

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

7.1 Strategic Base Areas and Insurgent Sanctuaries

The father of modern rural insurgency theory, Maozedong (Mao tse Tung) identified the following six fundamental principles of insurgency:

1. The relation between offensive and defensive actions within the total revolutionary conflict.
2. Strategic defence and strategic offensive.
3. The establishment of strategic base areas.
4. The co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with conventional warfare.
5. The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.
6. The link between the various levels of command.

It is with the third of these principles namely the establishment of strategic base areas that we are concerned.

Mao defined strategic bases as those areas

... on which a guerrilla war relies for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding oneself and annihilating or expelling the enemy ... (1)

While he viewed these bases within a political and ideological context, the major thrust of Mao's deliberations in this regard focusses on geographical features. His emphasis to this effect led him to state that

... guerrillas without base areas are roving insurgents and can have no connection with the

political aspirations of the indigenous population. (2)

In accordance with the above, strategic base areas may be established either within the borders of the endangered state, or adjacent to them. The latter are generally termed sanctuaries. In both cases the area should provide the insurgent forces with a degree of physical security. This can be obtained by terrain features such as inaccessability, or by political and diplomatic measures. Should the base area for an insurgency be established with an adjacent country, i.e. across an international boundary, the insurgent forces might obtain security by diplomatic means.

The necessity for the establishment of such areas is contained in the following definition by Bernard Fall:

... an active sanctuary is a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which, though ostensibly not involved in the conflict provides the rebel side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and - if he can get away with it - troops. (3)

For the purposes of this chapter contiguous territory may be regarded as another sovereign state.

Some writers on insurgency such as Walter Lippman, Peter Paret and John Shy claim that insurgency forces with a privileged sanctuary cannot be defeated. These views are undoubtedly influenced by the important role that sanctuaries, or lack of them, have played in Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya, Greece, etc. Although the view expressed is possibly extreme, there is little doubt that

... history shows that if guerrillas are provided with the freedom to move across national borders, enabling them to receive material aid and a sanctuary privileged from attack, then their chances for overthrowing target governments seem greatly enhanced. (4)

It should be clear at this stage that the status of a sanctuary and the degree of 'privilege from attack' it affords directly influences the importance of this factor in counter-insurgency strategy. However, political constraints are the primary determinants of both.

To John D. Deiner the results of case studies

done on Algeria, Greece and Vietnam indicate the existence of two strategies as counter to active sanctuaries. The first is border control and the second armed incursions. John J. McCuen indicates a third strategy, the organisation and support of 'counter-insurgent insurgents' operating from the target country into that country serving as host to the insurgent forces; in other words, fighting fire with fire.

Physical border control on the frontier is probably exemplified by the construction of a cordon sanitaire as discussed in Chapter 4. The second strategy, that of armed incursions to destroy or dislocate insurgent sanctuaries, is the subject of this chapter.

Even in the case of a country such as Rhodesia which was, since 1975 and up to the end of the war, virtually surrounded by potential sanctuaries, care should be exercised to avoid over-emphasising the importance of a strategy of external operations. As Deiner cautioned:

... while border sanctuaries may be significant factors affecting the military aspects of guerrilla wars, they are not determinant factors of the ultimate outcomes of such struggles. (5)

Clearly such operations constitute an important element of military strategy, but only in the case of total military preponderance can external operations eliminate the external insurgent threat. Even should this be possible, the political costs involved in such actions will be the final sanction for their execution.

After UDI in 1965, Zambia was Rhodesia's only neighbour providing active assistance and succour to insurgent forces. Infiltrators from that country either had to cross the Zambezi river (or Kariba lake) to the south, or attempt to enter Rhodesia through the territories of Botswana and Mozambique. Once the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, had come to power in Mozambique during 1974, the Rhodesian strategic situation changed drastically for the worse. The whole north-eastern, eastern and south-eastern border was thrown open to penetration and infiltration. When ZPRA infiltration via Botswana increased from 1976 onwards, a similar situation developed along the western and south-western borders. The number of recruits and refugees leaving the war-torn country during those years further provided both ZANLA and ZPRA with more than an

ample supply of trainees. Therefore, by the end of the war Rhodesia had an active hostile border stretching for nearly 3 000km. Only 200km of southern border adjacent to the Republic of South Africa remained in hands not hostile to the country.

As indicated in Chapter 4 (Border Minefield Obstacles) Rhodesia had neither the manpower nor the resources to even attempt an effective system of border control. The obvious military alternative entailed a forward defence in depth. Such a strategy would imply that insurgent forces could be eliminated en masse within their strategic base areas.

A further extension of this strategy entailed punishing countries giving sanctuary for passive and/or active aid rendered to the insurgent forces. In this regard Zambia and Mozambique provided evidence of an almost unrestricted commitment to the 'decolonialisation' of Rhodesia.

Lastly, Rhodesian creation and support of the Mozambique Resistance Movement had great potential as a destabilising factor. It is, however, not directly relevant to this chapter.

The Rhodesian strategy of cross-border assaults developed rapidly in the period 1976 to 1979. The major characteristics of this strategy can only be ascertained from an account of external operations into neighbouring countries.

## 7.2 Mozambique

In spite of Prime Minister Ian Smith's public denial on 4 December 1972, Rhodesian military units had been operating continually in Mozambique since 1969. After the initiation of Operation Hurricane, co-operation with Portuguese armed forces was increased. Permission was granted for Special Air Service (SAS) and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) operations in large areas north and south of the Zambezi river, to a line running North-South through the village of Carnde 100km into Mozambique.

Co-operation lasted until 1974, and even for some months after the coup in Lisbon. Operations by section and platoon size units into Mozambique continued after Portugal had handed over power to FRELIMO, for it was some months before President Samora Machel was able to consolidate power.

Co-operation between ZANLA and FRELIMO dated from 1969, when ZANLA was offered the use of the Tete province to infiltrate insurgents into north-eastern Rhodesia. This co-operation had strengthened




Figure 7.1 Mozambique

during the intervening years to such an extent that the two movements had a largely integrated logistics system. Once PRELIMO was in power, command, control and training were also to be integrated. President Machel's commitment to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was total.

By 1979 the Directorate of Military Intelligence estimated that a total of 1 000 FAM (Army of Mozambique, formerly known as FPLM) troops were trained for use in support of ZANLA forces inside Rhodesia. The total number actually deployed within Rhodesia was estimated at between 150 and 300 troops.

Initially political constraints and the integration of ZANLA and FAM discouraged large Rhodesian operations into Mozambique. Strict constraints were placed on raids into that country. Only during the latter half of 1975, for example, were the Selous Scouts given permission to penetrate into Mozambique. Penetration was, however, limited to a maximum of five kilometres and attacks on FAM or camps jointly occupied by FAM and ZANLA were strictly prohibited. The first Selous Scouts operation into Mozambique was executed on 7 January 1976 when fifteen Scouts attacked a ZANLA transit camp situated near Chicombidzi. Although a number of insurgents were wounded, no fatal casualties could be confirmed.

During 1976, as the trickle of ZANLA insurgents into Rhodesia turned into a flood, Combined Headquarters, (COMOPS), was able to convince the Security Council that attacks against ZANLA training and holding camps in Mozambique was vitally important to limit the number of insurgents inside Rhodesia to manageable levels. In spite of the continuous small-unit operations that had taken place, Rhodesian intelligence concerning these bases had previously not been detailed enough to ensure success.

First use of the Selous Scouts' so-called 'Flying Column' occurred during June 1976. Code-named Operation Long John it entailed an attack on the ZANLA transit camp at Mapai and staging-post known as Chicualacuála. The operation was greatly assisted by the capture of a ZANLA liaison officer from Malvernina opposite Vila Salazar. Under cover of an artillery barrage the column of six vehicles crossed into Mozambique and in succession attacked Mapai and Chicualacuála. Although only a small number of insurgents were killed a large quantity of arms and ammunition was destroyed.

The first major success resulted from pseudo operations in Holdenby Tribal Trust Land during which a ZANLA captive gave detailed information

regarding a major base in Mozambique. According to all reports this base was the major staging area for ZANLA infiltration into Operation Thrasher. The exact location of the camp followed from a visual sighting by a Canberra pilot. Detailed preparation led to the execution of Operation Eland on 8 August 1976. Eighty-four members of the Selous Scouts, dressed as FAM soldiers, swept into the Nyadzonja camp about 40km from the Rhodesian border in Manica province with ten Unimogs and four Ferret armoured scout cars. Entering the camp via a circular route during muster parade, the Scouts killed about 300 ZANLA and 30 FAM troops according to the official Security Force communique released after the raid. At the time of the attack Nyadzonja was reported to contain about 5 000 ZANLA insurgents and 50 FAM soldiers. According to the results of an FAM board of inquiry subsequently found at Chimoio, total ZANLA deaths at Nyadzonja were estimated at over 1 000. During the raid the Pungwe river bridge linking Tete to Chimoio was also blown up to prevent any intervention by the FAM brigade stationed at Chimoio.

Although this has not been confirmed, it would seem that the Selous Scouts launched a simultaneous attack on a camp in the region of Vila Machado nearly 200km from the Rhodesian border on the Umtali-Beira railway line. FAM and ZANLA casualties were reported to be between 800 and 1 000. (6)

Code-named Operation Mardon, the Selous Scouts launched a second flying column attack into the Gaza province on 31 October 1976. The columns main objective was to disrupt the ZANLA logistical system. After the attack on the Mapai base in June 1976, ZANLA had shifted their base to Jorge do Limpopo, fourteen kilometers away, but still referred to it as Mapai. As part of the operation the railway between Jorge do Limpopo, Malvernia and Massangera was also disrupted.

At the time there was considerable doubt as to FAM reaction to such raids. As it turned out, this was less of a danger than originally feared and even after Rhodesian Security Forces launched overt attacks on FAM targets, the armed forces of Mozambique remained hesitant to close with them.

During this early stage deployment of insurgent base camps was found to assist rather than hinder Rhodesian operations. Camps were permanent establishments in which hundreds of trainees were concentrated in a very small area. Active air defence measures such as missile sites and anti-aircraft guns were very few while passive measures such as

camouflage, bunkers and track discipline were in their infancy.

These practices changed drastically, and from 1978 onwards ZANLA camps were spread over several square kilometres. Permanent sites gave way to numerous temporary camps. Locations were rotated between these sites at irregular intervals, while camouflage and concealment were highly sophisticated. By the end of the war, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly

To avoid detection, ZANLA transit camps had become little more than mere resting places, with stocks of ammunition, food and supplies concealed, often by burying, in wide areas of the surrounding bush. There were no huts or grass shelters and the camping areas were generally sited amongst thick bush or under large trees, to camouflage the terrorist presence from our reconnaissance aircraft. They were normally manned by a small garrison who lived, if they were fortunate, in nearby villages. Their job was to ration and resupply the groups passing through on route to the war and to provide guides to take them to the next staging post. (7)

Where the Joint Services Photographic Interpretation Staff, JSPIS, originally had little difficulty in identifying camps and their lay-out from aerial photographs, this was no longer possible. The determination of whether a camp was occupied or not became a major problem. Since final confirmation could only be obtained by physical ground reconnaissance, Special Air Service or Selous Scout teams of one to four men in strength had to be sent in. Within camps spread over large areas they were also needed to determine the precise location of key installations such as anti-aircraft sites. The nature of the task in hand led to the discovery of some of these reconnaissance teams and comprised ensuing operations.

The Mapai raid of May/June 1977, was one such attack. Official Security Force figures released claimed only 32 insurgent casualties. The camp dispersal also played a role during this raid. Co-ordinated with an external area operation by 2nd Battalion of the Rhodesia Regiment in the Vila Salazar area, elements of the Rhodesian Light Infantry were emplaced into the Rio base on the Nuanetsi river as well as into Madulo Pan. Similarly a Selous Scouts

column attacked Jorge do Limpopo, only to discover that the main ZANLA camp had shifted back to Mapai. During the ensuing attack on the latter a Rhodesian Air Force Dakota was shot down. This operation also finally destroyed what remained of the Mozambique railway system in the Gaza province. The previous large external raid into Mozambique, Operation Miracle, had encountered similar problems during October/November 1976, when the targets in Tete province received early warning as a result of the detection of the approaching vehicle column.

In spite of these problems the destruction and capture of arms, ammunition and other material increasingly played a role in Security Force strategy. Where the initial objective had always been primarily to obtain maximum insurgent casualties, it was moderated to give logistical damage an almost equal status.

The first operation aimed at destroying logistical targets, albeit for mainly military reasons, was code-named Operation Virile. It entailed the destruction of five road bridges on the road between Dombe and Espungabera during November 1977. Espungabera is located on the Mozambique side of the border to Mount Silinda. As a result, Espungabera was cut off from the main FAM and ZANLA base at Chimoio and the garrison stationed there denied all substantial means of support. As a transit base for infiltration into Rhodesia it subsequently lost much of its value.

The pattern of Security Force external operations was closely linked to seasonal fluctuations. The annual summer rainy season brought about the growth of thick, green vegetation which provided the best natural cover for insurgent infiltration and activity. Such was the case on 23 November 1977, when ZANLA suffered heavy losses of 1 200 casualties during Security Force attacks on the ZANLA headquarters north of Chimoio, and against the holding camp at Tembue. The attacks were executed by the same force of Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light Infantry troops who were air-lifted from Chimoio to Tembue. In preparing for the massed infiltration of insurgents, ZANLA had taken to concentrating them in forward holding camps at the start of the annual summer rains. Needless to say, this strategy was not repeated indefinitely.

ZANLA base camp deployment, as it had developed by 1978, presented the Rhodesian Security Forces with a number of interrelated problems. The method employed to attack an insurgent base was known as

vertical envelopment. This consisted of an air strike by bombers followed by the delivery of troops on the perimeters of the camp and across the most likely enemy escape routes by helicopters or parachute. The latter forces adopted ambush positions while the perimeter forces fought inwards, cleaning the camp progressively from one side as the battle progressed. This had originally been made possible by the development adopted by ZANLA in its base camps, as well as the absence of organised resistance to Security Forces during the operations.

While the lack of offensive action remained specifically a hallmark of ZANLA forces when faced with a conventional attack, passive counter measures such as the dispersal and extensive use of bunkers presented a serious challenge to the cost-effectiveness of such attacks. These problems were further accentuated when the insurgents resorted to building their bunkers on higher ground. As a result their anti-aircraft cover was both better placed and more effective, improving the somewhat restrictive capabilities of SA-7 missiles and the fields of fire both of missiles and other anti-aircraft weaponry. The FAM in particular were becoming more adept in the use of SA-7's. During the later Chimoio raids they positioned these missiles along the Vandusi-Catandica road, firing on all aircraft in transit.

Air strikes and close air support gradually became more costly and dangerous. Since the Rhodesian Army relied on antiquated Second World War 25 pounder field guns, artillery fire support would not dislodge insurgents from bunkers built to withstand a near miss by a 350kg bomb. (8) Artillery fire support was only used during Operation Miracle previously mentioned. During this operation FAM attempted one of its few interventions, while a ZANLA anti-aircraft machine gun company put up fierce resistance in the face of concerted Rhodesian air and ground attacks. (9)

Throughout the period in question, although the FAM never became involved against the Rhodesian forces in any meaningful way, FAM intervention was more active than that of the Zambian National Defence Force (ZNDF). The most serious Rhodesian fear was a possible attack on their Forward Administrative Areas (FAA). These were established as logistical resupply points within Mozambique (or Zambia) when deep strikes were made into enemy territory. Any attack against the FAA would endanger the entire operation. As a result many of the Rhodesian attacks on FAM forces should be viewed in the light of the

danger these forces posed vis-a-vis the FAA.

Occasionally the Rhodesian Air Force also accidentally bombed either FAM or members of the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force (TPDF). A maximum of 2 000 TPDF troops were deployed at Massingwe in Tete province but did not actively involve themselves in the war against Rhodesia. Such accidental bombings were normally the result of faulty intelligence reports and related to the problem of distinguishing between ZANLA, FAM and TPDF forces within the various camps. Restrictions on action against FAM forces were lifted during 1978. Prior to this these forces had been engaged only in self-defence. One example of the accidental bombing of TPDF forces occurred late in 1978/early 1979. The Directorate of Military Intelligence had identified two possible area locations of a ZANLA base with the knowledge that there was also a TPDF camp in the area. When Selous Scouts teams discovered a base in the Songo area near Lake Cahora Bassa, and air strike was carried out on the location. The base subsequently proved to have been occupied by TPDF forces. As an insurgent training area Tanzania had played an active role in providing ZANLA training facilities since August 1968. These were initially situated at Itumbi in south-western Tanzania and as from 1971 at Mgagoo.

Although not as widely publicized, air strikes without ground support proved an important factor in insurgent casualties. One such raid that was never officially disclosed occurred in mid to late 1979 when a ZANLA holding camp at Nhangau, north of Beira was bombed, resulting in about 600 casualties.

As ZANLA started its build-up of conventional forces and armaments in 1978-1979, it was also becoming clear that Rhodesian weaponry could not deal with the base camp deployment that was evolving, especially as regards dispersal and the extensive use of bunkers. In terms of casualties and effort the cost of traditional vertical envelopment methods was rising, but no ready alternative seemed apparent.

During 1978 it was also becoming increasingly evident that purely as a method of inflicting insurgent casualties, external operations were not as effective as they seemed to be initially. In the period 1977 to 1978 ZANLA casualties resulting from such raids totalled 3 500, while the number of active insurgents in eastern Rhodesia had risen from 1 200 to more than 8 000. This led to a shift in emphasis from causing casualties to disrupting the ZANLA logistical system. One example of such a change

in emphasis is the air attack on combined ZANLA and FAM armouries at Chingodzi and Dendo. Henceforth, ZANLA arms were mainly stored in Maputo itself, where political considerations prevented their mass destruction by air. Alternatively they were dispersed in forward areas. ZANLA was, however, forced to stay in the vicinity of Chimoio since the latter was the main FAM administrative centre for Manica Province, and, subsequently, for ZANLA. ZANLA was thus forced to alternate their camps within an approximate radius of sixty kilometers of Chimoio. To the Security Forces this area became known as the Chimoio Circle.

As the war entered its final stages, logistics were increasingly seen as a primary factor in easing the onslaught from outside Rhodesia. A target study of the Mozambiquan communication and transport system as part of the ZANLA logistical chain was completed by the Directorate of Military Intelligence early in 1979. The result presented to NATJOC suggested the destruction of eighteen major bridges, extensive mining of certain stretches of road and sinking of dredgers in the Makuti channel off Sofala.

The War Council refused to agree to the execution of this plan in a single operation. NATJOC proceeded, however, to authorise piece-meal attacks on some of these objectives during 1979. When the Lancaster House constitutional talks began, a number of them had been attacked, but the desired result, total collapse of all traffic, and thus of ZANLA logistics, was not achieved. The operations launched were too extended in time to be effective and the only result achieved was the disruption of local movement.

During the ensuing ceasefire, ZANLA was capable of concentrating its remaining external forces and then infiltrating them into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia with little difficulty directly counter to the ceasefire agreement.

The attempts at what amounted to a limited interdiction campaign was the nearest that the Rhodesian Security Forces came to being allowed to attack strategic targets in Mozambique. At no stage did NATJOC sanction operations against economic targets that could not be justified on purely military grounds. Operation Uric (September 1979) into Gaza province bears witness to this.

Although this operation was the first to be officially admitted as purposely aimed at FAM targets (in the subsequent Security Forces communique)

the real aim of Operation Uric was to destroy five bridges and thus halt all rail and road movement north of Baragem. Military justification for the raid was provided by the arrival of large numbers of Ethiopian-trained ZANLA insurgents in Maputo in transit to holding camps near Zimbabwe-Rhodesia prior to infiltration. In view of the political negotiations underway that would eventually lead to Lancaster House, NATJOC feared that the FAM might be tempted to assist ZANLA either in seizing territory and declaring it a 'liberated' area, or in shortening ZANLA's logistical line. In an effort to halt all movement in the area as well as to counter the FAM build-up there, an FAM brigade administrative area at Mabalane near Mapai was also attacked. Only three of the five bridges were effectively destroyed. It is reasonable to assume that this operation had an effect on the pressure exerted by President Machel on Mugabe at Lancaster House, for it represented a further serious blow to the Mozambique economy.

In conclusion, Rhodesian Security Force raids into Mozambique had some distinct advantages in comparison with those into Zambia. Vehicle columns could be employed with little difficulty as a result of the absence of a barrier comparable to the Zambezi river. This made the use of artillery possible to provide close fire support, although only used during Operation Miracle. As a legacy of co-operation with the Portuguese their detailed knowledge of the terrain was a further advantage. A strange factor was the reliability of radio interceptions. Vast numbers of these were made, but the loose, uncoordinated command and control structure of ZANLA in contrast to that of ZPRA led to the interceptions being of greater use in Zambia than in the case of Mozambique.

While the general strategic posture regarding Zambia was forward and aggressive, the eastern operational area commanders attempted to institute a defence in depth, with protection of vital economic areas as a vital component. Within the three eastern operational areas such a strategy entailed establishing border minefield obstacles as impediments to cross-border movement, with little manpower back-up. The majority of forces were involved in the protection of farming areas and railway lines.

In the final year of the war an attempt was made towards a more forward strategic posture; with Rhodesian Light Infantry and Special Air Service units operating inside Mozambique on a continual basis. The Special Air Service and Corps of Engineers

laid extensive minefields in Manica, Gaza and Tete provinces in a further attempt to hamper freedom of movement. The effectiveness of these measures is extremely difficult to determine.

### 7.3 Zambia

Zambia had been the traditional base for Rhodesian nationalist movements since UDI in 1965. Although in direct political and ethnic competition, both ZANU and ZAPU had no choice but to avail themselves of the hospitality of President Kaunda. This situation continued until FRELIMO gained power in Mozambique. The third member of the Frontline states, Botswana, was economically too dependent on the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia and militarily too weak to play any major role in the war.

President Kaunda had played an active role in numerous attempts to obtain international action against Rhodesia. These had cost Zambia dearly and culminated in the closure of the border with Rhodesia on 9 January 1973. Zambian commitment to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia is probably best illustrated in the well-known Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 which included the following statement:

On the objective of liberation ... we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence ... But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the people of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. (10)

Despite having signed this, President Kaunda was not prepared to use Zambian forces to 'liberate' Rhodesia. It was to be a struggle by a people for their country. A legacy similar to that of the common struggle by ZANLA and FRELIMO in Mozambique did not exist in Zambia between the Zambian National Defence Force, ZNDF, and ZPRA. This led to a major distinction regarding the support these two countries accorded ZAPU and ZANU.

While FAM and ZANLA forces were integrated at various levels those of the ZNDF and ZPRA remained strictly separate. (11) Each had its own command and control functions as well as logistical chain. At no




Figure 7.2 Zambia

stage of the war did the ZNDF become actively involved with insurgent operations inside Rhodesia.

As regards Rhodesian Security Force operations in that country, separate bases and facilities for ZNDF and ZPRA were advantageous. Therefore attacks on insurgent bases could take place with little or no chance of ZNDF casualties. As in Mozambique, the Zambian army did not involve itself further in Rhodesian external operations. It became evident that the ZNDF was intent on preventing any confrontation with the Rhodesian armed forces. Three factors, however, hampered large scale Security Force operations into Zambia at least until 1978.

The first of these was Zambian membership of the Commonwealth and its standing as a moderate government in the eyes of the West. While Mozambique had gained independence merely as a result of the coup in Portugal, Zambia had gained its freedom peacefully from Britain during the era of de-colonisation. Large scale Rhodesian reprisals would at least have prompted Britain to adopt a harsher Rhodesian policy. The distinct prospect of direct involvement in the dispute could not be ruled out.

South Africa exercised a similar and possibly more direct restraint on Rhodesian actions against Zambia since President Kaunda was the one major black leader prepared to take part in détente in Southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa could not allow any Rhodesian actions that might endanger this relationship.

In the years preceeding 1978, Security Force external operations into Zambia consisted of small-scale clandestine activities such as sabotage and the laying of mines. The operations were conducted in close secrecy and at a relatively low level of intensity. As the war intensified, operations against ZPRA also intensified but were still limited in comparison with raids into Mozambique. Thus, for example, a combined force of Special Air Service, Rhodesian Light Infantry and Rhodesia African Rifles attacked the ZPRA staging-post in Kavalananja on 6 March 1978. The operation was code-named Operation Turmoil and the camp attacked was a mere four kilometers inside Zambia. Forty two ZPRA insurgents were killed and a quantity of equipment destroyed.

Until 1978, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, had repeatedly proved ready to take part in negotiations with the Rhodesian Front government. To a large extent this willingness reflected the imbalance of strength between ZPRA and ZANLA, yet during this period Nkomo was still widely regarded as the major

nationalist leader. (During 1976 Nkomo was still inside Rhodesia as leader of the Internal ANC.) His agreement to a constitutional settlement could have been a decisive blow to the insurgent onslaught. The first Viscount disaster and the ensuing massacre of the survivors on 3 September 1978, however, halted all contact between Ian Smith and Nkomo. Following this, and in the face of reports concerning a major build-up of ZPRA forces in Zambia, the War Council sanctioned attacks on major ZPRA bases in and around Lusaka.

A final factor that tended to restrict Security Force raids was that of physical barriers such as the Zambezi river and Kariba Lake. The initial strike, emplacement of troops, fire support, logistical replenishment and evacuation of troops thus all had to be undertaken by air. As the Rhodesian Air Force had a strictly limited number of aircraft, this was a severe limitation. Only on a single occasion did Rhodesia ferry vehicles across the Zambezi to attack ZPRA targets inside Lusaka itself.

The first major external raid into Zambia took place during October 1978. During May of the previous year, Prime Minister Smith had warned President Kaunda that Harare might order pre-emptive strikes against insurgent bases in Zambia in view of the increased ZPRA forces in that country. This first raid consisted of bombing raids on several targets, inter alia on the ZPRA headquarters at Freedom Camp (F.C.) near Lusaka on 20 October 1978. From here half-trained insurgents were forwarded to Luso in Angola for a final four month training period. As had been the case with the first large-scale raid into Mozambique, targets that had neither active nor passive defence systems were taken entirely by surprise. This was the well-known Green Leader attack.

ZPRA quickly learned from the casualties they had suffered. As with ZANLA, they resorted to camouflage and concealment, the use of bunkers and dispersal of bases over large areas. Where ZPRA bases had initially been limited to major camps close to urban areas, they were now divided into numerous smaller bases and spread over remote areas, away from Lusaka. Within a matter of months air attacks against ZPRA bases were proving much less cost effective than was the case initially. Their training was more conventionally orientated and in general more thorough. ZPRA forces also put up more resistance when attacked than ZANLA did.

The effectiveness of ZPRA passive counter-

measures is illustrated by the air strikes against Mulungushi camp north-east of Lusaka during 1979. Subjected to twelve Canberra and eighteen Hunter sorties over a period of two days, ZPRA forces remained dug-in throughout the attack, sustaining only 7 deaths and 30-40 wounded despite the expenditure of thousands of kilograms of explosives. This was the second bombing attack on Mulungushi. It had first been bombed on 22 December 1978. At the time it contained two hundred and seventy conventionally trained ZPRA insurgents. Thirty-three died during this first attack.

As in Mozambique, it soon became clear that Rhodesian Air Force armaments could not dislodge the enemy from hardened shelters. Various experiments were conducted in an attempt to design some means of dislodging or killing personnel in their bunkers over a wide area. These experiments met with little success. In the case of Zambia specifically this was a serious limitation.

At a later stage Mulungushi base also provided proof of the effectiveness of insurgent camp routine and general security. Security Forces had planned a normal vertical envelopment operation on the camp in the belief that total ZPRA strength amounted to a single battalion. Owing to logistical problems and possible ZNDF involvement the operation was cancelled. After the war the Directorate of Military Intelligence learned that ZPRA had encamped a further three battalions in the surrounding area as counter attack force against just such an eventuality.

The preparation and strength of ZPRA forces and camps soon made it evident that attacks on main camps were becoming too costly. The alternative entailed the elimination of ZPRA communications, logistics and hierarchy. This decision was further prompted following a highly successful Selous Scouts operation into Francistown, during which a number of high-ranking ZPRA officials were captured. During interrogation they revealed the extent of the ZPRA conventional build-up in Zambia. It was planned to seize bridgeheads across the Zambezi after which either Wankie or Victoria Falls airfields would be used as air resupply points. Ground forces would establish an anti-aircraft umbrella over the two airfields.

The whole operation was intended as a severe psychological blow to white morale, as well as international proof of the extent of insurgent activities. During May 1979 Intelligence Digest had reported:

It is reliably reported from Zambia that there is a large-scale build-up of Russian military forces and equipment in the country. Up to 50 Russian transport planes daily have been seen on the Lusaka runways ... The military equipment is largely offensive ... mostly tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns. The troops are mainly East German 'instructors' and a few Yugoslav pilots ... There is much talk of an offensive against Rhodesia, spearheaded by Nkomo's terrorist forces and some elements of the Zambian Army. (12)

It can be accepted that the planned ZPRA operation was to be a concerted bid by Nkomo and his Soviet backing to forestall ZANU (ie. Chinese) political or military victory. Planning included Angola which was to provide the aircraft for a typical Warsaw Pact type operation. (Egyptian attacks across the Suez canal in the Yom Kippur war during 1973 exemplify such an operation.)

In reaction, the Security Forces launched pre-emptive raids by Special Air Service troops into the heart of Lusaka during April and June 1979 to disrupt ZPRA command and control structures. ZPRA central command and communication facilities were severely damaged by these operations. The first of these raids on 14 and 15 April 1979 was the only occasion during which a mobile column of seven Land Rovers was used in Zambia. During the raid an abortive attempt on the life of Joshua Nkomo was carried out.

Although large-scale external operations into Zambia had started only in 1978, two years after similar operations against Mozambique, their scope and intensity were soon to be of an equal magnitude. The same basic arguments that were used to justify attacks on strategic targets in Mozambique were used regarding Zambia.

Being a land-locked country, Zambia had limited export routes. In Angola the Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, had cut the rail link to the port of Benguela. To the south lay Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The only viable routes remaining were along the Chinese built railway line between Tanzania and Zambia (TANZAM now called the TAZARA) and through Mozambique to the port of Beira. Hampered by inefficient management and handling problems at the ports of Dar es Salaam and Beira, these links were hard pressed to move even the minimum of exports and imports.

As part of the limited interdiction campaign waged against Mozambique, the first raids on strategic targets in Zambia took place on 11 and 12 October 1979. Three bridges on the Beira-Moatize railway line in Mozambique were bombed. Zambian links with the port of Beira were effectively cut. At the same time Special Air Service forces destroyed the Cham-beshi railway bridge in northern Zambia. The route carrying 40% of all Zambian imports and exports was thus cut. Since the initial appreciation of objectives to be attacked was incomplete, subsequent raids had to be complemented by further attacks some weeks later. A number of other bridges were also destroyed making Zambia almost entirely dependent on its southern rail link through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. President Kaunda was forced to re-open this route in full to avoid total economic chaos.

The military justification for these raids was towards halting the flow of military equipment to ZPRA from Dar es Salaam. The rate and extent of supply had reached alarming proportions.

As in the case of President Machel's pressure on Robert Mugabe at Lancaster House, it is difficult to gauge the resulting pressure that President Kaunda brought to bear on Joshua Nkomo.

In contrast to ZANLA, the majority of whose forces were inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at the time of the Lancaster House talks, the larger part of ZPRA was still in Zambia. As mentioned in the previous section, Nkomo had been planning a conventional onslaught to regain the military initiative he had lost to ZANLA in 1969-1976. When it became evident that a Lancaster House ceasefire would prevent the execution of any such plan in time, it should then have been clear to Nkomo that little doubt could exist regarding the results of an election in view of the imbalance (more ZANLA than ZPRA) of politically motivated insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,

Early in 1979 a high-powered Soviet military delegation arrived in Lusaka to reorganize the ZPRA strategy. They emphasised the need to go onto a conventional war footing, but in the meantime making the maximum use of the existing ZPRA insurgents to pave the way for entry into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia of the conventional forces. From then on ZPRA was divided into a conventional and an insurgent force.

The conventional plan involved having two bridgeheads across the Zambezi, one in the Chirundu/Kariba area and the other near Victoria Falls. Large numbers of conventionally trained troops would then advance in armoured vehicles to seize the airfields

at Hvange and Kariba into which they would airlift the remainder of their troops.

However, as a settlement at Lancaster House became a real possibility, it also became apparent that the number of insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would play a major role in the elections that were to follow. Furthermore, ZANLA encroachment into traditional ZPRA areas was causing great alarm. To bolster their insurgent forces inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, ZPRA began deploying regular troops into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These forces operated in strengths up to company level. Friction between ZPRA regulars and insurgents had a distinctly negative effect on these operations. ZPRA regulars also suffered severe reverses at the hands of the Security Forces at or near infiltration points, such as Mlibizi, Lumbimbi and Lupane.

By mid-1979 ZPRA had concentrated close to twenty thousand regular soldiers at its Central Guerrilla Training Camp No 2 (CGT-2). Further troops were stationed in Angola. Unable to tackle this force head-on, COMOPS decided on a defensive strategy. This strategy was aimed at preventing any ZPRA armoured columns from arriving at the launch points along the Kariba Lake and the Zambezi River, and to prevent a build-up of ZPRA troops and supplies for an attack into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Accordingly the Special Air Service destroyed the road and rail bridges along the Great North road linking Zambia with Tanzania over which the bulk of Zambian exports and imports had flowed. Nine road bridges were also destroyed a few weeks later. This effectively cut the Great East, the Chirundu and the Livingstone roads. The latter two constituted the major two road approach routes to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. As further counter COMOPS deployed Special Air Service Selous Scouts and Rhodesia Light Infantry forces in southern and south-western Zambia on a continual basis in operations designed to hinder disrupt and where possible, stop all ZPRA movement into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Pressure brought to bear on Bishop Muzorewa in London forced the withdrawal of these forces late in 1979. ZPRA was thus enabled to concentrate its forces from Luso in Angola at CGT-2 and Mulungushi. From here they were transported by road to infiltrate through bridgeheads held by five conventionally trained ZPRA battalions along Lake Kariba and eastwards to the point where the border between Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia meet.

In general, Security Force operations into

Zambia were influenced by a number of geographical features, the most obvious being the barrier of the Zambezi river and Lake Kariba. A second was the vulnerability of Zambia as a land-locked country whose major viable export routes ran through a country with which it was at war. It was mainly these factors that led to the use of Botswana as a ZPRA transit route.

Strategically, ZAPU had a major problem in its ethnic representation; one fifth of the Rhodesian population against the three quarters represented by ZANU. In contrast, however, Nkomo could be assured of the total support of the Matabele. Muzurewa, Sithole and Mugabe were all vying for Shona support, which led to the distinct possibility of ZAPU emerging as power-broker in any elected government.

Possibly as a result of the influence of its Soviet-block backers, ZPRA's military strategy was not as closely aligned to the politization of the rural masses as was ZANLA. ZPRA commanders believed that the better military force would eventually triumph, if only by force of arms.

#### 7.4 Botswana

During December 1972, the Rhodesian Minister of Defence had stated that

We have always had to watch the Botswana border, but now we have undoubted evidence of the existence of terrorists in Botswana.(13)

As the war spread across the rural areas of Rhodesia, three operational areas were formed and actively engaged in combating the threat from Mozambique and Zambia (Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse). Political consideration forestalled the official declaration of 'war' against Botswana so that military commanders were hesitant to provoke an intensified struggle in the area that was eventually designated Operation Tangent. A final factor was a mutual interest to limit the level of violence:

... in view of the fact that many guerrilla raids against Rhodesia have been mounted from Botswana the Rhodesians have responded with notable restraint. This may be related to the fact that one of Rhodesia's two remaining rail links with South Africa runs through Botswana.(14)

Possibly the first external operation of real significance mounted into Botswana was executed by a team of eight Selous Scouts on the night of 30 March 1974. As a result four high level ZPRA officials were captured. Numerous arrests were made and arms caches seized, resulting in a complete setback for both ZPRA and ZAPU in Matabeleland.

During September a fifth ZPRA official who had been attempting to reorganize the broken network in Matabeleland was also abducted by three members of the Selous Scouts. Both operations were substantial intelligence coups for the Security Forces.

Botswana had always been an unwilling partner with the other three black African countries bordering on Rhodesia and actively involved in the war against that country. Flanked on all sides by white-controlled countries her economic survival was in the hands of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa. Botswana's only link with any other black state was at a single point in the north where South West Africa/Namibia and Zambian territory met. The Kasangula ferry across the Zambezi river was the only external link which did not run through Rhodesian or South African territory.

Largely as a result of the natural obstacles hindering direct infiltration into Rhodesia from Zambia, ZPRA had begun to enter Matabeleland via Botswana. ZPRA forces cut across the western tip of Rhodesia, were transported down the Grove road in eastern Botswana from where they entered Rhodesia. Initially this did not occur with the active aid of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) but Sir Seretse Khama became more sympathetic to ZPRA's use of Botswana terrain as the war in Rhodesia intensified.

Until April 1977, Botswana had a very small paramilitary Police Mobile Unit which proved totally inadequate to police the long Rhodesian and Zambian borders. The BDF was then formed, at total strength of two companies. ZPRA use of Botswana continued unabated however, and although not officially condoned, the BDF provided limited aid to ZPRA forces.

An important factor in the Rhodesian attitude towards Botswana was the absence of any armed insurgent camps, in contrast to their approach to Mozambique and Zambia. In both these countries 'refugee' camps listed as such by the resident United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were actively being used as training bases. Listed refugee camps in Botswana were a major source of ZPRA recruits, who were flown out to Nyamapanda near Lusaka. From there

recruits were transported in batches of 2 000 to Lusaka in Angola as well as to other training camps within Zambia such as Mwembeshi, CGT and Mulungushi. Insurgents were not trained within Botswana itself. Botswana's role as a passive transit area, however, became vital in the years 1977-1978 when ZAPU launched its massive recruitment drive in western Rhodesia in an attempt to build up an army comparable to that of ZANLA.

Teams of Selous Scouts and Special Air Service troops were now operating in Botswana virtually on a permanent, if small-scale, basis. These were especially aimed at ambushes on the Grove road and met with varying degrees of success resulting in both ZPRA and BDF casualties. During 1977 Africa Confidential stated

There is now also no doubt that members of the Selous Scouts counter-insurgency unit have been operating inside Botswana, primarily to kidnap men wanted by the Smith regime and abduct them across the border. Sometimes they have posed as refugees in order to gain access to the refugee camps at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe. (15)

Possibly one of the largest single operations into Botswana was the sinking of the Kasangula ferry during April 1979, which effectively cut Botswana's major link with Zambia, and the concurrent attack on the ZPRA headquarters in Francistown. Highly successful pseudo operations in Francistown by the Selous Scouts further provided invaluable intelligence, as documented in the previous section on Zambia. During an ambush on the Grove road by members of Three Group, Selous Scouts, Elliot Sibanda, the senior ZPRA Intelligence Officer for the South Front, was wounded and taken prisoner. The ambush team had actually been waiting for Dumiso Dabengwa on 22 March 1979 when Sibanda was captured. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, 'he was the most important prisoner of the whole war', (16) Information received from him resulted in a brilliant operation by a team of Selous Scouts leading to the capture of the entire ZPRA command for the Southern Front. Under the guise of BDF soldiers, the Scouts gained entry to the ZPRA command headquarters on 13 April 1979 and 'arrested' all ZPRA insurgents present. A vast amount of documentation was also captured.

### 7.5 Angola

For the greater part of the war, Rhodesian Security Forces were largely unaware of the active role played by Angola in training ZPRA forces and supplying them logistically.

The same ZPRA high-level capture whose information led to the raids on Lusaka during the first half of 1979, also provided details of training undertaken at Luso in Angola. This was later confirmed by aerial photographs taken by the Rhodesian Air Force. On 26 February 1979, after delaying the raid for two days as a result of bad weather, an extremely successful air strike was carried out against the series of twelve camps in the area. No ground forces were involved while total surprise was achieved. ZPRA losses were considerable, not least as a result of the fact that the attack took place early in the morning. Rain had further confined the majority of the recruits to their huts. According to captured ZPRA documents total casualties amounted to 160 insurgents killed and 530 injured.

As with Tanzania, Angola played a much more active role in the war for Rhodesia than is generally recognised. Ample proof of this is provided by the plans to launch a conventional onslaught against western Rhodesia. Angola was to provide the aircraft for this operation.

### 7.6 Conclusion

Although only a selected number of the larger and more spectacular operations conducted in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola have been mentioned, the sum total of these raids should not be underestimated. Interviewed in Cape Town during September 1978, Lieutenant-General Walls stated: 'There is no single day of the year when we are not operating beyond our borders ...' (17)

It should, of course, be emphasised that the size of external operations varied from one man reconnaissance missions to almost brigade-size operations.

External operations, however, need to be placed within a sound strategic framework, as has partially been discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Before returning to this central theme, there are a number of relevant factors that need to be mentioned to provide proper perspective.

In both planning and execution of external

operations, senior military commanders were faced with a number of severe planning restrictions. The first of these was sensitivity concerning the number of white casualties. With the singular exception of the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Special Air Service were exclusively white units. Repeated combat experience had indicated to the Rhodesians that in aggressive operations, white soldiers were better, while black soldiers had the edge regarding bush- and fieldcraft. Inevitably external operations involved the extensive use of the white units as attacking force. With a total community of 250 000, white casualties had a disproportionately large effect. In the words of T.E. Lawrence:

An individual death, like a pebble dropped in water, might make a brief hole; yet rings of sorrow widened out therefrom. We could not afford casualties. (18)

In practical terms this influences the type of operation that could be carried out as well as the security of the operation itself.

Initially external operations were primarily aimed at inflicting the maximum number of insurgent casualties before these forces entered Rhodesia. As pointed out, in the early stages insurgent base camp strategy assisted this role. However, evolving insurgent strategy soon had a marked effect on Rhodesian military operations. On the one hand, the targets presented were no longer as concentrated and limited in size. On the other hand the facilities constructed inside these camps proved very difficult to destroy. The emphasis thus slowly shifted to what had been termed in Vietnam 'working the system' (the motto of General Abrams). Insurgent logistics probably became the primary rationale behind Rhodesian military planning for these raids. This was, however, also the result of a realization that almost unlimited manpower resources available to both ZANLA and ZPRA prevented the long term effectiveness of a strategy simply aimed at eliminating these insurgents prior to their entry into Rhodesia.

A further related factor was the threat of significant involvement by the Zambian and Mozambique armies during such raids. This was specifically of importance regarding the physical security of the Rhodesian forces' return route to their country. Any possible involvement by national defence forces that could jeopardise this had to be eliminated at an

early stage. Equally important, Rhodesian forces could not become involved in either long drawn out or running battles with any insurgent or foreign army. Although the armed forces of Mozambique and Zambia only actively intervened on a small scale on four occasions, adequate provision had to be made for dealing with any such an eventuality.

From 1976, with the geographical spread of subverted areas and the increasing numbers of insurgents inside Rhodesia, the availability of select weaponry and weapon systems also became a severely restricting factor. Although the majority of insurgent casualties inside Rhodesia resulted from intelligence provided by the Selous Scouts, the actual killing force was the airborne Fire Force.

This consisted of Rhodesian Light Infantry troops transported in helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, supported by helicopter gunships. Owing to the limited availability of helicopters in particular, any large-scale external operation virtually implied denuding internal operational areas of Fire Force. With the most effective weapon temporarily forfeited, the internal security situation deteriorated dramatically to the extent that during the last two years of the war, a single week proved almost the maximum period for any external operation. According to the officer commanding the Selous Scouts, Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly:

Due to the small numbers of aircraft we possessed, any major attack on an external base meant that the internal scene was denuded of helicopters and consequently their Fireforce passengers for periods of up to ten days at a time and, without Fireforce around, the kill rates dropped back to almost zero and the influence of the terrorist increased. (19)

A procurement problem related to that of aircraft was also encountered as regards sophisticated air delivery weaponry. At the start of external operations the only available counter to extensive bunkers was the old 350kg (1 000 lb) bomb which only succeeded in collapsing shelters in the immediate vicinity. Various experiments and projects were initiated to develop a counter to the use of bunkers. Possible solutions included the use of heavy gasses as well as the creation of a ring of fire by means of the vortex effect. The war ended before any of these attempts could be realized. Attempts at night bombing to counter insurgent movement during the

hours of darkness had little more than a psychological effect.

The general implication was that the Security Forces were not able to counter the evolving insurgent base camp deployment strategies. The alternative to the measures discussed above was to land ground troops to clear such bases. Once on the ground, however, and fighting through bases spread over several square kilometres, Rhodesian forces ran into increasingly strong resistance.

Within a base of 30km<sup>2</sup>, such as found in the Tete Province, insurgent forces had space to regroup and break out of any possible encirclement. ZPRA in particular became increasingly aggressive as the war progressed. This was clearly illustrated during Operation Tepid in Zambia, where ZPRA forces made a conventional night withdrawal from their well-prepared battalion defensive positions: whereas, lacking supportive weaponry, the Rhodesian forces almost suffered serious casualties. Availability and procurement of both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft was limited so that ground forces airlifted into an operation could not be provided with close fire support. For reasons that have already been discussed in sections 2 and 3 this problem was more serious in the case of Zambia. If necessary, artillery could provide this support for operations into Mozambique. This support would undoubtedly have become necessary had the war continued for even a few months longer.

Two final factors worth mention are the repeated attempts to assassinate key ZANU and ZAPU leaders, as well as Rhodesian support of dissident movements such as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, MRN, in Mozambique. The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RNM) is also known as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNRM), the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), and the Mozambique National Resistance Front (FUMO). Following the coup in Portugal, the Rhodesian government decided to aid resistance against the Machel-regime in Mozambique. A 400 000 watt transmitter stationed at Gwero was used to transmit the 'Voice of Free Africa'. This was the same transmitter originally used from Plumtree to block BBC broadcasts from Francistown in Botswana shortly after UDI. Transmissions in support of the MNRM began early in 1976. For the first years of its existence, the MNRM had no distinct ideological stance other than the rejection of the FRELIMO regime. By the end of the war this movement had become a major factor in undermining the stability of Mozambique.

The elimination of key expatriate nationalist leaders was codenamed Operation Bouncer. In spite of repeated attempts it failed to remove leaders such as Mugabe, Nkomo, Nhongo and Dubengwa. Rex Nhongo was wounded during one attempt, while Dumisa Dubengwa escaped death by a few minutes on the Grove road. (20)

In sum, external operations had to be part of Rhodesian military strategy. Alone, they could either buy time for a political settlement or be aimed at the overthrow of the existing government to destroy that country's support for insurgent forces. If, as in the case of Rhodesia, a political strategy was lacking, only the latter option remained.

Eventually Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces engaged in limited interdiction campaigns that tended to be more punitive than preventative. The lessons to be learnt from the American strategic bombing of North Vietnam should have been heeded; Zambia and Mozambique provided evidence of an almost limitless commitment to the de-colonialisation of Rhodesia. Neither country could lay claim to democratic status and as a result could sustain their commitment far beyond that which would have been the case had the respective government been responsible to an electorate. Furthermore, with largely subsistence economies, neither country could be brought to total political chaos by economic disruption.

#### NOTES

1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 52.
2. W.D. Jacobs 'Mao Tse Tung as a Guerrilla - a Second Look' in F.M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962), p. 170.
3. J.D. Deiner, 'Guerrilla (sic) Border Sanctuaries and Counter-insurgent Warfare' in The Army Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 2 (Apr. 1979), pp. 163-164.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 177.
6. See the Rhodesia Herald, 18 August 1976. The Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) was at this stage in its infancy and could not have launched such a raid without active Rhodesian assistance.
7. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 248.
8. The use of artillery was further dependent on the existence of a suitable approach route for

both guns and their logistical support vehicles.

9. The FAM 'intervention' was limited to an advance during the night by one or more T34 tanks supported by infantry. Faced with artillery fire, they limited themselves to speculative fire and withdrew well before first light. During all external operations two Hunters armed with 68mm SNEP rockets were on constant standby for just this kind of eventuality.

10. M. Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle (Rujeko, Harare, 1979), pp. 130-131.

11. The only exceptions occurred at Mulungushi camp where ZPRA were trained by ZNDF instructors, and at the Kabwe officers school.

12. Intelligence Digest (16 May 1979), p. 3. Foreign Report had already referred to Cuban guarded convoys of up to 50 trucks transporting weaponry from Angola to Zambia for ZPRA during September 1977.

13. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Dec. 1972), p. 2702.

14. Foreign Report (3 Aug. 1977), p. 4.

15. Africa Confidential (22 Jul. 1977), p.3.

16. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 373.

17. Rhodesia Herald (28 Sep. 1978).

18. T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977), p. 199.

19. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 302.

20. Reid-Daly provides a detailed account of one such attempt against the life of Joshua Nkomo during December 1978/January 1979 in Selous Scouts: Top Secret War. A radio-activated car bomb was to be used for the assassination, but as a result of Nkomo's studied lack of routine, the operation was aborted.