

Better ways to build peace and resilience in South Sudan

Caitriona Dowd and Liezelle Kumalo



Against a backdrop of protracted conflict and civil war, South Sudan has experienced a series of stop-start peace processes. Innovative approaches are now needed at national and local level to address the root causes of violence. This report synthesises the findings of the Network for Innovative Resilience-Building in South Sudan. It shows the importance of understanding conflict drivers and focusing on longer-term peace outcomes. Gaps in knowledge, evidence and learning are also identified.

Key findings

- ▶ South Sudan has experienced cyclical violence for several decades. Successive efforts to resolve conflict have failed. Continued delays in the implementation of the latest peace agreement have sparked an increase in sub-national and inter-communal violence related to national political actors.
- ▶ The protracted crisis has exacted a devastating humanitarian cost. As of October 2021, an estimated 8.3 million people need humanitarian assistance.
- ▶ While the humanitarian community refers to the need for the meaningful participation and leadership of local and national actors in humanitarian responses, this is not happening in practice.
- ▶ Successful grassroots peacebuilding depends on the involvement of traditional leaders and people of influence in the community and local government.
- ▶ Failure to establish links between peacebuilding initiatives significantly undermines their sustainability and impact.
- ▶ There are gaps in existing knowledge about the interaction between different scales and types of conflict, local and national food systems and food security.
- ▶ With small-scale returns of displaced people already underway, the potential for large-scale returns and movement to urban areas could trigger more violence.

Recommendations

For the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity:

- ▶ Address the gendered impact of the conflict-driven food crisis, in consultation with civil society.
- ▶ Explicitly acknowledge the gendered dimensions of hunger and food rights in existing national policies, including on security and peace.
- ▶ Develop a gender-sensitive food security programme with local and international actors.
- ▶ Prioritise security sector reform with a clear human security focus.

For donor and aid agencies:

- ▶ Support initiatives that recognise that peacebuilding is a long-term investment requiring predictable and flexible support for community-led activities.
- ▶ Support approaches that strengthen livelihoods and provide coherence in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

- ▶ Support resilience-building initiatives that account for conflict as a distinct shock and stressor.

For peacebuilding and humanitarian practitioners:

- ▶ Conduct local conflict mapping to understand drivers, triggers and specific conflict (de-)escalation processes.
- ▶ Prioritise peace processes in communities over stand-alone events such as conferences and dialogues, which risk undermining peace prospects if poorly aligned with local priorities.
- ▶ Design and deliver resilience-building activities that focus on equality and justice rather than seeing resilience as an outcome in itself.
- ▶ Work with civil society actors who support the design, implementation and monitoring of local peace agreements to help create space for dialogue on definitions of peace.

Introduction

South Sudan has been devastated by violent conflict since 2013, and is the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. The country's leaders have navigated successive rounds of peace negotiations. Yet for many, the challenges of displacement and return, acute food insecurity and ongoing violence have perpetuated the long shadow cast by conflict.¹

The civil war in South Sudan has destroyed lives, forced people to flee and entrenched divisions that will take decades to heal.

Each wave of insecurity has triggered new local, national and regional peace processes, and these have continued amid a period of profound change globally. For peace to be durable and inclusive, local and national-level peace have to be mutually reinforcing.² Durable peace would also mean women are not only represented, but are meaningfully engaged at every level. Similarly, urgent humanitarian needs have to be met in a way that builds longer-term resilience. As a result, international organisations, donors and humanitarian actors have invested in initiatives to strengthen resilience, empower women and girls, and support political and economic transformation alongside formal and informal peacebuilding processes.

Network for Innovative Resilience-Building

This report synthesises the work of the Network for Innovative Resilience-Building in South Sudan.³ The network is funded by the Irish Research Council and Department of Foreign Affairs. It brings together academic, policy and humanitarian experts working on violent conflict, women's empowerment, and political and economic transformation in South Sudan; facilitating exchange to promote lesson-sharing and identify opportunities for collaboration and innovative action. Network members included staff from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Africa, Dublin City University and Concern Worldwide, along with other partners.

The ultimate aim of the network has been to help reduce humanitarian need and strengthen resilience and conditions for durable, inclusive peace in South Sudan. As COVID-19 travel restrictions prevented travel to South Sudan and in-person meetings for many members,

the network met remotely in a series of facilitated workshops and dialogues.

The resulting report synthesises the key outcomes of these exchanges. The report consists of three main sections:

- A synthesis of evidence on what works in peacebuilding, also reviewing existing research, evaluations and approaches on resilience-building
- A mapping of the remaining gaps in evidence, knowledge and learning that network members identified, and which should be prioritised in future data collection, research and learning initiatives
- A section that identifies and explores opportunities for innovation in peace- and resilience-building responses in the humanitarian, development and peace nexus.

Peace, conflict and humanitarian needs

South Sudan has experienced long-running, protracted and cyclical violence for several decades. Successive efforts to resolve this conflict have, to date, failed to establish lasting and sustainable peace. On paper, successive frameworks appear to be geared towards successful peace, but closer examination reveals unaddressed issues – particularly as it pertains to power- and wealth-sharing. Critical drivers of the conflict often remain excluded, and a lack of national ownership has consistently hampered the implementation of peace frameworks. A lack of commitment to political transformation and inconsistency in international and regional support further undermine the sustainability of these agreements – setting the stage for future conflict.

National-level peace and conflict

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Partners' Forum have, since 2005, been responsible for brokering the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in South Sudan.⁴ In January 2005, the CPA ended 22 years of conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) and the government in Khartoum. It was considered the most significant and most unlikely diplomatic success in the Sudanese conflict.⁵ This is due to the fact that despite years of painstaking negotiations, doubts still remained whether it would be a lasting

solution, especially because the document contained an escape clause.⁶

Two years after the country's declaration of independence in July 2011, civil war erupted in the country in 2013. This dramatically increased humanitarian need in South Sudan. It was estimated that two million people were violently displaced, with another two million becoming refugees in neighbouring countries.⁷

In August 2015, IGAD brokered the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) to resolve the conflict as the ruling SPLM party split into three factions. The agreement set out a 30-month transition involving a unity government, with security arrangements including the unification of forces. The agreement further focused on providing for a reconstruction and economic rehabilitation programme; a hybrid court to try war crimes, genocide and other crimes; a truth commission and other reconciliation initiatives; and parameters for a new constitution.

Political, military and ethnic divisions still plague South Sudan and violence between signatories of the R-ARCSS persists

While IGAD was brokering the ARCSS, the governments of South Africa and Tanzania negotiated a separate process aimed at unifying the SPLM, which resulted in the Arusha Agreement of January 2015. Some contend that the Arusha Agreement succeeded in addressing the root causes of the violence,⁸ while others considered it to have been contradictory to the IGAD-led process.⁹

IGAD mediators understood that the December 2013 crisis was a symptom of deep social and political problems and unresolved legacies of the liberation war.¹⁰ Yet the IGAD peace efforts were framed as key to solving the country's issues, thus ultimately undermining the implementation of the Arusha Agreement.¹¹ Consequently, the civil war raged on throughout the negotiation period of the ARCSS, which led to missed deadlines and precious time being wasted.¹² Conflict broke out in June 2016, because ARCSS failed to address the root causes of the conflict.

In response to the collapse of the ARCSS and increased pressure from the so-called Troika (the United States,

United Kingdom and Norway) and the European Union, IGAD launched a Revitalised Forum in 2017. The forum was established to discuss how the agreement could be implemented.¹³ After much stalling from all parties, the revitalised peace agreement (R-ARCSS) was eventually signed in September 2018.

Largely based on the ARCSS, the R-ARCSS was to be implemented in two phases. The first was the pre-transitional period, intended to lead to the establishment of the Revitalised Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), and expected to last three years. The unity government was formed on 22 February 2020, after many delays.¹⁴

The second phase of the R-ARCSS outlines the procedure for accessing humanitarian assistance, managing the country's resources, security arrangements and transitional justice. The areas that were identified as requiring focus are:¹⁵

- Creating a space to ensure building sustainable peace
- Instituting radical reforms in terms of the public financial management system
- Devolving power to local government to form a workable federal system
- Expediting the reintegration of forcefully displaced South Sudanese
- Facilitating a people-centred national reconciliation and healing process

Security arrangements are a critical issue, and could hamper the peace deal. While reintegrating armed forces are essential to building trust, South Sudan remains ethnically polarised.¹⁶ Political, military and ethnic divisions are still widening in the country,¹⁷ and although there has been a general decrease in insecurity, violent incidents between the main signatories of R-ARCSS have persisted. The signatories are: Salva Kiir Mayardit, Riek Machar Teny, Deng Alor Kuol, Gabriel Changson Chang, Peter Mayen Majondit, Kornello Kon Ngu, Utaz Joseph Ukel Abango, Steward Sorobo Budia and Wilson Lionding Sabit.

Clashes continue between splinter groups, government factions and rebels, and there are documented accounts of political and military leaders supplying weapons to communities.¹⁸ This violates Article 2.1.10.4

of the R-ARCSS agreement, which states: ‘Parties shall refrain from ... [the] recruitment, mobilisation, redeployment and movement of forces.’¹⁹ The fact that no action has been taken against any party, by IGAD demonstrates a lack of accountability among the guarantors of the peace agreement.

Local-level peace and conflict

The overview above summarises key developments in *national-level* peace and conflict over the past decade-and-a-half in South Sudan. However, *localised* violent conflict also has a profound impact on both governance structures and humanitarian outcomes. This refers to conflict centred primarily at the sub-national level, engaging sub-national actors, stakeholders, institutions, processes and issues.

Importantly, these conflict systems are not easily separable from national-level peace and conflict dynamics. In fact, localised conflict actors and systems can shape – and in turn, are shaped by – national-level dynamics in significant ways.²⁰ However, this distinction illustrates key issues of contestation and dynamics of violence and actors that are salient at the local level. Focusing on the local allows for these to be understood in greater detail; and enables interactions between the different levels to be mapped with greater accuracy.

Key issues of contestation include conflict over natural resources, including use of water points, access to and use of land; power struggles between leaders within and between communities; and conflict over commercial assets – including cattle raiding.²¹

Inter-communal violence in South Sudan has always been a seasonal part of local dynamics. Resource pressures caused by arms proliferation, climate change and weak state structures are exacerbating localised conflicts. In some instances, local authorities have exploited disputes – even using extrajudicial execution to gain local support.²²

The implementation of the R-ARCSS continues to be delayed. This has sparked an increase in sub-national and inter-communal violence related to national political actors.²³ The appointment of state governors has faced repeated delays, leaving a power vacuum that allows violence and criminality to proceed unchecked. The delay in peace processes led to growing frustration and the

continued dwindling of resources; again leading to more localised violence. For example, in the Greater Equatoria region, deeply ingrained grievances and violent state abuses have engendered fierce ethnic animosity against the Dinka at the grassroots level.²⁴

In addition, Koch County in Unity State has witnessed many incidents of cattle raids, revenge and random killings, and the harassment of humanitarian workers. In February 2021, a group of Koch County youth raided cows from Rubkona County. When government troops and the livestock owners went to recover the cattle, five soldiers and two civilians were killed.²⁵ Continued violence between armed youth and government forces also displaced 1 300 people, and there have been reports of gender-based violence.²⁶

Key contentious issues include conflict over natural resources, commercial assets, cattle and leadership struggles

Inter-communal violence increased in Jonglei in 2020. During that time, at least 686 women and children were abducted.²⁷ Attacks undertaken by the Lou Nuer community-based militias were planned, with over 10 000 youth mobilised to raid Murle villages and cattle camps.²⁸ Dinka communities also conducted fundraising to support their militias.

Humanitarian cost

The humanitarian cost of the protracted crisis has been devastating. As of October 2021, 8.3 million people in the country are estimated to need humanitarian assistance. This includes 1.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs), almost half a million malnourished women and 1.4 million malnourished children.²⁹ Although it has become harder to quantify acute food insecurity in South Sudan given the limited the availability of recent figures,³⁰ estimates for late 2020 indicated that over 6.3 million people – over half the population – were categorised as being in crisis (Integrated Food Classification 3) or worse.³¹

As members of the Network for Innovative Resilience-Building have documented, several key changes in the

past two years have particularly affected humanitarian needs, and the ability to respond effectively.³²

First is the change in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) approach to the protection of civilians (PoC). Where the mission had previously been responsible for PoC sites, the majority of these have now been transformed into IDP camps – with the local government taking responsibility for security and protection. Some humanitarian actors had feared that this would give rise to large-scale outbreaks of violence in Unity State – yet the difficulties that some had expected did not transpire. However, signs of further fragmentation among political elites mean the possibility for conflict in the near future remains very real.

Second is the nascent return of displaced populations. Against the backdrop of the formation of the national unity government and the re-establishment of local government at different levels, participants noted small numbers of returns.

Recurring climatic shocks and stressors prompt increased humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities

As of December 2020, the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated that a total of 1.71 million people remain displaced within South Sudan (including 6% who were previously displaced abroad) and that there are now 1.73 million returnees across the country (just under a third of whom have returned from abroad, while the others were internally displaced).³³ These figures indicate that new displacements and instances of returnees are occurring simultaneously, although growth in return numbers remains modest.³⁴

Notwithstanding the profound challenges associated with ongoing displacement, network members reported that many people are experiencing limited services and support to help facilitate recovery. If return communities' needs cannot be met, they may go back to their displacement site, move on to a further location, and influence the decisions of others to return – all of which have implications for protection, integration and livelihoods.

Finally, the impact of climate change on livelihoods and food security was highlighted as a continuing source of uncertainty and humanitarian needs. In 2021 alone, an estimated 780 000 people have been reported to be affected by flooding since May; with communities in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States (among the areas most devastated by conflict) identified as the worst affected.³⁵

Beyond acute and sudden-onset crises, humanitarian actors also reported increasing challenges – for example, in accurately advising communities of when, how and what to plant. Due to climate change, seasonal patterns are increasingly unpredictable – which is exacerbated by insecurity. Recurring climatic shocks and stressors contribute to increased humanitarian needs and vulnerability in the short-term. Over the long term, there is an erosion of coping strategies related to the sale of productive assets, a depletion of household stores, and the re-orientation of livelihoods towards short-term activities that may have negative longer-term effects on sustainability.

Importantly, these impacts are experienced differently within and across households. Notably, hunger and food crises are profoundly gendered, as women and girls often bear disproportionate responsibilities for food production, collection and preparation. These roles, coupled with women's relative dependence on natural resources,³⁶ mean they are at disproportionate risk when both the security context, and livelihood activities, are unstable.

In addition to these changes in the broader context, humanitarian responses have also been affected by a range of developments, which have been mapped by network members.

First, new movement restrictions have arisen as a result of COVID-19. The mobility of humanitarian actors has been severely restricted, which has affected programme delivery. Varying access to populations has long been noted as an obstacle to addressing humanitarian needs in South Sudan. The scale of restrictions resulting from COVID-19 – and the implications for consultation by, and the accountability of humanitarian actors to affected populations – are relatively new. Such restrictions are compounded by well-documented operational constraints in South Sudan. These include ongoing

attacks on humanitarian actors, which make the country one of the most challenging contexts globally for delivering assistance.³⁷

A second major development is a reduction of funding from donors and UN agencies, which presents new obstacles to humanitarian localisation in South Sudan. Localisation refers to local ownership of humanitarian processes, including the meaningful participation and leadership of local and national humanitarian organisations. Supporting humanitarian localisation requires international actors to engage in meaningful partnership with local responders, aiming to ‘reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities.’³⁸

Contexts such as South Sudan are highly dynamic, and balancing human and material needs for sustainable resilience-building is challenging

While the humanitarian community speaks the ‘language’ of localisation, the ambition of the localisation agenda is a long way from being realised in South Sudan. Bureaucratic and administrative systems – at all levels, and across diverse actors – were identified as key barriers to funding and opportunities reaching local humanitarian organisations and researchers. Moreover, both donors and international humanitarian actors struggle to identify suitable local civil society organisations (CSOs). This is both because international actors, at times, fail to understand the potential politicisation of local civil society; and because a relatively small number of local CSOs with established international partnerships can find themselves overburdened.

Third, the challenge of planning not only for immediate needs, but also the medium and longer term, was highlighted. The urgency of responding to rapidly deteriorating humanitarian needs can hinder longer-term planning. Contexts such as South Sudan are highly dynamic, and present challenges in balancing the human and material resources required to address immediate needs with sustainable resilience-building activities over the longer term; particularly when funds are limited.

In the sections that follow, this report seeks to synthesise ‘what currently works’ in peacebuilding in South Sudan; review existing research on resilience-building in the context of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus; map persistent gaps in evidence, knowledge and learning, as identified by network members; and propose potential opportunities for innovative responses.

Building peace in South Sudan

Sustaining peace means supporting national efforts to build inclusive and people-centred peace. The concept of sustaining peace has been encapsulated by the parallel resolutions of the United Nations General

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Assembly and Security Council in April 2016. Activities in this context include 'preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.'³⁹

Peacebuilding is a broad concept that encompasses ending violence, laying the foundation for future peace, and addressing underlying structural drivers that undermine stability and reconciliation.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding the interactions between regional, national and local systems noted previously,⁴¹ for the purposes of this report, local peacebuilding refers to establishing and consolidating peace primarily centred at the sub-national level, and which engages sub-national actors, stakeholders, institutions, processes, and issues.

No single peacebuilding approach will be appropriate across local contexts in South Sudan

Two further distinctions are worth noting. First, it is essential to distinguish between initiatives that are truly 'locally owned,' those that are 'locally managed', and those that are simply 'locally implemented'.⁴² True local ownership refers to cases where local people and groups, in their own context, lead in designing the approach and setting priorities, with resource support from external actors. At the end of the spectrum, local implementation often reflects an external approach and priorities, with the expectation that these will be implemented locally. Local management, on the other hand, can encompass a greater transfer of the control and resourcing of activities to local actors, but may continue to reflect external approaches and priorities.

It is important to emphasise that the 'local' is not monolithic. Given the variety of contexts, conditions and conflict systems at the sub-national level, it must be emphasised that 'local' needs are highly diverse.⁴³ Equally, actors at a sub-national level are highly diverse. These actors are neither uniformly working for peace, nor instigating conflict.⁴⁴ As a result, no single approach or strategy will be appropriate (or effective) across all, or even many, local contexts.

Following from this definition, this section proceeds by synthesising key evidence on successes and challenges of peacebuilding approaches in South Sudan.

It is important to note, however, that a global review has found that there is limited high-quality evidence available regarding the effectiveness of most violence-reduction efforts.⁴⁵ This should be regarded as an important structural limitation on any synthesis of effective peacebuilding efforts. It also points to the importance of further research and learning on the medium- and longer-term impact of peacebuilding activities. In spite of this general limitation, several key lessons can be identified.

Lessons on success

A key lesson is to map the underlying causes of conflict, and make sure that activities reflect and respond to these. This requires an initial, in-depth analysis of the conflict, followed by subsequent, iterative conflict scans. These should be targeted and focus on specific sub-national areas, avoiding generalisation.⁴⁶

Evidence suggests that location is a critical determinant of individuals' experience and perception of conflict. For example, a conflict analysis conducted by Search for Common Ground found that access to resources like water was the most prominent driver of conflict in Tonj East County. In contrast, land disputes were more prevalent in Malakal.⁴⁷ In the absence of a detailed conflict analysis that maps the drivers and triggers of these discrete forms of conflict, peacebuilding activities are unlikely to be targeted effectively.

The principle of comprehensive conflict mapping may be widely accepted in peacebuilding. Yet evidence suggests that operationally, organisations struggle in designing peacebuilding activities that are well aligned to underlying conflict causes, while still remaining sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances.

Christian Aid offers specific considerations for good practice from lesson-learning. These include the value of a multi-level approach to conflict mapping, which engages diverse stakeholders – from conflict specialists to external organisations (where applicable), local partners and community members.⁴⁸ The analyses of diverse groups can highlight distinct issues and drivers, and may be complementary. Yet effective integration

depends on working collaboratively across partners and supporting local partners – particularly in contexts where conflict is rarely discussed openly, and/or not viewed by partners as central to ongoing work.⁴⁹

A second lesson is to work through existing community structures. In South Sudan, the inclusion of traditional leaders and people of influence in the community and local government has been documented as critical for successful grassroots peacebuilding.⁵⁰ Reports of successful peacebuilding activities under this category included capacity-building of traditional authorities, and activities to link them to local government. Other examples include involving local government officials in ceremonies and activities, dispute resolution, and gender-focused interventions in local court processes.

Among the most effective practices noted by a CARE evaluation were initiatives working with local peace champions within local government. These aimed at fostering the inclusion of grassroots voices and advocates within government policy through an adaptive training and coaching approach, accompanied by tailored lobbying and advocacy strategies.⁵¹

In qualitative interviews, however, CARE evaluators identified several barriers to women's full participation. Many disputes related to women as victims, such as forced marriages or elopements. These issues are, as a rule, referred to traditional courts – where women have a limited role or do not participate at all. A similar pattern was found for disputes relating to land ownership, which were widely seen as the responsibility of traditional authorities. Many respondents reported that peace committees made a positive contribution to the community. Though appreciated, qualitative interviews suggested that respondents saw their role as limited mainly to sensitisation and awareness-raising, rather than actively resolving conflicts.⁵² While these sensitisation functions can play a critical role, they may be poorly aligned with wider project ambitions that aim to address and resolve disputes – in part through such mechanisms.

Engagement with local institutions and systems needs to be carefully designed with community members to avoid negatively impacting these systems. For example, a cross-country, meta evaluation of local-level

peacebuilding cautioned that international NGOs, in particular, can have a negative impact in compromising, and co-opting, legitimate local structures.⁵³ The evaluation found that such entities ‘... can undermine community initiatives by co-opting them, drawing them into inappropriate activities, or providing them with forms of support on which they become over-reliant.’⁵⁴ Related to this is the way that structures and requirements of funding and projects can be conditional. Through these conditions, incentives are created for working methods to be aligned with external actors' priorities in ways that are not necessarily context-appropriate.

Third, peacebuilding activities that integrate short- and medium-term livelihood needs have documented particular success in South Sudan. Lessons can be drawn from a number of peacebuilding projects that have sought to engage directly in livelihoods and food security. For example, in a Search for Common Ground-supported project, community interlocutors and religious leaders from divided communities were facilitated to come together in dialogue.

In South Sudan, working with local leaders is critical for successful grassroots peacebuilding

Communities were supported to identify common areas of social, economic and/or livelihood priorities for both communities to ‘... build on commonalities and enhance social cohesion.’ Over a one-year period, the project reported an over three-fold increase in the number of participants who had 10 or more weekly interactions with a member of another ethnic group – with the potential that frequent, positive interactions could reduce fear and mistrust, while building mutual exchange, interdependence and social cohesion.⁵⁵

Christian Aid reflected on the value of a similar approach, documenting examples of cross-border (or ‘crossline’) peace markets supporting economic cooperation. They concluded that these instances offer various benefits, including a boost in day-to-day security; improved livelihoods and secondary impacts from these (such as health); enhanced freedom of movement; increased interaction across groups through an ‘... opening

[of] spaces for storytelling, trust-building and mutual understanding,' and the development of context-specific and locally relevant institutions for inter-group governance, conflict management and trade.⁵⁶

However, risks and limitation to this approach were also highlighted. The study emphasised the importance of considering both long-term aims and short-term interests, and the need to approach economic activity in a conflict-sensitive way. Specifically, it stated:⁵⁷

... peacebuilders must ask in this case whether the mode of economic interaction contributes to a situation where the society and the individuals within it are transforming themselves and their relationships, addressing the legacy of conflict and ensuring future tensions can be managed peacefully.

Achieving this requires moving beyond a short-term focus on economic interaction alone, to consider how conflict drivers of conflict reflect the distribution of, access to, and control over resources; and how economic activity can spur conflict. A detailed, regularly updated conflict analysis is essential to promote conflict-sensitive and integrated livelihood and peacebuilding activities.

Lessons on failures and challenges

The first lesson from challenges and failures is for peacebuilding actors to avoid focusing exclusively on 'easy win' and 'quick impact' activities – and recognise instead that peace is a long-term process. Ample time and space are critical for robust peace processes. Informal, ongoing engagement with actors over a long period of time is critical – including so-called 'spoilers' who seek to derail peace efforts. This has implications for project timelines, the resourcing of teams, and reporting: not all efforts, for example, will yield immediate, tangible deliverables.

Some of the research reviewed describes the failures of attempted local peace agreements arising from efforts with short timeframes for consultation and dialogue; shallow engagement with local leaders; and an emphasis on immediate deliverables – rather than ongoing negotiation and influencing.⁵⁸ For example, an independent mid-term evaluation of CARE's peacebuilding project in 2019 found that, overall,

ambitious targets set for numerous dialogues were not realised, and progress was slower than anticipated.

Christian Aid noted in its lessons learnt that '... too many peace initiatives still focus on the idea of a peace "conference" rather than a "peace process"'.⁵⁹ Not only do isolated, standalone events stand to have limited impact, but they can also be actively harmful when resulting in poorly considered, unenforceable or unsupported agreements. Such arrangements erode trust and cooperation across groups, rather than reinforcing it.

Peacebuilding is a long-term effort – ample time and space are critical for robust peace processes

A common lesson from various reviews is the frequent under-estimation of time and resources required for peacebuilding projects. Christian Aid found that resources were not allocated according to local realities, but often for ease or speed of implementation – citing the Evaluation of the Sudan Peace Fund, and the South Sudan Transition Initiatives Programme. A similar conclusion was reached by evaluators of a CARE programme, who found that although the project successfully established peace clubs and committees, limited monitoring (as a result, in part, of insufficient staffing) meant that impact and sustainability suffered.

This is, in part, a result of restricted or limited funding for peacebuilding activities – which is often available only for short-term 'quick-fix' solutions or one-time events, the effects of which are often limited. This phenomenon can also have particular gendered effects. Research (albeit drawing on incomplete data) indicates that women-led peacebuilding organisations are often particularly under-funded.⁶⁰ Longer-term peacebuilding engagement and support are crucial for organisations to staff and resource projects sufficiently to engage in a meaningful and more profound way. Such an approach is also required to allow for flexibility in the conflict context.

The second lesson on challenges and failures is to link peace structures both vertically and horizontally. A failure to establish linkages between peacebuilding initiatives

has been identified as a critical factor in undermining the sustainability and impact of peacebuilding initiatives. As Peace Direct found:⁶¹

Small-scale peacebuilding interventions can and do have a cumulative impact. This is especially the case when they persist over a long period of time, expand the scope of their actions, where there is a clustering effect, or when initiatives link up.

These linkages need to be established at two levels: vertically, through local to regional and national initiatives, and horizontally, through parallel projects in different locations. Strong feedback from local to national, and vice versa, is important. Misinformation and the failure to apply or translate national agreements at the local level can drive mobilisation and conflict. At the same time, national processes are unlikely to be sustainable if they do not consider local agreements and considerations.

At a minimum, agencies undertaking peacebuilding work, and donors supporting it, should be aware of the limitations of attempting to build what Boswell refers to as ‘pockets of stability’ – where vertical linkages are absent or weak.⁶² None of the local peace agreements that Boswell reviewed succeeded in establishing a local peace agreement where a national actor was a main party to the local conflict. This reflects on the difficulty of ‘... forging local peace in areas contested by national armed groups.’

Peacebuilding linkages need to be established locally, regionally and nationally through initiatives at each level

It is also important to link to existing or ongoing parallel initiatives. An example can be seen in a CARE evaluation report, which highlights a parallel local authority decree on cattle raiding at the same time as a project on peacebuilding was taking place; leading to a missed opportunity.⁶³ The most appropriate linkages or potential scaling up from one community to neighbouring or higher-level initiatives will depend on the context and need to be locally relevant; and should form an integral part of any mapping of conflict dynamics and peace initiatives.⁶⁴

To support this, initiatives will be most effective if underlying programme design is premised on a multi-level, multi-zone conflict analysis. Critically, such efforts should first consider how the conflict in a local area links to actors in neighbouring and more distant areas; and which national players are relevant to local dynamics.⁶⁵ This is important not only to promote linkages vertically (upwards to national-level initiatives) and horizontally (across to other geographic areas), but also to ensure any activity is truly conflict-sensitive and aims to do no harm. Peacebuilding can, inadvertently, serve to bolster the power of some military actors and/or create linkages between them. This can, in turn, have negative implications for peace; which makes a detailed and multi-level analysis particularly important.

Building resilience in South Sudan

In the context of cyclical, recurring shocks and stressors and deepening humanitarian needs, humanitarian actors have sought to implement approaches that not only address immediate needs, but also build resilience over time. Resilience refers to people’s ability to withstand and recover from disruptions in a durable way.⁶⁶

Three key features of resilience are relevant to peacebuilding and humanitarian responses alike. First, resilience refers to a complex and multi-dimensional concept. When defining, analysing or trying to support resilience, it therefore raises the following questions: ‘resilience of what?’, ‘resilience to what?’, and ‘resilience for whom?’.⁶⁷ When we consider resilience – whether in the face of conflict shocks or stressors, or in building resilience-oriented peacebuilding initiatives – a comprehensive approach requires an understanding of whose resilience has been eroded, and by which forces.

Second, resilience is dynamic and cannot be understood at an isolated point in time. It is preventive (in terms of the ability to anticipate), responsive (in terms of the ability to adapt) and retrospective (in terms of the ability to ‘bounce back’).⁶⁸ In the context of conflict, this focuses attention on how resilience-building strategies can better anticipate, respond and adapt to conflict shocks, and rebuild or transform in the wake of such events.

Third, although shocks and stressors are generally accepted as complex and diverse, greater attention has been paid to environmental, ecological and

climate-related shocks than crises in the broader socio-political system.⁶⁹ Consequently, the peacebuilding-resilience nexus remains relatively poorly understood, as do the specific impacts of conflict on individual, household and community resilience.

With these conditions in mind, the following section documents key learning from recent resilience literature and resilience-building initiatives in South Sudan, with a specific focus on how conflict and peace have been integrated within these.

Lessons from resilience-building in South Sudan

A first and fundamental lesson is to understand that resilient systems are not an end in themselves; nor should resilience be considered an end goal, without due consideration given to issues of justice and equality. As noted in lessons learnt from resilience-building in South Sudan by Concern Worldwide:⁷⁰

Building resilience requires equality – projects must move beyond participation of the most vulnerable towards addressing the root causes of exclusion. Future projects and programmes should tackle the root causes of social exclusion and reflect realistic timeframes to achieve change from the start.

For example, responses that support resilience in a food system that is unjust or profoundly unequal are unlikely to support a transformative agenda that addresses and prioritises the needs of the most vulnerable.⁷¹ Equally, it is possible to support and build systems that are resilient to shocks and stressors, but which will not be fundamentally transformational if they fail to address the root causes of these harms. Instead, reflecting on learning from South Sudan, Villaneuva, Itty and Swords-Daniels note that transformation depends on:⁷²

... whether [resilience-building initiatives] affect social and political structural changes, are catalytic, impacting at scale and sustainable. Programmes need to combine community-based projects with national and regional engagements to effectively influence policy and decision making.

In other words, what Hilhorst has called ‘resilience humanitarianism’ should not be pursued uncritically; where the question of ‘resilience to what?’ often implicates violence, human rights abuses, injustices and profound inequalities.⁷³ Approaches to resilience-building should instead include considerations of inclusion, equity, justice, rights and accountability in their frameworks, so that resulting resilience can also be sustainable.

Second, understanding the distinct impacts of conflict as a shock or stressor is important to understanding resilience, and related capacities. Resilience programming is increasingly designed and delivered in conflict-affected contexts. Despite this, impact and innovation in this area continue to be limited by a lack of robust evidence on programming in such contexts



generally, and on resilience-building responses in conflict specifically.⁷⁴ As Maxwell *et al.* note:⁷⁵

While some investments in resilience have been made in conflict-affected areas, coming to grips with conflict is clearly a major priority for resilience policy and programming, and probably presents the biggest challenges ...

Conflict plays a central role in undermining individual, household and community resilience. Despite this, very few resilience measurement frameworks to date have directly, actively and explicitly integrated conflict measures. One example where this has been achieved is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation's Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis model (also called RIMA-II), which contains a module on conflict shocks and measurement.⁷⁶ Yet the extent to which this model or similar ones are used to capture specific conflict impacts and particular resilience capacities varies greatly.

Conflict plays a central role in undermining individual, household and community resilience

Early conceptions of shocks and stressors in resilience, disaster recovery and humanitarian response literature often conceive of 'external shocks' as floods, earthquakes or climate change; which are influenced by human behaviour but can have other causes. Violent conflict, on the other hand, is fundamentally a function of human processes, rooted in 'internal' behaviour and relationships.⁷⁷

Moreover, the strategies adopted to cope with shocks and stressors in the face of conflict may differ to those adopted in peacetime, in response to other disruptions.⁷⁸ This may be because the consequences of conflict differ – where the destruction of livelihoods and assets, and mass forced displacement, are not always effects of other shocks. It may also be because strategies aimed at bolstering resilience to environmental shocks (for example – such as the accumulation of assets or investment in human capital) can render people *more* rather than less vulnerable to violence.

Third, and related, resilience-building approaches benefit from explicit and consistent attention to conflict and conflict-sensitivity in their design and activities. Insecurity and violence often constitute part of 'the everyday practice of programme teams in such contexts.'⁷⁹ Yet programmes can nevertheless fail to explicitly acknowledge and address conflict factors.⁸⁰ Large-scale reviews of key resilience programmes in conflict-affected contexts have identified a common tendency for conflict sensitivity to be integrated in an ad hoc way through 'learning by doing' – rather than being instituted as standard practice.⁸¹

This can arise due to a tendency to use conflict analysis, mapping and sensitivity tools primarily in the design stage, rather than having these components form part of ongoing and iterative scanning activities.⁸² Another scenario which justifies an iterative process is when an increasingly diverse range of tools are drawn on by humanitarians seeking to balance different – and sometimes, competing – demands and priorities.⁸³

Other constraints that shape the extent to which conflict is explicitly addressed in resilience programming can arise from a lack of familiarity with conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution. This is particularly relevant to instances where partners have strong technical skills, which they view as aligned to their core areas of work.⁸⁴ The ability to be flexible and adapt tools to local conditions and programmes is vital.⁸⁵ Yet a degree of consistency in analysis and approach is important. This, along with the explicit acknowledgement of conflict within programme design and ongoing monitoring, is critical in institutionalising conflict-sensitive practices.

Looking ahead: opportunities for innovation

To identify particular opportunities for future innovation, this section begins by mapping ongoing evidence, knowledge and learning gaps identified by network members. Next, it identifies a particular opportunity for innovation in response, as identified in the course of the network's activities.

Evidence, knowledge and learning gaps

Network members mapped key gaps in evidence, knowledge and learning throughout the project. The first gaps identified concerned conflict dynamics

and peacebuilding, including the differential impacts of conflict shocks. Specifically, gaps were identified in understanding how different types of conflict have differing effects on individuals, households and communities.

To date, many resilience-building initiatives consider the wider conflict context in which initiatives take place. Yet such initiatives may not sufficiently specify the precise impacts of different shocks and stressors, including conflict, nor sufficiently understand how different shocks and stressors necessitate differing resilience capacities.⁸⁶

Translating existing early-warning systems into operational planning and response is a major hurdle

Similarly, spikes and conflict triggers were also raised as areas for further study with clear operational impact. Network members reported that early-warning signs of triggers and spikes in conflict – and how these can be prevented from spilling over into active conflict – remain poorly understood. Numerous initiatives exist to track and monitor conflict. Network members nevertheless reported challenges in translating existing early-warning systems into operational planning and response. This reflects a gap in how these systems are applied at the local and operational level.

More widely, the long-term impact of local-level peacebuilding remains poorly understood. As with the broader literature on peacebuilding impact,⁸⁷ many evaluations and studies focus mostly on outcomes within the life cycle of projects.

A second gap in existing knowledge was highlighted in the interaction between different scales and types of conflict, local and national food systems, and resulting food security. Reflecting on the extraordinarily high levels of food insecurity in the country at present, and the rapidly evolving context, network members emphasised that past evidence and knowledge may no longer hold.

Operationally, accessing essential and basic information continues to pose challenges, which further limits understanding and effective response. For example, network partners reported challenges in communities

and responders accessing reliable, local meteorological data.⁸⁸ Additionally, international systems for providing food security statistics broke down in South Sudan over the period of the network's exchanges.⁸⁹

Third, the area of land issues was highlighted, particularly in the context of ongoing displacement and return. With small-scale returns already underway, the potential for large-scale returns and movement to urban areas could trigger more violence in South Sudan.

Drawing on learning from response in other regional contexts, network members noted that 'durable solutions' as an approach can be extremely practical and effective if given enough time and funding.⁹⁰ The R-ARCSS recognises that South Sudan's legal framework with regard to land is problematic and requires reform.⁹¹ Nevertheless, network dialogues highlighted that when the government stakeholders lead efforts, the implications of this approach for the social contract between populations and other stakeholders – including other armed groups or customary authorities – are relatively poorly understood.

Gender, hunger and peacebuilding

The network's activities focused on efforts to identify, map and propose innovative approaches that draw on the body of evidence on peacebuilding and humanitarian resilience-building, alongside the gaps and challenges mapped by network members. The authors identified a focus area at the intersection of these themes, namely the strengthening of provisions in peacebuilding activities to address the gendered dimensions of conflict-driven hunger. This proposed innovation also integrates questions of justice and equality, and is located at the intersection of three strands of current research and policymaking.

Extensive research has been carried out on peacebuilding, gender and hunger in humanitarian crises. Yet only limited scholarship has explored the interface of these issues, and robustly mapped how they intersect in peacebuilding policy and practice. In particular, research has extensively documented the multifaceted ways in which conflict, insecurity and peacebuilding are profoundly gendered. This includes analysis of how structural inequalities fuel driving conflict;⁹² the wide-ranging gendered harms

experienced by women, girls, men, boys and gender minorities during conflict;⁹³ and the limited role that diverse groups of women and gender minorities continue to play in peacebuilding processes – particularly at a leadership level.⁹⁴

As previously noted, hunger and food crises are also deeply gendered. Women and girls often bear disproportionate responsibility for food production, collection and preparation, meaning they often put themselves at grave risk when cultivating food.⁹⁵ Research shows that women and girls are also more likely to deny food to themselves (and other female family members) to meet the needs of men and boys.⁹⁶

While some studies have suggested that conflict and insecurity can transform gender norms, women nevertheless face systematic imbalances in land and property rights. This can profoundly affect livelihoods and food security in periods of recovery.⁹⁷ Gendered vulnerabilities in conflict and insecurity also poses broader implications. Conflict often disrupts girls' education, for instance, triggering cascade effects – as higher female education has been shown to improve nutrition for all household members.⁹⁸

There is a disconnect between priorities for women and planning for their needs in policy frameworks

Lastly, there is also extensive research on the role of conflict and insecurity in driving hunger, and increasing attention is being paid to the strategic leveraging of food and food systems – including through the deliberate targeting of food and humanitarian systems in South Sudan.⁹⁹ However, there is less research on the integration of hunger and food rights in peacebuilding, and what has been documented is generally not comprehensively mapped or analysed.

Various studies have explored the role of food assistance in building social capital, and through this, contributing to peace.¹⁰⁰ Elsewhere, research has considered the role of land and natural resources in peacebuilding.¹⁰¹ While these are inextricably linked to food security and gender inequality, particularly in rural areas, few studies have explored their integration in peace agreements.

The intersection of the gendered dimensions of hunger and food rights in peacebuilding clearly merits additional research and programming activities. To date, scholars have highlighted addressing women's food security and nutrition priorities and laying the groundwork for peace;¹⁰² parallels between advocacy and accountability initiatives on gender-based violence and starvation crimes;¹⁰³ and attention to potential synergies between UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2417 as mutually reinforcing.¹⁰⁴ However, overall, there has been a relative paucity of linkages forged between conflict and hunger, and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

In the context of South Sudan, these issues have particular salience, and have already been identified as key priorities for women. The National Action Plan (NAP) on Women Peace and Security (2015–2000) explicitly notes:¹⁰⁵

... even in the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005], women's critical concerns – such as, human, economic, political and social security, health issues, including reproductive health, property rights, food security, access to justice and sustainable livelihood opportunities – were not addressed ...

Moreover, the NAP recognises the gendered risks of food cultivation and preparation falling largely on women, as well as the need for strengthened human rights monitoring and accountability (including the right to food security), by the South Sudan Human Rights Commission.¹⁰⁶ In spite of this explicit recognition, the R-ARCSS largely limits references to food security to provisions concerning cantonment and disengagement (Article 2.2.2), and broadly provides for the establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (Article 1.11.1.7).

Gender, meanwhile, is primarily referenced in terms of sexual and gender-based violence (articles 2.1.10.2 and 5.3.2.1.4.), protection (Article 2.1.10.7.5), and the establishment of a gender and youth cluster of ministries (Article 1.10.6). This disconnect between recognised priorities for women – including food security and sustainable livelihood opportunities – and their relative neglect in subsequent agreement suggests a deeper misalignment between policy and peace frameworks at the national level.

Attention to the gendered dimensions of conflict-driven food crises in peacebuilding integrates several of the lessons learnt mapped earlier in this report. This includes the importance of considering issues of justice, rights and long-term drivers of crisis in responses; the value of activities at the intersection of peacebuilding and short- to medium-term livelihood supports; and the importance of understanding – and acting upon – the distinct impacts of conflict on immediate needs and resilience capacities.

Efforts to map and identify the extent to which – and how, and under what conditions – these have been integrated in peacebuilding would be valuable both to research in this field, and to the activities of operational agencies. We contend that the gendered dimensions of conflict-driven hunger have so far been overlooked in peacebuilding, and that this represents a clear and promising opportunity for innovation in both peacebuilding and humanitarian practice.

Conclusion

This report set out to synthesise the work of the Network for Innovative Resilience-Building in South Sudan. The ultimate aim of the network is to contribute to reducing humanitarian need, and strengthening resilience and conditions for durable, inclusive peace in South Sudan.

Over the past two years, the network facilitated the exchange of ideas and relationship-building and research among research, policy and humanitarian experts working on violent conflict, humanitarian resilience, women's empowerment and political and economic transformation in South Sudan. The resulting report synthesised the key outcomes of the network's exchanges.

Particular attention has been paid to the importance of understanding the unique dynamics and drivers of conflict; avoiding quick-impact and short-term activities in place of processes that support longer-term peace outcomes; and carefully considering issues of equality and justice in resilience-building.

In light of these considerations – and current gaps in knowledge, evidence and learning – the authors identified a particular opportunity around the gendered dimensions of conflict-driven food crises, and

violations of food rights, in the peacebuilding context. This nexus merits further research, policy development and programming.

Recommendations

Drawing on the insights of the network's scoping review and dialogues, a series of recommendations are presented below.

For the Transitional Government of National Unity

- The government should, through consultation with civil society, adopt a strategy to address the gendered impact of the conflict-driven food crises. Working with civil society, the government could map existing challenges and provide steps to strengthen community-led projects.
- Some existing national policies – including on security and peace – explicitly acknowledge the gendered dimensions of hunger and food rights. In these instances, policy actors – including national, regional and international – should play a more active role in promoting coherence between policies and national peace agreements. This can help to ensure greater inclusion of diverse perspectives, and alignment with diverse priorities and conceptions of peace.
- A gender-sensitive food security programme should be developed with local and international actors, built on robust context and conflict analysis. The government alone cannot resolve the issue of food insecurity. Having both internal and external partners working together could help in developing a workable implementation strategy.
- In order to establish a semblance of stability, the government should prioritise security sector reform with a clear focus on human security.

For donor and aid agencies

- Donor and aid agencies should support initiatives which regard peacebuilding as a long-term investment. Targeted, predictable and flexible support for community-led activities is vital to ensure peacebuilding activities are locally led, well-designed, aligned with local realities and likely to deliver medium- to longer-term impact.
- Operational agencies continue to report short-term, relatively inflexible funding mechanisms as an obstacle

to more sustainable, and ultimately transformative, responses to conflict and related humanitarian impacts. It is therefore vital that donors and aid agencies fund and support initiatives that don't just acknowledge this principle, but also reflect it in practice.

- Support should be prioritised for approaches that can strengthen livelihoods, and help consolidate coherence in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. This can be achieved by supporting programming that promotes medium- to longer-term livelihood strengthening and economic recovery. The evidence reviewed highlighted particular successes in local-level peacebuilding initiatives that integrated both livelihood-strengthening and social cohesion components. Greater investment in such approaches – cognisant of wider learning on good practice in peacebuilding – is a promising avenue that can help address both immediate and longer-term needs in communities.

Resilience-building initiatives should prioritise equality, justice and harm reduction, and consider the gendered dimensions of hunger in conflict

- Resilience-building initiatives that explicitly acknowledge, and account for, conflict as a distinct shock and stressor should be supported. To date, relatively few resilience models account for the distinct impacts of conflict on household and community resilience – in spite of increased resilience programming in conflict-affected contexts. Moreover, an uncritical focus on resilience as an outcome of such programmes in itself should be avoided. Rather, initiatives that seek to address underlying drivers of shocks and stressors should be prioritised to enhance equality and justice, rather than harm minimisation alone.

Peacebuilding and humanitarian actors

- Peacebuilding and humanitarian actors should undertake in-depth and up-to-date conflict mapping at the local level to make sense of underlying drivers, proximate triggers and specific conflict (de-)escalation processes. While this principle is widely accepted in peacebuilding approaches, the evidence reviewed indicates that operational agencies may nevertheless struggle to prioritise and resource conflict analyses as part of ongoing programming. This poses implications for the potential impact and success of such initiatives. Where linkages with national and other local initiatives are weak, opportunities for coordinated conflict mapping across multiple actors should be considered.
- Peace processes in communities should be prioritised over standalone, quick impact peace activities like conferences and dialogues. Such activities risk undermining prospects for peace if poorly aligned with local priorities and needs.



RESEARCH GAPS SHOULD ADDRESS GENDER EQUALITY AND FOOD SECURITY IN PEACEBUILDING

- Evidence from existing programming suggests that activities that support livelihoods, exchange and trust-building across divided communities can offer practical approaches to integrated peacebuilding. These also present opportunities to integrate marginalised groups, and address the particular harms and violations experienced, for example, by women and girls in the current food crisis. Ample time and space should be allowed for extensive informal engagement with peace and conflict actors over time. This has implications for resourcing, staffing and reporting. Organisations should leverage multi-year, flexible funding for peacebuilding activities where available, and communicate the importance of peacebuilding outcomes in advocacy and donor engagement.
- Resilience-building activities should be designed and delivered in a way that integrates an explicit focus on equality and justice, rather than treating resilience as an outcome in itself. In the context of conflict and ongoing crisis, attention to the underlying drivers – rather than adapting to and reducing harm experienced by shocks and stressors alone – is fundamental to transformation. Consistent, and explicit, attention to conflict sensitivity in programme design, activities and tools is important. This will help to ensure that the specific impacts of conflict on resilience and particular resilience capacities are well understood and accounted for.

Research community

- The focus of research should be expanded to include the long-term impact of local-level peacebuilding. Most existing studies focus on end-line outcomes within the life cycle of specific peacebuilding projects. Wider impacts and long-term legacies have been more rarely recorded and analysed. This is a common characteristic of evaluations of peacebuilding programmes, documented across a range of contexts.

Yet the dearth of evidence in this regard may be particularly harmful in contexts of ongoing, protracted crisis, where a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of projects could usefully inform further – and future – local-level peacebuilding, even in the context of wider insecurity.

Resilience-building should integrate equality and justice rather than treating resilience as an outcome

- Research and evidence gaps should be addressed at the interface of gender equality and food security in peacebuilding. The gendered dimensions of both conflict-driven hunger, and conflict and peacebuilding more widely, are widely recognised. Yet research exploring the potential to strengthen provisions in peacebuilding to address the gendered dimensions of food crisis specifically remains limited. There would be substantial value in exploring the feasibility of provisions that boost sustainable livelihoods and food security, while addressing and strengthening the protection of food rights for women and girls.
- In light of the drastic transformation of the economic, political and social environment in the past year, research should be conducted to analyse the differential impacts of discrete shocks and stressors – and their cumulative effect – on household and community resilience. The current context is characterised by a global health crisis, shifting political and conflict dynamics, and mounting food crises. Against this backdrop, a clearer understanding of the diverse ways in which different and combined shocks and stressors affect individuals, households and communities is important for long-term resilience-building.

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
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About the authors

Caitriona Dowd is an Assistant Professor in Security Studies at Dublin City University. Her research focuses on conflict and humanitarian crises and she has a PhD from the University of Sussex.

Liezelle Kumalo is a Researcher in the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding programme at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. She has a Master's degree in international relations.

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