Chapter 1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE 1965-1979

1.1 The Early Years

By 1890 there were already a number of white settlers inhabiting what was later known as the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. The impingement of white interests upon indigenous black customs and property, however, led to racial tension. So, in 1893 and again in 1895, the Matabele regiments rose up under their king, Lobengula, in the first freedom struggles or Chimurenga against the whites. Although the black warriors were overwhelmingly defeated this did not secure the position of the white settlers, who remained ill at ease in their isolated outposts across Mashonaland. White military preparedness was consequently directed towards securing internal security and remained so for a number of years.

Gradually, as European influence grew, racial prejudice against the blacks increased as well, became established and institutionalized. It was expressed clearly in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 by which the country was divided into distinct areas for black and white habitation. Areas assigned for black habitation were known as Reserves until 1969 and after that as Tribal Trust Lands until independence in 1981. Generally these areas lay in the more arid reaches surrounding the more fertile white controlled region which ran from southwest to northeast (see Figure 1.1). This division of land was made possible by the white referendum of 1922 after which Britain granted self-government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923. Faint awareness of a threat other than that from the indigenous black peoples arose after 1926, and in response to this a small standing army was formed. This force was expanded during the troubled years preceding the Second World




Figure 1.1 Land Apportionment 1968

War. During this war Rhodesian squadrons served with distinction in the Royal Air Force. After 1945 the armed forces were demobilized. However, during 1947 a largely black unit, the Rhodesian African Rifles, was constituted as the core of a regular Army. The territorial force, on the other hand, was almost entirely white and comprised the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regiment. The Rhodesian African Rifles saw service in Malaya from 1956 to 1958.

After the general strike in Bulawayo during 1948, a revision of military policy apparently occurred, since three additional white territorial battalions were formed. Recruits into No. 1 Training Unit were formed into the Rhodesian Light Infantry Battalion in 1961. Two other units established were C Squadron of the Special Air Service and an armoured car unit, the Selous Scouts, named after Courtney Selous, a nineteenth century explorer. (This name was relinquished by the armoured car unit and given to a pseudo-insurgent infantry unit in 1973.)

During 1963 an attempted federation with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) ended in failure. This politically ambitious scheme was launched in 1953. Its failure could largely be ascribed to the internal racial policies of Southern Rhodesia and the realisation that these policies were incompatible with a closer relationship to neighbouring black states. Black riots during 1960 increased white intransigence and made them less willing than ever to consider reform. Unrest first broke out in the black townships of Salisbury (now renamed Harare) when three leaders of the National Democratic Party were detained. Over twenty thousand people gathered in protest at Stodart Hall. Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead responded by ordering the distribution of leaflets from the air announcing a ban on all similar meetings. He also ordered the partial mobilisation of the Army. Further disturbances in Bulawayo were also dispersed and gatherings were banned.

During December 1962 the new Rhodesian Front party was elected to power. Since its inception the party had been committed to the entrenchment and maintenance of white supremacy without the involvement of a distant colonial mother. The leader of the Rhodesian Front, Ian Douglas Smith, was elected Prime Minister on 14 April 1964. He was initially elected to the Southern Rhodesia legislative assembly as a Liberal Party member in 1948 but became

a founder member of the Rhodesian Front party in 1962. He was a dour speaker who had won little public attention before the formation of the Front. Once elected Prime Minister, however, he gained unprecedented popularity among the white population. This support even endured beyond the war against the insurgents. Two events in particular strengthened the resolve of an increasingly isolated Southern Rhodesia to 'go it alone' in an attempt to maintain white supremacy: the massacre of whites in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising of the early sixties and the election to power of an unsympathetic Labour government in Britain in 1964. So, on Armistice day, 11 November 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence (UDI). Although aware of the imminent declaration, Rhodesian black nationalists were totally unprepared to offer any form of organized protest. The small number of blacks sent for training in insurgency warfare by emerging nationalist movements at the time were apparently intended for political propaganda rather than to wage a real revolutionary campaign. Arguably the major nationalist insurgent incident before UDI occurred during July 1964: a group calling itself the Crocodile Gang killed a white farmer at a roadblock in the Melsetter area.

Recruitment and training for an insurgent campaign against the Rhodesian Front government started in 1963. The formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in that year in competition with the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) acted as a catalyst for armed confrontation between the black nationalist forces and the white controlled Rhodesian Security Forces.

The undisputed father and leader of Rhodesian nationalist movements in the late fifties and for many years afterwards, was Joshua Nqabuko Nyangolo Nkomo.He had been elected president of the newly formed African National Congress on 12 September 1957, after the Southern Rhodesian African Nationalist Congress and the City Youth League had united. The African National Congress was subsequently banned in February 1959, but re-emerged on 1 January 1960 as the National Democratic Party. This party, in turn, was banned on 9 December 1961. It reappeared on 17 December 1961, as the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union or ZAPU.

For some months before the formation of ZAPU, Nkomo's leadership had come under increased criticism. It was alleged that he spent more time abroad, canvassing for the nationalist cause, than in

Southern Rhodesia leading it. Further dissension broke out among black nationalists after the National Democratic Party executives agreed to the proposals of the 1961 London constitutional conference whereby only 15 out of 65 parliamentry seats were allocated to blacks. African nationalists reacted angrily to this agreement and forced the National Democratic Party hastily to repudiate the agreement, but the damage to the unity of Rhodesian African nationalism had been done. When ZAPU was banned on 20 September 1962, Nkomo was again absent from Rhodesia. He was persuaded to return only after considerable pressure from his own followers as well as from President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. After his release from 3 months' restriction, Nkomo persuaded the former ZAPU executive to flee with him to Tanzania and there form a government in exile. Bitter dissension about the leadership of the Rhodesian nationalist movement now arose amongst prominent black nationalists including the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mbellarmine Mugabe. In response, ZAPU President Nkomo suspended his executive council and returned to Rhodesia to form the interim People's Caretaker Council. Outside Rhodesia the People's Caretaker Council retained the name ZAPU. Nkomo was rearrested and detained until 1974. In spite of his long detention, he was never again seriously challenged as ZAPU president.Nkomo's foremost critics formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on 8 August 1963 with the Reverend Sithole as interim president and Robert Mugabe as Secretary General. Both ZANU and the People's Caretaker Council were banned in Rhodesia on 26 August 1964. Mugabe and Sithole were arrested. Although he was released during June of the following year, Mugabe was restricted to Sikombela until his rearrest in November 1965. Both Mugabe and Sithole remained in detention until December 1974.

ZANU sent its first contingent of five men led by Emmerson Mnangagwa to the People's Republic of China for military training in September 1963. They formed the nucleus of ZANU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, or ZANLA. Having been actively involved in operations against the Rhodesian regime since 1964 it was thus understandable that Sithole precipitated his own fall from the ZANU presidency during 1969 when he stated in the dock

> I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word, thought or deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities and from any form of violence.(1)

Internal dissension within the ranks of the black nationalists thus brought about the formation of ZANU. Although Nkomo's vacillation had discredited him among a large section of the Rhodesian nationalist leaders, he still appeared to command majority black nationalist support within the country at the turn of the decade. At this stage the tribal bias of both ZANU and ZAPU was not as strongly manifested as from 1972 onward.

ZANU and ZAPU, however, increasingly competed in revolutionary zeal and recruitment. The ZAPU armed forces later became known as the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA or ZIPRA)(2)

The insurgents' strategy at this stage was based on two false assumptions. First, that Britain could be induced to intervene forcibly in Rhodesia should law and order seem in imminent danger of collapsing, and second that

> ... all that was necessary to end white domination was to train some guerrillas and send them home with guns: this would not only scare the whites but would ignite a wave of civil disobedience by blacks.(3)

By 1966, however, ZAPU, still the major black nationalist movement, had realized that the British government could not be induced to intervene actively in Rhodesia. ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, also recognized that it did not have the ability to force a collapse of law and order. The major task of the insurgent forces existing at this early stage was therefore to convince the Organisation of African Unity and the world at large that the forces to overthrow the regime of Ian Smith really did exist. This was vitally important if financial and political support was to be forthcoming. It was also apparent that if Rhodesia was to become Zimbabwe, Zimbabweans themselves would have to take up arms and fight for it. While leaders of ZANLA and ZPRA were convinced of this, black Rhodesians as yet were not. Rhodesian citizens resident in Zambia and Tanzania were thus forcibly recruited to swell ZANLA and ZPRA ranks until the trickle of refugees and recruits turned into a flood.

While ZPRA bore almost the full weight of the

war effort in these initial years, ZAPU remained at the same time the major exponent of the 'external manoeuvre' designed to obtain maximum international support. ZANLA, trained by China, played a very limited military role during this period. Both movements also increasingly appeared to represent a major tribal grouping in Rhodesia. ZAPU had the backing of the Matabeles, who constitute some 19% of Zimbabwe's black population, while ZANU had that of the loosely grouped Shona nations (77%). (See Figure 1.2)

Following UDI the first military engagement recognised officially by Rhodesia occurred on 28 April 1966 between Security Forces and seven ZANLA insurgents near Sinoia, 100 km northwest of Harare.

That day is now commemorated in Zimbabwe as Chimurenga Day - the start of the war. The group eliminated was in fact one of three teams that had entered Rhodesia with the aim of cutting power lines and attacking white farmsteads. A second of the groups murdered a white couple with the surname of Viljoen on their farm near Hartley on the night of 16 May 1966. The insurgents were subsequently captured by Security Forces. In total all but one of the original fourteen insurgents were either killed or captured.

Shortly afterwards a second ZANLA infiltration was detected near Sinoia. In the ensuing battle seven insurgents were killed and a number captured.

During August 1967 a combined force of 90 insurgents from ZPRA and the South African African National Congress entered Rhodesia near the Victoria Falls. They miscalculated the attitude of the local black population and the Security Forces soon knew of their presence there. In the first major operation of the war 47 insurgents were killed within three weeks and more than 20 were captured. The remainder fled to Botswana in disarray. Fourteen of the Security Force members were wounded and seven others killed.

Early in 1968 a second force of 123 insurgents from ZPRA and the South African African National Congress crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia into northern Mashonaland. The group remained undetected for three months, setting up a series of six base camps at intervals of 30 kilometers before being reported by a game ranger. On 18 March Security Forces attacked and destroyed all of the six camps. During the ensuing month 60 insurgents were killed for the loss of six members of the Security Forces.

During July 1968 a third joint incursion took place. The 91 insurgents involved formed into three groups.




Figure 1.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe

About 80 insurgents were either killed or captured at that time and significantly, the first member of the South African Police deployed in Rhodesia also died then. Following the entrance of the South African African National Congress into Rhodesia, members of South African Police counter-insurgency units were detached to the Rhodesian Security Forces. In the ensuing years the Republic of South Africa involved itself increasingly with the security situation on the borders of its northern neighbour.

These first insurgent incursions into Rhodesia all originated from Zambia across the floor of the Zambezi River valley. This sparsely populated area was deemed the natural infiltration route as mobilisation of the masses did not yet constitute an important principle in insurgent strategy. Security Force counter-measures were thus largely track and kill type operations. Furthermore infiltrations took place in relatively large groups, which Security Forces located more easily.

After a peak during 1968, almost no incursions took place the following year. By the end of 1969 both ZANU and ZAPU had realized that their military strategy had serious shortcomings. These problems proved to have less impact on ZANLA than on ZPRA, for since the latter had borne the brunt of the insurgency effort up to that stage, the defeats suffered in the field resulted in a collapse of morale and the withdrawal of ZPRA from the conflict for a number of years. On the other hand, Rhodesian authorities were satisfied with the performance of their small Security Forces. This later had the effect of lulling Rhodesia into a false sense of security, as reflected in the figures for defence expenditure which remained relatively constant over this period. It also tended to strengthen the impression amongst Rhodesians that military action, to the exclusion of political and other non-military action, would be sufficient to destroy the insurgency threat, for, at this stage, the insurgent groups had not yet resorted to internal subversion as a major element in their strategy. This sense of complacency was further increased by the apparent economic success of UDI. The economic upswing led to an influx of white immigrants and increased optimism. This was in stark contrast to the defeatism and low morale among insurgent forces.

By 1970 ZANU, under the external leadership of Herbert Chitepo, emerged as leader of what was regarded as a liberation struggle. Although the ZANU president, Reverend Sithole, was

still imprisoned in Rhodesia, this did not have the divisive and eventual disruptive effect on ZANU that the concurrent imprisonment of ZAPU leader, Nkomo, had on his organisation. Within ZAPU a struggle had been waged between James Chikerema and Jason Moyo for external leadership. The infighting soon led to a split between ZAPU as a political wing and ZPRA as a military wing. In a document entitled 'Observations on our Struggle' Moyo summarized the situation as follows:

> Since 1969 there has been a steady decline of serious (sic) nature in our Military Administration and Army. Military rules have been cast overboard. Relations between some members of the War Council and the Military Administration are strained. Accusations of a serious nature have been made. Military Administration and War Council meetings are no longer being held. Planning of strategy is seriously lacking. There is no co-ordination in the deployment of cadres in Zimbabwe.(4)

The clash between Moyo and Chikerema reached a climax in April 1970. From the total number of approximately four hundred ZPRA insurgents some decided to side with one of the two faction leaders while others either stayed in a small neutral group, or deserted altogether. Chikerema subsequently formed FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe) in October 1971 with a splinter ZANU group led by Nathan Shamuyarira. The original objective behind the creation of FROLIZI was to reunite ZANU and ZAPU into a single nationalist movement but neither party was prepared to do so. In 1973 FROLIZI itself split and consequently played an insignificant part in the insurgency campaign.

Even at this early stage the basic differences in strategic concept between ZANLA and ZPRA were readily discernable.

> By 1971, ZANU's emphasis was on the political education of the Zimbabwe workers and peasants. The purpose of this was to elicit support from the masses and to recruit more people for guerrilla warfare training. Another significant factor for this change in strategy was to widen the areas of combat.(5)

As regards ZPRA, the general strategy adopted relied principally on military action. As expressed by W.W. Nyangoni:

> Since 1970 we have analysed the basis of the enemy strength and revised our strategy and tactics so as to be able to strike where it hurts most.(6)

and further

> The strategy pursued by the liberation forces of ZAPU was that of engaging the enemy largely with series of landmines accompanied by limited and calculated armed attacks.(7)

From 1970 onwards ZANLA placed a higher premium on politicizing the population than ZPRA. Rhodesian intelligence reports indicated that it was only as from 1978 that ZPRA turned to the politicization of the local population to the same degree that ZANLA had been doing. Probably with Russian backing and instruction ZPRA forces also tended to be more conventionally orientated and trained than those of ZANLA. The latter took its doctrine from China that the main object of such a protracted war is to gain the support of the local population.

Regarding the politicization of the Rhodesian black population in general, the single most significant event was the formation of the African National Council on 16 October 1971, led by Bishop Abel Muzurewa. In December of the following year the African National Council succeeded in helping to persuade the Pearce Commission to report adversely on the acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement. Possibly for the first time, the rural and urban black population of Rhodesia had been made politically aware en masse. In its report, the Pearce Commission inter alia noted:

> Mistrust of the intentions and motives of the Government transcended all other considerations. Apprehension for the future stemmed from resentment of what they felt to be the humiliations of the past and at the limitations on policies on land, education, and personal advancement. One summed it up in saying, 'We do not reject the Proposals, we reject the Government'.(8)

1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic Base Area in the North-East

ZANLA chose the Tete province in Mozambique

as approach route to Rhodesia more by force of circumstance than by conscious analysis. Both ZANLA and ZPRA were still based in Zambia, and were forced to operate from that country as Mozambique was a Portuguese colony at the time. Yet the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, who had been fighting against the Portuguese for a number of years, had been gaining ground steadily in the Tete province and initially offered ZPRA the use of this front as an alternative entry route into Rhodesia. Not least as a result of the continual small scale Rhodesian operations in support of the Portuguese forces, FRELIMO had become convinced of the necessity to 'liberate' Rhodesia as well, if the liberation of Mozambique was to be effected. Low morale and internal strife caused ZPRA to show little interest in this route. Furthermore it would take ZPRA, a movement under Matabele control into an area of the country under Shona control. The use of the route was thus offered to ZANLA, who eagerly grasped this opportunity.(9)

A number of demographic, historic and geographical factors favoured the North-eastern border of Rhodesia for insurgency. The rugged Mavuradonha mountains presented numerous obstacles to Security Forces in locating and eliminating known insurgent groups, while dense vegetation hindered observation, especially during the summer rainy season (November to March). Owing to its vast expanse and relatively low economic value, the area had furthermore suffered decades of administrative neglect. The traditional tribal way of life had been allowed to continue, with little active interference from Harare. The Shona tribe in the area, the Korekore, also spilt across the border into the Tete province of Mozambique, thus easing the infiltration of insurgents from that country into the North-east. A final factor was the lack of a physical impediment comparable to the Zambezi river on the common national border. With active FRELIMO cooperation ZANLA was presented with an excellent opportunity.(10)

As indicated above, ZANLA strategy had shifted its emphasis markedly since the sixties. In accordance with the teaching of Mao Zedong greater attention was now given to the politicization and mobilization of the local population before mounting any attacks on Rhodesian Security Forces or white farms. Yet at this early stage ZANLA had, in total, only about 300 trained insurgents. Of these, 60 men mounted the infiltrations in the north-east.

Noel Mukona, the head of ZANLA from 1969 to 1973 could later claim with little hyperbole:

> In 1969 it was decided to operate silently ... We worked underground, training, stocking equipment and regrouping inside the country. Special Branch could not find out what was going on and that we were preparing for a continuation of the struggle. Much contact was maintained with the local population to review the terrain ... In July 1972 ZANU called together all its forces and met in the bush in Mozambique and reviewed the situation. We were satisfied that the preparations were enough and that enough arms and food had been stashed in the bush and that we could restart the onslaught. (11)

In the early hours of 21 December 1972, ZANLA insurgents attacked the white homestead of Marc de Borchgrave in the Centenary district, marking the resurgence of the insurgent onslaught, indeed of a new campaign. Most Rhodesians, however, accepted the news philosophically. Official concern over the deteriorating situation in the area had been expressed some weeks earlier by Prime Minister Ian Smith when he stated on the radio that the security situation was

> ... far more serious than it appears on the surface, and if the man in the street could have access to the security information which I and my colleagues in government have, then I think he would be a lot more worried than he is today.(12)

Yet the information available to the government at this stage was somewhat incomplete. All of the four traditional intelligence sources, Army, uniformed Police, Special Branch and the Department of Internal Affairs (subsequently renamed Home Affairs) had limited representation in the area, and in the case of the Army had maintained little more than a token presence.

At a later stage Prime Minister Smith explained how the insurgents were able to remain undetected for such a period of time:

> ... they were able to move backwards and forwards across the border from their so-called base camps and were thereby able to avoid detection for long enough to enable them to subvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereafter their task was made easy through shelter, food

> and assistance they received from the locals. This situation has complicated the position as far as our security forces are concerned. (13)

Not only had ZANLA succeeded in establishing a relatively secure base area inside Rhodesia, but had also succeeded in obtaining the full co-operation and support of the black rural population within the area. This proved a crucial factor in their later success and in the way the Rhodesian government attempted to eradicate the threat.

1.3 Operation Hurricane

Before the formation of the operational area in the North-east that was to become known as Operation Hurricane, Rhodesian Security Force authorities had become increasingly anxious about the security situation in the neigbouring province of Tete in Mozambique. Although the Security Forces was largely unaware of the extent of insurgent activities inside Rhodesia itself, they had, since early 1972, considerably stepped up co-operation with the Portuguese forces who were then still in control of Mozambique. The two elite Rhodesian Army units, C Squadron of the Special Air Service and the 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, were operating in Tete itself on an almost continuous basis. Yet when insurgent operations inside Rhodesia resumed in late 1972, Army presence in an area of more than 1 000 square kilometers was only at company strength.

The extent of the insurgent penetration at the turn of 1972 was widespread, ranging from Sipolilo, west of Centenary, across to Mutoko in the east, and southwards to the Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands. In contrast to the Security Force operations of the sixties, the war for Rhodesia had now entered a new phase. Previously members of the local population had willingly come forward to supply information on the presence and activities of insurgents, but within a matter of weeks all intelligence sources in the North-east dried up. Security Force morale plummeted as they failed to meet the enemy face to face. After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote

> For the first time the Rhodesian Security Forces were faced with a seemingly insoluble problem ... after carrying out their attacks the terrorists had not gone to ground in bush-camps in uninhabited areas where they could

> eventually be tracked down ... neither had they gone to ground in inhabited areas where information from the local population to the Police or Special Branch had indicated their whereabouts. This time there was nothing. No tracks ... no information. (14)

A Joint Operation Centre (JOC), code-named Hurricane, (see Figure 1.3) was formed at Army brigade level of command to counter the internal threat that had developed. JOC Hurricane was initially situated at Centenary, was then moved to Bindura and eventually to Harare as its area of responsibility increased. It constituted the formalization of a committee system approach that had already been used to counter the insurgency threats of the sixties.

With the limited scope of active operations during 1973-74, JOC Hurricane benefitted from almost all the available forces of the Army, Air Force and British South Africa Police. The latter alone could contribute some 16 companies to the counter-insurgency effort. This enabled the Army, nominally in control of Hurricane, to formulate a strategy based on two fundamental requirements; first, the necessity of stemming the flow of insurgents from Mozambique and second, that of population control. The vital elements of JOC Hurricane strategy as developed by 1974 were succinctly summarized by the then brigade major as follows:

> Large external operations to turn off the tap; a cordon sanitaire with warning devices, patrolled and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area; population control consisting of Protected Villages, food control, curfews and (eventually) martial law, and massive psychological action. (15)

The object was to channel insurgents into designated areas from which the local population had been removed. Here the Security Forces could easily track and eliminate the insurgents before they reached populated areas. In areas adjoining these depopulated or 'no-go' areas, movement of the local population was to be restricted by placing them in Protected and Consolidated Villages. Strict curfews were to be enforced within these areas with the aim of cutting the link between the local population and the insurgents. Largely due to the limited availability of manpower and other resources, and the increasing demands made upon them, the strategy described

was not employed in full.

In an attempt to reassert control over rural areas, four new districts were proclaimed in the north-eastern and eastern highlands, at Centenary, Rushinga, Mudzi and Mutasa. In an attempt to persuade Zambia to desist from aiding both ZANLA and ZPRA, Rhodesia closed its border at Chirundu, Kariba, and Victoria Falls to all Zambian traffic on 9 January 1973. Although Zambian copper exports were exempted from this embargo shortly afterwards, President Kaunda refused to use any of these routes. Officially the border remained closed until 1978, when Rhodesian external raids into Zambia forced President Kaunda to reopen his southern export routes.

When the campaign began in 1973 it seemed that the Rhodesian government was not yet convinced of the political character of the threat facing it. Heedless of the possible consequences of such action, government then empowered Provincial Commissioners on 19 January 1973 to impose collective punishment on tribal communities assisting the insurgent forces in accordance with the Emergency Powers (Collective Fines) Regulations. The most extreme case of collective punishment documented was the resettlement of nearly 200 members of the local population from Madziwa Tribal Trust land in the Beit bridge area in 1974 "... as punishment for assisting terrorists."(16) The extent to which collective punishment was to be enforced is apparent from the following extraction from a poster distributed in Marante Tribal Trust Land and Mukumi African Purchase Area during January 1978:

> as from dawn on the 20th January 1978 the following restrictions will be posed upon all of you and your TTL (Tribal Trust Land) and Purchase Land
> 1. Human curfew from last light to 12 o'clock daily
> 2. Cattle, yolked oxen, goats and sheep curfew from last light to 12 o'clock daily
> 3. No vehicles, including bicycles and buses to run either (in) the TTL or the APL (African Purchase Land)
> 4. No person will either go on or near any high ground or they will be shot
> 5. All dogs to be tied up 24 hours each day or they will be shot
> 6. Cattle, sheep and goats, after 12 o'clock, are only to be herded by adults
> 7. No juveniles (to the age of 16 years) will be allowed out of the kraal area at any time either day or night, or they will be shot
> 8. No schools will be open
> 9. All stores and grinding mills will be closed.(17)

Specifically during the period up to 1976 collective punishment measures such as those quoted above could only have had serious negative effects on the attitude of the black rural massas for at this stage the majority of the local population were not neccessarily supporters of either ZANU or ZAPU.

In execution of the strategy devised for Operation Hurricane, the first 'no-go' area was proclaimed along the Mozambique border on 17 May 1973. In one way or another 'no-go' areas were extended along vast stretches of Rhodesian border in an attempt to establish depopulated 'free-fire' zones for Security Force operations. Government attitude to the infringement of curfews and 'no-go' areas was well summarised by P.K. van der Byl, Rhodesian Minister of Information on 31 July 1975 in Parliament when he stated that "... as far as I am concerned the more curfew breakers that are shot the better'.(18) On 21 June the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Mr Wickus de Kock, told Parliament that there were indications that the removal of tribesmen from parts of the north-eastern border to form a cordon sanitaire was beginning to have the desired effect. The use of the name cordon sanitaire was however misleading and should not be confused with attempts to establish a proper cordon sanitaire some months later (see Chapter 4).

In July 1973 the first major abduction of schoolchildren by insurgents occurred. St Albert's Mission, on the Zambezi Valley escarpment, was entered by a group which abducted 292 pupils and members of staff, who were then forced to march into the Zambezi Valley and north towards Mozambique. Security Forces intercepted the column and rescued all but eight of the abductees. Similar abductions were repeated in years to come and Security Forces were increasingly unable to prevent these actions.

At the start of the summer rainy season towards the close of 1973, the insurgent forces intensified their efforts. In an attempt to cut all links with the insurgents in subverted areas, Deputy Minister de Kock announced the initiation of the Protected Village programme. Four villages were in various stages of completion as part of a pilot scheme, It was estimated that more than 8 000 blacks would be resettled

in the Zambezi Valley by the end of December. Thus started one of the essential elements of Rhodesian military strategy which eventually led to the formation of an independent arm of the Security Forces, the Guard Force, to man and protect these villages. It placed a heavy strain on the limited resources available to the war effort, but some 750 000 rural blacks were eventually resettled in over 200 Protected Villages. Geographically, the distribution of these villages gave a very clear impression of the spread of insurgency, but even when the scheme had reached its most extended phase, the vast majority of Protected Villages were still found in the North-east where ZANLA had set up its original base area. In general the strategy was not consistently executed and, as a result, success varied. Eventually the Security Force punitive approach to the scheme, limited manpower and finance and bad execution was to lead to the failure of Protected Villages in general. (This strategy is evaluated in Chapter 3.)

But by the close of 1973 the number of insurgents in Hurricane was estimated at a mere 145 men. Insurgent casualties for the year stood at 179 while 44 members of the Security Forces and 12 white civilians had lost their lives. All in all the Rhodesian Security Forces had barely succeeded in holding their own. As a result Government announced during December that the period of national service would be extended from that of nine months instituted in 1966 to one year. Prior to 1966 national service had consisted of a short 4½ months.

1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction

During 1974 the Rhodesian authorities made a concerted effort to restore law and order. The Minister of Defence announced in February:

> The Government is embarking on a call-up programme in which the first phase will be to double the national service intake. A second battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles will be raised to augment the Army ... These arrangements by the Ministry of Defence, together with other actions are designed to eliminate the terrorists in the shortest possible time.(19)

Measures introduced included extensing the powers of protecting authorities in the north-eastern area.

These authorities had previously consisted of comsioned police officers, but legislation was extended to include certain District Commissioners from the Department of Internal Affairs. Protecting authorities could now order residents to do specified public security work, which included the building or maintenance of bridges, roads, fences, and dams. Detention without trial was extended to sixty days. A government statement during April set out a scale of fixed rewards ranging from Rh$ 300 to Rh$ 5 000 for information. This included information leading to the death or capture of a senior insurgent leader or to the recovery of insurgent weaponry.

Already, at this early stage of the conflict, logistics played a major role in the insurgents' strategy. All weaponry had to be carried in from either Mozambique or Zambia. While food was readily obtainable from the local population, the insurgent forces were not able to capture and thereby arm and resupply themselves with weaponry from the Security Forces. In the case of ZANLA, which was supplied by the People's Republic of China, this problem was further complicated by the erratic and limited supply of arms. ZPRA, in contrast, tended to be better and more heavily armed by the USSR. Awareness of the ZANLA problems influenced Army and Air Force planning for external operations in the years to come.

Operations were almost exclusively confined to the North-east at this stage. During March 1974, however, it was becoming clear that the ZPRA reopening of the Zambian front in the North-west was imminent. This was officially confirmed on 6 October in a government statement which lodged a formal complaint with Zambia over the use of its territory by insurgents.

On 25 April 1974, the armed forces of Portugal staged a successful coup d' état and overthrew President Ceatano. General Antonio de Spinola became the new President. On 27 July he recognised the right of Portugal's overseas provinces of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea to independence. June 1975, was set as date for the transfer of power in Mozambique to FRELIMO. A month after the coup the revolutionary junta in Lisbon asked Harare to halt all cross-border operations into Mozambique. Rhodesia did not immediately feel the military impact, for it was some months before FRELIMO leader, Samora Machel, moved south to Maputo then still known as Lourenco Marques, and assumed the presidency. Once in power, however, his commitment to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was clear. As a result

construction of the Rutenga-Beit bridge rail link to South Africa was hastily begun: during the years to follow it developed into a Rhodesian life-line and important insurgent target. The collapse of Portuguese colonial control in Mozambique also had a distinct effect on politically conscious black Rhodesians.

> In 1974, particularly following the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, and the impending independence of neighbouring Mozambique, sent (sic) an euphoric wave of high revolutionary hopes among the masses who now voluntarily sought and followed the ZANU-ZANLA 'freedom trail' into the training camps.(20)

A team of Security Force pseudo insurgents, when posing as members of ZANLA were '... shocked and disillusioned at the wild sometimes ecstatic, receptions that ZANLA was getting (amongst the local population)' (21)

Not only did the independence of Mozambique have a profound effect on the war in Rhodesia, but also on the independence of Angola, which was prepared to play a large role in the training of ZPRA forces.

During May 1974, construction began on the first border minefield obstacle. Known as the Cordon Sanitaire it was completed in April 1976 and stretched from the Musengedzi to the Mazoe river. As the name implies, it was planned to establish an impassable obstacle to prevent all cross-border movement in the areas in which it was erected. Despite the fact that this soon proved impractical, however, by 1978 border obstacles of various descriptions had been constructed along virtually the entire eastern border with Mozambique, as was the section of Rhodesian border with Zambia from Victoria Falls eastward to Milibezi. While all the initial efforts entailed the use of an electronic alarm system and a reaction force, these were phased out. Eventually the Cordon Sanitaire merely became a border minefield obstacle. Owing to restrictions in manpower and finance, Security Forces were unable to cover it by observation or fire, patrol or even maintain it. In planning and execution these border minefield obstacles bore clearest witness to a lack of a coherent national strategy to counter the insurgency, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The pressures of the war were now increasingly exerted upon white farmers in the affected areas.

During June a scheme was announced which included grants of up to Rh$ 3 000 for establishing protected compounds for labourers. The compounds were to have floodlighting and wire fences. It was envisaged that the Department of Internal Affairs would provide armed guards at a later stage, yet manpower limitations precluded any such plans.

In the latter half of 1974 the first two major operations to move the total black population of a Tribal Trust Land into Protected Villages took place. On 25 July Operation Overload was announced by Army Headquarters and consisted of moving the 46 960 people of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land simultaneously within 6 weeks into 21 Protected Villages. Although this objective was achieved, it totally failed to provide the local population with improved living conditions. Operation Overload Two followed in Madziwa Tribal Trust Land in August/September/October and proved to be a substantial improvement. Both Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands were seen as key areas in halting the insurgent advance on Harare. Contrary to established principles it was decided to relocate the most subverted areas first, instead of consolidating government controlled areas as a secure base. As documented in Chapter 4 the Army viewed the Protected and Consolidated villages purely as population control measures. Where members of the local population were concentrated in a restricted area, the Security Forces could move freely in the vast depopulated areas. This approach negated any advantages achieved by the whole scheme in the long run, although both Operations Overload One and Two temporarily broke contact between local population and insurgent forces in the areas concerned. This break enabled Security Forces to regain the initiative in these heavily infiltrated areas.

Government estimates of defence expenditure tabled in Parliament on 24 August for the financial year 1974/75, provided for greatly increased spending in all the related ministries for the period ending 30 June 1975. The defence vote was increased by Rh$ 6,7 mil to a total of Rh$ 46,176 mil.

Intelligence estimates released towards the end of 1974 put the number of insurgents inside Rhodesia at between three and four hundred. Nevertheless, despite the opening of the Zambian Front, Security Force morale was high and prospects seemed better than a mere twelve months previously. Since December 1972, 468 insurgents had been killed and only 48 members of the Security Forces lost - a ratio of nearly 10 to 1. This high kill ratio was also the

result of a new tactic adopted by the Security Forces known as Fire Force. Largely as a result of successes obtained by pseudo insurgents in Madziwa and Kandeya Tribal Trust Lands during which armed helicopters delivered fighting troops directly onto or close to the enemy. The concept was formalized and honed to a vital element of Security Force action. The first Fire Forces were formed at Mount Darwin and Centenary during June 1974. Initially they consisted of three elements: G-cars, K-cars and members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry as fighting force on the ground. G-cars were normally helicopters armed with twin Browning machine guns and each carried four troops. K- or kill-cars were Allouette helicopters armed with 20 mm canon to provide fire support. At a later stage Lynx fixed wing aircraft were included to provide further close support as well as a DC-3 Dakota aircraft which could carry twenty paratroopers to be deployed as stop-groups. Fire Force call-ups normally originated from Security Force operation posts on high ground which then 'talked' the aircraft onto the target. Yet the high kill ratio achieved could at best have pointed to tactical superiority, for insurgent numbers inside the country continued to rise.

1.5 Detente

When Rhodesia was pressured to accept the South African proposals for a détente on 11 Desember 1974, Security Forces claimed that there were a total of only 70 active insurgents on Rhodesian soil. Although no troops had been withdrawn from active operations, offensive and aggressive actions were temporarily halted. Troops were in fact ordered to desist from attacking insurgents leaving Rhodesia - although how this intention was to be measured remained uncertain. For the hard-pressed insurgents this presented a welcome reprieve and they stood only to gain psychologically from reduced Security Force actions in the countryside. Many left Rhodesia to regroup, replenish and retrain.

During the preceding months there had been intense turmoil within the ranks of ZANU. In November 1974 what was to become known as the Nhari rebellion had taken place in reaction to the high standard of living enjoyed by most of the ZANU High Command members in Lusaka. Although ZANU defence chief Josiah Tongogara had forcibly repressed the rebellion, the effects of the Nhari rebellion later

culminated in the assassination of High Command chairman Herbert Chitepo on 18 March 1975. This then led to the imprisonment of all ZANU High Command members in Zambia. They were released shortly before the Geneva talks in 1976. The combination of these confused events rather hamstrung the offensive efforts of ZANLA for some months. The disruption within ZANLA ranks presented the Security Forces with an excellent opportunity to disrupt the insurgent effort further. Strangely enough Rhodesian politicians dreamed of an accord with FRELIMO whereby access to the ports of Beira and Maputo would be retained indefinitely. The result was that both ZANLA and FRELIMO were allowed time to consolidate their forces without active Rhodesian interference. This was possibly the major result of the detente forced onto Rhodesia by its South African ally.

President Kaunda, together with President Machel, had grown increasingly impatient of the disunity among nationalist forces both within the movements themselves as well as between the various parties and armed forces. Prior to the constitutional talks in Lusaka during December 1974, the two presidents had been able to induce ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the African National Council to join in a united African National Congress. The signatories to this Lusaka Unity Accord of 8 December 1974, were Sithole, Nkomo, Chikerema and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Bishop Muzorewa was leader of the only internally based nationalist movement, the African National Council. Launched in November 1971 to organize a massive negative vote against the Pearce proposals, the African National Council (ANC) was essentially an internal coalition between ZANU and ZAPU. Following the rejection of the Pearce proposals, the ANC took on a more formal political structure. In the years leading up to the Lusaka Unity Accord Bishop Muzorewa had been involved in repeated talks with the Smith regime. The most serious weakness as regards the African National Council was its lack of military strength. The latter was an obvious precondition to legal recognition inside Rhodesia. Although thousands of youths in fact left the country to fight 'in the Bishop's army' they invariably ended up fighting for either ZANLA or ZPRA.

Several weeks before the Lusaka Unity Accord, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole had still been the undisputed leader of both ZANU and ZANLA. Even as the détente initiative was gaining momentum, however, his fellow prisoner at Que Que, Robert Mugabe, was elected to the ZANU presidency in a palace coup.

When South Africa coerced Rhodesia to release imprisoned nationalist leaders in order to attend the constitutional conference in Lusaka, both Sithole and Mugabe then claimed to represent ZANU. (At this stage Frontline states had, in confusion, refused to recognize Mugabe as ZANU president.) ZAPU leader Nkomo was also released on 15 December 1974.

The first sign that there was an imminent collapse of the proposed constitutional talks came on 10 January 1975. The Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Mr Lardner-Burke, announced that he had stopped the further release of political detainees on the grounds that neither ZANLA nor ZPRA was observing the negotiated ceasefire. On average, six incidents were being reported daily during that month. Furthermore, Martin Meredith could write that

> The ceasefire and the release of African leaders had had the effect of convincing the local population that the guerillas had won a victory similar to the one which the ceasefire had brought FRELIMO in Mozambique. All intelligence sources had dried up and the army's position on the ground was weaker than it had been since the beginning of the war in 1972.(22)

The momentum of détente had now slowed down considerably. The first contact between the African National Council and the Rhodesian government, since agreement had been reached in Lusaka on convening a constitutional conference took place within Rhodesia on 20 January. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Smith's reluctance to press ahead with any meaningful agreement with the nationalist forces now led to the withdrawal of some 2 000 South African Policemen from forward bases in Rhodesia as a prelude to their total withdrawal from Rhodesia, which was completed by August 1975. With the arrest and renewed detention of the Reverend Sithole in early March, talks with the Rhodesian government temporarily collapsed. As stated above, however, it was at this stage that the assassination of Herbert Chitepo threw ZANU into a new crisis. Mainly as a result of South African pressure, Sithole was released during April, ostensibly to attend the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in Dar-es-Salaam. Talks with the African National Congress were thus resumed. Simultaneously Robert Mugabe escaped into neighbouring Mozambique in an attempt to consolidate his supremacy within both ZANU and ZANLA.

The Chitepo murder and related incidents finally

tried the patience of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere to breaking point. Both leaders outlawed ZANU and ZAPU, recognising only the Lusaka Unity Accord African National Council as the single and united voice of all Rhodesian nationalist movements. Yet as the prospect of meaningful talks with Harare dimmed, so did the unity of the African National Council.

As Security Forces slowly re-established their authority and regained lost ground, détente reached its high water mark during talks held at the Victoria Falls bridge on 25 August 1975. When this attempt failed, further dissension within the ranks of the African National Council was inevitable. Nkomo was now leader of the Internal ANC and Bishop Muzorewa, in self-imposed exile, was leader of the External ANC. Both were competing for control over the middle and lower structure of the original African National Council. Externally, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema formed the African National Congress - Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ANC-ZLC) with minimum ZAPU participation. Attempts to obtain control of ZANLA forces in Mozambique and Tanzania failed, and the ANC-ZLC finally collapsed when the Reverend Sithole withdrew his ZANU faction in September 1976. By then Mugabe could claim effective control of both the original ZANU and ZANLA. The collapse of yet another attempt at unity prompted Bishop Muzorewa to return to a tumultuous welcome in Harare.

On 17 September 1975, Security Force Headquarters in Harare announced that 651 insurgents had been killed since December 1972. Security Forces lost 73 members. Although the summer rainy season was approaching, Army commanders were confident that the insurgency threat could be contained. During the rainy season insurgent movement was largely screened by the thick foilage. At the same time water was more plentiful. But this was against the background of reports of increased ZANLA and ZPRA recruitment, both voluntary and compulsory. Besides the ongoing Protected Village programme, Security Force efforts were mainly aimed at easing the acute manpower shortages facing them.

Government estimates of expenditure tabled in Parliament on 25 June 1975 for the financial year ending 30 June 1976, represented the largest increase in expenditure accountable to Defence yet, from Rh$ 46 mil to Rh$ 57 mil: an increase of 23,5%. Security spending was also included in some other votes. The estimates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was increased from Rh$ 4,3 mil to Rh$ 30,94

mil which included allocations of Rh$ 1,09 mil for administration of security measures in border areas, and Rh$ 3,72 mil for counter-insurgency programmes, including administrative bases, Protected Villages and a security corridor. Of the Rh$ 2,77 mil allocated for road traffic, Rh$ 7,75 mil was earmarked for 'special road and bridge works in border areas'.

A final round of talks between Prime Minister Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo commenced in December 1975. These recurrent talks with the ZAPU president had placed a premium on Security Force operations against ZPRA bases in Zambia, as well as on the numbers of ZPRA insurgents infiltrating Rhodesia. It was becoming increasingly apparent that ZAPU would soon have to choose between a political settlement and full-scale war. On the other hand, the Nhari rebellion, the death of Herbert Chitepo and the eviction of ZANLA from Zambia seriously affected the ZANU war effort during 1975.

At this stage, however, Rhodesia was still on a war footing. Security chiefs and the white population as a whole refused to believe that the nationalists could in any way pose a real threat to 'the best counter-insurgency force in the world'. Nationalist leaders seemed inept in their dealings with Prime Minister Smith and were in general held in contempt by their white counterparts. On the other hand, the lack of combat sense and skills amongst insurgent forces when faced by Security Forces led by white officers, caused an even greater underestimation of the nationalist forces in the field. Rhodesian Security Forces had not yet realized that a good kill ratio and tactical ability were not the only determinants for success.

A factor that was discernable at this stage was the lack of central direction and co-ordination of the war. The threat was contained on a day-to-day basis. Few regular Security Force members, and certainly no Rhodesian Front politicians appreciated the necessity for a real political settlement as a means of regaining the initiative on all fronts and thus towards restoring peace. Nevertheless, the final stage of the war was fast approaching, for President Machel had consolidated his hold on Mozambique and totally backed ZANLA. In Zambia, President Kaunda had finally concluded that force alone could solve the problem. In the west, Botswana, although not actively committed to the struggle, could not halt the use of its soil as a transit route to and from western Rhodesia under Matabele domination. In South Africa the spirit of détente had gained general

support, and Prime Minister Vorster had decided to pressure his ally into a settlement in the interests of a peaceful and stable sub-continent.

Although not yet evident, the relative quiet of 1975 was at an end. The military intervention of the Republic of South Africa into Angola early in 1976 had foreshadowed the end of détente. As expressed by Anthony Wilkinson:

> The effect of South Africa's military involvement was to undermine the limited basis of trust which had been achieved by her apparently ready acceptance of Mozambique's independence and which had paved the way for the joint initiative with Zambia on Rhodesia.(23)

1.6 1976 and Dr Henry Kissinger

The extent to which President Machel was committed to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was soon evident. Rhodesian Security Forces continued to conduct hot pursuit raids into Mozambique. In addition, Rhodesia effectively halted all rail traffic into that country in retaliation against the arrest of Rhodesian employees at Malvernia. On 3 March 1976, President Machel closed the borders of his country with Rhodesia, banned all land, air and communication links, confiscated Rhodesian property and assets in his country and in effect prepared for war. Prime Minister Smith had again underestimated the commitment of the Frontline states to the struggle.

Security Forces had already been confronted by a series of renewed incursions from Mozambique, which reportedly included approximately 150 men. If final prcof of the extent of the Mozambican commitment was still needed, it was provided a mere three months later when Harare confirmed on 27 July that Security Forces had clashed with FRELIMO troops inside Rhodesia. In response, a government official disclosed on 28 January that call-ups would be extended to bring force levels up to their former high levels in the North-east. During January to April 1976, three waves of insurgents crossed into Rhodesia. The first group of about 90 crossed the border south of Nyamapanda. A second group infiltrated the Melsetter area and a third group the south-east.

In a broadcast on 6 February Prime Minister Ian Smith warned that Rhodesia was facing the most

serious insurgent threat since the start of the war in 1972. He also warned of the increased burden that would have to be placed on the civilian sector as skilled manpower had to be withdrawn for long periods of operational duty. Some indication of this was received three days later when a Security Force communique disclosed that a total of 32 insurgents had been killed inside Rhodesia during the preceeding few days. To the public at large it was also becoming clear that 1976 would be a difficult year. Reports indicated that 1 000 insurgents were active inside the country with a further 15 000 in various stages of preparedness in Mozambique. A second operational area, Operation Thrasher, was designated in February, followed by a third, Operation Repulse, in May. (See Figure 1.3)

For some time ZANLA had been engaged in expanding its area of operations, and had slowly shifted its offensive southwards. The main infiltration routes now ran through the Gona Re Zhou game park in the South-east. Partly as a result of the Cordon Sanitaire in the North-east that was now nearing completion, ZANLA needed to extent its operations over as large an area of Rhodesia as possible. Severely hampered by white manpower shortage and politically hesitant to increase the black contingent of the Army, Rhodesian forces lacked the manpower resources to consolidate their authority in the ever-increasingly subverted areas. ZANLA also had other, more specific, objectives. These included threatening the main Rhodesian rail link across Beit bridge, which would also have great symbolic value. A second objective was the ZANLA attempt to encroach on the traditional ZAPU power base in Matabeleland. During April it was evident that a second wave of ZANLA insurgents, some 450 in total, had followed this route. Both the Rutenga-Beit Bridge railway and the Fort Victoria-Beit Bridge road link were attacked. These attacks came as an acute blow to Harare, which had remained relatively complacent, even though rife with rumours. The introduction of selective censorship on 26 April and the imposition of strict controls on visiting foreign journalists in July indicated the extent of government concern about the effect that a deteriorating security situation could have on white morale.

On 15 April 1976, Finance Minister David Smith, announced an interim budget to raise Rh$ 60 mil by higher taxes on luxury items to help meet the rising costs of the war. This followed supplementary defence estimates of Rh$ 3,245 mil tabled in the House of




Figure 1.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas

Assembly on 12 February 1976, which had raised the total defence vote by 5,7% to Rh$ 60,259 mil for the financial year 1975/76.

Between 1971/72 and 1975/76 direct defence expenditure had risen by 280%, while related expenditure also rose dramatically - that of the Department of Internal Affairs by 320%, the British South African Police by 199%, Roads and Traffic by 357%. By 1976/77 defence related expenditure accounted for 23% of the total expenditure.

Extended call-up and the extension of the initial period of uninterrupted national service from 12 to 18 months with immediate effect signalled the start of a counter-offensive. But April had shown a marked increase in the number of whites leaving the country with a nett loss of 817 for the month, compared to 40 for March. In Lusaka, President Kaunda was threatening to open a new front in the near future. By the end of May, the total death toll for that month stood at a record 231. ZANLA forces were reported to number 1 500 internally and the previous record 11 to 1 kill ratio had dropped to a relatively poor 6 to 1. It almost seemed that the Security Forces had also lost their tactical edge over the insurgents.

It had become clear that white morale was the primary target of the insurgents, while the military aim was to overtax the capabilities of the Rhodesian Security Forces. The continued call-ups were already having a distinctly detrimental effect on white morale. Attacks on politically sensitive targets such as the southern rail and road links forced the government in Harare to divert further forces towards protecting these key installations. A further strain was consequently placed upon the already limited manpower available. A total of 63 Army companies were already deployed at this stage (7 560 men) together with about 10 000 members of the British South African Police.(24) Escalating attacks on the estates and plantations in the Eastern Highlands were part of this onslaught. By striking at white commercial farmers, insurgents were given the added incentive of hitting the Rhodesian economy at its most vulnerable point.

An attack on the Bumi Hills airstrip in north-western Rhodesia on 5 June made it known that ZPRA forces were ready to reopen the long dormant Zambian front in all earnest. Since talks between the leader of the Internal ANC, Joshua Nkomo, and Prime Minister Smith had failed, the last restraint on ZAPU was lifted. For some years ZPRA had been bitterly

accused by ZANU of intentionally holding its forces at bay and leaving ZANLA to do all the fighting. While the talks between the Rhodesian Front and ZAPU had been in progress, ZPRA recruitment and infiltration into Rhodesia had been curtailed, while Harare refrained from striking at the main ZPRA base camps in Zambia. Now that this tacit agreement had failed, there were signs that the whole western front with Botswana was gradually being activated after nearly 18 months of relative peace and quiet.

For some months Security Force commanders had been deeply concerned about intelligence reports that indicated a mass of 6 000 ZANLA insurgents preparing for an offensive of between 1 000 and 2 000 men into Rhodesia at the start of the annual summer rainy season. This would have been the third large influx of insurgents within a period of ten months. Some doubt existed as to whether the Security Forces had the ability to contain this threat. Within the ranks of the military there had long been support for external raids to eliminate insurgents, where they presented a viable target in base and transit camps. Political caution had tended to forestall any such large scale raids which could not reasonably be categorized as 'hot pursuit'. Zambia's membership of the Commonwealth further complicated the problem. Already hard pressed to contain the 1 200 insurgents operating inside the country, the security chiefs were not confident of their ability to deal with a further influx of several thousand. Largely as a result of the visit of the American Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, and his peace initiative in general the South African government was vehemently opposed to Rhodesia launching external operations against its neighbours. Nevertheless the Selous Scouts were ordered to go ahead with the first attack of this kind on the Nyadzonia training base in Mozambique on 8 August 1976. This unit, which specialized in pseudo tactics, had been formed in 1973. It adopted the name Selous Scouts which had been relinquished by the Armoured Car Regiment. The Nyadzonia raid marked the start of a new phase in the struggle for Rhodesia. Later it spread to Zambia, Angola and Botswana ending as a limited interdiction campaign during 1979. Besides immediate relief to the security situation, external operations proved an important factor in bolstering white morale. White emigration for November was already running at 1 200.

South African Prime Minister Vorster was, however

not amused. Similar attacks could only serve to finally scuttle all attempts at reducing tension in the sub-continent. As a result South African military aircraft were withdrawn from Rhodesia while inexplicable congestion hampered the railway line to the south.

During the final months of 1976, food control measures were instituted on an experimental basis as a further element of total population control. These measures were known as Operation Turkey and were first introduced in the Mtepatepa farming area between Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands. Although emergency regulations empowering the control of food supplies were only introduced on 28 January 1977, the concept had gained relatively wide support. Owing to lack of manpower and the absence of concurrent population control measures such as total movement control, Operation Turkey was, however, limited to white farming areas where the farmer could ration the supply of food to his black workers in the compounds. The rationale behind food control was closely related to that of Protected Villages. Food in the Tribal Trust Lands had become less readily available to insurgent forces owing to a general drought and the movement of locals into Protected Villages. The insurgents had in some areas thus resorted to obtaining sustenance from farm compounds. The intention was to further limit even these supplies by rationing the farm labourers to that which was needed, and no more. In general the scheme was ineffective as it relied almost exclusively on farmer compliance and regulation, which in some areas such as the ranching farms of Matabeleland, white farmers found impossible to implement.

During a twenty-minute nationwide broadcast on 24 September 1976 Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith calmly announced the acceptance by his government of majority rule within two years. This marked the high water mark of the Kissinger peace initiative. That Smith's acceptance was less than total is clearly illustrated in a classified psychological directive issued on 15 October 1976

> The National Aim remains unchanged ('To sustain a united and sovereign Rhodesia which guarantees a permanent home and equal opportunities for all its communities, which maintains responsible government and civilized standards.) (25)

Only a few days previously South African Prime Minister John Vorster, had reprimanded his Rhodesian counterpart in Pretoria. The extent of South African pressure is best illustrated by the confidential notes of a speech given to a closed white audience by Ted Sutton-Pryce then Deputy Minister in the Rhodesian Prime Minister's Office. Inter alia these read:

> Vorster is the bad guy. The reason for the RF (Rhodesian Front) failure was because of pressure put on Rhodesia ... Fifty percent of the Rhodesian defence bill was paid by South Africa up until June. A reply had not been given since then as to whether they would support it for a further year. There has been a delay on war items for as long as 2½ years. The railway system is moving very few goods - reported congestion. The border was closed over the period of the Kissinger talks, 1-4 days. Fuel supply down to 196 days. It is difficult to prove these facts as we cannot afford to antagonize South Africa by exposing her ... Against this background they had no alternative but to accept the Kissinger package deal. (26)

The Kissinger initiative soon ran into difficulties; chiefly as a result of the American Secretary of State's high risk diplomacy in promising everything to everyone, simply to break the deadlock, while simultaneously wielding as much political and economic pressure as possible. The various parties started voicing their respective interpretations of the proposals before settling down to talk, thus prejudicing the Geneva conference that was to convene under the chairmanship of Britain's Ivor Richards on 28 October 1976.

1.7 The Patriotic Front

As a prelude to the negotiations, various nationalist leaders went through what was by now an almost ritualistic scramble for power in an effort to combine personal ambitions with the strategic necessity of presenting at least a facade of unity in the international area. The unity now achieved under the banner of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front (PF), however, proved more enduring than any previous attempt. Although both ZANU and ZAPU changed their names several times they had remained essentially

unaltered. As recounted above ZAPU had already attempted to establish an internal base within Rhodesia by attempting to gain control of the middle rank structure of the African National Council. Having less of a single tribal basis than either ZANU or ZAPU, the Council was still the party most representative of the black Rhodesian population as a whole. ZANU had become increasingly dominated by the Karanga tribe - a process completed in the High Command by March 1975, when all five of the elected members were from the Karanga tribe. ZAPU, on the other hand, had fallen almost completely under Ndebele dominance. To both Nkomo and Mugabe the Patriotic Front was thus a unity of convenience. For, while Robert Mugabe lacked his co-leader's international political standing, ZANLA had by far the largest armed force. As each party represented a major power block within Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front was structurally complementary. Nkomo had in fact been taking part in tentative talks with the external ANC in Botswana on the establishment of a united front. The tumultuous welcome accorded Bishop Muzorewa at Harare airport by some 100 000 blacks on 3 October led to Nkomo leaving Rhodesia for Lusaka and then Dar-es-Salaam, where the formation of the Patriotic Front was jointly announced on 9 October. Within Rhodesia Nkomo desperately needed to improve his tarnished nationalist political image which had been damaged after his talks with Ian Smith ended in failure during March.

Unified in name only, ZANLA and ZPRA were jointly to be known as ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army) which had already been formed during November 1975 by the so-called Frontline states (Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana) and the Organization of Africa Unity's African Liberation Committee. This was an attempt to bypass the nationalist political leaders and unify the armed struggle. ZIPA was also known as the Third Force.

As explained by Dr Masipula Sithole,

> Originally, ZIPA had a High Command of 18 men, 9 from ZANU and 9 from ZAPU. Clashes ensued. After a few weeks of joint operations, the surviving ZAPU men withdrew from ZIPA in Mozambique and fled to Zambia, where they have largely remained. Thus, ZIPA, as a joint ZANU-ZAPU enterprise remained in name only. The frontline states and the Liberation Committee encouraged and endorsed the creation of the Patriotic Front with (sic) the hope that political leadership would cement ZANU-ZAPU guerrillas in ZIPA. But this did not work. The ZAPU army ... (ZPRA) remained in Zambia, while the ZANU army (ZANLA) remained in Mozambique.(27)

Even as the ill-fated Geneva talks continued into December, it was clear that the insurgent onslaught on Rhodesia was intensifying. During October 131 insurgents had been killed, one of the highest monthly totals since 1972. Once again it had become obvious that a concerted effort was being made to undermine white morale as white farms and government buildings had become prime targets for insurgents.

On 4 November Ian Smith returned to Harare, stating that if the Geneva talks failed, he would attempt an internal settlement with moderate black leaders. Geneva had already failed, however, and the official Christmas recess which started on 14 December only served to confirm the impasse.

1.8 1977: ZPRA intensifies the War

Within weeks the new year provided evidence that the war was rapidly intensifying. Incidents along both the Botswana and Mozambique borders gave a clear indication that 1977 would be particularly difficult. The five Frontlines states met in Luanda on 9 January and declared their full and unqualified support for the Patriotic Front. In effect this endorsed the armed struggle as a vehicle for settlement and forced Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole into political obscurity. As the year progressed it became clear that Nkomo was desperately trying to match his political stature with an equal military capability. ZANU's armed wing, ZANLA, had been carrying by far the greater burden of the war effort against the Smith regime, as can clearly be seen when comparing casualty figures for the various operational areas (see Table 1.1). The figures for ZANLA's traditional areas of influence, Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse are much higher than those for Tangent, ZPRA's established domain.

		Killed	Missing	Wounded	Captured	Total
Operation Hurricane	Insurgents	1 033			372	1 405
	Security Forces	106	-	769	-	875
	Civilians	525	4	740	-	1 269
	Total	1 664	4	1 509	372	3 549
Operation Thrasher	Insurgents	359	-	-	46	405
	Security Forces	41	1	324	-	366
	Civilians	269	-	263	-	532
	Total	669	1	587	46	1 303
Operation Repulse	Insurgents	262	-	-	53	315
	Security Forces	29	-	138	-	167
	Civilians	96	7	104	-	207
	Total	387	7	242	53	689
Operation Tangent	Insurgents	18	-	-	13	31
	Security Forces	14	-	30	-	44
	Civilians	36	3	37	-	76
	Total	68	3	67	13	151

TABLE 1.1: Casualty figures per Operational Area up to 30 January 1977

Note: Operation Tangent was only officially designated during August 1977.

The disparity between their respective war efforts had led to considerable friction between ZANU and ZAPU. The attitude of the Frontline states had made it clear to ZAPU president Nkomo that any political future and power had to lie within the confines of the Patriotic Front, as such armed forces were the decisive factor. Nkomo thus forfeited his negotiating power vis-à-vis Harare and wasted little time in building up the ZPRA armed forces from an embryo liberation movement into a fully trained and capable army of a largely conventional nature. February saw the first sign of this; reports indicated increased recruitment by ZAPU in western

Rhodesia, via Botswana. The most dramatic example was the abduction of approximately 400 pupils from the Manama Secondary School in south-western Rhodesia. Only 51 of the 384 students elected to return to Rhodesia after personal appeals by their parents. This was followed on 16 February by the proclamation of the first 'no-go' area along the border with Botswana. Although Botswana did not become an active training area for insurgents as did Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania, it was slowly developing into an established transit area from which recruits and abductees were forwarded (mostly by air) to training camps in Zambia and Angola. The return route into Rhodesia was usually back through Botswana, down the Grove road and into western Rhodesia. Although Sir Seretse Khama did not choose to bring Botswana from Frontline status into the front line itself, his commitment to the armed struggle strengthened perceptibly. While there was no prima facie case to be made against Botswana as to the harbouring and training of insurgents, Rhodesian authorities hesitated to open an active third front in view of the burden already imposed upon their Security Forces.

Until 1978, ZPRA infiltration into Matabeleland had been relatively limited, for Nkomo had decided on a risky strategy. As from 1977, ZPRA was divided into two forces, a smaller insurgent force, and a large, mostly external, conventional army stationed in Zambia. The relative cohesion of the Matabele ethnic grouping was reflected in the cohesion of ZAPU as against the divisions within ZANU. Nkomo's traditional tribal base was secure and, aware of the historical animosity that existed between Shona and Matabele, he appreciated the difficulty of making inroads into Shona territory. Since the Matabele represented only twenty percent of the Rhodesian black population, it seemed obvious that ZAPU would have to resort to other means to reassert its dominance over the Shona majority. This could only be effected by force of arms.

In contrast to ZANU, which had committed all its forces to Rhodesia, consolidating its power base and even attempting to infringe on that of ZAPU, Nkomo's forces were training and waiting en masse in Zambia and Angola. Had the war reached the final stage of insurgency, that of mobile warfare, the outcome of the Lancaster House talks might have been quite different. By early 1978 ZPRA was reported to be 8 000 strong, and growing, with Cuban instructors based in Angola responsible for much of the training. In




Figure 1.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes

Lusaka a number of high ranking Soviet officers had taken control of ZPRA strategy.

Prime Minister Ian Smith was apparently influenced by the strong stand taken by his security chiefs and rejected Ivor Richards' final proposals on 24 January 1977, which effectively ended the Kissinger initiative. The British envoy had already given an indication of future trends the previous day by ruling out British recognition of any internal settlement - even one elected by means of a landslide victory. Both Nkomo and Mugabe had also made it clear that they were no longer interested in the proposals made by Richards and the latter had no choice but to end his mission. In the meantime, across the Atlantic, the rise to power of President Jimmy Carter and that of his United Nations representative, Andrew Young, indicated a significant shift in American foreign policy concerning the surviving white regimes in Black Africa.

Within Rhodesia the bush war had reached a new intensity with the massacre of Roman Catholic missionaries on 6 February at St Paul's mission, Musami. The onslaught against the morale of the whites was about to be intensified to an unprecedented level bringing the war closer to the urban white communities than at any time before.

For the first time since the start of the war, cracks seemed to appear in the cohesion of the Rhodesian Front Party as a result of the intensifying war. During February Minister of Defence Reginald Cowper resigned, ostensibly as a result of the controversy surrounding new call-up measures. The tight rein kept on the running of the war by the Prime Minister, sometimes to the exclusion of his Minister of Defence, later proved to be the real reason for Cowper's resignation. Further dissension occurred when Prime Minister Smith forced through the Land Tenure Amendment Bill during March, whereby white agricultural land was opened for purchase by all races. A group of twelve dissident Rhodesian Front members opposed the Bill and Smith had to rely on the votes of six African Members of Parliament to have it passed. Predictably this led to a cabinet reshuffle on 10 March.

By late March 1977 the Rhodesian government admitted that the insurgency had developed into a full scale revolutionary onslaught. This was confirmed by the formation of Combined Operations Headquarters (COMOPS) and the announcement on 23 March that the senior army officer at each Joint Operations Centre (JOC) would assume command of counter-

insurgency operations in his designated area. Against a background of strenuous efforts to tighten the call-up system, the announcement was made that the death toll in the four year campaign had passed the four thousand mark and stood at 4 044. Of these, 79 were white civilians, 1 394 black civilians, 292 Security Force members and 2 279 insurgent fatalities (inside Rhodesia only). By 6 April official estimates totalled some 2 500 insurgents operating inside Rhodesia with 520 in Operation Hurricane, 1 000 in Thrasher, 650 in Repulse and 220 in Tangent. The latter operational area encompassed the south-western and much of the western area of Rhodesia. It was officially proclaimed during August 1977, to counter ZPRA infiltration from Botswana.

The Protected Village programme was gradually extended along the eastern border with Mozambique. Meanwhile, in a nationwide address on 3 April the new commander COMOPS, Lieutenant-General Peter Walls announced the start of a fresh 'hearts and minds' campaign among the black population. Although a small number of territorial officers had been engaged in promoting both civil action and psychological action, very little success could be claimed within the ranks of either regular or territorial members. Their efforts, however, were formalized in the creation of 1 Psychological Operations Unit on 1 July 1977. In general, however, psychological operations executed in Rhodesia proved a failure. They were aimed at convincing the blacks to support the white regime instead of attempting to change white racial views as a prelude to any such support. That Rhodesia entirely lacked any grasp of the dynamics of the revolutionary threat facing her is nowhere more perfectly evidenced than by the statement of the then Minister of Information P. K. van der Byl in which he, in hindsight, said

> I wanted to step up the use of the bayonet that's the most effective propaganda - the bayonet .(28)

Van der Byl was, as Minister of Information, in control of the majority of psychological operations.

In the meanwhile the roving Owen-Young settlement initiative had been gaining momentum. Despite some alarmingly naïve political views, Ambassador Andrew Young did, however, see that: 'if you want to stop the fighting you have to talk to the people with the guns.'(30)

Both Young and British Foreign Secretary Dr

David Owen had toured the Frontline states to gain impressions and to gather support for their proposals. Dr Owen arrived in Harare on 15 April to prepare for the Anglo-American consultative team which was to arrive on 26 May. These talks soon ran into difficulties. As the year progressed it became apparent that neither Ian Smith nor the Patriotic Front was interested in what could be offered. Smith favoured an internal settlement with moderate black nationalist leaders. To this end the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole was allowed to return to Rhodesia on 10 July. This followed talks with Rhodesian Government officials in Malawi regarding a coalition between himself and Bishop Muzorewa.

It seemed that Prime Minister Smith had at last become convinced of the necessity for a political settlement, although with defunct black nationalist figures. By now the Reverend Sithole had lost all effective control over both ZANU and ZANLA, as well as any backing he might have had from members of the Frontline states. Following both Organisation of Africa Unity and Frontline endorsement of the Patriotic Front and its leadership, Bishop Muzorewa had also been left without any external support. The white general election fought in Rhodesia on 31 August was also aimed at obtaining a mandate for a possible internal settlement, as well as crushing the right wing Rhodesian Action Party.

In a White Paper dated 1 September 1977, the British government published Anglo-American proposals for a Rhodesian settlement. Field Marshal Lord Carver was nominated as resident commissioner designate for the transition period. Prime Minister Smith's response was characteristic: 'We have had crazy proposals before and managed to shrug them off and go on.' (31)

Yet the proposed internal settlement was delayed in view of the new proposals. At the same time a third prominent black nationalist leader returned to Rhodesia, the veteran James Chikerema. He subsequently became Vice-president of Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC). In an effort both to divide the Patriotic Front and to obtain the concurrence of 'the men with the guns' a highly secretive approach by Smith to Nkomo failed during October.

During this time Lord Carver and the United Nations appointee, General Prem Chand, had run into distinct difficulties on their tour of Southern Africa. Finally disillusioned with the Anglo-American proposals, Prime Minister Smith announced on 26 November

that he accepted majority rule as a preliminary to beginning internal settlement negotiation. Thus ended the last attempt at a negotiated international settlement before the Lancaster House deliberations.

Inevitably, the war for Rhodesia had forced Smith's hand in the intervening months. By the middle of 1977 it had spread across the entire country. Although large scale external operations into Zambia only began during 1978, Smith had, to President Kaunda's extreme chagrin, used the 'good offices' of the British government to warn Zambia, some months earlier, that pre-emptive strikes could be launched against insurgent bases in his country. The Zambian leader promptly responded on 16 May 1977, by placing his country on a war footing. Tension along the common Rhodesian-Zambian border rose dramatically, as was also the case along Rhodesia's eastern border. In the case of Mozambique, external operations had now come to be accepted as a primary element in Security Force strategy. As with the Mapai and Tembue raids on 24 and 25 November the main justification from a military point of view was the elimination of the potential threat before the start of the annual summer rains. In the case of both countries, the initially spectacular results obtained from external operations did not last indefinitely. After the first Chimoio raid into Mozambique (1976), and as from late 1978 in Zambia, insurgent forces were quick to adapt their base camp strategy to counter the methods used by Rhodesian Army and Air Force elements during these raids.

Internally, sporadic insurgent activity surfaced around the central plateau towns of Que Que, Gweru and Shangani, and even the major urban centres of Harare and Bulawayo no longer seemed entirely safe. Facing the grim prospect of urban terrorism, precautionary measures became a way of life. New operational areas flourished. The great tourist attraction and holiday resort of Lake Kariba was designated Operation Splinter, for ZPRA infiltration across the lake in rubber dingies had become too widespread to ignore. During August the central province of Midlands officially became Operation Grapple, bearing silent witness to the spread of insurgency across the country. Largely as an administrative and logistic unit, the urban area surrounding Harare was designated Salops (Salisbury Operations). In rural areas the local administration was fast approaching almost total collapse. Insurgent forces had launched a concerted campaign to close all schools, hospitals, clinics, and in fact all local

representation or symbols of government authority. By July some 300 schools, mostly in Operation Hurricane, had already been forced to close, leaving more than 40 000 children without schools. The most devastating success by ZANLA unsurgents was a bomb explosion at a Woolworth store in Harare on 7 August 1977. Eleven people were killed and more than 70 injured. Although nearly all casualties were black, the war had become a sudden reality to people in the cities. As a barometer of white morale, white emigration during August exceeded immigration by 1 006.

By November 1977, insurgent strengths within the various operational areas were as follows:

Operation Hurricane	904
Operation Thrasher	1 500
Operation Repulse	1 650
Operation Tangent	932
Operation Grapple	180
Salops	50
Total Insurgents	5 216

With the onset of the annual summer rainy season, monthly incidents had risen from 479 (October), to 540 (November) to 642 (December) and 763 (January 1978). During February 1978 the monthly tally fell to 579 and stabilized at well over 500 incidents per month. While the total number of trained insurgents both inside and outside Rhodesia had almost trebled between early 1976 and late 1977, internal insurgent casualties for 1976 were 1 244 killed and 160 captured against 1 770 killed and 219 captured for 1977. Purely statistically, the security situation was deteriorating with each passing month. The most critical Security Force commodity was manpower and that seemed dangerously limited. The major source of manpower remained the mobilisation of reserves. The call-up eventually encompassed all able-bodied white men between 18 and 60 years of age. All white youths between 18 and 25 were liable for conscription which increased from 12 to 18 months. Eventually the eight battalions of the Rhodesia Regiment with a strength on paper of 15 000 provided the backbone of the Territorial Army. Its counterpart in the British South Africa Police, the Police Reserve, became a repository for less able and older men.

In April 1977 conscription was extended to the 38 to 50 age group and exemptions were severely reduced. The maximum call-up for those under 38 was increased to 190 days a year: those older than 50 were asked to volunteer for police duties. In

September of the same year a short service scheme was introduced whereby the government encouraged national servicemen to stay on for another year by offering a Rh$ 100 a month bonus. But even such inducements could not solve the problem of a dwindling white reservoir of manpower and an ever increasing enemy.

The year 1977 ended in a spectacular way for the insurgent forces with a bold although unsuccessful attack on Grand Reef Air Base near Mutare on 18 December.

1.9 The Internal Settlement

Meanwhile internal settlement talks had duly begun on 9 December 1977, against a background succinctly described in the Financial Times:

> Yet a combination of factors now makes an internal settlement appear more possible than at any time in the past ... perhaps most important of all, the four parties engaged in the discussions fear that if they fail, they will become increasingly irrelevant to the outcome. (32)

The internal talks in Harare resumed on 3 January 1978, after a Christmas recess and the Patriotic Front sought desperately to thwart the momentum that seemed to be building up from Prime Minister Smith's projected settlement with moderate black leaders. Talks ensued in Malta with both British and American representatives, while the threat of losing the international initiative led to attempts by both Nkomo and Mugabe to solidify their two factions within a single political and military structure. As before, however, politics, personalities, tribalism and ambition precluded any really integrated structure.

On 15 February Harare announced that an eight point agreement had been reached as a basis for a majority rule government. This was followed by further discussions concerning the composition of the future defence force and the structure of the constitutional government. Against the background of British scepticism, American comdemnation and Patriotic Front rejection, Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Cherimiah Chirau signed on 3 March 1978, what was to become known as the Internal Settlement Agreement.

White minority rule effectively came to an end in Rhodesia with a Transitional Government ruling the country until majority rule was instituted on 31 December 1978. In the interim an Executive Council consisting of the four signatories governed the country with black/white parity in the Ministerial Council. Although the internal leaders had left the door to negotiations with the Patriotic Front ajar, it was evident that a final effort was under way towards a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.

The Agreement of 3 March was based on two primary objectives: the first was the achievement of international recognition; the second an end to the war. Recognition was to be achieved by presenting the outside world with the results from a free and fair election which bore witness to the support these three black parties had amongst the black population.

On the one hand an end to the war flowed from the internal political initiative, and on the other from the support Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole claimed to have within the ranks of the insurgents. The two aims were closely linked. When the one failed to materialize so did the other.

In an attempt to benefit at an early stage from the momentum of the settlement talks, the first full scale safe return programme, including an amnesty offer, was announced by Harare on 20 January to be repeated on 2 May. Both proved futile gestures. Intelligence reports indicated that the achievement of majority rule under an internal settlement could lead to possibly hundreds of insurgents making use of the amnesty offer. It soon became apparent that conclusive proof would first have to be given that the agreement was to achieve international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. Any such offer of leniency had of necessity to be made from a position of strength and at a time that insurgent defeat seemed only a matter of time. This was hardly the case within Rhodesia at the time. During February, when the eight point plan agreement was announced, insurgent strengths were as follows:

	ZANLA	ZPRA	TOTAL
Operation Hurricane	710	110	820
Operation Thrasher	1 920	–	1 920
Operation Repulse	1 610	10	1 620
Operation Tangent	240	570	810
Operation Grapple	140	238	378
Salops	25	25	50
Total	4 645	953	5 598

By March, the total stood at 6 456. At the same time black nationalists, who had now obtained both executive and Cabinet status, realized that having linked their fortunes to that of their former enemies, the forces of their external nationalist 'allies' would at least have to be held at bay until the political initiative overtook events. To this end external operations against Botswana and Zambia were stepped up, and it almost seemed that the new black/white government in Harare was set to fight an even more ruthless war than had the previous all-white regime. Nevertheless, reports indicated that ZAPU recruitment in western Matabeleland was continuing unabated, with more than 10 000 recruits airlifted from Botswana to Zambia. The abduction of 420 black children from the Methodist School at Tegwani once again provided substantiating evidence to this effect. By June, Prime Minister Smith was publicly expressing his disappointment over the results achieved by the Internal Settlement, and appealed to Britain for recognition.

Despite the repeated demands of the internal black leaders, very little was done for five crucial months towards the removal of discriminatory measures, owing to Rhodesian Front resistance. Much of the international momentum gained towards recognition of events in Harare was thus lost. Only on 10 October was an announcement made, envisaging an end to racial discrimination in schools, hospitals and residential areas. In the first of yet another series of shocks to white morale, twelve missionaries were massacred by ZANLA insurgents at the Elim Pentecostal Mission on 3 June. In what seemed part of a concerted campaign, officials from Bishop Muzorewa's United Africa National Council attempting to explain the internal agreement to the rural black population were also killed. In the period January to June alone, some 20 000 black Rhodesians fled into Botswana, while figures released during September indicated that 4 664 insurgents had been killed since the start of the war in December 1972. Nearly 550 members of the Security Forces had also lost their lives during the same period. On 4 September white morale received its second shock when it was reported that an Air Rhodesia Viscount had been shot down by a SA-7 ground-to-air missile and that ten of the eighteen survivors had subsequently been massacred by ZPRA insurgents.

This incident had two direct results. On 12 September it was announced that martial law was to be introduced. People in the affected areas had hence-

forth to comply with and obey all regulations, orders and instructions issued by officers of government and the Security Forces. Special military courts-martial were empowered to impose any sentence, including capital punishment, on any person who committed an act relating to what was simply described as 'terrorism' within the martial law areas. This also applied to those who impeded the suppression of insurgency or the maintenance of law, order and public safety.

> Executive officers of the Government, the military forces and other security forces of the Government and its other servants employed to assist the Government are hereby vested with full and complete powers and authority to do all things in their judgement proper and necessary. (33)

By early November almost a half of Rhodesia had been placed under martial law. Three weeks later this had been extended to roughly 70% of the country. By September 1979, 90% of the country was under this law.

Although Security Forces were accorded wide discretionary powers by the institution of martial law, the Rhodesian armed forces were no longer able to enforce compliance. Having delayed the institution of martial law, the security situation had been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the available manpower was totally inadequate to cope with the threat.

The second, and potentially the most serious result of the Viscount massacre, was that resentment amongst the white population forced Prime Minister Ian Smith to halt all talks with Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, at a time that these had seemed on the verge of success. An agreement with Nkomo at this critical stage could possibly have tilted the balance of international recognition in favour of the Transitional Government. The massacre had occurred the day after Smith and Nkomo admitted they had met in secret.

Internally, the momentum gained from the internal settlement seemed to be slipping away slowly as an increasing number of reports told of a general black apathy towards the Transitional Government. A scheme to open Protected Villages soon ran into difficulties as it became evident that this only served to further loosen the precarious grip the government had on the rural populace. The latter, in fact, bore silent witness to the general failure of the

Protected Village programme. Standards of living among the local population had declined instead of rising while they were concentrated in these villages, resulting in a general belief that life outside the Protected Village was better. The reverse was the only guarantee for the success of the Protected Village scheme as a whole. The inability of the new government to abide by the 31 December target for the achievement of majority rule seemed further to underline the relatively leisurely pace at which Rhodesia's leaders were seeking an internationally recognised settlement. On 29 October an official announcement was made setting a new timetable for achieving majority rule. Black elections were now scheduled for April 1979. According to Ian Smith the delay was entirely due to 'mechanical problems'. But 1978 had seen one promising development, that of the Security Force Auxiliaries. Although not in accord with the initial idea, the Auxiliary scheme encompassed the formation of private political forces loyal to Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Sithole respectively. When Special Branch initiated the scheme the idea was to provide villages with their own local militia for protection. After a pilot scheme started in Msana Tribal Trust Lands early in 1978 proved highly successful the scheme was expanded. By the end of that year the Security Force Auxiliaries numbered over 2 000 men.

Although some serious mistakes were made during the execution of the Security Force Auxiliary scheme, this represented the first broad attempt by the authorities to regain and consolidate their hold on the Tribal Trust Lands. This vital element of providing permanent and participatory protection at local level had always been lacking in Security Force strategy. Numerous 'search and destroy' operations were conducted, but a 'clear and hold'-type operation had never been introduced in a satisfactory manner. In the months preceding the April 1979 elections, every possible effort was made to field, recruit, train and deploy as many Security Force Auxiliaries as possible. Their success was validated in no uncertain terms by the April 1979 election results.

Those insurgents considering support for the internal settlement were encouraged to join the Security Forces. To facilitate this, an intensive propaganda campaign was launched to present these forces as consisting of ex-insurgents that had decided to support the Transitional Government. While this was initially the case to a certain extent, the

majority of Auxiliary members were recruited by the political parties themselves.

Following the Viscount massacre any agreement with ZAPU was now ruled out and amidst increased reports of an alarming build-up of ZPRA forces within Zambia as from 21 October. Rhodesian armed forces launched their deepest air raid yet on insurgent bases at Chikunbi, Mkushi, Old Mkushi and Mborama. The reasons for these operations before the summer rains lay in the extension of martial law announced on 31 October to include most of Matabeleland, the traditional ZAPU power base. These areas were being infiltrated on an increased scale from the bases mentioned above.

White morale was obviously declining rapidly. During December white emigration recorded a nett loss of 2 771 emigrants, while the total loss for 1978 stood at 13 709. On 11 December ZANLA insurgents attacked the central oil storage depot in the heart of Harare's industrial site. The resulting fire lasted six days and destroyed tens of million litres of precious fuel. Harare was aghast. Guarantees as to white pensions, property, jobs and the like that Prime Minister Smith had extracted from his three black co-leaders and detailed within the proposed constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia seemed of little consequence to a white population having to fight an increasingly desperate war.

A concise statement of the eminently successful insurgent strategy that had been followed during 1978 reads as follows:

> The PF strategy is to undermine government control over the population in three ways. First is disruption of internal administration and governmental services ... The second ... is complete intimidation of the populace. One objective is to break down the traditional authority, with its implied replacement, ultimately by some new form of social organisation. The other objective is to demonstrate government inability to provide security ... The third part of PF strategy is to render the entire counterinsurgency effort of the government cost ineffective.(34)

The year 1979 held little hope for the whites in Rhodesia. Black conscription produced a poor 300 recruits out of 1 544 drafted. Call-ups for whites were extended to all men aged between 50 and 59, each of whom had to serve 42 days of the year, while


government announced that it was examining ways of tightening deferment and exemption procedures. The only promising news from the security point of view was the success that the Security Force Auxiliaries were having in Msana, Chinamora, Chesa and Manyeni Tribal Trust Lands. On 12 February a second Air Rhodesia Viscount was brought down by a SA-7 missile resulting in the death of all 59 people on board. In the short period from December 1978 to January 1979 insurgent numbers inside Rhodesia had risen from 8 954 to 11 183, an increase of 2 229 (25%). As indicated below, the whole of Rhodesia had now been divided into operational areas by the insurgent forces. Operation Thrasher had the highest density of insurgents at this stage. (See Figure 1.5)

Ian Smith's attitude vis-à-vis the newly published constitution was well summarized by Martin Meredith:

> The welfare of the whites was Smith's concern. He did not perceive at the time that, to make the internal settlement plan work, the black leaders needed to win terms favourable enough for them to be able to convince the black population that a real transfer of power was taking place which merited their support. Instead he argued that, as the whites had agreed to one-man one-vote, it was the turn of the nationalists to make concessions. (35)

This was possibly best illustrated by the 28 seats allocated to the whites in parliament. Since entrenched clauses in the constitution could only be amended by a vote of 72 black and 6 white members, Smith had secured a considerable veto for white power for a period of 10 years.

Against the background of a very successful air attack on the ZPRA training base at Luso in Angola, the Security Force apparatus started with the largest build-up of forces the country had ever witnessed. To counter Patriotic Front threats to disrupt the elections that had now been scheduled for April, Security Force numbers were raised to unprecedented levels. In fact, for the first time in the six years of war, at least in terms of the white population, Rhodesia was mobilized. Leave for all regulars and civilians with Security Force commitments was cancelled. Curfews were extended. By April 60 000 Security Force personnel were in the field. On 16 March an amnesty and guaranteed safe return offer was once again made, but had almost no success. March provided



	TOTAL DEC	TOTAL JAN	INCREASE
ZPRA	1 696	1 906	210
ZANLA	7 256	9 277	2 021
TOTAL	8 952	11 183	2 231

Figure 1.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers: Dec. 1978 to Jan. 1979

a rare public example of the personality clashes that were so prevalent within the ranks of the senior Security Force commanders. The Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Hickman was dismissed for 'disciplinary' reasons. Ostensibly this was as the result of a clash between General Hickman and Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, the commander of the Selous Scouts. In fact, however, the reasons were rooted more deeply than the bugging of the colonel's telephone as part of investigations on an alleged charge of game poaching. This kind of clash was quite common among senior Army commanders as well as amongst Internal Affairs, Special Branch and British South African Police officials. This bickering hampered the smooth functioning of the defence apparatus as a whole.

Prior to the elections, Rhodesian forces launched a daring Land Rover raid into Lusaka on 13 April. Although Nkomo was not killed in the attack on his home, the operation was a definite blow to both ZPRA and Zambia. At the same time the Kasangula Ferry, the only link between Botswana and Zambia, was sunk in the most audacious raid yet into Botswana. Then, during the first days of April, having delayed the announcement for as long as possible for security reasons, Harare announced that polling would begin on 17 April. Although Patriotic Front forces attacked 18 of the 932 polling stations, none was closed.

When the final results of the election were announced on 24 April Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council had taken 67% of the total vote, the Reverend Sithole's ZANU 16,5% and Chief Chirau's ZUPO, 6%. An astounding 64,45% of the voting population had cast their votes. (35) International recognition seemed only a hairsbreath away. Insurgent casualties internally had shot up from 208 during February 1979, to 423 for March and nearly reaching 650 during April. Intelligence reports indicated that the massive electoral support obtained by Bishop Muzorewa had led to literally hundreds of insurgents waiting for an indication of international recognition before making use of the amnesty offer. Yet the momentum that had been restored to the floundering internal solution slowed down almost immediately. With nearly all available white manpower mobilized, the Rhodesian economy was approaching stagnation. The result was that demobilization of forces commenced very soon after the elections. The intense pressure that had been brought to bear on insurgent forces eased, and as it did, so did the

incentive to make use of any amnesty offer. The Security Forces were, however, themselves totally misled by the election results. Instead of realizing that essentially the black people had voted for peace, a classified Army briefing document simplistically stated:

> Subversion. The high election poll (63,9%) indicates that the terrorists have not subverted the African population to the degree sometimes believed. As 65% of the African population live in the rural areas, and 60% of the total vote came from rural areas, the indication is that only 5% of adults in the rural areas support, or are totally dominated by the terrorists. Most of their support in rural areas seems to come from irresponsible youths (Mujibas).

The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, astounded by the lack of support for his party, condemned the election as a fraud and refused to participate in the government. Prior to the elections, Special Branch had predicted the number of seats he would win with amazing precision. Convinced, however, of his own prowess and stature as nationalist leader, Reverend Sithole had rejected these alarming findings. The Reverend saw himself as the natural alternative to the rather inept and bumbling Bishop, but in reality he had lost all control over both ZANU and ZANLA. His sole support was amongst that of his own tribe, the Ndau, along the eastern border.

In reaction to the election results, the leaders of the two most committed Frontline countries, Presidents Kaunda and Machel met in Maputo to discuss the fragile unity of the Patriotic Front. Little resulted, although the two Patriotic Front co-leaders did announce in Addis Ababa during May the formation of a single constitution and joint command for military operations.

Once political initiative had started to ebb, the weight of the 2 500 to 3 000 ZPRA and 10 000 to 11 000 ZANLA insurgents inside the country again began to take its toll. To counter this, COMOPS stepped up the frequency of external operations. Raids into the heart of Lusaka and deep into Mozambique appeared to become an almost weekly occurrence.

While the election of President Carter had announced a US foreign policy severely hostile to the Smith regime, the election of Mrs Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister on 3 May, seemed

to indicate a less hostile British policy. The choice, however, of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary instead of Francis Pym was the first sign that a Conservative Government of Britain might not necessarily be sympathetic to Rhodesia. Further indication of this was received during the Commonwealth Heads of State Conference held in Lusaka during August. It soon became apparent that Conservative government policy regarding the government of National Unity in Rhodesia was based on expediency rather than principle. Yet the release of the Boyd and Drinkwater reports on the Rhodesian elections encouraged optimism as to the chances of British recognition. Meanwhile, at one minute past midnight on 1 June, the Republic of Rhodesia ceased to exist as the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution came into effect, to last a total of 195 days.

Other internal developments were also having their own effects. Disciplinary problems within Security Force Auxiliaries loyal to the Reverend Sithole led to Security Forces killing 183 Auxiliaries in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land during June. Within the ruling United African National Council (UANC) Prime Minister Muzorewa had also run into difficulties. During July James Chikerema and 7 UANC Members of Parliament broke away to form the Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) as a Zezuru tribal grouping. This effectively stripped the UANC of Parliamentry control, reducing its share of the total 100 seats to 44. Prime Minister Muzorewa was once again dependent on the 28 white Members of Parliament as the second largest voting block. The Reverend Sithole had occupied his 12 seats after his Security Force Auxiliaries power base had been shut down by a UANC government. By favouring his own Manyika tribe in the composition of the Cabinet, Bishop Muzorewa further hastened the loss of united political and local support.

The security situation in the post election period had deteriorated. During July 1979 the deployment figures for Security Forces were roughly as follows:

33 Infantry companies deployed (8 companies each in Hurricane, Repulse and Tangent, 7 in Thrasher and 2 in Grapple)	3 300
3 Rhodesian Light Infantry commando's as reaction force	240
2 squadrons Grey Scouts	80
Special Air Service	250
Selous Scouts	420

Security Force Auxiliaries	8 000
Guard Force	7 000
Internal Affairs	5 000
Defence Units	6 900
British South Africa Police	9 000
British South Africa Police Reservists	30 000

Note: The figures indicate actual deployment and not total strength of unit(s).

The total number of officially recorded monthly incidents had increased from an average of under 600 in late 1979 to 935 during March 1979. By April this figure increased to 1 110, and totalled 1 706 for May. The majority of these incidents consisted of reported cases of intimidation and contacts between Security Forces and the insurgents. The latter, especially in the case of ZANLA, were exacting a terrible revenge for the local support given to Bishop Muzorewa. By September 1979 the UANC popular base had vanished.

1.10 Lancaster House

British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had by now decided on a last attempt at resolving the Rhodesian problem. Not very confident of success, his approach differed in one important aspect from previous British initiatives. He was prepared to reassert Britain's responsibility for devising a solution, including active British participation in the process. The basis of the Tory solution was agreed upon through discussions among Britain, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Jamaica and Australia during the Commonwealth conference in August. Instead of primarily talking to the Patriotic Front as was the case with the Owen-Young initiative, the proposals first were directed at Mozambique and Zambia as the countries serving as hosts to the insurgents. Both countries were economically desperate for an end to a war that was threatening to engulf them. With internal dissension rife in Mozambique, President Machel was in particularly dire straits.

Thus the first Rhodesian constitutional conference on British home soil opened on 10 September 1979. As if to underline the Zambian need for a settlement, Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces bombed three bridges on the Beira-Moatize railway line in Mozambique and blew up the Chambeshi railway bridge in

northern Zambia. Both Zambia's eastern outlets to the Indian Ocean had thus been severed. The Benguela railway line through the west was also closed by UNITA insurgents operating in Angola, with the result that Zambia was virtually strangled. To forestall any possible conventional ZPRA attack from Zambia, four bridges on the Lusaka-Chirundu and Lusaka-Victoria Falls were also destroyed. In effect Zambia was denied the use of road or rail to move their imports or exports. Even the Kasangula ferry had been sunk the previous year. Zambia was now almost totally dependant for all her imports and exports on the remaining link through the south.

By a shrewd combination of brinkmanship and diplomacy, Lord Carrington forced through his settlement plan. With the majority of his forces still based in Zambia, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo ordered his ZPRA forces to infiltrate Rhodesia in an effort to consolidate his internal power base to the extent that had already been achieved by the ZANLA forces of Robert Mugabe. COMOPS still pursued a forward defence posture as regards Zambia. Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and Rhodesian Light Infantry forces were pushed across the Zambezi river with the aim of halting all movement southwards from Lusaka. Some success was achieved but British pressure brought to bear on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian delegation at Lancaster House forced the withdrawal of these forces from Zambian soil. With the vast majority of his forces already committed, Mugabe and ZANLA were potentially in a much stronger position than Nkomo. Although the negotiated ceasefire called for the movement of all insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to 16 selected assembly points and a stop to all cross-border movement, neither ZANLA nor ZPRA were to pay much more than lip service to the latter. Against the background of continual external raids by Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces, Lord Carrington, in a desperate gamble, sent British appointed governor Lord Soames to Harare on 11 December. His appointment and despatch to Harare were directed more towards supplying momentum to the stop-start talks at Lancaster House than at the exercise of any real authority, for on 15 December Mugabe had walked out. Pressure mainly brought to bear by Mozambique forced him to return to the negotiating table. Thus, at midnight, 21 December, all cross-border movement was to stop and efforts were initiated towards informing all insurgents of the ceasefire arrangements. A Commonwealth monitoring force under command of General John Acland was to supervise the movement

of all Patriotic Front insurgents to 16 Assembly Points and then keep them there. Only 1 300 men strong, by 6 January 1980 the force had assembled 15 730 insurgents. Within days this number swelled to about 22 000. Of these about 16 500 were ZANLA and the remainder ZPRA. Several thousand distrustful insurgents chose, however, to remain outside the Assembly Points and sent mujiba's instead. Officially this marked the end of the war, yet the political war was only finalized with the announcement during April 1980 that ZANU, now known as ZANU(PF), had against all predictions had an overwhelming victory of 63% of the national vote. Mugabe's party was thus entitled to 57 of the 80 black seats in Parliament. Voting was clearly divided between the Shona and Matabele groupings, with Nkomo receiving the overwhelming vote in the latter areas. (37) On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent with Robert Mugabe as its premier.

The war that had been fought so tenaciously by the whites in Rhodesia for almost 15 years ended with their worst fears being realized. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, a self-avowed Marxist, was undisputably the next Prime Minister. The Rhodesian Front was reduced from a position of strength to one of impoverishment and impotence in which they no longer had the power to effect a compromise. Ian Smith and his inflexible colleagues had been entirely circumvented in a revolutionary struggle of classic proportions fought on a total frontage. It could be proudly asserted that Rhodesia had never lost a single battle but had most ignominously lost the war.

NOTES

1. P.L. Moorecraft and P. McLaughlin, Chimurenga The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980 (Sygma/Collins, Marshalltown, 1982), p. 100.

2. Two authoritative studies on ethnicity within the Zimbabwean nationalist movements are: W.W. Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (University Press of America, Washington D.C., 1978) and M. Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle Rujeko, Harare, 1979).

3. D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981), p. 10.

4. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, pp. 34-35.

5. W.W. Nyangoni, 'Revolutionary Strategies for National Liberation in Zimbabwe', (paper presented

to the African Studies Association Conference, Chicago, 31 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1974), p. 10.

6. Ibid, p. 11.

7. Ibid.

8. As quoted by J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe, (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1982), p. 35.

9. The circumstances leading to ZANU acceptence of FRELIMO's offer are well documented in Martin and Johnson, Struggle for Zimbabwe, pp. 14-20.

10. The northeast suited the requirements laid down by Maozedong to a large degree. The following quotation from ZANLA documents captured by the Security Forces at Mororo on 30 and 31 July, 1978, illustrate this clearly

Selection of Base Area

a. Mass condition must be favourable.

b. Organisation condition (of insurgents) must be good ...

c. Enemy condition must be weak. Where the enemy is ruling not so efficiently like places far away from the cities and his strongholds.

d. Where we can expand our forces and develop an organisation and political influence.

e. Good terrein features.

f. Economic strength to support us and the masses for the long period ...

11. From an interview conducted between Mukona and Maj. P.C. Erasmus.

12. As quoted by A. Wilkinson in his introduction to M. Reaburn, Black Fire (Julian Friedman, London, 1978), pp. 12-13.

13. 'Zambezi Konfrontasie', Africa Institute Bulletin, vol.XIII, no. 2 (1973), p. 47.

14. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 16.

15. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel I. Bates.

16. Africa Research Bulletin (1-30 Apr. 1974), p. 3212.

17. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 85.

18. Ibid., p. 88.

19. Africa Research Bulletin, (1-28 Feb. 1974), p. 3144.

20. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, pp. 75-76.

21. Stiff and Reid Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 84.

22. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country, revised and extended edition (Pan Books, London, 1980), p. 171.

23. Wilkinson in Raeburn, Black Fire, p. 41.

24. According to classified Army documentation

total Rhodesian mobilisation figures at this stage were

Army Regulars	3 650
National Servicemen	2 000
Active Territorial Army	4 100
Territorial Army Reserve	7 000
Colours and Asians	1 500
Total	18 250
Air Force	1 200
BSAP Regulars	8 000
Reservists	35 000
Total	43 000

25. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 132.

26. Wilkinson in Raeburn, Black Fire, pp. 42-43.

27. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, p. 123.

28. This law updated the land Tenure Act of 1969, whereby 45 million acres of land was set aside for blacks and whites respectively. In the white area 38,5 million acres was allocated for farming purposes. Of the 45 million acres reserved for blacks, 39,9 million acres was categorised as Tribal Lands, previously called Reserves. Here a system of communal tenure operated, in contrast to the 3,7 million acres designated as African Purchase Areas where the more wealthy black farmers could purchase land.

29. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 126.

30. Africa Research Bulletin (1-28 Feb. 1977), p. 4334.

31. Ibid. (1-30 Sep. 1977), p. 4575.

32. Ibid. (1-31 Dec. 1977), p. 4681.

33. Rhodesia Herald, 26 Sep. 1978.

34. J.K. Burton, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia; Military Review (Apr., 1980), p. 31.

35. Meredith, Past Another Country, p. 325.

36. Fifty one percent, using World Bank projected figures.

37. Mugabe's victory was gained despite a massive propaganda and disinformation campaign launched against him. Entitled 'Operation Welfare' it included false information spread within Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, forgery of the weekly Moto newspaper and thousands of pamflets dropped by air within the rural black areas.