

The **Zambian military—**trials, tribulations and hope

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THE CHALLENGES

The military is an important part of a country's history, reflecting the challenges it has gone through, the problems it has encountered—and survived. In the case of Zambia, the military reflects its trials, tribulations and hopes. This chapter is a 'snap shot' of the Zambian defence and security forces. It cannot be a full history of the defence force, which spans the entire history of the country itself; neither can it contain all the details of the past 40 years, which reflect Zambia's modern history. Rather, this is an attempt at recording some of the many issues in the birth of a country; its survival through the traumatic era of independence struggles when the Southern African region faced formidable enemies; and finally the political growth of a state whose government, people and their military have focused on a brighter, more peaceful and secure environment for both themselves and the region at large.

The chapter begins by tracking the formation of the Zambia Army and Air Force in the new state of Zambia, and follows the trauma of its political growth which was characterised by the transition from a plural political system to a single party system and, finally, a return to multipartism. The focus here will be on the establishment of the new army and air force; the 'false' sharing of the military arsenal held during the previous federal government system; and the robust changes taken to meet the challenges at hand.

The next epoch of Zambia's military history traces some of the major issues that the military had to go through during the liberation wars and

insurgencies that were waged in Southern Africa for the ‘heart and soul’ of the region. The issue of the military in a democracy is then addressed, followed by an assessment of some intra-state and regional challenges that the military is set to face.

BIRTH OF A MILITARY

The first Zambian government at independence on 24 October 1964 was formed by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which ruled Zambia from independence until 1991. Certain that it was poised to form the first government of an independent state, UNIP had in its manifesto thought through some issues about the defence and security of an independent Zambia. UNIP’s 1962 manifesto states as follows:

When a UNIP government is formed, the armed forces of Zambia will be strengthened and made more efficient in order to ensure internal security and to provide effective Defence against external aggression. However, a self-governing Zambia will be entitled to the benefits of the Commonwealth Defence schemes A UNIP government will pursue a policy of non-alignment. A free Zambia will not align itself with either the West or the East.¹

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ZAMBIA ARMY AND AIR FORCE

During the colonial period, the colonial authorities established a police force to look after their security needs, known as the Northern Rhodesia Police (Military). On 28 April 1933, this title was changed to Northern Rhodesia Regiment,² and at independence the Northern Rhodesia Regiment became the Zambia Army.

In the case of the air force, however, Northern Rhodesian needs were covered by the air force of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, known as the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (RRAF), and which was under the Central African Command.

Following the dissolution of the federation in 1963, the Northern Rhodesian government changed the title of the air force to ‘air wing’ and that of the territorial force of the air force to the ‘auxiliary air wing’.³ At independence, the Northern Rhodesia Air Wing became the Zambia Air Force in accordance with the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, the Republic of Zambia (modifications and adaptations) (General) Order, 1964, para 3(l), which states:

Any reference in the existing laws to the ‘military forces of the territory’ shall be read and construed in respect of any time, or any period commencing on or after the appointed day as if it were a reference to the Defence Force.⁴

The nature and character of the pre-1964 history of the Zambian military is critical to understanding subsequent developments in the post-colonial era.

THE FALSE SHARING OF THE MILITARY ARSENAL

Zambia’s treatment at independence in the case of the two Rhodesias may probably go down as one of the greatest injustices ever to occur in the sharing of goods and services between states previously in a federal system of government. This was particularly evident in the sharing of the military arsenal between the two Rhodesias.

Northern Rhodesia was the richest territory in the federation, despite the federation’s capital being in Southern Rhodesia. One would therefore have expected the sharing to have been in favour of the highest contributor to the purchase of that equipment—or, at the least, an equitable distribution. This was not to be.

Southern Rhodesia received the lion’s share, leaving the new state of Zambia with some old and out-of-service aircraft (four DC-3 Dakotas and two Pembrokes) and little of anything else. In addition, the new state of Zambia did not have its own indigenous officer corps—all officers were from the British Army and the British Royal Air Force, or from the ‘white’ settler communities from both Southern and Northern Rhodesias (now Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively) who had decided to cast their lot with Salisbury—another distinction for Southern Rhodesia. The dishonest nature of the British colonial power on this matter is best illustrated by Martin Rupiya who in his doctoral dissertation writes:

When dissolution faced Central Africa, Britain’s arbitration at the Victoria Conference was uneven. She allowed all the weapons to be retained by S. Rhodesia and when she was challenged in the international United Nations (UN) Security Council chambers, used her veto power, for the first time since Suez in 1956. In the middle and late 1950s, the motive to have a powerful air force changed from Dominion status to becoming the corner stone and pillar supporting white minority rule.⁵

Table 1: Organisation of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force during the Central African Federation

No. 1 Squadron	Day Fighter/Ground Attack
No. 2 Squadron	Ground Attack/Advanced Flying Training
No. 3 Squadron	Transport Supply
No. 4 Squadron	Light Ground Attack/Basic Flying Training
No. 5 Squadron	Light Bomber/Ground Attack/Photographic Recce
No. 6 Squadron	Flying Training
No. 7 Squadron	Vertical Support – Helicopters

Some of the aircraft ought to have been shared following the massive contribution by the Northern Rhodesian treasury of £300,000 over three years towards the purchasing of the aircraft and the costs for aircrew, engineers and technicians.⁶ Table 1 provides an indication of the size of the air force that the Northern Rhodesian government contributed towards. This imbalance continued to exist right through the tumultuous history of the Southern African region, characterised by the liberation wars fought by the Zimbabwean nationalists organised as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) representing the Shona in the central, eastern and northern parts of the country, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), identified with the Ndebele in the south, in what had now become Rhodesia. It is, of course, a matter of conjecture (and dealt with later) what effect this military imbalance had on both Zimbabwe's liberation struggle as well as on Zambia's ability to ensure its own peace and security.

THE INDEPENDENCE ORDER OF BATTLE

The Zambia Defence Force was established at independence in 1964 under CAP 131 of the Laws of Zambia, section 4(1), which on the maintenance of the defence force stipulates that the new republican defence force shall consist of an army and an air force as follows:

An army comprising:

- the regular force of the army;
- the home guard;
- the army reserve; and
- the territorial army reserve.

An air force comprising:

- the regular force of the air force;
- the auxiliary air force;
- the air force reserve; and
- the auxiliary air force reserve.

CAP 131 under section 5 also indicates the employment of the defence force and that it shall be charged with the defence of Zambia and with such other duties as may from time to time be determined by the republican president. Section 6 covers the employment of the defence force outside the republic in whole or in part, while section 7 provides for the establishment of a Defence Council which shall advise the president on such matters of policy and matters affecting the command, discipline and administration of the defence force. The Defence Council was also designed to perform such other functions and duties as the president may refer to it from time to time.

Another important provision in CAP 131 is section 165, which relates to the command of the defence force. Under this provision the president shall appoint an officer to be the commander of the army and another officer to be the commander of the air force.

On independence day, 24 October 1964, the defence force inherited the army headquarters from the colonial forces, as well as a brigade group comprising:

- brigade headquarters in Ndola;
- two infantry battalions;
- one armour squadron;
- one artillery battery;
- one squadron of engineers;
- one signals squadron;
- one transport squadron;
- one ordinance supply company;
- one medical unit; and
- one training school.

The defence force also inherited the British Joint Services Training Team (BJSTT), established to train Zambians on the various army and air force jobs. The circumstances prevailing meant that the defence force had to be run and commanded by British officers and men. However, the hostile political environment with Zambia's southern neighbours who

had yet to achieve political independence required that the new defence force seek an urgent solution to its dilemma whereby it was commanded by officers whose loyalty could not be guaranteed.

The presence in Zambia of liberation movements from Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa made Zambia a military target, especially since it did not have an adequately manned and equipped defence force. It was therefore important that the country should consider accelerated training of its indigenous peoples as a solution to the threat it was facing.

ENTER ZAMBIANISATION

The process of indigenisation referred to as 'Zambianisation', started in 1963 just before the first Zambian Army officers graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The Royal Air Force (RAF) at RAF South Cerney, RAF Church Fenton, RAF Biken Hill and RAF Granwell trained air force officers. Professional training for pilots was introduced in Zambia at ZAF Livingstone, and some aircraft technicians were trained at RAF institutions in the United Kingdom. Soldiers were trained in Zambia.

With an exclusive focus on male candidates, the defence force recruited volunteers from all parts of Zambia regardless of colour, religion or tribe. The recruits and officer cadets were not allowed to be active in politics and were required to sign a declaration stating such.

British defence personnel were replaced by Zambians, as well as by some contracted personnel from 'friendly' countries such as India and Ghana. The first Zambian army and air force commanders were appointed in 1971. In 1973 the first female officers and other ranks were recruited into the military. The air force took longer to indigenise due to its technical nature and since indigenous people had in the past not been given opportunities to join.

GROWTH AND EXPANSION

As indicated earlier, the Zambia Defence Force inherited at independence could not match the magnitude of the threat facing the country from the 1970s onwards. Consequently, Zambia had to redesign and expand its defence force. New and more equipment was purchased and new air force bases and army barracks were built, coupled with unprecedented levels of personnel recruitment and training from 1963 to 1980.

In line with its pre-independence declared policy of non-alignment, Zambia procured military equipment from various countries including Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, China and the Soviet Union. Some countries which were sympathetic to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, such as China, even donated equipment to Zambia. Officers and men were sent abroad for training in such countries as Britain, Canada, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. Likewise, training teams from some of these countries were contracted to train Zambians locally. Several training institutions were established, which then meant that training abroad was minimised.

All these developments were taking place in a very hostile environment; Zambia was being attacked by the colonial and racist regimes under the pretext of their 'hot pursuit' of freedom fighters. Against all odds, the Zambia Defence Force expanded rapidly and was able to face the threat squarely by the time the liberation wars reached their peak from the late 1970s to 1980.

Young, inexperienced and relatively out-resourced, the Zambian military nevertheless had to withstand many challenges—this meant that it had to mature within a very short period of time. The wars of liberation and internal instability played a significant role in maturing the military; however, the administrative development of the country's military posed some serious challenges.

At independence the defence force inherited a non-unified command structure in which the commanders of the army and air force reported individually and directly to the commander-in-chief through the minister of defence—the arrangement that is presently followed.

However, during the mid 1970s there was a desire to seek better co-ordination between the two services—especially since the country was at that time experiencing some serious threats by the settler regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. The Zambia National Service (ZNS) was yet to be formed.

In 1976 the President announced that the defence force would now employ a unified command system. The defence force—comprising the army, air force and the ZNS—was to be known as the Zambia National Defence Force (ZNDF). The Commander of the Army, Maj Gen Kingsley Chinkuli (presently Zambia's ambassador to Germany) was made commander of the new ZNDF and was promoted to the rank of full general, while the Commander of the Air Force, Air Commodore Peter Zuze, was made Deputy Commander of the ZNDF and promoted to lieutenant general. The air force rank nomenclature that was identical

to that of the British Royal Air Force was changed to that used by the army. The 'symbolic' change in uniform was, however, not well received by Zambia Air Force personnel, judging by the ultimate switch back to the traditional 'blue'.

Nonetheless, there was seemingly a firm political decision to achieve a strongly unified military force. A general staff was created to oversee and co-ordinate operations of the ZNDF, and the army, air force and ZNS were each headed by a chief of staff co-located in Arrakan, an army barracks in Lusaka.

Regional commands were established in each province of Zambia—including where there were no military units. Members of the different services were cross-posted to units not necessarily of their original service. Some army officers were therefore posted to command air force units and vice versa. Even staff cars were cross-posted—including relatively new air force staff cars that were 'posted' to the army and old ones from the army to the air force.

Most senior appointments in the ZNDF were filled by army officers; a move that created resentment and rejection of the ZNDF by the air force and ZNS, which felt dominated by the army. The general feeling was that their identity was obscured and their professionalism interfered with. The extent to which the latter could be regarded as a reality is debatable. Nevertheless, the system created discomfort for the chiefs of staff, who felt overshadowed and over supervised. Consequently, the ZNDF was disbanded in 1980 and the defence force reverted to the command system inherited at independence.

However, some value of the system appeared to have been identified clearly enough; in 1990 Lt Gen Hanania Lungu, then Air Commander, was appointed Minister of Defence in a unified command structure, re-introduced with some modifications. This time, the army, air force and ZNS headquarters were at different locations. The services maintained their structures and autonomy but the commanders reported to the chief of general staff. In essence, a Department of Defence had been created; however, Lt Gen Lungu—the new Minister of Defence—was also appointed chief of general staff to oversee the transition up to the eventual appointment of a chief of the defence force.

With the re-introduction of a multiparty system of government in 1991 under a new political party—the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)—the unified command structure was abolished and the defence force structure reverted to that inherited at independence. Zambia has continued with this system, making the Zambia Defence

Force unique in a region where all defence forces employ a unified command structure.

THE ERA OF TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

The challenges that faced the Zambian military took a number of forms. The most serious was as a result of the Zambian government's commitment to support liberation movements in the Southern African region. This undertaking brought immense suffering to the people of Zambia, and the related insurgency operations by neighbouring states challenged the military.

Another set of challenges involved the attempts at unconstitutional changes of government.

LIBERATION WARS AND INSURGENCIES

The young republic—and consequently the equally young military—had to deal with aggression by the numerically larger and better equipped militaries of the 'white' settler regimes of Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. Faced with the decision of providing refuge and a staging point for the liberation movements from these countries and collaborating with them, the Zambian government chose the former.

The decision unleashed repeated intrusions by the enemy forces into Zambia, leaving destruction, injury and death in their wake. The Zambian military was kept on continuous operational duties until 1994 when South Africa finally became a democratic state.

The aggressive attacks by South Africa's infamous race units, Rhodesia's 'D' Squadron, Special Air Services and Selous Scouts complemented by their regular army and air force units, only served to mature and harden the Zambian military.⁷

Insurgents trained and equipped by apartheid South Africa also subjected the Zambian military to attacks. In what was code-named 'Operation Plathond', the Bureau for State Security and the South African Defence Force joint operation unleashed the Mushala insurgency on the Zambian government, designed to destabilise it and that way reduce or indeed stop it from providing support to the African National Congress.⁸

The 200-strong insurgency led by Adamson Mushala (a former wildlife game ranger) under the command of Col Jannie Breytenbach of

South Africa's first Special Forces unit operated in the jungles of north-western Zambia from 1976 to 1982.⁹ The group killed and destroyed property until it was defeated by the Zambia Army. Adamson Mushala was himself shot dead by the Zambia Army in 1982, putting an end to the eight-year scourge of abductions, looting and burning of villages, destruction of state infrastructure and general attacks on selected targets in the province. The insurgency was destroyed before it could spread to other parts of the country.

The experience gained by the military during its counter-insurgency operations in Zambia's North-Western province came in handy when it was confronted by yet another insurgency in the country's Eastern province. The Mozambique National Resistance (sometimes referred to by its Portuguese acronym Renamo) carried out incursions into Zambia in the 1990s, burning villages and killing and abducting villagers. The Zambian military counter-insurgency operations in the area finally ended the incursions.

ATTEMPTS AT UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT

A dimension of instability that is often difficult to write about is that of the military itself, or part of it, being the cause of instability. It is true, however, that the military has also been known to be the institution that reverses the problem; in the case of Zambia, the latter has indeed been the case.

The military in Zambia—unlike its counterparts elsewhere in Africa—has been able to defeat efforts by disaffected members of the military and population, as well as the designs by other forces external to the country, to change the government through illegal means. The military coup attempts in 1980, 1989, 1990 and 1997 failed due to the commitment of the Zambian defence and security forces to democratic ideals.¹⁰

THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY

Discussion of the military in a democracy presupposes a variety of notions, including the extent to which the defence and security forces have been able to exist in an era of high political activity. In the case of a democratic space—generally interpreted to suggest a multiparty environment in which the government usually adopts liberal economic policies—of interest would be to see how the defence forces adapted to the changes taking place at the political level.

In the case of Zambia, three distinct eras may be identified: 1994–1973 when the country was under a multiparty political system; 1973–1991 when the country was under a single-party system;¹¹ and 1991 to the present period, with the country once again governed by a multiparty system. We turn now to the military’s response to these different political experiences.

THE CONTEMPORARY DEFENCE FORCE

The Zambia Defence Force is unique in two ways: first, the defence force does not employ a joint or unified command system of

Figure 1: An administrative layout of the lines and levels of authority in Zambia’s armed forces





Figure 2: Operational structure of the defence and security services in Zambia

administration where there is a single commander of the force. Instead, the commanders of the army and the air force report independently and directly to the commander-in-chief (the republican president) through the Ministry of Defence.

Second, the ZNS is part of the defence force in the sense that it is a strategic reserve for the army and the air force and therefore provides resources when required. This service, which in many respects is different from the traditional military structures exhibited by the army and air force, was established and is maintained under CAP 121, Part 2 of the Laws of Zambia. A similar message is repeated in Part 7, sections 24(2) and 25, which state that “the functions of the service shall include the training of citizens to serve the Republic and the employment of its members in tasks of national importance of which the defence of the Republic is a part”.¹² The ZNS was designed to be largely developmentally oriented, with arming, bricklaying and carpentry as some of the service’s major activities.

The army, air force and ZNS are nevertheless organically interlinked and complementary in their functions. Figures 1 and 2 show the administrative and operational structure of Zambia’s armed forces.

Although the defence services mentioned in Figure 1 operate as distinct entities, their operational functions are co-ordinated by the Ministry of Defence. Figure 2 shows operational level command-and-control. At the apex of the command-and-control hierarchy is the Defence and Security Committee, which comprises Cabinet ministers and is chaired by the president. Below this is the Defence and Security Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the minister of defence. This Committee is responsible for the military and other security institutions such as the Intelligence Branch, Police Service, the Immigration Department and the Anti Drug Commission.

Critical to the operation of the defence sector is the amount of resources available to it. With an economy not yet performing as well as it used to in the 1960s and 1970s when the country’s resource base (copper) was at its highest, coupled with myriad social and political demands, the needs of the Zambia military are not always met. Table 2 shows the current force level of the country’s 18,000-strong active force.

PROFESSIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

The level of stockholding has not affected the performance of Zambia’s military. During the difficult period from the 1970s to the early 1990s,

Table 2: Zambia's force levels

Service	Force level	Units	Equipment	Forces abroad
ARMY	16,500		MBT 10 T-55, 20 PRC Type-59	DRC (MONUC): 21 include 18 obs Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNAMEE): 14 include 10 obs Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): 833 include 9 obs
	3	bde Hq	LT TK 30 PT-76	
	1	Arty regt	RECCE 70 BRDM-1/-2 (~30 serviceable)	
	9	Infantry bn	APC 13 BTR-60	
	1	Engr regt	TOWED ARTY 76mm: 35M-1942; 105mm; 18 Model 56 pack; 122mm; 25 D-30; 130mm: 18 M-46	
	1	Armd regt -1 tank bn -1 armd recce bn	MRL 122mm: 50 BM-21 (~12 serviceable) MOR 81mm: 55; 82mm: 24; 120mm: 12 ATGW AT-3 Sagger RL 73mm: RPG-7 RCL 57mm: 12 M-18; 75mm: M-20; 84mm: <i>Carl Gustav</i> AD GUNS 20mm: 50 M-55 triple; 37mm: 40 M-1939; 57mm: ~30 S-60; 85mm: 16 KS-12 SAM SA-7	
AIR FORCE	1,600			A few on obs in UN missions
	1 sqn (12)	FGA	F-6 (MiG-19)	
	1 sqn (12)	FGA/	MiG-21 MF	
	(8 being refurbished)	Interceptor		
	1 sqn	TPT	4 An-26, 4 C-47, 4 DHC-5D, 4 Y-12(11)	
	1	VIP Transport	1 HS-748, 2 Yak-40	
		Liaison	5 Do-28	
		Training	2 F-5T, 2 MiG-21U, 12 Galeb G-2, 15 MB 326GB, 8 SF-260MZ, 8 K-8	
	1 sqn	Helicopter	4 AB-205A, 5 AB-212, 12 Mi-8	
		Liaison Helicopter	12 AB-47G	
		Missiles	ASM 1T-3 Sagger, SAM 1 bn; 3 bty: SA-3 Goa	
PARA-MILITARY	1,400 (2 bn)		Mobile Unit & Police Paramilitary Unit	

Source: IISS Military Balance, 2003-2004, pp 226-227

the good military performance was largely the result of the highly professional way in which the defence force carried out its tasks, despite it being severely under resourced.

Possibly the most trying factor on Zambia's military was the country's fluctuating political landscape. Zambia was initially governed by a multiparty democracy from 1964–1973, then by a one-party system of government from 1973–1991, and is now once again using a multiparty system.

One would expect differing professional standards among the defence and security forces during these periods. Furthermore, the fact that the defence and security services were highly interwoven in the political structure of the one-party state would imply their intense politicisation, and consequently an expectation by 'conventional wisdom' that the level of professionalism would correspondingly drop.

Indeed, the defence and security services were extremely close to the party political and governmental structures, to the extent that service chiefs were members of the party Central Committee, and some were even appointed to political and governmental positions, such as district governors, cabinet ministers and diplomats. Additionally, this period coincided with the time of Zambia's highest security risk, and the successful way in which the defence and security forces responded to the challenge reflects their high professional standards.

Furthermore, the military's easy adaptation to the reintroduction of multipartism highlights the extent to which it has remained focused on its primary role of providing peace and security to Zambia, regardless of the political system that obtains at the time. The presumed inverse relationship between professionalism and democracy has, at least in the Zambian case, not been apparent.

THE MILITARY AND TENETS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Just as much as the military in Zambia has maintained its professionalism over time, so has it also responded positively to the challenges of good governance, which demand a defence and security force that is both transparent and accountable.

In this respect, the military in Zambia has during the post-1991 era been subjected to stringent parliamentary oversight. This has been conducted by a number of parliamentary committees (mainly the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee) as well as by the Office of the Auditor-General.

The auditor-general, who is an officer of the National Assembly, releases an annual report on the financial activities of government—and the defence sector is one such government department that is studied. The auditor-general's report usually identifies any cases of unconstitutional expenditure, and the report is considered by the various parliamentary committees. Since the report is available to all, the executive, and indeed the Zambia Army, Air Force, ZNS, Police and Security Intelligence Service can note the findings and explain these to the relevant parliamentary committees as well as to the executive, while also undertaking corrective measures where possible and appropriate.

The auditor-general has often observed cases of both excess and under expenditure, as well as inappropriate procurement and acquisition of goods and services, some of which border on corruption and corrupt practices.

Since the resumption of open debates in Parliament, the executive has tended to act decisively on some of these cases. There are currently parallel investigations¹³ on what is popularly referred to as the 'plundering of state resources'. The auditor-general's report on the accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 2002 has revealed some severe cases of unconstitutional expenditure.

INTRA-STATE AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Inasmuch as Zambia's defence and security forces have responded positively to the various challenges they have encountered, their contribution to the overall goal of human security may be seen in their operation in non-traditional areas, such as food production and disaster relief, both within the country and the region.

In addition, the military has been actively involved in the maintenance of peace and security under the UN. The Zambia Defence Force and other security wings have participated in peacekeeping operations in Chad, Angola, Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Burundi and most recently in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Zambia remains an active member of the Southern African Development Community and of its Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, which is attempting to harmonise the region's defence and security needs. Towards this end, Zambia has been an active participant in a number of regional exercises that, among others, are required in order to achieve the interoperability needed for collaborative missions.

HIV/AIDS is another challenge, the exact magnitude of which has yet

to be determined beyond the mere acceptance of its seriousness as a global, continental, regional and national challenge. Any significant statistical evidence showing the magnitude of the pandemic in the military has been described as ‘speculative’.¹⁴ The need for intensive research in this area is one of the major tasks facing Zambia as it tackles the pandemic at national level.

NOTES

- 1 UNIP Manifesto 1962, (1) and (2).
- 2 General Notice No. 192 of 1933.
- 3 *Northern Rhodesia Gazette Supplement Government Notice*, 1964, Vol. 1, Government Notice No. 28 of 1964, p 333.
- 4 *Northern Rhodesia Gazette Supplement Government Notice*, 1964, Vol. 2, Government Notice No. 497 of 1964, p 1967.
- 5 M Rupiya, *The development of the Southern Rhodesia military system from the 1926 Defence Act to the dissolution of the Federation in December 1963*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 2001.
- 6 See D Cowdrey & R C Nesbit, *War in the air: Rhodesian Air Force 1935–1980*, Calgo, South Africa; and R Wellenky, Comments, *Annual Defence Report*, 31 December 1959, p 113.
- 7 See also JRT Wood, Rhodesian insurgency, <<http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/wood2.htm>>
- 8 <<http://www.stanford.edu/class/history48q/Documents/EMBARGO/2chap>>
- 9 <<http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2001/p01-304.pdf>>
- 10 See also G Machona, A harvest of treason trials, in A Onadipe & D Lord, *African media and conflict*, <http://www.c-r.org/pubs/occ_papers/afmedia/machona.shtm>.
- 11 The government regarded this period as a ‘one-party participatory democracy’. In view of the various forms of democracies or levels of democracies, it may therefore be argued that the period exhibited a sort of democracy.
- 12 Part 7 sections 24(2) and 25(1)-(2) provide the ZNS’s function in times of national insecurity or war through the use of arms and weapons of war. During the war of liberation in the region, some members of the ZNS saw active service and a number were killed. Their level of performance was high, evidenced by the various commendations received for their heroism during active service.
- 13 The Zambian government is currently undertaking widespread investigations of cases of theft of government resources. President Frederick Chiluba and some senior members of the executive, including former head of the country’s Security Intelligence Service, have since been charged and are already appearing in court. This action by the Zambian government is unprecedented in the country in particular, as well as regionally and internationally.
- 14 Prof. L Simbayi, *Behavioural and social aspects of HIV/AIDS*, Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, South Africa.



Source: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/index.html