) bring to South Africa a 'new ethos'. How this ethos would fare when shot at by an AK-47 was never explained. South Africa was not a foreign country into which forces were going to be deployed! In fact there is little difference between the function of the ISD which is defined as *'The combatting of riots ... combatting of violence and unrest in the Republic of South Africa.'* (21 June, 1993: 45) and the subsequent Transitional Executive Act (No 151 of 1993) which stated that the Sub-Council on Defence *'... shall budget for and be allocated the necessary resources to establish and maintain a force, to be known as the National Peacekeeping Force, the functions of which shall relate to the maintenance of peace and public order in South Africa.'*

The opposition of the ANC against the inclusion of the ISD in the NPKF was politically expedient but strategically inept, as for that matter, was the opposition of the SA Police to the idea of the NPKF. The ANC argued that the ISD had, through its actions, *'... come into direct conflict with many communities'* (Business Day, 9 December 1993). The SA Police argued that the ISD was, in fact, a highly trained, disciplined elite force which had simply suffered a bad press. Both ignored the real problem that South Africa was a very violent society which would require a strong public order police force or acceptance of the permanent deployment of the SADF in support of the Police internally. The fact is that **the NPKF was a political creation and not a determined answer to a violent problem**—although it clearly had the potential to make a substantial contribution to conflict management and resolution.

The TEC Act mandated the Sub-Council to do a range of things ranging from determining *'... the philosophy, doctrine, syllabi and training policy of the National Peacekeeping Force to make regulations regarding ... the powers and duties ... the circumstances under which the National Peacekeeping Force may be deployed ... the conditions of service and remuneration of members of the National Peacekeeping Force ...'* and establish *'... a disciplinary code, including a code*

of conduct, for members of the National Peacekeeping Force'

The TEC Act did not link the NPKF directly to the elections. This appeared to leave the door ajar to establish such a force as a permanent organization and not to limit its role to the elections only. Yet, in practice, the very *raison d'être* of the NPKF was to help ensure free and fair elections. As a result all planning and preparations were clearly affected by and aimed at deployment before the elections scheduled for 26–28 April 1994. Eventually, the determination of the TEC and its Sub-Council on Defence to train and deploy the NPKF before elections, necessitated by the lack of any long term vision of the NPKF beyond April 1994, would spell near disaster.

In retrospect it would appear as if the requirement for a South African Peacekeeping Force arose from the following considerations:

- the legitimacy crisis confronting the SA Police (the Internal Stability Division in particular) and the SADF in the townships at that stage, the level of distrust and mistrust of these forces at a political level, and therefore the requirement for an all-inclusive but non-partisan force in the run-up to and during the elections coupled with the fact that such a force would not be provided by the international community. (Such a notion was not favoured by either the ANC or the National Party.)⁸
- the desire to remove the various armies, the SADF in particular, from their role in support of the police in law and order duties, particularly in the run-up to elections;
- it obviated the requirement for full multi-party control of the Security Forces (the SADF in particular) as well as all other non-statutory forces and those of the homelands by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC)—something which the SA Government had strongly resisted⁹; and
- as a preparatory experiment in the integration of military forces—an issue about which the SADF was particularly enthusiastic.

⁸ Maj. Gen. Bantu Holomisa, amongst others, did call for an international peacekeeping force to come to South Africa. See Anon., *Focus on Defence in Sowetan*, 15 July 1993

⁹ See L. Coutts, *Warning on united SA Army*, in Business Day, 14 June 1993; J. Masilela, *Call for joint control of armed forces*, in Pretoria News, 13 June 1993.

Right from the start the SA Police were decidedly unenthusiastic about the idea of the NPKF as was evident in their submissions to both the Technical Committee on Violence and the Goldstone Commission (SA Police, 21 June 1993). To some degree this is also the reason why the NPKF was set up under the auspices of the Sub-Council on Defence and not the Sub-Council on Law, Order, Stability and Security of the TEC. But there was a second, more cogent reason. **Only the SADF had the logistic and infrastructural capacity to assist the establishment of the NPKF in the time demanded.** Placing the NPKF under the Law and Order Sub-Council would, therefore, have compounded coordination and assistance. On the other hand the SA Police were aware that the new constitution made them responsible for public order policing after elections.

2.4 COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMITTEES

Once the decision to establish the NPKF had been taken, its formal inauguration was made dependent upon the passage of the TEC Act which authorized the establishment of the Force. With the benefit of hindsight there was no reason why Parliament, with the agreement of the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum could not have legislated for the establishment of the NPKF much earlier.

The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) Act was passed by Parliament in September 1993. On 18 November 1993 the plenary session of the multiparty negotiation process endorsed the provisions of the Act and authorised its implementation. The TEC started functioning on 7 December 1993 with seven sub-councils. The truly daunting responsibility to establish the NPKF was that of the eight-member **Sub-Council on Defence**.¹⁰ Despite the problems that the NPKF soon ran into, the Sub-Council had a mammoth task and **would eventually be the most effective of the various sub-councils.**

On 5 January 1994 the Sub-Council on Defence established the **Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC)** to plan the integration of military forces, as well as create a new, national,

Defence Force for South Africa,¹¹ and the **National Peace Keeping Force Command Council (NPKFCC)** to establish the NPKF.¹² The co-chairpersons for the NPKFCC were Mr. Lambert Moloi from MK and Lt. Gen. J.H. Pretorius from the SADF. All military, police and non-statutory forces who contributed to the NPKF were represented on the NPKFCC which therefore was a much more disparate group than the JMCC.

The proposed establishment of the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was greeted enthusiastically in the media. An editorial in *The Daily News* of 5 January 1994 said that '... it is a remarkable achievement. South Africa has proved not only that its people can decide their own political and constitutional future, they can bring it into effect as well without United Nations, Commonwealth or any other external Peace keeping Forces.'

The intention was to establish an initial force of some 4 500 strong, divided into four battalions, three at De Brug near Bloemfontein and one at Koeberg in the Cape. Each battalion would consist of five companies of 190 men (A, B, C, D and E companies). Each company was composed of five platoons with three sections per platoon. Shortages in key personnel such as headquarters administrative personnel existed right up to the end. The initial size of the force was, therefore, slightly less than that of a brigade without the trained staff officers, the support services or heavy equipment normally associated with such a formation.

The obligation on the Sub-Council to effect command of the NPKF through a large Command Council, although perhaps a 'politically correct' decision, was to prove a fatal flaw. Management by committee was bad enough. **Command by committees would prove disastrous.**

¹⁰ The members of the Sub-council were Mr. W.N. Breytenbach, General A.J. Liebenberg (rt.), Mr. R. Kasrils, Brig. L.M. Bengu, Mr. J. Modise, Adv. A.S. Maake, Prof. D.M.D. Mahlangu and Brig. G. Ramushwana.

¹¹ The co-chairman of the JMCC were General George Meiring, Chief of the SADF, and Mr. Sipwe Nayanda, Chief of Staff of MK. It included as its members representatives from all the various statutory and non-statutory armed forces which had subscribed to the TEC Act.

¹² The TEC Act stated that: 'The Sub-council shall establish a National Peacekeeping Force Command Council, comprised of representatives of all the military forces and policing agencies participating in the National Peacekeeping Force and wishing to be represented on that Command Council.'

Instead of delegating its responsibilities to the commander of the NPKF, the NPKFCC was forced to adopt this cumbersome methodology in the interests of inclusivity and political balance. Various work groups were established under the NPKFCC—all of which were politically balanced—such as one each for personnel, logistics, training, international assistance, operations, telecommunications, intelligence, etc. The working groups worked for the NPKFCC, who in turn presented their recommendations to the Sub-Council, for reference to the Management Committee of the TEC, for approval by the TEC, so as to instruct the commander of the NPKF. At the end of this chain of command, the commanding officer of the Force had an unenviable task.

The first and crucial task had to be the appointment of a commander for the force. But on this the Sub-Council on Defence deadlocked between Brig. George Krus of the SADF and Brig. Derrick Mgwebi of the Transkei Defence Force. Crucial days passed before, after consideration of the appointment of an international commander, the Sub-Council decided in favour of a compromise candidate in the form of Brig. Gabriel Ramushwana, then the Head of State of Venda and Chief of the Venda Defence Force. Brig. Ramushwana was appointed by the Sub-Council at its meeting on 24 January 1994, i.e. the same day that training was to have started. Technically he only assumed duties on 7 February with the rank of major-general and was replaced on the Sub-Council, representing the Venda Defence Force, by Col. N.G. Ramare-misa. (*Government Gazette*, 4 March 1994.) **For four crucial weeks a force without a commander was yet another novel invention of transition politics.**

Ramushwana subsequently vacated his seat on the Sub-Council but gaps in the command structures of the NPKF existed for weeks after the establishment of that force—even up to the deployment of the force in KATORUS when the NPKF found itself unable to deploy an operational tactical headquarters. The controversy surrounding the Commander of the NPKF did not end there and the press pointed to an alleged financial scandal related to a pension payout to the General in Venda. The fact that Ramushwana was an ANC election candidate did not, of course, endear the NPKF to the IFP, although he withdrew his candidacy upon his appointment as commander of the NPKF. Again IFP supporters would point to the alleged bias in

the composition of the NPKF not including, as indeed it did not, any IFP component.

But there were also other problems. For political reasons the command and support staff of the NPKF had to be 'balanced' in their composition. That is, if the chief of logistics was from the SADF, his deputy had to be from either MK or the Transkei Defence Force. In the absence of his own contingent of an integrated staff organisation and in some cases a lack of capable staff officers, Gen. Ramushwana bore an inordinate work load and had the unenviable task of having to command the NPKF with the Sub-Council on Defence and NPKFCC constantly looking over his shoulder. As time passed the lack of competent staff officers at De Brug, in Pretoria and eventually in KATORUS became a virtual nightmare. For example, none of the signals officers, at any of the three De Brug battalions were making the grade.

Finally, instead of locating the NPKF headquarters at the major training base (De Brug), the Sub-Council on Defence decided that the headquarters for the force was to be situated at Kasteel Park, Pretoria. This decision ensured that the commander of the force was removed from the physical location of the object of his command, at De Brug and Koeberg, although it gave the NPKFCC direct and easy access to the commander of the NPKF. Given the speed with which the NPKF was being set up, it is questionable whether this was a wise decision. The solution to this problem, the appointment of a capable deputy commander at De Brug, was never, for whatever reason, adopted. Eventually the members of the NPKF would also complain that they never saw Ramushwana who became less visible as the problems of the force increased.

2.5 COMPOSITION OF THE NPKF

According to the TEC Act, the NPKF had to be comprised of members of:

- (i) *all military forces, as far as practicable in equal numbers, except in so far as any such force prefers to contribute fewer members to that Force; and*
- (ii) *every policing agency which falls under the authority and control of a participant in the Council, wishing to be represented in that Force.*

Originally the SADF and MK would have contributed to the Force in equal numbers, making

up some two thirds of the force in total, with the rest provided by various other military and police forces. The KwaZulu Police Force, the Bophuthatswana Defence and Police Force and Ciskei were not part of the NPKF planning and preparation process, although the latter eventually did subscribe to the TEC Act and participated in the NPKF (Government Gazette, 10 February 1994). As a result the NPKF would eventually be composed of members of the SADF, the SA Police, MK, armed and police forces of Transkei, Ciskei and Venda, as well as members of the police forces of five of the six non-independent 'national states'.

The racial composition of the NPKF eventually also came under scrutiny. On 1 February Maj. Gen. Bantu Holomisa, head of the Transkei government, issued a press statement: *'I have been shocked to learn that no white troops (Riflemen or Privates) have been included in the training of the National Peace-Keeping Force ... The only whites involved in the training exercise are only instructors. ... We can only conclude that the RSA Government still upholds the 'own affairs approach' to national affairs and the SADF is for the protection of whites. ... For example, the National Peace-Keeping Force could be ambushed while executing their duties by the SADF and its trained surrogate forces in the knowledge that there are no whites who would be wounded or injured.'* General Holomisa raised this accusation in public despite the fact that he was a member of the TEC and that the Transkei Defence Force was represented on both the Sub-Council for Defence (by Brig. L. Bengu) and the NPKFCC, without apparently first taking the issue up in a less public manner. This could only have angered and upset the members of both the Sub-Council as well as the NPKFCC. It could also not have contributed to good morale amongst the members of the NPKF itself.¹³ His accusation, although factually correct, was a reflection of the changed composition of the SADF at lower level, where the number of white troops had declined to a very small proportion of the total SADF as a result of conscription ending.

2.6 TRAINING

Logically, the assembly and training of the NPKF was expected to consist of two phases.

¹³ It also soon became apparent that Transkei was intent to recruit an additional 1 000 Police and 1 000 Army personnel, some of whom were required to replace those personnel who had been seconded to the NPKF.

First the selection, integration, orientation and training of the leader group, followed by the same for other ranks. A selection process (both for the leader group and other ranks) typically extends over two weeks in a country such as France, depending very much on the preparatory work and numbers involved. Using international comparative standards, junior leaders (platoon leaders) could be crash-trained in 2 months, but if this is to be achieved, they required 5-8 years of appropriate experience. Company commanders and more senior officers could be trained in a month, but required at least 10 years appropriate experience. In sum, the selection process for all leader groups would take about two weeks, followed by either one or two months of training (for senior and junior leaders respectively) and a further two weeks of evaluation and examination. The minimum training requirement for the troops was estimated at 16 weeks.¹⁴ None of these schedules caters for or allows any time for the integration of forces—in itself an equally demanding task. Nor does it allow for the special training requirements for drivers, signalers, medics, clerks, storekeepers, etc. **The South African planning for the NPKF would set new standards in shortened training schemes.**

In fact, **no preparatory selection process was established for either the leader group or the other ranks of the NPKF.** As a result, there were major differences in standards. The NPKF troops should at least have had an equivalent to std 8 level of education and a common level of basic military or police training. This was not to be. Some of the MK members who arrived at De Brug were, in fact, not trained cadres, but members of SDUs. Others were distinctly rusty in their level of training and some had very limited reading and writing skills. Many SADF members, on the other hand, had apparently been ordered to 'volunteer' in the age old tradition of military discipline, and tempted with better pay. Such incentives do not necessarily attract the cream of the crop. Nor, for that matter, was there necessarily a common standard between the members of military and police forces from some ten police and military forces and a Soviet organised and trained liberation army.

At De Brug and Koeberg instructors of the NPKF underwent a two-week training course (which

¹⁴ See Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills, *Time to face Facts - what future for the National Peace-Keeping Force?*, in the African Defence Review, no. 14, January 1994.

was often shorter due to logistic and political problems) after which they in turn had five weeks to train the NPKF recruits. This period of training was later extended by one week — a crash course in any person's language. As discussed below, Commonwealth and French observers were called in in an advisory capacity to assist and provide some expertise on the training of the NPKF but even this assistance would prove insufficient.

Eventually the training for the troops was divided into three main training modules, all with their specific sub-topics. Module One started with the 'aim of the force' and its structure, the code of conduct and lectures on the peace accord. Module Two focused on drill, musketry, communications, negotiation skills and first aid. The final module concentrated on more detail regarding peace force training, namely crowd control, road blocks, cordon and search operations, etc.

Then there was the problem of different military cultures, particularly between that of the SADF and the TBVC armed forces on the one hand, and MK on the other. And finally, the differences in culture between the participating military and police forces. Severe problems were to arise when police culture had to marry with military culture on top of all the other challenges. The police tend to work in small groups and mostly individually. A police warrant officer, for example, differs vastly from a military sergeant-major who is often the man who organizes food and clothing, is responsible for general discipline, guard duties, etc. In contrast to the publicly held perception, **integration was a multifaceted affair.**

All of these problems compounded the demands on the overworked, understaffed and ill-prepared training teams at De Brug and Koeberg, suffering as they were from poor logistics, unsure of the doctrine they were to teach and without a commander. There was little chance that they could succeed in the time available. Tragically, **a good idea had come to suffer the consequences of inappropriate political demands.**

2.7 THE (LACK OF A) LONGER TERM FUTURE

For the members of the NPKF at De Brug and Koeberg the longer term future of the force would remain unsure. As the IDP had warned *'Without a clear longer term career prospect,*

people of calibre and skill will not join a Peacekeeping Force' (Cilliers, 1993: 34).

According to the post-April 1994 constitution (Act no 200 of 1993), the function of public order policing is constitutionally allocated to the police (section 218). In fact, Chapter 14 of the interim constitution provides for only two distinct Security Forces under a newly elected Government, a National Defence Force and a National Police Service, the latter with the responsibility to *'establish and maintain a national public order policing unit'* allocated to the National Police Commissioner. The post-election Police Service is also tasked with border control. No mention is made of the future of the newly established National Peace-keeping Force in the interim constitution. The implication was clear—the NPKF would not be a permanent, separate force, but would have to form part of either the SA National Defence Force or the SA Police Service, after the elections. It would not appear as if the members of the NPKF were informed whether or not the NPKF would survive as an organisation. **Such a lack of the most basic job security could not have contributed to motivation and morale.**

Given these facts, the continued planning about the long-term future of the NPKF and its size by the Sub-Council and NPKFCC presents an intriguing mystery. During early February 1994 the Sub-Council on Defence recommended to the TEC that the NPKF should exist for at least three months after the general elections before being integrated into the yet-to-be-established SANDF, i.e. during August 1994. The Sub-Council still continued to plan for a second and even third intake at De Brug, the first of these which would only be ready for deployment during mid July (eventually mid-August), i.e. just in time to be integrated!¹⁵ It was obvious that differences of opinion existed about the future of the force. General Ramushwana, for example, saw the Force as the embryonic South African contribution to international peace-keeping operations, i.e. a force that could participate in UN initiatives in areas today such as in Rwanda, etc. The SA Police appeared to think that there was a chance that the NPKF would be absorbed into the ISD.

¹⁵ The planning for a second intake at De Brug (two battalions strong) was for the training team preparations to commence on 18 April and the main force intake to start on 9 May. Deployment would occur by 19 July but following the evaluation results of the first De Brug intake in April, prior to deployment in KATORUS, training was extended by 30 days with deployment re-scheduled for mid-August.

From the start the idea was to train up to 10 000 men and women for the NPKF. Yet this remained an elusive target. The target figure of 10 000 appears to be an arbitrary one, possibly drawn from the average SADF levels deployed in the townships during the preceding months.

In fact it would appear as if even the 4 500 member force presented considerable problems in the sudden procurement of large numbers of body armour, riot shields, riot batons, shortage of instructors, etc. A first intake of 4 500 men and women at De Brug (three battalions) and Koeberg (one battalion) would, therefore, either have to be followed by a second and even a third intake at the same bases, or additional facilities had to be found for the additional 5 500 men and women required to bring the force up to 10 000 members. Although both Venda and the Transkei offered additional training facilities, closer inspection revealed that these did not meet the requirements and the Sub-Council eventually decided in favour of successive intakes at De Brug and Koeberg. Yet the full contingent of the NPKF, i.e. 10 000 troops could probably have been housed and trained at one of a number of SADF locations. The Army Battle School in the Northern Cape, although very isolated, comes to mind. In fact a large number of SADF bases and facilities stood half-empty or were under-utilized following years of post-Namibian war downscaling. Some of these now serve as Assembly Areas for MK prior to integration into the SANDF.

It was these examples that made MK suspect that the SADF was not assisting the further expansion of the NPKF. This caused Mr Ronnie Kasrils to make a detailed submission to the Sub-Council, spelling out the extent to which many SADF facilities were under-utilized or empty. By implication Kasrils was accusing the SADF of restricting the expansion of the NPKF. Although the SADF responded in detail to Kasrils's accusations, the suspicion lingered. **Relations between separate, independent, self-accounting government security agencies are never easy. In the case of the SADF and the NPKF they appeared to reflect competitors.**

Eventually the Sub-Council decided that two more battalions were to be trained at De Brug, that the main intake would commence on 18 May and that the initial 6-week training period would be extended for 30 days. By then the various forces which were to contribute to the further intakes were a little reluctant to provide

these forces. Apparently, at the time that the NPKF deployment was starting, only the SADF and MK had promised forces.

2.8 THE DE BRUG INTAKE

In accordance with a media release by the Sub-Council on Defence (dated 19 January 1994) the training of the first NPKF contingent at De Brug was to commence on 24 January 1994 and consist of five to six weeks of training so as to enable the NPKF to be deployed before elections on 26-28 April 1994. This compressed training schedule, one needs to emphasize, was forced upon the NPKF through no fault of its own. In fact, the original training schedules which the SADF recommended were considerably longer.

The acting Officer Commanding De Brug was Col. Fred Burger of the SADF who, in the absence of a TEC-appointed commander of the NPKF, had to fend for himself. The prior training for the training team of some 47 members at De Brug commenced on 9 January.¹⁶ The command group arrived at De Brug on 16 January and received orientation training from 16-23 January. The main force, scheduled to arrive on Monday 24 January arrived two days early, catching the De Brug preparations on the wrong foot. These problems were compounded by a stream of visitors to the De Brug area, including the NPKFCC, the Sub-Council and the media who resorted to any and all means to gain information about events at the base.

The De Brug training camp had, at a stretch, accommodation for 3 350 persons, which was the number originally expected. Instead the camp had to deal with some 3 740 trainees—a situation largely caused by the arrival at the camp of an additional 440 policemen from the Transkei who were not expected or planned for. As a result the NPKFCC decided to reduce the Transkei contingent (both Defence and Police). When 439 Transkei Police and military persons were sent back to the Transkei, another 55 members of the Transkei Police accompanied them without permission. This pattern was apparently not restricted to members from Transkei.

¹⁶ From a comparative perspective, a training team of ten members per company is required. I.e. to train a NPKF of 1 000 men (four companies) simultaneously would require a team of 40 full-time trainers. The first De Brug intake would therefore have required a training team of 120-150 instructors to meet these criteria.

The first of many administrative problems arose when it became apparent that some MK cadres were using their 'battle' (*Nome de guerre*) instead of their real names. Without identity documents no bank accounts could be opened. Without bank accounts salary payment had to occur by hand in the camp. A comparison between the remuneration of persons from different armed forces but with equal rank under these circumstances was inevitable.

Various other problems also surfaced in the De Brug intake. The Transkei Defence Force, for example, sent 240 lance-corporals—a vastly expanded number—which implied an additional financial burden. Only the SADF supplied any signal officers and there was a deficit of logistic personnel which was to remain a thorn in the side of the NPKF until the end. Another problem was the ranks of MK cadres. The problem of a lack of uniform standards or criteria for ranks was compounded by the overnight changes in some MK ranks. MK, after all, had never followed the Westernised rank system.

When training commenced at De Brug, the SADF had provided 927 persons, the Transkei Defence Force 863, the Transkei Police 440 (not planned for), the Ciskei Defence Force about 256 (which was 32 persons more than planned for), MK 830 (which was 59 persons less than planned for), the Venda Defence Force 188 (23 less than planned for) and the SA Police 197 (23 less than planned for). A nominal number of policemen from Qwa Qwa, Kangwane, Ciskei, Venda and Gazankulu (29 in total) also reported. Similar to the additional recruits from the Transkei Defence Force, they were not expected.

Right from the start command and control problems arose in the distribution of clothing, such as boots, to the lowest ranks. While De Brug expected that all the members were medically fit, this was soon found not to be the case. Within a week or so 16 members had to be discharged with various illnesses such as TB.

Time marched on but the NPKF did not. Troops were reported as being undisciplined. Various shortages of uniforms developed. In a very highly publicized event on 29 January, MK members threatened members of the SADF and SA Police, danced and sang into the morning hours. This incident dealt a severe blow to the image of the NPKF. The problem was solved, but seven MK members were subsequently discharged at their own request due to the fact

that they were not free to carry on with political activity on the base. The already low morale of many SADF members, which stemmed from the fact that not all the members of the SADF were volunteers, plummeted further. On 17 February a SAMIL truck overturned. One member of the NPKF was killed and several others injured. The cause of the accident appeared to be drunkenness on the part of the driver and overloading. Soldiers went absent without leave (about 30 men were absent without leave at any given stage during the first few weeks), went on strike over their salaries and no sooner had this matter been resolved than some were involved in a drunken brawl in the centre of Bloemfontein. During the third week of March it was reported that one of the battalion commanders and the chief of staff had been charged for unspecified crimes. Members were also tardy in returning from leave and in some cases, took NPKF vehicles for this purpose. The media soon labeled the Force the '*National Peace Keeping Farce*'.

All of these events, and the adverse media coverage, undermined morale. Low morale meant little motivation. Resignations from the force increased. By 8 March 1994, 187 resignations from NPKF had occurred. Reasons ranged from conditions of service to the strike over pay or domestic problems.

By early February the TEC had not yet passed the NPKF legal support plan. There was simply insufficient time for all the legal and other preparations. Without legal powers there was neither a proper basis for the conditions of service of the members of the NPKF, nor a disciplinary code. It was only after troops had been absent without leave (and their commanders legally powerless to stop them) that a code of conduct and disciplinary code were finalized by the TEC and published in the Government Gazette on 21 February 1994. A normal military relies more on *esprit de corps* than on the threat of legal proceedings for its internal cohesion. **In the absence of an integrated military culture, only coercion remained.** After members of the NPKF had signed the code of conduct discipline improved.

In a briefing to the Sub-Council on Defence on 11 March, Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA) Chairman Russel Marshall was blunt. He summarized the problems in the NPKF at De Brug as follows:

- 'Integration of a force from 13 different groupings, in some cases previously opposed to each other.
- Resentment among elements of SADF, SAP and homelands forces at the circumstances of their recruitment—some of these soldiers have left.
- The pay issue, now resolved.
- Inappropriate gradings of some officers to senior rank.
- An impression that the SADF either wishes the NPKF to fail¹⁷, or is ambivalent (a) foot dragging over the supply of equipment, such as armed vehicles. (b) an impression that neither SADF nor SAP have sent their best trainers, (c) poor provision of logistical support—shortage of drivers, cooks, technical support, armoured. No gas masks for training
- ... what seems to be an orchestrated campaign to undermine confidence in the NPKF ... through the media.'

All these problems were vigorously reported by the hungry pack of media representatives which descended on De Brug. The attention was neither unexpected, nor should the various disciplinary problems have come as a surprise. Eventually additional media liaison personnel were appointed and a comprehensive media strategy was prepared by the NPKF during March but it was not implemented—probably a wise decision if one reflects on the results that followed.

The evaluation of the De Brug contingent occurred over the period 21-25 March 1994. The evaluation team was a politically balanced one under the coordination of the Director Training of the SA Army, members of Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group (CPAG) as well as the Transkei Defence Force, SA Army, MK, SA Police and Venda Defence Force. During evaluation, weaknesses emerged in the command element of the NPKF which were attributed to the requirement for 'politically correct' appointments. In fact, the verdict of the evaluation team was mostly negative. It attempted to soften the blow by vaguely indicating three 'strong points': *'Although the integration went well there is still place for improvement.*

¹⁷ This was also the view of Minister of Defence Joe Modise. See P. De Ionnio, *Former MK leader gets to grips with his army*, in *The Sunday Times*, 22 May 1994.

a. *Despite restraints and few guidelines from Bde HQ [Brigade Headquarters] the Bns [Battalions] carried on with training.*

b. *Impact from CPAG members on the training.*

c. *Willingness to learn by most of the troops.'*

These three points were followed by 22 'weak points', ranging from 'Poor or no guidelines from Bde HQ' to 'Lack of Basic Leader knowledge', to poor initiative, 'Members of some delegations do not have the affinity for military discipline', etc. (*The Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 22-28 April 1994: 3-4) In sum the Evaluation Team found that One and Three Battalions (with the exemption of two companies which could be deployed) needed considerable retraining. Two Battalion, under its commander Lt. Col. Q.B. Painter, was ready for deployment after some retraining. As a result Two Battalion plus two companies of Three Battalion would be deployed in KATORUS on 11 April. One and the rest of Three Battalion would be retrained and possibly deployed on 23 April.

Following leave, the retraining of Two Battalion was delayed because the troops were slow in returning from their leave. This in turn cut into the available time for re-evaluation prior to deployment. The retraining of One and Three Battalion occurred from 11 to 16 April, but was apparently not followed by re-evaluation.

2.9 THE KOEBERG INTAKE

On 25 January the NPKFCC approved that the force at Koeberg would consist of a single Battalion (Headquarters and five operational companies), a total of 1062 (later 1 200) persons. Due to the limitations of the available ablution facilities, the Koeberg intake included only 22 women, the majority belonging to the medical unit.

The detailed composition was eventually as follows:

- SADF 251;
- Transkei Defence Force 188 and the Transkei Police 161 i.e. more than a company each;
- MK 246;
- The SA Police 36;
- the Venda Police 20; and

- the police forces of Kangwane 5, KwaNdebele 26, Lebowa 39 and Qwa Qwa 32.

Yet a number (about 120) of police force members of Lebowa, Gazankulu, Kwandebele, Kwangwane and Qwa Qwa left the base and returned to their home forces soon after reporting.

The Koeberg Base Commander was Lt.-Col. M Dhladhla from MK. The MK contingent which reported at Koeberg apparently all came from Tanzania. In contrast to the situation at De Brug, they were well disciplined, trained and organised. This in itself alleviated and even avoided many of the problems that De Brug had experienced. A second reason for the higher morale and standards at Koeberg, than at De Brug, could be found in the excellent facilities, both living quarters and recreational at Koeberg. Rooms, not tents, were the norm. Perhaps a third reason is that Koeberg did not have to suffer the media scrutiny of De Brug.

The original training schedule for Koeberg was as follows:

- Training team preparations at Koeberg: 7-14 February
- Command Group preparations: 14-21 February
- Main Force intake: 21-28 February
- Main Force training: 28 February-11 March
- Evaluation: 11-12 April
- Possible retraining: 13-14 April
- Possible leave: 15-20 April
- Preparations for deployment: 21-22 April

The Koeberg instructor cadre was some 14 men strong, i.e. much smaller than that at De Brug, with the SA Police providing the larger contingent (as opposed to the SADF in the case of De Brug). Similarly, the French training contingent at Koeberg was from the police and did not include a military contingent as was the case with the Commonwealth team. An inevitable problem was anticipated when the two forces, the military-trained De Brug and the police-trained Koeberg contingents, were deployed together. To this end some care was taken to ensure uniform standard operating procedures between the two contingents.

The evaluation of the Koeberg Battalion occurred from 8-9 April. In general the results were slightly better than those of De Brug, with the evaluators agreeing that the battalion could deploy following limited retraining. These better results, one can accept, flowed from the greater time that the training team had to prepare themselves for their intake, as well as the higher quality of the MK delegation. Following evaluation, retraining was scheduled for the Koeberg Battalion as from 12 April but did not commence on the stated date.

Eventually the Koeberg battalion was not deployed, but stayed at their base as a reserve force for the De Brug battalions.

2.10 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The involvement of the international community in the training of the NPKF was obligatory in terms of the TEC Act. In an earlier article Cilliers & Mills (January 1994: 36-37) argued that such assistance should '*... include four elements, namely: expert policy advice; assistance with the selection of members for the Force; the provision of training for the South African training contingent; and, finally, ongoing oversight and refresher courses (including overseas visits and courses) for some period afterwards.*'

The participation of foreigners could have provided an unbiased source of expertise in a much more effective manner than a 'politically balanced' South African effort. It could also have served as a crucial arbitration function for the selection of personnel. Assistance with determining and adjudicating standards of admission to the Peacekeeping Force would have been particularly useful. The TEC Act specifically mandated the Sub-Council on Defence to: '*... establish criteria for the recruitment, training and selection of members of the National Peacekeeping Force.*' As discussed earlier, this was not done and had a detrimental effect, particularly at De Brug.

Following exploratory discussions, the Commonwealth and the French government offered training assistance in mid-January. The Netherlands also offered assistance but no Dutch assistance was utilized. The Commonwealth was originally requested to provide a contingent of 26 members for both De Brug and Koeberg. The subsequent arrangement with the French largely confined the CPAG (Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group) to De Brug.

France originally agreed to send a training team composed of 10 trainers from the French National Police in February with the purpose of training 100 instructors for the NPKF. This presented the NPKF with a problem since there was insufficient time to train the instructors prior to the actual training period. In fact instructor training had to be done virtually parallel with the training of the NPKF themselves. The eventual request to France was reduced to only 6 instructors. They arrived at Koeberg on 4 March, did their job, and left for France on 11 April.

The Commonwealth, on the advice of Britain, were less than enthusiastic about French involvement, as were the French about the presence of a Commonwealth liaison contingent at Koeberg. There were obvious problems in having a mixture of French (police) and British (military) doctrines—apart from language and other more practical differences. The first group of COMSA trainers from Britain, India, Canada, Botswana and Zimbabwe for De Brug was to arrive on 6 February. This group was under the command of Col. Nick Cottam from the UK with Deputy Inspector General Arun Gupta of India as deputy co-ordinator. They led a team of 20 advisors. From discussions with members of the NPKF at both Koeberg and De Brug, it would appear as if the Commonwealth team followed a more 'hands on' approach than the French.

Both the FPAG and the CPAG made substantial and positive contributions to the training. They were professional and perceived as such. However, being restricted to an advisory role and a very limited time frame, theirs was a frustrating experience.

2.11 LOGISTICS, FINANCES AND SALARIES

The TEC Act stipulated that the Sub-Council on Defence '... shall -

- (i) *in consultation with the National Peacekeeping Force Command Council and after consultation with the South African Defence Force, determine the requirements of the National Peacekeeping Force in respect of uniforms, transport, accommodation, equipment and other logistic support; and*
- (ii) *budget for and be allocated funds for this purpose.*
- (c) *The uniforms, transport, accommodation, equipment and other logistical support ... shall*

be supplied by the South African Defence Force, either from its own resources or from the resources of any other defence force or policing agency or any other source, for the account of the Sub-Council.

The NPKF was virtually totally dependent on the logistic support of the SADF. Practically, Orange Free State and Western Province Commands were to provide logistic and other support to the De Brug and Koeberg intakes respectively. The feedback from the NPKF leadership appears to suggest that it was only the support of these organisations that often prevented the collapse of the NPKF project at various stages. But survival does not imply progress. The political requirement for consultation, representation, etc. meant that **the SADF could not proceed with prior planning for the NPKF**. In fact any such preparations were often viewed with suspicion. The delays with the establishment of the NPKF also meant that when a final decision was taken to establish the force, little preparatory time remained.

Low morale within the NPKF was compounded by the lack of clarity about pay scales for the first few weeks. The original finances stipulated that seconded members would retain all allowances as stipulated by their force of origin as well as a service allowance per month according to rank. Members of MK were particularly concerned since they did not, as was the case with seconded members of the other armies and police forces, have an existing payment system. In the absence of personnel files and registers, all MK members were paid on the lowest notch of their rank. It would appear as if the initial planning for the NPKF by the NPKFCC entailed paying all members at the top salary notch of the participant forces. It would also appear that the high salaries which the Sub-Council wanted to pay all members of the NPKF was to improve morale and provide an incentive for personnel to remain in the NPKF.

When it became apparent that the troops from the Ciskei were remunerated at higher scales than any of the other forces, the Sub-Council and the NPKFCC recommended that the Ciskei scales be used as a '*highest common denominator*'. The TEC balked at this suggestion and resisted, fearing that such a decision would set a precedent for the payment of salaries of members of the SADF and SAP. The recommendation to accept the highest common denominator approach was subsequently revised downward by the TEC who decided that all members of the Force would be paid according

to SADF scales. In the case of a Private (the rank most severely affected) this meant, for example, that he or she would receive an effective 33% smaller salary.

The salary problem, foreseen for some weeks, built up. The TEC did not want to budge as it was concerned about the problems that could be created when the NPKF was deployed alongside the SADF and SAP, both of whom were doing the same job, but at much lower salaries. The issue soon started to affect morale and a crisis was expected with the first payment of salaries on 25 February 1994. Recruits felt that they had been recruited under false pretences. The fact that persons of the same rank performing the same tasks would receive different salaries was a problem. At De Brug members of the NPKF were apparently aware of the recommendation that all be paid at Ciskei levels. Then, as feared, the NPKF went on strike.

As a first step the TEC agreed that a special daily allowance amounting to R26,50 per day was to be paid to members from 1 March 1994. Salaries were also revised. The revised monthly salary structure after the strikes were as follows:

- Brigadier—R10 534,25; Colonel—R7 697,25; Lieutenant Colonel—R6 535,50 ; Major—R5 835,25 ; Captain—R5 053, 25; Lieutenant—R4 354;
- Warrant Officer First Class—R5 053,25; Warrant Officer Second Class—R4 052; Staff Sergeant—R3 599; Sergeant—R3 146; Corporal—R2 692; Lance-Corporal—R2 692; Private—R2 389.

There were also long delays in the approval of a budget for the NPKF by the TEC with the approval of the NPKF budget 'in principle' only happening during the last week in January. Eventually the TEC approved a substantially reduced 1993 budget of R130 million, i.e. for the financial year ending on 31 March 1994, during the third week in February. The 1994/5 NPKF budget for R255 million was also subsequently approved by the TEC.

2.12 DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

At an early stage, possibly during early February, three areas were identified as possible deployment sites for the NPKF. These were the Western Cape, Natal and the PWV, more particularly the East Rand. Given the lack of any IFP participation in the NPKF and the low intensity war being waged in a large part of that

province, the inclusion of Natal as a possible deployment site is inexplicable. Apparently the plan was to 'penny packet' and deploy a company of troops in the Western Province, two battalions of NPKF troops in Natal and three battalions in the PWV region. The NPKF had already commenced with deployment drills when the Sub-Council recommended to the TEC, early during March, that the NPKF only deploy in the Witwatersrand.

At the end of March the Sub-Council again changed its mind and now decided that the three De Brug battalions should be deployed in the KATORUS area and that the Koeberg Battalion would be deployed in the Greater Inanda area (comprising Kwa Mashu, Bhambayi and Entuzuma) in Natal. Then, in the third week of April, the Sub-Council, acting upon an appeal from the Management Committee of the TEC, directed that the NPKF not be deployed in Natal, but only in the East Rand.

It is difficult to understand what could have been achieved by the deployment of a company of troops in the Western Province. Nor does an explanation readily present itself for the insistence to deploy the NPKF in the country's most volatile areas, such as the East Rand and Natal, where the force was virtually assured of failure given its limited training, the lack of IFP representation and the high levels of violence in those areas. In fact a number of commentators had publicly advised against such deployment.

By the end of March General Ramushwana could indicate to the NPKFCC that he planned to have the best of the three De Brug battalions deployed in the KATORUS area on 8 April and the remainder on 11 April, depending on the results of the evaluation at De Brug from 21-25 March which are discussed elsewhere. Following the evaluation, the NPKFCC decided that one battalion would be deployed on 14 April and the remaining two on 23 April, subject to further evaluation.¹⁸

Because of retraining, the deployment of the three battalions into the area was to be phased in as they became ready, but completed before the elections. The NPKF was to be responsible for Kathlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus and the following informal settlements: Phola Park, Mandela View, Holomisa Camp, Tambo Park,

¹⁸ At the time of the deployment of the first battalion from De Brug, the NPKF was 3 950 strong (HQ 140, De Brug 2 814 and Koeberg 996).

and Crossroads. No additional powers were granted to the NPKF in relation to those of the SADF.

2.13 THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NPKF IN THOKOZA

The NPKF brigade tactical headquarters commander was Col. Vic Walker (appointed to this post on 15 April, the weekend before deployment), with Lt Col Quinton Painter as the Battalion commander.

An advanced team of NPKF soldiers was deployed on 11 April 1994 in the East Rand. A report in *The Star* dated 11 April quoted the IFP central committee as saying that *'it was alarmed to hear MK members within the NPKF were moving into the East Rand and warned of grave consequences.'* In the week of the 15 and 16 April the rest of the battalion was deployed and promptly came under fire from hostel dwellers. The IFP said they were not welcome and preferred the ISD and SADF. On the evening news of 17 April reports stated that there was an exchange of fire between the hostel dwellers of Thokoza and the NPKF. Running gun battles developed between hostel dwellers, residents and NPKF soldiers in Thokoza. In three days 15 people had been killed including a well-known photographer, Ken Oosterbroek. A NPKF soldier, according to photographers and journalists at the scene, had panicked and started to shoot wildly—resulting in the death of Oosterbroek (*The Star* 19 April).

The SADF was eventually called in to restore calm—a move which was welcomed by residents. By 20 April, sixteen people including one NPKF soldier had died and 40 were injured in unrest-related violence. Later reports put the death toll at 19. The ANC called for the dismissal of the head of the NPKF unit on the East Rand after the SADF had to be called in to end a bloody battle. On the streets, Self Defence Unit members were calling the force the 'National Party killing force' and demanded they leave, while those in the hostels accused it of assisting Umkhonto we Sizwe. Amid all the chaos, the South African Police claimed that police vehicles and policemen had come under attack by the NPKF in Thokoza on at least three different occasions in two days (*Business Day* 20 April; *The Citizen*, 20 April; *The Star*, 20 April). The IFP called for the withdrawal of the NPKF from the East Rand. At the time of the events in KATORUS, only a battalion had been

deployed, with the remaining two De Brug battalions preparing to move to the area.

Less than a week after the integrated force replaced the SADF in the violence-torn region, the NPKF was withdrawn from the East Rand and operationally restricted to certain areas as the SADF moved back into the area to restore peace (*Pretoria News*, 20 April).

2.14 WINDING DOWN

Following the clashes in KATORUS, the NPKF was in support of the SADF, despite the press statement referring to joint operations and shared responsibilities. The NPKF would henceforth serve as back-up to the SADF. On 21 April Col. Vic Walker of the NPKF announced that: *'... we have agreed that the SADF will resume its previous role in maintaining stability in those areas which have seen the most violent clashes in the past week whilst the NPKF will conduct the more routine tasks of escorts, protection of certain schools and similar areas and establish itself as part of the community ...'* The division of tasks was as follows:

- SADF: roadblocks/vehicle control points; mobile/foot patrols; liaison forums; search operations.
- NPKF: escorts; school protection; protection of essential tasks; protection of key points; water provision; protection of polling stations after hours; liaison with community.
- Joint SADF/NPKF: roadblocks on main entrances; manning of observation posts.

On 9 May it was announced that the NPKF contingent which had been deployed would return to De Brug, regroup and commence retraining pending a decision on their future by the incoming government. On 16 May 1994 the JMCC recommended that the NPKF be disbanded. The 1 200 MK members would be allowed to apply, through the assembly area at Wallmansthal, to join the SANDF. Members of the statutory armed and police forces (i.e. former SADF, Transkei Defence Force, Venda Defence Force, etc.) would rejoin their various organisations and be integrated from there into a central military or police organisation.

It is unfortunate that the NPKF on its first tour of duty did not succeed. However, inexperience and a lack of sufficient training is partly to blame. The overriding reason, however, was the lack of time. Politicians were in too much of a

hurry to get the NPKF off the ground. It was politically expedient to create the force at the time. *'By pressing for the deployment of hastily trained soldiers in an area notoriously difficult to police, the TEC has exhibited classic symptoms of political conceit and myopia'* (The Star, 20 April). Criticism against the NPKF came from all quarters, some were sympathetic. For example, senior military sources are reported to have said that it was 'unfair' to expect the NPKF to cope with the situation in the area (Pretoria News, 19 April).

The Citizen (21 April) was more scathing: *'instead of helping to maintain or restore peace, it is a menace to peace...[I]t should be disbanded...or allocated innocuous duties far from the volatile East Rand or any other unrest areas.'*

2.15 CONCLUSION

Only one of the three battalions of the NPKF was ready for deployment in April, a small force considering the KATORUS area and its requirements. For its part, the SADF which was better trained, equally or better equipped, had much more experience and the operational experience in the area, deployed three battalions in the East Rand but withdrew two of these at the time the NPKF was being deployed. Allegations of deliberate sabotage of the NPKF have been levelled at the SADF, not least by the new Minister of Defence, Joe Modise. These included failure to provide sufficient logistical support at the De Brug base, and where the force was deployed on the East Rand. Others have also added that the SADF did not want the NPKF to succeed as it would have upstaged the SADF. These allegations, whether true or false, are fuelled by SADF official spokesperson's vehement denial that the NPKF was a lesson in integration of the armed forces, or that it was in any way linked to the SADF. The perception is not that everything was done to make it fail but rather that it was only granted the 'proper' co-operation and support which an independent self-accounting department or force could expect—an attitude of 'if you cannot manage for yourself do not take the job'.

The real tragedy of the NPKF is that it was all so predictable and expected. Nothing that happened at De Brug and in KATORUS should have come as any surprise to the informed observer. The blame does not rest on the members of the NPKF or their commanders. They tried their best against virtually insurmountable

odds. A greater degree of realism in the political guidelines regarding the establishment of the force and the effort required, would have been appropriate.

Besides all the logistical problems the NPKF experienced, added to the short period it had for training and preparation for deployment, it is evident that **even if it had been sufficiently trained, it most likely may not have been able to cope with an area as volatile as the East Rand.** Suggestions by experts, including the Commonwealth Group and defence analysts that the force be deployed in a 'soft' area were scoffed at. Alternatively, it could have been deployed in support of the SADF, and not be left on its own. It is noteworthy that even the force commanders' recommendations to the Sub-Council and TEC about a desirable area for deployment were not heeded. The decision therefore for deployment of the force lay with the politicians in the TEC, and the principals of the NPKF forces in the NPKF Command Council.

In retrospect the crux of the problem at De Brug was:

- insufficient time for selection, training of the leader group, training of the troops, evaluation, re-training and deployment drills. Allowing only eight weeks for all these activities was a mistake. It takes years of training and expertise to create a coherent and effective force. SADF training for the most basic recruit takes 9-11 months—and that occurs within an established training organisation.
- no clear and uncompromising (high) entry standards.
- MK members were organised and trained according to a **different philosophy** as well as unwilling SADF and SA Police members (evidenced by the fact that the majority of resignations from the NPKF came from the SADF and SAP).
- absolute **crisis management** to address problems which required a much more solid approach. For example, the De Brug contingent required in excess of 360 drivers but only had about 60. As a result driver training had to be condensed and various other measures had to be adopted.
- **management by committee**, and even worse, detail management and even command by a very large committee. Instead of making the appointment of the best available

commander their first priority, the Sub-Council made it only one of their many priorities.

- a long and complex **chain of command** which included the officer commanding the NPKF, the NPKFCC, the Sub-Council on Defence, the management committee of the TEC and eventually the TEC. This apart from the political requirement of the transition which necessitated that each political party regularly consult with its principles (i.e. obtain the agreement of the political parties for each detail decision).
- poor **logistic support** and preparedness.

There will remain, for many years to come, a requirement for a public order police force in addition to a community based police service. If the Internal Stability Division has become so discredited as to be beyond redemption, a replacement will have to be created. **The real challenge should have been how to use the NPKF to legitimise the function of public order policing in South Africa.** The conversion of the NPKF into an alternative to the ISD or, after integration into the ISD, would have made a substantial impact upon the available police numbers. The disbanding of the NPKF compounds an expensive exercise in futility.

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CHAPTER 3

VIOLENCE ON THE EAST RAND: 1990-1994

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

With the deployment of the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF) on the East Rand in the KATORUS (Kathlehong/Thokoza/Vosloorus) area in April 1994 the question remains: Why was this area chosen for the first ever deployment of the untested and untried NPKF?

One answer to this question is the high levels of conflict and violence that have occurred on an ongoing basis in the area since mid-1990. One of the clearest indicators of the scope and extent of this conflict on the East Rand has been the high incidence of massacres. (Defined here as the killing of five or more people in a single attack.) Of the 136 massacres which have occurred in the PWV region for the period 1990 to 1993, 35 took place in the KATORUS area (see Fig.1). This figure represents just more than 25% of the total, which by any standard is a disproportionate number for the size of the KATORUS area. In these 35 massacres 311 people were killed (Minnaar, Keith & Pretorius, 1994). At one stage, the KATORUS area accounted for about half of all the violent incidents reported across South Africa.

From an examination of levels of conflict in the area it is obvious that for the Reef, the KATORUS area has, since mid-1990, displayed consistently high numbers of deaths, injuries and violent incidents linked to the unrest (see Fig. 2 & 3). This violence has formed a considerable part of the so-called 'Reef Township War', whose start is usually given as July 1990. The most identifiable participants in this violence were the migrant workers residing in the many hostels in the area on the one hand and on the other, the inhabitants, mostly youths from the townships, particularly the informal squatter settlements.

The conflict on the East Rand, and in particular the KATORUS area, has been likened to an

undeclared and unofficial war. It is a war in which there are two opposing and armed sides who protect and hold on to territory in a 'War Zone'. People die on a regular basis and the lives of ordinary residents are disrupted. In this unofficial war there are 'battle lines' with 'no-man's land buffer areas', night time patrols and guard duties. There is a proliferation of armaments, from the more traditional spears and pangas to home-made guns (*qwashas*), shot-guns, automatic assault rifles like AK-47s and R1s. There are even light machine guns (LMGs) while grenades, mortars and rockets have on occasion been used in attacks. Both sides claim to be justified in arming themselves and repulsing any attacks.

The township inhabitants feel that they are justified in '*protecting*' themselves since they are '*communities under attack*' and are merely '*organising themselves for self-defence*' (Laufer, 1993). Similarly hostel residents blame ANC supporters for the conflict saying that the township inhabitants resent the presence of the hostel residents since '*they [township residents] don't want us here and attack us [the hostels]*'. A further resentment of the hostel residents are the terrible living conditions they experience with an almost total lack of services. For this they again blame local township inhabitants, who the hostel residents maintain, prevent the Thokoza Town Council from spending any money to improve the conditions in the hostels (Blow, 1991).

This 'war' started in 1990 and it was the extent and scope of the ongoing conflict in the KATORUS area which necessitated first the intervention of the South African Defence Force (SADF) (December 1993 and February 1994) in an effort to stabilise the situation and then the deployment of the NPKF in April 1994 to keep the peace wrought by the SADF presence. However, some sort of overview of the background and underlying dynamics of the conflict

is essential to understanding the need for the presence of a force like the NPKF.

3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE EAST RAND CONFLICT

3.2.1 The 'Reef Township War', 1990: The First Clashes

The Reef Township War had no clear starting point in 1990 but a number of developments impacted on the rise in violent incidents from late July onwards. The first was the lifting of political restrictions on banned organisations such as the ANC and PAC. This allowed the supporters of these organisations to organise openly and in the first six months of 1990 numerous branches, particularly of the ANC, were launched in the townships on the Reef. At the end of July, Inkatha also launched itself as a political party and became the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The launch was followed by a recruitment campaign in certain Transvaal hostels. Another occurrence which exacerbated tensions on the Reef was the stayaway called by COSATU on 2 July 1990 to protest specifically against the continuation of high levels of violence in Natal/KwaZulu. Allied to this a number of pro-ANC organisations such as the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) declared Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha as *'enemies of the people'*. This call led to attacks on many Inkatha officials in the Transvaal with their houses being fire-bombed (Seekings, 1991:11).

The physical start of the 'war' is taken by some observers to be an IFP rally in the Vaal Triangle on 22 July 1990. It appears that Inkatha supporters on their way to the rally venue were subjected to verbal abuse and physical harassment. On conclusion of the rally a number of rally-goers then proceeded to attack residents of Sebokeng indiscriminately and this resulted in at least 27 people being killed. Many of the pro-Inkatha hostel residents were then refused re-entry to the KwaMasiza Hostel in Sebokeng by the other hostel residents. Those who were refused re-entry occupied another local hostel, the disused KwaMadala Hostel (Seekings, 1991:11). This attack led to further tension between hostel residents and township dwellers as well as between the hostel residents themselves. On 12 August an AK-47 attack on one of the Sebokeng hostels occurred which left at least nine people dead and ten wounded. On the same day a Zulu speaker was killed in Thokoza. That night and the next morning hostel residents

and squatters fought each other with the result that 20 were killed (Anon, 1990a & 1990b). On the following night, according to residents of the Thokoza Hostel, *'a group of armed men wearing blankets entered the Khalanyoni Hostel grounds ... and started attacking everyone in sight'* (Anon., 1990a).

It was suspected that the attackers were from the nearby Phola Park informal squatter settlement in Thokoza since the attack was labelled as retaliation for the killing of one of the Phola Park residents at the hostel (Anon., 1990a & 1990b). By 14 August the violence had spread to Katlehong and Vosloorus (Grange, 1990a).

On 15 August the Thokoza hostel residents responded with an attack of their own on Phola Park. The fighting between hostel residents and squatters also continued in Katlehong and Vosloorus. The divisions between the warring factions were exacerbated by perceptions (not always correct) that the squatter settlements were populated largely by Xhosa speakers and the hostels dominated by Zulu-speaking migrant workers. These perceptions appeared to draw the battle lines between Xhosas and Zulus in ethnic terms. As the violence spread Zulu-speaking residents of the hostels banded together and attacked Xhosa speakers in the squatter camps (Grange, 1990b; Grange *et al.*, 1990; Kotze *et al.*, 1990).

Some of the ensuing violence also occurred between hostel residents themselves. As the violence escalated those supporting Inkatha managed, in most cases, to evict the non-Inkatha hostel residents from the hostels. In most cases Xhosa-speaking hostel residents were targeted for expulsion. These hostel refugees sought shelter in the surrounding squatter settlements (such as Phola Park) and the conflict soon became one between youths (ANC-aligned comrades and self-defence units) supported by township inhabitants and IFP supporters backed by Zulu-speaking hostel residents. Furthermore, in a number of cases, if Zulu-speaking hostel residents refused to join the attacks they too were forcibly evicted from the hostels (Seekings, 1991:11-12; Everatt, 1991; IBHIR, 1992:1; Anon., 1991g)

Similarly IFP supporters in the township i.e. non-hostel residents, found themselves under attack by the youthful comrades and being driven out of their houses. Many of these families took refuge in the hostels. **By the beginning of 1991 a number of the IFP-controlled hostels**

FIGURE 1

**FIGURE 1: MULTIPLE MASSACRE AREAS IN THE PWV
REGION: 1990 - 1993**





FIGURE 2 : LEVEL OF CONFLICT ACTIVITY ON THE EAST RAND 1990 - 1993



Magisterial districts

*Recorded events of public protest actions and incidents of collective violence

FIGURE 2

were housing entire families and were no longer simply single-sex hostels (they became known as 'refugee' hostels). The hostels became isolated communities cut off and alienated from the surrounding township.

Fighting also resulted in hundreds of refugees, most of them women and children, fleeing the various squatter camps that had come under attack. There were other consequences too: schooling was again disrupted with pupils staying away from school on account of fear; many of the young men joined the township mobs in attacks and clashes with hostel residents, and workers were prevented from commuting to work. In addition, the loss of those killed created a wave of resentment and anger in survivors once the fighting had stopped. The families and friends of those killed felt a huge sense of loss and anger which was soon replaced by a desire for revenge and retaliation. Retribution was uppermost in most minds and merely fuelled the ongoing violence. Children exposed to the fighting and violence were becoming immune to it. They all seemed to accept that violence was the only way to resolve problems (Grange, 1990b).

By 16 August 1990 the fighting had spread to townships all over the Reef. There were reports that 'comrades' were being bussed in to the East Rand to support the 'Xhosa' squatter residents against the 'Zulu' impis. These comrades allegedly prevented minibuses from operating in order to force township residents to remain in the townships so that they would be at home to resist any possible attacks by hostel residents. In retaliation, on the morning of 16 August 1990, many commuters on their way to work on the Soweto rail line found themselves prevented from boarding or were forced off trains by groups of hostel residents. In retaliation angry mobs of youths and residents then gathered near the hostels where clashes broke out between them and hostel residents.

There were also reports of attacks on commuters on the trains. By the end of the week the number of dead in the violent clashes in Soweto and the East Rand townships of Thokoza, Vosloorus and Katlehong had reached 191 with more than 1 000 injured (Laurence, 1990; Anon., 1990c; Anon., 1990d; Grange, 1990c).

During the clashes squatter-camp residents voiced complaints that the police were siding with Inkatha supporters and that the former were


not impartial in the confiscation of dangerous weapons. In other words the police were not as zealous in acting against armed Inkatha supporters as they were in disarming, teargassing and preventing attacks by township youths. A number of political leaders also publicly claimed that the police were fuelling the violence. However, relative peace returned to the strife-torn Reef townships after massive police and SADF troop reinforcements had moved in to patrol conflict areas. Twenty-seven townships (19 magisterial districts) were declared unrest areas and the security forces were given wide powers under the Public Safety Act. Public calls by tribal chiefs and ANC leaders for peace also seemed to contribute to a drop in the violence (Laurence, 1990; Fabricius *et al.*, 1990).

Both sides in this 'Reef Township War' blamed each other for starting hostilities. Hostel residents claimed that ANC supporters (i.e. township youths – the 'comrades') started the conflict by denigrating the Inkatha leader, Chief Buthelezi, and by continually taunting the hostel residents. As one hostel resident bitterly complained: *'they abuse us on the trains, they abuse us in the streets and then at night they try to petrol bomb us [in the hostels]'*. The youths claimed that the August clashes only started when an alleged Inkatha impi had attacked a train at dawn. The youths saw only one solution to the problem and that was to *'kill the Zulus or drive them out and then demolish the hostels'* (Pearson, 1990). (The Khalanyoni Hostel opposite Phola Park was in fact physically demolished to its foundations brick by brick by the residents of this informal settlement early in 1991.)

For many of the participants and victims the causes of the fighting were lost in the ruins of squatter shacks and hostels under siege. Some observers felt that the ethnic factor was uppermost (as in Thokoza). Others felt that the fighting had been fanned by criminal gangs for their own self-interest (looting, disruption of law and order), while still others felt that the fighting was primarily a struggle for political supremacy between the ANC and Inkatha. But these explanations did not adequately reflect what was happening in the hostels on the East Rand and elsewhere. In hostels where Inkatha-supporting Zulu speakers had driven out a number of hostel residents, those driven out were not only Xhosa-speakers but also a number of Zulu-speakers. So the conflict was not strictly an ethnic one. In Sebokeng, where some of the first clashes had occurred between ANC and Inkatha

FIGURE 3—PWV REGION

PWV REGION



supporters, Inkatha blamed the call by ANC supporters for Inkatha to be driven completely out of the area for the subsequent violence, while the ANC counter-response was that Inkatha members were the initiators of the present conflict—hence their call for Inkatha's banishment from the area. The Sebokeng clashes were then said to have spread to other townships with the two factions squaring off against each other in a struggle for total control on the one hand (ANC) and a struggle to remain in the Transvaal (by Zulu-speaking hostel residents supporting Inkatha). However, for some hostel residents attacks on any Xhosa speakers were justified since the '*ANC is a Xhosa organisation*'. This gave the ANC the same tribal/ethnic label as was attached to Inkatha by its opponents. Hostel residents often used the trappings of tribal tradition such as organising themselves into impis and performing war dances, shouting slogans and singing war songs prior to any attack. Conversely township youth identified the use of Zulu language as a sign of being an Inkatha supporter.

The August 1990 clashes were sometimes defined in terms of the youths as 'township soldiers' fighting a virtual 'civil war' against 'impis' of Zulu-speaking hostel residents. If disarmed by the police, combatants easily re-armed by simply picking up a length of steel and sharpening it. However, there was also a proliferation of hand guns, rifles and automatic weapons, particularly AK-47s. The introduction of firearms meant that the fatality rate was much higher and it also changed the nature of the fighting from hand-to-hand combat to a more individualised form away from a crowd situation. Attacks often took the form of ambushes or assassinations at night. As the fighting escalated gangs of youths stood guard or patrolled township streets armed with a variety of weapons – iron pipes, stones, petrol bombs, knives and pangas, while in the hostels the residents relied largely on spears and sharpened lengths of pipes. In the townships and squatter settlements self-defence units (SDUs) were once again established (reminiscent of the street committees of the mid-1980s) while in the hostels a certain degree of militarisation occurred in the form of utilising existing impi organisation that had been transferred from the rural areas (Pearson, 1990; Mapisa, 1990).

It became dangerous just to be suspected of being a Zulu hostel resident or vice-versa a 'comrade' or Xhosa speaker, especially if you

were a resident of a squatter settlement. As the conflict progressed there were numerous reported cases of ordinary township inhabitants or hostel residents being set upon by either vigilantes from the hostels or comrades from the self-defence units and being beaten up or killed merely on suspicion that the victim was either a Zulu or Xhosa speaker. There were also reports of innocent people being attacked randomly on the assumption that they belonged to either political grouping (ANC/IFP). Mistaken identification of victims was based on such innocuous things as having tribal marks on the face, speaking Zulu with a heavy accent even if the person had been born on the Reef, or wearing some form of traditional clothing, etc. (Mapisa, 1990).

One result of the August clashes during the so-called 'Reef Township War' of 1990 was that many of the hostels were organised on what can only be described as a 'war footing', with certain residents appointed as sentries to keep a watchful eye for any possible attack from the surrounding township. Furthermore, township residents living in houses in the streets immediately adjacent to a hostel where conflict had occurred, began to move out and abandon their houses for fear of attacks from the nearby hostel (some of these residents had lived there for up to thirty years) (Barkhuizen, 1990).

In the wake of the violence in the Reef townships calls were made by the ANC and various church leaders for the hostel network to be dismantled or for hostels to be converted to family units. This was strenuously objected to by the hostel residents.

3.2.2 Renewed Outbreak of Violence

After a period of relative quiet, violence once again exploded in Thokoza when, on the night of 11 September 1990, the Phola Park squatter settlement was attacked by alleged 'Zulu vigilantes' from the Thokoza Hostel. Shacks were burnt down and a number of inhabitants were killed, while hundreds fled for their lives. According to eyewitness accounts an ominous development was that many of the attackers were armed with AK-47s or other automatic weapons. This attack set off another round of violence all over the Reef with mobs shooting and hacking people to death, burning houses and looting. More Zulu-speaking residents, many of them having resided in the area for many years and who were not necessarily IFP supporters, became the targets for attack by the youth merely

because they spoke Zulu. Numbers of them sought refuge in the nearby hostels like Mazibuko, Kwesine, Buyafuthi and Thokoza hostels. These refugees in turn forced out the residents from the houses closest to these hostels and often occupied them.

In essence the East Rand came to have three sets of refugees, viz. those hostel residents expelled from the hostels in the first round of violence in mid-1990; Zulu-speaking township residents who came under attack from the youth and sought refuge in the hostels; and the residents living in houses nearby to the hostels forced out by the hostel residents and the refugees. All three groups wanted to return to their 'own accommodation' whether hostel or township house. By this stage the various participating combatants had become 'locked in a cycle of violence' characterised by attacks on each other under the pretext of revenge, retaliation, counter-attack or pre-emptive strikes. In the existing 'atmosphere of threat' and suspicious intolerance rumours often played an important 'trigger' role setting off another round of violence. In the process 'no-go' areas were set up by both sides where it was dangerous for either to enter or pass through. There was a breakdown of essential services and the people living in the townships of the East Rand region suffered accordingly.

There were other particular incidents of intense conflict in the East Rand during 1990. For instance the second Sunday of December 1990 became known as 'Black Sunday' in Thokoza when well co-ordinated attacks on two consecutive days by hostel residents against township inhabitants left more than 50 dead. According to eyewitnesses the violence started on the Sunday afternoon when a group of armed men from the Buyafuthi Hostel manned roadblocks in the streets leading to the township. The men searched cars apparently looking for Xhosas and ANC supporters. Two men were dragged from their vehicle by the armed men and stabbed with spears. Some men then set the vehicle alight and moved towards the township while assaulting people in the streets. Later in the evening the attacks intensified and more than 15 houses and fifty backyard shacks were burnt down, more than twenty people killed and a number injured.

The attacks seemed to be well planned and co-ordinated and the attackers had surprised the local SDUs who had not expected them to use such sophisticated weaponry and have auto-

matic rifles. At this stage members of the local SDU were largely armed with homemade weapons, spears and knobkieries (other weapons such as automatic guns only made an appearance in the Phola Park squatter settlement at a later date). There were claims that the attackers appeared to be working off a hit list of names and addresses in locating the houses of victims. Apparently most of the houses attacked belonged to Xhosa-speaking residents. After these attacks residents made strong calls for the police to 'go to the hostels and disarm hostel residents' (Anon., 1990e; Anon., 1990f).

3.2.3 The 'War' Continues in 1991

In 1991 the violence on the Reef seemed to change in its pattern. There were fewer open and large-scale attacks between hostel residents and the inhabitants of the townships, including squatter settlements. Attacks were often on such 'soft' targets as mourners at funeral vigils or patrons of shebeens, train passengers or taxi ranks by unknown attackers. Throughout the year there had also been numerous attacks on houses in which individuals were killed. Although no culprits were apprehended the ANC were strongly suspicious that those involved in the killings were *'not brought to book because they serve the interests of the State in its endeavour to create a climate unfavourable to free political activity'* (Moroke, 1991). This was strongly denied by the government while the IFP also categorically denied being involved in the continuing violence (Moroke, 1991; Anon, 1991f).

However, during 1991 the antagonism between hostel residents and township inhabitants remained. The most serious outbreak of violence for quite a time again occurred in Thokoza which had been relatively quiet for almost a year. At the beginning of September the Thokoza Hostel Residents' Association had organised a rally at the Thokoza Stadium for Sunday 8 September. Rallygoers from the Thokoza hostels had come under two separate attacks on their way to the stadium. In one ambush from a house in Kumalo Street on the northeastern side of the stadium three men with AK-47s had killed sixteen hostel residents and wounded another thirteen. In another attack (with handguns, spears, assegais and pangas) on a group of hostel residents on the southwestern side of the stadium two hostel residents were killed. In evidence gathered by a sub-committee of the Goldstone Committee of Inquiry it subsequently transpired that these at-

tacks had been premeditated, planned and carried out by residents of the Phola Park squatter settlement and members of the Phola Park SDU (Goldstone Commission, 1992:9–13). These attacks substantially raised tensions in the area and led to further bloodshed.

The situation was further exacerbated when on 19 September a prominent political leader and General-Secretary of the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (CAST), Sam Ntuli, was forced off the road and assassinated by the unidentified occupants of a blue Chevrolet car while travelling in his car down Kumalo Street in Thokoza. Ntuli's funeral on 7 October was the scene of more deaths. Despite a large police presence at the funeral there were a series of attacks which left at least 19 dead (the first on taxi drivers by some mourners; then retaliatory attacks by members of the Katlehong People's Taxi Association—members of whom were considered to be overwhelmingly IFP supporting—and lastly by hostel dwellers on funeral goers marching to and fro past the Thokoza hostels taunting the hostel residents) (Goldstone Commission, 1992:20–27; Mbhele, 1991a & 1991b).

The killings in Thokoza during September 1991 were disturbing for a number of reasons, namely the planned ambushing of residents from the hostel on their way to the rally in the Thokoza Stadium; the increased proliferation of AK-47s in the possession of many of the participants; and the unprovoked attacks on people perceived to be political opponents. That many people had access to weaponry also seemed to make participants that much more prepared and ready to retaliate at any signs of threatened attack. As a result the violence on the East Rand could now be termed 'endemic'.

3.2.4 'Much of the same' in 1992 and 1993

The violence on the Reef continued throughout 1991 with no end in sight and was carried over into 1992 when the killing continued in round after round of attack and counterattack, in clashes between township inhabitants and hostel residents. After a 'holiday lull', when many hostel residents had gone home for the Christmas vacation, renewed fighting erupted in the Reef townships between the migrant workers returning to their hostels and township inhabitants.

At the beginning of April 1992 the focus shifted away from clashes directly between the hostel residents and the comrades of the SDUs. In a late night attack on 3 April 1992, 21 Inkatha-supporting squatters were killed in the Crossroads squatter camp bordering on Katlehong by allegedly 'Xhosa-speaking' attackers. The camp's leader, Douglas Madlala, claimed the attack was an attempt to scare Inkatha supporters from Crossroads and recapture a previously ANC-controlled area (Stansfield, 1992).

However, a turning point seemed to occur after the Boipatong Massacre of 17 June 1992. Following on this attack there was considerable public outrage and renewed calls for the demolition of single-sex hostels. These demands raised other contentious issues. While township residents demanded the immediate destruction of hostels many people had no other choice but to live in them. The Transvaal Hostel Residents Association responded immediately, stating that it was concerned about what would happen to all the residents if the hostels were simply demolished. Furthermore there was an increase in political pressure for much stricter controls over the hostels. The ANC made public demands for the fencing off of hostels, the searching by security forces of hostels for weapons on a regular basis and the installation of permanent patrols around hostel premises. The aim of the ANC remained for the hostels to be phased out (Stirling, 1992; Koch, 1992; Zwane, 1992; Flynn, 1992).

For the rest of 1992 there was continuing conflict around the hostels on the East Rand. By the end of 1992 the hostel 'problem' was still in the forefront of violence in the PWV region and was receiving far more attention than previously, while featuring prominently in most calls for the ending of the violence. A number of initiatives (such as upgrading and fencing) initially seemed to provide some hope of progress in achieving a semblance of peace but these foundered as a result of the intransigence of a number of parties.

Although there were signs that during the early part of 1993 there was a lessening of conflict in the KATORUS area, this was not to be. This relative peace was overturned in the aftermath of the assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993. The subsequent course of events aptly demonstrated that not much had changed. In the renewed spiral of violence on the Reef, hostel residents once again found themselves caught up in events not always of their own making.

They were accused of being attackers, of fomenting the violence and of having undertaken pre-emptive strikes against township residents. But by the same token they were also victims of the situation and hostel residents found themselves lumped together and subjected to approbation and vilification as being the cause of renewed conflict.

Events during April to August 1993 aptly demonstrated that much of the dynamics found to be previously operating in the Reef townships was still in place, viz. the atmosphere of threat, the social divide between hostels and townships, political competition and the cycle of revenge and retaliatory attacks. Rumours remained rife. A case in point was a protest march on 22 May 1993 from the Thokoza Stadium to the Alberton Police Station organised by the ANC to hand over a petition. However, when it became known that the march would pass close to the Thokoza Hostel the hostel residents expressed the fear that the march would be used as a cover for an attack on them and accordingly appeared to prepare for this eventuality by arming themselves. The rumour then went back that the hostel residents would launch an attack on the marchers as they passed the hostel. This led some of the marchers to arm themselves for protection.

The rumour of an impending attack under cover of the march was strengthened when the organisers refused to change the route of the march even after the local peace committee had suggested this. **This refusal was seen by the hostel residents as a confirmation of the marchers' covert intentions.** Accordingly on the day of the march the hostel residents massed in the hostel grounds ready for anything. Such a volatile situation was bound to explode and when some of the marchers tried to force a small group of Zulu protestors back through the hostel gates the police fired teargas, rubber bullets and bird shot to disperse these two groups. However, a group of ten persons, ostensibly having broken away from the march, fired into one of the hostel buildings from behind the complex and out of sight of any persons involved in the march. This resulted in return fire from both within the hostel and within the group of marchers. In the ensuing crossfire 13 people were killed and at least 61 injured (Goldstone Commission, 1993). The open antagonism between hostels and townships was once again resurgent.

In the recriminations following this incident the government was blamed for not having '*secured the problem hostels*' by fencing them as agreed to by the Record of Understanding signed between the government and the ANC in September 1992 (Anon., 1993a). The whole issue of fencing the hostels was anathema to hostel residents and they vehemently opposed this measure, firstly on the grounds that they were never consulted on the desirability of this step, secondly because it would isolate them further from the surrounding communities, and thirdly that it would restrict them in '*cages like animals*' and was inhuman treatment denying them recognition as ordinary people (Minnaar, 1993a).

Hostel residents continued to feel under threat with rumours abounding that township inhabitants wanted to physically demolish all hostels on the Reef.

3.2.5 'Under Siege'

The situation on the Reef continued to worsen and a renewed round of violence erupted at the beginning of July (after the announcement of the date for national elections) (Shaw, 1993). The immediate cause of the new round of violence was not clear but apparently stemmed from an alleged ambush of a funeral march in Katlehong by occupants from a passing car which had then apparently sped off in the direction of the Mazibuko Hostel. In revenge comrades had burnt down nearby shacks and looted the belongings of some IFP supporters who had fled to the hostel and were forced to seek refuge there. The streets of Katlehong were soon crisscrossed with barricades and deep trenches. Neighbourhoods were patrolled by members of local SDUs. Gunfire echoed constantly throughout the night. In the ensuing violence Zulu-speaking residents in the townships of the East Rand again became the targets of attack by armed youth, while hostel residents launched a number of pre-emptive and retaliatory attacks on the communities surrounding the hostels. The worst hit areas seemed to be those neighbourhoods close to hostels (Ramokonupi, Mavimbela, Kwesine and Hlahatsi in Katlehong and Kumalo Street in Thokoza) (Sokutu & Mantini, 1993). This all resulted in a high death toll—343 deaths for the PWV Region with the majority of these emanating from the KATORUS area (in comparison there were 580 unrest-related deaths for the whole of South Africa) for the month of July 1993 (the second highest since 1990 when a high of 709 was reached in

August of that year) (HRC Monthly Repression Report, 1993).

Public transport came to a complete standstill with taxis refusing to enter any area near a hostel while the railways discontinued some services to the East Rand after train drivers were threatened. Services to the hostels were also stopped with no delivery vans being allowed through. The problem in Thokoza/ Katlehong was complicated by the fact that there are only two routes out of these two townships: one up Kumalo Road past the Inkatha-controlled hostel, the other via Phola Park which is an ANC stronghold. Kumalo Road was a no go area for taxis serving the ANC-held areas. Many of these taxi drivers had been forced to either pay a toll when passing the hostel or had their passengers abducted into the hostel where they were either beaten up or killed. The taxis transporting those who lived in the hostels were afraid to drive past Phola Park having been ambushed and fired upon on numerous occasions (Sokutu & Mantini, 1993; Laufer, 1993; Minnaar & Torres, 1993). Such tensions more often than not resulted in atrocities like the cold-blooded execution of seven Zulu-speaking taxi commuters in Germiston at the end of July 1993 or the killing of 21 commuters and the injuring of another 25 in two attacks on taxi ranks in Wadeville near Germiston on 8 September 1993 (Mamaila, 1993; Anon., 1993b).

Residents also blamed the police, accusing them of leaving the area in the evening and only returning the following morning to pick up the bodies. Complaints were also voiced by apolitical residents who claimed that enforced political recruitment was occurring on a large-scale in the violence affected areas with the consequent territorial control and institution of 'no-go' areas for any opposing party. Residents despaired of peace ever being possible in such an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred between the township inhabitants and the hostel residents. It was openly being stated that all you needed to start a war in the East Rand townships of Katlehong and Thokoza was 'two bullets'—one fired at a hostel and the other at the residents' houses (Sokutu & Mantini, 1993).

During the July/August 1993 violence on the East Rand many hostel residents found themselves under siege. Access to and from hostels was blocked. This blockade by local SDUs was extended to the delivery of food and enforced a work stayaway. The worst hit hostels were the

Buyafuthi, Kwesine and Mazibuko hostels—all Inkatha strongholds. Close on 7 000 people in these hostels were ordered by the Inkatha leadership not to set foot in the surrounding townships. The residents in these hostels talk about 'the war' in Katlehong and like the comrades of the local SDUs the young men of the hostels take turns to stand guard around the clock against 'the enemy'. The hostel residents dismissed talk of a 'third force' rather fearing an organised 'campaign to clean out Zulus from townships'. Food and other supplies only reached these hostels when the delivery trucks were escorted by the SADF to the hostel gates. This informal siege was still in place at the end of August (Nomadolo, 1993; Waldman, 1993).

This siege of the hostels was justified by township inhabitants who feared the hostel residents, pointing to the numerous attacks emanating from hostel compounds. They also felt that the hostel residents were being used, armed and manipulated by unknown forces to ensure that the violence would continue. For this reason most township inhabitants perceived hostel residents as being part of the violence and therefore wanted to see them removed permanently from their midst. It was this wish that the hostel residents in turn interpreted as a direct political attack on them (Minnaar, 1993b).

3.3 BRINGING PEACE TO THE EAST RAND

Various approaches have been adopted recently to stabilise the East Rand. This section discusses the more important efforts which follow roughly in chronological order.

- The first effort was that of the National Peace Accord which were followed by;
- the deployment of the Internal Stability Division in the East Rand who, in turn;
- was replaced by the SADF and eventually, for a very brief period;
- the NPKF was deployed in the area.

3.3.1 Peace by Consensus? The National Peace Accord

Since 1990 mechanisms of policing the conflict on the East Rand have been the source of much controversy. When intensive violence first broke out in the KATORUS area in August 1990, only ordinary officers of the South African Police

(SAP) were present in the area. **Understaffed, often outgunned and appearing to lack commitment, the SAP seemed to have little control of the East Rand violence in its initial stages.**

Allied to this are the problems facing ordinary policing activities in the area. The Thokoza police station, for example, is understaffed and lacks sufficient equipment and resources to be able to do an efficient job. Often when residents phone the police station asking for help they are told there are no vehicles available to respond. Residents also complain of the phones not being answered or that the lines are out of order. Furthermore cases are often not followed up or arrests made. The lack of prosecution of offenders has also caused residents to have a total lack of faith in the efficacy of the police in solving crimes. The result is that fewer and fewer crimes are reported to the local police station (IBI & Peace Action, 1994: 30).

During all the violence in the KATORUS area there were also repeated allegations of the presence of *agent provocateurs* and 'third force'-style activity, aggravating the situation. The ANC paraded a suspected IFP supporter and police informer caught by the Phola Park SDU who, at first, publicly stated that the police had supplied Inkatha-supporting hostel residents with arms. He was handed over to the Goldstone Commission but subsequently retracted his accusations, claiming to have been coerced and intimidated by members of the SDU from the Phola Park squatter settlement.

Such alleged involvement of the security forces in the violence merely reinforced existing negative perceptions and entrenched the cycle of violence. On the Reef the challenge for peace remains to break the process and get the opposing groups to meet and work constructively towards healing the rifts and antagonisms.

While the National Peace Accord was signed in September of 1991, there had been earlier attempts at bringing peace to the troubled region. Indeed, in many cases structures established on the East Rand, for example a local peace forum in Thokoza, were duplicated in the form of Local Peace Committees in other areas. Peace monitoring, now a central and extremely visible part of all Peace Secretariat operations, also had its seeds in the conflict on the East Rand. But, despite the huge commitment on the part of local peace activists and peace secretariat staff in the area to ending the conflict, their

efforts have been hamstrung from the beginning.

Peace Committees were established in Thokoza, Germiston/Katlehong and Vosloorus. Each attempted to bring together warring parties to discuss areas of common ground in order to facilitate an end to conflict. **Local Peace Committees, while not lacking commitment, were short on resources—many simply lacked the capacity to call political supporters of one or the other side to order. Importantly, many of the people who sat in on Peace Committee meetings were not those who were directly engaged in the violence.** The self-defence units in the KATORUS area, for example, have long been perceived as an obstacle to peace.

The SDUs have themselves been responsible for distinct acts of violence and intimidation. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many of the SDUs were undisciplined and were accountable neither to any political organisation on a national level nor to local community structures, often using their arms for terrorising the very people they were meant to protect. Many had become a 'law unto themselves'. Some of them had been infiltrated and taken over by criminal elements using the political violence for their own economic self-interest. Hiding behind political labels these criminal SDUs became involved in all kinds of criminal activities from smuggling illegal arms, to extorting household 'protection levies' and blackmailing businesses for 'contributions' (see Minnaar, 1994).

By mid-1993, it became clear that Peace Secretariat monitoring operations were having only a limited effect on violence in the area. In many cases monitors could not carry out their duties as their lives were endangered. Partly as a reaction to this, but also set up to monitor and increase co-operation during the volatile Hani funeral period on the East Rand, Joint Operation Centre's (JOCs) were established. JOCs were designed to bring leadership elements of opposing political parties together, along with representatives of the security forces, the Peace Secretariat and international observers. Theoretically monitors in the field would warn of impending danger areas allowing civic, political and security force officials to decide on a course of action. Peace secretariat monitoring at major events like marches or funerals clearly has served to reduce levels of violence and contain the actions of the police, but monitoring has been limited by its inability to end more protracted incidents of conflict.

While the JOCs recorded many successes they have weakened over their period of operation since they lack substantial and sustained commitment from all parties. Participants complained that senior police or army officers were not present in JOCs and more junior officers did not have the power to issue orders. SAP and SADF officers complained in turn that senior political officials were not always present to control their supporters. The reality was that JOCs were only successful in terms of definable events, such as a march or funeral, but became less effective when operating over long periods of time as the locus of influence in the various participating organisations moved elsewhere.

By the end of 1993 the ANC had been accused, both by the IFP, international observers and the SAP, of '*hijacking*' the JOC in Thokoza. Gradually, the usefulness of the JOCs in the KATORUS area declined and officials at Natal-spruit Hospital in Katlehong/Thokoza asked that the JOC be removed from the hospital premises as it was becoming a source of tension with neighbouring hostel dwellers and undermined the '*neutrality*' of the hospital.

Given the unarmed nature of Peace Secretariat operations, many on the ground accused the Peace Accord structures of lacking teeth to effectively deal with the violence. **Gradually during 1993, political and security developments took the initiative away from the peace structures. By mid-1994 some had argued that they had served their period of usefulness (Shaw, 1993b).**

3.3.2 Peace by Force? The Internal Stability Division

With the announcement of the restructuring of the South African Police in 1991 a new public order policing unit was established. The rationale for the setting up of the Internal Stability Division (ISD) appeared to be two fold. On the one hand, it was hoped that by separating the public order or 'hard' policing duties from the normal blue uniformed SAP, these officers could concentrate on fighting crime and retain some credibility within affected communities. On the other hand, although it was never openly stated, the ISD was also designed to be able to be the hard point of the SAP, in a position to counter '*fire with fire*' and so serve to contain violence and stabilize violence torn areas so that normal policing operations could begin.

The ISD—while there has been an attempt to soften this image lately—is essentially a para-military force. Officers wore camouflage uniforms until recently, carried automatic rifles and operated in hard skin vehicles. While the early deployment of the ISD on the East Rand met with some success as violence levels declined, the ISD itself remained thinly stretched on the ground. In many cases, the unit's hard policing approach became seen to be as much a part of the violence as part of the solution (Cawthra, 1993).

The ISD was perceived by the people of the KATORUS area as not being impartial and of using excessive force in the arms searches and arrests. The ISD was also accused of deliberately targeting and eliminating the leadership structures of the SDUs (IBI & Peace Action, 1994:6). Furthermore, there were accusations that the ISD was involved in clandestinely fanning the violence by secretly supplying the hostel residents with arms, of assisting the hostel residents in their attacks either by escorting them on their way to attacks or not arresting them after perpetrating attacks or protecting them from counter-attacks.

These allegations culminated in repeated requests by the township inhabitants for the withdrawal of the ISD from the area while hostel residents were equally adamant that the ISD should remain '*to protect them*'. The debate around the maintenance of the ISD in the East Rand townships heated up as the ANC mobilised support on the ground for their withdrawal. Allegations, however, of torture by the ISD sealed their fate early in 1994.

The withdrawal of the unit was not uncontroversial. Representatives from the United Nations observer group in South Africa and the Goldstone Commission called for the retention of the unit in the area arguing that there was simply no adequate replacement. Senior SAP officers argued that the policy of vilifying the ISD on the ground was making the task of maintaining order virtually impossible. The reality, however, was that given the policing techniques employed by the ISD and the opposition of the community to their continued deployment, the units of the ISD could no longer effectively police the East Rand. For some time already, relations between the police—and the ISD in particular—and the community had been polarising. Early in February 1994 the ISD was withdrawn from the area and replaced by the SADF.

3.3.3 Peace Enforcement: Enter the SADF

Politically, since the ANC had vilified the ISD, they needed to effectively welcome the SADF. This was done through the organisation of welcoming rallies with ANC leaders calling for the community to co-operate with the army. The SADF, although now in an advantageous position from the start, responded in kind with a modified form of 'winning hearts and minds': soldiers handed out sweets and SADF units assisted with the cleaning up of parts of the area.

The SADF, however, also displayed a sharp end. Both sides in turn tested the army's resolve. The troops were not to be found wanting: township rumour has it that both sides in the conflict respected SADF troops because of their willingness to press home attacks when fired on, their impartiality and their disciplined operation.

The SADF also had another central advantage: manpower. In all, three battalions were deployed into the KATORUS area. The SADF's policy was to saturate the area with army personnel. This had two direct consequences. First, the SADF troops were everywhere making it difficult for either side to instigate violence. Second, troops moved into some 'no-go' areas where the SAP had feared to venture. In this way, the army could respond to violence far quicker than the police had done in the past. Thus, the deployment of the SADF did lead to a significant drop in the levels of violence in the area (Peace Action, 1994:10) (See Fig. 3).

This was not the first time that the SADF had been deployed in the area. In December 1993, during periods of spiraling violence, the SADF had ordered significant numbers of armoured units into the troubled area. This move had been met by some success. However, when peace returned to the area the armoured and infantry units were withdrawn. This earlier move appeared to be the precursor for later demands from the community and the ANC that SADF units should be stationed permanently in the area.

The February 1994 deployment, however, was the result of an agreement between Nelson Mandela and then President de Klerk. The initiative was designed to be more broad-based than the simple deployment of troops and also was designed to begin development projects—with the help of the SADF, the Peace Secretar-

iat and local business interests—in the area. A retired senior SADF officer, General Van Loggenberg, was appointed to head the project.

While the SADF deployment in the KATORUS area has been fairly successful in containing violence, the development side of the project appears to be slow moving. In fairness, the social problems of the KATORUS area cannot be resolved overnight and initial plans have been made to begin upgrading projects. Much though remains, hinged on the establishment of viable and democratic local government structures in the area. These structures would be best positioned to begin the process of upgrading. But, with local government elections only occurring in October, coupled with the possible weak institutional capacity of new local government structures, the establishment of comprehensive and sustainable development projects may still be some time off.

3.3.4 Peace by other means? the National Peacekeeping Force

As violence in the KATORUS area had worsened in mid-1993 (see Fig. 3), initiatives were underway at national level to establish a National Peacekeeping Force to be deployed in areas of large-scale conflict. Although the details of these negotiations are not of concern to us here, the force was designed to include members of all the armed formations in South Africa with a substantial component coming from Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) to ensure legitimacy in volatile areas. **Since the IFP had dropped out of negotiations at this stage, there was no Inkatha representation in the NPKF. From the beginning, this was to have serious consequences with Inkatha-aligned hostel dwellers on the East Rand viewing the NPKF as an extension of MK.**

Arguably, a number of factors contributed to the NPKF's poor performance on deployment in the East Rand. While still undergoing training, the NPKF had been mauled by the media with reports of indiscipline and poor training performance. Many of these reports were undoubtedly true, and the NPKF had undergone a surprisingly short period of training given the complex tasks that it was supposed to perform in the KATORUS area. But, NPKF officers argue that early and later reports had a substantial influence in lowering the morale of the unit.

FIGURE 3: KATORUS—NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND DEATHS

JANUARY 1993–APRIL 1994

MONTH	INCIDENTS	DEATHS
1993		
January	21	23
February	13	7
March	14	9
April	28	20
May	64	75
June	30	36
July	125	197
August	199	224
September	200	157
October	244	178
November	174	156
1994		
January	113	90
February	22	25
March	22	19
April	88	76

Source: Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg

There is some dispute why the unit—untried and tested as it was—was deployed in the KATORUS area at all. While the force's statutory role suggested that it should be deployed in areas of high conflict, practically this turned out to be an unwise choice. The NPKF's training—limited as it was—had also relied on 'minimum fire and force' tactics with a concentration on shield and baton manoeuvres to control crowds. These were simply ineffectual in the urban warfare situation prevalent on the East Rand.

Crucially too, the NPKF was discredited on its first operational deployment. The cards were stacked against it. In the first place, it was ordered to replace a much larger SADF force which pulled out altogether, with only one company being left behind, leaving the area in control of the NPKF. The Peacekeeping Force was at the time not ready to deploy its men with only one of its battalions in the area.

Although the SADF had successfully stabilised the area, a recent incident had served to increase tensions on both sides, meaning that the

undertrained NPKF were being deployed in a potentially volatile situation. Tensions in the area were high after the killing of Jeff Sibiya, an Inkatha member of the Peace Secretariat, by SADF troops at a hostel shoot out. Reports at the time suggested that hostel dwellers were preparing to attack residents of Katlehong, who had moved back to their homes in areas surrounding the hostel, in the days before the official handover. In turn, ISD units appeared to have redeployed in the area and were reported to have been firing randomly at residents. To compound matters heavily armed self-defence unit members moved back into the area in anticipation of renewed outbreaks of violence.


When the NPKF members came under fire, given their orders to use minimum force, many felt that their reaction was inadequate. Renewed reports of insubordination in NPKF ranks were also reported by the media undermining already fragile relations between officers and men. Following an upswing in violence over the next two days, SADF troops were redeployed in the area. Initially, this was meant to be in conjunction with NPKF troops, but the NPKF was then withdrawn to its base near Bloemfontein. The NPKF Command Council is said to have decided unanimously to recommend to the TEC that the NPKF be disbanded.

While the chances for a peaceful election period were greatly enhanced once Inkatha had joined the process, it is difficult to determine whether the peaceful conditions experienced during the election period can be maintained. With the withdrawal of the NPKF, SADF troops were again deployed in large numbers in the area. While clearly the most effective short term solution—although the decision to withdraw the NPKF altogether from all areas on the East Rand is arguable—it may hold some dangers.

If the new SANDF is perceived to be the only force capable of policing the area, this may undermine the role of the new South African Police Service from the beginning and divert resources away from re-establishing proper forms of policing in the area. As soon as KATORUS has been stabilized active attempts must be made to allow the deployment of substantial numbers of police officers in the area. However, the SANDF should still remain in the area and only after a period of overlap should the army be withdrawn. There must be no question of the

FIGURE—KATORUS AREA: EAST RAND

KATORUS AREA: EAST RAND



SANDF remaining permanently deployed on the East Rand despite the temptation such a course of action may hold in the short to medium term.

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CHAPTER 4

THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE NPKF AT DEPLOYMENT IN KATORUS

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4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

The telephonic survey on the public's perceptions of the NPKF was executed by Markdata of the HSRC on 18 to 21 April 1994 in a random sample of residents of the KATORUS (Katlhong, Thokoza and Vosloorus) area. Some biographical characteristics of the sample are represented in Table 1.

**TABLE 1: SOME BIOGRAPHICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE**

	N	%
Sex		
Male	320	40.4
Female	472	59.6
Age		
18-24 years	199	25.1
25-34 years	208	26.3
35-49 years	225	28.4
50-64 years	125	15.8
65+ years	35	4.4
Education		
Did not attend school	48	6.1
Std. 3 or lower	47	5.9
Std. 4 or 5	70	8.8
Std. 6 or 7	148	18.7
Std. 8 or 9	209	26.4
Std. 10	181	22.9
Std. 10 and 1-2 years	44	5.6
Std. 10 and 3-5 years	34	4.3
Std. 10 and 5+ years	9	1.1
Other	2	0.3

Language		
English	1	0.1
Afrikaans	5	0.6
Southern Sotho	299	37.8
Western Sotho	32	4.0
Northern Sotho	66	8.3
Swazi	7	0.9
Ndebele	5	0.6
Xhosa	24	3.0
Zulu	339	42.8
Shangana-Tsonga	10	1.3
Venda/Lemba	4	0.5

Table 1 indicates that the sample is reasonably representative of the residents of the KATORUS area. It should be accepted however that a telephonic survey cannot reach hostel residents, residents of informal settlements and residents not having telephones. The ideal would be to execute a door-to-door survey, but in this case a telephone survey was decided upon for the following reasons:

- because of the high levels of violence experienced in the area since July 1993, door-to-door surveys were not possible, especially in hostels and informal settlements
- the telephonic survey could be completed in four evenings, whereas a door-to-door survey would have taken a minimum of two weeks. The researchers were interested in measuring residents' perceptions of the NPKF in the period while they were deployed and not at a later stage
- a telephonic survey costs approximately a quarter to one-third of a door-to-door survey.

The readers' attention must also be drawn to the fact that the respondents may have had a particular political orientation because hostel residents were not reached by the survey. This

assumption tends to be confirmed by the fact that 92% of the 48% of the respondents willing to express their party support a week before the election indicated support for the ANC.

4.2 THE NEED FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NPKF

The East Rand and the KATORUS area in particular have been, relatively speaking, reasonably quiet and peaceful in the months since the deployment of the SADF in the area in February 1994. The SADF has therefore ostensibly managed to maintain law and order and stability in the area. In spite of this, 44% of the respondents still indicated during the survey that they feel unsafe to very unsafe. It then came as no surprise that 40% and 23% respectively of the respondents indicated that the NPKF was either very much needed or needed in their area. Only 23% of the respondents indicated that they were not needed. Normally one would expect that people feeling unsafe would have a need for a peacekeeping force or even more than one such force.

A further analysis of the respondents' response to the question whether or not the NPKF was necessary, revealed that this logic does not always apply:

- 15% of the respondents in Vosloorus, the area which was the least affected by the violence of 17-19 April 1994, were of the opinion that the NPKF was not needed. On the other hand, 37% of the respondents in Thokoza, the area most affected by the violence on 17-19 April 1994, said that the NPKF was not needed.
- 69% of the respondents with whom interviews were conducted during the evenings on which there was violence (18 and 19 April 1994) believed that the NPKF was needed. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents with whom interviews were conducted during the evenings of 20 and 21 April, after the SADF had returned and the violence had subsided, believed that the NPKF was needed.
- 71% of the respondents who felt safe or very safe believed that the NPKF was needed, while 57% of the respondents who felt unsafe or very unsafe believed that the NPKF was needed.

These conclusions could possibly be explained as follows. Many people in KATORUS felt safe under SADF control up to and during the weekend of 15 to 17 April, when the SADF was withdrawn and the NPKF was deployed in the area. By Sunday night violence was occurring

between the two old arch-enemies in the area, the SDUs and the hostels, especially Thokoza hostels 1-3. Most of the violence remained confined to Thokoza near hostels 1-3. The deployment of the inexperienced NPKF and the withdrawal of the SADF may have been blamed for the outbreak of violence. That is, people directly affected by the violence on 18 and 19 April in Thokoza tended to feel unsafe and ascribed the violence to the presence of the NPKF, stating that the NPKF was unnecessary. They may even have gone so far as to claim that the NPKF was actually responsible for the disturbance of the peace. The respondents were asked what their main reason was for the perception that the NPKF was unnecessary. They responded as follows:

The NPKF was not well trained	26%
The NPKF was the cause of the violence	21%
The NPKF does nothing to stop the violence	18%
We want the SADF	14%
The NPKF cannot control the violence	8%
The place was quiet until the NPKF came	5%
Other reasons	8%
TOTAL	100%

This indicates that the respondents believed that the withdrawal of the SADF and the deployment of the badly trained NPKF was directly responsible for the violence.

The withdrawal of the SADF and the deployment of the NPKF did not add to the feeling of security experienced by the residents. For example, only 42% of the respondents indicated that the presence of the NPKF added to their feeling of security, while 43% did not believe this to be the case. These responses are analyzed in Table 2 according to area and feeling of security.

The respondents feeling the most insecure during the survey were those living in Thokoza, the area where there was the most violence. The fact that respondents from Thokoza were the least inclined to indicate that the NPKF added to their feeling of security lends support to the finding that the NPKF, because of an unfortunate convergence of events, was quickly singled out as part of the problem rather than the solution.

TABLE 2

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION:

'Does the presence of the NPKF in your area add to your feeling of safety or not?'

Analyzed according to area and feeling of security

	NPKF PRESENCE				
	Adds to security	Does not add to security	Uncertain	TOTAL	N
Area in KATORUS					
Vosloorus	48	33	19	100	217
Katlehong	43	42	15	100	420
Thokoza	31	61	8	100	163
Feeling of security					
Safe	65	24	11	100	313
Unsafe	23	62	15	100	353
Uncertain/Do not know	37	39	24	100	134

Clearly an armed force with inadequate training and experience should not be deployed in an area with high levels of insecurity. Such deployment can easily trigger the dynamics of violence, which is what happened in Thokoza on 17-19 April.

4.3 KNOWLEDGE OF THE NPKF

When asked, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (88%) indicated that they were indeed aware that the NPKF was deployed in their area.

In response to a question what the main purpose of the NPKF was, almost two-thirds of the respondents answered that it was to restore peace in the area. Yet, there appeared to be some confusion regarding the main purpose of the NPKF amongst respondents. This confusion was exacerbated by vague and conflicting public pronouncements as to the purpose of the NPKF. The media coverage showing disciplinary problems during training of the NPKF probably also tended to blur the real purpose of the NPKF in the eyes of the public. Obviously such ambiguity does not contribute to effective operations.

4.4 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE NPKF

The respondents who gave definite answers to a question on their first choice regarding who should be represented in the NPKF indicated a clear preference for the South African Defence Force (SADF) to be a part of the NPKF.

All together 26% of the respondents wanted the SADF in the NPKF, followed by Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) (9%), the South African police (8%), peace monitors (5%) and civics (3%). It should be noted that 35% of the respondents were uncertain in their response to this question.

A Chi-squared analysis correlating respondents' feeling of safety (or lack of safety) to their first choice for representation in the NPKF indicated that the SADF was the first choice of 39% of the respondents feeling safe to very safe and of 46% of the respondents feeling unsafe to very unsafe. MK was the first choice of 38% of the respondents feeling safe to very safe and of 44% of those feeling unsafe to very unsafe. The SADF was also the first choice for representation in the NPKF of respondents falling mainly in the lower to middle educational categories (up to Std. 10), whereas MK tended to be the first choice of respondents mainly in the middle to higher educational categories (Std. 10 and further education).

Respondents' second choice in respect of who should be represented in the NPKF again reflects a strong preference in this respect for the SADF. The SADF was the second choice of more than 22% of the respondents, followed by MK (15%), peace monitors (12%), the police (11%) and civics (10%).

The third choice most often mentioned by the respondents in this respect was MK (20%); civics (11%); the police and peace monitors (both 9%); the SADF, homeland armies and soldiers from foreign countries (all 7%); SDUs

5% and the Internal Stability Division and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (both 3%).

It should be borne in mind that the sample in the present study did not include hostels and squatter camps and that the respondents were largely supporters of the ANC (cf. Section 4.1). It therefore came as no surprise that MK was a popular choice after the SADF, while organizations such as the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and ISD were not even mentioned.

There was a clear preference for the SADF (now the SANDF) and MK to be represented in the NPKF and little support for the police, especially the ISD. Obviously great care must be taken so that a peacekeeping force should represent all interest groups in the area where it is deployed. The SADF had achieved success in peacekeeping in KATORUS in the period before the NPKF was deployed. The people of Katorus's preference for the SADF as the peacekeeping force illustrates the degree to which effective, impartial execution can contribute to legitimacy in the medium and long term.

4.5 THE USE OF FORCE IN PUBLIC ORDER POLICING

When asked whether the NPKF should be allowed to use force in order to ensure that there is peace more than half the respondents answered in the affirmative, while 26% took the opposite view and a substantial percentage (23%) was uncertain.

As might have been expected, Chi-squared analysis revealed that respondents feeling unsafe to very unsafe were more inclined to indicate that the NPKF should be allowed to use force in order to ensure peace than those feeling safe to very safe. There was no noticeable difference in educational level between those respondents saying that the NPKF should be allowed to use force to ensure peace and those against the use of force by the NPKF.

Respondents in favour of the use of force to ensure peace were also asked why they answered in that way. Significantly, in view of the events (the NPKF was withdrawn after only approximately a week's deployment in the KATORUS area when violence broke out on a large scale) the most often cited reason for supporting the use of force by the NPKF was that they were *'not well trained'* (42%). This was followed by *'they have to be able to protect*

themselves' (19%) and *'they have to maintain law and order'* (15%).

Although media coverage may have created the impression that the NPKF was less trained than it actually was, this finding tends to emphasize the need for thorough training of any peacekeeping force before it is deployed in a trouble-spot like KATORUS. **Legitimacy must be backed up by effective execution.**

Respondents not in favour of the use of force by the NPKF were also asked the reason for their answers. The most common reason cited in this regard was *'there will be no peace if they force us'* (36%). This was followed by *'the situation will be worse'* (23%).

A related question was whether the NPKF should be allowed to use weapons or not. More than 60% of the respondents were indeed inclined to the response that the NPKF should be allowed to use weapons. Those favouring the use of weapons by the NPKF were asked what kind of weapons the NPKF should be allowed to use. The greatest single proportion of these respondents (24%) indicated that the NPKF should be allowed to use rifles with live ammunition, followed by rifles using rubber bullets and pistols/revolvers (both 17%) and shotguns using birdshot (11%).

The fact that 60% of the respondents were in favour of the NPKF using weapons probably confirms the view that there is a deep-seated desire for peace among many of those South Africans who have been afflicted by violence during the past few years. The use of appropriate weapons by the NPKF in keeping the peace would therefore apparently have the support of many members of the public and is an issue which should be thoroughly considered by the appropriate authorities.

As was expected, Chi-squared analysis revealed that respondents feeling very unsafe to unsafe were more inclined to state that they favoured the use of weapons by the NPKF than respondents feeling safe to very safe. There was no appreciable difference in the educational level of respondents for and against the use of weapons by the NPKF.

The respondents were also questioned as to the things the NPKF should be allowed to do in their efforts to keep the peace. Their answers were:

TABLE 3

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION:
'I am going to read you a list of things
the NPKF may be allowed to do in their
efforts to keep the peace. Say in each
instance whether the NPKF should be
allowed to do these things or not:'

	N	%
POWER TO SEARCH HOSTELS		
Yes, should be allowed	663	82.9
No, should not be allowed	72	9.0
Uncertain/Do not know	65	8.1
TOTAL	800	100.0
POWER TO SEARCH VEHICLES		
Yes, should be allowed	655	81.9
No, should not be allowed	79	9.9
Uncertain/Do not know	66	8.3
TOTAL	800	100.0
CROWD CONTROL		
Yes, should be allowed	649	81.0
No, should not be allowed	81	10.1
Uncertain/Do not know	71	8.9
TOTAL	801	100.0
RIOT OR UNREST CONTROL		
Yes, should be allowed	639	79.8
No, should not be allowed	82	10.2
Uncertain/Do not know	80	10.0
TOTAL	801	100.0
POWERS OF ARREST		
Yes, should be allowed	620	77.4
No, should not be allowed	98	12.2
Uncertain/Do not know	83	10.4
TOTAL	801	100.0
POWER TO SEARCH PEOPLE		
Yes, should be allowed	614	76.8
No, should not be allowed	117	14.6
Uncertain/Do not know	69	8.6
TOTAL	800	100.0
MEDIATION ON CONFLICT		
Yes, should be allowed	610	76.3
No, should not be allowed	98	12.3
Uncertain/Do not know	91	11.4
TOTAL	799	100.0
POWER TO SEARCH HOMES		
Yes, should be allowed	541	67.6
No, should not be allowed	182	22.8
Uncertain/Do not know	77	9.6
TOTAL	800	100.0
POWER TO USE TEARGAS		
Yes, should be allowed	363	45.4
No, should not be allowed	329	41.2
Uncertain/Do not know	107	13.4
TOTAL	799	100.0

POWER TO HIT PEOPLE		
Yes, should be allowed	267	33.4
No, should not be allowed	432	54.1
Uncertain/Do not know	100	12.5
TOTAL	799	100.0
POWER TO SHOOT PEOPLE		
Yes, should be allowed	219	27.4
No, should not be allowed	468	58.5
Uncertain/Do not know	113	14.1
TOTAL	800	100.0

Chi-squared analysis revealed that, as was expected, respondents feeling unsafe or very unsafe were more inclined to state that the NPKF should indeed have the power to shoot people in order to ensure peace than respondents feeling safe or very safe. There was very little difference in the educational level of respondents indicating that the NPKF should be allowed to shoot people and those indicating that the NPKF should not be allowed to shoot people. The same pattern of responses was observed in the case of the power to hit people.

Public policing agencies should, it appears, take cognizance of the fact that more than half the respondents indicate that the NPKF should not be allowed to shoot or hit people in its efforts to keep the peace. This in part probably also reflects an aversion to violence which is to be expected in most people. This finding reaffirms the view that the public expects a peacekeeping force to apply the principle of the minimum use of force. In spite of this, those feeling unsafe or very unsafe appear to see the need in some situations for the use of selectively applied stronger measures.

4.6 OBSTACLES TO THE NPKF PERFORMING ITS DUTY IN THE AREA

The most frequent response to a question enquiring after the biggest single obstacle to the NPKF performing its duty in the area was that there were no obstacles (27%). This was followed by 'uncertain/do not know' (22%) and again apparently significantly by the response 'they are weak and not well trained' (10%).

4.7 THE EVALUATION OF THE NEUTRALITY AND CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE KATORUS AREA DURING THE ELECTION OF DIFFERENT ARMED FORCES AND COMMUNITY- AND PEACE STRUCTURES

A cross-tabulation of the questions on the neutrality and capacity of the SAP, ISD of the police, SADF, SDUs, peace structures and NPKF revealed (see Table 4) that 79%, 56% and 51% respectively of the respondents believed that the SADF, peace structures and the NPKF were both neutral enough and had the capacity to maintain peace during the election. This indicates a relatively high evaluation of the NPKF. This is an especially high evaluation if it is taken into account that the NPKF was scarcely deployed for a week at that stage and that only 8% and 26% of the respondents assigned this evaluation to the ISD of the police and the police respectively. It appears to be a reasonable conclusion that the NPKF would have received a less positive evaluation if the survey were repeated today. Table 4 reveals further that **the ISD has a very bad image in the communities of KATORUS and that even the image of the SAP leaves a lot to be desired.** The readers' attention should be drawn, however, to the fact that the respondent was not informed that the SAP referred to in the question actually excludes the ISD and includes the local police only.

The explanation for the particularly positive image of the SADF and the NPKF (which was possibly seen as part of the SADF) and the very negative image of the ISD and the police can be sought in the following:

- the fact that the SADF was able to restore peace in the area, something that the ISD, which is seen as an inextricable part of the SAP, could never achieve permanently. (For the reasons why the SADF succeeded in this, see Chapter 3).
- the fact that the ISD, because of long-term involvement in the hostel-township conflict has developed the image on both sides that it supports the other side.
- the SADF's excellent liaison, negotiation and consultation with the community (established by qualitative research).

Given the evaluation in Table 4 it can be expected that the respondents would be of the opinion that the NPKF should only cooperate with the organizations which they evaluate as 'neutral'. In Table 5 the response to the question *'Should the NPKF cooperate with the following in keeping the peace? Please answer in each instance'* is analyzed by their evaluation of the neutrality of different forces. The table reveals that the respondents who were of the opinion that a particular force is not neutral are also not keen that the NPKF cooperates with that particular force.

The findings on neutrality and capacity once again confirm that **it is of the utmost importance that a peacekeeping force or any force which is responsible for public order policing should be seen by the public as being completely neutral.** This is especially true where the restoration of order and peace between groups in a clash are involved. Once a public order policing organization has been ascribed the image of partiality (with or without reason), as has happened to the ISD, that body will not be able to restore order and keep the peace. The image of the SA Police has been seriously affected by the ISD. Since South Africa has experienced a serious wave of crime, it has become imperative that very serious consideration should be given to the separation of the functions of pure crime fighting and public order policing. If this is not done, the police service may not be able to implement both community-based policing and a programme to combat crime effectively. Policy makers will seriously have to address the issue of whether South Africa should not have three forces, namely: a defence force, a police force(s) and a national peace force or stability force.

Given the relatively positive evaluation of the NPKF (although it was deployed for only about a week) the question should be further put whether the very negative media image that South Africans have of the NPKF was completely justified. The question also arises whether the NPKF was given enough opportunity to prove itself in a supporting role to the SADF. Indeed, all survey data indicate that the NPKF was reasonably positively evaluated in areas where they functioned under reasonably 'normal' circumstances.

TABLE 4

**The evaluation of different armed forces and community
and peace structures' neutrality and capacity to maintain peace
in the Katorus area during the election**

EVALUATION									
Armed force or structure	Are neutral and have capacity	Are neutral but do not have capacity or are uncertain	Have capacity but are not neutral or are uncertain	Not neutral and uncertain of capacity	Do not have capacity and uncertain of neutrality	Uncertain of both	Not neutral and do not have capacity	TOTAL	N
SADF	79	5	4	1	0	8	3	100	793
PEACE STRUCTURES	56	9	8	1	3	19	4	100	794
NPKF	51	6	7	2	2	20	12	100	793
SDU'S	34	8	7	4	5	19	23	100	794
SAP	26	8	10	6	4	13	33	100	794
ISU OF SAP	8	3	3	5	3	14	63	99	794

TABLE 5

**Should the NPKF cooperate with armed forces and peace structures,
analyzed by the neutrality of the forces and structures**

Neutrality of force or structure	NPKF COOPERATION WITH FORCE AND STRUCTURE				N
	Yes, should cooperate	No, should not cooperate	Uncertain	TOTAL	
<u>SADF</u>					
Neutral	94	3	3	100	662
Not neutral	48	52	0	100	42
Uncertain	65	4	31	100	81
<u>SDU'S</u>					
Neutral	79	15	6	100	329
Not neutral	28	64	8	100	230
Uncertain	41	21	38	100	226
<u>SAP</u>					
Neutral	80	14	6	100	267
Not neutral	46	49	5	100	356
Uncertain	61	14	25	100	163
<u>ISU of SAP</u>					
Neutral	64	29	7	100	89
Not neutral	15	78	7	100	551
Uncertain	35	21	44	100	145

4.8 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NPKF AND THE COMMUNITY

The respondents were asked the question: *'What are the relations between the members of the NPKF and your local community?'* The response was:

RESPONSE	%
Very good	16
Good	36
Neither good nor bad	18
Bad	6
Very bad	6
Uncertain/Do not know	18
TOTAL	100

A week after deployment, only approximately one out of ten respondents saw the relations between the NPKF and the community as 'bad' or 'very bad'. Further analysis indicated again that it was especially the respondents in Thokoza (where the violence of 17 to 19 April occurred) who were more inclined to describe the relations between their community and the NPKF as 'bad' to 'very bad'.

4.9 CONCLUSION

In contrast to the 'national' public sentiment and certainly that of the media, **the people in KATORUS had a more positive assessment of the NPKF than was expected.** Admittedly, the survey excluded hostels and informal settlements, i.e. it was done in areas generally with high levels of ANC support.

A second conclusion of the survey relates to the powers and methods which the NPKF could employ.

More than three-quarters of the respondents indicated that the NPKF should be allowed to engage in the following: crowd control, riot or unrest control, exercise the power to arrest people, mediate in conflicts, search people, search vehicles and search hostels. More than two-thirds of the respondents felt that the NPKF should be empowered to search people's homes. The greatest single proportion of the respondents (45%) felt that the NPKF should be

allowed to teargas people. More than half the respondents stated that the NPKF should not be allowed to shoot people or hit people.

Perceptions that the NPKF was needed, declined once that force had been deployed and violence escalated. Although the NPKF clearly had a large degree of legitimacy, the majority of residents appeared to realise that the Force was not very well trained, had done little to stop the violence and, in some cases, may even have contributed to the violence. To some degree, therefore, **the track record of the SADF as an effective (and increasingly legitimate) force in stabilising the area overrode the initial acceptance by the community of the NPKF.** Therefore, the more unsafe the residents felt, the more inclined they were towards the SADF.

The surprisingly high acceptance and legitimacy of the SADF was reinforced by the perceptions of respondents as to how the NPKF should be composed. A clear preference was expressed for the SADF (26%), MK (9%), the SA Police (8%), Peace Monitors (5%) and the civics (3%). A large proportion (35%) of respondents were uncertain in their response. These views on the SADF are further reinforced by the perceptions regarding the neutrality and capacity of various organisations involved in combating violence. Close on 80% of respondents believed that the SADF was both neutral and effective in maintaining peace during the elections. Just over half of the respondents (56% and 51%) felt that both the NPKF and the Peace Structures had a similar capacity.

In contrast, the ISD scored very badly on all counts. It is perceived as neither effective nor legitimate. The NPKF, by contrast, had an initial legitimacy which was inevitably undermined by its lack of effectiveness and method of operations. The SADF, an initially illegitimate force, through its effective operations in the eyes of the community, succeeded in earning legitimacy over time. In sum, **legitimacy bestows authority. In itself it is insufficient if not supported by effective and impartial execution.**

