

SOUTH AFRICAN CRIME QUARTERLY



The direct cost to government of alcohol abuse

The reliability of violent crime statistics

When measuring performance undermines police effectiveness

Police training on domestic violence

Interview with Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane



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Editorial

Welcome to the first edition of *SA Crime Quarterly* for 2010. This promises to be an exciting year, for a number of reasons. Of course the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament will be a particular highlight. During June/July the world's attention will be focused on South Africa and everything the country has to offer. In *SA Crime Quarterly* 29 Burger and Omar (September 2009) assessed security preparations for the World Cup and there is little doubt that we will do a post mortem of event security later this year.

This is also an exciting year for the Crime and Justice Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. We intend embarking on a number of new projects to enhance policy making and public insights into crime, criminal justice and social crime prevention in South Africa. More on these initiatives will be presented in future editions of *SA Crime Quarterly*.

This edition kicks off with a look at one part of a social crime prevention initiative to reduce violence through addressing alcohol abuse. Debbie Budlender from the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) presents the findings of research that estimated the direct revenue costs and benefits of alcohol abuse to national and provincial government departments involved in safety and security. Alcohol abuse is a well-known risk factor for many violent crimes in South Africa. Establishing its real cost to government can be a powerful method for advocating for the development of appropriate policies that can reduce the extent to which alcohol abuse facilitates crime and violence in our society.

The four remaining articles are focused on matters relating to policing. In his article, David Bruce from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) addresses the peculiarities that he has identified in the official SAPS statistics on violent crime. He argues that certain statistical trends can be explained by the incentives that have emerged from the ambitious crime reduction targets set by government, coupled with shortcomings in the current police performance management system. It may be about time that we recognise that crime statistics are not an accurate measure of police performance, but rather an indication of the crime challenges we face. This could lead to more accurate and transparent crime statistics that would better enable all of us to collectively work towards improving our safety.

Andrew Faull from the Institute for Security Studies further examines the unintended negative consequences that have emerged from the SAPS performance management system. He gives a range of practical examples to show how the need for police officials to meet prescribed performance targets has the effect of encouraging behaviour and practices that are at odds with the overall purpose of policing and, in some cases, the law. He argues that it would be better to assess police against their legitimacy in society if they are to remain beholden to their core function of improving security through reducing crime in our various communities.

In their article on police training on the domestic violence legislation, Hélène Combrinck and Lorenzo Wakefield from the University of the Western Cape present research that has shown the training to be relatively ineffective. They point out that this has to do with shortcomings in the training methodology, which does little to assist police officials to understand how to practically apply the law. Their findings could have a broader implication for methodologies in police training, especially if it is to improve the effectiveness of the police.

This edition ends with an interview with new national secretary of police, Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane. She provides insight into the changes that are being driven by the minister of police to improve civilian oversight of policing in the form of the National Secretariat of Police. The move to strengthen the policy development capacity and partnership approach of this important structure is certainly good news and could lead to much needed improvements in policing in South Africa.

I hope that this edition of *SA Crime Quarterly* provides you with insights, and provokes debate. Please contact us with your comments and thoughts as we value your feedback. I wish you all the best for 2010.

Gareth Newham

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Money down the drain

The direct cost to government of alcohol abuse

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Soul City has recently embarked on a multi-year campaign that aims to prevent and reduce violence through focusing on alcohol abuse. This article describes an exercise commissioned by Soul City to estimate the expenditure allocations and expected revenue of national and provincial government departments in South Africa that can be attributed to alcohol abuse. The article highlights, in particular, the estimates derived for the security-related departments, namely Safety and Security, Correctional Services, Justice and Constitutional Development, and the national and provincial departments responsible for policing. The article concludes with suggestions regarding areas that would benefit from further investigation.

Soul City, the well-known South African multi-media health promotion and social change project, has recently embarked on a multi-year campaign that aims to prevent and reduce violence through focusing on alcohol abuse. As part of the preparation for this campaign, Soul City commissioned a study to estimate the spending and revenue of South Africa's national and provincial governments that could be related to alcohol abuse. The estimate was to include budget allocations that aim to deal with the consequences of alcohol abuse (such as expenditure of departments of health), as well as allocations that aim to reduce the extent of alcohol abuse and its negative consequences (such as Drive Alive campaigns of provincial traffic authorities). This article highlights some of the key findings of the budget study.

GENERAL APPROACH

The estimation exercise did not attempt to calculate the full cost of alcohol abuse to society. Instead it focused only on the costs reflected in government

budget allocations. It did not look, for example, at the costs incurred by private companies, or by households. Single et al note that estimates in other countries suggest that the money that government spends on policy-related costs such as treatment, enforcement, prevention and research in relation to drug abuse amounts to only about five per cent of even a narrow definition of the full costs incurred by society.¹ The estimates given in this article thus represent only a fraction of the true cost that alcohol abuse imposes on society.

The Soul City exercise also did not look at what government should spend, but instead on what government actually allocated in the 2009-10 financial year.

Estimating the amounts allocated by government on account of alcohol abuse is not a simple exercise. There may be a few allocations that focus directly on alcohol abuse, such as money for anti-alcohol awareness-raising initiatives or research. However, even here there are challenges, as publicly available

budget documents may not provide the detailed breakdowns that allow the projects or initiatives directly related to alcohol to be separated out.

Beyond the focused allocations, government also incurs expenses within general allocations such as those for enforcing the law, punishing offenders, providing treatment for health problems, and welfare and other services for those negatively affected by alcohol abuse. The challenge here is that the government agencies responsible for these functions do not allocate separate amounts for the police, magistrates, nurses, prison warders and other officials who deal with alcohol abuse. Instead, 'general' police, magistrates, nurses and prison warders deal with problems resulting from alcohol abuse alongside dealing with problems arising from a host of other reasons. For these areas we therefore have to estimate the proportion of time and other resources that is attributable to alcohol abuse. The Soul City study details the research or other information on which each such estimate is based. Some of the assumptions may well be challenged. By providing full details of the source and assumptions, the study laid the basis for future refinement of the overall estimate.

After discussion with experts, the following departments were included in the study:

- Health (national and provincial)
- Social Development (national and provincial)
- Safety and Security (national and provincial)
- Justice and Constitutional Development (national)
- Correctional Services (national)
- Transport (provincial)
- Economic Development (provincial)

This article focuses on the security-related departments. It is, however, not only these departments that have allocations related to crime. For example, each of the nine provincial departments of Social Development has sub-programmes related to crime prevention and support as well as to victim empowerment. To the extent that we acknowledge traffic infringements as crimes, the sub-programmes of the provincial departments responsible for traffic enforcement also deal with crime.

In addition to expenditure, there are some revenues that accrue to government on account of alcohol abuse (or use). Firstly, there are the fees paid to provincial governments for liquor licences. Secondly, there are the excise duties paid in respect of alcohol. Thirdly, there is the value-added tax (VAT) generated through sale of alcohol. The Soul City exercise included estimates for all these revenue sources. It did not include estimates in respect of income tax paid by those employed in the liquor industry.

SOURCES

The primary source for the estimates was the government's publicly available budget-related documentation. In particular, the paper draws on the budget numbers published in the annual national estimates of expenditure and provincial budget statements that are tabled in the legislatures on budget days. Each of the chapters of these provincial and national documents details the budget allocated for a particular 'vote', which is for the most part equivalent to a government department. Within each vote, the chapter disaggregates the budget estimates first into programmes, of which there are typically about five for each vote. Each programme budget is then further disaggregated into sub-programmes, which can number as few as one per programme, or, in a few instances, more than ten.

South Africa's budget documents include fairly extensive narratives alongside the budget numbers. This narrative assists in understanding what particular sub-programmes cover. The narrative also provides an indication of issues that the department concerned considers most important.

In addition to the budget documents, the estimation drew on reports of diverse research initiatives. These research documents helped in determining the proportion of each sub-programme budget that might be considered attributable to alcohol abuse. In addition, the initiative drew on information offered through interviews, e-mails and short discussions with many people.

THE OVERALL PICTURE

The estimation exercise suggested that provincial governments allocated a total of close on R7 billion in 2009/10 on account of alcohol abuse, while national government allocated more than R10 billion. Against these amounts, we can offset the revenue gained through value-added tax on alcohol sales and liquor licenses to arrive at a net expenditure of more than R1 billion.

The national and provincial departments of health accounted for R6 804,8m (35 per cent of total expenditure), with Safety and Security following close behind at R5 807,5m (34 per cent of the total). Correctional Services was the third largest contributor, at R3 355m (20 per cent of the total).

SECTORAL ESTIMATES

Safety and security

For Safety and Security we included sub-programmes that involve active policing and investigation. We included the forensic science laboratory, despite it being a support service, because of the role it might play in linking particular criminal acts with alcohol. We drew on crime statistics patterns as the basis for the percentage attribution. These are different from patterns in respect of prisoners, as some crimes are more likely than others to result in imprisonment.

Official police crime statistics for the period April 2008 to March 2009 show 36 per cent of reported crime falling in the category of contact crimes (crimes against the person), 7 per cent in the category contact-related (arson and malicious damage to property), 25 per cent property-related, 9 per cent crime 'heavily dependent on police action for detection', 22 per cent 'other serious crime' and 2 per cent 'other crime categories'. Within the category of crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection, are driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (4 per cent of the overall total), and drug-related crime (4 per cent of the total). The category 'other crime categories' includes culpable homicide and neglect and ill treatment of children, while 'other serious crime'

includes theft, commercial crime and shoplifting.²

Anecdotally, it seems that police attribute exceptionally high proportions of crime to alcohol abuse. Thus in a workshop with 20 priority precinct station commanders in the Western Cape during early 2009, participants agreed that at least 90 per cent of violent crimes were linked to alcohol.³

We assumed that contact crimes, crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection, and 'other crime categories' are most likely to have a link to alcohol abuse. For contact crimes, which include murder and sexual offences, we assumed 22,5 per cent are related to alcohol abuse. We based this proportion on the 55 per cent of cases in which murder accused are found to test positive for alcohol in the blood, but halved this percentage to acknowledge that alcohol would not have been the cause of the crime in all these instances. For crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection we assumed 50 per cent were related to alcohol abuse. For 'other crime categories' we assumed the same percentage as for contact crimes. Assuming further that each reported crime takes up the same amount of police resources, we then allocated 24 per cent of the police allocations for alcohol. This final assumption is unrealistic as one assumes that more resources will be used on a murder case than on one of shoplifting. However, we do not have any information on which to base a differential weighting of the different types of cases.

Table 1: Allocations by safety and security (Rm)

Sub-programme	Allocation
Prog 2: Visible policing	
2.1 Crime prevention	17 269,4
Prog 3: Detective services	
3.1 Crime investigation	6 430,4
3.3 Forensic science laboratory	498,0

After applying the relevant percentages discussed above, the figure attributable to alcohol abuse in the national safety and security budget for 2009/10 would be R5 807,4m.

Community safety and social crime prevention

At provincial level the departments responsible for safety and security have different names, and the programmes and sub-programmes are also diverse. The sub-programmes selected for the exercise are those that focus on social crimes, which we assumed to have a particular focus on violence against women and children. Community liaison and related sub-programmes also cover community police forums (CPFs) and the bulk of the funds allocated for these sub-programmes might well go towards this purpose. We included the sub-programmes because some of the CPF work will focus on social crime prevention, but the proportion is probably relatively small.

Donson & Marais, in their study of injuries reported to three rural hospitals in the Western Cape, find that 70 per cent of injuries sustained through intimate partner violence were reported to be alcohol-related, as were two thirds of injuries from male-on-female violence more generally.⁴ (Male-on-male violence accounts for the overwhelming majority of violence discussed elsewhere in this report in respect of murder and assault). We assumed a proportion of 35 per cent for these sub-programmes in acknowledgement of the fact that the focus is not solely on violence against women and children, and that other crimes might well have some link to alcohol.

For the community liaison sub-programmes we allocated a much smaller two per cent to acknowledge that there is likely to be some focus, but not a significant one, within CPF work on alcohol abuse. The fact that few of the narratives in the provincial budget statements explicitly mention alcohol supports the assumption that there is not a significant focus on this issue. However, the Gauteng budget statement does note that the Ikhaya Lethembu sub-programme provides services for survivors of violence against women and children, and that activities include prevention programmes on violence against women and children, and men acting as a network of safety protectors. The Gauteng sub-programme also provides for schools-based initiatives on substance

abuse prevention and promotion of substance abuse prevention through youth desks. The KwaZulu-Natal statement refers to awareness campaigns on substance abuse and violence against women.

Where a sub-programme is likely to deal with both social crime prevention and community liaison we allocated 18,5 per cent, half the sum of two per cent and 35 per cent. However, the names of the sub-programmes and the accompanying narratives often do not indicate at all clearly what a sub-programme covers. The proportions are thus 'best guesses'.

The total figure attributable to alcohol abuse in the provincial community safety budgets was estimated at R43,9m.

Justice and constitutional development

For justice and constitutional development we included the lower courts' sub-programme, as general crimes are tried in these courts.

Leggett reports that among arrestees in three metros of South Africa, nearly a quarter were arrested for property crimes, 20 per cent for violent crimes, 16 per cent for substance-related crimes, and 40 per cent for 'other' crimes.⁵ Illegal immigrants accounted for a large proportion of the last-named category. Half of the arrestees who were surveyed reported that they used alcohol or tobacco. Close on 20 per cent reported that they were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged offence, but Leggett suggests that this might be an exaggeration as some might have claimed this to explain their behaviour. We used a proportion of ten per cent in acknowledgement of possible exaggeration as well as the fact that being under the influence of alcohol was not necessarily the cause of their committing the crime.

The public prosecutions sub-programme under the National Prosecuting Authority is included because the focus is on sexual offences and community affairs alongside priority crimes and specialised commercial crime. This sub-programme is, however, also responsible for other issues. Thus the 2009/10 budget document states that in 2007/08 the service finalised 1 043 857 cases, including

diversions, while the regional courts dedicated to sexual offences finalised 'only' 4 365 cases, the Specialised Commercial Crime Unit finalised 3 031 cases, the Directorate of Special Operations resolved 178 investigations and the Asset Forfeiture Unit finalised 223 cases. We assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that 20 per cent of the resources are spent on sexual offences and community affairs, and applied the 25 per cent used previously for victim empowerment to this 20 per cent, getting a resultant proportion of five per cent for this sub-programme.

The witness protection programme is included because those covered include witnesses for domestic violence cases. We used a lower percentage of two per cent here on the assumption that only a small proportion of those in this programme are involved in domestic violence cases.

Table 2: Allocations by justice and constitutional development (Rm)

Sub-programme	Allocation
Prog 2: Court services	
2.5 Lower courts	2 559,3
Prog 4: National Prosecuting Authority	
4.1 Public prosecutions	1 532,8
4.2 Witness protection programme	130,1

After applying the relevant percentages discussed above, the figure attributable to alcohol abuse in the national justice and constitutional development budget for 2009/10 would be R335,2m.

Correctional services

In the correctional services budget, unlike that of other departments, most programmes consist of only one sub-programme. The corrections programme involves the accommodation of inmates. Care provides for inmates' welfare, including anti-retrovirals and moral regeneration programmes for staff and inmates. Development provides for the education and training of inmates. Social integration aims to prepare inmates for reintegration into ordinary society through

probation and parole. We also include the allocation for the public-private partnership whereby private companies provide and manage prisons for the department on the basis that the service provided is similar to that in a programme such as corrections.

All offenders at the two private prisons reportedly have risk assessment forms that indicate the role that alcohol abuse played in the crimes they committed. Unfortunately, however, these forms have not to date been analysed to give an overall profile.⁶

According to the *Estimates of National Expenditure*, virtually all sub-programme allocations are based on staff and inmate population. If we base the proportion attributed to alcohol on the proportion of inmates thought to be incarcerated on account of crimes related to alcohol abuse, then the same proportion could arguably be used for all the programmes listed below, as well as for the sub-programme related to prisons run by private companies through public-private partnerships. We use the same logic and approach described above in respect of crime prevention services under social development, but apply the calculations to all prisoners, whether already sentenced or not. The calculation yields an attributable proportion of 38,5 per cent.

One might want to include some amount reflecting expenditure incurred in initiatives to help inmates overcome their addiction. Knowledgeable informants felt that such initiatives were rare. When respondents in Muntingh's small qualitative study of ex-prisoners of Western Cape prisons were asked if they participated in any programmes while they were imprisoned, the pre-release programme run by the Department of Correctional Services was the most frequently identified programme.⁷ Eight ex-prisoners said that they attended drug abuse programmes and three reported attending Alcoholics Anonymous. It is not clear if this occurred while they were incarcerated. According to the department, all substance abuse programmes for imprisoned offenders form part of other programmes and do not have a separate budget allocation.⁸ The Judicial

Inspectorate plans to conduct a full audit of all programmes on offer in correction centres over the next five months, and this audit should provide better information for future estimates.⁹

Table 3: Allocations by correctional services (Rm)

Sub-programme	Allocation
Prog 2: Security	4 425,3
Prog 3: Corrections	1 112,1
Prog 4: Care	1 591,8
Prog 5: Development	448,7
Prog 6: Social reintegration	425,9
Prog 7: Facilities	
7.1 Public private partnership prisons	710,4

After applying the relevant percentages discussed above, the figure attributable to alcohol abuse in the national correctional services budget for 2009/10 would be R3 355m.

GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article highlights some of the findings of the first known attempt in South Africa to arrive at an overall estimate of the costs incurred by government on account of alcohol abuse. The estimate is made up of a large number of sub-estimates, some of which are, unfortunately, based on assumptions that could have a wide margin of error. It will never be possible to arrive at an exact estimate, given that most of the expenditure occurs within general allocations rather than being specifically targeted at alcohol abuse. There are, however, several areas where there is weak information and which seem to merit further investigation, given their potential importance in terms of numbers involved as well as opportunities for expanding on what is currently being done. The areas include:

- Employee assistance programmes for civil servants: The amounts allocated for these programmes, and the extent to which they address alcohol abuse
- Alcohol and the criminal justice system: The extent to which crime can be attributed to alcohol abuse, the amounts allocated to

programmes addressing alcohol abuse within prisons, and the number of prisoners attending such programmes

- Traffic management: The proportions of offences and fines related to alcohol abuse, and initiatives undertaken to combat alcohol abuse
- Community safety: Initiatives undertaken by community policing forums and similar initiatives to combat alcohol abuse
- Disability: The extent to which disability, as reflected in disability grant recipients and among those benefiting from social services, is linked to alcohol abuse.

Finally, we note that the estimations were based as much as possible on credible research. The aim was not to arrive at a figure that was as large and 'shocking' as possible. Shocking figures attract media attention, but they are too easily discredited, bringing other related research and advocacy into question. The problem of alcohol abuse is serious enough in South Africa – we do not need to exaggerate to show the importance of addressing the problem.



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<http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php>

NOTES

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‘The ones in the pile were the ones going down’¹

The reliability of violent crime statistics

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Following an announcement in 2004 by the South African government that in the coming years it would endeavour to reduce violent crime by seven to ten per cent per annum, total levels of violent crime dropped by 25 per cent over the next five years. However, a closer look at the crime statistics over this period reveals a number of peculiarities that require explanation. In recent years there have also been numerous press reports on the manipulation of crime statistics that have highlighted the existence of incentives within the SAPS not to record violent crime. This article argues that the identified peculiarities in crime statistics can be understood as linked to non-recording, which is shaped by a hierarchy of violent crime in which some categories of crime are viewed as important while others are viewed as unimportant. This implies that current violent crime statistics cannot be relied on as an indicator of trends in violent crime.

During 2004 the South African government announced that in the coming years it would endeavour to reduce violent crime by seven to ten per cent per annum. Over the following five years there was a steep decrease of 25 per cent in the overall level of violent crime in South Africa as measured by the total number of incidents of assault (common assault and assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm), robbery (common robbery and aggravated robbery), murder and attempted murder (Table 1).² The decreases have been lowest in relation to murder and aggravated robbery but have been fairly dramatic in relation to the other four offence categories; varying between 22 per cent in the case of assault GBH and 39 per cent in the case of attempted murder. As a result, during the 2003/04 to 2008/09 period, the total number of recorded cases has declined by 206 448. Of this decline, 43 per cent is accounted for by the decline in cases of common assault, and a further 27 per cent in cases of assault GBH, so that 70 per cent of the total reduction is accounted for by different categories of assault.

Table 1: Change in recorded levels of six major categories of violent crime, 2003-04 to 2008-09

	2003/ 04	2008/ 09	Change over five years	% change over five years	% of total reduct -ion
Murder	19 824	18 148	-1 676	8,5	0,8
Attempted murder	30 076	18 298	-11 778	39,2	5,7
Assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	260 082	203 777	-56 305	21,6	27,3
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	133 658	121 392	-12 266	9,2	5,9
Common assault	280 942	192 838	-88 104	31,4	42,7
Common robbery	95 551	59 232	-36 319	38	17,6
Total	820 133	613 685	-206 448	25,2	100

Source: SAPS statistics

PECULIAR FIGURES

At face value the figures presented in Table 1 are peculiar for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that there should be some correlation between trends in attempted murder and trends in murder. How then to account for the fact that attempted murder is decreasing at a rate five times greater than murder? If the reduction is a result of government efforts to reduce violent crime, how is it that the SAPS, or the criminal justice system, or government more generally, were able to reduce attempted murder so dramatically, but not murder itself?

A second peculiarity relates to the comparison between purported trends in assault GBH and aggravated robbery, and those of murder. It is widely acknowledged that there are two principal drivers of the murder rate. The first includes various types of disputes which become increasingly violent and could end in cases of common assault, assault GBH, or attempted murder, with the most extreme cases resulting in murder. The predominance of these types of murders is confirmed by the latest police research, which indicates that they account for roughly 64 per cent of murders.³ Aggravated robbery is also an important driver of murder, although its contribution to the number of murders is dramatically smaller than that of dispute-type murders.⁴ The statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that there has been an 8,5 per cent decrease in the number of murders, notwithstanding the fact that both the key drivers of murder have decreased by a greater amount. In particular, assault GBH is decreasing at more than 2,5 times (21,6 per cent) the rate at which the murder rate is decreasing. How is it that this is not having a more dramatic impact on murder levels?⁵

A third peculiarity relates to the trends in common assault. Along with common robbery, this is a category of violent crime that usually escapes scrutiny from people commenting on crime statistics, as it is understood to represent a less serious form of violence.


SAPS statistics on common assault and assault GBH over the period 1994/95 are reflected in

Figure 1. As can be seen, there is a similarity between recorded levels of common assault and assault GBH over this period. From 1994/5 until 2001/02 common assault was recorded at a lower rate than assault GBH. But common assault exceeded cases of assault GBH in the 2002/03 year by some 16 000 cases and in the 2003/04 year by some 20 000 cases. Though there were decreases in both categories of assault from 2002/03 to 2003/04, from then onwards both assault GBH and common assault figures dropped precipitously. Also, from this point onwards declines in common assault exceeded those for assault GBH, so that as from 2006/07, figures for common assault once again fell below those for assault GBH. One outcome of this dramatic decline in figures in both categories is that both the latest SAPS common assault figure (192 838) and assault GBH figure (203 777) are the lowest recorded in South Africa since 1994/95, when the SAPS recorded 200 248 and 215 671 of these cases respectively. Overall the reduction in common assault since 2003/04 (31 per cent or 88 104 cases) is far more dramatic than that recorded for assault GBH (22 per cent or 56 305 cases).

In any society the occurrence of assault can be understood to have a pyramid-like distribution. Less severe assaults (that would be recorded as common assault) occupy the bulk of the pyramid at the bottom. More serious assaults (that would be recorded as assault GBH) occupy a band across the middle with assault-related murders (i.e. the 'dispute type' murders referred to above) at the top.⁶

Notwithstanding this pyramid-like distribution, it is not unusual for fewer incidents of common assault to be recorded than assault GBH, as was the case in South Africa up to 2001/02. Due to the fact that victims often do not regard such cases as serious enough to report, or do not even identify them as crime, they are far less likely to report common assaults than they are to report more serious assaults.⁷ However it seems reasonable to assume that confidence in a police service will improve as police become more effective and more approachable, and that this will lead to higher rates of reporting, including more reporting of

Figure 1: Trends in recorded Common Assault and Assault GBH in South Africa, 1994-95 to 2008-09



Source: SAPS statistics

common assaults. In South Africa such an improvement in confidence, or at least in community relationships with police, may account for the distinct increase in reported levels of common assault reflected in statistics for the period from 1996/97 to 2002/03. But considering that common assault is more under-reported than assault GBH, why is it that recorded common assault should drop at a far faster rate than assault GBH, particularly during a period where it is claimed that there are improvements in police service delivery and where there is no evidence of a dramatic deterioration in police community relations (despite persistent complaints about the quality of police services)?⁸

If the trends reported in the SAPS statistics are an accurate reflection of reality, the implication is that for some reason the base of the 'assault pyramid' (reflected in cases of common assault) is withering away at a far faster rate than the middle of the pyramid (cases of assault GBH), which in turn is withering away at a faster rate than the top of the pyramid (assault-related murders). If there were an overall decline in levels of assault it might be assumed that this would have at least as much of an impact on serious assault as it does on less serious assault, rather than the decline being most concentrated in common assault.

Police often make the claim that crimes such as assault are not responsive to policing crime prevention strategies. If so, it is unlikely that policing would produce the above effect, and to do so it would need to be targeted at common assaults to the exclusion of more serious assaults. Notwithstanding the claim that assault is not responsive to policing, it is possible that enforcement of the Domestic Violence Act has contributed to the decline in common assaults. However, SAPS statistics provided in November 2009 to parliament provide no indication that reports of domestic violence received by the SAPS are declining. Instead they indicate that the number of these cases increased by eight per cent from 2006/07 to 2008/09.⁹ This includes increases even in the Northern Cape, the province that has recorded a 47 per cent decline in reported common assault in the last five years, the most dramatic decline among any of the nine provinces.

Just as it is unlikely that policing would disproportionately impact on common assault there is no reason to believe that any 'crime prevention effect' of other social interventions on the part of government (such as improvements in social grants) would contribute to faster declines in common assaults than in more serious assaults.

DISCORDANT TRENDS IN CATEGORIES OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

Similar peculiarities are apparent in relation to robbery. Common robbery has purportedly declined by 38 per cent, whereas aggravated robbery¹⁰ declined by only 9,2 per cent.¹¹ Just as peculiar is the radical discrepancy between trends in street robbery (in which figures have plummeted) and trends in the other six 'high profile' categories of aggravated robbery (which have been doing the opposite). As illustrated in Table 2, apart from street robbery, all categories of aggravated robbery have increased, most obviously residential and business robbery. The nine per cent decline in the number of aggravated robbery cases reflected in Table 1 is purely attributable to the fact that the net increase of 12 360 cases in the six categories is offset by a decrease of 27 706 cases of street robbery.

Table 2: Change in recorded levels of seven sub-categories of aggravated robbery, 2003-04 to 2008-09

	Record- ed cases 2003 – 04	Record- ed cases 2008 – 09	Change over five years	% change over five years	% of total change in this category
Vehicle hijacking	13 793	14 201	408	3	3
Cash in transit heists	192	395	203	106	1
Truck hijacking	901	1 245	344	38	2
Bank robbery	54	144	90	167	1
Residential robbery	9 351	14 481	5 130	55	33
Business robbery	3 677	9 862	6 185	168	40
Street robbery	105 690	77 984	-27 706	-26	-181
Total	133 658	118 312	-15 346	-11	-100

Source: SAPS statistics

What can be made of this discrepancy? Is it possible that those involved in street robbery

spontaneously opted to desist from their activities, with more and more street robbers endorsing this decision? Or have street robbers decided en masse to switch to other types of robbery? Or is it that government efforts to reduce robbery have miraculously reduced street robbery, notwithstanding the fact that policing and business-led crime prevention initiatives give priority to preventing and tracking down the culprits involved in the smaller 'high profile six' categories, particularly the 'trio' crimes of hijacking, residential and business robbery?¹²

PRESS REPORTS OF THE MANIPULATION OF CRIME STATISTICS

In recent years there have been persistent reports in the press about the 'cooking of crime statistics' by police. In a selection of press articles on the matter,¹³ allegations relating to such manipulation are made in relation to five of South Africa's nine provinces. In this selection of press articles, eleven different police stations in the Western Cape, four stations in Gauteng, one station in KwaZulu-Natal and one station in Limpopo are alleged to have manipulated crime statistics. Whilst not referring to any single police station, a brief press report in January 2010 also referred to an ICD investigation that pointed to various 'irregularities' in the SAPS in the Free State, including the 'manipulation of crime statistics'.

One prominent example is the Mountain Rise police station in Pietermaritzburg. In June 2009 press reports indicated that a SAPS inspector at the station had been suspended after alleging that statistics at the station were being manipulated. It was claimed that police at the station were instructed not to record criminal complaints unless the suspects were immediately available or facts easily ascertainable. Unrecorded dockets were allegedly kept aside in a separate room and eventually burnt.¹⁴ The practice had become institutionalised on the instructions of the station commissioner who had been deployed to the station early in 2007. The inspector was subsequently reinstated (and apparently seconded to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation)

whilst an ICD investigation confirmed the allegations and culminated in a recommendation that disciplinary action be taken against the station commissioner.¹⁵

Also in June 2009, the Western Cape MEC for Safety and Security, Lennit Max, went public with allegations that at the police stations in Paarl, Paarl East, Mbekweni, Wellington and Oudtshoorn, cases were downgraded (i.e. offences were recorded as less serious than had been reported) or not recorded at all. Max is reported to have said that he feared the manipulation of crime statistics he had so far been notified of was only a fraction of what had occurred at the province's 147 police stations. Press reports in October 2009 also indicated that an SAPS disciplinary process had found the station commissioner and others at the Lansdowne police station guilty of tampering with crime statistics.¹⁶

Another press article referred to a leaked internal report sent to the Western Cape provincial commissioner in December 2006, indicating that 'quite a substantial number of stations are involved in manipulation'. The report referred specifically to the Porterville, Piketberg and Paarl East police stations. A report in June 2007 referred to such manipulation at the Bishop Lavis police station, with other reports in 2007 and 2008 referring to similar practices at the Knysna and Gugulethu police stations.¹⁷ Subsequent press reports appeared to confirm the existence of evidence of cases systematically not being recorded at the Knysna police station.¹⁸

The non-recording or 'downgrading' of cases of crime referred to in these press reports is not specific to cases of violent crime. The press reports refer to a diversity of cases, including attempted murder, assault, robbery, rape, fraud, various forms of theft, and burglary. Some of the articles dealing with the issue have given particular prominence to the non-recording of sexual offences, reflecting how seriously the press views these cases. Organisations focusing on sexual offences have also given prominence to the non-recording of these types of offences. In August 2009, Joan van Niekerk of Childline told

Parliament's portfolio committee on women and children that police were turning away 'numerous' sexual abuses victims, 'telling parents that their children will be traumatised by the criminal justice system process, that they can do nothing if the child is too young to testify'.¹⁹

One explanation for the non-recording emerging from the press reports is that the Police Performance Chart has provided a perverse incentive for the practice. The SAPS 'Performance Chart' is a computerised system linked to the SAPS Crime Administration System, which ranks stations according to improvements in their performance as measured by reductions in crime and increases in the rate of detection. The Performance Chart clearly provides an incentive to station commissioners for the non-recording of cases, particularly those that are unlikely to be detected. This is because a reduction in recorded cases results in a favourable performance rating for any given police station – but because the Performance Chart also ranks stations on 'detection rates', there is a positive motivation to record cases that are likely to be solved. Members at the winning stations (i.e. those stations that record the highest performance rating scores) in each province are apparently entitled to a performance bonus.²⁰ Both the Tzaneen and Mountain Rise police stations were apparently the best performing stations in their provinces in 2008 as a result of their non-recording of key categories of crime.

Non-recording appears to have had a particularly strong impact on cases of violent crime. One reason for this is that the Performance Chart gives particular weight to violent crime cases so that the incentive not to record these cases is stronger (see Andrew Faull's article in this edition of SACQ). However, considering the dramatic way in which statistics on violent crime have plummeted, and the fact that this coincides with the period subsequent to the introduction of the seven to ten per cent targets in 2004, it seems reasonable to conclude that these targets have also provided a strong motivation for non-recording.

The targets were implemented without due consideration being given to the possible negative

implications thereof. Referring to cases of rape, for instance, one provincial commissioner is quoted as saying that the target of seven to ten per cent reduction is 'impossible to achieve – the only way we can do it is to turn victims away'.²¹ In addition to the financial incentives for police officers not to record crime, reports indicate that an additional incentive was that station commanders were placed under direct pressure by senior SAPS management if their crime statistics increased, irrespective of evidence of other improvements in the performance of their police stations.²² Due to the fact that these were targets that government had committed to, police management had a strong motivation to ensure that they were achieved, for fear of embarrassing government and incurring the displeasure of senior politicians.

The Performance Chart and the seven to ten per cent targets can therefore be seen to have provided both 'carrot and stick' motivations to reduce the recording of crime. The Performance Chart created internal incentives for stations not to record crime. Motivators might have included the possibility of performance bonuses as well as the concern that if one did not manipulate the statistics, one's station would have been identified as 'under-performing'. In relation to the seven to ten per cent targets it appears that station commissioners would have been concerned about incurring the acrimony of senior management. Senior management was more concerned with reducing recorded crime than with how this reduction was achieved.

WHY ARE SOME CATEGORIES OF VIOLENT CRIME GOING UP?

If one accepts that there are peculiarities in relation to statistics on violent crime, and that the system of perverse incentives described may explain these peculiarities, there nonetheless remains an anomaly. Notwithstanding the fact that there were reductions in all of the major categories of violent crime reflected in Table 1, notable increases were recorded in six of the seven sub-categories of aggravated robbery as indicated in Table 2. How can it be that the system of

perverse incentives highlighted above could be 'selective' in its impact on different categories of violent crime?

In understanding why this is possible, it is necessary to recognise that in South Africa there is a largely unacknowledged hierarchy of violent crime, which contributes to some categories of violent crime being regarded as important and others as unimportant. There are two dynamics that shape this hierarchy. The first of these is the seriousness of offences themselves. Thus two of the three categories²³ that have recorded the highest overall reductions are common assault and common robbery, categories that (as indicated above) are widely regarded as less serious.

The second factor might be described as the 'politics of violent crime'. What this means is that different victim constituencies, or their advocates, compete for recognition and attention to be given to specific types of violent crime. The effect of this in South Africa, and no doubt in other countries, is that types of crime that are of concern to the most powerful and articulate tend to be considered as most important, and those that affect less powerful constituencies are by comparison virtually invisible, and tend to be neglected in public policy.²⁴

If this is true it is not a coincidence that the forms of violent crime in which increases have been recorded, and which probably have been more reliably recorded, are those forms of violent crime that most affect businesses and the middle class. Vehicle hijacking is likely to mostly affect the middle class, since poor people are less likely to be vehicle owners, but it is not clear whether this is also the case for residential robbery.

Nevertheless, as was the case with hijacking in the 1990s, during the last decade residential robbery has become prominent because of the apparent increased targeting of middle class homes. Even though it may be common in poorer areas, it is because of its impact on the middle class that it has come to be seen as a priority crime. Similarly, business robbery has come to be regarded as a priority crime because of its impact on the formal

business sector, though the businesses that are most vulnerable to robbery may be those in the informal sector.

There may be other factors at work here. Upper middle class victims, who constitute a substantial proportion of the victims of residential robberies and car hijackings, are probably more likely to want proof that the case has been registered for insurance purposes, and may also be more likely to make follow-up calls to the police to check on progress with the case, motivating for their cases to be recorded.²⁵ However, violent crime cases with middle class victims are not only more likely to be recorded, but because these types of crime impact on businesses or the middle class, they have come to be seen as more important – and are likely to be better recorded, even in poorer areas.²⁶

The hierarchy of violent crime is a product of the combined effect of these two types of dynamics.²⁷ Thus it is the offences that are less important in terms of this hierarchy, offences that by and large impact on poorer South Africans, that are most likely not to be recorded and that have therefore been declining most precipitously.²⁸

CONCLUSION

This article has considered a number of peculiarities in current statistics on violent crime and argued that these peculiarities make sense when understood in relation to the 'perverse incentives' created by the establishment of the SAPS Performance Chart and pressure from government for the SAPS to reduce violent crime by seven to ten per cent per annum.

The implication is that the non-recording of crime is widespread within the SAPS and that this non-recording is responsible for much of the reduction in violent crime that has been reported in statistics over recent years. The implication of this, in turn, is that current crime statistics cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator of trends in crime, particularly in violent crime.

Reports in the press of stations involved in the manipulation of crime statistics have raised

doubts about the reliability of police crime statistics. Yet there is still a tendency on the part of the Ministry of Police to view these stations as exceptions to the rule.²⁹ In totality these reports point towards a pervasive pattern of manipulation of crime statistics, notwithstanding the fact that the police stations identified above only make up roughly one per cent of the total number of police stations.³⁰ It seems reasonable to assume that the stations identified in the press reports referred to represent the tip of the iceberg of this phenomenon, both on the basis of the reports and because the peculiar patterns in crime statistics can be explained by the perverse incentives that have been established to under-record crime. Thus, rather than being a reflection of the extent of the problem, the press reports are an indication of the paucity of whistle blowing. While this is disappointing it is not necessarily surprising. The inspector at Mountain Rise, for instance, gave testimony of how he was victimised at the station after various attempts to draw attention to the issue, including the attention of senior SAPS management and state prosecutors.³¹

There are specific difficulties and risks related to the use of crime statistics as a key performance measure for the police. One difficulty is that levels of reporting do not purely reflect crime trends, but also changes in attitudes to the police. If people have greater confidence in the police they will be more inclined to report cases to them. A reduction in crime statistics can only reasonably be used as a police performance measure in a social environment where police-community relations are at an optimal level and can be expected to remain very stable.

Another obvious drawback is that using crime statistics as a performance measure creates perverse incentives. If police are being evaluated on how many cases they report, they will be motivated to discourage reporting or otherwise manipulate the recording process to get the numbers down. It is therefore only viable to use crime statistics as a police performance measure in circumstances where the process of recording crime itself has a high level of integrity and reliability.³²

There is therefore obviously a need to establish a culture of integrity in recording crime statistics in the SAPS. Whether or not the pending Stats SA investigation into SAPS crime statistics will contribute to this objective cannot be known at this point, but what is clear is that until it is demonstrated that such a culture has been established³³ there will be serious doubts about the reliability of official crime statistics, as well as questions about whether crime statistics and detection rates should be included as key indicators in performance measures.

The issue of crime statistics has been a vexed one throughout much of the post-1994 period. Government has often appeared to view these statistics primarily in terms of the negative image they might create. Government ministers have variously tried to restrict their availability, to the point of imposing a complete moratorium on their release from July 2000 to May 2001. Crime has thus in many ways been a matter of image management for government, rather than an incentive to develop proper strategies for reducing crime. The credibility and integrity of SAPS crime statistics are now casualties of this approach. If there is one principal lesson that should be drawn from this, it is that tackling violent crime can no longer be an issue of image management and must become the focus of clear strategies that are properly implemented.

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NOTES

- 1 The title is a quote from one of the journalists who was involved in exposing the manipulation of statistics at Mountain Rise police station, referring to a pile of unrecorded dockets. (Telephone conversation, M Laganparsad, 25 September 2009).
- 2 Due to the fact that the system of reporting statistics of sexual offences has changed as a result of the new Sexual Offences Act, 32 of 2007, this article does not discuss whether recording practice has impacted on such offences; though they of course constitute a key manifestation of the problem of violent crime.
- 3 South African Police Service, Crime Situation in South Africa, Pretoria: SAPS Strategic Management (Head Office), 2009. Available at http://www.saps.gov.za/saps_profile/strategic_framework/annual_report/2008_2009/2_crime_situation_sa.pdf (accessed 22 January 2010).

- 4 Robbery may be estimated to account for roughly 13% of murders if statistics in the SAPS report cited above are read against other statistics that indicate that robberies account for roughly 80% of murders that take place in the context of another crime. On the latter see Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, *Streets of Pain, Streets of Sorrow: The circumstances of the occurrence of murder in six areas with high rates of murder*, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Department of Safety and Security, 2008.
- 5 Note that the approach here is to assume that murder is declining at roughly the rate indicated. However questions have also been raised as to whether the reported trends in murder can in fact be taken at face value (J Redpath & M O'Donovan, *The impact of minimum sentencing in South Africa*, Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006.)
- 6 In the UK context it has been said, for instance, that 'serious' assaults judged in terms of levels of injury are greatly outnumbered by cases resulting in only minor injury: Home Office data are cited that put the ratio of 'more serious' to 'less serious' offences at 1:20. M Levi and M Maguire, Violent crime, in M Maguire, R Morgan, and R Reiner, (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (3rd Edition), Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002, 805.
- 7 An Australian study indicated that the seriousness of the assault, indicated for instance by the severity of injury as well as the number of perpetrators, was one factor impacting on whether victims saw the assault as a crime or not. Where assaults were seen as a crime 60% were reported, while where they were not seen as a crime, only 16% were reported. See J Clare and F Morgan, Factors affecting perceived criminality: evidence from victims of assault, *Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, 376, Australian Institute of Criminology. On factors affecting recording of crime more generally see M Maguire, Crime statistics, in M Maguire, R Morgan and R Reiner, (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (4th Edition). Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007, 255-262. Intimidation would also be a factor influencing reporting but would also be likely to apply to cases of assault GBH as well as common assault.
- 8 For instance in the 2003 National Victimisation Survey, 46% of respondents said they thought that police were doing a poor job while by 2007 this number had dropped to 37%. (M 'O Donovan, South Africans' perceptions of the police and the courts, *ISS Paper* 176, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008).
- 9 Document dated 28 October 2010 from the National Commissioner of the SAPS addressed to the Committee Secretary of the Portfolio Committee on Women, Youth, Children and People with Disabilities with the subject line 'Replies to questions for government departments'. South African Police Service. The figures reported are 2006/07 (88 777), 2007/08 (95 218), and 2008/09 (95 555).
- 10 Aggravated robbery is distinguished from common robbery on the basis that it involves the use or threatened use of weapons such as guns or knives.
- 11 One factor that might also impact on these statistics

was an agreement entered into by cell phone companies and the SAPS in April 2005 in terms of which stolen handsets were supposed to be reported to the cell-phone company in order to be blacklisted. Police sometimes refused to record such cases until the complainant provided proof that the phone had been blacklisted. See N Mawson, Police, cell-firms in anti-theft drive, *Engineering News*, 14 April 2005. Available at <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/police-cell-firms-in-antitheft-drive-2005-04-14>, (accessed 12 February 2009).

- 12 See for example G Newham, Cops and robbers: a new approach – The Gauteng Aggravated Robbery Strategy, SACQ 29, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009.
- 13 F Maponya, Cops 'cook' their crime figures – Serious cases deliberately covered up, *Sowetan*, 2 December 2008; S Regchand, Top police station 'fiddled crime stats' – policeman files affidavit, *The Mercury*, 11 June 2009; G Underhill and S Alcock, KZN police station cooked crime stats, *Mail & Guardian*, 29 January 2010, 10; C Dolley, Max attacks police boss, *Cape Times*, 24 June 2009, 1; G Underhill, Chandler used to set an example, *Mail & Guardian*, 16 October 2009; S Alcock, Fear made police cook stats, *Mail & Guardian*, 10 July 2009; G Underhill, Top cops 'knew stats were cooked', *Mail & Guardian*, 16 October 2009; G Underhill, How cops cooked crime books, *Mail & Guardian*, 23 October 2009; M Langanparsad & N Davids, How cops fiddle crime statistics, SAPA; Police chief, deputies face music, *Business Day*, 18 January 2010.
- 14 S Regchand, Top police station 'fiddled crime stats' – policeman files affidavit, *The Mercury*, 11 June 2009.
- 15 Underhill and Alcock, KZN police station cooked crime stats, 10.
- 16 Underhill, Chandler used to set an example.
- 17 Underhill, Top cops 'knew stats were cooked'.
- 18 Underhill, How cops cooked crime books.
- 19 SAPA, Cops 'turning away sex abuse victims', 26 August 2009.
- 20 S Alcock, Crime stats scam exposed, *Mail & Guardian*, 3 July 2009; Underhill and Alcock, KZN police station cooked crime stats, 10.
- 21 SAPA, Cops 'turning away sex abuse victims'.
- 22 See S Alcock, Fear made police cook stats, which includes the quote that 'good management practices' were confused with 'management by fear'. See also Andrew Faull article in this edition of SACQ.
- 23 These being attempted murder, common robbery and common assault.
- 24 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, *The violent nature of crime in South Africa: A concept paper*. Prepared for the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & Department of Safety and Security, 2008; Creating a violence free society – Key findings and recommendations of the study on the violent nature of crime in South Africa, Johannesburg: Unpublished report, 2009.
- 25 A further question is whether the degree of independent monitoring is likely to impact on recording behaviour. For example, cash-in-transit heists and bank robberies are closely and independently monitored by groups in the business sector, limiting the space for crime statistics to be

manipulated. (See J Burger, Worrying trends – the official 2008/09 South African crime statistics, SACQ 30, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, 4. Most vehicles and middle class homes and businesses are insured. If the SAPS statistics showed reductions while the insurance industry revealed increases this would be likely to become a public issue. However it is not clear that this type of factor would impact on crime recording practice at police stations, which is the concern of this article.

- 26 Note that there may also be a 'net-widening effect' resulting from the fact that robberies at informal businesses are increasingly recorded as business robberies rather than as 'other' robberies.
- 27 The status of cases of sexual violence is more ambiguous. While they by and large involve the victimization of poorer women, partly as a result of political mobilization against violence against women, rape cases are also acknowledged as 'serious crime'.
- 28 In addition to the dynamics arising from this hierarchy another factor would be the simple question of whether a specific category of crime is amenable to non-recording or other manipulation. Thus in addition to the fact that it is regarded by its nature as a serious offence, murder would appear to be less amenable to non-recording partly because, even in the absence of a criminal case, all cases of murder are still supposed to be the subject of an inquest. By contrast, cases of attempted murder are less concrete in nature but also more open to being 'downgraded' as the classification of a case as 'attempted murder' partly involves a judgment about the intention of the perpetrator.
- 29 For instance, a spokesperson for the Minister of Police is reported to have emphasised the fact that police stations that had been the subject of allegations made up 'zero' percent of police stations in the country. Langanparsad & Davids, op cit.
- 30 There are 1 116 police station in South Africa, according to the latest SAPS annual report, xvi.
- 31 S Alcock, Crime stats scam exposed, *Mail & Guardian*, 3 July 2009.
- 32 In the absence of such reliability crime statistics might best be seen as an indicator of the safety challenges that government and society face.
- 33 Independent audits of crime reporting might be one measure that would help in this regard.

Missing the target

When measuring performance undermines police effectiveness

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Crime statistics can only offer a limited measure of police performance, if they can be a measure of performance at all. Many types of crime fluctuate completely independently of policing. To place pressure on the police to reduce crime statistics leads to perverse incentives, typically to not record crime (see the article by Bruce in this edition of SACQ). In South Africa, crime statistics are still seen as a measure of police performance rather than a measure of the challenge facing the police, and indeed society as a whole. Other police performance assessment measures currently in place also contribute to poor and abusive policing practices. This article explores these issues by drawing on research conducted in recent years, and through reference to the South African Police Service (SAPS) performance chart.

Police in democratic societies operate in a space forged between their constitutional mandate and the legal framework that defines how they must operate. The vision and mission of the SAPS, as based on the constitution, requires police to:

- Prevent, combat and investigate crime
- Protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property
- Uphold and enforce the law
- Create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa
- Prevent anything that may threaten the safety or security of any community¹

Such a mandate is impossible for a police service alone to achieve; yet statements by police leaders, research on SAPS culture, as well as this author's experience as a police reservist, suggest most SAPS members nonetheless embrace the mandate.²

Given the high ideals of the mandate it would seem obvious that police participation in illicit activities would be detrimental to their effectiveness. But can police dishonesty,

corruption, or crime ever be considered an enhancer of police performance? This article suggests it depends on who is doing the measuring, and how. It argues that current approaches to performance measurement in the SAPS may encourage disreputable and illicit actions by some in order to meet performance targets, rather than encouraging effective policing. The article argues that falsely positive assessments of achievement that hide illicit activity are an almost inevitable consequence of the measures of achievement as they currently exist. Additionally, the article suggests that that some of these illicit actions erode an already tenuous social contract between citizens and the police and that the measures of performance ignore the importance of citizen perceptions of police performance.

AN EVOLVING POLICE CULTURE

Informal rule bending has for decades been noted as a trend in police cultures, developing as a means to realise a mandate within a restrictive environment. Usually such cultures develop beyond the public gaze and remain informal, but

this is not always so. Take for example the much-touted rhetoric that became prominent in the second half of 2009, perhaps oversimplified by the media as 'shoot to kill'. While a clear call to the police to act illegally, in that the law prohibits the intentional murder of any person, it signified that a causal link was drawn between police use of force and police effectiveness. The national commissioner, minister and deputy minister of police, among others, repeatedly spoke of the need for police not deliberate over, or fear using lethal force against armed suspects, inferring that this would instil fear in the would-be criminal, and reduce crime. Analysts expressed concern that such rhetoric effectively encouraged police to act recklessly, or even to break the law by acting outside of the parameters of Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures Act governing police use of force.³ Although only at a stretch, the rhetoric can be interpreted as equating illegal police action with enhancing police performance.

While a more trigger-happy police service (or *force*) may serve to temporarily satiate public anger over crime, will it lead to a greater long-term citizen satisfaction with police performance? Unfortunately citizen satisfaction is not currently high up on the SAPS performance measurement agenda, while 'tough on crime' rhetoric appears an easy way to deal with public pressure.

POLICING STATISTICS RATHER THAN CRIME STATISTICS

One of the simplest and most visible ways in which both the SAPS and South African citizens measure police performance is through fluctuations in crime statistics. Individuals, shifts and stations receive monthly targets, which they need to meet in order to be seen to be functioning effectively. Former national commissioner, Jackie Selebi, notoriously lambasted station commissioners who failed to produce reductions in crime statistics, leading them to unrealistically pressure the men and women working beneath them.⁴

One negative side effect of the extreme organisational pressure on police commanders

generated by a quota-based reduction system, has been the manipulation of crime statistics by station level members, as reported in the media in late 2009 and early 2010 (discussed in greater detail in the article by Bruce in this edition of SACQ).⁵ Although the SAPS would have us believe this truth-bending only happens in isolated cases, interviews conducted by this researcher with at least four current and former members in different parts of the country, including two former station commissioners, suggest such statistics-fixing is more widespread.⁶ In *Beyond 'Good Cop'/'Bad Cop'*, Rajohane Matshedisho observes what he interprets as police viewing crime statistics, or the meeting of performance quotas, as more important than 'actual' policing.⁷ This provides corroboration for the views expressed in the interviews mentioned above.

Matshedisho illustrates how statistics-fixing does not only occur at the sinister level of manipulating already open cases, nor does it always necessarily involve rule bending. He recounts time spent with two members who stop and check cars as part of their shift assignment. The two police had been given a target of the number of vehicles that they needed to stop and search before the end of the shift. Matshedisho's observation was of the cops engaging in this task not as a crime prevention measure, as intended, but only to gather the information needed to complete the forms that would reflect the work they had done (e.g. writing down the licence number). Their work was motivated by a need to deliver on paper rather than in practice.

Similarly, many will have experienced driving through a SAPS roadblock only to have their driver's licence examined and its details recorded. Neither the car's roadworthiness nor the driver's blood alcohol levels are checked, and there is no search for contraband or firearms.

In these examples a performance target has been met and will be reflected in police records, but the police have not in reality accomplished anything of significance.

In a comparable experience in 2010, I was on patrol with two vans. One of the vans and its occupants

began the evening shift by issuing fines to five separate vehicles for various road offences. Later in the evening when the same van came across an illegal taxi, and separately, an unlicensed urban drag racer (pounced on by six speeding police cars), neither was fined because it was felt enough fines had been issued for one evening. In this case there had been no dishonesty or offence committed on the part of the police. Instead, police discretion determined whether action was taken against the offenders. In this case the police felt they had achieved what was necessary, albeit according to artificial measures rather than the requirements of the rule of law (that everyone should be treated equally before the law).

In these examples police (in)action is based on a perceived need to meet particular quantitative targets, rather than on an understanding of the role and function of police in society.

ENFORCING NO LAW

But there is another form of police logic that encourages illicit deeds, yet is justified by police as facilitating justice. Take for example the story of a police inspector who left the service in 2006. He recounted how, when the opportunity emerged, he would facilitate the exchange of cash between the perpetrator and victim of an assault in instances where the two knew each other, in order to have charges withdrawn. In return he would pocket a 'commission' from the two. He believed this benefited both parties and produced a better result than would have been achieved by the criminal justice system:

I don't have any feelings about it being wrong. Sometimes when you do something that helps you, you become happy. I also helped those guys. I restored their relationship. The one did not go to jail and the other one was fine with it.⁸

This kind of action serves a dual purpose, as another inspector explains:

If I must take all the cases that people want to report when there's a possibility that they will withdraw it the next morning, there would be

ten times more cases. So you settle things with them and you work things out, otherwise you will be told you haven't done your job. I've seen a case where it was nearly a murder and the victim said, 'Just pay the medical expenses and I will forget it'. They knew each other and were drinking together.⁹

Does this type of rule breaking aid police performance? The fact that these crimes are not registered contributes to a veneer of low crime while at the same time the police member convinces him- or herself that both offender and perpetrator are better off having avoided formal judicial procedures. On paper then, and in the minds of the police involved, police performance has improved.

CHARTING POLICE PERFORMANCE

Reductions in station level crime rates are the holy grail of a station commissioner's performance assessment as measured by the SAPS Performance Chart. Eighty per cent of a station commissioner's personal performance measurement is derived from the highly complex chart.¹⁰

The chart provides measurements for police stations according to three categories: operational performance, data integrity and resource management. It refers to, but currently does not provide, due to difficulties in measuring this, a rating for community satisfaction. The three categories are not evenly weighted. Eighty-five per cent of the ultimate measurement of performance, which is presented as a series of scores, is made up from quantitative data relating to operational policing (e.g. reported crime, cases to court, detection rate, response times, etc.). But not all crimes are measured in the same way. Weighting is given to crimes based on their nature and priority, with violent crime (referred to by the SAPS as 'contact crime', e.g. robbery, murder, rape, assault, etc.) most heavily weighted. Crime statistics generated by policing activities (e.g. drunk driving, drug arrests, firearm recovery) carry no weighting. In other words, a high

number of reported contact crimes will reduce a police station's performance score. Although crime statistics generated by policing activities are viewed in a positive manner and are guided by quotas, increases in these statistics do not improve a station's performance score unless a suspect is sent to court and sentenced, in which case they count favourably.

Considering the rituals in which station commissioners have been made to stand up in front of their peers and account for the low performance scores of their police stations,¹¹ it is understandable that any pressure exerted on a station commissioner is transferred to his or her members. For example, at a station where I was working in 2006 an instruction was issued that police officers should discourage victims of assault from opening cases. The logic was that assault cases are so often thrown out of court or withdrawn by complainants, that they were better left off the station's records. Although it is easy to see how the station members could easily accept this logic as legitimate, the result is that police management have no idea how much assault is taking place in their precinct and therefore will not be able to identify it as an emerging problem. Furthermore, station management could erroneously claim that they had reduced assault, when in fact the opposite could be occurring. By not recording crime, the police undermine the ability of government to identify problems, develop solutions and assess impact.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND POLICE ABUSE

The assessment or measurement of police performance policies is not only an internal police matter. Ultimately police need to satisfy the public. The 2007 ISS Victims of Crime Survey asked respondents whether they felt the police were doing a 'good job' or a 'bad job'. Promisingly, more felt they were performing well (49 per cent) than badly (38 per cent). The most common affirmations for good police performance were the perceptions that police 'arrest criminals' (37 per cent), 'respond on time' (36 per cent) and 'are committed' (32 per cent).

Negative views of police performance were based on perceptions that they 'don't respond on time' (56 per cent), 'are lazy' (26 per cent), 'don't come to my area' (23 per cent) and 'are corrupt' (22 per cent).

Police response times – vital to citizen perceptions of police – are measured by the SAPS performance chart, as are arrests. However, in order for police to meet the public requirement of being seen to be 'arresting criminals' they need to formally process individuals through the justice system by means of arrest, investigation and prosecution. Perhaps through a combination of pressure to perform, lack of citizen support, and investigative incompetence, some police feel compelled to abuse or torture suspects in order to achieve these results. Although not yet empirically investigated on a large scale, reports of torture in the media and investigations conducted by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) suggest abuse and torture may be routine.¹² As a former member of Crime Intelligence in the Free State put it:

I don't care who says what, if you're not going to torture somebody, you're not going to get much information. That's just the way it is. Liberals hate to hear that. But they like the result.¹³

But it's not only retired cops who tell such tales, as this Johannesburg-based detective constable shows:

If you want to know more about a suspect you must interrogate him. Sometimes we use illegal means to get information from the suspect. Sometimes you must *moer* him. Sometimes you must break the law to get the information... Unfortunately there's no other way. Most of these people are hardened criminals. They are not afraid of police officers. They won't tell you anything unless you make them tell you.¹⁴

And this serving Western Cape Organised Crime detective:

I've been involved in the usual – a sack over the head and you throw water over him, or you tube

him – but not anymore. Although it still happens, I don't participate. I believe that it's sometimes still the right thing to do... It happens a lot in Organised Crime.¹⁵

In *Beyond 'Good Cop'/'Bad Cop'* Matshedisho notes the manner in which police use of violence as a policing tool has become inculcated at one Gauteng station. Preparing to beat a suspected hijacker, a shift constable tells Matshedisho, 'Now we are going to do our duty', following which the suspect is beaten and made to inhale pepper spray from a plastic packet. Matshedisho sees police use of violence as a show of power, but also as a performance enhancer in as much as it is used to solicit confessions or information and effect arrests.¹⁶

In each of these examples the police involved have clearly legitimised their illegal actions as being necessary to accomplish their crime reduction mandate and improve their performance. That such attitudes are held by members playing such different policing roles, and in different provinces and cities, suggests they have become accepted, if not throughout the organisation, then in pockets across the country.

CONSENSUAL POLICING (BY FORCE)

In *Thin Blue* Jonny Steinberg paints a portrait of contemporary South Africa as a country in which citizens have yet to consent to being policed.¹⁷ It is one in which two patrolling police will corner a thief in an alley but leave enough space for him to escape, satiating bystanders' need to see the police in action but without exerting any authority which the public has not granted them. In Steinberg's reading, this dance on the part of police is a means to appear to fulfil their mandate within the constricts of a public's withheld consent. His depictions present police officials without legitimacy or power.

However, he contrasts this image with one of a team of police roaming the township streets in a pack and stamping their authority on those

around them. This group does not see its work as extending beyond the end of the shift. Information is gleaned regarding the whereabouts of an illegal firearm, but is not passed on at the end of the evening, the information presumably lost forever. Among the possible motivating factors behind this (in)action one should consider the fact that the seizing of an illegal firearm would be considered a 'police generated crime', one that is not given weighting in the SAPS Performance Chart unless it leads to a positive conviction. Although the other arrests made by the group that night would have been similarly 'police generated', the firearm required action beyond their delineated working hours; would not have scored the station or shift either positive or negative performance points; and was ignored. Like the police member I observed declining to fine a drag racer because it was felt enough fines had been issued for the evening, these police may have already met their quota for recovered firearms for the month, or, more likely, had not been issued with a quota, so had not felt compelled to follow the lead. If the latter is the case, it reveals another negative ramification of a quota-based performance measurement system.

Can a connection be made between a population's consenting to being policed and police use of force? Most definitely. In *The Dirty Work of Democracy* Antony Albeker recounts meeting a detective in Hillbrow who says that '[When arresting someone in Hillbrow], if they think you are weak, that is when they will come after you. The only way is for them to fear us. It's as simple as that: if they don't fear us then they shoot.'¹⁸ This detective claimed to have fired his weapon in about twenty incidents, including waiting for a car thief to step out of his own vehicle before shooting him. The detective's words and alleged actions hark to the current police leadership's 'shoot to kill' rhetoric, as well as the testimonies of the police members quoted above. Albeker notes that this officer's view is not representative of the service, but also that for a cop to hold such a view he must live it; he must be hard. It would seem that South Africans increasingly expect their police to be just this: hard.

Do police really need to be 'hard' and liberal with their use of force and violence in order to 'arrest criminals', 'respond on time' and 'be committed'? Although it is easy to see how a culture may develop that sees violence as a means to these ends, it is not necessary that it should.

Acclaimed police academic, David H. Bayley, suggests that for a police service to be truly effective it must demonstrate that it is *responsive, available and fair* to the population.¹⁹ He bases this on the premise that police are the tool for legitimising the law and mobilising public support for a moral regime. Although Bayley agrees that this is accomplished through the provision of security, it is easy to see how this provision, if based on illegitimate means, serves to delegitimise the police. Bayley believes only about fifteen police organisations in the world realise this mandate of responsiveness, availability and fairness. The SAPS is not one of them. In this light, police leadership in South Africa could be said to be sending the wrong message, as a 'tougher', more violent police service is likely to further undermine the social contract that allows police to function effectively.

CONCLUSION

Police performance is assessed on the basis of operational performance indicators, such as the number of contact crimes recorded, response times, and number of cases to court. Although 'community satisfaction' forms part of the SAPS performance chart, it carries no weight and remains almost entirely unmeasured at most stations. 'Community perception' as a whole remains entirely unmeasured. This is problematic, particularly considering less than half of adults in South Africa consider the police to be doing a 'good job'. Not only do negative perceptions undermine the legitimacy of the police, but also potentially that of the government and rule of law.

The 'community satisfaction' portion of the SAPS performance chart needs to be developed and applied at all stations and given a reasonable weighting, in order for the chart to more holistically assess levels of police performance.

Possible forms this could take are regular exit polls at police stations or annual surveys conducted in station precincts. Whether these rather costly methods are used, or a simpler, more streamlined system is developed, this aspect of the chart should be prioritised for completion.

South African police are stuck between a need to perform, based on the performance chart, and to meet the principles of community centred policing. Perhaps most importantly, they need to perform in a manner that will win over the people of this country so that they will consent to being policed. While getting tough on criminals through the use of torture, and the adoption of 'shoot to kill' attitudes may appear to satiate public needs, the misdirection and abuse of force in the long run is likely to do far more harm than good to public perceptions of police, not to mention that such acts are often illegal. If positive perceptions decline, already scarce citizen-volunteered information may become harder to come by, leading to a further reliance on strong-arm short cuts to achieve results.

Ultimately, it is clear that within the framework in which police performance is currently conceptualised and monitored, some illegal and illegitimate acts occur because they are seen to increase police performance as measured by the SAPS: for example, by diverting would-be cases away from official records so as to reduce crime statistics, or forcefully extracting information from a suspect in the hope that it will aid investigations. As important as the SAPS performance chart is in its current form, a paradigm shift is needed so that members do not equate good policing with meeting performance quotas. Police action should always be motivated by a sound knowledge of police purpose, and should involve a consistent application of the law. Until we see police legitimacy as the ultimate measure of police performance, illegitimate activities that enhance current measures of police performance will continue, and the risk that the police alienate themselves from the population will grow.



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NOTES

- 1 South African Police Service, Visions and Mission, available online at http://www.saps.gov.za/org_profiles/vision_mission.htm (accessed 28 January 2010).
- 2 Examples of research exploring police culture in South African include: M Marks, *Transforming the Robocops: changing police in South Africa*, Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005; J Hornberger, *'Don't push this constitution down my throat!' Human rights in Everyday Practice. An Ethnography of Police Transformation in Johannesburg, South Africa*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Utrecht, 2007; A Albeker, *The Dirty Work of Democracy*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2005; J Steinberg, *Thin Blue: the unwritten rules of policing South Africa*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008; A Faull, *Policing Diversity: an analysis of a diversity intervention and its effects on a South African Police Service station*, Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2008; D Vigneswaran & J Hornberger (eds.), *Beyond 'Good Cop'/'Bad Cop': Understanding informality and police corruption in South Africa*, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 2009; and A. Faull, *Behind the Badge: the untold stories of South Africa's Police Service members*, Cape Town: Zebra Press, (forthcoming in May 2010).
- 3 Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977).
- 4 This statement is based on a discourse in police circles which refers to 'Selebi-gate' or 'the Selebi trials' – the former commissioner's emphasis on crime statistics as the ultimate measure of police performance and his public embarrassment of station commissioners who failed to keep statistics down. During fieldwork in April 2009 the former commissioner of a Gauteng station explained to this author that he was forced to manipulate statistics in order to avoid public humiliation. See also: S Alcock, Fear made police cook stats, 11 July 2009, *Mail & Guardian Online*, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-11-fear-made-police-cook-stats> (accessed 14 August 2009).
- 5 See for example: S Alcock, Crime stats scam exposed, 5 July 2009, *Mail & Guardian Online*, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-05-crime-stats-scam-exposed> (accessed 14 August 2009); S Alcock, Fear made police cook stats, 11 July 2009; L de Vries, Petros faces press on stats allegations, 25 June 2009, *Independent Online*, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20090625104808219C442522&page_number=2 (Accessed 9 February 2010); C Smith, Probe fingers top FS cops, *News 24.com*, 15 January 2010, http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/News/1059/ca3cda6b75d04e238a2163d4fbc4770f/15-01-2010-0754/Probe_fingers_top_FS_cops (Accessed 9 February 2010).
- 6 Faull, *Behind the Badge*.
- 7 R Matshedisho, *Concept Note Eight: 'We must fight them!' Police violence, torture and brutality in Vigneswaran & Hornberger (eds.) Beyond 'Good Cop'/'Bad Cop': Understanding informality and police corruption in South Africa*.
- 8 Faull, *Behind the Badge*.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 My information on the SAPS performance chart was gathered during a three-hour interview with a SAPS member responsible for working with and training in the chart. Although authorized to speak with me, the member requested that s/he remain anonymous in any publication.
- 11 See endnote 5.
- 12 See for example Independent Complaints Directorate Annual Report 2008/2009, available at <http://www.icd.gov.za/documents/index.html>; S Alcock, The torture force, 2 March 2009, *Mail & Guardian Online*, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-02-the-torture-force> (accessed 10 February 2010); Report on torture cases investigated by the ICD, 2001, <http://www.icd.gov.za/reports/torture.htm> (accessed 10 February 2010); P Joubert, Cops in torture death probe, 6 April 2009, *Mail & Guardian Online*, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-06-cops-in-torture-death-probe> (accessed 10 February 2010); Faull, *Behind the Badge*.
- 13 Faull, *Behind the Badge*.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Matshedisho, *Concept Note Eight: 'We must fight them!'*
- 17 Steinberg, *Thin Blue*.
- 18 Albeker, *The Dirty Work of Democracy*.
- 19 D Bayley, presentation titled "The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime" made at the *Politics, Theory and Methods of Policing Research: Innovations and Trends conference*, Cape Town, 30 January 2010.

Going the extra mile

Police training on domestic violence

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As anticipated by the drafters of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA),² the South African Police Service holds the key to the successful implementation of the Act. Over the past ten years, researchers and independent bodies tasked with monitoring the implementation of this legislation have consistently called for more training for police officials on how to deal with domestic violence. However, the reality is that police officials already receive such training. The question that therefore arises is why these training programmes appear to be ineffective in ensuring compliance with the DVA. A recently completed research and advocacy project found that although the majority of SAPS members interviewed had a basic understanding of the DVA and its key concepts, their ability to apply its provisions in practical problem-solving scenarios was often limited, leading to the recommendation that training methodologies should be more practice-oriented if they are to improve DVA compliance.³

The Legal Advice and Training Programme⁴ (hereafter referred to as the Legal Programme) at the Saartjie Baartman Centre for Women and Children in Athlone, Cape Town, assists clients to obtain and enforce protection orders in terms of the DVA. This is a major part of the Legal Programme's work. Through these activities, the Programme noticed that many of the well-documented⁵ shortcomings in the police's response to domestic violence still persisted. These ranged from infringements of complainants' right to dignity (for example, making insensitive comments and 'blaming' them for the violence), to conduct that endangered their lives and right to freedom from violence, such as a refusal to intervene in potentially life-threatening situations of domestic violence. Failure of the SAPS to act or intervene

appropriately both potentially endangers the complainant and constitutes a breach of the duties imposed on the police by the DVA and the accompanying National Instruction issued by the Commissioner of Police in terms of the DVA.⁶ This research project was established to explore why the current SAPS training programmes appear to be ineffective in ensuring police compliance with the duties set out in the DVA and accompanying National Instruction.

Before embarking on the research, the research team scanned the Legal Programme's client files, and observed two reasons for inadequate or inappropriate police responses to domestic violence: a lack of knowledge of the DVA and the National Instruction, or a misinterpretation of the DVA's provisions. This was also the finding of a

number of research studies aimed at monitoring the implementation of the DVA in the years since its implementation in 1999. These studies almost unanimously recommended additional training for police officials.⁷ But while it appeared that additional training might remedy the problem, police officials in fact *already* receive training on the Act: at least once, as part of their basic training, and likely again as part of ongoing in-service training.

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT

The research and advocacy project referred to above formed part of a broader programme administered by the Open Society Foundation, called the Criminal Justice Initiative. The Initiative's goal is to build accountability within the individual agencies of the criminal justice system (i.e. police, courts, prisons), with the intention of 'ensuring a broader humanity, efficiency and accountability within the criminal justice process as a whole'.⁸ For this reason, the research and advocacy project linked the issue of training on the DVA to police accountability. In practice, this meant that training would not be examined in isolation; researchers took the 'accountability framework'⁹ in the Act into consideration in planning the project. This influenced the project in the sense that increasing accountability in terms of the DVA was the overall vision or backdrop against which the project operated. The point of departure was that police members need to know *what they are accountable for*, which is where training plays a key role. For this reason, the role of the so-called oversight mechanisms in domestic violence was also included in the research design.

The main objective of the research and advocacy project was to evaluate existing training programmes and contribute to such programmes, where appropriate, in order to strengthen the capacity of SAPS members to comply with their duties as set out in the DVA. A second objective was to enhance police accountability in respect of dealing with domestic violence matters by reinforcing the

capacity of formal oversight mechanisms, such as the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) and the provincial Department of Community Safety (DCS) in the Western Cape.¹⁰

RESEARCH DESIGN

As explained above, the purpose of the research was to explore why current training programmes appear to be ineffective in ensuring police compliance with the duties set out in the DVA and accompanying National Instruction. We therefore started by examining what 'compliance' with the DVA meant.

Drawing on the experience of the Legal Programme, we determined six elements of the DVA and National Instruction that an SAPS official, at a minimum, could be expected to comply with when attending to a complaint of domestic violence (either at the Community Service Centre or at the scene of the violence). This assessment was specifically based on our understanding of clients' needs. We identified these duties as the following:

- To listen to the complainant and treat her with respect
- To provide immediate assistance
- To ensure her safety (for instance by arresting the perpetrator, where appropriate) and enquire into her injuries
- To inform her of her rights and options
- To assist her to obtain medical attention and find shelter and to refer her to other service providers, where appropriate
- To open a criminal docket and investigate the case

Two research teams (from the Community Law Centre and the Saartjie Baartman Centre respectively) conducted interviews with SAPS members and station commissioners at 20 police stations in the Western Cape. Since the study was carried out with the assistance of the provincial commissioner, his office identified the 20 stations. These stations were more or less evenly distributed among rural, peri-urban and urban areas.

The research team conducted 75 structured interviews with SAPS members who deal with domestic violence cases either at the Community Service Centre (CSC) or while conducting vehicle patrols. Of the 75 respondents 56 were men and 19 were women. Respondents had an average of 8,8 years' experience in the SAPS. Research participants were selected by the various station commissioners or CSC commanders, and for the most part, this selection depended on the availability of officials at the time of the researchers' visit. The research team also conducted 20 structured interviews with station commissioners or their representatives. In addition, three semi-structured focus group discussions were held with representatives from the national and provincial offices of the Independent Complaints Directorate and the Western Cape Department of Community Safety.

The interviews focused on:

- Training that the interviewee received (including the length of training sessions, who conducted the training, the content of the training and which aspects of the training the interviewee assessed to be most useful)
- Knowledge of the DVA and National Instruction and application in practice
- The interviewee's view of the DVA and recommendations for training¹¹

To assess whether the respondents had the knowledge and skills required to apply the DVA and National Instruction in practice, researchers asked what they understood by 'domestic violence' and 'protection' of the complainant. Further questions canvassed the knowledge and skills of respondents in respect of assisting complainants to find shelter or medical treatment, explaining one of the prescribed forms to complainants, and arresting alleged abusers for breach of the protection order. Three case studies were included to ensure that the questions were realistic and practice-oriented. The following is an example of one of the case studies. This case study was intended to determine how a respondent would approach a situation in which an alleged perpetrator needs to be arrested, where there is a protection order in place, but where there is a

history of the complainant's withdrawing the charges and a suggestion that she might be under the influence of alcohol.

Lindiwe is a 23-year old woman who lives with her boyfriend, Peter. She has repeatedly called the police station for assistance because Peter assaults her. However, on each occasion she withdrew the criminal charges because Peter is the breadwinner and she does not want him to go to jail.

One Friday evening Lindiwe arrives at the police station with a domestic violence protection order that prohibits Peter from assaulting her, and the accompanying warrant of arrest. She alleges that Peter has again assaulted her, thus breaching the protection order, and has also threatened her with a knife. She is therefore really scared of him and asks you to arrest him for breaching the order.

When you take Lindiwe's statement, you realise that her breath smells of alcohol and that her speech is slightly slurred.

FINDINGS

SAPS members

Seventy-three per cent of the SAPS members interviewed had received training on the DVA, mostly for more than one day. The majority of respondents had been trained by the SAPS Training Division. Yet it was not possible to draw sharp distinctions in levels of knowledge between those members who had been trained and those who had not.

Regarding the central research question, i.e. whether the current training programmes provide SAPS members with the knowledge and skills required to apply the DVA and the National Instruction in practice, it appeared from the interviews that the majority of the research participants (members dealing with domestic violence complaints) had a basic awareness of the DVA and the National Instruction. Their explanations of the meaning of operational concepts such as 'domestic violence', 'domestic

relationship' and 'protection of the complainant', while basic, were generally satisfactory.

However, when it came to the practical application of knowledge in a problem-solving scenario, the majority of interviewees experienced difficulties when multi-faceted variables were included; for example, the prospect of reciprocal complaints or the possible need to evaluate the complainant's state of intoxication before taking her statement. This points to limitations in the ability of those trained to *apply* their knowledge. It also confirms recommendations from research participants that training should be more 'practical' and oriented towards problem solving.

In responding to the above case study, for example, the majority of the respondents indicated that they would arrest Peter for violating the protection order. However, there seemed to be some indecision as to *when* to arrest Peter. In this regard, Lindiwe's state of sobriety (or lack thereof) presented respondents with considerable difficulties. Twenty-two per cent of the participants said that they would not take a statement from someone smelling of alcohol, while others stated that they could, but they would have to assess how intoxicated Lindiwe was. These participants said they would assist Lindiwe by finding her suitable shelter or have her stay over at the station's Trauma Room, and then take a statement from her once she had sobered up. At this point they would arrest Peter.

In evaluating the responses received, researchers took into account that there will always be some individual discretion in the assessment of an incident of domestic violence, and therefore didn't categorise responses as 'right' or 'wrong. Instead, attempts were made to identify trends. The general trend towards arresting Peter discerned above is in line with what would ordinarily be expected under the circumstances, given the fact that there is a clear breach of the protection order and, on the facts provided, an indication of imminent harm to Lindiwe. Her potential state of intoxication should be assessed: if she is unable to make a statement under oath because she is under the influence of alcohol, efforts should be made to

find a place of safety such as a victims' shelter where she can be accommodated in comfort until she can provide the police with such a statement. The Community Service Centre should have a list of potential service providers who might assist to find an appropriate shelter.

However, there were a number of responses that researchers identified as disconcerting, not only because they were incorrect interpretations of the DVA (and other laws) but also failed to provide Lindiwe with the necessary protection. Some of the participants used a 'creative' interpretation of the law and decided to arrest Peter – though not for violation of the protection order or assault, but for riotous behaviour. Two participants would arrest Peter for riotous behaviour, and once Lindiwe was sober, they would take her statement and re-arrest him for violation of the protection order. Another participant stated that he would arrest Lindiwe for riotous behaviour should she protest against the fact that they could not take steps against Peter, because she was under the influence of alcohol. Three participants stated that there was nothing that they could do as she was under the influence of alcohol. Of these three participants, one would send her back home, another participant would warn Peter, while the third officer would speak to Peter 'man to man'. In all three these cases Lindiwe would thus be exposed to the possibility of further violence from Peter without receiving any real protection from the police.

The interviews also revealed that 40 per cent of the respondents did not know what Form 1 was, or were unable to explain its content to researchers. Paragraph 10 of the National Instruction requires members to provide Form 1 to a complainant in a domestic violence case and to explain the contents thereof. This form is incorporated in the regulations to the Act. Its purpose is to ensure that complainants are informed about all the legal options available to them and about the assistance that police officials can render to them. Importantly, Form 1 makes it clear that a complainant can both apply for a protection order at court and lay criminal charges with the police (provided that the act of domestic violence committed against her also amounts to a criminal offence). During the

interview, participants were handed a copy of the form and were asked to explain the contents to the researcher, as if the researcher were a complainant in a domestic violence case.

Station commissioners

The twenty station commissioners interviewed were very experienced, with an average length of service in the SAPS of 22,9 years. The interview covered areas similar to that for SAPS members, except that applying the DVA in practice was expanded to include various aspects related to management of domestic violence cases at station level. In this regard, questions around the following topics were included:

- Responsibility for training of SAPS members at station level
- Prioritisation of domestic violence
- Ensuring compliance with the National Instruction
- The interviewee's view of the DVA and recommendations for training

Nineteen of the 20 participants had been trained on the DVA. We noted the same trends here as in the case of police officials dealing with domestic violence, i.e. that the training methodologies used were reportedly more lecture-style and based on theory rather than practical or experiential. It was interesting to note that SAPS Legal Services appeared to play a larger role in providing training for station commissioners than the Training Division.

Our questions regarding the prioritisation of domestic violence yielded important information about the management of this category of offences at station level. It also enabled researchers to identify a number of good practices relating to service of protection orders, ensuring compliance with the National Instruction (with specific reference to administrative requirements) and measuring progress in policing domestic violence.

When it came to presenting or arranging training on domestic violence at station level, we observed that certain station commissioners leave formal

training to centralised training divisions. Others take full responsibility for training at station level, including ensuring that members who attend formal training courses away from the station share this information on their return. In addition to arranging formal training for members, station commissioners also make use of informal training opportunities, such as station lectures, 'parade' meetings, informal training while checking registers, etc. We identified the training of reservists on the implementation of the DVA as an area of concern at certain stations.¹²

Oversight bodies

There are three bodies that monitor and oversee the SAPS in respect of its compliance with the DVA: the ICD, the parliamentary portfolio committee on police in the National Assembly, and civilian bodies at provincial level (for example, the Department of Community Safety, in the case of the Western Cape).¹³ The reports submitted by the ICD to the parliamentary portfolio committee (as well as the reports of the SAPS itself) during 2007 highlighted the importance of training in ensuring members' compliance with the DVA.

Through focus group discussions with members of the ICD and the DCS, we examined their views on the effectiveness of training for police on domestic violence. We also looked at whether these bodies were conducting training for police officials on domestic violence. We found that both bodies offer training aimed at enhancing police compliance with the DVA.

In the Western Cape an important development at provincial level was the establishment of a Joint Complaints Mechanism, consisting of the DCS, SAPS (various directorates, including the National Evaluation Services), ICD, and the Metro Police. This combined body, which has signed a memorandum of understanding to ensure that there is a shared vision, jointly examines instances of non-compliance with the DVA.¹⁴ A research participant reported that this body is a good forum to ensure police accountability for non-compliance, and that the levels of cooperation from all partners are generally acceptable.

The National Assembly portfolio committee on women, youth, children and people with disability recently held parliamentary hearings on the implementation of the DVA since its introduction.¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, the call for improved police training also reverberated through these hearings. Although we had excluded this committee from the research for methodological reasons, it has an important role to play in monitoring the implementation of the DVA – thus completing the accountability picture.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research findings, researchers formulated recommendations aimed among others at the SAPS Training Division (national and provincial), station commissioners and SAPS management. These include:

- Domestic violence training should be more practical and based more on practical examples
- New students should be given additional training on domestic violence as part of their basic training
- Policy guidance should be given to station commissioners regarding their responsibility for training on the DVA at station level
- A uniform measuring tool for measuring progress in policing domestic violence at station level should be developed
- Efforts should be made to avoid duplication between training offered by the ICD and SAPS Training Division
- Resources should be allocated for training done by the ICD
- The Joint Complaints Mechanism in the Western Cape should be monitored as a potential 'promising practice' to enhance police accountability in domestic violence

REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

The completion of this project provided insights into the levels of training that police officials had received and their ability to apply the DVA in

practice. It also offered some interesting 'snapshots' of the issues that complicate the policing of domestic violence. Although researchers did not make use of the 'immersion' methods applied by, for example, Altbeker and Steinberg (who both spent a considerable amount of time accompanying SAPS members on their duties),¹⁶ the time we spent in the Community Service Centres and in conversation with SAPS members provided us with an insider's view of certain of the operational constraints facing police officials. These included a lack of secondary support, such as shelters for women experiencing domestic violence, or organisations providing counselling for these women. This frustrated many SAPS members due to their inability to intervene in what seemed to them to be an endless cycle of violence and reluctant reconciliation.

Contrary to our expectations, the police stations located in the rural areas were not necessarily worse off compared to their counterparts in urban or peri-urban areas. We observed that one of the positive spin-offs of sector policing appears to be that police officials assigned to particular sectors get to know their sectors really well, including the households where domestic violence could be expected to erupt repeatedly. They therefore seem to be in a better position to intercede. Although not necessarily as well placed as their urban counterparts in terms of access to support organisations, these rural stations seemed to be more invested in enlisting all available assistance in the community to ensure the safety of women experiencing domestic violence.

The 'insider's view' referred to above did not always result in a sympathetic view of the way in which certain police officials approach domestic violence. There were police officials who were not even aware of the National Instruction on domestic violence. Furthermore, many officials appeared to approach domestic violence cases with a lack of patience, understanding and empathy towards complainants, which is also borne out by the information presented to the portfolio committee at its recent hearings. This raises the thorny question of 'transformative'

training – in other words, to what extent does one expect training on domestic violence not only to convey knowledge and skills, but to also transform the trainee's personal attitude towards domestic violence? We did not ultimately formulate a recommendation on this,¹⁷ but we flagged it as a question for further consideration.

CONCLUSION

The project started off by questioning the assumption that 'police need more training on domestic violence'. This was borne out by our research findings, as indicated, for example, by the 40 per cent of research participants who were unfamiliar (or insufficiently familiar) with a key 'tool of the trade' such as Form 1. Our results have also shown that 'more of the same' training will likely not address the difficulties currently experienced by victims of domestic violence who approach the police for assistance. For this reason, we have recommended adjustments in terms of training methodologies and greater emphasis on training at station level – not as a replacement for the more centralised training programmes, but as an ongoing and vital complement to these programmes.

One theme that runs like a golden thread through our own observations from the interview questions and the recommendations from research participants is the call for practice-oriented training. Although the project did not include an in-depth study of the content of existing courses, our review of current training material and our informal discussions with trainers indicate that expanding the course material is not necessarily where the answer lies. As it stands, the current training courses do include practical examples and experiential training methods; however, experience has shown that when trainers are under time pressure to complete training courses and to cover a set body of prescribed coursework, this is usually the element that is cut short.

There can be no question that allowing more time for intensive, practical training on domestic violence for more SAPS members (and station

commissioners) will require the commitment of additional financial resources. This was recognised by one of the station commissioners when discussing the resource implications of ongoing training for members. She observed that although there were financial implications in providing training to members on a continuous basis (in the form of ongoing follow-up even with members who have already been trained), the necessary resources had to be made available. She added:

Domestic violence is seen as the number one crime: therefore we must go the extra mile with training.¹⁸

Given the reality of competing priorities, both in terms of the basic training programme and subsequent in-service training, one strongly hopes that SAPS management will see the long-term wisdom of investment in more focused, practical and results-based training for members on the DVA and its National Instruction.



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NOTES

- 1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Charmaine Morris and Fatima Ismail, both employed by the Saartjie Baartman Centre for Women and Children, to this article.
- 2 Act 116 of 1998.
- 3 For a comprehensive report see H Combrinck and L Wakefield, *Training for Police on the Domestic Violence Act*, Bellville and Gatesville: Community Law Centre and Saartjie Baartman Centre, 2009. Available at www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/gender/publications/gender-publications/.
- 4 The Saartjie Baartman Legal Advice and Training Programme is a partnership undertaking between the Saartjie Baartman Centre and the Gender Project of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape.
- 5 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, *Violence Against Women in South Africa – State Response to Domestic Violence and Rape*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995, 74-76; J Fedler, *Lawyerdom Domestic Violence through the Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 – An Evaluation after a Year in Operation*, *South African Law Journal*, (1995), 246; S Mathews & N Abrahams, *Combining Stories and Numbers: An Analysis of the Impact of the Domestic Violence Act (No. 116 of 1998) on Women*, Cape Town/ Tygerberg: Gender Advocacy Programme & Medical Research Council, 2001, 26-27.

- 6 SAPS National Instruction 7/1999 on Domestic Violence, Version 02.00 (published in *Government Gazette* No 207, 3 March 2006).
- 7 See P Parenzee et al, *Monitoring the Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act: First Research Report*, 2001, 85-89; S Mathews & N Abrahams, *Combining Stories and Numbers*, 2001, 26-27, 40; J Smit & F Nel, 'An evaluation of the Domestic Violence Act: What is happening in practice?', *Acta Criminologica* 15(3) (2002), 53-55; P Parenzee & D Smythe, *Domestic Violence and Development: Looking at the Farming Context*, 2003, 40, 51; L Artz, *Magistrates and the Domestic Violence Act: Issues of Interpretation*, 2003, 25-26.
- 8 For more information, see website of the Open Society Foundation of South Africa (available at www.osf.org.za) and follow links to 'Criminal Justice Initiative'.
- 9 The DVA imposes duties on members of the SAPS in respect of managing domestic violence cases, for example, sections 2 and 8(4)(b). In addition, the 'accountability framework' set out in section 18 requires the National Commissioner of the SAPS to issue national instructions (as contemplated in section 25 of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995) with which its members must comply in the execution of their functions in terms of this Act. Such instructions must be published in the *Gazette* – Sec 18(3). This national instruction was issued in 1999 and updated in 2006. A failure by a member of the SAPS to comply with an obligation imposed in terms of this Act or the National Instruction referred to above constitutes misconduct as contemplated in the South African Police Service Act of 1995 – Sec 18(4)(a). The ICD must, every six months, submit a report to Parliament regarding the number and particulars of matters reported to it, and setting out the recommendations made – Sec 18(5)(a). The National Police Commissioner must similarly submit a report to Parliament every six months regarding the number and particulars of complaints received against SAPS members in respect of any failure to comply with the DVA or National Instruction, the disciplinary proceedings instituted as a result thereof, the decisions which resulted from such proceedings, and steps taken as a result of recommendations made by the ICD – Sec 18(5)(d)(i)-(iii).
- 10 The study was conducted with a further objective, viz. to examine whether the intersections between domestic violence and HIV/AIDS should be included in police training on domestic violence. Due to length constraints, this objective and related findings will not be discussed here.
- 11 The interview schedule also contained a section on the intersections between domestic violence and HIV/AIDS, which will not be dealt with here.
- 12 Station commissioners are responsible for the training of reservists. The responses received here ranged from those of station commissioners who had put highly regulated systems in place for the training of reservists on domestic violence, to those who conceded that they did not have training for reservists on domestic violence. This would constitute a serious shortcoming in practice, since reservists fulfill the same tasks in practice as 'regular' members and are therefore expected to also attend to domestic violence complaints.
- 13 A further body or mechanism, viz. the SAPS Evaluation Services, which operates both nationally and provincially, should be added here.
- 14 The Joint Complaints Mechanism body handles not only non-compliance under the DVA, but also other instances of alleged police misconduct, e.g. death in custody.
- 15 See minutes of portfolio committee meeting on 28 October, available at www.pmg.org.za/report/20091028-domestic-violence-act-public-hearings-implementation-over-past-years.
- 16 See A Altbeker, *The Dirty Work of Democracy*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2005; J Steinberg, *Thin Blue: the unwritten rules of policing South Africa*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008.
- 17 The topic of transformative training and its effectiveness (or lack thereof) is a broad one that falls outside the scope of this project.
- 18 Translated from Afrikaans.

On the record...

Interview with Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Since the 2009 national election, minister of police, Nathi Mthethwa, has been reorganising and strengthening the national secretariat of police. The existence of this body is constitutionally mandated. Gareth Newham spoke to the new national secretary of police, Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, on 25 February 2010.

Gareth Newham (GN): What are the core functions of the Secretariat?

Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane (JIQ): Essentially, the core function is to support the minister of police to fulfil his constitutional mandate and responsibility. This includes determining the policy and strategic direction of the police, securing its budget and overseeing expenditure. It is for this reason that the Secretariat has a strong policy and research role to play in support of the minister. Ultimately it is to provide civilian oversight over the police. The minister has added a function, which is to build and maintain partnerships. So there are three key functions of the Secretariat: to advise the minister on policy and conduct research to inform the minister's decision-making; to conduct civilian oversight of the police through monitoring and evaluation; and thirdly, to fulfil these functions through partnerships. The minister also wants the Secretariat to play a role in the drafting of legislation for the police, which used to be done only by the SAPS.

GN: Between 1994 and 1999 the Secretariat was seen as a powerful structure and played an important policy role. However, after 1999 the post of the national secretary was downgraded, and for the past decade many people have seen the National Secretariat as having a very limited function. Now the post of the national secretary has been upgraded and there are moves to substantially strengthen the structure. What has changed?

JIQ: The changes were twofold. Firstly, government became increasingly concerned with the quality of service delivery and there was a strong emphasis on strengthening the monitoring and evaluation capacity of government. Secondly, the minister himself has been the driving force behind the change to the Secretariat. In the period following the April 2009 national elections he identified a range of gaps and weaknesses in policing. This was partly because of concerns about the police that were being raised in parliament. Also, there were a number of crucial issues in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security that had not been taken forward. It was for these reasons that the need arose to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat. The role of the Secretariat also needs to be entrenched, and so we are in the process of drafting legislation to give the Secretariat the authority it needs. This will go before parliament this year. Currently we are also looking at how we align the Provincial Secretariats' work with the National Secretariat, given that policing is a national competency in South Africa. We are also going to ensure that the National Secretariat has people of quality who can perform the necessary functions that are required. The minister wants to make sure that the capacity of the National Secretariat is entrenched so that it does not again become weakened, as was the case in the past.

GN: What is the vision that is driving the current thinking of changing the police from a 'service' to a 'force'?

JIQ: Essentially it can be explained in terms of three things, accountability, communication and

coordination. The issue of accountability is most important as there is a need to create clear line functions in the police so that each person knows who is in charge, who they are accountable to, and who is accountable to them. This will also help the public know who has authority and responsibility. This is also a way of improving discipline in the police, which is an important matter. It must also be understood that the approach is not just about making the police tougher on criminals. The reorganisation and strengthening of the National Secretariat and the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) must be seen in this context. We are aware that there may be challenges as a result of changing the police. To minimise the negative impact of these challenges, the external oversight structures are being strengthened. The minister has thought through these issues carefully. It is not just a knee-jerk reaction.

GN: What are the most important police oversight challenges facing the Secretariat?

JIQ: There are a number of challenges. The past backward slide of the Secretariat is not just the fault of the SAPS. It was also about the capacity of the Secretariat. This is the biggest challenge we face. We need to bring in the right people but we also need to draw on the expertise that is out there in society. There are many people in various organisations that have a lot of valuable experience and insight and we want to work in partnership with them to assist the Secretariat in fulfilling its functions. It is for this reason that we intend to establish reference groups consisting of representatives from civil society to engage with the Secretariat.

Another challenge is getting the police to understand the functions of the Secretariat. We need to recapture some of the terrain that the Secretariat held in its early days. This is a daily challenge. Addressing this challenge requires the support and vision of our Executive Authority (the minister). Fortunately this does exist and we believe that legislation will help. We also need parliament to hold the Secretariat accountable for its oversight role. Another key challenge is that

the Secretariat will have to remain focused on the broad issues, or the structural issues, that impact on police transformation and not be distracted by the different individual issues that emerge.

Over the past few years the Secretariat has tried to investigate each complaint against the police that was brought before it. However, these complaints usually refer to police service delivery and fall within the responsibility of operational policing. We need to take cognisance of the service delivery and other complaints that are made against the police, but our focus needs to be on the structural and policy shortcomings that led to the complaint, and not only the complaint itself.

We are not going to establish a massive Secretariat. Rather, we want to have a streamlined body that is effective. This will require that we clearly communicate with the public that we are not a complaints office. We have to keep a clear line between our role, which is to focus on civilian oversight and policy advice; and the role of the police, which is to focus on operations. There mustn't be encroachment on each other's core functions. This will be a challenge that we must always keep in mind.

Another important challenge is developing a clear implementation plan. Once the legislation is finalised and our functions are clear, we will be in a better position to plan our activities. We will need to keep our house in order if we are to succeed in holding the police accountable for the implementation of their plans.

GN: Could you explain the issue of separating policy issues from operational issues by speaking to practical examples? There will be specific incidents that make it into the media that will be indicative of a larger problem in the police. A couple of examples that come to mind include the recent arrest of the UCT student by members of the SAPS VIP unit that were part of the presidential cavalcade; and the accusation that evidence is going missing from the police forensic laboratories.

JIQ: The minister is aware of these issues and will usually do a couple of things. He may order a

specific investigation into the incident for the purposes of uncovering the facts behind it. If police officers have broken the law they will be subject to criminal charges. On the other hand, he will also instruct the Secretariat to look into the reasons behind the incident. Are there policy or other organisational shortcomings that have resulted in this incident? He will then expect the Secretariat to come up with recommendations on how it could be addressed more broadly. He may also request the internal SAPS Inspectorate to investigate a problem and give him feedback. He does this quite regularly. However, the UCT example cited was purely an operational issue and was dealt with at this level by the minister and national commissioner.

GN: Finally, may I ask you to briefly tell our readers something about your background before you were appointed the national secretary for the Police Civilian Secretariat?

JIQ: I am from KwaZulu Natal and I was politically active in youth structures during the 1980s and early 1990s. During this time I also started monitoring political violence for the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM). These experiences brought me in contact with the police and I became aware of the challenges associated with policing and private security. During the 1990s my late husband was among those from the African National Congress (ANC) structures who were integrated into the SAPS as part of its transformation and it was also through him that I obtained good insight into policing. In 1999 he left the police and we set up a consultancy. Our first job in fact was for the National Secretariat for Safety and Security, as it was then called. Most of our consulting work was focused on research and facilitation in relation to policing. We worked for a variety of stakeholders from government, civil society and the private sector. Increasingly we started working on policing in Africa and spent time in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Sierra Leone. After a time my husband became ill and it became impossible to travel. It was at this time, in 2006, that I was appointed to head up the Business Robbery Strategy Project at Business Against

Crime (BAC). I was then offered this position in 2009 on a fixed term contract.

GN: Thank you for taking the time to be interviewed and for sharing your insights with SA Crime Quarterly.



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