

# **The post-apartheid South African military: Transforming with the nation**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

After a long struggle for freedom, South Africa in 1994 finally joined the community of nations as a democratic state. Since then the country has undergone fundamental transformation from the closed and isolated apartheid state to a state that is playing an increasingly important role in international, regional and sub-regional affairs. Internally, much has been done to advance reconciliation and nation building, and government has been transformed to ensure transparency and accountability in governance, as well as to focus all spheres of government on improved service delivery.

The South African Department of Defence (DoD) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have also been substantially transformed from the defence organisation of the apartheid military era. This transformation focused on the integration of former combatant forces into one national force, making the DoD representative of the people of South Africa, ensuring transparency in defence management and accountability to civil authority, establishing greater efficiency and aligning defence policy with the Constitution, international law and national culture.

This chapter focuses on the creation and evolution of the South African DoD and SANDF in the period leading up to and after the first democratic elections in South Africa, and the birth of the 'new' South Africa in 1994. It presents insight into the challenges that faced the South African DoD post-apartheid, and the way in which these were met.

**BACKGROUND**GEOGRAPHY<sup>1</sup>

South Africa is situated at the southernmost part of the African continent and has common boundaries with the republics of Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, the kingdom of Swaziland and the mountain kingdom of Lesotho. The country covers an area of about 1,220,000 km<sup>2</sup> and is home to some 43 million people. Much of South Africa is situated on a high plateau (1,500 m above sea level), surrounded by a coastal mountain range and coastal plains. South Africa is generally dry, with 65% of the country having an annual rainfall of less than 500 mm. The climate, however, varies from arid in the west to Mediterranean in the south-western Cape, sub-tropical in the eastern coastal plains and continental on the plateau.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION<sup>2</sup>

South Africa's modern political history is dominated by the period of European settlement, which started when the Dutch East India Company set up a station in Table Bay (Cape Town) in 1652, to provision passing ships. Later in 1795, the British occupied the Cape as a strategic base, controlling the sea route to the east. These occupations soon led to the expansion of European settlement into the interior and to conflict for land, natural resources, livestock and labour.

By 1854 South Africa was divided into the two Boer republics: the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State; and the two British colonies, Natal and the Cape. In the Boer republics the principles of racially exclusive citizenship were absolute, despite their reliance on black labour, while in the colonies more liberal policies prevailed.

The discovery of diamonds and gold coincided with a new era of imperialism, and the scramble for Africa brought imperial power and influence to bear in Southern Africa as never before. This led to the South African War, which lasted from October 1899 to May 1902. In the Treaty of Vereeniging that ended the war, the British agreed to leave the issue of rights for Africans to be decided by a future self-governing (white) authority.

This led to the creation of a white-ruled dominion by uniting the former Boer republics with Natal and the Cape into the Union of South Africa that came into being on 31 May 1910. The most important priority was to re-establish white control over the land and to force the

Africans into wage labour. These events, together with increasing segregationist policies, caused great dissatisfaction among black South Africans and led to the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) as early as 1912. The ANC became the most important organisation for black liberation and empowerment, drawing together traditional authorities and the educated elite in a common cause.

#### APARTHEID AND THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE

After the National Party (NP) came to power in South Africa (following the whites-only elections of 1948) it soon instituted the ideology of apartheid that brought an even more rigorous and authoritarian approach than the segregationist policies of previous governments. This policy led to increasing discrimination and disenfranchisement of people of colour.

Apartheid met with growing black resistance and hostility, and this in turn led to such events as the anti-pass law demonstration in Sharpeville in 1960, which was ruthlessly put down by apartheid security forces, leading to the deaths of 69 demonstrators.

Soon afterwards, the ANC formed its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and embarked on a campaign of limited sabotage that resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and other leaders. According to Rocky Williams:

The final decision to embark on an armed struggle by the ANC was not a decision reached easily by the Congress Alliance nor was it a strategy that necessarily enjoyed the support of all sectors of the Alliance itself. It was both the perceived limitations of previous peaceful protest, the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the intransigence displayed by the regime in declaring the White Republic in 1961 and the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress in the same year that led to the formation of MK.<sup>3</sup>

The imprisonment of these leaders and other repressive actions caused increasing unrest and eventually led to fully-fledged armed struggle during the 1970s and 1980s.

Externally, South Africa was also becoming increasingly isolated from the world community, and the corresponding political, social and economic pressures combined with internal mass action and the armed struggle, forced the apartheid regime to re-think its political policies.

## ADVENT OF INDEPENDENCE

The NP government embarked on a series of reforms, which culminated when President F W de Klerk un-banned the liberation movements and released political prisoners, notably Nelson Mandela, in February 1990. This led to a long, difficult negotiation process and in April 1994 South Africa held its first democratic election under an Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act 200 of 1993).<sup>4</sup>

The ANC emerged with a 62% majority. Its main opposition came from the NP, which gained 20% of the vote nationally. The ANC-led government embarked on a programme to promote the reconstruction and development of the country and its institutions. This called for the simultaneous pursuit of democratisation and socio-economic change, as well as reconciliation and the building of a consensus founded on the commitment to improving the lives of all South Africans, in particular the poor.

Converting democratic ideals into practice required, among others, initiating a radical overhaul of the machinery of government at every level, towards service delivery, openness and a culture of human rights.

A significant milestone of democratisation during the five-year period of the Mandela presidency was the constitution-making process, which delivered a document that is highly regarded in the democratic world.<sup>5</sup>

The second democratic election, held on 2 June 1999, saw the ANC increase its majority to a point just short of two-thirds of the total vote. South Africa entered into the post-Mandela era under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. President Mbeki promised a tough, hands-on managerial style, geared to efficiency and delivery. In particular, the Mbeki administration committed itself to the development of Africa based on democracy, good governance, and a co-operative approach to resolving the political and economic challenges across the continent.<sup>6</sup> This is clearly demonstrated in the leadership role that South Africa has taken in the establishment and functioning of the African Union (AU) and in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD forms the basis of South African foreign policy.

In 2004, South Africa celebrated its tenth year of democracy with, among others, its third democratic poll, from which the ANC emerged with a clear two-thirds majority.

Once again the ANC government has committed itself to improved service delivery by all spheres of government and to working towards the economic and social development of Africa, as well as to peace and stability on the continent.

FORM OF GOVERNMENT<sup>7</sup>

South Africa is a federal state, governed by a democratically elected government based on universal adult suffrage. The South African government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The powers of the legislative authorities, executive authorities and judicial authorities are separate from one another.

Parliament is the legislative authority of South Africa and has the power to make laws for the country in accordance with the Constitution. Parliament comprises the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Parliamentary sittings are open to the public. Since the establishment of the new Parliament in 1994, a number of steps have been taken to make it more accessible. This has been done to make the institution more accountable, as well as to motivate and facilitate public participation in the legislative processes. Two of these steps are the parliamentary website (<http://www.parliament.gov.za/>), which encourages comments and feedback from the public, and the parliamentary channel on television that broadcasts live coverage of Parliament and parliamentary committee sittings. This is further enhanced by an active non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), which regularly attends committee meetings and publishes the discussions on the group's website (<http://www.pmg.org.za>).

The National Assembly consists of members elected through a system of proportional representation for a term of five years, and is presided over by a speaker, assisted by a deputy speaker. The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure democratic governance as required by the Constitution. It does this by electing the president, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by passing legislation, and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) entrenches the separation of powers, offers appropriate checks and balances and includes a far-reaching Bill of Rights. Socio-economic rights—such as housing, health care, access to food and water, social security and basic education—are recognised.

**THE FORMATION OF THE SANDF**

Chapter 11 of the Constitution provides for the defence force and determines that the “primary object of the defence force is to defend and

protect the republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”.<sup>8</sup> It makes a member of Cabinet responsible for defence and determines the rules for the deployment of the SANDF. The Constitution also provides for the establishment of a civilian defence secretariat.

#### THE TRANSITION—CODESA AND THE JMCC

During the transition phase to prepare for the first democratic elections in South Africa, political events in South Africa were dominated by the negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). During this period the Sub-Council on Defence, a sub-structure of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), constituted and mandated the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) to draft provisional policies for the establishment of a new Ministry of Defence and to address the issues of integration and future defence policy.

This Ministry of Defence was to be governed by the principles of transparency, accountability, separation of powers and legality. Rocky Williams, a member of the JMCC wrote:

The planning and staff responsibility for the management of the pre-integration planning process was delegated to a body known as the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council [sic] which fell under the authority of the Sub-Council on Defence. Although the JMCC did not possess the attributes of a formal command structure, it was to become responsible for the management of a strategic planning process whereby detailed plans for the creation of the new defence force were laid [down].<sup>9</sup>

The JMCC provided the first forum for officers of the old South African Defence Force (SADF), MK, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) and the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) states’ defence forces to work together to create the post-election DoD and SANDF.

The proceedings were dominated by the officers of the SADF (due to their institutional capacity and experience in running complex planning processes) and MK (mostly due to the “political leverage possessed by the ANC”),<sup>10</sup> as well as by the preparatory work that had been done by the Military Research Group—an ANC think-tank on defence policy.

### According to Williams:

The TVBC armies had no significant impact on the integration process beyond the influence of a few individuals. It is not surprising, for the reasons outlined above, that the force design of the new SANDF was largely based on that of the former SADF and that the strategies, doctrines and procedures remained unaltered (prompting one senior SADF officer at the time to comment that “the SADF got more than 80% of what it wanted out of the JMCC process”). The imminent integration process was to be based, therefore, on SADF structures and SADF rules and regulations—a phenomenon that was to greatly undermine the capacity of non-SADF forces to influence the integration process in the initial integration period.<sup>11</sup>

Despite tension and difficulties, caused mostly by the very restricted and limited mandates from their political masters, the JMCC members managed to establish good working and social relations. This was mostly due to the strong leadership of such individuals as Rocky Williams<sup>12</sup> of MK and Roland de Vries of the SADF, among others, who were willing to seek and find commonality in interest, to think and act ‘outside the box’, and to challenge authority as and when appropriate.

#### THE NEW SANDF: MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS

Officially the new, post-apartheid South African DoD, comprising the Defence Secretariat and the SANDF, came into being on 27 April 1994 with the establishment of the new democratic South Africa. The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) established the National Defence Force as the only defence force for the Republic and provided the fundamental policy framework on which further developments were to be based. The most important of these are:

- adherence to the principles of international law regulating the use of force;
- determination that the SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture;
- determination of the functions for which the SANDF may be employed; and

- ensuring democratic (parliamentary) control over the military by the establishment of a Joint Standing Committee on Defence, and the provision that a minister, responsible for defence, shall be accountable to Parliament for the National Defence Force.<sup>13</sup>

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) further determined that the “primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”.<sup>14</sup>

The Constitution provides that the SANDF may be employed for service:

- in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
- in the preservation of life, health or property;
- in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
- in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the police service is unable to maintain law and order on its own: and
- in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.<sup>15</sup>

#### CONSTITUENT FORCES

The 1993 Constitution provided for the integration of forces into the new SANDF. This entailed integrating the former SADF, the defence forces of the former TBVC states, the guerrilla armies of the ANC (MK) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (APLA) and the KwaZulu Self-Protection Forces (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party into the SANDF. By 1998, the SANDF (military and civilian) totalled 93,324 members (see Table 1).



Table 1: SANDF constituent forces, 1998

Force	1998
SADF	57,053
MK	11,738
APLA	3,713
TBVC	7,243
KZSPF	1,788
SANDF (members who joined after 27 April 1994)	10,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>93,324</b>

Source: *South African Defence Review 1998, chapter 10, figure 10.1, p 70*

#### BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE CONSTITUENT FORCES

##### The South African Defence Force before 1994

The SADF developed from the Union Defence Force, which was established in 1912. The SADF participated in both the First and Second world wars as well as in the Korean conflict. Through these engagements, the SADF developed into an effective and well-equipped conventional military force.

The SADF consisted of the army, the air force, the navy and the military health service. The SADF was organised along the lines of a conventional force and a territorial or counter-insurgency force. During the 1970s and 1980s the conventional force, both regular and part-time, was responsible for external operations and operated extensively in Namibia and Angola in operations against the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and in support of the Movement for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the armed forces of Angola (FAPLA), which were supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union. The counter-insurgency forces operated in South Africa opposing the freedom struggle as led by the ANC and its armed wing, MK.

The SADF was a significant military power in Southern Africa and could field three army divisions supported by strong and sophisticated air and naval power. These forces relied heavily on part-time soldiers and conscripts (white male national service conscripts that served for an initial period of two years and then joined the part-time force for another ten years). The two-year obligation totalled, at its peak, 100,000 conscripts. This system allowed for the rapid expansion of the SADF if and when required.

The strategic posture of the SADF was based on a pre-emptive, operationally offensive approach, and the force was also designed around this approach. The fundamental principle was that all threats had to be met outside South African territory by highly mobile forces with high firepower and strategic reach.

The SADF budget reached a peak of around 4.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) by the early 1980s. This was obviously putting much strain on the embattled South African economy and contributed to the initiatives for reaching a negotiated settlement of the country's political problems and the ending of armed conflict.

In the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s, as the peace process gained momentum and as the SADF started withdrawing from Angola and Namibia, the defence budget was progressively reduced to reach 2.2% of GDP by 1993.

The combination of the high cost of defence in the 1970s and early 1980s and the rapid reduction after 1986 meant that the SADF could not replace ageing equipment. This resulted in creeping obsolescence of critical equipment, especially in the South African navy and certain conventional army formations by 1994.

In the early years of the SADF, civil–military relations were modelled on the Westminster system. Legislative control over the armed forces was vested in Parliament, executive control resided in the prime minister and his Cabinet, and civil control was further enhanced by a civilian Ministry of Defence and a civilian secretary for defence.<sup>16</sup>

Post 1948, these formal structures remained essentially intact except for the disbandment of the Secretariat in 1966. But the armed forces were also 'purged' to ensure their loyalty to the new ruling party. According to Williams:

[I]t was both the values and common vision that it [SADF] shared with the political and civil elite, and the strong ascriptive ties that existed between its command cadre and the leadership of the then ruling National Party that prevented its intrusion on to the extra-parliamentary terrain.<sup>17</sup>

In later years (1980s and beyond) this resulted in civil–military relations that were characterised by a lack of transparency of the military to the public and a lack of parliamentary oversight and control of the armed forces, as opposed to significant influence of the military in political matters and a strong tie between the military and the executive.

### The TBVC defence forces

The apartheid regime developed the concept of the independent 'black homelands' of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Each of these nominally independent states created, with the assistance of South Africa and the SADF, their own defence forces, essentially comprising infantry armies and air wings. These forces were modelled on the SADF and used mostly the same type of equipment and doctrine. According to Dr Jakkie Cilliers: "All four of the TBVC forces were established by the SADF and have, to varying degrees, adopted SADF training systems and standards."<sup>18</sup> They were little more than an extension of the SADF, responsible for regime security in their respective homelands.

The Transkei Defence Force (TDF) was established in 1975 and was involved in an unsuccessful raid on the home of Ciskei President, Chief Lennox Sebe, in February 1987. On 30 December 1987 the TDF took over the administration of the Transkei in a bloodless coup; Maj Gen Holomisa declared martial law and suspended the Transkei constitution. He ruled the Transkei until the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994.

The Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) was established on 30 November 1979 out of the original Bophuthatswana National Guard. The BDF was involved in an aborted coup attempt in February 1988. This coup attempt was thwarted through the intervention of the SADF.

The Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) was established on 4 December 1981 with the independence of the Ciskei. The CDF was involved in a successful coup in March 1990 and another unsuccessful coup in January 1991. The CDF is, however, best remembered for the Bisho incident—a confrontation between marchers and the CDF when a group of ANC demonstrators attempted to outflank the CDF forces deployed to counter a march on Bisho, where the CDF opened fire on the marchers, killing and injuring several.

The Venda Defence Force (VDF) was formally established on 27 September 1982. It was involved in a bloodless coup in April 1990.

All four defence forces were established to protect regime security rather than the security of the people, and were politicised and unprofessional. As can be seen, this led to their direct involvement in politics, and eventually military coups or coup attempts in all four homelands. They did, however, provide a significant repository for black officers and non-commissioned officers outside of the racially based SADF. Many of these officers played important roles in the later establishment of the SANDF.<sup>19</sup>

## **Umkhonto we Sizwe**

The formation of MK was announced on 16 December 1961. On that same evening a series of explosions rocked all major cities in South Africa and marked the beginning of a sabotage campaign against strategic installations throughout the country. In a leaflet issued on 16 December 1961, MK High Command made its political allegiance quite clear by stating:

Umkhonto we Sizwe will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by methods, which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation organisations. Umkhonto we Sizwe fully supports the national liberation movement and calls on members, jointly and individually, to place themselves under the overall political guidance of the movement.<sup>20</sup>

In subsequent years, MK was at the forefront of the armed struggle against the apartheid regime and the South African security forces, both within and outside South Africa.

The history of MK is complex due to the many phases and nuances that it underwent, and is perhaps best described by Rocky Williams in an article entitled ‘The other armies: A brief historical overview of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 1961–1994’.<sup>21</sup> In summary, the armed struggle as conducted by MK had an initial emphasis on sabotage. These sabotage operations were principally aimed at, among others, pass offices, power pylons and police stations. The state’s reaction through legislation and security force operations compelled the ANC to establish a mission in exile, with the two-fold purpose of mobilising international support for the struggle and securing military training facilities for MK abroad.

MK also realised the necessity of moving to more sophisticated levels of guerrilla struggle, and the ANC instructed a number of its senior members to study revolutionary warfare and theories of guerrilla struggle in more detail.<sup>22</sup> This led to the development of Operation Mayibuye—a comprehensive plan designed to create and internalise the structures required for the successful execution of the armed struggle within South Africa.

Operation Mayibuye had three objectives: first was to prepare an underground structure capable of ensuring the revolutionary overthrow of the state; second was to provide for the military training of MK personnel whether at home or abroad so that MK would possess the capacity to confront the state militarily; and third was to ensure, via the

ANC's external structures, that the necessary levels of international support accrued to the liberation struggle. Operation Mayibuye was, however, disrupted by the arrest of members of MK's High Command in South Africa, and the subsequent Rivonia Trial where most of those arrested were sentenced to lengthy periods of imprisonment.

The post-Rivonia period saw the ANC concentrate on developing its external infrastructure and securing military facilities for the training of existing and prospective combatants. The late 1960s and early 1970s were dedicated to reconsolidating MK's underground structures and training, with few military operations undertaken. The late 1970s and 1980s saw a progressive increase in military operations inside South Africa evidenced by, for example: attacks on police stations (Booyens, Soweto and Soekmekaar); physical clashes with the police in the rural areas (Derdepoort and Rustenberg); an attack by the MK Special Operations Unit on the Sasol oil refinery complex in June 1980, causing damage estimated at R66 million; attacks on Eskom power plants (1981) and military bases in rural areas; a dramatic attack on the Voortekkerhoogte military complex outside Pretoria (1981) by MK Special Operations personnel; a Special Operations attack on the Koeberg nuclear power plant outside Cape Town (1982); and the car bomb explosion outside both the South African Air Force and Military Intelligence headquarters in Pretoria in 1983. MK managed to maintain a steady increase in both its rural and urban operations. In the late 1980s, Special Operations activities included the detonation of a car bomb outside the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court (1987) and a sustained mortar attack on the South African Air Force's 3 Satellite Radar Station at Klippan in the Western Transvaal.<sup>23</sup>

MK was also involved in external operations to assist its MPLA allies in Angola against UNITA and the SADF; in support of Frelimo forces in the liberation of Tete province; and in support of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces in Zimbabwe throughout the 1970s. These operations were of a more conventional nature and allowed MK to accumulate considerable combat experience in conventional and semi-conventional operations.

Regarding civil-military relations, the ANC leadership had control over the MK High Command, and volunteers for MK came from the ANC or its allies. James Nqculu writes that:

Operation Mayibuye (a strategy document of MK for the conduct of guerrilla warfare) stated that "before operations take place, political authority will have been set up in secrecy in a friendly territory with a

view to supervise the struggle both in its internal and external aspects.” So, from the very beginning, MK emphasised that armed actions took place within a broader political context.<sup>24</sup>

He further emphasises the importance placed by the ANC on political education and training, overseen by the political commissars who acted as deputies to military commanders.

### The Azanian People’s Liberation Army

APLA was the armed wing of the PAC and was formed in September 1961. The PAC was established in 1959 as an alternative liberation movement to the ANC, and contrary to the ANC, advocated “that ideological emphasis on racial identity was essential in the formation of a revolutionary popular consciousness”.<sup>25</sup> In its early years the PAC instigated a civil disobedience campaign against the apartheid pass laws, which led to the killing of 69 people at Sharpeville in 1960. The Sharpeville unrest led directly to the banning of both the ANC and PAC.

After the banning of the PAC, APLA members received training in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), Ghana and Algeria. Later, in 1970, APLA was granted a base in Chunya, Tanzania, where its members received military instruction from Chinese military personnel. In 1968, APLA was involved in an attempted sabotage of the Beira oil pipeline (in co-operation with Corema—*Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique*). Other than this, it concentrated on establishing arms caches in South Africa and also on training members of the Mgoomezulu tribe, a community straddling the South African–Swaziland border, in military operations.

When PAC President Robert Sobukwe died in 1978, internal dissent and conflict in the PAC and APLA brought all military operations to a halt. The conflict had external ramifications, leading to the closing of the APLA base at Chunya, expulsion from Lesotho and APLA defections to the ANC and MK. However, by 1985 APLA operations had resumed in South Africa. These operations included:

- attacks on the South African Police (SAP) in Sharpeville in 1986;
- grenade attacks on the Soweto police training college in 1987;
- co-operation with Qibla, an Islamic fundamentalist grouping in the Cape; and
- operations in smaller towns in the Transvaal.

By the 1990s, with the un-banning of the ANC and PAC, APLA operations extended considerably. The PAC was in and out of the negotiation process for a new South African constitution while APLA continued its armed struggle. During this period APLA forces concentrated on attacks on 'whites' and, although not great in number, these attacks had a significant impact on South African society. In the period 1990 to 1992, these operations focused on widely dispersed attacks on policemen and police stations. By 1993 there was a shift to civilian targets, including farmers, restaurants and hotels. In 1993, APLA carried out about 142 attacks, the majority (128) of them directed at farms.<sup>26</sup> One of the most publicised APLA attacks during this period was the attack on St James Church in Cape Town on 25 July 1993, in which 12 worshippers were killed and 148 injured.

In general, APLA operations were sophisticated and methodical. APLA operatives used automatic weapons and grenades as their preferred method of engagement and could therefore be selective in their targeting. Tom Lodge writes:


For a very small operational force, APLA cadres were really rather effective, though their military impact continued to be constrained by the logistical difficulties confronting an externally located command remote from operations.<sup>27</sup>

APLA's command-and-control arrangements depict adherence to the 'movement' concept of civil-military relations. According to Lodge:

APLA's command arrangements attempted to employ the guerrilla doctrine of a unified political and military leadership. Dual authority rested with field commanders and political commissars, the latter holding notional seniority. APLA's nine person military commission, a sub-committee of the PAC's, included several civilian leaders in its membership and up until 1992 APLA's commander in chief was PAC chairman Johnson Mlambo.<sup>28</sup>

#### THE STRUCTURE OF THE DoD AND SANDF

The post independent South African DoD today comprises the Defence Secretariat headed by the secretary for defence, and the SANDF headed by the chief of the National Defence Force (CSANDF). The secretary for defence is the head of department (HoD) and the accounting officer for

**Figure 1: Structure of the Ministry of Defence and Department of Defence**

the department and he/she is the principal advisor to the minister of defence regarding defence policy.

The CSANDF executes defence policy, directs the work of Defence Headquarters and manages the overall functioning and operations of the SANDF. He/she is also the principal advisor to the minister of defence on military, operational and administrative matters within his/her competence.

The SANDF consists of four services—the army, air force, navy and military health service—as well as the staff divisions that report primarily to the CSANDF. These divisions are: Corporate Staff, Joint



Operations, Joint Support and Defence Intelligence. Four divisions and one directorate report primarily to the secretary for defence, namely: Policy and Planning, Finance, Acquisition, and the Defence Inspectorate, and the Equal Opportunities Directorate. The structure of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DoD is shown in Figure 1.

The South African Army force design consists of armour and armoured reconnaissance, mechanised, parachute, motorised, light and special infantry, artillery and air defence artillery, intelligence, logistic and engineer support capabilities. The personnel strength of the army for 2001/02 was 38,646 members. The South African Air Force force design consists of air combat and reconnaissance squadrons, helicopters, transport and maritime air squadrons, command-and-control units, operational support and intelligence capabilities. The personnel strength of the air force for 2001/02 was 10,979 members. The South African Navy force design consists of surface warfare, submarine warfare, mine-countermeasures, and operational and tactical logistic support capabilities. The personnel strength of the navy for 2001/02 was 7,821 members. The South African Military Health Service force design consists of deployable medical units, military and specialist health services and facilities, logistic support, and operational and medical product support capabilities. The personnel strength of the military health service for 2001/02 was 7,739 members. The total personnel strength of the DoD (including all supporting services) for 2001/02 was 78,724 members.<sup>29</sup> There are no para-military forces in the South African DoD.

#### FUNCTIONS, POSTURE AND FORCE DESIGN

The approved force design of the SANDF in the Defence Review is reflected in Table 2.

**Table 2: SANDF approved force design**

Arm of service and element	Quantity
<b>SA Army</b>	
Mobile Division	1
Mechanised Brigade (Rapid Deployment Force)	1
Parachute Brigade (Rapid Deployment Force)	1
Special Forces Brigade	1
Territorial Forces:	

Table 2: SANDF approved force design (continued)

Arm of service and element	Quantity
<i>Group Headquarters</i>	27
<i>Light Infantry Battalions</i>	14
<i>Territorial/Motorised Infantry Battalions</i>	12
<i>Area Protection Units</i>	183
<b>SA Air Force</b>	
Fighters	
<i>Light Fighters</i>	16
<i>Medium Fighters</i>	32
Reconnaissance Aircraft	
<i>Light Reconnaissance Aircraft</i>	16
<i>Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft</i>	6
<i>Short Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft</i>	10
<i>Remotely Piloted Squadrons</i>	1
Helicopters	
<i>Combat Support Helicopters</i>	12
<i>Maritime Helicopters</i>	5
<i>Transport Helicopters</i>	96
Transport Aircraft	
<i>Transport Aircraft</i>	44
<i>VIP</i>	9
<i>Voluntary Squadrons</i>	9
In-Flight Refuelling/Electronic Warfare Aircraft	5
Airspace Control	
<i>Radar Squadrons</i>	3.5
<i>Mobile Ground Signals Intelligence Teams</i>	3
<b>SA Navy</b>	
Submarines	4
Corvettes	4
Strike Craft	6
Combat Support Ships	1
Minesweeper/Hunter	8
Inshore Patrol Vessels	2
Harbour Patrol Boats	39
<b>SA Military Health Services</b>	
CB Defensive Programmes	1
Medical Battalion Groups (Full Time Component)	1
Medical Battalion Groups (Part Time Component)	1.5

Source: *South African Defence Review, 1998, ch.8, pp 47–8.*

## **DEVELOPMENT OF THE SANDF POST-INDEPENDENCE**

### GENERAL

In the period leading up to the 1994 elections and the establishment of the SANDF on 27 April of that year, emphasis was on the establishment of the new MoD, a civilian Defence Secretariat and the SANDF based on clear constitutional provisions, and on the integration of the forces of all the previous combatant forces into the new SANDF. It was clear that the detailed development of new defence policy and strategy as well as the detailed elaboration of defence doctrine, a new force design and structure and defence management concepts, would have to be addressed after 27 April 1994.

Immediately after the celebrations of the 'new' South Africa—with the inauguration of President Mandela as the first president of a democratic South Africa (a celebration in which the SANDF played a significant part)—emphasis shifted to a project to establish the new MoD and the civilian Defence Secretariat, the development of detailed defence policy through the elaboration of a white paper on defence and a defence review, and a comprehensive defence transformation project aimed at optimising the structuring and management of the DoD. These activities and processes were concurrent and culminated in the publication of the 1998 Defence Review.

### INTEGRATION OF FORCES

The integration process mentioned above began almost immediately after the elections in 1994. It aimed at integrating into the SANDF all personnel whose names appeared on the certified personnel registers of the statutory and non-statutory forces identified in the Constitution (with the subsequent inclusion of APLA), as well as the education and training of all members of the SANDF to meet international standards of competence and professionalism. The process was neither easy nor trouble free. Numerous problems and grievances emerged and, at times, gave rise to serious tensions. Many of these difficulties were inevitable given the political and logistical complexities of merging forces. One of the complaints was that the integration process was simply a matter of absorption of the other forces by the SADF.

A Ministerial Integration Oversight Committee was established to manage these tensions and to monitor the process and, particularly, adherence to policy. The Committee included members of the SANDF,

**Table 3: Forces available for integration**

Force	Anticipated	1998
SADF	90,000	57,053
MK	22,000	11,738
APLA	6,000	3,713
TBVC	11,000	7,243
KZSPF		1,788
SANDF		10,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>129,000</b>	<b>93,324</b>

Source: *South African Defence Review, 1998, chapter 10, figure 10.1, p 70*

the Defence Secretariat and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. A British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) was incorporated into the process to ensure its fairness. A Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee (PIOC) of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence was created and was regularly briefed by the DoD on the integration process. It also visited units of the SANDF to monitor progress.

In regard to whether this was a true integration process or simply a matter of absorption, it is clear that elements of both were present. On the one hand, the size of the SADF element (*see Table 3*) and its institutional capacity made it inevitable that it would dominate the process numerically and technically. On the other hand, the political leverage of MK and the control and oversight provided by the Defence Ministry and the parliamentary oversight committees ensured the political dominance of the decision-making process. BMATT also played an important role in ensuring fairness and objectivity, and its contribution was largely responsible for the ultimate credibility of the integration process.

It is the view of the author that despite the difficulties and setbacks experienced, the integration process was largely successful and has contributed significantly to the present stability and success of the SANDF in its internal and external operations.

The most critical area of transformation for the SANDF was that of ensuring equity in racial and gender representation. The predominantly white and male character of the apartheid defence force had to be eliminated rapidly or at least ameliorated. However, due to the imbalances in the sizes of the integrating forces, the initial composition

**Table 4: Racial reflection of the new SANDF (%)**

Race	1994	1998	2003
African	38	57	62
Asian	1	1	1
Coloured	16	12	12
White	45	30	25

Source: South African Defence Review, 1998, ch.10, Figure 10.2, p 71; and South African Department of Defence 2002/2003 Annual Report, ch.3, Table 3.14, p 23.

**Table 5: Breakdown of SANDF by gender (%)**

Gender	1994	1998	2003
Female	20	19	21
Male	80	81	79

Source: *Ibid.*

of the SANDF did not reflect positively on this imperative. This led to the need for concerted rationalisation strategies through affirmative action and fast tracking on the one hand, and the institution of voluntary severance packages on the other. Significant advances have been made in this regard, albeit far more in relation to race than gender (*see tables 4 and 5*).

While a degree of progress is clear, the major challenge currently lies in the fact that although top management is representative and aligned with national demographics, middle management is still biased towards white, ex-SADF members (around 65%). At the same time, the SANDF is not attracting whites at the lower levels, causing that level to be predominantly black. Asians are also still under-represented in the SANDF. In terms of gender representivity, the figure of 21% for females in the DoD is obviously low, yet good by international, and especially African, standards.

All in all, the present situation in the SANDF regarding both integration in general, and racial and gender representation in particular, is satisfactory and remaining problems are being addressed by the recently approved DoD Human Resources Strategy 2010.

## NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The White Paper on Defence was developed over the period 1994 to 1996 and had as its primary aim to align defence with the new South African democracy. It also describes the national strategy for the defence and protection of the state and its people through the hierarchy of:

- political, economic and military co-operation with other states;
- the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means; and
- the use or threat of force as a measure of last resort.<sup>30</sup>

The White Paper argues that government's preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war:

South Africa will therefore only turn to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed. Deterrence requires defence capabilities that are sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors.<sup>31</sup>

The hierarchy for the defence of South Africa, therefore, is clearly:

- prevention of conflict and war;
- containment of conflict and war; and
- employment of military force as the last option.

Despite the above, the White Paper goes on to define the primary function of the SANDF as "to defend South Africa against external military aggression"<sup>32</sup> and determines that the SANDF should be designed mainly around the demands of its primary function.

The overemphasis on the primary function of the SANDF as the defence of South Africa against external military aggression and the primacy of designing the SANDF for this function came about for two reasons. First, the new ruling party was painfully aware of the results of allowing the apartheid SADF to become involved in political and internal stability matters. The ANC accepted the need for a defence force but wanted one that would be truly apolitical (non-partisan) and professional; therefore, one that was restricted to purely conventional military tasks.

At the same time, the military command structure of the new SANDF (overwhelmingly officers from the old SADF) were concerned about the

aging of conventional military equipment and the loss of capabilities, and saw the strong focus on the primary function of conventional defence as an opportunity to motivate for re-equipping the SANDF. This was also supported by the captains of the defence industry and was in fact a marriage of convenience between unlikely parties.

Second, the euphoria experienced with the demise of apartheid rule brought an unrealistic vision of the end of conflict in Africa and a dream of continental peace, stability and development. Not much was therefore thought about the role that the SANDF might have to play in shaping the conditions of peace and stability on the continent for the realisation of the African Renaissance.

The current demand for the SANDF in African peace missions was simply not formally envisaged. This boiled down to the following: if South Africa accepted the need for a defence force due to the uncertainties of the future but wanted this defence force to remain disengaged from internal stability matters and did not foresee a significant role for it on the continent, a defence force could only be built based on the logic of 'defence against external aggression'. And, as this was a remote possibility, a defence force needed to build on the concept of 'a small conventional core force with the ability for rapid expansion based on a sufficiently large reserve component'. Such a force would be able to execute any secondary functions using the collateral utility available in its primary design. This policy framework fundamentally influenced the later development and acceptance of the Defence Review force design.

Based on the White Paper policy direction, the Defence Review (1998) developed the concepts of the primary function of the SANDF, its secondary tasks and the core force logic into more tangible defence doctrines and a force design for the future SANDF. The eventually approved force design as reflected in Chapter 8 of the Defence Review became the blueprint against which the subsequent development of the SANDF was undertaken, and against which the acquisition of the so-called 'strategic defence package' was conducted.

#### CIVIL—MILITARY RELATIONS

The legislative framework for the governance and management of the DoD and SANDF is contained in the Constitution, the Defence Act (Act No. 42 of 2002), the Public Service Act (Act No. 103 of 1994) and the Public Finance Management Act (Act No. 1 of 1999). The internal

management responsibilities and respective roles of the secretary for defence and the CSANDF were described earlier.

Substantial mechanisms, forums and procedures exist to ensure political oversight and executive control over defence. This is to make sure that the executive and national legislature both accept responsibility for defence policy, its plans and budget, as well as the execution of the defence plan. These bodies are to make certain that policy priorities are linked to departmental spending plans and service delivery. The key role-players in this process of political oversight and executive control over defence are discussed below.

The minister of defence is the political head of the DoD. He/she is designated as the 'executive authority' for defence by the Public Service and Public Finance Management Acts. As such, the minister has the primary responsibility for political oversight of defence, including the defence budget. He/she is responsible for ensuring that political priorities are linked to departmental spending plans, the delivery of service and to determine departmental priorities. The executive authority is responsible for ensuring that the department performs its statutory functions within the limits of the funds authorised for the relevant vote. The minister executes these functions primarily through the statutory Council of Defence, which comprises the minister, the deputy minister, the secretary for defence and the CSANDF.

The Portfolio Committee of Parliament on Defence (PCPD) is a committee of the National Assembly with membership open to all parties represented in the legislature. It ensures parliamentary oversight over defence. According to Rule 201 of the National Assembly, the PCPD is mandated, among others, to:

Deal with Bills and other matters falling within its portfolio as are referred to in terms of the Constitution, these Rules, the Joint Rules or by resolutions of the Assembly;

Monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations concerning any such executive organ of state, constitutional institution or other body or institution, including the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, staff and policies of such organ of state, institution or other body or institution.<sup>33</sup>

Parliament is the highest authority for the approval of defence policy,



legislation, the deployment of the SANDF, and the approval of the defence budget. The National Treasury plays a key technical role in the national budgetary process and guides the budgeting process of all departments. The National Treasury is responsible for:

- identifying the overall level of spending that can be afforded within government's macro-economic and fiscal framework;
- evaluating departmental policy options and budget planning submissions;
- presenting comments and views on proposed departmental options;
- developing a Medium Term Expenditure Framework;
- negotiating allocations, reprioritisation and funding levels of programmes/activities, including possible savings;
- making recommendations to the Medium Term Expenditure Committee; and
- presenting the National Medium Term Expenditure Framework to the Ministers' Committee on the Budget.

External auditing of the DoD is done by the auditor-general. He/she reports to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts.

The principles of civil–military relations and parliamentary oversight of defence have special reference to Defence Intelligence. For that reason a National Intelligence Act (Act No. 39 of 1994) was enacted to provide for control in respect of all intelligence agencies. Defence Intelligence structures are furthermore subject to scrutiny by the inspector-general of the DoD, the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, the inspector-general for intelligence and the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence of Parliament.

With the SANDF becoming more involved in peace support operations in Africa, the Defence Intelligence division is accordingly co-operating more closely with the intelligence structures of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The main emphasis is on “producing intelligence in support of operations in the region [and] developing strategic partnerships with member countries of SADC”.<sup>34</sup>

This is a positive development as intelligence co-operation is an important confidence- and security-building measure among regional states.

In terms of accountability, the SANDF is under democratic civil control. Indicative of this is the fact that 13 meetings of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and 18 of the Portfolio Committee were convened in 2003. These meetings covered a range of issues—from a human resource strategy to the defence budget, the defence strategic plan and the Armscor Bill. Much the same is true of the transparency issue. The defence strategic plan can be seen on the DoD website at <[www.mil.za](http://www.mil.za)>, the budget at <[www.treasury.gov.za](http://www.treasury.gov.za)> and the minutes of nearly all committee meetings are available on the PMG website mentioned above.

#### CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since completion of the White Paper and the Defence Review, much has happened to put strain on implementing defence policy and to indicate the need for a re-evaluation of the policy. Major shifts in the strategic environment and the non-realised planning assumptions include the:

- conflict situation in Africa and the demand that this has placed on the SANDF to support foreign policy initiatives through peace support operations;
- developing African defence and security architecture and the move towards collective security processes and structures;
- internal crime situation in South Africa that continues to place demands on the SANDF for deployments in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS); and
- strategic defence acquisition packages.

These changes have caused a greater demand for SANDF services both externally and internally, while budget provisions have not kept pace to allow for the simultaneous development of the SANDF in line with policy.

#### **Conflict and security in Africa and SANDF peace missions**

Despite the post-Cold War and post-apartheid optimistic view of Africa, the continent is unfortunately still suffering from chronic

underdevelopment, poverty, lack of human security and other social ills. This, together with poor governance and competition for control and exploitation of resources, has led to the proliferation of intra-state conflicts on the continent. Currently there are 11 United Nations (UN) and African peace missions in 12 African countries. These are Burundi, the DRC, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Western Sahara.

Most of these peace operations are directed at solving internal disputes spurred on by poor governance, warlords and rebel groups motivated by ethnic or religious disputes, the control and exploitation of resources, and/or political adventurism.

These conflicts also overflow into neighbouring states, as is evidenced in West Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. This high level of instability and conflict, coupled with the general state of underdevelopment on the continent, creates a vast potential breeding ground for polarisation, the rise of warlords, rogue regimes, terrorism and crime. It could also create conditions favourable for a base from which international terrorists could operate. If this is not contained, the potential for unilateral external interventions will become very real.

In support of South African, AU and international efforts at conflict prevention and management, the SANDF has become increasingly engaged in peace support operations on the continent. At present the SANDF has about 3,000 soldiers deployed in these conflict areas in Africa with a demand for more.

The major deployments are in Burundi and the DRC, with an increasing involvement in Sudan. The SANDF is, however, not well equipped for these types of operations as its force design is predicated on short logistic lines for highly mechanised mobile forces prepared to fight in defence of the territorial integrity of the country and not for out-of-area force projection and support in distant places.

### **Africa's developing collective security architecture**

Africa is rapidly moving towards becoming a collective security community. At a continental level, the AU has accepted the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which acknowledges that

each African country's defence is inextricably linked to that of other African countries, as well as to that of other regions and, by the same token, that of the African continent as a whole.<sup>35</sup>

One of the building blocks of the CADSP is the African Standby Force (ASF), which is mandated by the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. The concept of the African Standby Force is based on standby brigades to be provided by the five African sub-regions. These brigades will be established in two phases, to be completed by the year 2010, with the attendant strengthening of capabilities at both the AU and regional levels. The ASF will have military, police and civilian components and will operate on the basis of various scenarios under AU mandates, ranging from observer missions to peacekeeping operations and intervention in conformity with the Constitutive Act of the AU.

At a sub-regional level, SADC has made great progress on issues of collective defence and security. This is manifested through the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and its sub-structure, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Furthermore, through these structures all SADC countries have agreed to a Mutual Defence Pact and are working on the modalities of the SADC regional brigade as an element of the ASF. Operationalising and strengthening these regional and sub-regional mechanisms will undoubtedly contribute greatly towards providing the wherewithal to combat collectively the threats to African peace and security.

These developments are heavily premised on political integration and co-operation on the continent and in the sub-regions, as is evidenced in the AU and NEPAD. They also require, however, that African defence forces should be built around the concepts of 'confidence-building defence' (also known as non-offensive or non-provocative defence), as well as those of confidence- and security-building measures. Present South African defence policy stresses the need for confidence- and security-building measures, but the approved force design is not well aligned to these principles. The Defence Review did present one option based on the principles of non-offensive defence, but in the conclusion of Chapter 8 stated:

[This] option involves major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine, and will require more study before it can be recommended. If future tendencies are in this direction [the selected] option 1 will be an acceptable base for such development.<sup>36</sup>

The developments in Africa are clearly leading in the direction of collective defence, and demand more consideration of the principles of confidence-building defence in revisiting the Defence Review.

### **The internal crime situation in South Africa**

Despite the stated policy that the SANDF should disengage from its ongoing policing role, the pressure placed on the SAPS by the high crime rate in South Africa has kept the SANDF involved in providing support to the police. Last year the SANDF had an average of around 3,000 soldiers deployed on operations Intexo (border control) and Stipper (rural protection) on an ongoing basis.

The SANDF has currently started disengaging from such support and has also announced the phasing out of the commando system (SANDF territorial reserves). This has led to many concerns about how the SAPS will be able to cope with the more organised and militarised forms of crime, and the feasibility of replacing the commando system with an, as yet, undefined policing system.

### **The strategic defence acquisition packages**

Since completion of the Defence Review, the South African government and the DoD have embarked on an ambitious project to replace obsolete equipment in the SANDF force design with new acquisitions through the so-called 'strategic defence package' deal. It provides for the acquisition of four corvettes, three submarines, 30 light-utility helicopters, 24 lead-in fighter trainer aircraft, and 28 fighter aircraft.

These acquisitions are aligned with the force design of the Defence Review, but it can be argued that they did not take cognisance of real priorities and trends in the defence budget and expenditure. They favour the air force and navy above the army, while it is the army that is at the forefront of deployments into Africa. They also tie the defence budget down to a high expenditure on capital equipment, while the operating budget for force development, force preparation and force employment is shrinking. This has led to many problems vis-à-vis maintaining standards, and a general deterioration in the preparedness of the SANDF.

### **CONCLUSION**

The new, post-apartheid DoD and SANDF differ vastly from that which existed in South Africa before 1994. The MoD has been strengthened and the functions of head of department and accounting officer are vested in the civilian secretary for defence. The civilian Defence Secretariat is responsible for the overall development of defence policy, financial management of the department and for the management of

departmental acquisition processes. The inspector general also reports to the secretary. In the previous situation, all these functions were conducted by the military.

Democratic civil–military relations are assured through the active role played by the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Defence, and are further enhanced through the significant capacity for the management of the South African defence function that exists within the Ministry and the Secretariat. This has led to a high level of transparency and accountability in the management of defence in South Africa.

The DoD is reasonably representative of the South African population due to the strong emphasis placed on the integration process and rationalisation strategies. This is obviously a complex process and has its associated problems. Rationalisation has led to a loss of skills due to the concentration of such skills in the hands of the whites during the apartheid era. There is no instant solution, and only time can rectify this situation.

The SANDF is today extensively deployed in peace support operations in Africa and is coping well with this new challenge. This is an important development because these deployments will greatly enhance the skills basis of the new defence establishment through the exigencies of such operations. These operations will serve as a testing ground, but also as a learning experience for the new SANDF in the fields of operational planning, intelligence, logistic support and management of deployed personnel.

The South African DoD and SANDF have done well in their short history and can serve as an example of successful defence transformation to many young and emerging democracies. The integration process, the inclusive and consultative defence review process and the establishment of a capable civilian defence secretariat, among others, are commendable achievements.

The major challenges facing the South African DoD and SANDF in the near future will be to: readdress the issue of its primary function being aligned with current challenges; balance policy with budget; improve its skills basis; integrate successfully the newly acquired weapon systems into its force design; and meet the demands of the CADSP. This is a daunting task, but given the way in which the SANDF has met the challenges of its first ten years of existence, there is little reason to doubt its capability to overcome these challenges.


## NOTES

- 1 With acknowledgement to the South African Government Communications and Information Service (GCIS), *SA an overview* <[http://www.gov.za/sa\\_overview/index.html](http://www.gov.za/sa_overview/index.html)>.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 R M Williams, *Guerrilla armies, guerrilla strategies and guerrilla culture: The impact of guerrilla armies on the creation of South Africa's armed forces between 1912–1999*, unpublished paper, ISS, p 10.
- 4 Note on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: Section 24(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), determines that “Sections 224 to 228 of the previous Constitution continue in force as if the previous Constitution had not been repealed”. These sections contain the provisions referred to in references to the Interim Constitution 1993.
- 5 GCIS, op cit.
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- 8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Republic of South Africa, *Government Gazette* 378(17678), Cape Town, 18 December 1996, Section 200(2), p 88.
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- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Rocky Williams was a member of MK, a member of the MRG and one of the principal negotiators of MK during the JMCC. At integration in 1994 he obtained the rank of colonel in the new SANDF and later became the Director of Defence Policy at the South African Defence Secretariat. Williams was the Convenor of the Defence Review Working Group and one of the most influential individuals in the South African and African defence discourse. Roland de Vries led the South African Army delegation at the JMCC. He later became the Director Transformation of the new SANDF and then the Deputy Chief of the South African Army.
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- 33 Rules of the National Assembly, Chapter 12: Committee System, Rule 201(1), <[www.parliament.gov.za](http://www.parliament.gov.za)>
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- 36 South African Defence Review 1998, Chapter 8.







Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/index.html](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/index.html)