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A GOLDEN GOAL FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Security arrangements for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup

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The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup has been a major talking point both locally and internationally, and many concerns have been raised over South Africa's ability to host such a major event. These concerns essentially relate to infrastructural capacity and security. It goes without saying that South Africa is obliged to provide high level security for participating teams and management as well as for the thousands of spectators who are expected to flood South Africa for the duration of the event. This article takes a look at other high level events that have been hosted in South Africa so as to get an idea of what is required and examines planned security arrangements for the 2010 World Cup.

The FIFA Soccer World Cup in 2010¹ will be a month-long event taking place in June/July of that year and will be decided by 64 matches played in ten stadiums spread over nine South African cities. During this time approximately 450,000 visitors are expected to visit this country, while 3.3 million tickets will be sold for these matches. South Africa, as the host country, is obligated to ensure a high level of security for this event, which includes the security of the teams, the spectators, and their property, for the duration of the event. At the same time 'normal' policing, i.e. policing the public of South Africa, cannot be neglected.

Media reports have questioned South Africa's readiness to present an event of this magnitude. In addition to concerns about infrastructure and transport, the high levels of serious and violent crimes in particular have raised doubts about the ability of the police to provide the required levels of security. In the discussion that follows, attention will be given to the 2010 crime and security situation, as

well as to the development potential of this event for the South African police and for policing in general.

Crime overview

The crime situation in South Africa is serious and dominates the domestic agendas of both government and civil society as well as daily media reports. There are also legitimate concerns that levels of violence associated with crime in this country are on the increase. The result is increased fear of crime, and growing distrust in the police and government in general to effectively deal with crime. For example, in a victim survey done by the Institute for Security Studies in 2003, 58% of respondents indicated that they are afraid of walking alone in their area after dark, compared to 25% in a 1998 survey.

Table 1 provides a summary of the serious and violent crimes that are our biggest cause for concern. In an attempt to determine possible trends, a comparison is provided for three financial years since 1994/95. Unfortunately, the figures for car

hijackings are available only from 2001/02 (Table 2), as is the case with cash-in-transit robberies. In the latter case the actual figures are given because, although still serious, the numbers are too small to determine a meaningful ratio per 100,000 of the population.

<i>Table 1: Comparative figures for serious and violent crimes² (rate per 100,000 of the population)</i>			
	1994/95	1999/2000	2005/06
Murder	66,9	52,5	39,5
Attempted murder	69,1	65,4	43,9
Rape	115,3	122,8	117,1
Robbery (aggravated)	218,5	229,5	255,3
Robbery (common)	84,2	173,5	159,4

<i>Table 2: Car hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies</i>					
	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Hijackings (rate per 100,000)	35,4	32,3	29,7	26,7	27,4
Cash-in-transit robberies (number of incidents)	238	374	192	220	383

According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2005/06 there are promising signs over the last five years that crime is on the decrease. Between 2004/05 and 2005/06 the listed serious and violent crimes decreased as follows:

- Murder: 2,0%
- Attempted murder: 16,6%
- Rape: 1%
- Robbery with aggravated circumstances: 6,2%
- Common robbery (an element of violence, but without the use of weapons): 18,3%.

Car hijackings, on the other hand, which decreased by 10,1% in the previous financial year, increased

by 2,6% in the last financial year (2005/06). Cash-in-transit robberies increased by 74,1% and robberies at shopping malls (not shown in the tables) by 32%.

These decreases are indeed promising, but it must be kept in mind that they are decreases from extremely high levels and that it will take a long time before these crimes reach the sort of levels that will positively impact on public feelings of safety. The murder rate, for example, decreased from 66,9 per 100,000 in 1994/95 to 39,5 in 2005/06, but is still almost eight times the world average of 5,5 and 20 times higher than the British rate of just under two per 100,000. In other words, if the current reduction rate in murder is maintained, it will take approximately another 15 years to reach the international norm. The South African figure becomes even more disturbing if one looks at the real number of 18,528 people who were murdered in one year, i.e. 50 murders per day.

Rape has remained at the same high level over the last 11 years and shows no sign of decreasing to the extent that some of the other serious crimes have done. In real terms, the figure of 117,1 per 100,000 in 2005/06 represents almost 55,000 rapes, i.e. 150 women raped every day in this country. This is an alarming situation; especially in view of the result of independent research that shows that between 33–66% of rape cases are never reported to the police. Rape is also not an easy crime to police and happens mostly indoors in areas outside the normal reach of police activities. Recent research has shown that in 75% of rape incidents the victim and perpetrator are known to one another.

However, it is robbery, and the violence that goes with it, that has the biggest psychological impact on the ordinary person. Whether it is robbery at one's home, a hijacking, or robbery at places of entertainment (e.g. shopping malls, restaurants, etc), the indisputable fact is that people are afraid of being robbed. If this situation is allowed to continue and, even worse, allowed to further deteriorate, it will create a psychosis of fear which, in turn, could lead to irrational and even unlawful behaviour by certain individuals and groups.

Unlike murder and attempted murder, robbery (both aggravated and common) displays a different trend. Whereas murder consistently decreased since 1994/95 (by approximately 40% over the last 11 years), robbery with aggravating circumstances increased from 218,5 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to 288,1 in 2003/04; before decreasing again to 255,3. This last figure is still 17% higher than in 1994/95. Common robbery increased rapidly from 84,2 per 100,000 in 1994/95, to 223,4 in 2003/04, before decreasing to 159,4 in 2005/06. This means that in spite of decreases over the last three years, common robbery is now 90% higher than 11 years ago.

It is fairly certain that robbery (and non-violent crimes such as theft) will be the biggest crime threat to visitors and spectators during the 2010 Soccer World Cup. When considering the ability of the police to safeguard the 2010 event, it may therefore be useful to briefly compare this event with previous major events held in South Africa, with a specific focus on the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup.

Previous 'big' events in South Africa

Since the advent of democracy South Africa has hosted a number of major events, notably the 1995 IRB Rugby World Cup, the 1999 All Africa Games, the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup and a number of international conferences such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the World Conference on Racism (WCR). During this time the police developed effective security concepts to underpin their entire big event planning, and which have proven to be very successful. No serious incidents occurred at any of these events. According to SAPS Deputy National Commissioner André Pruis, these concepts were recognised by the United Nations (UN) after the WSSD and adopted for all future UN events.

A quick comparison between the 2010 Soccer World Cup (SWC) and the 2003 Cricket World Cup (CWC) will give an indication of the size of this type of security operation. Whereas the SWC will be a month-long event with 64 matches, the CWC lasted 44 days, with 33 matches. CWC matches were played in seven provinces, while SWC

matches will be played in all nine provinces. The security budget for the CWC was approximately R91m, against FIFA's safety and security budget estimate of approximately \$36m (more than R250m) for 2010.

The combined force deployed for the CWC totalled approximately 4,600 members of the South African Police Service, South African National Defence Force, Metropolitan Police Services, various emergency services and private security companies. Given that the duration of the event should not have a substantial influence on the number of police/security personnel deployed, the total number of personnel for the SWC will probably be determined more by factors such as the larger number of matches, the fact that matches will be played in all nine provinces, and that much larger crowds of supporters and spectators are expected at the soccer matches. A rough estimate at this stage places the number of police/security personnel at double that of the CWC, i.e. approximately 10,000.

To the credit of the South African Police Service, which led the security operation during 2003, no serious incidents occurred during the entire event. In fact, after the CWC a leading London financial newspaper remarked that an amazing thing happened during the Cricket World Cup in South Africa: "Nothing went wrong". This is despite the fact that crime rates were generally higher in 2003/04 than at any time before or since, even for robbery. So why is there such widespread concern that South Africa may not be able to provide adequate security for the Soccer World Cup?

The security operation for 2010

At an ISS seminar, 'Securing the 2010 Soccer World Cup: Are we ready?', in September 2006, the SAPS was given the opportunity to allay fears that crime may derail the World Cup and that South Africa will not be ready to safeguard this event. Assistant Commissioner Mathongwane, on behalf of the police, gave an overview of the security plan for this event, but was careful to avoid detail that may compromise operational security.

Based on Commissioner Mathongwane's presentation and the FIFA report of 4 May 2004, the

security operation is understood to be built around the following key areas:

- An integrated operational coordinating mechanism. The utilisation of such a mechanism (or organisational structure) to plan and execute the security operation is crucial. In this instance the police are once again the lead agent in the so-called JOINTS (Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure) that reports to and is directed by the JCPS cluster (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) at both Cabinet and Directors-General level. The JOINTS created an operational planning committee, chaired by a divisional commissioner, and a priority committee, chaired by an assistant commissioner, for the operational work. All the various role-players, including relevant government departments such as Sport and Recreation and Environmental Affairs and Tourism, as well as SAFA (South African Football Association) and FIFA, are represented on the planning and priority committees.
- An integrated security strategy. This strategy details the security for the stadiums, practice venues, public viewing areas, media centres, main hotels, public transport, air- and seaports, main routes and popular tourist attractions. The strategy also provides for an integrated intelligence capability, information technology security, and control of undesirable persons (e.g. soccer hooligans or 'risk supporters'), public order, food security, dedicated courts, contingency plans and disaster management. In 2004 the FIFA Inspection Group, while concerned about the crime problem, expressed their satisfaction with this approach.
- Adequate numbers. The SAPS has ensured that by 2010 (and in addition to other police and security services), it will have sufficient member numbers to both safeguard the event and to provide 'normal' policing services. In 2001 the police numbered approximately 121,000 and in 2006 that figure increased to 156,000. According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2005/06 the personnel target for 2008/09 is 179,000.
- A thorough vetting and accreditation process. Security companies, for example, will have to be accredited before being contracted.
- Training. Members of the various security services, including police reservists who will be utilised during the event, will receive special training and orientation.
- Practice. Other big events between now and 2010 will be used to test the above approach and to make changes where necessary. An example of such a big event is South Africa's general election in 2009.
- Good media communication. Structures to ensure good media and public communication will be in place well ahead of the event. Apart from keeping the media informed about security issues, these structures will also be responsible for security 'tips' to the public (during the 2003 CWC these 'tips' were also published in the Tournament Guide).
- Lessons learnt. Over the years the police have sent representatives to attend a number of big events abroad and to study their security arrangements. For example, police members attended the last three Olympic Games and other big sporting events such as the 2006 FIFA Soccer World Cup in Germany. From all these events and local experience they were able to develop the security concepts that seem to be very effective locally and also impressed the United Nations security representatives. According to Commissioner Mathongwane the following practices, applied by the Germans during the 2006 World Cup, were of particular interest:
 - The use of 'Fan Fests'. These were stadiums not used for any of the matches and where the organisers provided facilities to show matches on big screens. People who did not have or could not afford tickets had free access to these stadiums. However, the same level of security that applied at the official venues also applied at the Fan Fests.
 - The ticketing system. Tickets were not only electronically monitored, but also personalised. This had a number of advantages, such as

keeping the authorities informed of the number of spectators and also who they were. In addition it prevented sales of tickets on the black market.

- The integrated security plan. Some aspects of the German security plan were very useful for purposes of finalising South Africa's integrated security strategy.

Policing and security

The current crime situation in South Africa is certainly a huge area of concern and perhaps also a source of embarrassment for the South African government. This is especially the case in view of the fast approaching Soccer World Cup in 2010 and our struggle to get the crime situation under control. It is feared that the ongoing high levels of crime and violence may deter many people from coming to South Africa and even, according to some speculation, that the event itself may be moved elsewhere. Against this background, government over the last few months announced a number of new 'plans' to curb crime.

At a press conference on 1 August 2006, Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, provided details of the crime combating strategy adopted by Cabinet at their *lekgotla* the week before. This strategy is nothing really new, but does contain some additions to the existing National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) which was adopted in 2000 and which boasted a number of operational successes. According to the Minister his office would approach the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation to do a study on the violent nature of crime in South Africa. This is a welcome admission that a better understanding of this phenomenon is needed in order to deal with it more effectively.

The Minister also made it clear that much more emphasis will be placed on eradicating organised crime. For this purpose special teams will be established to deal with crime syndicates while other teams will be formed to search for and arrest suspects for whom warrants of arrest are outstanding. Intelligence units will assist these teams and will receive additional funding and human resources. In view of indications of the

increasing involvement of foreigners in crime in South Africa, the Minister announced stricter border control measures. For this purpose a national border control and security strategy had been finalised and a national border control centre set up. Finally, the Minister announced closer cooperation with Business Against Crime and the mobilisation of communities, through religious groupings and others, to become more actively involved in the fight against crime.

However, the large scale restructuring that the SAPS has embarked upon remains a source of concern. Although the intentions of this exercise are not being questioned, its practicability is in doubt. The intentions are, among others, to move police officials at various administrative offices to police stations to numerically strengthen these stations and to increase police visibility; to decentralise specialised units to the so-called accounting (or 'super') stations where they will be more accessible to communities; and to transfer high ranking officers such as directors and assistant commissioners to 'problem' stations as station commissioners and to other key posts.

From discussions with members of the police it is evident that there is growing dissatisfaction with the rationale behind the restructuring process. Police officials are generally confused with the reasoning behind the process and with the way in which it is being communicated and implemented. It is to be expected that this type of dissatisfaction and uncertainty must have a negative impact on morale. As a consequence the following questions or concerns about the restructuring process are raised:

- Is it wise to undertake such a comprehensive restructuring so close to the biggest major event this country has ever seen and amidst an increasing violent crime situation? Would it not be more realistic to phase it in more gradually and over a much longer period?
- Is it a fair assumption by police management that senior officers, who in many cases obtained their senior rank due to fast track promotions to enhance transformation, will improve the management of problematic police stations?
- Instead of decentralising the specialised units and running the risk of these members eventually

losing their skills or leaving the police (and losing their skills anyway), why not rather consider strengthening them and enabling them, firstly, to retain and continue developing expertise, and secondly, from a position of strength and expertise, to assist and train members at police station level?

- The police/public ratio of 1:385 compares favourably with the international average of 1:300–400 and, as indicated above, is set to improve even more over the next three years. It appears as if the problem is not so much with the number of police, but rather with how they are being managed. This notion is supported by the recent announcement of the Minister of Safety and Security that retired police officers will be approached to assist the police in terms of their experience and skills. At the same time it is an acknowledgement that the police lost more expertise than they could afford. There seems to be an almost desperate search for alternative ways to compensate for earlier mistakes, but without admitting that these were made.

Conclusion

There are legitimate concerns that South Africa may not be able to provide an adequate level of security for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. These concerns are based primarily on two premises:

- Firstly, there is general consensus that the high levels of crime and especially the extreme nature of the violence that accompanies these crimes, create a negative perception about South Africa's readiness to host this event. There is a danger that this may deter people from coming here and some even speculate that the event may be moved to another country.
- Secondly, the perceived struggle within the police to stem the crime tide and the apparent clumsiness with which they are attempting to restructure the organisation to make it more efficient and effective, leads to serious distrust in the ability of the police to safeguard the 2010 event.

As regards the first premise, there is an obvious need for more visible commitment and an expression of political will by government to address the crime problem. This should include a

more holistic and inclusive approach to crime, both in terms of its manifestation and its economic and socio-political roots. Commitment would also include the setting up of an extra-cabinet ministerial committee to manage such an inclusive approach.

With regard to the second premise, some form of political intervention is necessary to ensure that the restructuring of the police is done sensibly and responsibly. The police have in the past proved themselves as competent and able to secure major events. This was the case, for example, in 2003 with the Cricket World Cup, despite the fact that in general levels of crime were higher then than they are at the moment. Therefore the current restructuring process should not be allowed in any way to impair the ability of the police to perform according to their proven ability.

Acknowledgement

This article is based on J Burger, The 2010 FIFA World Cup: A Development Opportunity for South Africa, in *Discourse* 34 (2), Dec 2006, pp 40-46.

Endnotes

- 1 Most of the information for this article can be found on the Internet at, for example:
<<http://www.southafrica.info/2010/fifareportsa.htm>>
- 2 These figures were taken from the *Annual Reports of the South African Police Service* 2001/02 – 2005/06.

REACHING A VERDICT

The impact of minimum sentencing

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The so-called 'temporary' minimum sentencing legislation introduced into South African law in 1998 is still in place. The legislation was passed largely in response to high crime rates at the time and the perceived leniency of the courts, and prescribes minimum sentences ranging from five years' to life imprisonment for a variety of offences (including murder and rape and a range of other crimes, some of which are non-violent). Given the current furore over crime, it is highly likely that in April this year the legislation will be renewed for another year. But what has the impact of the legislation been and what legislative changes should be considered?

In 2006 Hlakanaphila Analytics was commissioned by the Open Society Foundation South Africa (OSF-SA) to investigate the impact of the minimum sentencing legislation. 'Impact' was considered broadly and included the impact on crime, on court procedure, on consistency of sentencing, on the rights of victims, on judicial independence, on public confidence, as well as issues such as the legislation's constitutionality. A separate study of the impact on the size of the prison population was also commissioned by OSF-SA (and selected results will be published in the next issue of the *SA Crime Quarterly*).

Methods used to assess impact

The methodology for the Hlakanaphila study involved analysis of data including crime data, court data held by the National Prosecuting Authority, and Correctional Services data, supplemented by a survey of a sample of closed cases (328 records) drawn from three regional courts. Interviews with 50 relevant role players were conducted, including judges, magistrates and prosecutors. A review of relevant case law and international literature was also done.

The only other review of the impact of the minimum sentencing legislation was conducted in 2000 by the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC). The SALRC study was arguably conducted too soon, as there is usually a delay of one to two years between a crime being committed and sentence being passed in our courts; and the legislation's provisions apply only to crimes committed after minimum sentencing became law.

One finding from the 2000 SALRC review that was quickly contradicted by the Hlakanaphila study was that magistrates and judges now do *not* feel their discretion is unduly compromised by the legislation. This was explained by a judgement from the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down in March 2001, which changed the way in which the courts had been interpreting the legislation. *Malgas v S* (Case Number 117/2000) essentially decided that a court could deviate from the prescribed minimum sentence *if all the circumstances considered together* were "substantial and compelling".

Earlier cases opined that a circumstance had to be extraordinary to justify a deviation from the

minimum, which was a much more restrictive interpretation. Presiding officers, particularly magistrates, largely feel this judgement gives them enough discretion to deviate when appropriate.

Although it was not part of the brief to investigate overcrowding in prisons, the researchers had to consider correctional services data for the purposes of investigating changes in sentence length.

It soon became apparent that current levels of overcrowding have little to do with minimum sentencing. Given that most accused sentenced for offences covered by minimum sentencing would in any event have received some sort of custodial sentence, the effect of minimum sentencing only becomes apparent at the point when prisoners remain in prison beyond the sentence and parole date they would otherwise have received – and in the majority of cases we have not yet reached that point.

But it is also clear that in future years, the crisis in prisons will be far worse than what we have seen so far, as a direct result of minimum sentencing – and will only be ameliorated by mass early releases.

Have minimum sentences helped reduce crime?


According to the official line, crime has gone down since the legislation was passed. Can this be

attributed to minimum sentencing? Murder, the most reliable indicator of crime levels and also one of the few crimes for which a minimum is prescribed under all circumstances, has indeed dropped since the legislation was passed. But this trend cannot necessarily be attributed to minimum sentencing. This is because the downward trend was established long before the legislation was implemented, may well have been overstated, and furthermore, may be in the process of reversing.

The survey of closed cases highlighted the fact that whereas many countries consider 'homicide' rates when analysing crime trends, in South Africa we look at the 'murder' rate. There is a tendency in this country to think of culpable homicide only in relation to fatal traffic accidents. In the closed case sample there were no traffic accidents but instead cases of shootings in the chest and stabbings that were charged and convicted as culpable homicide. Surely we should be looking at the number of homicides – murder plus culpable homicide – when analysing crime levels?

Plotting both the number of murder and culpable homicide cases over time showed that the two trends tended to broadly mirror each other until 2001/2 (Figure 1). This was the year of the uproar over 'incorrect' categorisations of crime and the

Figure 1: Trends for murder and culpable homicide in SA, 1994/95–2005/06



retraining of police in how to classify crimes, as well as the explicit linking of crime rates to police performance. Thereafter murder continues to go down quite sharply, but culpable homicide goes up. The trend for the two together – referred to as ‘homicide’ – flattens out over the last three years, possibly indicating the end of the downward trend in homicides.

It makes sense that minimum sentences have not necessarily impacted on murder levels because the international literature shows that the severity of sentence tends not to operate as a deterrent to crime. Instead, only high rates of detection of crime act as a deterrent.

The best illustration of the point is that pick-pocketing was a capital offence in Victorian England, yet those who pick-pocketed regularly plied their trade during public hangings of people convicted of pick-pocketing, because they did not believe they would be caught. Sentences – even the death penalty – are irrelevant to criminals if they do not believe they will be caught.

The literature did however find a small impact on crime via incapacitation – the impact of the removal of the offender from society. Internationally, this effect has been found to be small (because comparatively few offenders are caught, and the impact is only relevant in the case of serial offenders). Compared to other measures such as investment in social development and education, imprisonment is found to be expensive for the small amount of crime it prevents.

Impact on court efficiency

In the case of South Africa, for the same reason that the impact on overcrowding is yet to come, any small incapacitation effects of the legislation are probably still to come. Worse, the collateral impact of the legislation on court efficiency may be reducing the number of serious offenders being sent to prison, thus lessening any anticipated incapacitation effect.

Since January 2002 the total number of admissions to prison has dropped by 25% for both long- and short-term sentences. There are several reasons for this drop, including an increased reluctance to send

‘petty’ offenders to prison. Another reason lies in an increase in court congestion.

The increase in court congestion is a result of cases taking longer to conclude. The research, using NPA data, showed that both the regional court and high court – the courts in which these serious offences are heard – are taking longer to conclude cases and this may be partly attributable to minimum sentencing. By 2006 the average time between conviction and sentencing had risen to seven months, from four months in 2005. The time between the offence being committed and sentencing in the high court was in 2006 at an average of 25 months for cases heard by the high court and 27 months for cases heard in the regional courts and sentenced in the high courts (life imprisonment cases).

Why are cases taking longer? Evidence suggests that accused persons facing stiff minimum sentences – of which they must be forewarned on first appearance – seldom plead guilty, tend to use Legal Aid more, and tend to appeal their sentences more often – lengthening case cycles, and adding to the overall burden on the courts.

This view is supported by interview evidence, the sample data and relevant data on use of Legal Aid

Figure 2: Number of cases finalised with a verdict per regional court



Source: NPA

and appeals. Thus there are fewer serious cases being convicted but they are taking up more of the courts' time. The number of cases finalised per regional court is dropping (Figure 2), indicating the reducing efficiency of these courts and the increasing time taken to resolve cases.

Interviewees furthermore consistently expressed the view that the split procedure for life imprisonment cases – which requires referral of the case to the high court for sentencing if it was heard in the regional court – is onerous and causing havoc.

The referred cases are referred to as 'section 52s'. Three copies of the regional court record must be prepared and sent to the high court for a s52. The high court must then satisfy itself of the conviction in the regional court before passing sentence. To do so the high court can and does re-hear evidence and often – more frequently than is comfortable, considering that these are life imprisonment cases – finds that the decision of the regional court to convict was incorrect. Available NPA data for 2005 shows that 12% of regional court convictions were set aside by the high court at sentencing stage.

The high courts are not in favour of the minimum sentencing legislation, largely because of this split sentencing procedure, and have twice found it to be unconstitutional.

The Witwatersrand High Court said the split procedure violated the right to a fair trial and caused inordinate delays. The Eastern Cape High Court held that the requirement to impose life imprisonment violated the principle of separation of powers, while the split procedure violated the right of an accused to have a case heard before the ordinary courts. In both cases the Constitutional Court declined to agree with the High Court (see *S v Dzukuda & others, S v Tshilo 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC)*, and *S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC)*).

Why is the number of short sentences also dropping? The data suggest that serious crime is being prioritised, in terms of the scarce resources of both prison time and court time. The number of persons serving terms of five years or less has dropped and continues to do so, which could

suggest either that crimes which used to attract short sentences are getting heavier sentences, or that they are being dealt with outside the court and prison system.

However, the number of people sentenced to long-term imprisonment has also been dropping, while there has not been a vast increase in capacity for alternative sentencing and diversion. This suggests that less serious crimes are being crowded out, and are either not entering the prison system, or are not entering the court system at all. Indeed, NPA data show that since January 2002 the total number of cases in the district courts has dropped by approximately 10%.

Prioritising serious crime is laudable. But what message will an offender receive from the criminal justice system after committing a less serious offence, and what impact will that have on potential future behaviour?

More consistent sentences?

So far the research has established that the legislation has probably not had any desirable impact on crime and has probably reduced court efficiency. Have the prescribed minimums at least improved consistency of sentencing? Unfortunately, this is not generally the case either.

The minimums have indeed increased the average sentence length per offence type. Analysis of Correctional Services data showed that between 1995 and 2005 the average term served by current prisoners for sexual offences rose from approximately seven months to just over ten years (126 months).

But the minimum sentencing legislation appears at the same time to have increased the range of sentences passed per offence type, thus reducing overall consistency. This is because the minimums were generally set so far in excess of the earlier norms that in practice the 'minimums' are operating as maximums – an obvious result when the minimum sentence for some crimes is also the maximum penalty in our law (life imprisonment).

The increase in the range of sentences is a result of the 'maximum minimum' being applied in some

instances, while sentences in line with previous practice are applied in others, leading to a greater range of sentences. For example, in the research sample of closed cases, murder charges resulted in an average sentence of eight and a half years, with sentences ranging widely from non-custodial sentences on the one hand, to 15 years' imprisonment on the other.

The exception to this finding is rape (but not life imprisonment rape). The minimum penalty prescribed for rape is ten years on first offence. (When rape is aggravated by specified violent circumstances or the vulnerability of the victim, life in prison is prescribed). The sample of rape cases drawn for 2005 showed the sentences for rape cases to be clustered around the ten year minimum, with a narrower range from seven to 15 years. The average sentence was ten years.

Why should rape result in less of a range of sentences than other offences? Rape is different because it is the only offence apart from murder (and murder charges often result in culpable homicide convictions) for which the minimum of ten years applies to *all* rape offences. Most other offences require particular aggravating circumstances, such as use of a firearm or a threshold amount of money involved, for a minimum to apply.

The minimum is also well known by prosecutors and magistrates and is unlikely to be overlooked. A ten-year sentence falls well within the regional court jurisdiction of 15 years, allowing for leeway on either side of the minimum.

From the point of view of those calling for more appropriate sentences for rape, the legislation may well be viewed as a success. But that may only be from the perspective of those victims whose cases reach conviction stage. The harsher penalties have raised the stakes and reduced the likelihood of a guilty plea, increasing the proportion of rape victims who have to endure a full trial process.

Rape cases still show a far higher withdrawal rate than other offences. Of the sample of rape cases opened in 2005 that had been closed by June/July

2006, some 67% of rape cases were resolved by way of withdrawal, compared to 39% of all other offences.

Victims of the worst kinds of rape (life imprisonment rapes) also face testifying in both the regional court for trial and the high court for sentencing, if the high court finds it necessary. Given that these cases include rapes of children, and the high court often feels compelled to be sure of the evidence of child witnesses, it is indeed the most vulnerable who are bearing the brunt of this two-step process.

Public confidence in the justice system

Has public confidence been buoyed by the lengthening of sentences? Magistrates and prosecutors agree that on the whole, victims of serious crime welcome heavy sentences – if they are in court for sentencing or are informed of the sentences. Broader public confidence, however, is linked to more than just sentencing.

Earlier work conducted by Hlakanaphila Analytics for the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) found that negative perceptions of the justice system are closely linked to perceptions about the general slowness of the justice system. So anything that slows down the operation of the courts and results in more postponements and referrals – like minimum sentencing – is likely to impact negatively on public confidence.

It is unclear whether the positive impact of the heavier sentences offsets the negative impact that the legislation has on the length of cases.

Public confidence may also be affected by raised expectations. Told that a prescribed minimum applies, victims may feel aggrieved if there is a deviation toward leniency in their case – even if the sentence ultimately handed down is in excess of what applied in the past.

This is particularly likely in the most serious life imprisonment cases, when victims are often confused by the referral to the high court for sentencing. NPA data show that in 79% of cases in 2005 when life imprisonment was prescribed and a

conviction obtained, an outcome other than life imprisonment was handed down in the high court.

Even for less serious offences, the closed case sample found that the minimums still do not appear to be widely applied. The court records of the sampled 2005 cases were examined to see whether the offence noted in the charge sheet was one for which a minimum is prescribed. The majority of the cases classified as 'minimum sentence cases' were committed with a firearm and should, if the minimums were strictly applied, at the least have received a five-year sentence (the shortest of all the prescribed minimums). Yet in only 55% of all 'minimum sentence' cases was a sentence of five or more years handed down.

Part of the problem is that the offences and circumstances in which minimum sentencing applies are quite complicated, and open to interpretation (except for 'ordinary' rape). In the 2005 sample, where there was a deviation from the minimum, 'substantial and compelling circumstances' justifying the deviation were only noted in writing, as required by the legislation, in one fifth of cases. This suggests that the courts frequently do not realise that, or consider whether, a minimum sentence applies in less well-known instances where they are indeed applicable.

Interviewees suggested that the problem of the split procedure could be dealt with either by allowing the regional court to sentence to life imprisonment, or by allowing it to decide whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances and only referring to the high court those cases where there are not. The problem with the latter is that it would still be the most serious cases that would result in a split procedure. The problem with the former would be those 12% of cases where the high court has had to overturn the conviction of the regional court.

No one is suggesting that all potential life imprisonment cases should be set down, heard and sentenced in the high court – because there are simply too many of them for our less than 30 judges to handle. The NPA data show that between May 2002 and March 2006, almost 10,000 cases in which a life sentence was a consideration were

heard by the high courts (either from trial stage or for sentencing only). This means that in less than five years the high courts had the potential of filling almost 9% of South Africa's prison beds through the life imprisonment minimum sentences alone.

The impact of not renewing the minimum sentence

Given the negative impacts discussed above, the inevitable question is, what if the legislation were simply not renewed? Interviewees think that the tariff for serious violent crime has been raised and that judges and magistrates would still hand down heavier sentences, even without the minimums. If that was the intention of the legislature, it certainly seems to have succeeded.

Prosecutors would also probably be judicious in deciding in which cases they seek a life penalty, and would set them down in the high court. In all probability, fewer life terms would be handed down. The number of appeals would probably decrease. But there would still be a crisis in the prisons.

The broader public would probably deplore the scrapping of minimum sentencing. Given the need for government to appear 'tough on crime', it is unlikely that the legislation will change, despite the damage it is causing. Tinkering with the legislation may result in paradoxical and unintended consequences, much as the legislation itself has done.

Ultimately, a comprehensive overhaul of the justice system in general and the sentencing regime in particular is required. The courts do not appear to be coping, the prisons are increasingly overcrowded, and the public views mass releases from prison even less positively than it might view a change in sentencing law.

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POLICE AS WORKERS

Police labour rights in Southern Africa and beyond

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Efforts by police organisations to unionise and to increase their social and labour rights is an international phenomenon, and one that is becoming more vigorous in the Southern African region. However, many governments are wary of police unions and limit their rights, or refuse to recognise them at all. This gave impetus to the formation of the International Council of Police Representative Associations (ICPRA), in September 2006. Two of ICPRA's aims are to assist and advise police unions all over the world and to provide the international police union movement with a voice for influencing policing futures. In South Africa, the Police and Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) is assisting police in the subregion and has become a symbol of what is possible for police even in repressive states. In a rapidly changing police labour environment, police unions have the capacity to confront existing (undemocratic) occupational cultures, to promote organisational accord and to forge positive reform.

In February 2007 a group of Swaziland police officers came together to form a police union. Unsurprisingly, the Swaziland government refused to recognise or register the union. The current Industrial Relations Act bars members of the police or the security forces more generally from joining or forming a union.¹ The Swazi police officers who have been advocating for the rights of the police to unionise have been threatened with arrest. They have turned to the Police and Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) in South Africa for strategic direction and legal advice. POPCRU, as the first police union to be formed and registered in Southern Africa, has become a signifier of the possibilities of social and labour rights for the police in the Southern African region.

At roughly the same time, the Mauritian Police Association approached POPCRU for assistance and

support in their efforts to have police included in the Mauritian Labour Relations Act. At present, while police officers in Mauritius have the right to collective representation through the Association, they have very limited rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The Mauritian Police Association is seeking recognition of police as workers with equal rights to other workers in the public and private sectors.²

These Southern African initiatives, while audacious in their regional context, fit well with international efforts by police officers to increase their social and labour rights. In September 2006 an international network of national police unions came together to form a network known as the International Council of Police Representative Associations (ICPRA). POPCRU is a member organisation of ICPRA as are national police

unions and associations from Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australasia.

Since the beginning of this year ICPRA has offered advice and support to the nascent police union in Swaziland as well as to police officers from the Guardia Civil in Spain whose rights have been limited by the Spanish government.³ ICPRA's aims include giving police on the frontline a voice and improving the conditions of service of police across the world. The best way to do this, ICPRA representatives believe, is to assist police in establishing and strengthening police representative organisations.

Police as workers

What is apparent is that in many parts of the world police are actively campaigning for their rights as citizens and as workers. This article takes as a given the point made by Robert Reiner in 1978 that police are workers. They sell their labour power and have little control over their work process. The state police have always been drawn from working class backgrounds, many from families with strong traditions of unions in the mine and railway industries.⁴ Today's police officers have dual self-identities as workers and as professionals.⁵

This article refers to face-to-face and telephone interviews, as well as e-mail correspondence, with police unionists from Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia and the United States of America. It does not offer a comprehensive review of police unionism and its impact on police organisations. Rather, it is a discussion – intended to portray police as workers, to emphasise their labour rights and to foreshadow the positive role that police unions can play in securing these rights and participating fully in police reform initiatives.

It is hoped that this piece will stimulate discussions on police labour rights and prompt future research that interrogates the relationship between police labour rights, police productivity and the democratisation of policing.

Police as unionists

Police unions “have become an increasingly prominent feature of the modern agency and its

environment of interested parties”.⁶ The expansion of police union networks both regionally and internationally is an indication that police officers are increasingly concerned with workplace rights and participation. Despite initial resistance to the unionisation of police, even in western liberal democracies, police unions have been remarkably successful in achieving benefits for their members. Such success has been achieved using what Freeman and Medoff would identify as the ‘monopoly face of unionism’; the face that focuses on raising wages over and above the market value and achieving above par conditions of service.⁷

Police unions have had similar successes. Unions in places like Australia, New Zealand and even South Africa enjoy membership levels of almost 100%⁸ and they have become prominent ‘insiders’ in the employment relationship, particularly in the “determination of criminal justice policy and administration”.⁹

Yet despite the long history of police union rights and the institutionalisation of police unions in many countries, police managers and employers continue to view police unions as disruptive entities, and as bodies that resist reform and challenge managerial prerogative.¹⁰ Their antagonism is not simply a response to police union defensiveness, but also a response to the reality that police unions have hastened the breakdown of militaristic aspects of police organisational culture.¹¹

In post-conflict and newly democratising countries, police unions are viewed as potentially insurrectionist bodies, threatening newly attained peace and stability. In countries with authoritarian governments such as Swaziland, unionisation within the police threatens unquestioning responsiveness to government orders. Police unions are viewed as undermining much needed discipline within police organisations¹² and as “crippling management's control”.¹³

It is argued here that the challenges presented by police unions are positive. They have the capacity to confront existing (undemocratic) occupational cultures, to promote organisational accord and to forge positive reform.

Labour rights in police organisations

According to the International Labour Organisation, freedom of association and the right to organise and bargain collectively are fundamental human rights.¹⁴ The ILO maintains that through encouraging the full realisation of these rights a 'decent work-cycle' is established, which has the potential to increase productivity, income, and profits for all concerned.

However, the guarantees provided in the ILO Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining do not apply automatically to the police and the armed forces. Instead, police labour rights are to be determined by national laws or regulations.¹⁵ These national frameworks are themselves dependent on a number of national dynamics including broad labour law legislation (at all levels of government), party political standpoints, social movement environments and the configuration of police organisations.

It is not surprising that while police unions are permitted in most (Western) liberal democracies, they are prohibited in societies with transitional or authoritarian governments. Where collective bargaining and freedom of association are proscribed (for example, in most African, South American and Asian countries and in many Eastern European countries), governments argue that access to core labour rights will negatively impact on the operational efficiency of the police. In these countries, government and police managers maintain that awarding police the rights to collective bargaining and freedom of association will diminish discipline and emasculate the chain of command.¹⁶

The next section will discuss basic labour rights, and the possibilities that extending these rights to the police hold for creating more democratic police organisations and practice.

Collective representation

Unions bring with them a range of benefits to both employers and employees that participative arrangements alone are unable to achieve. These include balancing the power relations within occupational organisations and promoting collective buy-in and morale.¹⁷ Police employment issues in

particular may be considered in light of the broader 'public good', that is, outside the organisation itself. If police officers are not happy with their employment conditions, industrial action or other activities may well impact on the community's safety and security. Despite the evidence on the positive contribution unions can make in any given workplace, antipathy toward police unions remains strong on the part of police managers and employers.

Long-standing police unions have made significant gains in terms of benefits for their members. They have secured greater rank-and-file engagement with the shaping of policy and practice. Police, through their membership of the union, are able to become active, participatory 'citizens' within police organisations and are able to negotiate important decisions that affect them individually and collectively. Such engagement, particularly at middle management level, is crucial for organisational buy-in at all levels, particularly during periods of organisational change.¹⁸

Having a 'voice' that is heard in an organisation that is typically hierarchical and centred on management prerogative helps to build both morale and organisational commitment. As Dale Kinnear, Director of Labour Services in the Canadian Professional Police Association, argues:

Unions provide a means for employees to vent frustrations and resolve contentious issues in the workplace. In so doing, concerns can be addressed by management and this can prevent issues from disrupting the workforce and the workplace. Unions are also a buffer on the operations of these quasi-military organisations. In any workplace, a union can help keep an employer on track and above board. When a mutual fear/respect relationship exists, management and employees keep each other centred.¹⁹

Police unions realign power balances within police organisations and keep a watchful eye in terms of professional integrity. They have also presented a much-needed challenge to the traditional

bureaucratic and hierarchical occupational culture of police organisations.²⁰

Unions also provide lower-ranking police officers with protection, particularly in disciplinary circumstances,²¹ boosting police members' confidence in their professional discretion. In the words of Ron DeLord, President of the Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas, union membership is an 'insurance policy' for police members:

Where police do not have basic civil service rights, there is usually a lack of quality policing. Officers in these situations are always worrying about who and when to arrest and how police authorities will respond. Here, in Texas, we benefit from having a police union. We can write tickets for the governor when necessary and not feel threatened. The ability to act on behalf of the public as a whole is what shapes policing and if police have rights you are more likely to be able to serve the public without fear or favour...Not having a union in the police is like driving a car without insurance.²²

The unions play an important role in providing legal and collegial support when they operate outside of the interests of powerful individual members of society. This is extremely important if policing is to be independent of the requirements of political elites. For police representative organisations to provide these protections and to safeguard these rights, however, they need to have some relative autonomy from the police organisation.

Collective bargaining

The purpose of collective bargaining is to negotiate working conditions and terms of employment; to regulate relations between employers and workers; and to regulate relations between employers and worker organisations. Collective agreements can also pertain to broader policy issues that may not appear to be directly related to issues of salary and working conditions.²³

But what, specifically, are the benefits of collective bargaining for police organisations?

Pat Ntsobi, personal assistant to the Secretary General of POPCRU in South Africa points out that collective bargaining allows for broader involvement in problem solving and policy making. It creates an environment within police organisations where police managers and employee organisations are *partners* in the governance of the organisation:

Collective bargaining forces the employer and the employee organisation to officially seek a solution to problems affecting members. The bargaining structure also removes the bureaucratic red-tape that prevents management and workers from engaging as equal partners.²⁴

Police unionists argue that collective bargaining rights benefit all police stakeholders by promoting more harmonious relations, usually through the finalisation of collective agreements. As Mark Burgess, Chief Executive Officer of the Police Federation of Australia reckons:

Once you have collective representation and agreement, you are able to have a more consistent approach to the way that things are organised and the way that things are done. You will then get consistency in policy that can be applied equally to everyone. I think it is far better from a management point of view to be able to develop a framework or a process for dealing with a group of people across a whole jurisdiction. It benefits the industry generally. It leads to greater co-ordination and more effective management.²⁵

The reckoning then for the right to collectively bargain within police organisations is much the same as for any other industry, both public and private. Collective agreements provide police members with the opportunity to directly experience the benefits of partnership building, which has become a central tenet of new police governance arrangements.²⁶

The potential benefits that police unions and collective bargaining can bring to police organisations are shadowed by police management and employers' anxieties about

their capacity to be highly politicised, unruly and undermining of authority (both within the police organisation and more broadly). The Swazi government, for example, has stated that the move by police to unionise is a strategy to undermine the state and has declared this initiative to be criminal. The Swaziland Police Union chairperson has denied this, stating that the purpose of the union is "to enable members of the force to bargain collectively on all issues affecting their interest at the work place".²⁷

Addressing concerns

Yet, despite such reassurances, police unionism remains threatening in the eyes of police authorities. Below there is brief mention of two concerns (and there are others) of police authorities in regard to police unionisation, and also police union leaders' responses to these concerns.

Police managers and employers worry that if police have the right to unionise and to collectively bargain, they could choose to engage in strike action.²⁸ The reality is that police unions across the world have been reluctant to strike and generally police unions have not argued for the right to withdraw their labour.²⁹ Police unionists argue that the communities that the police serve are most harmed by strike activity, and that criminals are the ones who benefit from such action.³⁰

In the absence of the right to strike, police unions across the world have called for the institutionalisation of dispute resolution and arbitration processes.³¹ In most countries legislation constrains the boundaries of police industrial action. Grievance procedures, tribunals and conciliation and arbitration avenues are all designed to prevent 'aggressive industrial bargainers'.³² Police unions have been actively involved in shaping and promoting these alternative institutions and processes with positive results in terms of labour peace and social dialogue.

Finally, police managers worry that extending labour rights to the police will serve to undermine

management prerogative.³³ Police unionists interviewed, however, indicated that they did not feel the unions should have the right to interfere with operational matters. As Ron de Lord, a police unionist from Texas who was involved in the formation of ICPRA, put it:

The onus is upon police managers to indicate the limits of collective bargaining and to come to agreement with police labour organisations on this issue. We are primarily interested in 'flavour of the day management theories', political whims and management issues such as training, diversity management, disciplinary systems and professional opportunity – issues that impact on the way we do the job. We are not necessarily interested in operational issues unless they fall into those categories.³⁴

Police unionists recognise and value the police ranking structure as well as the importance of command structures and discipline. This is perhaps because police unionists and their members tend to identify themselves primarily as police officers, rather than as unionists. Ideally, according to one police unionist from Australia, police unions would prefer to leave operational decision-making to police managers and supervisors.³⁵

Perhaps this is, as Grimes argued four decades ago, because police unions don't want to take responsibility for any disastrous outcomes that may result from operational decision-making. The fear then that police unions will undermine the *operational* authority of police leaders seems unwarranted, although admittedly it is sometimes difficult to separate workplace issues from more operational matters.

Conclusion

Regional and international networks of police unions are growing in strength and influence. Even in countries characterised by extremely authoritarian governments, police officers are now using the language of rights and citizenship and are determined to have their collective voices heard.³⁶ While in Southern Africa at present the only country that awards police the right to unionise and

to bargain collectively is South Africa, there are moves from below challenging current police regulations and labour legislation. These efforts are likely to be supported and even advanced by organisations like POPCRU and international networks like the ICPRA.

Resistance to the extension of labour rights to the police is likely to continue. But what needs to be borne in mind is that, despite the apprehensions of governments and senior police management towards police unions, where they do exist and are strong, the sky has not fallen and chaos has not ensued. If international police union experience is anything to go by, management and employer fears about the strike imperative of police unions and the erosion of managerial prerogative seems unwarranted.

Through collective representation and access to collective bargaining, police unions have added considerably to the fabric of police organisations. Through collective representation police officers have been able to engage significantly in co-determination processes and participate in decision-making forums; often contributing significantly to improvements within the organisation and the bolstering of rank-and-file morale.

Interviews with police union leaders reveal a desire to work collaboratively with police managers to forge police organisations that embrace democratic reform, and to improve productivity. The presence of police unions may in fact facilitate smoother processes and decision-making within police organisations, given shared professionalism agendas and a climate of social dialogue. Police are more likely to be receptive to management initiatives if they have "reason to believe that the department will not treat them in an arbitrary fashion".³⁷

In 2005 Canadian criminologist Pat O'Malley recommended that police managers review their oppositional stance to police unions to consider them as 'mediums of change'. As partners, he suggests, police managers and unions could work together in moving away from "the old military guild of public police, toward the formation of a

public business corporation, and a privileged labour force, in a segmented policing market".³⁸

It is hoped that this article has opened some space for policing and employment relations scholars and also police managers to deliberate on the important role of police unions and police labour rights in a rapidly changing policing environment. Police organisations in the Southern African region should not avoid these deliberations. If they do, it is likely that reform initiatives from below will clash with those from above and ongoing instability in the police workplace will persist.

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OPERATION IRON FIST AFTER SIX MONTHS

Provincial police strategy under review

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At the beginning of July last year, the Gauteng MEC for Community Safety publicly announced the launch of a six month, high intensity police operation called Operation Iron Fist. This article draws from a media statement delivered by the MEC on 2 February 2007 in which the achievements of Iron Fist between July and December 2006 were discussed. Given that little information on policing strategy is currently provided to the public, the *SA Crime Quarterly* hopes, by publishing extracts of the MEC's statement, to assist in documenting and publicising anti-crime efforts and to help hold accountable those in positions of leadership on crime in South Africa.

The purpose of Operation Iron Fist was to address a spike in certain crimes in Gauteng. At a meeting with the SAPS Provincial Commissioner and his management team, the MEC requested the police to develop a specific operational plan to address the increases in some of the crime categories. In particular, it was highlighted that certain objectives relating to police visibility and performance should be included in the plan and that certain crimes should be prioritised.

As a result, the MEC reported in a public statement on 11 July 2006 that Operation Iron Fist would have eight key performance objectives:

- the public could expect to see more police on Gauteng's roads and streets;
- the police would put up more roadblocks;
- the police would increase their efforts to track down and bring the most wanted criminals to justice;
- the police would focus their deployment to tackle serious crimes;

- efforts to remove and destroy illegal firearms would be stepped up;
- efforts would be made to improve the service delivery from 10111 call centres;
- the police would improve safety on the province's trains; and
- there would be a focus on increasing community mobilisation against crime.

The primary intention of the operation was to arrest the spike in certain crime categories and stabilise the situation in the short-term period of six months. The intention of the Department of Community Safety was to establish what impact a high-intensity, high visibility police operation would have on the following specific crimes:

- vehicle hijacking;
- cash-in-transit heists;
- house robbery;
- business robbery;
- taxi violence; and
- residential burglary.

The evaluation of Iron Fist's achievements comes at a time of growing public concern about violent crime in our country. There can be little doubt that an analysis of crime patterns across the province will not offer consolation to those who have been robbed in their homes, families of those killed for a cell phone, women raped on the way to work, those who have been hijacked at gun-point or an elderly person assaulted on the way from a pension pay point.

Nevertheless, every effort has been made to guarantee the integrity and objectivity of this assessment. The Community Safety Department's evaluation of Operation Iron Fist was based on information from police performance management systems, crime statistics from the SAPS and other sources. The department also conducted its own research, including a public perception survey that was undertaken by an independent organisation.

Understanding the role of the MEC in relation to safety

It is important to note that the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of the Gauteng Provincial Government responsible for Community Safety has no direct managerial authority over the police. The SAPS is a national organisation that is resourced and managed centrally. However, as an elected member of a provincial government with the responsibility for community safety, the MEC is responsible for expressing the safety concerns of the public to the police and requesting that the police respond. The Community Safety Department monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the police's response to public concerns in an attempt to ensure that the police are held accountable to the public.

Assessing Iron Fist against its objectives

The section that follows presents the main findings of the evaluation of police performance against the specific objectives outlined above.

Objective 1: Increased mobilisation of police resources

The aim was to improve police visibility through increasing the number of officers in the field. During the operation, a nationally driven restructuring process of the SAPS resulted in 3,000 police officers being deployed to priority police stations (i.e. those stations that record the highest levels of serious violent crime). Furthermore, all officers, including administrative staff, were expected to work overtime to support operations, and 400 entry-level constables were deployed throughout the province.

Police reservists

The objective of doubling the number of reservists in Gauteng by July 2007 was partly achieved. The number of trained reservists available in July was 3,206. To double this number the police would have had to recruit 266 reservists per month on average. By the end of December an average of 237 reservists had been recruited per month. This meant that 1,421 reservists were recruited during the Operation Iron Fist period.

Recently the structure of reservists has changed to allow for four categories of reservists:

- 'Category A' reservists receive six months of training and have the same powers as fully functional police officers.
- 'Category B' reservists provide administrative support to the SAPS.
- 'Category C' reservists provide specialist skills (e.g. lawyers, medical doctors, etc).
- 'Category D' reservists are replacing the old commandos and similarly will not have full police powers or authority. They will be utilised primarily on patrols and high visibility operations.

Once the curriculum has been finalised for these reservists a large-scale recruitment drive can be undertaken.

Vehicle patrols

The number of police vehicle patrols was also increased. A total of 93,757 vehicle patrols were undertaken during the operation (a monthly average of 15,626 vehicle patrols). This meant 7,202 more

patrols (an increase of 8%) than in the same period in 2005, and 2,037 more patrols (an increase of 2%) than in the first half of 2006.

Highway patrols

There were more highway patrols when compared with the same time period in 2005, but marginally fewer than in the first six months of 2006. A total of 8,528 highway patrols were conducted during Operation Iron Fist (a monthly average of 1,421 highway patrols). This was 3,415 more (an increase of 67%) than in 2005, but 160 fewer (a decrease of 2%) than in the first half of 2006.

During Operation Iron Fist there was better coordination between the SAPS and the Metropolitan Police Departments. This meant that the police could focus their resources within communities while the MPDs focused on the highways. There were also targeted interventions at areas identified as 'hot-spots', such as the Rivonia off-ramp on the N1 highway. Police increased their patrols to improve safety in that area.

Vehicles searched

There was a substantial increase in the number of vehicles searched during Operation Iron Fist. A total of 698,555 vehicles were searched during the operation (a monthly average of 116,426 vehicles). This represented 161,590 more (an increase of 30%) vehicles searched than during the same time period in 2005, and 133,308 more (an increase of 24%) vehicles searched than in the first half of 2006.

People searched

There was a notable increase in the number of people searched during the operation. A total of 1,705,235 people were searched (a monthly average of 284,206 people). This represents 504,865 more people (an increase of 42%) than during the same period in 2006, and 542,116 more people (an increase of 47%) than during the first half of 2006.

Objective 2: Increased roadblocks

The objective of increasing the number of roadblocks was achieved, as reflected in the figures below.

Roadblocks

The police put up a total of 10,727 roadblocks (an average of 1,788 per month) during the operation. This meant 3,159 more roadblocks (a 42% increase) than during the same period in 2005, and a 40% increase compared with the first six months of 2006.

Vehicle control points

There was a substantial increase in vehicle control points compared with the same time period in 2005 but a decrease when compared with the first six months of 2006. In total 17,528 vehicle control points (a monthly average of 2,921) were set up during the operation. This represents 3,731 more vehicle control points (an increase of 27%) when compared with the same period in 2005.

However, there was a 21% decrease in the number of control points when compared with the first six months of 2006. This can be attributed to operational decisions that resulted in resources for vehicle control points (i.e. personnel and vehicles) being used for other purposes (e.g. roadblocks and targeted patrols).

Objective 3: Targeting key wanted suspects

In terms of tracing wanted suspects, a total of 4,653 initiatives were carried out to trace wanted criminals during the operation (a monthly average of 776). This represents 2,920 more initiatives (an increase of 169%) than during the same period in 2005, and 2,246 more (an increase of 93%) than during the first six months of 2006.

Suspect raids were also substantially increased as part of Operation Iron Fist. A total of 4,416 suspect raids were undertaken during the operation (a monthly average of 736). This represents 2,316 more raids (an increase of 110%) than were undertaken over the same period in 2005 and 1,638 more raids (an increase of 59%) than were carried out during the first half of 2006.

Apart from other arrests made during the above raids, a total of 224 suspects who were on Gauteng's 'most wanted' list at the start of Operation Iron Fist, were arrested.

Objective 4: The targeted deployment of police against serious crime

The police arrested a total of 218,572 people during the operational period for *all* offences. This resulted in 10,471 more people being arrested than in the first six months of 2006 (a 5% increase).

During Operation Iron Fist, a total of 80,729 people were arrested for all *serious* crimes, ranging from murder to theft. This was an increase of 2,775 people (a 4% increase) from the same period in 2005 and an increase of 9,767 (a 14% increase) over the first six months of 2006. Moreover, at the beginning of the operation in July, 32% of the total arrests were for serious criminal offences. By December the proportion of arrests for serious offences had increased to 43% of the total.

In terms of arrests for the specific crimes that Iron Fist aimed to reduce, the following numbers of arrests were made:

- Business robbery: 124 suspects were arrested, representing an increase of 103% when compared with the same six month period in 2005, and an increase of 114% when compared with the first six months of 2006. While it is encouraging to see a substantial improvement in the number of arrests for this crime category, it is important that these numbers increase further. Far more resources need to be devoted to identifying and arresting people involved in business robberies.
- Residential robbery: During the operation, a total of 566 suspects were arrested for residential robberies. This represents a 21% increase in the number of suspects arrested in 2005 and an increase of 25% over the number of suspects arrested during the first half of 2006. As with business robberies, the increase is encouraging but more attention will need to be given to identifying and arresting people involved in these crimes.
- Vehicle hijacking: 273 suspects were arrested, which is 84 more people (a 44% increase) arrested than in both 2005 and during the first half of 2006 (for both periods 189 suspects were arrested for hijacking).
- Cash-in-transit heists: 15 suspects were arrested for CITs during the operational period. This

represents nine more arrests when compared with 2005 and two more arrests when compared with the first half of 2006. It should also be noted that the gang of 26 who were arrested in KwaZulu-Natal during the operational period were also operating in Gauteng.

- Residential burglary: During the operation a total of 4,093 suspects were arrested for residential burglaries. While this represents 52 fewer arrests (a decrease of 1.2%) when compared with the same time period in 2005, it represents 84 more arrests (an increase of 2%) when compared with the first half of 2006.
- Taxi violence: 26 people were arrested for taxi violence, which represents 13 more arrests when compared with the same time period in 2005 and 15 more arrests when compared with the first half of 2006.

Objective 5: Removing illegal firearms

Efforts to remove illegal firearms from communities were stepped up, as is reflected in the increases in various police activities presented above. During Operation Iron Fist 8,324 firearms were recovered by the police. During November and December 2006, a total of 102,751 firearms that had previously been recovered by the police were destroyed. This is more than double the number of firearms destroyed during 2005 (approximately 40,000).

Objective 6: Improving the functioning of the 10111 Emergency Response Centres

Over the Operation Iron Fist time period, 136 personnel at the 10111 Police Emergency Response Centres underwent training to improve service delivery. Senior managers were also deployed to each of the six 10111 centres to improve the levels of supervision. These are however short-term measures and will not address the structural shortcomings facing the six 10111 call centres. These include challenges relating to recruitment, staffing and technology. There were also clear differences between the six existing call centres in Gauteng.

In order to address these structural challenges, the SAPS is in the process of changing the entire 10111

system. An amount of R600m has been spent on building and equipping a new world-class police emergency response centre in Midrand. This has already happened and it is anticipated that staff at the six existing centres will start being redeployed into a single emergency call centre from July 2007.

Technology for the satellite tracking of police vehicles is also in the process of being installed. This will enable the SAPS to better identify the location of individual police vehicles and then closely monitor the response times to calls for assistance. New staff recruitment, training and supervision systems will also be put into place to improve the service delivered by 10111 call operators to members of the public. The SAPS will publicly launch the new centre once it is fully operational.

Objective 7: Improving safety on the railways

In the month of July a special operation called 'Operation Railway Safety' was undertaken, during which 497 Gauteng provincial SAPS reservists were deployed onto the trains. They made a total of 4,435 arrests, successfully tackling the criminal elements that had started to operate on railways in the earlier part of the year. These police remained on the railways until the deployment of 300 permanent SAPS Railway Police Unit members.

Objective 8: Increasing community mobilisation against crime

The indicators used to measure this objective included the number of police visits to schools, number of pamphlets distributed by the SAPS, and the extension of CPFs.

School visits

The SAPS substantially increased the number of visits to schools during Operation Iron Fist. A total of 12,474 schools were visited (a monthly average of 2,079 visits). This demonstrates that 3,888 more visits took place, (a 45% increase) than in the same time period in 2005 and 1,530 more visits (a 14% increase) than during the first six months of 2006. These visits are undertaken by police members to educate children and youth to be aware of the

dangers of drugs and weapons, and to assist them in reporting crime.

Distribution of pamphlets

A total of 51,283 pamphlets on crime and police contact information were distributed during the operation. This is 23,779 more pamphlets (an 87% increase) than were distributed over the same time period in 2005 and 35,501 more pamphlets (a 225% increase) than were distributed during the first half of 2006. These pamphlets are distributed to assist communities with crime prevention tips and information on how to contact the police for assistance or to report crime.

Community Policing Forums (CPFs)

Many CPFs across the province stepped up to support Operation Iron Fist. The Gauteng Department of Community Safety was involved in a number of initiatives to assist CPFs and encourage community participation against crime. CPFs and sector forums were strengthened in 27 police precincts, including, among others, Booysens, Jeppe, Hillbrow, Kagiso, Tembisa, Naledi, Khutsong, Dobsonville and Kliptown.

In places such as Marabastad, Sebokeng and Rabie Ridge, community patrollers were deployed in community identified crime hotspots such as parks and around certain shopping malls. In places such as Mamelodi, Orlando, Naledi and Meadowlands, the CPFs were actively involved in road shows, Imbizos and door-to-door campaigns to ensure that people were aware of, and could support, Operation Iron Fist in their communities.

The Star newspaper also launched a campaign to support and publicise the work of various CPFs that started during the operational period.

The impact of Operation Iron Fist on crime

Information provided below on crime trends for specific targeted crimes in Gauteng over the Operation Iron Fist period is based on SAPS crime statistics. Increases or decreases in crime have been determined by comparing the monthly numbers in question with the same time the previous year. This provides a more accurate assessment, as there are distinct annual patterns for most crime categories.

Vehicle hijacking

Vehicle hijacking stabilised over the Operation Iron Fist period, compared with the increases that occurred during the first half of the year. Fewer instances of vehicle hijackings were reported during Operation Iron Fist than were reported during the first six months of 2006. Nevertheless, there are still too many hijackings occurring in Gauteng and greater effort will be needed to continue the downward trend in this crime that has been occurring over the past four years.

Cash-in-transit heists

There was a substantial reduction in the number of cash-in-transit heist (CIT) incidents during Operation Iron Fist. The Cash-in-Transit Crime Combating Forum, consisting of industry role players such as the South African Bank Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) and the police, announced that they had recorded a 27% reduction of CITs in the last four months of 2006 when compared with the same period in 2005.

Business robberies

Operation Iron Fist had some impact on business robberies. Although business robberies continued to increase during Operation Iron Fist, they did so at a slower rate than during the first six months of 2006. However, where businesses have come together to address robberies in specific sectors, positive results have been achieved. For example, the Consumer Goods Council Crime Prevention Programme reported that armed robberies among their members in the retail industry had decreased by 11% during 2006 when compared with 2005. Nevertheless, business robberies continue to be of concern and further attention will be paid to improving policing and business strategies for addressing this crime type.

Residential robberies

This crime occurs when criminals use violence against people while the victims are at home, to enter their premises and rob them. This crime continues to be of concern and although more people were arrested for residential robberies, decreases in the incidence of this crime were not recorded during Operation Iron Fist. This situation,

where armed criminals attack people in their homes, cannot be tolerated. This crime will continue to be prioritised until decreases are achieved, and to this end, new strategies and tactics are being explored to tackle this crime in 2007.

Residential burglaries

House burglaries occur when criminals break into houses when there is no one at home. It is encouraging that there was a substantial reduction in house burglary during Operation Iron Fist. This reflects a significant change, as house burglaries had increased slightly during the first six months of 2006.

Taxi violence

There was a substantial reduction in taxi violence towards the end of the Operation Iron Fist period with far fewer incidents occurring in November and December than during previous months. Nevertheless, there were still a few incidents in certain areas and efforts to end taxi related violence will continue.

Key lessons

Some of the key conclusions about the evaluation of Operation Iron Fist are discussed below.

Improved targeting

Operation Iron Fist demonstrated that the law enforcement agencies were able to mobilise their resources to increase visibility and arrest rates. The police use of resources did result in a decrease in overall crime rates, especially for property related crimes. However, the levels of violent crime remain high.

The strategy did not succeed in reducing incidents of specific types of violent crime, in particular house robberies and business robberies. These crimes account in some measure for the growing levels of fear in our society. Clearly, the capability of the police to target these types of violent crime needs to be strengthened. The Premier of the province has asked that the SAPS Provincial Commissioner develop specific strategies to target these types of crime, and explain the approach that the SAPS will be adopting to the Gauteng Legislature.

Effective partnerships

The results clearly showed that when relationships between CPFs and police management are effective, better results are achieved. Typically, partnerships result in increased and better intelligence being provided to the police in relation to individuals or groups committing specific crimes in specific communities. These results demonstrate that it is possible to reduce serious and violent crimes if communities and the police work together and focus their efforts.

Over half (56%) of Gauteng policing precincts saw a reduction in priority crimes, including places such as De Deur, Alexandra, Atteridgeville, Mamelodi and Eldorado Park (which recorded the largest decrease in Gauteng). In many instances it was also because of dedicated police station managers who were able to work in constructive partnerships with mobilised communities. Nevertheless, community involvement is still too low and efforts will be made to improve this through the launch of a 'social movement against crime.'

Some stations recorded significant increases in crime, including Dobsonville, Zonkwizizwe, Ennerdale, and Midrand. These stations will require increased attention in the months ahead.

Station management

The restructuring of the SAPS initiated by the national office resulted in improved management and leadership at station level in some areas. This has led to significant reductions in crime in some communities, such as Johannesburg Central, Hillbrow and Booysens. Nevertheless, demonstrable improvements in police responses to calls for assistance from the public must be achieved. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to ensuring that police responsiveness improves. The tracking devices installed in police vehicles later this year should result in better police responses.

Cooperation of law enforcement agencies

During the Iron Fist period, metropolitan police departments adjusted their operational plans in accordance with the operation, resulting in improved coordination of law enforcement agencies

in the province. This is one of the areas that experienced a positive impact during Operation Iron Fist. The trend towards an increasing proactive response by local government in improving safety must be encouraged.

The adoption of a comprehensive Gauteng Safety Strategy

There can be no doubt that a six-month, police-driven operation alone will not solve our crime problem. What is required over time is a comprehensive integrated strategy that includes a focus on improving the quality of policing, community mobilisation and partnerships, better coordination of law enforcement operations by the SAPS and the metropolitan police departments, and increased involvement of local authorities. It is for this reason that the Gauteng Provincial Government adopted a comprehensive eight-year Gauteng Safety Strategy in August of 2006 (see the next article in this issue).

Conclusion

All those who demonstrated considerable commitment and dedication during Operation Iron Fist and the continuing fight against crime must take credit for the achievements noted above. In particular, the SAPS Gauteng Provincial Commissioner and his dedicated policemen and women ought to be commended for their efforts and sacrifices in tackling crime. Appreciation must also be expressed to the metropolitan police departments, and the members of CPFs and the many unsung heroes who participate in these efforts.

Public safety is a priority and the Community Safety Department will continue to work in a systematic, focused and determined way to ensure that all people can enjoy the freedom and security that they deserve.

TACKLING CRIME AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL

The Gauteng Safety Strategy: 2006–2014

Office of the Gauteng MEC for Community Safety

As in the case of Operation Iron Fist, reviewed in the previous article in this issue, the Gauteng Department of Community Safety has been at the forefront of innovative ways to improve safety in the province. This article briefly summarises the Gauteng provincial government's Safety Strategy, adopted by the Provincial Executive in August 2006, and which will be publicly launched on 30 March 2007. The strategy is both comprehensive and ambitious, and as the first to provide a strategic framework for tackling violent and serious crime at the provincial level, will no doubt provide important lessons for other provinces to learn from.

With a population of around 9.5 million people and contributing 40% of South Africa's GDP, Gauteng is a diverse and dynamic province with many opportunities and challenges. One of the opportunities is to develop Gauteng as a competitive global city-region to drive economic growth and promote integrated governance. This vision supports government's core objectives of halving levels of poverty and unemployment by 2014.

One of the main challenges to this vision is violent crime, which makes up one third of all recorded crime in the province. Violence destroys lives, places communities under siege and breeds fear and anxiety in a manner that stifles economic and social development. The Gauteng Safety Strategy provides a framework for reducing and preventing violent and serious crime.

The strategy recognises that it is not possible for the police to tackle crime alone. In addition to short term policing measures, a long term strategy is needed that improves provincial government's ability to align and coordinate all available resources in Gauteng towards reducing crime.

Because the crime problem is complex and has strong social and economic roots, the strategy seeks to provide a framework for action that involves all public and private agencies in the province.

The Gauteng Safety Strategy draws from the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and the White Paper on Safety and Security. These documents recognise that crime in South Africa, as in any country, is a consequence of historical, social, economic and spatial characteristics of our society. Inequality, social exclusion, a culture of violence, dysfunctional families, high drop-out rates from school, and alcohol and drug abuse are among the factors that contribute to crime over which the police have little control.

Reducing crime therefore requires a strategy with two fundamental approaches:

- reforming and strengthening the criminal justice system in order to deter potential offenders;
- tackling the social and environmental factors associated with crime, which is the domain of departments outside the criminal justice system as well as organised civil society.

Provincial mandate and implementation

As the democratically elected representatives of the people of Gauteng, the provincial executive, through the Department of Community Safety, has a key role to play in promoting safety. Section 206 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that national policing policy be developed in line with the principal of cooperative governance through consultation with the provincial executive.

The Department of Community Safety will take responsibility for developing a funded implementation plan that will result in practical initiatives for each of the strategy's strategic objectives and focus areas. This will provide a basis for monitoring and evaluating the Gauteng Safety Strategy. The ultimate measure of the strategy's success will be the reduction in violent and serious crime in the province as per national government's annual target of between 7% and 10%. The strategy promotes the disaggregation of crime so that specific crime categories that cause the most harm and fear (such as murder, rape and aggravated robbery) are identified, prioritised and targeted for specific interventions.

The four pillar approach

The Gauteng Safety Strategy has adopted a four pillar approach through which the provincial government can improve community safety. The pillars, together with the relevant objectives in each pillar, are briefly discussed below.



Pillar 1: Improving the quality of policing

The provincial executive will play a greater and more innovative role in improving the quality of policing in the province.

Constitutional mandate for police oversight

Section 206 of the Constitution provides provincial executives with the authority to determine policing needs and priorities. This policy development role is supported by the constitutional powers granted to this sphere of government to hold the police accountable through monitoring service delivery, police conduct, visible policing and community police relations.

The Constitution clearly expects the principle of cooperative governance to frame the development of policing policy when it states that the national Minister of Safety and Security must determine national policing policy "after consulting with the provincial governments and taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by provincial executives."

There will be substantial improvements in the public's experience of police service delivery and a decrease in perceptions of police corruption by 2010. The provincial government will use its constitutional powers to determine provincial policing needs and priorities through enhancing the Department of Community Safety's ability to assess police performance and conduct.

Objective 1.1: Strengthening the monitoring of police performance

By 2008 the Department of Community Safety will have established a performance monitoring system that accurately and timeously tracks crime and police performance in Gauteng. This will allow the department, in partnership with the SAPS, to set and achieve specific targets relating to specific crime problems.

In order to effectively assess service delivery and performance, the Department of Community Safety must establish an integrated information management system that can access and synthesise data on crime and police performance in Gauteng.

Objective 1.2: Strengthening the monitoring of police conduct

By 2009 the SAPS will have implemented an ongoing Police Integrity Strategy that will be monitored with the Department of Community Safety. This will assist in ensuring that the police in Gauteng have a reputation for professional conduct and that reports of police corruption or misconduct will be few.

The SAPS in Gauteng must take urgent measures to deal with corruption. The Prevention of Corruption and Fraud Strategy developed by the SAPS national office provides a framework for provinces to use. An accessible and well publicised police feedback system must also be established so that all complaints and praises about police behaviour are gathered and dealt with.

The Department of Community Safety will assist in developing and monitoring a Provincial Police Integrity Strategy. In addition to tracking allegations of police misconduct and criminality, the strategy will include proactive measures such as covert operations and integrity tests to identify and root out police officers who are abusing their powers.

Objective 1.3: Improving the functioning of Community Policing Forums (CPFs)

By 2009 each police station in Gauteng will have an effective community policing forum that implements community safety plans developed in partnership with the SAPS. The department has completed a set of provincial directives for CPFs in Gauteng to guide the establishment, roles, responsibilities and functions of the forums and to ensure adherence to a set of minimum standards.

The department will establish a monitoring system that assesses the extent to which all CPFs have achieved the minimum standards. The monitoring system will assist in identifying good practices that could be disseminated to improve the functioning of CPFs throughout the province.

Objective 1.4: Improving collaboration between the SAPS and other agencies

By 2009, the SAPS will have clear protocols for working with public, private and civil society agencies on crime reduction projects.

In the public sector, the SAPS should improve cooperation with local government and in particular with the municipal police departments. The Department of Community Safety will assist by monitoring the Provincial Police Coordinating Committee's role in promoting cooperation between the police departments. Protocols or agreements will also be developed between SAPS and other state agencies such as the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Directorate for Special Operations in the NPA, the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Revenue Service.

Protocols or agreements will also be drawn up with non-state agencies. In particular, attention will be given to the regulation of the private security industry and ways in which the police and private security agencies can cooperate. Attention will also be paid to enhancing the role played by academic, research and other civil society bodies.

Pillar 2: Promoting social crime prevention

Social crime prevention is needed if a sustainable reduction of crime is to be realised. The Gauteng Safety Strategy seeks to introduce a number of innovations to the social crime prevention approach applied in the province.

Addressing the life cycle of crime

The social environment plays a significant role in determining whether or not people choose to become involved in crime. Children exposed to neglect or violence are at greater risk of becoming involved in anti-social and criminal behaviour as they grow up. Schools play a crucial socialising role for children as they progress to adolescence and should function not only as institutions of learning but as safe spaces that promote social responsibility and constitutional values.

Once young people leave school, they should have opportunities to further build self-esteem through participating in constructive activities and programmes. These programmes must be seen by young people as a viable alternative to becoming involved in crime.

Evaluated interventions

Effective programmes are those that target specific factors associated with crime among specific groups in particular communities. In this way it is possible to design interventions that can be monitored and evaluated to assess their impact on crime in a defined area. The Gauteng Safety Strategy will establish a Crime Prevention Resource Centre to provide examples of proven crime prevention interventions. The establishment of an integrated information management system will allow for the monitoring and evaluation of community-level interventions.

For sustained crime reduction over the period of the Gauteng Safety Strategy and beyond, it is necessary for the provincial government to focus on groups who are most vulnerable or at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violent crimes.

Objective 2.1: Violence prevention for children

Programmes must ensure that the numbers of crimes committed against children have decreased substantially by 2014. By 2010 interventions must be showing results in communities where children are most at risk. An early success indicator would be an increase in the reporting of violence against children as this indicates that fewer children suffer in silence and more perpetrators are identified and subject to appropriate interventions.

Objective 2.2: School safety strategies

This focus area seeks to achieve a substantial reduction in the number of violent crimes committed at schools. The provincial government should ensure that by 2009 each school in the province has a comprehensive School Safety Strategy which is monitored and reviewed annually. Schools that are identified as being the least safe should be prioritised.

Objective 2.3: Violence prevention for out-of-school youth

By 2009 the number of young people arrested and convicted for violent crime must have decreased significantly. Youth development and crime prevention programmes must be evaluated to ensure that they are averting young people from engaging in violent behaviour and criminality.

The implementation of the pillars of the 2005 Gauteng Integrated Youth Development Strategy will go a long way to addressing factors contributing to youth crime. In particular, the youth in the key risk categories need to be targeted, namely:

- youth who have dropped out of school;
- youth in trouble with the law;
- youth involved in alcohol or drug abuse; and
- young people who have been victims of crime.

The Department of Community Safety will identify and monitor the programmes undertaken by the provincial government and the Provincial Youth Commission that are specifically aimed at addressing issues of violence and crime.

Objective 2.4: Prevention of violence against women

By 2009 the province must have contributed to the creation of an environment that does not tolerate violence against women. The pillars in the Provincial Strategy for the Prevention of Violence against Women and Children (VAWAC) must be implemented. These include:

- implementing national legislation and policy;
- establishing infrastructure in areas where none exists;
- building the capacity of all public service practitioners;
- improving the criminal justice system's ability to respond to crimes against women and children;
- strengthening advocacy and awareness campaigns;
- strengthening prevention and support programmes;
- early childhood intervention; and
- improving data collection.

The Department of Community Safety will identify and monitor programmes undertaken as part of the VAWAC strategy so as to promote coordination between different departments and with roleplayers outside of government.

Pillar 3: Institutional arrangements to support crime prevention

The vision of Gauteng as a global city-region demands that the different departments and spheres of government operate in a more integrated and coordinated manner. This means aligning the planning processes, capacity and activities of government and non-government agencies to realise specific objectives.

Objective 3.1 Improving the coordination of the criminal justice system

By 2009 the departments of the criminal justice system and victim empowerment service providers will cooperate in a structured manner to ensure greater impact on perpetrators of violent crimes and better service provision to victims. At a national level the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster has been established to improve coordination among government departments. A similar provincial body could be established with close links to the national cluster.

Focus area: Provincial criminal justice coordinating committee

A provincial criminal justice coordinating committee will be established to ensure that high level support and a strategic framework is provided for improved cooperation. Senior officials from each criminal justice department should participate in the structure. The Department of Community Safety will initiate and coordinate the establishment of a provincial criminal justice coordinating committee and participate in its proceedings.

Focus area: Local level criminal justice coordinating committees

Local level criminal justice coordinating committees will ensure that there is an increase in conviction rates for violent crimes through improved

collaboration between police officials, the courts, prisons and victim empowerment service providers at the local level.

While the provincial level structure will provide strategic direction, support and coordination, it is at the local level that a structure of this nature will have direct impact. Local committees could also ensure coordination between specific courts, police stations and government social service departments and NGOs providing services to victims and witnesses.

The Department of Community Safety will monitor the extent to which each police station and court is participating in local level criminal justice coordinating committees.

Objective 3.2: Strengthening intergovernmental relations for crime prevention

By 2009 there will be greater alignment of national, provincial and local government planning with regard to the provision of security and crime prevention infrastructure and initiatives.

Focus area: Improving provincial government integration

Departments outside the criminal justice system have an important role to play in the prevention of violent crime. For example, the Department of Health can collect information on violence-related injuries, notify the police, provide victims with information about services, and ensure that medical evidence is properly processed and available to the police and courts.

With joint planning and systems for sharing information, government can have a better impact on crime. However, there are no simple answers for ensuring cross-departmental integration. The national Governance and Administration Cluster 'Framework for Managing Joint Programmes' has provided a set of principles that can enhance integration among government departments. Using these, the Department of Community Safety will seek to improve horizontal government alignment through engaging in joint planning with other provincial departments to ensure inter-

departmental participation in crime prevention initiatives.

Focus area: Improving cooperation between provincial and local government

The Department of Community Safety will seek to improve vertical alignment between the provincial and local governments with regard to reducing violent crime. The department will work with local governments to set up and coordinate crime prevention initiatives by participating in the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes and establishing a Gauteng Intergovernmental Safety Coordinating Committee (GISCC).

The MEC for Community Safety will chair the Forum and his Head of Department will provide a supporting secretariat. The department will align its planning process with the IDPs to ensure better integration between the community safety programmes undertaken by provincial and local government.

Objective 3.3: Expanding the role of local government in crime prevention

By 2009 local governments will each have a safety strategy that links local service delivery to crime prevention. These strategies will be aligned to national and provincial crime prevention policies and will be budgeted for in the IDPs. The local safety strategies should be coordinated and monitored by local government structures established for this purpose.

Focus area: Promoting social crime prevention in the IDPs

As a key roleplayer in ensuring community level safety, all local governments must be well versed in the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). This will allow local departments concerned with urban planning, design and management to develop communities in a manner that promotes healthy urban culture and space.

Furthermore, local governments can support a range of crime prevention priorities such as ensuring clean

and safe areas around schools and maintaining recreation areas for youth. Local planning processes for new or expanding communities must also include the identification of spaces where new police stations can be built.

The Department of Community Safety will undertake to align its planning process with that of local government to ensure that provincial guidelines are considered when incorporating social crime prevention objectives into the IDPs.

Objective 3.4 Strengthening crime and safety information management

By 2008 the provincial government will have accurate and updated information on crime statistics and police performance for each policing precinct in Gauteng, to allow for the timely identification of crime trends and to assess the Strategy's progress. Information on best practices will also be collected and made available from a central location.

Focus area: A crime and safety integrated information management system

Detailed information about each of the Strategy's violent crime categories is necessary for the provincial government to identify locations for crime prevention interventions, design the most effective programmes, and assess impact. Fortunately, much of the required capacity and information exists within the Gauteng province. The Department of Community Safety will establish and develop an integrated crime and safety information management system to identify challenges and track impact throughout the province.

Focus area: Establishing a crime prevention resource centre

In order to mobilise roleplayers to participate in crime prevention, information about what works is needed. In the past decade substantial South African work on crime prevention has been developed that could assist local agencies in better understanding and addressing specific crime challenges. The Department of Community Safety will establish a resource centre that will collect, evaluate and disseminate information on best practices.

Pillar 4: Encouraging community participation

One of the challenges confronting the province is the large number of people who tolerate or are complicit in criminal activity. A campaign is needed to lower the tolerance and complicity of ordinary people for criminality. In particular it is necessary to promote the concept of adhering to the rule of law.

Objective 4.1 Encouraging a social movement against crime

In 2007 a social movement against crime will be launched to raise awareness and mobilise individuals to participate in practical initiatives to reduce violent crime in their areas.

Focus area: Increasing awareness and changing behaviour around crime

The Department of Community Safety will establish a social movement to intensify community mobilisation against violence and crime. The seeds of a social movement will be planted through a sustained communications and awareness campaign. Awareness will be raised by developing a communications strategy that is used by all provincial government departments in campaigns, events, and meetings.

Although it is important to increase awareness, the next challenge is to translate this knowledge into changes in attitudes and behaviour. This requires organising structures to support new forms of behaviour and action that result in crime reduction.

Focus area: Building organisational capacity to support community activity to reduce crime

The social movement concept seeks to increase the number of people who recognise that they have a role to play in reducing crime. The Department of Community Safety will establish a social movement office that will coordinate and support initiatives to improve safety.

The social movement will be underpinned by an expanded volunteer management programme driven and coordinated by the department to ensure that

volunteers have the necessary training and capacity to engage in community based activities. Existing structures such as community policing forums and youth desks will be strengthened to drive community based crime prevention initiatives.

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By TJ Lemon / PictureNET Africa
Johannesburg Robbery Reaction Unit

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