A changing conception of defence: A historical perspective of the military in Tanzania

Nestor Luanda

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the historical development of the military in Tanzania, beginning with a background to the Tanganyika Rifles (TR). The legacies of Tanzania’s colonial history form an essential background, providing the basis from which major adjustments were made at independence. The chapter then reviews early attempts at formulating a defence policy in Tanganyika. The country was initially pre-occupied with developmentalism, and it was only after 1963 that glimpses of foreign and defence policies began to emerge; the TR mutiny of January 1964 was the turning point in the conception of a defence policy.

Tanganyika’s commitment to the liberation war from very early on provides another pillar in the country’s conception of defence and foreign policies. The chapter then argues that from its inception the Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Force (TPDF), largely an infantry army, was ideologically oriented. With the advent of multiparty politics and political liberalisation, however, this ideological orientation has been de-emphasised. As a result the conception of defence has also changed and become liberalised.

THE COLONIAL ROOT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY
Since the King’s African Rifles (KAR) was the precursor to the TR, we begin by outlining the main characteristics of the former in order to underscore the colonial roots of the latter. The KAR was inextricably
linked to the history of colonial conquest, pacification and occupation of East and Central Africa. Like many a colonial army, it was an adjunct of the colonial administration.

The KAR dates back to the days of chartered companies which had to raise local forces in order “to pacify the countries and to bring law and order”. The forces were “scantily equipped levies armed with out-of-date rifles and employed on local expeditions against ill-armed tribes”. KAR troops were mostly drawn from satrapic members of African societies; they were armed with antiquated rifles and possessed little superior marksmanship to that of the men they fought. These soldiers of fortune developed into a mercenary force with no local affinity to an area where they might be called on to operate, and controlled thousands of their own kind. The KAR was essentially an active service force whose main tasks were colonial pioneering, pacification, policing and counter-insurgency commitments.

However, the point stands that the KAR commanders held their African troops in contempt. The legendary loyalty and courage of the Askari was founded upon stereotyped inferior qualities of the African. When a new arrival asked a veteran KAR officer about the force, he commented:

... the great thing about the KAR is that they only enlist the thick ones to be soldiers, ... these are the ones that have plenty of espirit de corps, so long as there are European officers it can all be channelled in the right direction. The other trouble with all Africans, whether they’re educated or uneducated, is that they are totally unreliable, but I imagine military discipline caters for that in the KAR.

**PATTERN OF TRANSITION**

A permanent military barracks was established at Colito in Dar es Salaam in 1954, marking a watershed in the history of the military in Tanganyika. This 6th Battalion comprised rifle companies. Two years later the nucleus of a new battalion—the 26th Battalion, Kalewa Barracks—was formed at Urambo. Both battalions came under the control of East African Command and provided periodic garrison duty in Mauritius until 1957.

The point is that during crisis periods—notably the First and Second World Wars, and Mau Mau uprising—the War Office took control of the colonial forces. From 1957 to 1960, however, the respective governors
of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika took control of the KAR units under a loose federal body called the East African Land Forces’ Organisation; but the organisation was disbanded in 1960 and the KAR units were again taken over by the War Office.

In short, the 6th and 26th KAR battalions were forerunners of local constabulary forces designed for internal security duties in Tanganyika. They were indeed skeleton battalions whose companies fused, fissured or simply disbanded as expediency required; this holds true throughout the history of the two battalions. Another interesting feature of the 6th and 26th battalions is that they were continuously moved from place to place, but especially to Mauritius for garrison duty. A cynic once remarked that Tanganyika was unable to support military units and that the best way to avoid incurring maintenance costs was to let others do it by providing them in return with garrison duty.

There were other implications too. The 6th and 26th KAR battalions were particularly small; they were more or less a superior police force organised for rapid deployment to quell tax revolts, labour disputes or nationalist demonstrations. Dar es Salaam (Colito Barracks) and Tabora (Kalewa Barracks) were really transit camps or rest stations for the battalions’ rotating units. The upshot is that technical and expert fields dealing with, among others, electrical, motor vehicle, weaponry, heavy machinery and engineering were concentrated in Kenya. A training wing (infantry) was not established at Colito Barracks until 1956. A number of interviewees for this study claim that despite their relatively good educational backgrounds, they were denied a chance to take specialised training.

Up to 1963 Kenya remained the centre for specialised courses such as signals, stores, medicine, driving and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). For example, 12 out of the first 18 top appointments in 1957 were Kenyans. It is unclear how many came from Uganda, but only one was from Tanganyika.4

Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the promotion of African NCOs was arduously slow. All command positions from top to bottom were occupied by the British. In theory, it would take an African soldier two years to become lance corporal, six years to become corporal, and 10 years to reach sergeant—but in practice very few Africans were promoted. Most Africans did not join the army for a career. However, during the Second World War years, and especially in the early 1950s, Africans in general began to be promoted to NCO positions and were first appointed as warrant officer platoon commanders (WOPCs).
But the responsibilities given to African NCOs, including WOPCs, was a façade: the British never allowed African NCOs to assume full command of a unit, be it a platoon or a section—there was always a British counterpart who was the senior of the two. For example, a platoon would have a British national service subaltern and an African WOPC. The African platoon commander would, however, take charge when it came to such arduous tasks as foot slogging. However, the African WOPC would have to report to the British subaltern for orders regarding every administrative, tactical or logistical decision. The same was true for platoon sergeants; they took orders from the British sergeants. The British in East Africa gave no serious thought to commissioning Africans until the late 1950s. As mentioned, the highest rank an African in the KAR could aspire to was WOPC. The rank gave the African a semblance of responsibility but it was an NCO rank nevertheless. In addition, the standard of education particularly among the WOPCs was appallingly low.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AT INDEPENDENCE

Both the 6th and 26th battalions were part of KAR’s 11th Division. The 6th Battalion had distinguished itself in battle at Colito, Ethiopia during the First World War, with the Colito Barracks (1954) in Dar es Salaam named after that battle. The 26th Battalion had fought gallantly at Kalewa, Burma during the Second World War and the Kalewa Barracks (1956) in Tabora was named after that battle.

Minus the two world wars and the nationalist uprisings in the 1950s, colonial units were maintained through colonial revenues. Of Britain’s East and Central African colonies, Tanganyika was the runt of the litter, so to speak, and the KAR units in colonial Tanganyika operated on a threadbare budget. The KAR in Tanganyika was a poorly equipped infantry army: the Mark IV, with pounder mortar and rocket launcher thrown in, was the KAR’s most important weapon.

THE SEARCH FOR A DEFENCE POLICY

At independence on 9 December 1961 the KAR units in Tanganyika—namely the 6th and 26th battalions—became the First Battalion (at Colito Barracks in Dar es Salaam) and Second Battalion (at Kalewa Barracks in Tabora) Tanganyika Rifles respectively. It is important to emphasise that the change was in name only: the British continued to
All commanding positions were held by British officers—35 British officers and 25 British NCOs (from the KAR) were inherited intact to command the TR.

During the first two years of independence Tanganyika did not formulate any articulate defence or foreign policy. It was only after 1963 when there were clear perceptions of an external threat that moves were made to establish a defence system to confront this threat.

Parliamentary debates are key to understanding the search for a national defence policy. The substance of parliamentary debates during the pre-mutiny period was heavily oriented towards development policies as well as the strategies and tactics necessary to bring about this development. The dominant view was that British colonialism had been overthrown and the only task ahead worthy of attention was economic reconstruction. The ‘enemy’ was defined as poverty, ignorance and disease. There was even a pervasive sense of impatience and contempt towards those who looked beyond the borders to define the country’s enemies; such perceptions were seen at best as fantasies and at worst as deliberate diversions. This pre-occupation with internal enemies was underscored by the rather naive belief that the international environment was supportive of Tanganyika’s development efforts.

Questions of imperialism or neo-colonialism did not attract political attention until 1963. As Nyerere said: “The general concern was to take over the instruments of political power and to consolidate the political control of the country.”

Many African countries subscribed to the belief that political independence could be consolidated within the structural strictures of imperialism. Whether this was the objective reality of the time is a moot point. Generally, there was a pervasive influence of the political development and modernisation ideology, and its extreme pre-occupation with political stability and the maintenance of an environment conducive to imperialist exploitation.

Most parliamentary debates in early independent Tanganyika concerned issues of political, economic and social development. Those few debates that focused on foreign and defence policy issues were quite controversial and instructive.

Two opposite, broad propositions were taken on the question of defence: the pro-army position was that Tanganyika needed a sizeable professional army which would be responsible for defending its national borders and which could also make a contribution to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The anti-army position held that Tanganyika
had no external enemies and thus did not need a large army. It was argued that the nominal force inherited at independence should be deployed to undertake nation-building activities. The most extreme version of this argument was that Tanganyika should dissolve even the small force inherited at independence and place the country’s defence in the hands of the United Nations, in order to demonstrate its peaceful intentions.

An interesting component of the debate was the position of the Liberation Committee, which had been established in Dar es Salaam in March 1963 after the Addis Ababa Summit. The issue was also tied up with the question of the position and activities of the liberation movements that had established offices in Dar es Salaam since 1962. At the international level questions were being raised about the legality of Tanganyika giving succour to forces hostile to other sovereign states (such as South Africa). On the home front, similar questions were raised in the National Assembly: some members felt that there had to be a total commitment to the liberation cause, even to the point of taking up the offensive, while others tended to be more cautious. On the whole, however, there was general consensus on engaging in some form of active support for the liberation struggles in the region.

A third issue that featured prominently in the 1963 debate concerned the position and role of British officers in the army. Those who expressed support for a strong defence force for both national security and liberation struggles were rather wary of the presence of British officers in command and training positions. They believed that the army they envisaged had to come under African command as soon as possible.

It is clear that between 1961 and early 1963, there were two contending schools of thought about national defence policy in Tanganyika. During this period the anti-army sentiment dominated the scene, and as a result no clear policy on defence had emerged by the end of 1962. However, by 1963 there emerged a strong perception of threat posed by the settler colonial regimes to the south of Tanganyika. Similarly, the young nation believed that it had a historical responsibility to participate in the liberation of Africa. While Tanganyika was still searching for a defence policy, its colonial inherited army mutinied in January 1964.

**THE TURNING POINT IN DEFENCE POLICY**

The January 1964 TR mutiny prompted a major change in the conception of defence and foreign policy. The mutiny was a turning
point in terms of Tanganyika’s conception of the military, and the TR was overhauled and reorganised. According to the country’s President, Mwalimu Julius K Nyerere: “Tanganyika has to reorganise and rebuild its army. We cannot afford a large or elaborate military establishment nor does our foreign policy require one. But our army must be efficient.”

At this stage Nyerere’s conception of the military was informed by the conventional well-trained, professional and disciplined army. To all intents and purposes, Nyerere was still agonising over the conception of the military: “I request TANU Youth League [TYL] members wherever they are to go to enlist. We shall reconstruct our Republic’s army from TYL members.”

Nyerere was resolutely opposed to military intervention in the political domain: “We will always oppose a system whereby the gun becomes the ballot box.” He believed that self-discipline, leadership, combat skills, determination, dexterity of mind, dedication to soldiering and corporate responsibility were the cornerstones of military professionalism.

The most important consideration in recruiting the new army was political loyalty to the ruling Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU): membership of TANU was compulsory for recruitment into the army. A few days after the mutiny thousands of TYL members from across the country arrived in Dar es Salaam, responding to President Nyerere’s appeal for recruitment into the new army. In May 1964 a few hundred members of the Zanzibar Youth League arrived in Dar es Salaam to be recruited into the new army.

It is important to emphasise that all recruits (including former TR officers and troops) had to pass through Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (National Service) before they could be enlisted.

The new army, Jeshi la Wananchi Tanzania (JWTZ) was officially inaugurated in September 1964 with about 1,000 men. In his address to the newly created army at the National Stadium, President Nyerere emphasised the four requirements of loyalty, obedience, bravery and patriotism, and stressed the core concept of national service:

It is the government’s intention that everyone shall go through National Service. In future the National Service will serve as the main gate. One will not proceed to any other profession without passing through the National Service . . . In future no one can join the Army without going through National Service first. We sent out people to summon you to come here. I presume they put you into two groups.
They told you that one group would be recruited directly into Tanganyika Rifles and the other group would join the National Service. We say, absolutely no ... All of you will have to go through National Service first.⁹

One can delineate three phases in the history of the military in Tanzania. The formative period, 1964–69, laid the foundation for the national army, during which much emphasis was placed on recruitment, training and laying the administrative infrastructure of the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF). With assistance from Canada, an air transport unit was started during this period; however, the TPDF remained largely an infantry army. At its inception the TPDF boasted three battalions namely: the First Battalion at Lugalo in Dar es Salaam; the Second Battalion at Tabora; and the Third Battalion at Nachingwea. Units for heavy mortar and anti-aircraft were also formed during this period.

During the second period of consolidation from 1969–80, a naval wing was established with assistance from the Chinese. In 1979 an air defence regiment was established, with help from the former Soviet Union. Compulsory National Service remained the major recruiting ground for the TPDF. Both the TPDF and National Service fell under the Ministry of Defence. In 1975 the National Service, originally an autonomous organisation, became part of the TPDF; all officers of the National Service became officers of the TPDF. The commander of national service was responsible for all the affairs of nation building and production, while military matters became the responsibility of the commander of the defence force. It was also during this period that the TPDF was restructured into Eastern, Southern and Northern Infantry Brigades.

The most important point to make is that during both the first and second phases, the TPDF was an army of liberation. This is an important point to bear in mind in understanding the chequered history of the TPDF. In fact, when war broke out between Tanzania and Uganda, the battle-ready units were those of the Southern Brigade.

The third phase in the history of the military in Tanzania is the period 1980 to the present. This is a period of political liberalisation which has seen the military become de-politicised.

**TPDF: AN IDEOLOGICAL ARMY**

Within five years of its establishment the TPDF was slowly but surely moving beyond the conventional basic military requirements of loyalty,
obedience, bravery and patriotism. Over and above its normal functions, the TPDF was charged with the task of becoming a higher institution of learning as well as for disseminating *Ujamaa* (brotherhood). On Heroes Day, 1 September 1969, when the TPDF was also celebrating its fifth anniversary, President Nyerere said:

> A soldier of Tanzania must be patriotic. It is imperative that our soldier understands the politics of our country. Our army must accept this fact. Otherwise, I am unable to tell the difference between you and the colonial [army]. Our army must accept the principle of equality. Our army must be the highest institution of learning in matters of defence and socialism.10

Nyerere was serious and quite emphatic about integrating the military into the ideological machinery of the sole ruling party, TANU/Afro—and later Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM).

The Monduli Military Academy—whose precursor was the Kurasini Officer Cadet School—opened in 1974. The academy provided a grander opportunity to fulfil Nyerere’s vision of putting the military under the mainstream political ideology of the party. The Monduli Military Academy catered for both military commanders and ruling party leaders and cadres. Graduates from the academy could be posted either to the military, the party or the government.

> Army officers are [simultaneously] leaders of the party. We want our army officers to understand this. It is true we did not fight a [liberation] war. However, the military belongs to the Party. I do not have to say this to Frelimo. Frelimo knows this to be the case. One does not need to tell the Chinese that the military belongs to the Party. It would be like telling them that these are my eyes! My eyes are mine, [who] else’s can they possibly be? The military is an instrument of the Party.11

The novelty of Nyerere’s conception of the military was that he wanted a small, well-trained, highly professional and disciplined regular army, but one that was decidedly political. Furthermore, the TPDF was charged with the task of liberation:

> In co-operation with other progressive forces [the TPDF] will continue to be the bulwark in the struggle for justice and [the]
liberation of Africa. Apart from its task of defence [the TPDF] is a liberation army.\(^{12}\)

The significant point is that from its very inception the TPDF was recognised as being part of the ruling party.

A number of steps had already been taken to bring the military under the control of the party. But a much more significant step in the politicisation of the military was the formal institutionalisation of the CCM party in the armed forces and other sectors, such as the police and prisons, in 1987. The armed forces formally became *Mkoa wa Majeshi* of the sole ruling party, CCM. *Mkoa wa Majeshi* was represented in all the CCM organs on an equal footing with the other regions.

Politicisation of the military under one-party rule seriously eroded professionalism of the military. Discipline, leadership and corporate responsibility probably suffered most. The military command structure is founded on discipline and leadership, while political parties are premised on debate, argumentation, banter and even disagreement. The two do not mix well and Nyerere saw that this could undermine discipline in the military.

However, Nyerere staunchly believed that he could build an ideologically oriented, disciplined and professional army. The CCM party invention, *kofia mbili*, was hastily imposed on the military (and defence forces in general). Nyerere told the military commanders at the opening ceremony of a CCM meeting at the TPDF:

> In your capacity as leaders of the Party you do not give many orders. As Party leaders you give elaborate explanations and engage in lengthy argumentation. However, you are also army commanders. In that capacity you do give orders and argumentation is restricted. We want a professional army. Military commanders should be professionalised to the highest possible standards. We want professionalism and discipline. The Army is a University for defence and socialism. CCM professes socialism. The Army must be an army of socialism.\(^{13}\)

**CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS**

Many are agreed that military professionalism is the decisive factor in keeping soldiers out of politics. Soldiers anywhere are technicians in the management and organisation of violence. It has been noted above that the role of the military is to provide force or the threat of force at the
behest of the state. However, the military cannot be run like a democracy. In other words, the military should be able to perform its violent tasks in a way that is responsible to public opinion and without compromising the political process. However, the use or threat of force even on a small scale can have catastrophic practical and political consequences if things go wrong.

All these issues have a significant bearing on civil–military relations. Civil control involves and entails the obedience which the military owes to the state. In simple terms, the military is one of a number of state instruments, such as the police and the diplomatic service. Like these other instruments, the military has a duty of loyalty to its employer, the state. On its own the military is not a competent authority to decide on defence policy—it can only advise.

MULTIPARTY POLITICS AND THE CONCEPTION OF DEFENCE

In 1991, a presidential commission, the Nyalali Commission, was set up to evaluate whether or not Tanzanians wanted a multiparty system of governance. Based on its findings the Nyalali Commission recommended that Tanzania should adopt a multiparty democracy. The transformation of the political landscape in Tanzania from one-party rule to a multiparty system brought with it the reformulation of defence and security policy.

Currently, Tanzania boasts about 17 registered political parties. Liberalised political systems require that the military stays out of active politics. Accordingly, the Nyalali Commission recommended that soldiers may enjoy their civil right of association (as individual citizens they may join political parties), but should not actively demonstrate allegiance to any political party. Similarly, soldiers are not allowed to aspire for a leadership post in a political party.

Generally then, members of the TPDF enjoy the same fundamental rights as other citizens. However, owing to the unique nature of the armed forces and military service in particular, certain exceptions to this principle have been necessary. The exceptions are limited and specific. With specific reference to political participation, military personnel are entitled to vote in national and civic elections but shall not be members of any political party. Military personnel shall not attend political rallies in uniform except when they are on official duty.

During the one-party political regime the armed forces constituted a *Mkoa wa Majeshi* made up of four districts namely, the TPDF, the police,
prisons and armed units in the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (Chuo Cha Mafunzo, JKU and KMKM). The armed forces Mkoa wa Majeshi (and its constituent districts) had political commissars.

The Nyalali Commission further recommended dissolution of the armed forces Mkoa wa Majeshi. In effect, this involved the banning of active politics in the armed forces. Similarly, political commissars were required either to remain in the military or to return to their former posts. However, the Nyalali Commission recommended that soldiers should receive instruction on the constitutions of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government, as well as on nationalism—in a liberal democracy the military should receive training in national interests and core values, which should hopefully lead to responsible nationalism and nation building on the part of the military.

Peace, tranquillity and national unity form the cornerstones of the new vision and direction for defence. This new conception of defence places priority on the protection of Tanzania’s national interests and core values which include: preservation of national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and protection of natural resources; preservation of the Union; peace and tranquillity; democracy; economic prosperity and socio-economic development; regional peace and stability; and social justice.

Tanzania is a secular democratic state with a pluralist political system and a liberalised market economy. According to the constitution every citizen has the duty to protect, preserve and maintain the independence, sovereignty, territory and unity of the nation. In this regard, defence as part of national security is sought primarily through efforts intended to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of Tanzanians through efforts to promote and maintain domestic security. In this regard, too, the defence forces (regular force, regular reserve and volunteer reserve) and disciplined forces (police, prisons and national service) should operate strictly within the bounds of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law.

The TPDF should respect human rights and the democratic process; it should neither further nor prejudice political interests. Much more significantly, the defence forces should be subordinate and fully accountable to civilian authority.

Civil–military relations refer to the hierarchy between the executive, Parliament and the armed forces, as well as to civil control over the armed forces. Stable civil–military relations depend to a great extent on the professionalism of the armed forces—professionalism should be
consistent with democracy, the constitution and international standards. In most developing countries democracy is understood and indeed limited to the physical exercise of the electorate casting votes in general or civic elections. Admittedly, democracies that sprung up during the last quarter of the 20th century—the greatest period of democratic ferment in the history of modern civilisation—are fragile and must live on compressed time.

Although the democratic wave has swept through sub-Saharan Africa, it has more often than not left distortions of democracy. There are certain defining components, the presence of which are indispensable to modern political democracy. These include the following:

- Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
- Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is uncommon.
- Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
- Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in government.
- Citizens have a right to express themselves on political matters, broadly defined, without the danger of severe punishment.
- Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
- Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
- Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding opposition from unelected officials. Democracy is in jeopardy if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions made by people’s representatives.
The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overriding political system.

A perusal of the defining components of modern political democracy would show that democracy could be inconsistent with defence policy. However, liberal democracy and its practice is essential to defence policy. In other words, democratic control of the defence and security forces is a cardinal principle in a liberal democratic constitution. Defence and security establishments should adhere strictly to the principle of subservience to civil authority and institutions.

There are essentially two mechanisms for democratic control of the military. The first mechanism involves a public relations exercise: the civil elite must demonstrate by work and deed that they are in control. Similarly, the defence forces themselves have a role to play: they should deliberately increase their public relations exercises by, for example, holding lectures at schools, opening up museums, and distributing publications, leaflets and flyers. The public relations exercise is significant because it situates the civil elites, the general population and the military to the grassroots. This in turn enhances democracy.

The second cornerstone of civilian control of the military is parliamentary oversight. This is a legalising mechanism for whatever transpires in the armed forces, and is an important element in democratic governance. It also enshrines democracy. It is also important that there should be joint training among senior military personnel, senior civilian government officials and those from civil society. These training exercises should be well thought out, integrated and regular.

In brief then, the mission of national defence is to defend national independence, the people, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United Republic of Tanzania.

The specific tasks of the TPDF in a democratic Tanzania are, among others, to:

- make a contribution to Tanzania’s foreign and security policies and their promotion;

- direct and provide a defence effort that meets the needs of the present, prepares for the future and insures against the unpredictable;

- create, develop and nurture a research and development organisation;
generate modern, battle-winning forces and other defence capabilities to prevent conflicts and build stability, resolve crises and respond to emergencies, and protect and further national interests;

• support and render necessary assistance to the civil authorities in dealing with national emergencies and natural disasters;

• support and assist the civil power in internal security operations;

• contribute to peace-time support and humanitarian operations; and

• participate in national social and economic activities during peace time.

CONCLUSION

Having mapped out the mission of national defence in Tanzania, we conclude by highlighting the threats that confront the military and discipline forces in the country. The nature and character of these threats manifest in a complex interplay of globalisation, regional and domestic processes. Most of the security threats are economic in nature and character, and also threaten territorial sovereignty and international cooperation. These global security threats include: illicit drug trafficking; small arms proliferation; displaced people, refugees and illegal immigrants; political intolerance; religious extremism; terrorism; and organised crime.

The continued growth in the number of sub-Saharan African countries with civilian governments chosen through multiparty competitive elections, testifies to the persistent ascendancy of democracy during the 1990s. Importantly, however, this democratic push has coincided with a marked increase in violent conflicts in the continent, which conflicts have accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths in the world during this period. The conflicts have further resulted in more than eight million refugees, returnees and displaced people. A geo-political survey of Africa shows with painful clarity that the continent is steeped in violent conflict for which the military is largely responsible.
NOTES


2 Moyse-Bartlett, op cit, p iii.

3 Quoted in Grahame, op cit, p 10.

4 Major Temple Morris, interview, 5 June 1987, Mbozi.


6 Julius Nyerere, interview, 10 July 1987, Dar es Salaam.

7 Mwalimu J K Nyerere akihutubia taifa huku Asaki Waasi TR waliponyanganywa Silaha, tarehe 25 Januari 1964 (mss in authors’ possession).


9 Amiri Jeshi Mkuu, Mwalimu J K Nyerere Ahutubia Wamajeshi Wapya katika Uwanja wa Taifa, Dar es Salaam, tarehe 1 Septemba, 1964 (mss in authors’ possession).

10 Jemadari Mkuu, mwalimu J K Nyerere, Ahutubia Wakati waKilele cha Sherehe za Miaa 20 ya Jeshi la Wananchi Tanzania (JWTZ) Uwanja wa Taifa, Dar e alaam, 1 September 1984 (mss in author’s possession).


12 Jemadari Mkuu, Mwalimu J.K. Nyerer, Akitubwa Wakati wa Kilele cha Sherehe za Miaka 20 ya Jeshi la Wananchi Tanzania (JWTZ), Uwanjwa wa Taifa, Dar e Salaam, 1 Septemba, 1984 (mss in authors’ possession).

13 Rais Mwalimu JK Nyerere, op cit.

14 Jamburi ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Tume ya Rais ya Mfumo wa Chama Kimoja au Vyama Vingi vya Siasa, Kitabu cha Kwanza: Taarifana Mapendekezo ya Tume kuhusu Mfumo wa Siasa nchini Tanzania.
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