



Assessing long-term fragility in Africa

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*Using the International Futures system from the Pardee
Centre for International Futures, University of Denver*

Purpose


A long-term forecast of 25 “more fragile” countries in Africa using the International Futures forecasting system (IFs), based on our analysis of the structural drivers of conflict.


Structure

- Our understanding of fragility (some theory...)
- List of 25 'more fragile' countries
- The International Futures (IFs) forecasting system
- Trends in Africa and amongst 'more fragile' countries
- Ten recommendations

Dimensions of Fragility

- Each country unique, we focus on structural causality
- Drivers/causes can be direct or indirect, deep or proximate
- Originate from variety of diff sources such as population structure, poor governance, global context, bad neighbourhood, etc
- Causality is complex and interact as part of a system = a syndrome





Fragility and State formation

Today's context of 'state formation in more fragile countries'



1. Historical sequencing of transitions to greater *security, capacity* and *inclusion* has given way to a simultaneous and compressed process
2. Government/political elites have limited ability/agency to determine outcomes/control process:
 - Greater infusion of global/external concepts and ideas
 - Power and influence of private and financial sectors
3. Africa's positive new development trajectory provides new impetus to process of state formation
4. Personal and elite politics lies at the heart of the challenge of rebuilding fragile states

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IDENTIFYING AFRICA'S 25 'MORE FRAGILE' COUNTRIES

Africa's 25 'more fragile' countries



- 1. CPIA 19:** Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe
- 2. Plus 7:** Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda & Rwanda
= 26 “more fragile” countries (Sudan/South Sudan)
- 3. “Less fragile” countries:** the rest



7 additional Countries appear 3≥ Times in the Bottom 20 of the Following (in Africa)

1. Human Development Index from the UNDP
2. Ibrahim Governance Index
3. The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) done by Carlton University
4. The Failed State Index from the Fund for Peace
5. The failed state list from the Center for Systemic Peace
6. Governance capacity and country risk indices within the International Futures system (IFs)



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THE INTERNATIONAL FUTURES FORECASTING SYSTEM (IFs)


The Nature of Forecasting

- No matter how sophisticated, forecasting is not prediction. It is an aid to understanding one set of possible futures. Reality will inevitably unfold quite differently.
- If rooted in data and historical trends, such analysis is particularly useful in thinking creatively yet in a structured and 'bound' manner about what could be possible.
- A dynamic Base-Case forecast, and an optimistic and pessimistic forecast as outer boundaries
- Use 2030 and 2050 to benchmark changes

International Futures (IFs)



- Forecasts +200 variables for 186 countries using +2 000 data series from WB, IMF, UNDP, etc
- Database for trend analysis
- Scenario-creation parameters to shape alternative futures
- Open source and free educational tool developed over 3 decades
- Used for analysis in:
 - *Human Development Reports, 2011 & 2012 (United Nations)*
 - *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (US National Intelligence Council)*
 - *Patterns of Potential Human Progress Series (Pardee Centre)*



Variables and Indices

- For *governance* we used two variables of governance developed by Hughes et al, namely capacity (GOVINDCAP in IFs) and inclusion (GOVINDINCL in IFs). These provide for government revenues as a percentage of GDP, government corruption, democratic deficit and gender empowerment.
- For *war/violence* we use the inverse of the composite index developed by Hughes et al (SFINTLWARALL in IFs). This includes a moving (but declining) average of a society's past experience with such conflict, as well as of internal war probability, infant mortality, trade openness, democratic deficit, youth bulge and GDP growth rate.
- For *poverty* we use the Human Development Index (HDINEW in IFs). The HDI provides for life expectancy, education and income.
- For *inequality* we used the inverse of gini (GINIDOM in IFs). The Gini ratio is a measure of the statistical dispersion of inequality.




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SUMMARY TRENDS IN AFRICA


Working age population

Population-Working Age (15 to 65) as Percent of Total



Global vs African growth rates

(5 year moving average)




The African economy

(Base Case – US\$2005)

- Increases more than 9x in MER terms (from US\$9 631 bn in 2010 to US\$27 135 bn by 2030 and US\$86 317 bn by 2050)
- Currently around 2,5% of global economy, 3,8% by 2030 and 6,5% by 2050.
- GDP per person (PPP) will grow steadily from US\$2,718 in 2010 to US\$4,141 in 2030 and US \$7,588 by 2050


Poverty Less Than \$2, Log normal Formulation



Year	More Fragile mil people/% population	Less Fragile mil people/% population
2010	302 million (70%)	317 million (54%)
2030	365 million (53%)	282 million (33%)
2050	394 million (39%)	198 million (17%)


Internal War

State Failure Internal War Event, History and Forecast



The gap in the provision of governance

Ibrahim Index







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BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM - SUMMARY FORECAST

State Failure Internal War Event, History and Forecast



Poverty Less Than \$2, Log normal Formulation



2030 differences in size of the economy in MER and GDP PPP between worst and best case scenario

Country	Difference in size of the 2030 economy (MER)	Difference in GDP per person by 2030 (PPP)
Burundi	\$571 million	\$99
Cameroon	\$7,6 bn	\$340
CAR	\$767 million	\$174
Chad	\$3,2 bn	\$272
Comoros	\$96 million	\$115
DR Congo	\$2,7 bn	\$42
Rep of Congo	\$4,9 bn	\$887
Cote d'Ivoire	\$5,6 bn	\$219
Eritrea	\$376 million	\$77
Ethiopia	\$14,1 bn	\$207
Guinea	\$2,1 bn	\$236
Guinea-Bissau	\$195 million	\$151
Liberia	\$1,2 bn	\$229
Madagascar	\$1,6 bn	\$120
Malawi	\$2,7 bn	\$200
Mali	\$4,5 bn	\$234
Mauritania	\$947 million	\$283
Niger	\$1,7 bn	\$100
Rwanda	\$3,8 bn	\$357
Sierra Leone	\$1,9 bn	\$280
Somalia	\$1,2 bn	\$125
Sudan/South Sudan	\$9,2 bn	\$203
Togo	\$1 bn	\$166
Uganda	\$12,8 bn	\$316
Zimbabwe	\$1,3 bn	\$166

Summary Forecast

- By 2030 at least *Zimbabwe and Ethiopia* would have escaped from the current “more fragile” label
- By 2050 we expect that *Guinea, Malawi and Liberia* would also have exited the “more fragile” grouping.
- We expect that *Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan, the DR Congo and Central Africa Republic* will continue to experience sustained fragility for at least the next generation



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TEN RECOMMENDATIONS

1-2 Engagement with 5 long-term fragile countries

1. Set up a long-term fragility facility that is dedicated to the support of the 5 long-term fragile countries with a 20-year horizon.
2. Embark on discussions with each to support a jointly owned and collaborative effort towards a 20-year national development plan. This plan and adherence to it should serve as a basis for the engagement by the international community and neighbours.

3-4 Engagement with 5 long-term fragile countries

3. Develop a methodology and undertake/ commission annual independent political-economic assessments over at least an initial 10 year period, longer if possible, to track progress.
4. Work with each of the country's concerned to establish a self-evaluation process based on the example of the APRM, rooted in RECs and the AU

5 At the AfDB – Go Beyond Traditional Analysis!

Our forecasts and analysis is only as good as our data – and Africa's data problem will take decades to fix. Therefore:

Support exploration on use of 'big data' that could complement more traditional efforts of World Bank through its unit on fragility located in Nairobi and Washington DC. In this manner AfDB could short-circuit many of traditional data constraints and benefit from innovative new approaches to understanding (fragility in) Africa.

6 Support Cash-Grants to address **Deep-Seated Poverty**

Direct transfer payments to the poor are the most effective single measures to alleviate structural poverty while helping to establish tax base and develop social compact

Work towards up-front wealth sharing agreements in fragile countries that are expected to benefit from future oil and gas incomes. Aim should be to dispense large portion of additional revenues as taxable income directly to poorest using cell-phone and biometric ID technologies



7 Mainstream and encourage futures analysis and visioning

External actors do lots of things, fragility analysis, poverty assessments, conflict drivers, etc. Complex stuff.

Looking at the future allows us to see what can be possible for our children .

Encourage integrated futures discussions at various levels (not only national) to serve as the basis for planning and use of resources, building non-formal partnerships that can bridge state institutions and authority with traditional and informal institutions.

8 Support for g7+

Strong endorsement of the self-identification prioritization adopted by the g7+ group of fragile countries.

Offer to support the African members with the development of national plans and future's forecasting.

Advocate and offer support for a simplified version of the APRM process of self-evaluation.

Advocate for a “balanced approach” in advancement of institutionalization of governance, measures to reduce poverty, reduce inequality and conflict mediation



9 Help watch the Voters Roll and build the national IEC!

- Election-related violence will probably remain high and can trigger relapse in fragility
- Effective election-monitoring but little oversight of prior registration processes and management of election roll
- Support efforts at long-term oversight of voter registration processes in fragile states and capacity of IEC

10 Efforts to reduce spill-over from Regional Conflict

- Bad neighbourhood is a large driver of national instability
- Build on the example of AIM that was established by the Mbeki Panel to facilitate investigations of ongoing claims and counter-claims between Sudan/South Sudan by countries regarding external support – rooted in RECs and AU structures, but independent
- Base engagement on provisions in AU's non-aggression treaty

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